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SEABROOK UPDATED FSAR

APPENDIX 31

REPORT ON ANALYSIS OF HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAKS OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT

The information contained in this appendix was not revised, but has beenextracted from the original FSAR and is provided for historical information.

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November 1985

APPENDIX 31

REPORT ON

ANALYSES OF HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAKS

OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT

Prepared for

PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW HAMSPHIRE

SEABROOK STATION

Prepared by

United EngineersIt ConstructorsA Raytheon Company

Report No. 9763-006-S-N-2

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November 1985

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION TITLE

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

SUMMARY

1.0

INTRODUCTION

2.0

METHOD OF ANALYSIS

2.1 Mass and Energy Releases2.2 Pressure/Temperature/Humidity Transients

3.0 HELB ANALYSES AND RESULTS

3.1 Primary Auxiliary Building

3.2 Containment Enclosure Area

3.3 Main Steam/Feedwater Pipe Chase

3.4 Tank Farm Area

3.5 Waste Processing Building/Primary AuxiliaryBuilding Chase

4.0

4.14.24.34.44.5

5.0

6.0

HWHLB ANALYSES AND RESULTS

Primary Auxiliary BuildingContainment Enclosure AreaFuel Storage BuildingEmergency Feedwater PumphouseService Water Pumphouse

CONCLUSIONS

REFERENCES

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LIST OF TABLES

TABLE NO. TITLE

2.1-1 Determination of Mass/Energy Release

2.2-1 Design Basis Information

3.1-1 Primary Auxiliary Building - High Energy LineBreak Locations

3.1-2 Primary Auxiliary Building - Summary of Results

3.2-1 Containment Enclosure Area - High Energy LineBreak Locations

3.2-2 Containment Enclosure Area - Summary of Results

3.3-1 Main Steam/Feedwater Pipe Chase - High EnergyLine Break Locations

3.3-2 Main Steam/Feedwater Pipe Chase - Summary ofResults

3.4-1

Tank Farm Area - High Energy Line Break Locations

3.4-2

Tank Farm Area - Summary of Results

3.5-1

Waste Processing Building/Primary AuxiliaryBuilding Chase - High Energy Line Break Locations

3.5-2 Waste Processing Building/Primary AuxiliaryBuilding Chase - Summary of Results

4.0-1 Hot Water Heating Line Break Locations

4.0-2 Hot Water Heating Line Breaks - Summary ofResults

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LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE NO. TITLE

2.1-1 Primary Auxiliary Building Showing Locations ofHELB Temperature Detection Thermocouples

2.1-2 Containment Enclosure Area Showing Locations ofHELB Temperature Detection Thermocouples

2.1-3 Containment Enclosure Area Showing Locations ofHELB Temperature Detection Thermocouples

3.1-1 Zone Designations of Primary Auxiliary Buildingat Various Elevations

3.1-2A Nodal Arrangement of Primary Auxiliary Buildingat Various Elevations for Steam Generator Blow-down Line Break Analysis

3.1-2B

3.1-2C

3.1-2D

3.1-3A

3.1-3B

3.1-3C

3.1-3D

3.1-4A

3.1-4B

3.1-4C

3.1-4D

Nodal Parameters of PAB for Steam Generator Blow-down Line Break Analysis

Temperature Responses in PAB Following a Ruptureof 3" Steam Generator Blowdown Line

Pressure Responses in PAB Following a Rupture of3" Steam Generator Blowdown Line

Nodal Arrangement of Primary Auxiliary Buildingat Various Elevations for Auxiliary Steam LineAS-2302-2-8" Break Analysis

Nodal Parameters of PAB for Auxiliary Steam LineAS-2302-2-8" Break Analysis

Temperature Responses in PAB Following a Ruptureof 8" Auxiliary Steam Line

Pressure Responses in PAB Following a Rupture of8" Auxiliary Steam Line

Nodal Arrangement of Primary Auxiliary Buildingat Various Elevations for Auxiliary Steam LineAS-2303-1-6" Break Analysis

Nodal Parameters of PAB for Auxiliary Steam LineAS-2303-1-6" Break Analysis

Temperature Responses in PAB Following a Ruptureof 6" Auxiliary Steam Line

Pressure Responses in PAB Following a Ruptureof 6" Auxiliary Steam Line

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LIST OF FIGURES(Continued)

FIGURE NO. TITLE

3.1-5A Nodal Arrangement of Primary Auxiliary Buildingat Various Elevations for Auxiliary Steam Conden-sate Line ASC-2404-2-3" Break Analysis

3.1-5B Nodal Parameters of PAR for Auxiliary SteamLine ASC-2404-2-3" Break Analysis

3.1-5C Temperature Responses in PAB Following a Ruptureof 3" Auxiliary Steam Condensate Line

3.1-5D Pressure Responses in PAR Following a Ruptureof 3" Auxiliary Steam Condensate Line

3.1-6A Nodal Arrangement of Primary Auxiliary Buildingat Various Elevations for Auxiliary Steam Conden-sate Line ASC-2406-1-4" Break Analysis

3.1-6B Nodal Parameters of PAR for Auxiliary Steam Con-densate Line ASC-2406-1-4" Break Analysis

3.1-6C Temperature Responses in PAR Following a Ruptureof 4" Auxiliary Steam Condensate Line

3.1-6D Pressure Responses in PAR Following a Rupture of4" Auxiliary Steam Condensate Line

3.1-7A Nodal Arrangement of Primary Auxiliary Buildingat Various Elevations for CVCS Letdown Line BreakAnalysis

3.1-7B Nodal Parameters of PAR for CVCS Letdown LineBreak Analysis

3.1-7C Temperature Responses in PAR Following a Ruptureof CVCS Letdown Line

3.1-7D Pressure Responses in PAB Following a Rupture ofCVCS Letdown Line

3.2-1A Containment Enclosure Area Showing Nodal Arrange-(Sheets 1 & 2) ment for CVCS Letdown Line Break Analysis

3.2-1B Nodal Parameters of Containment Enclosure Areafor CVCS Letdown Line Break Analysis

3.2-1C Temperature Responses in Containment EnclosureArea Following a Rupture of 3" CVCS Letdown Line

3.2-1D Pressure Responses in Containment Enclosure AreaFollowing a Rupture of 3" CVCS Letdown Line

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LIST OF FIGURES(Continued)

FIGURE NO. TITLE

3.2-1E Maximized Pressure Responses in ContainmentEnclosure Area Following a Rupture of 3" CVCSletdown Line

3.3-1A

3.3-1B

3.3-1C

3.4-1A

3.4-1B

3.4-1C

3.5-1A

Nodal Arrangement of Main Steam/Feedwater PipeChase

Nodal Parameters of Main Steam/Feedwater PipeChase for Main Steam Line Break Analysis

Temperature Response of MS/FW Pipe Chase Follow-ing a Small (0.10 Sq. Ft.) Rupture of Main SteamLine

Nodal Parameters of Tank Farm Area for AuxiliarySteam Line AS-2302-32-8" Break Analysis

Temperature Response of Tank Farm Area Follow-ing a Rupture of 8" Auxiliary Steam Line

Pressure Response of Tank Farm Area Followinga Rupture of 8" Auxiliary Steam Line

Nodal Parameters of Waste Processing Building/Primary Auxiliary Building Chase for AuxiliarySteam Line AS-2339-1-1 1/2" Break Analysis

3.5-1B Temperature Response of WPB/PAB Chase Followinga Rupture of 1 1/2" Auxiliary Steam Line

3.5-1C Pressure Response of WPB/PAB Chase Followinga Rupture of 1 1/2" Auxiliary Steam Line

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November 1985

SUMMARY

The environmental envelopes that the safety related Class lE equipment will exper-

ience following postulated high energy line breaks outside containment have been

determined. Systems containing high energy lines for which breaks have been

evaluated include the Main Steam, Feedwater, Auxiliary Steam and Condensate,

Chemical and Volume Control, Steam Generator Blowdown, and Hot Water Heating.

