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REUNITE NOTES.DOC
HAGUEANDNON‐HAGUECONVENTIONABDUCTIONSNOTESFORREUNITEWEBSITEONHAGUECONVENTIONLAWASAT20THOCTOBER2009
DuncanRanton
A. TheLegalFramework
B. Wrongfulremovalsandretentions
C. RightsofCustody
D. ConventionDefences
E. TheJudicialDiscretion
F. Non‐HagueConventionCases
G. Sequestration
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A. THELEGALFRAMEWORK
EssentialReading
• ChildAbductionandCustodyAct1985(PartIandSchedule1)
• CouncilRegulation(EC)No.2201/2003of27November2003concerningjurisdictionandthe
recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of
parentalresponsibility,repealingRegulation(EC)No.1347/2000(“BIIr”),Articles10and11)
1. Definition
Inthiscontext,“abduction”meanstheremovalorretentionofachildbyaparent,guardian
or familymemberwithout the consent of theother personor peoplewho are entitled to
participate indecisionsabout thatchild’s futureandupbringing. Theparadigmabduction
hasshiftedradicallyoverthepasttwentyyears.
2. TheHagueConvention
TheHagueConferenceon Private International Lawwas formed in 1893 to “work for the
progressiveunificationoftherulesofprivateinternationallaw”.Thisitdoesbycreatingand
assisting in the implementation of multilateral treaties promoting the harmonisation of
conflictoflawsprinciplesindiversesubjectmatterswithinprivateinternationallaw.
One such treaty is the 1980 Hague Convention in the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction(“theAbductionConvention”).
The Abduction Convention is perhaps the best known treaty emanating from the Hague
Conference,andworld‐wide is thebest knownof thevariousarrangements regulating the
cross‐bordermovementofchildren.
Asat26August2009,eighty‐oneContractingStateshadsigned,ratifiedoraccededtothe
HagueConvention.
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TheUnitedKingdomofGreatBritainandNorthern IrelandsignedtheHagueConventionin
November 1984. It was incorporated into our domestic law by the Child Abduction and
CustodyAct1985(Schedule1).TheConventionenteredintoforceon1August1986.
Article3oftheHagueConventionidentifieswhatanapplicantmustdemonstratetolaunch
anapplication:
“Article3
Theremovalortheretentionofachildistobeconsideredwrongfulwhere–
(a) it is inbreachof rightsof custodyattributed toaperson,an institutionor
anyotherbody,either jointlyoralone,underthe lawoftheState inwhich
the child was habitually resident immediately before the removal or
retention;and
(b) at the time of removal or retention those rights were actually exercised,
eitherjointlyoralone,orwouldhavebeensoexercisedbutfortheremoval
orretention.
Therightsofcustodymentionedinsub‐paragraph(a)above,mayarise inparticular
byoperationoflaworbyreasonofajudicialoradministrativedecision,orbyreason
ofanagreementhavinglegaleffectunderthelawofthatState.”
Article3mustbereadinconjunctionwithArticles4and5.Theformer identifiestowhom
the Hague Convention applies. The latter assists in defining rights of custody for the
purposesoftheConvention’soperation:
“Article4
TheConventionshallapplytoanychildwhowashabituallyresidentinaContracting
State immediately before any breach of custody or access rights. The Convention
shallceasetoapplywhenthechildattainstheageofsixteenyears.
Article5
ForthepurposesofthisConvention–
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(a) “rightsofcustody”shall include rights relatingtothecareofthepersonof
the child and, in particular, the right to determine the child’s place of
residence;
(b) “rightsofaccess”shallincludetherighttotakeachildforalimitedperiodof
timetoaplaceotherthanthechild’shabitualresidence.
3. TheEuropeanCustodyConvention
Prior to theentry into force ofCouncil Regulation (EC)No.1347/2000of29May2000on
jurisdictionandtherecognitionandenforcementof judgments inmatrimonialmattersand
the matters of parental responsibility (“BII”), another treaty operated intra‐Europe in
respectofcustodyandabductionissues.
ThiswastheEuropeanConventiononRecognitionandEnforcementofDecisionsconcerning
CustodyofChildrenandonRestorationofCustodyofChildrensignedinLuxembourgon20
May1980(“theEuropeanCustodyConvention”).
The European Custody Convention sought to address “improper removals” between
ContractingStates,aswellasprovidingamechanismbywhichaccessandcustodydecisions
couldberecognisedtransnationally.
TheConventionisobsoletewithintheBIIrMembership.Itstillhasapplication,however, in
relationtojurisdictionsthatarenotpartofthatMembership,namelythefollowing:Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Denmark, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Macedonia, Moldova, Norway,
Serbia/Montenegro,SwitzerlandandTurkey.
