ex post evaluation of investment projects co-financed by the european regional development fund...
TRANSCRIPT
“Ex post evaluation of investment projects co-financed by the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and/or Cohesion Fund (CF)
in the period 1994-1999”
TEN PROJECTS OBSERVEDFinal Report
Evaluation Network Meeting Brussels, 23 November 2012
THE TEN PROJECTS
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IRELAND:•M1 Motorway•Dublin wastewater treatment
SPAIN:•Sogama solid waste treatment in Galicia;•Wastewater treatment in Ría de Vigo•Madrid Metro Line 8•Mediterranean Corridor
GREECE:•Egnatia Motorway
PORTUGAL:•Valorsul solid waste treatment in Lisbon
ITALY:•Port of Gioia Tauro•Water supply in Palermo
INVESTMENT COSTS AND EC CO-FINANCING
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PROJECT TOTAL INVESTMENT
COSTS
EC CO-FUNDING
EC CO-FUNDING RATE
Port of Gioia Tauro 473 M€ 61.9M€ 13%
Water supply in Palermo 120 M€ 44 M€ 37%
M1 Motorway 787 M€ 301 M€ 38.2%
Dublin waste water treatment 296 M€ 157 M€ 53.1%
Egnatia Motorway 7,053 M€ 3,091 M€ 43.8%
Urban solid waste treatment in Lisbon 366 M€ 137 M€ 37.38%
Waste water treatment in Ria de Vigo 172 M€ 118 M€ 68.6%
Madrid metro line 518 M€ 393 M€ 76%
Mediterranean Corridor 759 M€ 531 M€ 70%
Solid waste treatment in Galicia 275 M€ 100 M€ 36.3%
*Note: prices are expressed in constant terms (Euro 2011)
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
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WHAT:“What kind of long term contributions can be
identified for different types of investment in the field of environment and transport
infrastructure?“
WHEN: “What is the minimum and average time needed for
a given long term contribution to materialise and stabilise? What are these time spans for different
types of investment in the field of environment and transport infrastructure? “
HOW:“How are these long term contributions generated
for different types of investment in the field of environment and transport infrastructure, i.e., what is the causal chain between certain short term socio-
economic returns and long term returns from investment?”
•Appropriateness to the context
•Project design
•Forecasting capacity
•Project governance
•Managerial response
Economic development
• Direct welfare and economic growth
• Endogenous dynamics
Quality of life
• Social cohesion
• Environmental effects
• Territorial cohesion
• Institutional learning
• Social happiness and wellbeing
Effects stabilised
• In the short run
• In the long run
Effects not yet stabilised
DEVELOPMENT EFFECTS AT A GLANCE
5
-5-4-3-2-1012345
Environmental projects
Median Min Max
-5-4-3-2-1012345
Transport projects
Median Min Max
LESSONS LEARNT ON THE EFFECTS (1)
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Direct welfare and economic growth
Endogenous dynamics:• Less important than direct economic growth effects• More likely to be secured by transport projects
Social cohesion: • Side effects in 8 out of 10 projects• They can reach significant magnitude if appropriately exploited
Environmental sustainability:• As expected, environmental projects produce positive environmental
effects• Their full achievement is hampered by various operational difficulties
LESSONS LEARNT ON THE EFFECTS (2)
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Territorial cohesion:• Side effects for environmental projects• Transport projects have no far-reaching and automatic effects
Institutional quality: • Low or medium effects for all the projects observed, particularly for
environment projects• Possible lack of critical mass: major projects are big but few
Social happiness:• They can be influenced by proactive measures • Social (dis)satisfaction can be ‘captured’ by organised vested interests
LESSONS LEARNT ON THE EFFECTS (3)
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• The majority of effects appears to have already stabilised, either in the short or long run
• In some cases effects are not stabilised, but planned investments are expected to improve performance in the future
THE TEMPORAL DYNAMICS OF PROJECT EFFECTS
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40%
27%
33%
Environment
Stabilised in the short term
Stabilised in the long term
Not stabilised yet
21%
40%
39%
Transport
Stabilised in the short term
Stabilised in the long term
Not stabilised yet
PERFORMANCE DRIVERS AT A GLANCE
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-5-4-3-2-1012345
Approp. to the context
Project design
Forecast. capacity
Project govern.
Behav. response
Transport projects
Median Min Max
-5-4-3-2-1012345
Approp. to the context
Project design
Forecast. capacity
Project govern.