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

It is necessary to demonstrate that equipment used to perform a required

safety function for Seabrook Nuclear Station - Units 1 & 2 are capable of

functioning properly in the normal, abnormal, or accident environmental

conditions to which they could be exposed. As stated in NUREG-0588( 1 ), among

these environmental conditions are the elevated temperature, humidity,

and/or pressure which could result from the postulated rupture of high

energy lines which may be in the vicinity of this equipment. The purpose

of this study is to evaluate the consequences of high energy line breaks

outside containment and develop the environmental envelopes for Class 1E

equipment.

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2.0 METHOD OF ANALYSIS

Each of the high energy lines and all of the Class lE equipment outside

containment were identified and located. Based on this information, the

various plant buildings were nodalized and the high energy line break (HELB)

locations chosen in such a way as to provide an accurate representation

of the environmental conditions that would result in the vicinity of the

Class lE equipment following a postulated HELB.

2.1 Mass and Energy Releases

Each high energy line was evaluated on the basis of the methods of

Standard Review Plans 3.6.1 and 3.6.2( 2 ) to determine the types,

areas, and locations of postulated ruptures that would result in the

most severe environmental conditions at each of the Class lE equip-

ment. The break releases were calculated using the Moody critical

flow model( 3 ) and accounting for physical restrictions within the

system (e.g. flow and pressure control valves) and the frictional

effects of the piping system.

These release rates were taken to be constant, i.e. no decay of the

reservoir pressure was assumed, until isolation of the ruptured line

was initiated or, as in the case of the closed Hot Water Heating

Systems, until the piping inventory was depleted.

The methods and assumptions employed in calculating the mass and

energy release rates for each high energy line are outlined in Table

2.1-1. As noted in this table, isolation of many of these lines will

be accomplished by the use of redundant temperature detectors in

various plant areas that, in the event of elevated temperatures, will

send closure signals to redundant isolation valves present in the

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November 1985

high energy lines. The locations of these temperature detectors are

provided in Figures 2.1-1, 2.1-2, and 2.1-3.

The mass and energy release rates used in evaluating the pressure,

temperature, and humidity responses throughout the various plant areas

are calculated and defined in References 6, 7, and 8.

2.2 Pressure/Temperature/Humidity Transients

The environmental conditions that result due to postulated high

energy line ruptures were determined for the following areas:

1. Primary Auxiliary Building (PAB)

2. Containment Enclosure Area (CEA)

3. Fuel Storage Building (FSB)

4. Main Steam/Feedwater Pipe Chase

5. Tank Farm Area (TFA)

6. Waste Processing Building/Primary Auxiliary Building (WPB/PAB) Chase

For HELB other than Hot Water heating Line Breaks (HWELB), the envir-

onmental Responses of the PAB, CEA, TFA, WPB/PAB Chase, and MS/FW

Pipe Chase were calculated using the COMPRESS (4) computer program.

Using the break mass and energy releases and the building nodaliza-

tions discussed previously, COMPRESS calculates the transient pres-

sures, temperatures, and humidities that would occur throughout the

plant building following these ruptures. The methods and assumptions

used in these pressure/ temperature calculations agree with those of

NUREG-0588 (1) .

Table 2.2-1 lists the ambient conditions, building initial conditions,

and other pertinent design basis information used in analyzing these

environmental transients. The ambient and initial conditions were

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chosen so as to maximize the temperature response that would result

from these postulated HELB. In addition, the Uchida condensing steam

heat transfer correlation is used during the condensing mode while

a convective heat transfer coefficient of 2.0 Btu/hr-ft 2- °F is used

otherwise.

The environmental response of the PAB, CEA, and FSB to postulated

HWHIB was calculated using a reasonable, yet still conservative, hand

calculation method which accounted for mass and heat transfer between

the hot water and the room air. Since the HWH subsystems are closed

systems which will not be isolated and these plant areas are supplied

with ventilation air by non-Class 1E systems, the maximum temperatures

and humidities that result from HWHLB are calculated by releasing the

total HWH subsystem fluid mass into the initial room air mass.

The building initial conditions were determined based on the histor-

ical distribution of ambient conditions which occur during the time

of the year when the HWH system is in operation (September through

May). These conditions are defined in Table 2.2-1.

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November 1985

3.0 HELB ANALYSES AND RESULTS

The environmental response of the plant buildings to postulated high energy

line ruptures were calculated using the methods outlined in Section 2.0.

The results of these HELB analyses (other than HWHLB) are presented in the

following sections.


From an evaluation of each of the high energy lines in the PAR and

their operating conditions, it was concluded that the break locations

listed in Table 3.1-1 would provide environmental envelopes for the

Class lE equipment.

Figure 3.1-1 shows the layout of the PAR and the zone designations

which were useful in defining the environmental parameters throughout

the PAB. Zone 32A, which is not shown, represents the PAR below the

the (-)6' elevation and includes the piping tunnels, Zone 32E repre-

sents the 2' and (-)6' elevations, and Zones 32 and 33C, 32 and 33D,

and 32 and 33E represent the 7', 25', and 53' elevations, respective-

ly. Zones 47 and 48 represent the Chemical and Volume Control System

(CVCS) equipment vaults and contain no Class lE equipment.

Table 3.1-2 summarizes the peak and enveloping temperatures and pres-

sures that would occur in each of these zones for each postulated

high energy line rupture. All areas can be taken to experience 100%

relative humidity, condensing environments, however, air displacement

and thus essentially pure steam environments would be expected to

occur only in the general vicinity of the postulated breaks.

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Amendment 56FSAR

November 1985

For each of the ruptures considered in these tables there follows a

series of four figures, lettered A though D. The A series of these

figures (e.g. Figure 3.1-2A, 3.1-3A) physically defines the nodal

arrangement which was chosen to analyze the rupture's effect on the

PAB environment. The B series provides the flow diagrams and physical

parameters (volumes, heat sink areas, flow areas) for this nodal

arrangement. Figures C and D provide the calculated temperature and

pressure transients for each of the nodes defined in the A and B

series figures.


The Containment Enclosure Area contains several high energy (CVCS)

lines, however, only the letdown line operates at an elevated tem-

perature. Therefore, only a rupture of this line has been considered

as stated in Table 3.2-1.

The layout of the Containment Encosure Area, which includes the

Mechanical Penetration Area, the Charging Pump Cubicles, and the

Residual Heat Removal (RHR), Safety Injection (SI), and Containment

Spray (CBS) Vaults, is shown in Figure 3.2-1A, Sheets 1 and 2. These

figures also show the nodal arrangement used, while Figure 3.2-1B

provides the corresponding flow diagram and physical parameters.

