financial meltdown :where are we heading ? ricardo v. lago
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Lecture :FINANCIAL MELTDOWN :WHERE ARE WE HEADING ? October 24 , 2009TRANSCRIPT
Florida Interna-onal University Professor JIN ZENG’s Class INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY
FINANCIAL MELTDOWN : WHERE ARE WE HEADING ?
November 22 ,2008
RICARDO V. LAGO
THE SPECTER OF 1929
They Shoot Horses, Don't They? is a 1969 American drama film directed by Sydney Pollack. It is based on the 1935 novel of the same name by Horace McCoy.
It focuses on a group of disparate characters desperate to win a Depression‐era dance marathon and the opportunistic emcee who urges them on to victory.
ISSUES CAUSES OF THE CRISIS AND POLICIES TO DEAL WITH IT
THE PROBLEM OF HIGH LEVERAGE DO WE NEED MORE REGULATION ? THE ATTITUDE OF THE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES
ARE WE HEADING FOR A 1929‐TYPE OF DEPRESSION
Causes of the crisis: “let’s round up the usual suspects”
THE CAUSES OF THE CRISIS WAS IT EXCESSIVE CREDIT AND MONEY GROWTH ?
WAS IT AN UNSUSTAINABLE HOUSING FINANCE MODEL IN THE US ?
WAS IT TOO HIGH LEVERAGE RATIOS ?
WERE THE REGULATORS ASLEEP AT THE HELM ?
THE ANSWER IS : ALL OF THE ABOVE .
ILLIQUIDITY OR INSOLVENCY ? I CALCULATE THE SIZE OF THE WORLD BANKING SYSTEM AT
AT LEAST US$ 100 TRILLION OR 200% OF WORLD’S GDP
FURTHER , I CALCULATE CONSOLIDATED BANKS BOOK VALUE EQUITY AT AT LEAST US$ 5 TRILLION
MY HUNCH IS THAT THE MARKET VALUE OF CONSOLIDATED BANKS EQUITY IS PROBABLY NEGATIVE
BEWARE THAT TRUE SOLVENCY IS FORWARD LOOKING , AND IS DEPENDENT ON MULTIPLE EQULIBRIA
THEREFORE , THE CURRENT ILLIQUIDITY IS GROUNDED ON A PROBLEM OF INSOLVENCY
WARREN BUFFETT’s COLORFUL ILLUSTRATON You don't know who is swimming naked, until the tide goes out, and right now, Wall Street is a nudist beach”
( Interview in CNBC , August 22,2008)
“
SOLUTION :BANK RECAPITALIZATON
RECAPITALIZING THE BANKS ALL OVER THE WORLD WOULD COST NO LESS THAN US$ OR 5 TRILLION OR ABOUT 10% OF THE WORLD GDP
THE USA’s SHARE WOULD BE ABOUT US$1.5 TRILLION ( THE EXPENSE OF THE US TREASURY SO FAR IS ABOUT US$ 1 TRILLION )
BANK RECAPITALIZATION BY INJECTING EQUITY IN THE BANKS
BUYING OUT THE TOXIC ASSETS FROM BANKS ALONE MAY NOT DO THE TRICK
AND WHO PAYS FOR BANK RECAPITALIZATON ?
THE ACTIONS OF THE FED AND THE TREASURY THE SHADOW OF 1929 and of JAPAN 1992
IT IS IMPERATIVE TO STOP THE DE‐LEVERAGING OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS TO AVOID A 1929 ‐TYPE DEPRESSION
THE FED IS DOING THE RIGHT THING : MASSIVE INJECTIONS OF LIQUIDITY .IT BUYS PRECIOUS TIME BUT DOES NOT SOLVE THE PROBLEM
THE TREASURY : THE STATE AS UNDERWRITTER OF LAST RESORT TO AVOID LIQUIDATION (EXCEPT LEHMAN BROS)
RUNNING AGAINST THE CLOCK : THE 700 BILLION QUESTION IS WHETHER THE TREASURY
WILL BE ABLE TO RECAPITALIZE THE BANKS FAST ENOUGH .
LET ME FOCUS NOW ON HIGH LEVERAGE
HOW DOES HIGH LEVERAGE WORK?
GOOD TIMES ‐If the economy keeps growing , you multiply by 30 the profits you make on each dollar of capital .
HARD TIMES ‐When the inevitable economic downswing comes , you blow away the equity position by a wide margin .
Key asymmetry and inequity : in good times profits are privatized , in hard times creditors ( and sometimes shareholders) are bailed out : losses are socialized.
QQQQ
LTCM’s COLLAPSE(1998 ) : THE POSTMAN ’s FIRST RING
Leverage ratio : 26 times on balance sheet , more than 100 times off‐balance sheet
Long Term Capital Management was a hedge‐ fund that collapsed in 1998 and had to be bailed out to prevent widespread effects on creditors .
LTCM had equity of $4.72 billion and had borrowed over $124.5 billion with assets of around $129 billion.
In addition , it had off‐balance sheet derivative positions with a notional value of approximately $1.25 trillion .
AND WHO MODELLED RISK AT LTCM ?
Two of the principals were :
Myron Scholes and Robert Merton
Two academics who shared the Nobel Price of Economics in 1997 ( the year prior to the collapse )
Precisely for their work on the pricing of options
THE FOUR FLAWS OF LTCM VERY HIGH LEVERAGE HUGE OFF BALANCE SHEET OPERATIONS
ABUSE OF DERIVATIVES RISK MODELLING : PARAMETERS ESTIMATED WITH HISTORICAL DATA
FIVE YEARS LATER : WARREN BUFFET’S REMINDER
Derivatives are “financial weapons of mass destruction that could harm not only sellers and buyers but the whole economic system “
(Warren Buffett’s Annual letter to shareholders , 2003 )
“History always repeats itself twice: first time as tragedy, second time as farce” Karl Marx
THE POSTMAN’s SECOND RING : Black September 2008
Abuse of “derivatives” Leverage ratios of failed banks : Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 60 Lehman Bros : higher than 31 AIG : higher than 20
WHAT IS A DERIVATIVE ?