The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland was one of the original six
signatoriestotheEuropeanCustodyConventioninMay1980.Itwasincorporatedintoour
domesticlawbytheChildAbductionandCustodyAct1985(Schedule2).
The European CustodyConventionwas never an especially well‐used instrument, and the
numberofapplicationsmadeunder it(evenpriortoBII)wassmall. TheintroductionofBII
andsubsequentlyBIIrmakesitoflessrelevancestill.
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4. BIIr
BIIr is not directly concerned with questions of child abduction, but some Articles
supplement(asopposedtosupplant)provisionsoftheHagueConventioninabductioncases
involvingtwoEUMemberStates.
Article10 isconcernedwithattributingjurisdictiontoMemberStatesfollowingawrongful
removal or retention, and will be considered in the context of examining the concept of
“habitualresidence”.
Article 11 introducessomemodificationofprocedureandsubstancewhereachildwho is
habitually resident in oneMember State is wrongfully removed to or retained in another
Member State. We will return to Article 11 below, when looking at defences to Hague
Conventionapplications.
5. TheSupremeCourtAct1981
The Supreme Court Act is usually invoked in abduction cases that are not coveredby any
othertreatyorconvention.Thiswouldbethecase,forexample, iftherewerenotreaty in
existencebetweenthetwojurisdictionsconcerned.Italsoariseswherethereisatreaty,but
wheretheleft‐behindparentisunabletobringhimorherselfwithinitsterms.
TherelevantsectionsoftheSupremeCourtActaresections19and41,theformerbecause
itpreserves theHighCourt’s inherent jurisdictionas a superiorcourtof lawand the latter
becauseitmakesspecificreferencetotheprocedureformakingchildrenWardsofcourt.
Wardship is a status imposedby theHighCourt in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction
relatingtochildrenand incapacitatedadults. It isbasedupon theconceptofallegianceto
the Crown, and the corresponding duty of the Crown to ensure that the vulnerable are
protected. For practical purposes, it involves reposing in the court rights of
custody/parental responsibility in respect of the child who is a Ward. No significant
decisionsmaythenbetakeninrespectofthatchildwithoutthecourt’sapproval.
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6. TheChildAbductionAct1984
The Child Abduction Act 1984 criminalised certain removals of a child from the United
Kingdom.
A“child”forthesepurposesisundersixteen.
Section1makes itacriminaloffenceforaperson“connected”withachildtotakeorsend
himoutoftheUnitedKingdomwithouttheappropriateconsents.
Section2criminalisesthetakingordetainingofachildbyaperson,withoutlawfulauthority
orreasonableexcuse,soastoremovehimfromorkeephimfromthelawfulcontrolofany
personhavinglawfulcontrolofthechild.
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B. WrongfulRemovalsandRetentions
EssentialReading
• ChildAbductionandCustodyAct1985(Schedule1,Article3and15)
• ReH;ReS(Abduction:CustodyRights)[1991]2AC476;[1991]3AllER230
1. WrongfulRemovalversusWrongfulRetention
As we have seen already, Article 3 of the Abduction Convention confirms that either a
removaloraretentionmay,ifwrongful,beactionableundertheConvention.
Aremovalorretentioniswrongfulifitisinbreachoftherightsofcustodythatsomeperson
orinstitutionhasinrespectoftheparticularchild.Moreonrightsofcustodylater….
Additionally, theauthorities tellsus thata removalor retentionmaybewrongful if it is in
breach of a court order (Re E (Abduction: Rights of Custody) [2005] 2 FLR 759 or of an
implicit prohibitionon removal establishedby case law (C –v‐ C (Minors)(ChildAbduction)
[1992]1FLR163).
ReH;ReS(Abduction:CustodyRights)[1991]2AC476;[1991]2FLR262istheseminalcase
on thedistinction for Abduction Conventionpurposes between awrongful removal and a
wrongfulretention. ThespeechofLordBrandonisauthorityforthefollowingpropositions
inrelationtotheseconcepts:
(a) to be actionable under the Convention, the wrongful removal or retention must
involve and be across an international border ‐ a wrongful removal or retention
within thecountry inwhich thechild ishabitually resident isnot capableofbeing
remediedbyreferencetotheAbductionConvention;
(b) awrongful retention occurs on a specific occasion – it is not an ongoing state of
affairs;
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(c) wrongful removal and wrongful retention are mutually exclusive concepts. One
cannothavebothwrongfullyremovedandbewrongfullyretainingthesamesubject
childatthesametime.
Notethatitispossibleforawrongfulremovalandawrongfulretentiontooccuronthefacts
in relation to the same child at different times (see Re S (Custody: Habitual Residence]
[1998]AC750perLordSlynnat767).