Table 3.2-2 summarizes the pressures and temperatures experienced in

the various areas of the enclosure volume following a postulated CVCS

letdown line break. Figures 3.2-1C and 3.2-1D show the transient

temperatures and pressures in the CEA. By a variation of the assumed

initial conditions (10% vs. 95% relative humidity), an additional

investigation was made which determined the maximum pressure response

of the CEA. This result is shown in Figure 3.2-1E. For the HELB

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November 1985

temperature detection system is use, the peak pressures correspond to

approximately 95 seconds after the break. These peak pressures are

listed in Table 3.2-2. The relative humidity throughout all CEA

compartments would reach 100%.

3.3 Main Steam/Feedwater Pipe Chase

The breaks evaluated for the Main Steam/Feedwater Pipe Chase are

listed in Table 3.3-1. It was concluded that the MS line breaks will

result in more severe environmental conditions than the FW line

breaks.

Figures 3.3-1A and 3.3-1B define the MS/FW Pipe Chase arrangement and

nodalization. The MS/FW Pipe Chase reaches a maximum of 325 ° F for a

spectrum of MS line break sizes from 0.10 ft 2 to 1.0 ft 2 . The tem-

perature transient resulting from a 0.10 ft 2 break is provided in

Figure 3.3-1C and the results are summarized in Table 3.3-2.

3.4 Tank Farm Area

The break evaluated for the Tank Farm Area is listed in Table 3.4-1.

Since no HELB temperature detectors are located in the Tank Farm

Area, the Auxiliary Steam line break releases will continue until the

operator detects the break and isolates the line.

Figure 3.4-1A defines the nodal parameters used for the Tank Farm

Area HELB analysis. The resulting temperature and pressure transients

are provided in Figures 3.4-1B and 3.4-1C, respectively, and the peak

values summarized in Table 3.4-2.

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November 1985

3.5 Waste Processing Building/Primary Auxiliary Building Chase

The WPB/PAB Chase, which is located between the WPB and Column Line A

of the PAB, contains both Class lE equipment and several Auxiliary

Steam and Condensate lines. The line ruptures which have been eval-

uated are listed in Table 3.5-1.

Figure 3.5-1A defines the nodal parameters used for evaluation of the

WPB/PAB Chase response to postulated HELB. Figures 3.5-1B and 3.5-1C

provide the temperature and pressure transients that result for the

enveloping HELB. The peak values for pressure and temperature are

summarized in Table 3.5-2.

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November 1985

4.0 HWHLB ANALYSES AND RESULTS

The environmental response following postulated HWHLB has been calculated

for those plant buildings with Hot Water Heating (HWH) systems which operate

in the high energy region, i.e. pressure greater than 275 psig or temper-

ature greater than 200 °F. The HWBLB postulated are listed in Table 4.0-1.

The results of these HWHLB analyses are presented individually in the follow-

ing sections and are summarized in Table 4.0-2.


The peak environmental conditions at the 53' elevation of the PAB due

to postulated HWHLB were found to be 110 °F with a relative humidity

of 100%. These conditions are enveloped by the consequences resulting

from other HELB postulated to occur in the PAR.


The HWH system piping which serves the PAR and FSB passes through the

CEA. A postulated rupture of one of these lines results in tempera-

tures and relative humidities throughout the CEA of approximately

106 °F and 100%, respectively. Due to the location of this piping,

very localized conditions may be slightly more severe although the

large recirculation air flows will tend to mitigate these effects to

a certain extent. With the exception of these localized effects the

environmental conditions that result from a CVCS letdown line break

will envelope those resulting from a HWHLB.

4.3 Fuel Storage Building

Since the hot water heating piping are the only high energy lines

present in the FSB, the environmental conditions that result from a

postulated HWHLB will define the enveloping conditions for high

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November 1985

energy line ruptures. The resulting environmental conditions are

100 °F with a 100% relative humidity.

4.4 Emergency Feedwater Pumphouse


present in the EFWPH, the environmental conditions that result from

a postulated HWHLB will define the enveloping conditions for high

energy line ruptures. The resulting environmental conditions are

88 ° F with a 100% relative humidity.

4.5 Service Water Pumphouse


present in the SWP11, the environmental conditions that result from a

postulated HWHLB will define the enveloping conditions for high

energy line ruptures. The maximum temperature that would be expected

to result in the SWPH is 90 °F. Due to the relatively large room

volume and small volume of hot water heating piping for the SWPH,

the maximum relative humidity that is expected to result following a

RWELB is 90%

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Amendment 56FSAR

November 1985

5.0 CONCLUSIONS

The analysis of high energy line ruptures outside containment has yielded a

realistic evaluation of the elevated temperatures, pressures, and humidities

that can result in the various buildings of Units 1 and 2. These results

provide the HELB environmental envelopes for evaluation of the Class lE

equipment. These envelopes should be evaluated along with the conditions

that result following postulated moderate energy line breaks, loss of

ventilation air flow, and any other events which may cause adverse envir-

onmental conditions to develop.

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6.0 REFERENCES

1. NUREG-0588, "Interim Staff Position on Environmental Qualification ofSafety-Related Electrical Equipment", August, 1979.

2. NUREG-0800, U.S. NRC Standard Review Plans 3.6.1 and 3.6.2, July, 1981.

3. Moody, F. J., "Maximum Two-Phase Vessel Blowdown from Pipes", Journalof Heat Transfer, August 1966.

4. UEC-TR-004-1, "COMPRESS- A Code for Calculating Subcompartment PressureResponses", July, 1976.

5. Appendix E attached to ANSI Standard N176, "Design Basis for Protectionof Nuclear Power Plants Against Effects of Postulated Pipe Rupture".

6. Calculation Set No. 4.3.35-F03

7. Calculation Set No. MSVCS-FAG-07

8. Calculation Set No. 4.3.35-F01

TABLE 2.1-1

DETERMINATION OF MASS/ENERGY RELEASE

Line CVCS Letdown Line Steam Generator BlowdownAuxiliary Steam andCondensate Lines Main Steam Line Feedwater Line Hot Water Heating Line

PlantCondition

Heatup Phase Hot Standby Full Power Full Power Full Power Full Power

LineConditions

P = 435 psiaT = 380 ° F

P = 1100 psiaT = 550 ° F

P = 165 psiaT = 358 ° F

P = 1000 psiaT = 545 ° F

P = 1100 psiaT = 440 ° F

P - 157 pslair = 250 ° F

BreakFlow

Limited by CVCSLetdown Line Con-trol Valves

Moody critical flow withpiping system frictionaleffects included (Method-ology of App. E attachedto ANSI Std. N176( 5))

Limited by upstreampressure controlvalves

Releases calculatedusing Westinghouseinformation packagemethodology

Releases calculatedusing Westinghouseinformation packagemethodology

Moody Critical FlowModel

IsolationMechanism

Dependent on Loc-ation: HELB Temp-ature DetectionSystem or OperatorAction at 30 min.

HELB Temperature Detec-tion System

Dependent on Loca-tion: HELB Tempera-ture Detection Sys-tern or operator ac-tion at 30 minutes.

Reactor ProtectionSystem and EmergencyFeedwater Discon-tinued at 30 min.

