fmea presentation
DESCRIPTION
FMEA PresentationTRANSCRIPT
www.eccinternational.com
ECC International
Failure Mode & Effect Analysis
© 2006 ECCI. All rights reserved.
© 2006 ECCI. All rights reserved.
ECC International
2
Course Objectives
By the end of the course, delegates should be able to:
understand the role and function of FMEA
understand the concepts and techniques of PROCESS FMEA and how to apply it.
© 2006 ECCI. All rights reserved.
ECC International
3
Introduction to FMEA
Definition, Origin, Application, Benefits,
Fitting FMEA with TQM and its role in a Quality System
Relationship of FMEA to other Standards and its Prerequisites
FMEA Proper
Design & Process FMEA
Applying FMEA
FMEA on Automotive Industry
Training Course Outline
• What is FMEA?
• History and Origin of FMEA
• Applications of FMEA
• Benefits
• Fitting FMEA with TQM
• Role of FMEA in a Quality System
• Relationship of FMEA to other Standards
• FMEA Prerequisites
ECC International
© 2004 ECCI. All rights reserved.
© 2006 ECCI. All rights reserved.
ECC International
5
An Advance Quality Planning Tool used to evaluate Potential Failure
Modes and their Causes
Prioritizes Potential Failures according to their risk and drives action to eliminate or reduce their likelihood of occurrence
Introduction to FMEA
© 2006 ECCI. All rights reserved.
ECC International
6
Provides a disciplined methodology for documenting this analysis for future use and continuous process improvement
By itself, an FMEA is NOT a Problem Solver. It is used in combination with other problem solving tools.
“The FMEA presents the opportunity but does not solve the problem.”
Introduction to FMEA
© 2006 ECCI. All rights reserved.
ECC International
7
FMEA
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis – 1960’s and 70’s
First noticed and used by reliability engineers
System of various group activities provided through documentation of potential failure modes of products and or processes and its effect on product performance
The evaluation and documentation of potential failure modes of a product or process. Actions are then identified which could eliminate or reduce the potential failure.
Introduction to FMEA
© 2006 ECCI. All rights reserved.
ECC International
8
Prevention Planning
Identifies change requirements
Cost reduction
Increased through-put
Decreased waste
Decreased warranty cost
Reduced non-value added operations
Introduction to FMEA
© 2006 ECCI. All rights reserved.
ECC International
9
Quality Business
Objectives
Quality Business
Objectives
Problem Prevention
ProblemSolving
SpecialCharacteristics
SpecialCharacteristics
ControlPlan
ControlPlan
SPC ToolsSPC Tools
8 - D8 - D
Q O SQ O S
Process Improvement
Process Improvement
D O ED O E
F M E AF M E A
A P Q PA P Q P
F T AR F T AF T A
R F T A
Q F DQ F D
Introduction to FMEA
© 2006 ECCI. All rights reserved.
ECC International
10
Customer Input
Team – Team Selection (Cross-Functional)
Ranking – Ranking of Decisions
Risk Priority Assessment
Design Process
Production Process
Introduction to FMEA
© 2006 ECCI. All rights reserved.
ECC International
11
Is “… a summary of engineer’s/team’s thoughts (including an analysis of items that could go wrong based upon experience and past concerns) as a process is developed”.
A Process FMEA shall begin with a process flow chart/risk assessment of the general process. This flow chart should identify the product/process characteristics associated with each operation.
“Process Potential FMEA”
Relationship of FMEA to other Standards
© 2006 ECCI. All rights reserved.
ECC International
12
Before or After ?
Individual or Team Approach ?
Introduction to FMEA
© 2006 ECCI. All rights reserved.
ECC International
13
Select proper team and organize members effectively
Select teams for each product/service, process/system
Create a ranking system
Agree on format for FMEA matrix
Define the customer and customer needs/operations
Design/Process requirements
Develop a process flowchart
FMEA Prerequisites - Team
© 2006 ECCI. All rights reserved.
ECC International
14
What is a team ? Two or more who coordinate activities to accomplish . a common task or goal
Maintaining Focus A separate team for each product or project
Brainstorm Brainstorming (the Team) is necessary as the intent is to discover many possibilities.
FMEA Prerequisites - Team
© 2006 ECCI. All rights reserved.
ECC International
15
Representatives who have keyinformation or are stakeholders.
Assigned by steering committeeor upper management.
Assigned by or negotiated with steering committee or
upper management.
Disbands when task is finished.
Leadership shared or delegated by members.
Work area or unit.Representatives from support
groups on as-needed basis.
Participation is mandatory.
Assigned by management oridentified by team and within
its authority.
On-going
Leader appointed by management.
Membership
Member Selection
Project Identification
Team Life Span
Leadership
Natural Work Group Task Team
Two Types of Team Structures
FMEA Prerequisites - Team
© 2006 ECCI. All rights reserved.