It is not a Convention requirement that the removal or retention be unlawful to be
actionable. Thus, it is possible for a removal or retention that is entirely lawful from the
perspective of the domestic law of the child’s habitual residence to still be wrongful for
Conventionpurposes.Forexamplesofcaseswherethisoccurred,seeReF(ChildAbduction:
RiskifReturned)[1995]2FLR31andReD(Abduction:CustodyRights)[1999]2FLR626.
Obtaininganorder fromanEnglishcourt seeking to restrain the removalofachildwho is
habituallyresidentinanotherContractingStatecanconstituteawrongfulretention(seeRe
B(Minors)(Abduction)(No.2)[1993]1FLR993).
2. BurdenofProof
ThepartywhoisseekingthereturnorderundertheConventionbearstheevidentialburden
of showing that the removal or retention was wrongful. If he or she cannot, then the
applicationmustfail(seeReM(Abduction:Acquiescence)[1996]1FLR315).
3. Timingconsiderations
AwrongfulremovaloccursonthedatethatthechildistakenfromtheContractingState in
which he is habitually resident across an international boundary. There are seldom
evidential difficulties about establishing the date of a removal, which can often be
corroboratedbyaccesstothird‐partymaterial(forexample,traveltickets,passportstamps
andsimilar).
Thepositionvis‐à‐visawrongfulretentionisoftenlessclear. Thegeneralpositionisthata
wrongful retentionoccurswhen thechild isnot returnedat the endof theperiodof time
whichithasbeenagreedhewillspendabroad.
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What happens where a parent who is abroad with a child for an agreed period of time
declarespriortotheexpirationofthatperiodthatshedoesnot intendtoreturnthechild?
ThiswasthesituationthecourtfacedinReS(Abduction:WrongfulRetention)[1994]1FLR
82.There,parentshadagreedthattheywouldcometoEnglandfromIsraelforayearwith
theirchildren.Priortotheexpirationofthatyear,themotherannouncedshedidnotintend
toreturn. Conventionproceedingsfollowed,assertingawrongfulretention. Themother’s
defencewasthattheretentionwasnotwrongful,astheagreedperiodabroadhadnotyet
expired.Thecourtrejectedthatargument.Themother’sannouncedintentionnottoreturn
effectively voided the original agreement. The mother could no longer rely upon the
father’sagreementtothelimitedperiodofremoval.
See also Re AZ (Abduction: Acquiescence) [1993] 1 FLR 682, where the Court of Appeal
expresseddoubt aboutwhether anuncommunicateddecisionnot to return a child in the
futurecouldconstituteawrongfulretention.
4. Article15Declarations
Uncertainty sometimes arises aboutwhether a removal or retention is wrongful. In such
cases,referencemightbemadetoArticle15oftheAbductionConvention.
“Article15
The judicial or administrative authorities of a Contracting State may, prior to the
makingofanorderforthereturnofthechild,requestthattheapplicantobtainfrom
theauthoritiesoftheStateofthehabitualresidenceofthechildadecisionorother
determination that the removal or retention was wrongful within the meaning of
Article3oftheConvention,wheresuchadecisionordeterminationmaybeobtained
in that State. The Central Authorities of the Contracting States shall so far as
practicableassistapplicantstoobtainsuchadecisionordetermination.”
Section8oftheChildAbductionandCustodyAct1985providesasfollows:
“Section8
TheHighCourtorCourtofSessionmay,onanapplicationmadeforthepurposesof
Article15oftheConventionbyanypersonappearingtothecourttohaveaninterest
inthematter,makeadeclarationordeclaratorthattheremovalofanychildfrom,or
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his retention outside, the United Kingdom was wrongful within the meaning of
Article3oftheConvention.”
Section8hasbeenaffordedawideinterpretation,intermsofthedeclaratoryreliefthatleft
behind parents might seek from the English court (see Re J (Abduction: Ward of Court)
[1990]1FLR276andReP(Abduction:Declaration)[1995]1FLR831).
The Article 15 procedure is not without its drawbacks in terms of delay and potential
expense, and this must be borne in mind before deciding whether to embark upon an
application.
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C. RightsofCustody
EssentialReading
• ChildAbductionandCustodyAct1985(Schedule1,Article5)
• ReH(AMinor)(Abduction:RightsofCustody)[2000]1FLR374
• ReD(Abduction:RightsofCustody)[2007]1FLR961
1. WhoseRights?
Article3confirmsthatabreachofrightsofcustodyattributedtoaperson,aninstitutionor
anyotherbody,whetherjointlyoralone,isactionableundertheConvention.
Accordingly,whereasmostapplicationsarebroughtbyleft‐behindparentsclaimingabreach
of their own rights of custody, the Abduction Convention can be invoked by relying on
someoneelse’srightsorrightsvestedinacourtorotherauthority.