Reactor ProtectionSystem

No Isolation Occurs

IsolationValve ClosureTime

10 Seconds 5 Seconds 15 SecondsIsolation Valve inFaulted Loop Fails.

Isolation Valve inFaulted Loop Fails

No Isolation Occurs

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November 1985

TABLE 2.2-1

Design Basis Information

A. Ambient Conditions

1. HELB, other than HWHLB: 14.7 psia/88 ° F/100% RH

2. HWHLB: 14.7 psia/70 ° F/95% RH

B. Building Initial Conditions

1. HELB, other than HWHLB: 14.7 psia/104 ° F/952 RH

2. HWHLB: 14.7 psia/86 °F/56% RH

C. HELB Temperature Detection System

1. Temperature at Isolation Signal Initiation: 130°F(Intended to cover setpoint plus instrumenterror margins of up to 10 ° F)

2. System Response Time-time delay: 8.1 Secondsuntil signal at isolation valves

D. Ventilation System Operation

1. No credits are taken for energy removal orair exchange by non-Class 1E ventilationsystems.

2. Credits are taken for Class 1E ventilationsystems according to their performancecharacteristics following postulated HELB.

E. Unit Trip

1. A concurrent loss of offsite power or unittrip has not been assumed.

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November 1985

TABLE 3.1-1

Primary Auxiliary BuildingHigh Energy Line Break Locations

1. Steam Generator Blowdown Line (Lines No. SG-1301-5-3", SG1304-5-3",SG-1307-5-3", or SG-1310-5-3")

a. At 53' elevation of PAR in vicinity of blowdown flash tank.

2. Auxiliary Steam and Condensate Lines

4. Line No. 2302-2-8" -between Columns A & B.

At 53' elevation of PAR along Column Line 5

b. Line No. 2303-1-6" - At 7' elevation of PAR between Column Lines5 & 6.

c. Line No. 2404-2-3" - At (-) 6' elevation of PAR along Column LineC.

d. Line No. 2406-1-4" - At (-) 6' elevation of PAR along Column Line2.

3. Chemical and Volume Control System Letdown Line (Line No. CS-360-9-3")

a. At 7' elevation of PAR in the CVCS equipment vault area.

ZONEDESIGNATION

SG-1310-5-3"Break @

Zone 32E

AS-23O2-2-8Break @

Zone 33E

AS-2303-1-6"Break @

Zone 33C

AS-2404-2-3"Break @

Zone 32B

AS-2406-1-4"Break @

Zone 32B

CS-360-9-3"Break @Zone 47

EnvelopingConditions

Temp. Press. Temp. Press. Temp. Press. Temp. Press. Temp. Press. Temp. Press. Temp. Press.° F psig ° F psig psig ° F psig ° F psig ° F psig ° F psig

32A 108. 0.4 104 .04 104. 0.1 220 0.4 190. 0.3 114 .05 220. 0.4

32B 108. 0.4 104. .04 104. 0.1 220 0.4 190. 0.3 114. .05 220. 0.4

32C 108. 0.4 104. .04 104. 0.1 132 0.1 136. 0.1 112. .05 136. 0.4

33C 108. 0.4 104. .04 163. 0.1 105 0.1 104. 0.1 107. .05 163. 0.4

32D 111. 0.4 105. .04 113. 0.1 105 0.1 104. 0.1 108. .05 113. 0.4

33D 111. 0.4 105. .04 113. 0.1 105 0.1 104. 0.1 108. .05 113. 0.4

32E 165. 0.5 112. .04 104. 0.1 105 0.1 104. 0.1 107. .05 165. 0.5

33E 131. 0.5 158. .06 104. 0.1 105 0.1 104. 0.1 107. .05 158. 0.5

47 108. 0.4 104. .04 134. 0.1 105 0.1 120. 0.1 185. .15 185. 0.4

48 108. 0.4 104. .04 134. 0.1 105 0.1 120. 0.1 185. .15 185. 0.4

TABLE 3.1-2

Primary Auxiliary BuildingSummary of Results

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TABLE 3.2- 1

Containment Enclosure AreaHigh Energy Line Break Locations

1. Chemical and Volume Control System Letdown Line(Line No. CS-360-9-3")

a. In Mechanical Penetration Area (MPA) at (-) 34'-6" elevation nearcontainment wall penetration.

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November 1985

TABLE 3.2-2

Containment Enclosure AreaSummary of Results

Compartment

MechanicalPenetrationArea

Remainder ofEnclosure Volume(Including ChargingPump Cubicles &Ventilation EquipmentArea)

CVCS Letdown Line Rupture (CS-360-9-3") Peak Temperature ( °F) Peak Pressure (psig)

0.35

0.35

134

108

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TABLE 3.3-1

Main Steam/Feedwater Pipe ChaseHigh Energy Line Break Locations

1. Main Steam Line

a. At 21' elevation of MS/FW Pipe Chase

2. Feedwater Line

a. At 3' elevation of MS/FW Pipe Chase

Amendment 56November 1985

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November 1985

TABLE 3.3-2

Main Steam/Feedwater Pipe ChaseSummary of Results

Main Steam Line Rupture Peak Temperature ( ° F) Peak Pressure (psig)

325

Pressure Varies dependentupon location with respectto break location and hasbeen studied in detail ina separate analysis.Maximum Pressure:

4.8

SB 1 & 2FSAR


TABLE 3.4-1

Tank Farm AreaHigh Energy Line Break Locations


a. Line No. AS-2302-32-8"

Auxiliar Steam Line Ru turePeak Tem erature ( F) Peak Pressure

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TABLE 3.4-2

Tank Farm AreaSummary of Results


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November 1985

TABLE 3.5-1

Waste Processing Building/Primary Auxiliary Building ChaseHigh Energy Line Break Locations


a. Line No. 2339-1-1 1/2" - At 53' elevation of WPB/PAB Chase

B. Line No. 2341-1-1 1/2" - At 25' elevation of WPB/PAB Chase

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November 1985

TABLE 3.5-2

Waste processing Building/Primary Auxiliary Building ChaseSummary of Results

CompartmentAS-2339-1-1 1/2" Break

@ 53' elevationAS-2341-1 -1 1/2" Break

@ 25' elevation

WPB/PAB Chase53' elevation

Temp. ( °F) Pressure (psig) Temp. ( °F) Pressure (psig)

175 0.05 168 0.05

WPB/PAB Chase25' elevationand 15' 5" elevation

168 0.05 175 0.05

NOTE: Due to the general arrangement of the WPB/PAB Chase area, the results obtainedfor a break of Line No. AS-2339-1-1 1/2" have been extrapolated to be repre-sentative of the environmental conditions that would result from a break ofLine No. AS-2341-1-1 1/2".