ECC International
16
Are management directed and focused
Build their own identity
Are accountable and use measurements
Have corporate champions
Fit into organization
Are cross-functional or multi-disciplinary
Some teams just “Do not Work”
FMEA Prerequisites - Team
© 2006 ECCI. All rights reserved.
ECC International
17
Determine if there should be a meeting
Decide who should attend
Provide advance notices
Maintain minutes or records
Establish ground rules
Provide and follow and agenda
Evaluate meetings
Allow NO INTERRUPTIONS
FMEA Prerequisites - Team
© 2006 ECCI. All rights reserved.
ECC International
18
Clarify
Participate
Listen
Summarize
Stay on track
Manage Time
Test for consensus
Evaluate meeting process
FMEA Prerequisites - Team
© 2006 ECCI. All rights reserved.
ECC International
19
Start during prototype stage
Design Engineer - Generally the team leader
Team Members
Test Engineer Project Manager or Representative
Reliability Engineer Quality Engineer
Materials Engineer Customer Contact Person
Field Service Engineer Others, including Mfg, Sales,
Component Process Engineer Marketing, QA / QC, Process,
Vehicle Process Engineer Packaging.
Styling Engineer
FMEA Prerequisites – Design FMEA Team
© 2006 ECCI. All rights reserved.
ECC International
20
Process Engineer - Generally the Team Leader
Production Operator
Team Members
Industrial Engineer Styling Engineer
Design Engineer Project Manager or Rep.
Reliability Engineer Quality Engineer
Tooling Engineer Others incl. Supplier, Sales, QA/QC, Mfg.
Maintenance Engineer
FMEA Prerequisites – Process FMEA Team
© 2006 ECCI. All rights reserved.
ECC International
21
How do you CURRENTLYprevent problems from occurring?
FMEA Prerequisites - Team
© 2006 ECCI. All rights reserved.
ECC International
22
Design FMEA Customer
• End User; person who uses the product
• Use Failure
• This can help in Repair Manuals & Filed Service
• More in DFMEA section herein…
Process FMEA Customer
• Subsequent operations
• End User; person who uses the product
• More in the PFMEA section herein…
FMEA Prerequisites – Defining the Customer
© 2006 ECCI. All rights reserved.
ECC International
23
Design Failures & CausesDesign Failures & Causeswithwith
Process Failures & CausesProcess Failures & Causes
DESIGN FAILURES PROCESS FAILURES
Insufficient lubrication capability
Incorrect material specified
Insufficient lubrication applied
Incorrect material used
CAUTION!DO NOT MIX UP:
© 2006 ECCI. All rights reserved.
ECC International
24
RPN = (S) x (O) x (D)
S = Severity
O = Likelihood of Occurrence
D = Likelihood of DetectionPrevention vs Detection – Automotive Expectations
• 100 is the Maximum and 75 is considered “OK”
• High and low numbers are the important ones to consider
• Input Concept
FMEA Prerequisites – Creating Ranking System
© 2006 ECCI. All rights reserved.
ECC International
25
Process Function –
ReqmtsPotentialFailureMode
PotentialEffects of
Failure
SeverIty
PotentialCauses/
Mechanism(s) of
Failure
Occurrence
CurrentProcess Controls
DetectIon
R
P
N
Occurred
SeverIty
DetectIon
R
P
N
Recommended
Actionsand
Status
ResponsibleActivity
andTarget
CompletionDate
ActionsTaken
From Experience & Data
FromGuess
Item- Function
PotentialFailureMode
PotentialEffects of
Failure
SeverIty
PotentialCauses/
Mechanism(s) of
Failure
Occurrence
CurrentDesign Control
DetectIon
R
P
N
Occurred
SeverIty
DetectIon
R
P
N
RecommendedActions
andStatus
ResponsibleActivity
andTarget
CompletionDate
Pro
cess
FM
EA
Des
ign
FM
EA
Device /Process Cause Effect Control
Failure Mode Chance of Occurrence Severity Chance not detected
FMEA Prerequisites – Creating Ranking System
Design FMEA
Process FMEA
ECC International
© 2004 ECCI. All rights reserved.
© 2006 ECCI. All rights reserved.
ECC International
27
© 2006 ECCI. All rights reserved.
ECC International
28
Design FMEA
Design FMEA – is an analytical technique utilized primarily by a design FMEA team to ensure potential failure modes and their associated causes are identified, considered, and addressed.
Referenced in the AIAG FMEA Reference Manual.
This systematic approach parallels, formalizes an documents the mental discipline that an engineer normally goes through in any design process.
© 2006 ECCI. All rights reserved.
ECC International
29
Design FMEA foci
End User
• Repair Functions
• Dealership or other sales Outlet
• Designer of the next level system or product
• Process Engineers
• Assembly Engineers
• Test Engineers
• Product Analysis
© 2006 ECCI. All rights reserved.