In Re H (Abduction) [1990] 2 FLR 439, reliance was successfully placed on the rights of
custodyof the abducting parent to secure her return to Canada. Shewas found to be in
breachofherownrightsofcustody,giventhatherrightsofcustodyincludedaprohibition
onremovingthechildfromthatcountry.
Article3(a)oftheAbductionConventionconfirmsthatrightsofcustodyforthesepurposes
are attributedunder the lawof the country of the child’s habitual residence immediately
beforetheremovalorretention. Itdoesnotmatterwhetherthebundlesofrightsenjoyed
are described domestically as a right of custody. Rather, what matters is whether those
rightsfallwithintheConventiondefinitionfoundatArticle5.
Accordingly,what rights someonehas in relation to a child is amatter for the lawof the
child’s habitual residence. Whether those rights amount to a right of custody for
ConventionpurposesisaquestionforthecourtsoftherequestedState.
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2. WhatRightsQualify?
Arighttocontactoraccessalonewillnotentitleaparty tobringConventionproceedings;
theConventiondistinguishesrightsofaccessfromrightsofcustody(Article5).Theformer
alonecannotfoundanapplication(seeReV‐B(Abduction: RightsofCustody) [1999]2FLR
192.
TheearlyConventionjurisprudenceinthiscountrysupportedaviewthatonlyanestablished
legalrightcouldamounttoarightofcustody–seeReJ(Abduction:CustodyRights)[1990]2
AC 562, subnomC –v‐ S (AMinor)(Abduction) [1990] 2 FLR 442. There has since been a
movement away from this rigid stance, and a preference to apply a more purposive
definitionofrightsofcustody.
Thus, the right to insist that a parent did not remove the child from the country of his
habitualresidencewithoutconsent(a“rightofveto”)hasbeenheldbytheHouseofLords
tobearecognisedrightofcustody‐ReD(Abduction:RightsofCustody)[2007]1FLR961.It
mattered not whether the right of veto reposed in the other parent or in the court.
Likewise,itmatterednotwhethertherightofvetocameaboutbycourtorder,agreementor
byoperationoflaw.
However,apotentialrightofvetowouldnotqualifyasarightofcustody. Accordingly,ifa
parenthadtogotocourtandaskforanorderaboutsomefeatureofthechild’supbringing
(to include international relocation), the right to invoke the court’s assistancewas not of
itselfsufficienttocomewithintheConventiondefinition.
The English Court has sought to extend the concept of rights of custody for Convention
purposesviatheartificeofwhataredescribedas“inchoaterightsofcustody”.Theconcept
of such bundles of rights was identified in Re B (A Minor)(Abduction) [1994] 2 FLR 249,
where it was suggested that rights of custody might arise if a child was effectively
abandonedintothecareofapersonwhowasthenresponsibleforday‐to‐daycare,butwho
otherwisehadnorecognisedlegalcustodialright.
Thedevelopmentofinchoaterightsofcustodycontinuedthroughoutthe1990sandintothe
new millennium (for those interested in the jurisprudence, see Re O (Child Abduction:
CustodyRights)[1997]2FLR702,ReW;ReB(ChildAbduction:UnmarriedFather)[1998]2
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FLR 146, Re G (Abduction: Rights of Custody) [2002] 2 FLR 703, Re C (Child
Abduction)(Unmarried Father: Rights of Custody) [2003] 1 FLR 252 and Re F (Abduction:
UnmarriedFather:SoleCarer)[2003]1FLR839).
Whatcanbedistilledfromthis lineofauthority isthisproposition: English lawrecognises
thatarightofcustodyforthepurposesoftheConventioncanbeheldbysomebodywhohas
nodefinedlegalright,butwhohasthecareof thechildtotheexclusionoftheholdersof
parentalresponsibility.Thiscanbesoevenifthatcarewasnotbeingexercisedimmediately
beforethewrongfulremoval.
Aninstitution,suchasa localauthorityoradoptionagency,canhaverightsofcustody(see
ReJS(PrivateInternationalAdoption)[2000]2FLR638).
Similarly,acourtmighthaverightsofcustody(ReC(AMinor)(Abduction)[1989]1FLR403).
Theseminalcaseinrelation tosuchrights isReH(AMinor)(Abduction: RightsofCustody)
[2000] 1 FLR 374. There, theHouseof Lords confirmed that the Irish Court had rights of
custodyinrespectofachild,because itwasdealingwithaguardianshipapplicationat the
dateofthewrongfulremoval.TheHouseheldthat:
• a court would have rights of custody in relation to a child if it was seised of a
questionofcustody
• that right of custody would be conferred on the court (at the latest) when the
applicationwasserved,
• therightofcustodywouldcontinueuntiltheapplicationwasdisposedof,and
• questionsaboutthemeritsoftheapplicationcouldnotbedeployedasamechanism
togobehindthecourt’srightofcustody.