SB 1 & 2FSAR

TABLE 4.0-1

Hot Water Heating Line Break Locations

1. Primary Auxiliary Building

a. At 53' elevation of PAB

2. Containment Enclosure Area

a. At 21'-6" elevation of CEA

3. Fuel Storage Building

a'. At 21'-6" elevation of FSB

4. Emergency Feedwater Pumphouse

a. At 27' elevation of EFWPH

5. Service Water Pumphouse

a. At 21' elevation of SWPH


SB 1 & 2

Amendment 56FSAR

November 1985

TABLE 4.0-2

Hot Water Heating Line BreaksSummary of Results

1. Primary Auxiliary Building: 110 ° F/100% Rh(53' elevation)

2. Containment Enclosure Area: 106 °F/100% RE

3. Fuel Storage Building: 100 °F/100% RH

4. Emergency Feedwater Pumphouse: 88 °F/100% RH

5. Service Water Pumphouse: 90 °F/90% RH

A F A ci

C

LI

El

'furlI I I

A F A B

a. ?CC; rx's F. Inlet Heaters k. .tir Lock q. boric Acid Tanks v.b. Blel3own Flash Tank g. Inlet Filters n. Storage Ares r. CVCS Vaults w.c. PAS ithrust tan Roos b. RAACT Pipe Chase n. Electrics1 Chase s. Charging Pump Vaults s.8. Ale lock N. Valve Aisle la. 480 V. Loma C t. Letdown ilegssitier y.e. PAR inlet B Containment I. CPCS Tank p. PCCW Pumps U. tan-RAACT Pipe Chase z.

—

II DenotesThermocoupleLocation

)

HVAC OpeningBoron Injection TankChiller Surge TankAns. Steam Condensate TankPipe Trench

PSNli SEABROOY STATION FRINARY AUXILIARY BUI1DINC

Elevation 53 11 Elevation 25 FT Elevation 7 FT Elevation 2 FT 6 -6 FT

Figure 2.1-1: Primary Auxiliary Building Showing Locations of HELB TemperatureDetection Thermocouples

c. Charging Pumps

d. Containment Enclosure Cooling Units

containment

No Temperature Detectors Locatedin These Areas

CHARG/NC rums AREA CONTAINMENT VENTILATION ENCLOSURE AREAZONE 32 33 C ZONE 41 BEl. 7 . -0" to 23 . - 0"

El. 21 . .6" to 49'-0"

Figure 2.1-2: Containment Enclosure Area Showing Locationsof HELB Temperature Detection Thermocouples

MECHANICAL PENETRATibN AREA

ZONE 29 AEl. (-)8'-0" to (4)I'-0"

MECHANICAL PENETRATION AREA

ZONE 28 A 11. 8

El. (-) 96 . -6" to (4) 1 . -0"

Containment Building Spray Pumpb. ReLsiclual Heat Removal Pump

Thermocouple Location

RHR SI VAnTS2014E 30 A, 13„ C, A 0

. El. (-)6I'-0 to (4)23'-6"

Figure. 2.1-3: Containment Enclosure Area Showing Locations ofHELB Temperature Detection Thermocouples

0.0 b

5 —

p- -I MO IMO

13L-ir-Z

- 41111.1

Elevation 55 FT Elevation 25 FT Elev.tion 7 FT Elevation 2 6 -6 FT

A

II F A

A

A

I I I

A

•

ir A

A

B

A

S . PCCW Neat Exchangers P . Inlet Nesters k. Air Lock q. Boric Acid Tanks V. NVIC Opening

I,. Slowdown Flash lank B. Inlet Filters 6. Storage Area r. CVCS Vaults V. Boron Injection Tank

C. PAD Exhaust Fan Room I,- RAACT Pipe Chose n. Electrical Chase s. Charging Pump Vaults x . Chiller Surge Tank

d. Air Lock i. Valve Aisle 0. 6110 v. Load Centers t. Letdown Degessiller Y. Aux. Steam Condensate Tank

U. PAB Inlet A Containment J. CVCS Tank P. PCCW Pumps U. Non-RAACT Pipe Chase C. Pipe Trench

Purge Fans

Figure 3.1-1: Zone Designations of Primary Auxiliary Buildingat Various Elevations

Elevation 2 -6 FTElevation 7 FT

col

3

— 4

— 5

—

• A

Boric Acid Tanks v. to/AC Openieg

CVCS Vaults is. Boron Injection Tank

Charging Pump Vaults x. Chiller Surge Tank

Letdown Degessifier p. Aux. Steam Condensate Tank

Non-RAACT Pipe Chase Ir. Pipe Trench 04 '0'M M0 0W MM 0N M

a. PCCW Nest Exchengets F. Inlet Nesters k.

b. Slowdown Flash Tank S. Inlet Filters A.

C . PAB Exhaust Fen Room h. RAACT Pipe Chose n.

d.e.

Air LockFAB Inlet 1. Containment

1.J.

Valve AisleCVCS Tank

o,p.

Purge Fans

Air LockStorage AreaElectrical Chase480 v. Load CentersPCCW Pumps

A A

Elevation 53 FT

A

VIM

3 —

Line No. SB-1310-5-3''Sta. Can. hoedown

Elevation 25 FT

c Ø

LP" •6

5

I I I

A

CO LALi., cm

Figure 3.1-2A: Nodal Arrangement of Primary Auxiliary Building at VariousElevations for Steam Generator Blowdown Line Break Analysis

3

MJE

2

4

5

6

VOLUME BEAT SINKNODE (ft3) AREA(ft2)

1 95,490 18,0002 23,520 5603 53,930 8,0004 243,400 42,6705 108,070 18,5006 38,235 15,9007 ATMOSPHERE

FLOW PATH' CHARACTERISTICS

LOSS FACTOR

MI NNE AREA(ft2) INERTIA(ft) Kc exp Kfr1c Ktotal

1 2 15.0 .05 .78 1.0 .01 1.791 3 128.7 .45 .42 .85 .17 1.441 4 9.40 .88 .78 1.0 .20 1.982 4 31.5 .09 .78 1.0 .01 1.792 7 20.0 5.00 .78 1.0 3.50 5.283 4 10.6 5.40 .78 1.0 2.22 4.004 '5 44.8 .80 .78 1.0 .30 2.084 7 20.0 .50 .78 1.0 1.60 3.385 6 5.9 8.50 .78 1.0 3.2 4.98

Figure 3.1-2B: Nodal Parameters of Primary Auxiliary Building forSteam Generator Blowdown Line Break Analysis

COMPHRTMF N1ETJ

2YA3

Li •56 u

_c

CI CDa:

-JCr

CIC)

0-

1 I 1T T 1 3

2 3 4 5 6 789'10—1 T T T FT i i I 2

1 0° 2 3 4 5 6 789j0 '2 3 4 5 6 789 10

TIME r SEC JFigure 3.1-2C: Temperature Responses in Primary Auxiliary Building Following

A Rupture of 3" Steam Generator Blowdown Line

COMPARIMEN11 1712Y3 /\4

II

3

e;

a _- 7- -1 -T T T10 2 3 4 5 6 8 9 1

1 T-T—TT1Tr2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0

TIME (SEC)

-T T-T -1-1 32 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0

Figure 3.1-2D: Pressure Responses in Primary Auxiliary Building Following aRupture of 3" Steam Generator Blowdown Line

1

—2

— 3

— 5

EI

0

Elevation 52 FT

Elevation 25 FT

Elevation 7 FT Elevation 2 6 -6 FT

A A A F A

I I I

I I

A C

I I IF A A 11 C D A 8 C 0

a. PCCW Heat Exchongets R. Inlet Hester, k, Air Lock 4- Boric Acid Tanks v. HVAC Opening

b.C.

Slowdown Flash TankPAS Exhaust Fen Room

g.h.

Inlet Filters 6. Storage Ares r. CVCS VaultsRAACT Pipe Chase n. Electrical Chase a. Charging Pump Vaults

v.x.