ECC International
30
Typical Design Consideration
Design Intent
Customer Needs - can be specified and measured
Customer Wants - some cannot be explained
Product Requirements
Manufacturing Assembly Requirements
What the design is expected to do and what it is expected
not to do.
Think about what documents in your company
are used to define these
Quality Function DeploymentCustomer Contacts
Competitive AnalysisKnown Product Quality
Reliability RequirementsManufacturing Requirements
Start with a list of:
© 2006 ECCI. All rights reserved.
ECC International
31
Design FMEA Benefits
Aids in the objective evaluation of design requirements and alternatives.
Increases the probability that potential failure modes and their effects on the system/product have been considered.
Aids in the planning of design test and development programs.
Aids in analyzing field concerns, design changes and in developing advanced designs.
Ranks potential failure modes according to their effect on the customer, thus prioritizing improvements and development testing.
Provides an open issue format for recommending and tracking risk reducing actions.
© 2006 ECCI. All rights reserved.
ECC International
32
Design FMEA
The DFMEA
is a living document and should be initiated at, or by, design concept completion.
should be continually updated as changes occur throughout all phases of product development.
should be fundamentally complete along with the final product drawings.
addresses the design intent and assumes the design will be manufactures/assembled to this intent
The Potential Failure Modes/Causes which can occur during manufacturing or assembly process are covered by the Process FMEA and therefore should NOT be included in a Design FMEA.
More Design FMEA Considerations
© 2006 ECCI. All rights reserved.
ECC International
33
Causes of design failure modes are those things that, from a designer’s perspective, would, by
omission or
improper use, result in the
failure mode.
Design Failure CausesDesign FMEA
© 2006 ECCI. All rights reserved.
ECC International
34
Improper Tolerancing
Incorrect Stress Calculations
Wrong Assumptions
Wrong Material Call Out
Lower Grade Component
Lack of Design Standards
Improper Heat Treatment
Improper Torque Call Out
Design Failure Cause ExamplesDesign FMEA
© 2006 ECCI. All rights reserved.
ECC International
35
Body
Doors Exterior Window Interior
Door InnerPanel
GlassSealingw/ Strip
Latch/Lock
If the product function is complex, break it down into smaller subsystems. Identify
primary vs. secondary functions.
Design Block Diagram ExampleDesign FMEA
© 2006 ECCI. All rights reserved.
ECC International
36
Item-Function
PotentialFailureMode
PotentialEffects of
Failure
SeverIty
PotentialCauses/
Mechanism(s) of
Failure
Occurrence
CurrentDesign Control
DetectIon
R
P
N
Occurred
SeverIty
DetectIon
R
P
N
RecommendedActions
andStatus
ResponsibleActivity
andTarget
CompletionDate
FromGuess
From Experience & Data
Wording is important
DFMEA Basic Columns
Design FMEA
© 2006 ECCI. All rights reserved.
ECC International
37
HazardouswithoutWarning
Hazardouswith
Warning
Very high
High
Moderate
Low
Very Low
Minor
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
Very high severity ranking when a potential failure mode affects safevehicle operation and./or involves noncompliance with government
regulation without warning.
Very high severity ranking when a potential failure mode affects safevehicle operation and./or involves noncompliance with government
regulation with warning.
Vehicle/item inoperable, with loss of primary function.
Vehicle/item inoperable, but at a reduced level of performance. Customer dissatisfied.
Vehicle/item operable, but Comfort/Convenience item(s) inoperable. Customer experiences discomfort.
Vehicle/item operable, but Comfort/Convenience item(s) operable at reduced level of performance. Customer experiences some dissatisfaction,
Fit & Finish/Squeak & Rattle item does not conform. Defect noticed by most customers.
Fit & Finish/Squeak & Rattle item does not conform. Defect noticed by average customers.
Fit & Finish/Squeak & Rattle item does not conform. Defect noticed by discriminating customers.
No effect.
Very Minor
None
Effect Criteria: Severity of Effect Ranking
Generic Design FMEA SeveritySuggested Evaluation Criteria
Design FMEA
© 2006 ECCI. All rights reserved.
ECC International
38
Very High: Failure is almost inevitable
High: Repeated Failures
10
9
8
7
1 in 2
1 in 3
1 in 8
1 in 20
1 in 80
1 in 400
6
5Moderate: Occasional Failures
Low: Relatively Few Failures1 in 2,000
1 in 15,000
4
3
Remote: Failure Unlikely1 in 150,000
1 in 1,500,000
2
1
Probability of Failure Possible Failure Rates Ranking
Generic Design FMEA OccurrenceSuggested Evaluation Criteria
Design FMEA
© 2006 ECCI. All rights reserved.
ECC International
39
Detection Criteria: Likelihood of Detection by Design Control RankingAbsolute
Uncertainty
Very Remote
Remote
10
9
8
Design control will not and/or can not detect potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode; or there is no Design Control.
Very remote chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism andsubsequent failure mode.
Remote chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode.