Accordingly,thefatherwasentitledtorelyupontheIrishcourt’scustodialrightstoinvoke
theConvention.
3. ActualExerciseofCustodyRights
Article3comes in twoparts, thenet effectofwhich is tomakeclear that simplyhavinga
rightofcustodyattherelevanttimeisnottheendofthematter;therightofcustodymust
alsobeactuallyexercised(Article3(b)).
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Forpracticalpurposes inEnglandandWales, thisprovision isconstruedverybroadly. It is
notnecessarytoshowday‐to‐daycareorevenanydegreeofregularorrecentcontactwith
the child. Actual exercise will be presumed if the left‐behind parent is maintaining the
stance and attitude that is broadly in keeping with his right of custody. See Re H; Re S
(Abduction:CustodyRights)[1991]2FLR262perLordBrandon(at272‐273).
Givingpermissiontoachildtravellingor livingabroadfora temporaryperiod is theactual
exerciseofacustodyright(W–v‐W(ChildAbduction:Acquiescence)[1993]2FLR211.
4. BurdenofProof
TheapplicantundertheConventionmustshowonthebalanceofprobabilitiesthathehasa
rightofcustody,andifhecannotthentheapplicationwillfail.
Wherethereisanissueas tocustodialrights, thiscanbeaddressedby thefilingofexpert
evidenceand/orbyseekinganArticle15declaration. ReD(Abduction:RightsofCustody)
[2007]1FLR961suggeststhatthelatteristobepreferredtotheformer,andthatanArticle
15declarationshouldbesoughtfromtheforeigncourtatthehighestlevel.Abalancemust
bestruckbetweendelayon theonehandand theneed for thebest informationavailable
about thecustody rights in issueon theother. AnArticle15declarationwouldbeallbut
determinativeofthequestionsaveinexceptionalcircumstances.
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D. Defences
EssentialReading
• ChildAbductionandCustodyAct1985(Schedule1,Articles12and13)
• BIIr,Article11
1. Introduction
ThefollowingprovisionsoftheAbductionConventionareconcernedwith“defences”:
“Article12
WhereachildhasbeenwrongfullyremovedorretainedintermsofArticle3and,at
the date of the commencement of the proceedings before the judicial or
administrativeauthorityoftheContractingStatewherethechild is,aperiodof less
thanoneyearhas elapsed fromthedateof thewrongful removalor retention, the
authorityconcernedshallorderthereturnofthechildforthwith.
The judicial or administrative authority, even where the proceedings have been
commencedaftertheexpirationoftheperiodofoneyearreferredtointhepreceding
paragraph,shallalsoorderthereturnofthechild,unlessitisdemonstratedthatthe
childisnowsettledinitsnewenvironment.
Where the judicial oradministrativeauthority in the requestedstatehas reason to
believethatthechildhasbeentakentoanotherState,itmaystaytheproceedingsor
dismisstheapplicationforthereturnofthechild.”
“Article13
“Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding Article, the judicial or
administrativeauthorityof the requested State is notbound to order the returnof
thechildiftheperson, institutionorotherbodywhichopposesitsreturnestablishes
that–
(a) the person, institution or other body having the care of the person of the
childwasnotactuallyexercisingthecustodyrightsatthetimeofremovalor
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retention,orhadconsentedtoorsubsequentlyacquiescedintheremovalor
retention;or
(b) thereisagraveriskthathisorherreturnwouldexposethechildtophysical
or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable
situation.
The judicial or administrative authoritymay also refuse to order the return of the
childif itfindsthatthechildobjectstobeingreturnedandhasattainedanageand
degreeofmaturityatwhichitisappropriatetotakeaccountofitsviews.
In considering the circumstances referred to in this Article, the judicial and
administrative authorities shall take into account the information relating to the
socialbackgroundofthechildprovidedbytheCentralAuthorityorothercompetent
authorityofthechild’shabitualresidence.”
Also of relevance is Article 11 of BIIr in cases between two Member States, and see in
particularthefollowing:
“Article11–Returnofthechild
…
“4. AcourtcannotrefusetoreturnachildonthebasisofArticle13bofthe1980
HagueConventionifitisestablishedthatadequatearrangementshavebeen
madetosecuretheprotectionofthechildafterhisorherreturn.
There are other rules of procedure within Article 11, and provisions concerned with the
recognition of ordersmade in anotherMember State following a refusal to return under
Article13oftheAbductionConvention.