Boron injection TankChiller Surge Tank 0

4t

d. Air Lock I. Valve Aisle o 480 v. Load Centers t. Letdown Degaseifier y. Aux. Steen Condensate Tank 1D fDe. PAR Inlet Containment J. CVCS Tank p. PCCW Pumps u. Hon-RAACT Pipe Chase s. Pipe Trench =

Purge Fans Ce

M

r?%JD

Figure 3.1-3A: Nodal Arrangement of Primary Auxiliary Building at COLn

lncr

Various Elevations for Auxiliary Steam LineAS-2302-2-8" Break Analysis

M/E NODEVOLUME(ft 3)

HEAT SINKAREA(ft2 )

1 3

6

5

123456

53,930

8,000

95,490

18,000

23,520

560

243,400

42,670

146,300

34,400ATMOSPHERE

1 2 128.71 4 10.62 3 15.02 4 9.43 4 31.53 6 20.04 5 44.84 6 20.0

.45 .42 .85 .17 1.44

5.40 .78 1.0 2.22 4.00

.05 .78 1.0 .01 1.79

.88 .78 1.0 .20 1.98

.09 .78 1.0 101 1.79

5.00 .78 1.0 3.50 5.28

.80 .78 1.0 .30 2.08

.50 .78 1.0 1.60 3.38

FLOW PATHS CHARACTERISTICS

LOBS FACTOR

AREA(ft2 ) INERTIA (1t-1) Kc Kexp Kfrit total

FROM TONODE NODE

Figure 3.1.-38: Nodal Parameters of Primary Auxiliary Building forAuxiliary Steam Line AS-2302-2-8" Break Analysis

CI

24 6 1111 -17 02

TIME ( SEC )Figure 3.1-3C: Temperature Responses in Primary Auxiliary Building Following

a Rupture of 8" Auxiliary Steam Line

T—T3 4 5678910

I 3 4 5678910

3

COMPARTMENT1 El2 03 A

4 X5 <>6 1'

CD

COMPARTMENT1 [II2 03 A4 X

<>56+

fl-

"IMAWMI Ti '111,h 4,

, . 1' • . ;!flf,f— 0.11011114/01,11.4.1M)#11111TIPP"Irrill■11.1!.1

I *IR"'

r

1 o°I I 1 11114 5 6 78910"

I 3 14— ',!.)— 6 3 TI i 0' 1 T 1 1 1 iTly 2 (

3I,

2 2 3 4 5 6 789'10 e.

TIME 1 SEC JFigure 3.1-3D: Pressure Responses in Primary Auxiliary Building Following

a Rupture of 8" Auxiliary Steam Line

A A

I I I

Elevation 25 FTElevatIOn 53 FT

1

3 —

5

I I I 1ir A A

k.ALM.o.P .

Air LockStorage AresElectrical Chase480 v. Load CentersPCCW Pumps

q.r.s.t.U.

Boric Acid TanksCPCS VaultsCharging Pump VeultsLetdown DegasstfierHon-RAACT Pipe Chase

Tank

HVAC OpeningBoron Injection TankChiller Surge TankAux. Steam Cond Pipe Trench

EleVatIon 7 FT Elevation 2 & -6 FT

A A

1

2

— 3

1

Auxiliary Steamline No. 2303 -1-6'' --trtr

— &

—5

—

7-1

PCCW Heat ExchengetsBlowdown rush 'ConkPAB Exhaust Fan RoomAir LockPAP Inlet & ContainmentPurge Fans

Figure 3.1-4A: Nodal Arrangement of Primary Auxiliary Building atVarious Elevations for Auxiliary Steam Line AS-2303-1-6"Break Analysis

6 —- -I

V. Inlet Heaters1. Inlet Filtersh. RAACT Pipe Chase1. Valve Aislej. CPC! Tank

o 1 - -1775.1

- - -f- 1

II

NODEVOLUME(ft 3)

HEAT SINKAREA(ft?)

1 38,200 8,5002 49,700 10,0003 243,400 42,6704 172,940 26,5605 38,235 15,9006 ATMOSPHERE

3

01


LOSS FACTOR

rarpf_PISME

TOHOPE

AREA(ftl) INERTIA (ft-1)-Kc Kexp Kfric Ktotal

1 3 60.0 .04 .78 1.0 .02 1.802 3 44.8 .80 .78 1.0 .30 2.082 5 5.9 8.50 .78 1.0 3.20 4.983 4 51.5 1.33 .78 1.0 .33 2.113 6 20.0 .50 .78 1.0 1.60 3.384 6 20.0 5.00 .78 1.0 3.50 5.28

0<

tm MEl 0

0.M 9

M

6

Figure 3.1-4B: Nodal Parameters of Primary Auxiliary Building for AuxiliarySteam Line AS-2303-1-6" Break Analysis

0rt

uis.CO cnos

C)

IC3

COMPARTMENT[fl

2D3 L

4 X56+

CDa_

CD

o°iti------6 111 CD (1)

Cf t<0 =cr Ia.

I -7 t 1 IIIII .1 -I— T-- --1— T- I till 2 I I me1(D2 3 4 5 6 78910 2 3 4 5 6 78910 2 3

---r-I 1 i i 1 35 6 78910

. . - • gVD00 VI,...n 4:ts

Figure 3.1-4C: Temperature Responses in Primary Auxiliary BuildingFollowing a Rupture of 6" Auxiliary Steam Line

TIME ' SEC)

CT1

C

OMPARTMENT1 FA2 03 A

r1i 111 1 I I I 1 1 1 11 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 111 3

3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 '1 0 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0

TIME I SEC)Figure 3.1-4D: Pressure Responses in Primary Auxiliary Building

Following a Rupture of 6" Auxiliary Steam Line

I IF A A 3 A

2

Auxiliary SteamLine No. 2404-2-3"

—5

— 6

r

P. Inlet Nesters k. Air Lock q. Boric Acid Tanks v. NVAC Openings. Inlet Filters fi. Storage Area r. CFCS Vaults V. Boron Injection Tankh. NAACP Pipe Chase a. Electrical Chase m. Charging Pump Vaults x. Chiller Surge Tankt. Valve Aisle 0. 480 v. Load Centers t. Letdown Degassifier 7 - Aux. Steam Condensate Tank

J. CVCS Tank P- PCCW Pumps U. Non-RAACT Pipe Chose C. Pipe Trench

pccw Neat ExchangetaBlowdown Flesh TankPAB Exhaust Fan RoomAir LockPAB Inlet ContainmentPurge Fans

0.0 h111...1

Elevation 53 FT

A Elevation 25 FT- Elevation 7 FT Elevation 2 6 -6 FT

A A A

I I I

Figure 3.1-5A: Nodal Arragement of Primary Auxiliary Building at Various Elevationsfor Auxiliary Steam Condensate Line ASC-2404-2-3" Break Analysis

6

7

5

2

VOLUME HEAT SINKNODE (ft3) AREA(ft2)