SIMPLE EXAMPLES OF A PUT A CALL A CREDIT DEFAULT SWAP
ISDA® INTERNATIONAL SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES ASSOCIATION, INC.
NEWS RELEASE For Immediate Release, Wednesday, September 24, 2008
ISDA Mid‐Year 2008 Market Survey Shows Credit Derivatives at $54.6 Trillion
ABOUT ISDA
ISDA was chartered in 1985, and today has approximately 850 member institutions from 56 countries on six continents.
Most of the world’s major institutions that deal in privately negotiated derivatives, as well as many of the businesses, governmental entities and other end users that rely on over‐the‐counter derivatives .
INTERNATIONAL SWAP AND DERIVATIVES ASSOCIATION ‐ISDA ( June 2008)
NOTIONAL AMOUNTS OUTSTANDING CREDIT DERIVATIVES US$ 55 trillion INTEREST RATE DERIVATIVES US$ 465 trillion EQUITY DERIVATIVES US$ 12 trillion TOTAL AMOUNTS OUTSTANDING US$ 532 trillion
GROSS CREDIT EXPOSURE US$ 13 trillion
HOW HIGH ARE THESE FIGURES :COMPARISON TO GDP
TOTAL AMOUNTS OUTSTANDING US$ 532 trillion OR ABOUT 10 TIMES THE WORLD’s GDP
OUTSTANDING IN CREDIT SWAPS US$ 55 trillion OR ABOUT EQUIVALENT TO THE WORLD’s GDP
GROSS CREDIT EXPOSURE US$ 13 trillion OR EQUIVALENT TO THE USA’s GDP
DO CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS TRADE IN AN ORGANIZED EXCHANGE ? FORMAL EXCHANGE .No , they don’t . Today , the Chicago Mercantile Exchange announced , it is launching an electronic trading and clearing platform .
REGULATION .How well are they regulated /supervised ?.In general , they are not .
BIS .The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) collects both notional amounts and market values in derivatives .
NEED FOR A FORMAL EXCHANGE
REGULATION ONE OF THE PROBLEMS IS THAT REGULATION IS SCATTERED AMONG SEVERAL INSTITUTIONS : SECRURITIES COMMISSION , FED , COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY , FDIC
DO WE NEED MORE REGULATION ? ‐THE ISSUE IS NOT NEW REGULATIONS ‐THE REGULATORS DID NOT DO THEIR JOB ‐THE FED WAS TOO LAX ON CREDIT GROWTH – ‐THE SECURITIES COMMISION AND OTHERS COULD HAVE FORCED BANK ON LEVERAGE RATIOS , INCREASED PROVISIONS , ETC
‐ UNIFY REGULATORY AGENCIES LIKE IN THE UK
THE CANDIDATES REACTION TO THE CRISIS : IN GENERAL DISAPPOINTING COMPLAINTS ABOUT GREED IN WALL STREET COMPLAINTS ABOUT CORRUPTION IN WASHINGTON A RIGHT MOVE : JOINT SUPPORT FOR THE BAIL OUT PACKAGE
OBAMA MORE OF A STATEMAN IN : THE CORAL GABLES PRESS CONFERENCE
McCAIN :FUNDAMENTALS ARE RIGHT ! BUT CANDIDATES STICK TO THEIR GUNS :
OBAMA ON THE MIDDLE CLASS TAX REDUCTION McCAIN ON THE “LAFFER CURVE” :LOWER INCOME TAXES AND CORPORATE TAXES
PROCTECTIONISM IS A SERIOUS PROBLEM : REMEMBER SMOOT‐HOWLEY TARIFF ACT OF 1930
RISK OF BEGGAR MY NEIGHBOOR ACTIONS
THE CANDIDATES SHOULD HAVE PUT ASIDE THEIR PETTY CASH GIVE‐AWAYS AND FOCUS ON THE REAL PROBLEMS :
‐ SHORT TERM :CAUSES OF THE CRISIS AND HOW TO FIX IT
‐ LONG TERM :THE UNFOLDING BUDGET TIME BOMB .
ARE WE HEADING FOR A 1929‐TYPE DEPRESSION ?
NO …UNLESS ….. THE SHORT ANSWER IS : NO
WE HAVE LEARNT FROM THE POLICY MISTAKES OF 1929
BUT IN ANY CASE IT WILL DEPEND ON THE LEADERSHIP AND UNDERSTANDING OF THE ISSUES OF THE NEW PRESIDENT
WILL ALSO DEPEND ON RESPONSE BY OTHER COUNTRIES .SO FAR SO GOOD ON THIS FRONT .
SEVEN REASONS WHY THIS IS NOT 1929 CENTRAL BANKS ‘s HANDS ARE NOT TIED BY THE GOLD STANDARD
THERE IS DEPOSIT INSURANCE THERE IS UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE AUTHORITIES UNDERSTAND THAT THEY CAN AFFORD TO LET THE BANKING SYSTEM GO BUST
PUBLIC EXPENDITURE STIMULUS INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION NO RETURN TO PROTECTIONISM ( ie .No repetition of the Smoot‐Hawley Act 1930 )
AND THE RESUMPTION OF GROWTH
TWO KEY DRIVERS TO PULL US OUT OF THE HOLE
SUPPLY SIDE : THE FIRST ONE IS ON CONTINUED PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH
DEMAND SIDE :THE SECOND ON DEMAND‐PULL FOR GROWTH
THE INTERNET
THE END