Very Low
Low
Very low chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism andsubsequent failure mode.
Low chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode.
7
6
ModerateModerate chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and
subsequent failure mode.5
ModeratelyHigh
Moderately high chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode.
4
HighHigh chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and
subsequent failure mode.3
2
1
Very high chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode.
Design Control will almost certainly detect a potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode.
Very High
Almost Certain
Generic Design FMEA DetectionSuggested Evaluation Criteria
Design FMEA
© 2006 ECCI. All rights reserved.
ECC International
40
Design controls are those actions taken as a normal part of the development process that are designed into the process to minimize the occurrence of failure or to
detect specific failure modes.
Design controls should directly relate to the
Prevention and/or Detection of specific
causes of failures.
Design FMEA
© 2006 ECCI. All rights reserved.
ECC International
41
Designed Experiments
Finite Element Analysis
Variation Simulation
FT Analysis
Component Derating (60% to 80%)
100,000 Mile Pilot Test
Reliability Tests/Prototype Testing
Design Reviews
Worst Case Stress Analysis
Robust Design
Environmental Stress Testing
ConsiderInterpretation
of Data
Design Control ExamplesDesign FMEA
© 2006 ECCI. All rights reserved.
ECC International
42
When the failure modes have been ranked by their RPN, corrective actions should be first directed at the highest ranked concerns and critical items identified.
The intent of any recommended action is to reduce one or more (or all) of the occurrence, severity and/or detection rankings.
Only a design revision can bring about a reductionreduction in the severity ranking. If no actions are recommended for a specific cause, this should be indicated.
Design FMEA
© 2006 ECCI. All rights reserved.
ECC International
43
(Continued)
A reduction in the occurrence ranking can only be effected by removing or controlling one or more of the causes of the failure mode through a design revision.
An increase in design verification actions will result in a reduction in the detection ranking ONLY.
Design FMEA does not rely on process controls to overcome weaknesses in the design; however, it does take technical and physical limitations of a process into consideration (Design Rules).
Design FMEA
© 2006 ECCI. All rights reserved.
ECC International
44
Process FMEA
© 2006 ECCI. All rights reserved.
ECC International
45
Sample Sizes
EvaluationFrequency
Method of Evaluation
Out-of-ControlAction Plan
(OCAP)
IdentifiesCritical and Significant
Characteristicsand is therefore
theStarting Point
for theControl Plan
The Process FMEAThe Process FMEA
Process FMEA
© 2006 ECCI. All rights reserved.
ECC International
46
Use a Process Flow Chart!Because:
You want to understand your current process
You are looking for opportunities to improve
You want to illustrate a potential solution
You have improved a process and want to document the new process
Process Flow Chart
© 2006 ECCI. All rights reserved.
ECC International
47
Identify the process or task you want to analyze.
Ask the people most familiar with the process to help construct the chart.
Agree on the starting point and ending point.
Agree on the level of detail you will use.
Look for areas of improvement
Is the process standardized, or are the people doing the work in different ways?
Are steps repeated or out of sequence?
Are there steps that do not add value to the output?
Are there steps where errors occur frequently?
Are there rework loops?
Creating a Process Flow Chart
© 2006 ECCI. All rights reserved.
ECC International
48
(Continued)
Identify the sequence and the steps taken to carry out the process.
Construct the process flow chart either from left to right or from top to bottom, using the standard symbols and connecting the steps with arrows.
Analyze the results
Where are the rework loops?
Are there process steps that do not add value to the output?
Where are the differences between the current and the desired situation?
Creating a Process Flow Chart
© 2006 ECCI. All rights reserved.
ECC International
49
A summary of the engineer’s and the team’s thoughts (including an analysis of items that could go wrong based on experience and past concerns) as a process is developed in the manufacturing planning process.
Process FMEA
© 2006 ECCI. All rights reserved.
ECC International
50
Identifies potential product-related failure modes
Assesses the potential customer effects of the failures
Identifies the potential internal and external manufacturing or assembly process causes and identifies process variables on which to focus controls for occurrence reduction and/or detention of the failure condition(s).
Develops ranked list of potential failure modes, thus establishing a priority system for corrective action considerations.
Documents the results of the manufacturing or assembly process
Process FMEA
© 2006 ECCI. All rights reserved.
ECC International
51
Teams should be run by the owner of the process or someone who understands the process well.
Defines reasons for rejection at specific operations.
In preparation for the FMEA, the assumption should be made that the incoming parts and materials are correct.
A comparison of similar processes and a review of customer claims relating to similar components is a recommended starting point. A knowledge of the purpose of the design is necessary.
It can be cause-associated with a potential failure mode in a subsequent operation or an effect associated with a potential failure in a previous operation.
Each potential failure mode for the particular operation should be listed in terms of a part or process characteristic.
Process FMEA
© 2006 ECCI. All rights reserved.