FromtheArticlesquoted,thefollowingpropositionscanbeextracted:
• Contracting States have a mandatory obligation to return wrongfully removed or
retained children, where proceedings are started within the year following the
wrongfulremovalorretentioncomplainedof;
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• Thatobligationcontinuesaftertheexpirationoftheoneyearperiodreferredto,but
issubjecttothechildbeingsettledinhisnewenvironment;
• Inadditiontothetwelvemonths/settlementexception,thefollowingdefencesare
available:
o theleft‐behindparentwasnotactuallyexercisinghisrightsofcustodyatthe
timeofthewrongfulremovalorretention;
o theleft‐behindparentconsentedtotheremovalorretention;
o theleft‐behindparentsubsequentlyacquiescedtotheremovalorretention;
o the return sought would expose the child to a grave risk of physical or
psychologicalharmorwouldotherwiseplacehiminanintolerableposition,
and
o the child objects to returning and has attained an age and degree of
maturitysuchthatitisappropriatetohaveregardtohisviews.
Thesedefenceswillnowbeconsideredinturn.
2. Settlement
EssentialReading
• Cannon–v‐Cannon[2004]1FLR169
• ReM(Abduction:Zimbabwe)[2008]1FLR251
WeknowfromArticle12 thatsettlementof thechildconcerned isonlyofrelevanceifthe
periodoftimebetweenthedateofthewrongfulremoval/retentionandthedateonwhich
proceedingsarecommencedexceedstwelvemonths.Settlementrightuptotheendofthat
twelvemonthperiodcannotbeusedasthebasisofadefenceunderArticle12(althoughit
might be relevant elsewhere, such as in the context of a child’s wishes, or as part of an
intolerabilityargument).
Thedateforassessingsettlementisthedateonwhichproceedingsarestarted,andnotthe
dateonwhichtheapplicationisdetermined(seeReN(Abduction)[1991]1FLR413).
What ismeant by settlement? InReN, referred to in theprevious paragraph, the Judge
gave the term its ordinary meaning, and said it involved two constituent elements: “a
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physicalelementofrelatingto,beingestablishedin,acommunityandanenvironment”and
“an emotional constituent denoting security and stability”. The following factors,
unsurprisingly,weresaid tobe relevant toan examinationofwhetherachildwassettled:
“place, home, school, people, friends, activities and opportunities but not, per se, the
relationshipwiththemother,whichhasalwaysexistedinaclose,lovingattachment.”
Forreasonsthatareself‐evident,settlementcasesoftengiverisetodivergentviewsabout
timing;anapplicantupagainstthetwelvemonthperiodwillargueforawrongfulremovalor
retention that would have the effect of his application being within the year following
removal/retention,andarespondentwillseektoarguetheopposingposition.
Historically,therewassomejudicialdisagreementaboutwhethersettlement,ifestablished,
gaverisetoanobligationnottoreturnachild,orwhetheritsimplygaverisetoadiscretion
nottodirectareturn.EarlyEnglishauthoritiespreferredthelatter,butat leastonelineof
authority fromAustralia suggested thata strictapplicationof theConvention required the
formerconclusion. TheHouseofLords inReM(Abduction: Zimbabwe) [2008] 1FLR251
settledthematterforourpurposes:wheremorethantwelvemonthshaveexpiredandthe
child is settled, the court still has jurisdiction to hear the application and a discretion to
directareturn.
The Court of Appeal in Cannon –v‐ Cannon [2005] 1 FLR 169 looked at the question of
concealment–couldachildbeconsideredsettlediflivingwithanabductingparentinsucha
wayastopreventdetection?Theanswerwaspossibly.Incasesofconcealment,theburden
of demonstrating the necessary elements of emotional and psychological settlement was
much increased. Although it was not the case that a period of concealment should be
disregarded and therefore subtracted from the total period of delay in order to calculate
whetherthetwelve‐monthmark(whichisanapproachthathassomecurrencyintheUSA,
called “equitable tolling”) had been exceeded, judges should look critically at any alleged
settlementthathasconcealmentordeceitasitsfoundation.
Settlement cases will almost always now involve consideration of the separate
representationofthesubjectchild–seebelowunderchild’sobjections.
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3. Non‐exerciseofcustodyrights
EssentialReading
• W–v‐W(ChildAbduction:Acquiescence)[1993]2FLR211
• ReW(Abduction:Procedure)[1995]1FLR878
Thissub‐provisionofArticle13hasattractedverylittlejudicialattentioninthisjurisdiction.
Therearetwoorthreereporteddecisionswherethisissueisconsidered,buteventhenitis
inpassing.
Perhaps most usefully, Re W (Abduction: Procedure) [1995] 1 FLR 878 examined the
distinctionbetweenArticles3and13(a).Thecourtobservedthattheformerreferstorights
ofcustodygenerally,whereas the latter is concernedwith rightsofcustodywhicharenot
beingexercisedby thepersonwhohasthecareofthepersonof thechild. This isamuch
narrowersituation,therefore,thanthatcontemplatedbyArticle3.