I 8,645 4,1802 29,700 11,7003 49,700 10,0004 38,200 8,5005 243,400 42,6706 172,940 26,5607 ATMOSPHERE


LOSS FACTOR

AREA(ft2 ) INERTIA (ft-1) Ec exp Kfric Ktotal

1 2 2.1 15.0 .78 1.0 1.5 3.281 3 3.0 10.3 .78 1.0 1.4 3.182 3 5.9 '8.5 .78 1.0 3.20 4.983 5 44.8 .80 .78 1.0 .30 2.084 5 6.3 .32 .78 1.0 .10 1.885 6 51.5 1.33 .78 1.0 .33 2.115 7 20.0 .50 .78 1.0 1.60 3.386 7 20.0 5.00 .78 1.0 3.50 5.28

"mom 1MNODE MME

Figure 3.1-5B: Nodal Parameters of Primary Auxiliary Building forAuxiliary Steam Condensate Line ASC-2404-2-3" Break Analysis

IIIII124 5 6 789 10

t 3 4 5 6 789103 4 5 6 78910 3

Mr

COMPARTMENT1 [Ti

.t 2 0wCl 3 AA

C-) 1Xco 5 <>

6+7 Z

C)

CO

C

4."1

C)

TIME f SLCJFigure 3.1-5C: Temperature Responses in Primary Auxiliary Building

Following a Rupture of 3" Auxiliary Steam Condensate Line

(-r

o°—r

5 6 7 10'lI I I I I I I T—T- T---T I I 1 1 2 ,I

I,

3 4 5 5 7 9 9 .1 0 1 3 4 5 6 7 9 9 El 0 L

TIME 1 SEC )Figure 3.1-5D: Pressure Responses in Primary Auxiliary Building


COMPARTMENT1 [1]2D3 A

X

M0... Cr)._-.

LLI:3c3

CL

Elevation 7 FT Elevation 2 -6 FT

A A

Elevation 53 FT Elevation 25 FT

A

I I I

.1 IF A

3 —

4 —

5

6

Ento

3

—4

—5

— 6

DA

Irt•-••■...■■■■■•■••••■■•■■••....1•16J6111J

P.3.

Inlet HeatersInlet Filters

k.

I.Air Lock

Storage Are.4-r.

Boric Acid TanksCVCS Vaults

V.

V.

HVAC OpeningBoron Injection Tank

(DIDEg

0.h. RAACT Pipe Chase n. Electrical Chase a . Charging Pump Vaults a . Chiller Surge Tank EifI. Valve Aisle o. 480 v. Load Centers t . Letdown Degaselfier Y. Aux. Steam Condensete Tank (I)j. CVCS Tank p. PCCU Pumpe U. Bon-RAACT Pipe Chose C. Pipe Trench 0

rt

a. PCCW Rest Exchangesb. Blowdown Flash Tanke. PAB Exhaust Fen Roomd. Al, Locke. PAB Inlet Containment

Purge Fans

Figure 3.1.-6A: Nodal Arrangement of Primary Auxiliary Building at VariousElevations for Auxiliary Steam Condensate Line ASC-2406-1-4" Break Analysis

HEAT SINEAREA(ft 2 )

4,18011,70010,0008,500

42,67026,560

VOLUME(ft 3)

8,64529,70049,70038,200

243,400172,940ATMOSPHERE


,FROMNODE

.TONODE

AREA(ft2) INERTIA (ft-1) 'Cc

LOSS FACTOR

rtotalKexr Kfric

1 2 2.1 15.0 .78 1.0 1.5 3.281 3 3.0 10.3 .78 1.0 1.4 3.182 3 5.9 1.5 .78 1.0 3.20 4.983 5 44.8 .80 .78 1.0 .30 2.084 5 6.3 .32 .78 1.0 .10 1.885 6 51.5 1.33 .78 1.0 .33 2,115 7 20.0 .50 .78 1.0 1.60 3.386 7 20.0 5.00 .78 1.0 3.50 5.28

6

7

5

NODE

23

567

Figure 3.1-68: Nodal Parameters of Primary Auxiliary Building for AuxiliarySteam Condensate Line ASC-2406-1-4" Break Analysis

COMPARTMENT111]2 C1)3 A

4 ><5 KT>6+7Z

CD

CDLU C.)

I2 3 4 5 6789 1 ,3

O �.<M MSCr fa,

m• M

P■—• rt

CO LnVI ON

1 I -T-1 –T I -7" I I lilt3 4 5 6 1 8 9 1 0 2 3 4 5 6789 1 O

TIME ( SEC )Figure 3.1-6C: Temperature Responses in Primary Auxiliary Building


—4

1

L.17'

COMPHRTMF_NT1 El2 CD3 L

4X

I t FT i 1,, —- 1- 77-7

r c --7 2 t 1 ilin 3

G - JO/ 89 1 1 !s_ -I )7 E3 11 02 3 4 5 6 7 8 q 1 0TIME ( SET.r. l

Figure 3.1.-6D: Pressure Responses in Primary Auxiliary BuildingFollowing a Rupture of 4" Auxiliary Steam Condensate Line

100

Elevation 7 FT Elevation 2 .6 FT

4

9 —

2 —

6 —

I —

A

A

a.

b.c.d.C.

PCCW Heat ExchangersSlowdown Flash TankPAS Exhaust Fan RoomAir LockPAS Inlet ContainmentPurge Fans

Elevation 51 FT Elevation 25 FT

Figure 3.1-7A: Nodal Arrangement of Primary Auxiliary Building atVarious Elevations for CVCS Letdown Line Break Analysis

ii P A

P .

B.Ii.1.

J.

I I

Inlet HeatersInlet FiltersRAACT Pipe ChaseValve AisleCVCS Tank

A

Air LockStorage AreaElectrical Chase480 v. Load CentersPCCW Pumps

A C II A

4. Boric Acid Tanks V. HVAC Openingr. CVCS Vaults V. Boron Injection TeakO. Charging Pump Vaults x. Chiller Surge Tankt Letdown Degassifier Y- Aux. Steam Condensate Tanku. lion-RAACT Pipe Chase e. Pipe Trench

—

—5

—2

En

cr,

4 NI

D F AA

••••■■•••■11.11,1••••■••••1

cut__

6

5

3

HEAT SINKAREA(ft2 )

23,00015,90010,0008,50042,67026,560

valmr(ft )

47,10038,23549,70038,200243,400172,940ATMOSPHERE


leCOLEALIDE

TO AREA (ft2 ) INERTIA (ft-1) Ke Kexp Kfric KtotalNODE

1 2 .80 45.0 .11 .11 .22 .441 7 1.4 37.5 .34 .20 .67 1.212 3 2.3 47.0 .78 1.0 1.80 3.583 5 44.8 .80 .78 1.0 .30 2.084 5 6.3 -32 .78 1.0 .10 1.885 6 51.5 1.33 .78 1.0 .33 2.115 7 20.0 .50 .78 1.0 1.6 3.386 7 20.0 5.00 .78 1.0 3.5 5.28

ROBI

WE

Figure 3.1-7B: Nodal Parameters of Primary Auxiliary Buildingfor CVCS Letdown Line Break Analysis

NODE

1234567

f--z

.4 X t.) + NCC CV Cr) -a- L.0 coa_

—(s1

1:nape.4

SB 1 & 2 Amendment 56FSAR November 1985

000E O'OSZ 0'00Z O'OST 0'00T O'OS

]o)=C9C2(=CSO=DSC2I=090 Wb41=lid N1b31JI1UNC 1haNdInC3 C:N1: H N 1 d

COMPARTMENT1I2 03 L

4X5647

II-6

UDIa_

),

A VAPice A A A411,02 1 A A ri 6i661103TIME ( SEC )

Figure 3.1-7D: Pressure Responses in Primary Auxiliary BuildingFollowing a Rupture of CVCS Letdown Line

MECHANICAL PENETRATION AREAZONE 29 AEl. (-)8'-0" to (+)1'-0"

MECHANICAL PENETRATION AREAZONE 28 A & 8El. (-) 34'-6" to (+) 1 . -0"

I. Containment Building Spray Pumpb. Residual Heat Removal Pump

CVCS LetdownLine No.