ECC International
52
end user
next manufacturing or process step
process engineers
assembly engineers
repair functions
test engineers
product analysis
dealership or other sales outlet
Process FMEA
The Customer
© 2006 ECCI. All rights reserved.
ECC International
53
The Process Potential FMEA - identifies potential product related process failure modes
- assesses the potential customer effects of the failures
Process FMEA
As a systematic approach, the Process Potential FMEA parallels and formalizes the mental discipline that an engineer goes through in any manufacturing planning process.
© 2006 ECCI. All rights reserved.
ECC International
54
Process FMEA
(Continued)
identifies potential manufacturing and/or assembly process causes
identifies significant process variables to focus controls for occurrence reduction and detection of failure conditions.
develops a list of potential failure modes ranked according to their effect on the customer, thus establishing a priority system
for corrective and preventive action considerations.
© 2006 ECCI. All rights reserved.
ECC International
55
The PFMEA
is a living document.
should be continually updated as changes occur throughout all phases of product development and on into and through to the end of production.
should begin with a flowchart of the process - from receiving through shipping and warehousing
addresses the design intent and assumes the design will be manufactures/assembled to this intent
The Potential Failure Modes/Causes which can occur during manufacturing or assembly process are covered by the Process FMEA but some information (severity rankings, identification of some effects) MAY come from Design FMEA.
Process FMEA More Process FMEA ConsiderationsMore Process FMEA Considerations
© 2006 ECCI. All rights reserved.
ECC International
56
ProcessFunction
Requirements
PotentialFailureMode
PotentialEffects of
Failure
SeverIty
PotentialCauses/
Mechanism(s) of
Failure
Occurrence
CurrentProcess Controls
DetectIon
R
P
N
Occurred
SeverIty
DetectIon
R
P
N
RecommendedActions
andStatus
ResponsibleActivity
andTarget
CompletionDate
ActionsTaken
Wording is important
From Experience & Data
FromGuess
Process FMEA Generic PFMEA Basic ColumnsGeneric PFMEA Basic Columns
Customer Complaints
Warranty & Repair Info.
Internal Scrap & Rework History
FMEA Team Expertise
(Brainstorming)
• Brainstorming Principles
• Process Flow Diagrams
• Starting FMEA
• FMEA Roadmap
• FMEA Priority Actions
ECC International
© 2004 ECCI. All rights reserved.
© 2006 ECCI. All rights reserved.
ECC International
58
Brainstorming attempts to generate a list of ideas that can be evaluated and refined by the whole team
In a brainstorming session:
Criticism is NOT allowed
Evaluation of ideas is held off until a later stage
“Free-wheeling” is welcome
All ideas are welcome; nothing is refused
Quantity is desired - the more ideas the better
Hitchhiking is encouraged - build upon and improve upon ideas of other
Suggestions for “pumping” ideas:
Trigger session - Round Robin
Pass the buck
BRAINSTORMING Principles
© 2006 ECCI. All rights reserved.
ECC International
59
Flow diagrams provide a process overview at a glance. It assists in:
Identifying process customers
Specifying where is value is added
Relating one step to other steps
Determining appropriate data collection and control points
Highlighting work place deficiencies
Promoting teamwork, understanding and decision-making
Process Flow Diagrams
© 2006 ECCI. All rights reserved.
ECC International
60
© 2006 ECCI. All rights reserved.
ECC International
61
STEP # 1: Determine the Process to be Considered
The use of process flow diagrams provide a process overview at a glance and shows process functions/behaviors.
The conduct if FMEA is limited to the current level of understanding of process behaviors. Anything beyond the level of comprehension at a time of drafting should not be included.
Process function should be as mush as possible be expressed in verb-noun function.
Starting FMEA
© 2006 ECCI. All rights reserved.
ECC International
62
Process function expressed asVerb-Noun
Process function expressed asVerb-Noun
Failure mode (s)Failure mode (s)
Absence of Function
Absence of Function
“Does not, no”
“Does not, no”
Function done poorly,
inadequately or incompletely
Function done poorly,
inadequately or incompletely
Express inDirectional or
Actionable terms
Express inDirectional or
Actionable terms
Starting FMEASTEP # 2: Brainstorm the Potential Failure Modes that are Generated by the Process
© 2006 ECCI. All rights reserved.
ECC International
63
When defining failure modes - assume prior steps and incoming materials (inclusive of the units to be processed) are perfect.
STEP # 2: Brainstorm the Potential Failure Modes that are Generated by the Process
Starting FMEA
© 2006 ECCI. All rights reserved.
ECC International
64
An effect of a failure is the consequence (s) of a failure mode that would be noticed or experienced at the next station, or a subsequent operation, by a downstream user or by the ultimate customer.
Customers are defined as next-in-line customer rather than the end-user.
Look at effects from within, up to the next immediate process. If the particular failure mode has experiences of ending up at the customer, indicate a note to properly effect the severity rating.