Asthisisthe(only)Englishauthoritydirectlyonpoint,thisdefencecouldlikelyonlyariseifit
couldbeshownthatanapplicanthadabandonedforallintentsandpurposeshisroleasthe
child’sresidentialparent.
Note that imprisonment of the left‐behind parent will not necessarily deprive him of his
rightsofcustody, either for thepurposesofArticle3or13(a). Itdoesnot follow that, by
virtue of circumstances, including imprisonment or hospitalisation, whereby a parent is
unabletoexercisesomecomponentofhisrightsofcustody(forexample,physicalcare),he
isalsounabletoconsentorrefusetotheremovalof thechildfromthejurisdiction. There
areseveralcaseswherethecourthasconfirmedthataprisonercanstillexercisearightof
custodyforthepurposesofbeingconsultedaboutaremovalfromthejurisdiction–seeReA
(Abduction:RightsofCustody:Imprisonment)[2004]1FLR1andReL(AChild)[2006]1FLR
843.
4. Consent
EssentialReading
• ReP(Abduction:Consent)[2004]2FLR1057
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• T–v‐T(Abduction:Consent)[1999]2FLR912
It isadefencetoaConventionapplicationthattheleft‐behindparentagreedtothechild’s
permanent removal from or retention away from the country in which he was habitually
resident. It follows fromthis thatconsent toaholidaydoesnot equatewithconsent toa
permanent relocation (to the extent that any judicial confirmation of this principle is
required,seeReB(AMinor)(Abduction)[1994]2FLR249).
Therewassomedisputearisingfromseveralfirstinstancedecisionsaboutwhetherconsent
wasrelevanttothe“wrongful”stage(thatis,couldaremovalorretentiontowhichtheleft‐
behindparentagreed inadvancebewrongful?)or to thedefencestage. Thiswassettled
definitively by the Court of Appeal Re P (Abduction: Consent) [2004] 2 FLR 1057; issues
concerningconsentshouldbedealtwithunderArticle13(a),whichhastheeffectofputting
theevidentialburdenontheallegedabductor.
Whatisthepracticaldistinctionbetweenconsentandacquiescence?Theauthoritiestellus
it is one of timing: consent pre‐dates the removal or retention and acquiescence comes
aftertheevent(seeLordDonaldsonMRinReA(Minors)(Abduction:Acquiescence)[1992]1
FLR14at29).
Consentmustbeclearandunequivocaltoconstituteavaliddefence. Itmustnotbebased
uponafraud,oronmisunderstanding(ReB(AMinor)(Abduction)[1994]2FLR249andT–v‐
T(Abduction:Consent)[1999]2FLR912).
Whilst it needs to be unequivocal and clear, consent need not be in writing and can be
inferred from a parent’s words and actions as awhole. It is not necessary for particular
magicwordstobeuttered:aconsentdefencecanstillsucceedevenif“Iconsent”hasnever
been said. See in this regard Re C (Abduction: Consent) [1996] 1 FLR 414 and Re M
(Abduction)(Consent:Acquiescence)[1999]1FLR171.
The relevance of timing to the giving of consent was considered in Re K (Abduction:
Consent) [1997]2FLR212. There, thecourtwasconcernedwith thequestionofwhether
consent given and acted upon could be subsequently rescinded if the left‐behind parent
thoughtbetterofit.ReKsupportstheviewthatconsentgivenandacteduponcannotthen
bewithdrawn.
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5. Acquiescence
EssentialReading
• ReH(Abduction:Acquiescence)[1997]1FLR872
Aswehaveseen,acquiescenceisconsideredtobetheafter‐the‐eventcorollarytoconsent.
The development of English jurisprudence in this area initially focussed on concepts of
“active”and“passive”acquiescence,applyingdifferentapproachesdependinguponwhich
typewasinissue.ThiserrantlineofauthoritywassweptawaybytheHouseofLordsinReH
(Abduction: Acquiescence) [1997] 1 FLR 872, which remains the seminal authority on
acquiescencecases.
The following approach emerges from the speeches inRe H (per Lord Browne‐Wilson @
884):
“(1) For the purposes of Art 13 of the Convention, the question whether the
wronged parent has ‘acquiesced’ in the removal or retention of the child
dependsuponhisactualstateofmind.AsNeillLJsaidinReS(Minors)‘the
court is primarily concerned, not with the question of the other parent’s
perception of the applicant’s conduct, but with the question whether the
applicantacquiescedinfact’.
(2) Thesubjective intentionofthewrongedparent isaquestionoffactforthe
trial judge todetermineinall thecircumstancesof thecase,theburdenof
proofbeingontheabductingparent.