Behav. response
Environmental projects
Median Min Max
Appropriateness to the context: • All projects provided adapted solutions to population’s needs (except the
Port of Gioia Tauro)• Context influenced project design by imposing constraints in terms of time,
space and budget
Project design: • All transport projects were characterised by efficient and effective designs • Environmental projects (particularly 2 out of 5) were adversely affected by
budget and time constraint, forecasting mistakes and social pressure, and they lacked the necessary flexibility
Financial sustainability: • Financial sustainability is completely ensured only for the Palermo water
supply and Vigo waste water treatment projects• Future financial sustainability is uncertain for seven of the projects
assessed
LESSONS LEARNT ON THE PERFORMANCE DRIVERS (1)
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Forecasting capacity:
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LESSONS LEARNT ON THE PERFORMANCE DRIVERS (2)
PROJECT Cost overruns
Time overruns Overcapacity Undercapacity
Madrid Metro Line
Palermo Water Supply √
Valorsul solid waste treatment √
Ría de Vigo waste water treatment √
Sogama solid waste treatment √
Port of Gioia Tauro √ √
Egnatia motorway √ √
M1 motorway √ √
Dublin waste water treatment √ √
Mediterranean Corridor √ √ √
Project governance:• Governance is one fundamental factor accounting for project
performance• It should provide for a clear division of competence and adequate
mechanisms to integrate the views of stakeholders
Behavioural response:• Appropriate behavioural response can palliate deficiencies in terms of
design, governance or forecasting but it entails costs
Role of the EC:• The EC’s involvement in the project planning has been highly variable
across countries and type of project
LESSONS LEARNT ON THE PERFORMANCE DRIVERS (3)
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• Drivers are combined in different ways, through project-specific patterns
• Project design and governance are two legs upon which a project stands: they should both adhere to a precise and specific vision of what the project wants to achieve
• Timing of effects is more determined by the project’s structural features than by specific drivers
THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN FACTORS
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• Ex-post CBA provided the framework of analysis to disentangle the most crucial aspects of the project’s performance and final outcomes
• This exercise allowed the team to raise different methodological issues and to draw lessons learnt of general interest, concerning the following themes:
Project identification Time horizon Counterfactual scenario Demand analysis Social Discount Rates Quantification of costs and benefits Shadow prices
LESSONS LEARNT ON EX-POST CBA (1)
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LESSONS LEARNT ON EX-POST CBA (2)
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THEME LESSON
Project identification
• To be assessed on a case by case basis
• Criteria to be considered: 1) self-sufficiency and 2) pertinence and timing of the investments
Time horizon • Appropriate to its economically useful life and long enough to encompass its long term impact
• A time horizon longer that 30 years seems appropriate in case of long-lived mega projects (e.g. Egnatia motorway)
Counterfactual scenario
• The BAU option should be adopted as counterfactual
• In some cases, a feasible and realistic do-minimum option would be preferable
LESSONS LEARNT ON EX-POST CBA (3)
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THEME LESSON
Demand analysis • More complex in transport projects, since they operate in more competitive markets
• Sensitivity and scenario analysis to test the forecasts
Social Discount Rates
• Adoption of two SDRs (backward and forward)
• Risk analysis to test the realism of the SDRs
Quantification of costs and benefits
• Aggregate costs and benefits to deal with data limitations
Shadow prices • Backward and forward and/or region-specific shadow prices could be adopted
The ingredients of success for public investment projects
1. The origin of project ideas: entrepreneurialism within government
2. Professionalism as a built-in insurance mechanism
3. Social ownership to cope with civil claims
4. Forecasting and monitoring as learning devices
5. Governments and projects
6. Incentives for success and identity
CONCLUSIONS
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RECOMMENDATIONS
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Provide solid technical design and forecasting Develop sound and reliable cost-benefit analyses Cost-benefit analysis as key input of the selection
Promote an independent quality review Make social acceptance part of the process
Design responsive governance arrangements
Ensure financial sustainability Design solid risk management
schemes
Develop ‘intrapreneurial’ teams in public administration
Establish a close relationship between project identification and planning
Endorse a role of policy advisor for the EC
Carry out ex-post evaluation Reward good projects and teams Promote knowledge transfer and sharing of best
practice Track project life: a project data warehouse
Undertake systematic monitoring Allow restructuring and redesign
Thank you