Consider: next user, downstream user, ultimate customer, product operation, safety, government regulations
Starting FMEA
STEP # 3: Identify Potential Effects of Each Failure Mode
© 2006 ECCI. All rights reserved.
ECC International
65
PEOPLE
METHODS
MACHINERY
ULTIMATECUSTOMER
MATERIALSFAILURE
MODE
DOWNSTREAM USER
NEXT OPERATION
ENVIRONMENT
POTENTIAL EFFECTS
Starting FMEA
Cause & Effect Diagram
POTENTIAL CAUSES
© 2006 ECCI. All rights reserved.
ECC International
66
SEVERITY :
Severity is a rating corresponding to the seriousness of an effect of a potential failure mode.
Starting FMEA
STEP # 4: Determine the Severity of the Effect
© 2006 ECCI. All rights reserved.
ECC International
67
SEVERITY is an assessment
of the seriousness of the
effect of the potential
failure mode to the
customer.
SEVERITY applies to the
effect only.
Process FMEA
Generic Process FMEA Severity
© 2006 ECCI. All rights reserved.
ECC International
68
Process FMEA – Suggested Severity Criteria Criteria : Severity of Effect Criteria : Severity of Effect
This ranking results when a potentialfailure mode results in a final customerand/or a manufacturing / assembly plantdefect. The final customer should alwaysbe considered first. If both occur, use thehigher of the two severities.
This ranking results when a potentialfailure mode results in a final customerand/or a manufacturing / assembly plantdefect. The final customer should alwaysbe considered first. If both occur, use thehigher of the two severities.
(Customer Effect) (Manufacturing/Assembly Effect)Hazardous Without warning
Very high severity ranking when potential failuremode affects safe vehicle operation and/orinvolves noncompliance with governmentregulation without warning
or may endager operator (machine orassembly) without warning.
10
Hazardous with warning
Very high severity ranking when potential failuremode affects safe vehicle operation and/orinvolves noncompliance with governmentregulation with warning.
or may endager operator (machine orassembly) with warning.
9
Very high Vehicle/item inoperable (loss of primaryfunction)
or 100% of product may have to be scrapped,or vehicle/item repaired in repair departmentwith a repair time greater than one hour.
8
High Vehicle/item operable, but a reduced level ofperformance. Customer very dissatisfied.
or product may have to be sorted and a portion(less than 100%) scrapped, or vehicle/itemrepaired in repair department with repair timebetween a half hour and an hour.
7
Moderate Vehicle/item operable, but comfort /convenience item(s) inoperable. Customerdissatisfied.
or a portion (less than 100%) of the productmay have to be scrapped without sorting, orvehicle/item repaired in repair item with a repairtime less than half hour.
6
Low Vehicle/item operable, but comfort /convenience item(s) operable at a reduced levelof performance.
or 100% of product may have to be reworked, or vehicle/item repaired off line but does not go torepair department.
5
Very low Fit and finish/squeak and rattle item does notconform. Defect noticed by most customers(greater than 75%)
or the product may have to sorted, with noscrap, and a portion (less than 100%)reworked.
4
Minor Fit and finish/squeak and rattle item does notconform. Defect noticed by 50% of customers.
or a portion (less than 100%) of the productmay have to be reworked, with no scrap, on linebut out of station.
3
Very minor
Fit and finish/squeak and rattle item does notconform. Defect noticed by discriminatingcustomers (less than 25%)
or a portion (less than 100%) of the productmay have to be reworked, with no scrap, on linebut in station.
2
None No discernible effect. or slight inconvenience to operation or operator,or no effect.
1
Effect Ranking
© 2006 ECCI. All rights reserved.
ECC International
69
CAUSE:
A cause of a failure mode is a deficiency that results in a failure mode. It is description of how the process could result in a failure.
Must consider: method, machinery, materials, people and environment
Be specific! General statements such as “equipment malfunction” must not be used.
Use only first level causes for this analysis.
Deal on real issues and not on operator issues. Assume operators will do their best. This leaves us to focus on systematic failures with actionable causes.
Starting FMEA
STEP # 5: Determine Potential Cause for each Failure Mode
© 2006 ECCI. All rights reserved.
ECC International
70
01. Omitted processing 02. Processing errors 03. Errors setting up work pcs 04. Missing parts 05. Wrong parts 06. Processing wrong work pc 07. Mis-operation 08. Adjustment error 09. Equipment not set up properly 10. Tools and/or fixtures improperly prepared
11. Poor control procedures 12. Improper equipment maintenance 13. Bad recipe 14. Fatigue 15. Lack of safety 16. Hardware Failure 17. Failure to enforce controls 18. Environment 19. Stress connections 20. Poor FMEA(s)
Process FMEA
Process Failure CausesProcess Failure Causes
© 2006 ECCI. All rights reserved.