RHR & SI VAULTSZONE 30 A, B, C, & DEl. (-)61'-0 to (+)23' -6"

Figure 3.2-1A: Containment Enclosure Area Showing Nodal Arrangement(Sheet 1 of 2) for CVCS Letdown Line Break Analysis

..1=■■■•••••■■■■•—■••■ammi

P---n-L

C. Charging &impsd. Containment Enclosure Cooling Units

containment

CHARGING PUMPS AREA CONTAINMENT VENTILATION ENCLOSURE AREA

ZONE 32 33 C

ZONE 41 BEl. P-0" to 23'- 0"

El. 21'-6" to 49'-0"

Figure 3.2-1A : Containment Enclosure Area Showing Nodal(Sheet 2 of 2) Arrangement for CVCS Letdown Line Break Analysis

5

4

2

3

21,400

4,050

61,170

15,000

145,000

1 66,355

2 12,000

3 144,000

4 92,570

5 524,350

VOLUME HEAT SINK(ft 3 ) AREA(1t2)


LOSS FACTORS

FROM TO AREA (/C 2) INERTIA (ft-1) R-c Kexp Kfric total_HODE NODE

1 5 20.0 .20 .78 1.0 .02 1.802 4 8.0 5.50 .78 1.0 .74 2.523 4 18.9 4.07 .78 1.0 7.1 8.884 5 28.0 .18 .78 1.0 .10 1.88

Figure 3.2-18: Nodal Parameters of Containment EnclosureArea for CVCS Letdown Line Break Analysis

NODE

1O'OSI O'OVT 00E1 O'OZT 0'011 0001

.1°.°4

(A C]0) 3111.62dk121

SB 1 & 2

Amendment 56FSAR

November 1985

=C9C1t=t90=C903(=Mall WUUOCN4 m1 ,11:411vne IN3Wene3 31 SWO H N S

COMPARTMENT1!J2034X5 e>

--4

In-

360101 4 6 6 360102 6- 6 360103 10° 4TIME ( SEC )

Figure 3.2-1D: Pressure Responses in Containment Enclosure AreaFollowing a Rupture of 3" CVCS Letdown Line

COMPARTMENT1[I2 03 AC30

ist r- 4X

el

0 w4

!I 5 <1.',>CI

0 tA,

4-1

0_

L-3

4-4

4

A 1 1 I 1 1 A ?ihil301.02 I 1 1 1 1 1 14 5 4 5 6 769 'l o 4 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 11 03 2

TIME ( SEC )Figure 3.2-1E: Maximized Pressure Responses in Containment Enclosure

Area Following a Rupture of 3" CVCS Letdown Line

A

Main Steam &

Feedvater

PiPi Chase'

Containment

SB 1 E. 2

Amendment 56FSAR

November 1985

ControlBuilding

PrimaryAuxiliaryBuilding

Figure 3.3-1A: Nodal Arrangement of Main Steam/Feedwater Pipe Chase

NODE V0L1ME HEAT SINK

NODE (ft ) Area (ft 2 )

1 69,270 16,930

2 Atmosphere

M/E

FLOW PATH CHARACTERISTICS

LOSS FACTORS

FROM TONODE NODE AREA (ft 2 ) INERTIA (ft-1 ) K

c exp KEric Ktotal

1 2 856 .01 .78 1.0 .10 1.88

Figure 3.3-1B: Nodal Parameters of Main Steam/Feedwater Pipe Chasefor Main Steam Line Break Analysis

CI% 0

COMPARTMFNTI El2 0

tr;

1 A - 1 ro, A U -Lii 11 ce A 1 Iii 6 3/ 601 02TIME (SEC)

Figure 3.3-1C: Temperature Response of - Main Steam/Feedwater Pipe ChaseFollowing a Small (0.10 Square Feet) Rupture of Main Steam Line

A A 1 h Ye 0 2 , 3

NODE

1

2

BEAT SINEAREA(ft 2)

11,000240,000

Atmosphere

Irown(lra_

FLOW FATE - CHARACTERISTICS

LOSS FACTORS

FROM TO AREA (ft2 ) INERTIA (ft -1) FeNODE NODE

1 2 10.00 .006 .78 1.0 0.01 1.79

0$

P:1

NJ

Hit

rexp - Efric Ktotal

Figure 3.4-1A: Nodal Parameters of Tank Farm Area forAuxiliary Steam Line AS-2302-32-8" Break Analysis

COMPARTMENTH

CD(r)

CD

CDCD

I I I tri3 4 5 67891O '

r I rill 2 1 –1-1- 1 I3 r 13 4 5 6 78910 2 3 4 5 6 78910 2 3

TIME (SEC)Figure 3.4-1B: Temperature Response of Tank Farm Area

Following a Rupture of 8" Auxiliary Steam Line

COMPARTMENTl[1]

LID

LID

1 0°TIME (SEC)

Figure 3.4-1C: Pressure Response of Tank Farm Area Followinga Rupture of 8" Auxiliary Steam Line

02 k<m ma 0Cr CI.

I I I I I I Ilf 1 I 1 I I I I III 2 I I I I I I Ilf 3 r 1 ro 2

2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 '1 0 2 3 4 5 6 789 '1 0 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 '1 0 2 3 P1 CI)Z

4.....rt■DCO 1/4-nk.fi as

MIMEMME ( f t 1 )

HEAT SINEAREA(f0)

1 19,030 3,890

1 2 17,500 4,760

3 Atmosphere

cn

Dp•C/5OJ

2 3FLOW PATHS CHARACTERISTICS

LOSS FACTORS

FROM To AREA (ft 2 ) INERTIA (ft -1 ) KCKNODE NE exp Kfric K total

1 2 8.40 0.24 .78 1.0 0.01 1.79

2 3 1.75 1.14 .78 1.0 0.06 1.84

05

CO fD

Figure 3.5-1A: Nodal Parameters of Waste Processing Building/Primary Auxiliary Building

Ce fa,M

rT1/410

Chase for Auxiliary Steam Line AS-2339-1-1 1/2" Break Analysis CO lALAO'

M/E

COMPARTMENT11112C0

1. Op 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 4T- -T5 -F-6 T1 -r87-1 0 -T3- -E1)-761 8-91 0 3T 1 T i f _ 1 ---r

T IME I SF CFigure 3.5-1B: Temperature Response of WPB/PAB Chase

Following a Rupture of 1 1/2" Auxiliary Steam Line

COMPHR1 MEN]IPI

(I)

rn

-q`

3 -14 -)6J1861102-• -r I rill

2 3 4 5 678910T r--r T 1 Tr10° 2 3 4 56789'10

TIME ( SEC )Figure 3.5-1C: Pressure Response of WPB/PAB Chase

Following a Rupture of 1 1/2" Auxiliary Steam Line

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