ECC International
71
OCCURRENCE
Is rated as the number of times the cause has resulted in the failure mode before any additional process control are applied. The rating should be based on actual records such as machine downtime report, process yield and defects report, SPC log of activities, extent of reworks, production reports, etc.
The occurrence rating of each cause should reflect the relative occurrence of both the failure and cause.
Starting FMEA
STEP # 6: Rank the Occurrence of each Cause
© 2006 ECCI. All rights reserved.
ECC International
72
OCCURRENCE is how
frequently the specific
failure cause
/mechanism is
projected to occur.
Process FMEA
Generic Process FMEA Occurrence
© 2006 ECCI. All rights reserved.
ECC International
73
Probability of Failure Possible Failure Rates Ranking
Very High: Persistent failures
High: Frequent failures
Moderate: Occasional failures
Low: Relatively few failures
100 per thousand pieces
50 per thousand pieces
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
20 per thousand pieces
10 per thousand pieces
5 per thousand pieces
2 per thousand pieces
1 per thousand pieces
0.5 per thousand pieces
0.1 per thousand pieces
Remote: Failure unlikely. < 0.01 per thousand pieces
Process FMEA
Generic PFMEA OccurrenceSuggested Evaluation Criteria
© 2006 ECCI. All rights reserved.
ECC International
74
DETECTION :
Detection is rating corresponding to the likelihood that current process will detect the failure mode before it gets to the customer
In identifying detection (D) process controls, remember that if it is not rejecting units it will not be considered as a “D” control.
Detection (D) type controls must be as close as possible to the process itself for instantaneous feedback.
Starting FMEA
STEP # 7: Identify the Process Controls that are currently used to detect the failure mode or prevent the cause
© 2006 ECCI. All rights reserved.
ECC International
75
Detection (D) controls must treat each defined process step. Never consider those “D” controls too far down the line.
Do not rate prevention (P) controls as you have them rated already in the occurrence.
Detection should not be related to occurrence; detection indicates the likelihood of a failure that has occurred.
Assume that a failure has occurred to detection rating.
REMEMBER:
Controls are for causes or failure modes, but the Detection ranking only applies to controls for Failure Modes, I.e., for “D” controls not on “P” controls.
Starting FMEA
STEP # 7: Identify the Process Controls that are currently used to detect the failure mode or prevent the cause
© 2006 ECCI. All rights reserved.
ECC International
76
DETECTION is an assessment of the probability that the proposed type (2) current process controls will detect a potential
cause/mechanism (process weakness), or the probability that
the proposed type (3) process controls will detect the subsequent failure mode, before the part of the
component leaves the manufacturing operation or assembly location.
Process FMEA
Generic Process FMEA Detection
© 2006 ECCI. All rights reserved.
ECC International
77
Assume the failure has occurred and then assess the
capabilities of all current controls to prevent shipment of
the part having this failure mode or defect.
Random quality control checks would be unlikely to detect
the existence of an isolated defect and therefore would result
in low to remote detection ranking.
Sampling done on a statistical basis is valid detection control.
A reduction in detection ranking can only be achieved by
improving process control system(s).
Process FMEA
Generic Process FMEA Detection (continued)
© 2006 ECCI. All rights reserved.
ECC International
78
01. Standardized work instructions/procedures
02. Fixtures and jigs
03. Mechanical interference interfaces
04. Mechanical counters
05. Mechanical sensors
06. Electrical/Electronic sensors
07. Job sheets or Process packages
Controls can beprocess controls
suchas fixture
fool-proofingor SPC,
or can be post-process
inspection/testing.
Process FMEA Process Control ExamplesProcess Control Examples
© 2006 ECCI. All rights reserved.
ECC International
79
08. Bar coding with software integration and control
09. Marking
10. Training and related educational safeguards
11. Visual checks
12. Gage studies
13. Preventive maintenance
14. Automation (Real Time Control)
Inspection/testingmay occur at thesubject operation or at subsequent
operation(s) that can
detect the subject failure mode.
Process FMEA Process Control Examples Process Control Examples (continued)(continued)
© 2006 ECCI. All rights reserved.
ECC International
80
SPC Records
Visual aids
Work instructions
Inspection instructions/records
Equipment operating instructions
Training records
Traceability records
Process FMEA
© 2006 ECCI. All rights reserved.
ECC International
81
Process FMEA – Suggested Detection Criteria
A B CAlmost impossible
Absolute certainty of non detection
X Cannot detect or is not checked. 10
Very Remote
Controls will probably not detect.
X Control is achieved with indirect or random checksonly.
9
Remote Controls have poor chance of detection
X Control is achieved with visual inspection only. 8
Very Low Controls have poor chance of detection
X Control is achieved with double visual inspection only. 7
Low Controls may detect. X X Control is achieved with charting methods, such asSPC (Statistical Process Control)
6
Moderate Controls may detect. X Control is based on variable gauging after parts leftthe station, or Go/No Go gauging performed on 100%of the parts after parts have left the station.
5
Moderately high
Controls have a good chance to detect.
X X Error detection in subsequent operations, OR gaugingperformed on set up and first piece check (for set upcauses only).
4
High Controls have a good chance to detect.
X X Error detection in station, or error detection insubsequent operations by multiple layers ofacceptance: supply, select, install, verify. Cannotaccept discrepant part.
3
Very high Controls almost certain to detect.
X X Error detection in station (automatic gauging withautomatic stop feature). Cannot pass discrepant part.
2
Very high Controls certain to detect. X Discrepant parts cannot be made because item hasbeen error proofed by process/product design.
1
Ranking
Suggested PFMEA Detection Evaluation Criteria
Inspection TypesDetection Criteria Suggested Range of Detection Methods
© 2006 ECCI. All rights reserved.
ECC International
82
RPN
The RN is a measure of process risk and should be used to rank order the risks/concerns. It is calculated by getting the product of:
SEVERITY x OCCURRENCE x DETECTION
For RPN calculation purpose, the following must be observed:
The largest severity score will be used from among the severity score.
The largest occurrence rating will be applied for calculation
However, for detection score - the lowest score is utilized
Starting FMEA
STEP # 8: Calculate RPN
© 2006 ECCI. All rights reserved.
ECC International
83
Corrective action measures must be taken to reduce the risk for the following conditions:
Severity is <5.
It has the highest S*O rating
It belongs to the top 3 RPN’s (but not necessary)
RPN >100.
Note: These conditions only serve as a guide in prioritizing corrective actions. Eng’g findings and decisions will still hold through.
Starting FMEA
STEP # 9: Plan appropriate Corrective Action based on RPN
© 2006 ECCI. All rights reserved.
ECC International
84
The purpose of any action is to reduce the occurrence and/or
detection ranking. The action plan should include:
Recommended action : must be defined to reduce the risk
associated
Responsibility - the organization and/or individual responsible for
the action and the target date of completion.
Action taken - a brief description of the actual completed action and
the effective date.
Resulting RPN - after C/A has been taken, the occurrence and
detection ranking must be defined and the RPN recalculated.
STEP # 9: Plan appropriate Corrective Action based on RPN
Starting FMEA
© 2006 ECCI. All rights reserved.
ECC International
85
Corrective action should be first directed at the
highest concerns as rank ordered by RPN.
The intent of any recommended action is to reduce
the occurrence, severity and/or detection rankings.
If no actions are recommended for a specific
cause, then this should be indicated.
Process FMEA
© 2006 ECCI. All rights reserved.
ECC International
86
Only a design revision can bring about a reduction in the severity
ranking.
To reduce the probability of occurrence, process and/or
specifications revisions are required.
To increase the probability of detection, process control and/or
inspection changes are required.
Improving detection controls is typically costly. The emphasis should
be placed on preventing, rather than detecting, defects.
(Continued)
Process FMEA
© 2006 ECCI. All rights reserved.
ECC International
87
Eng’g is responsible for assuring that the recommended actions
have been adequately addressed and implemented.
An FMEA is a living document and should always reflect the latest
process as well as the latest actions.
Events when FMEA should be reviewed:
A change (I.e., added, deleted or altered) in the process or
equipment
When process improvements or problems have potential to alter
the RPN due to a change in severity, occurrence or detection
As actions or results are documented/implemented
Starting FMEA
STEP # 10: FMEA Follow-up Review and Revision
© 2006 ECCI. All rights reserved.
ECC International
88
POTENTIAL FAILURE MODEPOTENTIAL FAILURE MODE
EFFECTEFFECT
CAUSECAUSE
CURRENT CONTROLSCURRENT CONTROLS
DETERMINE OCCURRENCEDETERMINE OCCURRENCE
DETERMINE SEVERITYDETERMINE SEVERITY
DETERMINE DETECTABILITYDETERMINE DETECTABILITY
ACTIONS LEADING TOCONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT
ACTIONS LEADING TOCONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT
DETERMINE RPNDETERMINE RPN
FMEA Roadmap
© 2006 ECCI. All rights reserved.
ECC International
89
SEVERITY
OCCURRENCE
DETECTION
Changing design (material,
geometry, etc)
Changing designor process
Adding/improvingcontrols/methods
Eliminating failuremode
Preventing or reducing
occurrences of one
or more causes
Improving ability
to detect thefailure mode
FMEA Priority Actions
© 2006 ECCI. All rights reserved.
ECC International
90
© 2006 ECCI. All rights reserved.
ECC International
91
The Team Developing the FMEA turns out to be One Individual
The FMEA is created to satisfy a customer or third party requirement, NOT to improve the process.
The FMEA is developed too late in the process and does not improved the product/process development cycle.
The FMEA is perceived either as too complicated or as taking too much time.
Wrong approach to FMEA and its Misconception
© 2006 ECCI. All rights reserved.
ECC International
92© 2003 ECCI. All rights reserved.