(3) The trial judge, in reaching his decision on that question of fact, will no
doubtbeinclinedtoattachmoreweighttothecontemporaneouswordsand
actionsofthewrongedparentthantohisbareassertionsinevidenceofhis
intention. But that is a question of theweight to be attached to evidence
andisnotaquestionoflaw.
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(4) There is only one exception. Where the words or actions of the wronged
parent clearly and unequivocally show and have led the other parent to
believethatthewrongedparent isnotassertingorgoingtoasserthisright
to the summary return of the child and are inconsistentwith such return,
justicerequiresthatthewrongedparentbeheldtohaveacquiesced.”
Inpractice, therefore, theallegedabductormustprove to thecourt’s satisfaction that the
left‐behindparentacquiesced.Ifheorshecannot,thedefencefails,unlesstheexceptionat
paragraph(4)isengaged.
Recent examples of the judicial approach in operation can be found in Re G (Abduction:
WithdrawalofProceedings,AcquiescenceandHabitualResidence)[2008]2FLR351andD–
v‐S[2008]2FLR393.
Therearecompetinglinesofauthorityregardingwhetherdelaybroughtaboutbecauseofa
lack of knowledge of the Convention remedy can amount to acquiescence. These are
expressedinD–v‐S[2008]2FLR393ontheonehand,andinB‐G–v‐B‐G[2008]2FLR965
ontheother.
Pendingguidancefromanappellatecourt,perhapstheclearestguidancethatcanbegiven
aboutthisconceptisthatthedegreeofknowledgeoftheremediesavailableonthepartof
theleft‐behindparentwillbearelevantfactorineachcase.Theweighttobeattachedtoit
will be case‐specific. Once an applicant is aware of a Convention remedy, hemight be
consideredtohaveacquiescedifitisnotengagedpromptly.
Attemptstoachieveareconciliationoragreementforthechild’svoluntaryreturnshouldnot
beinferredasanintentiontoacquiesce–seeReH.
6. GraveRisk/Intolerability
EssentialReading
• ReC(Abduction:GraveRiskofPsychologicalHarm)[1999]1FLR1145
• ReC(Abduction:GraveRiskofPhysicalorPsychologicalHarm)[1999]2FLR478
• C–v‐B(Abduction:GraveRisk)[2006]1FLR1095
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Thisisbyfarandawaythemostcommonly‐pleadeddefencetoConventionapplications,and
accordingly has been the subject of the most judicial consideration of any of the
Convention’sarticles.
Themeaningof“graverisk”wasconsideredveryearlyonintheConvention’slifespaninthis
jurisdiction. The riskmust beweighty, andnot trivial. Theharmmust bemore than the
disruptioninherentinanunwelcomereturntothechild’scountryofhabitualresidence.The
graveriskisnottobecomparedtotheparamountconsiderationofthechild’swelfare,and
thetestsarewhollydifferent.
Itmustbeshownthattheriskarisesbyreasonofthereturntotherequestingstaterather
thanbyreturningtotheapplicant.ItisuptotheCourtsintheStateofthechild’shabitual
residencetodecidequestionsofcustodyandtoruleontheparties’meritsasparents.
Anallegedabductorcannotrelyonhisownrefusaltoreturntotherequestingstateforthe
psychologicalharmuponthechildasresultinginanintolerablesituationforthechild(seeRe
C(AMinor)(Abduction)[1989]1FLR403).
Our courts have been very slow to allow this defence to succeed in situationswhere the
abductionitselfhasgivenrisetotheproblemsthatarethenprayedinaidofthedefence‐
see Re C (Abduction: Grave Risk of Psychological Harm) [1999] 1 FLR 1145 and Re C
(Abduction:GraveRiskofPhysicalorPsychologicalHarm) [1999]2FLR478. In the former
case, the issues pleaded in support of the defence were immigration matters that would
result intheabductingmotherbeingseparatedfromhernewhusbandifsheaccompanied
her child back to the USA. The latter concerned a splitting of half‐siblings if a return to
Cyprus was enforced, with the older (and non‐subject) child refusing to cooperatewith a
return.Inbothcases,thecourttooktheviewthattheissuesraisedfloweddirectlyfromthe
wrongdoingoftheabductingparent,andthataccordinglyitshouldbeslowinallowingthose
factorstosustainanArticle13(b)defence.
Thefactthatanabductingparentmightfaceprosecutionifshereturnswiththechildisnot
ofitselfanArticle13(b)defence(seeReL(Abduction:PendingCriminalProceedings)[1991]
1FLR433).
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Abuse,whetherbywayofdomesticviolenceor someother formofphysicalor emotional
abuse,willnot of itselfbesufficient to establish this defence. See, for example,W–v‐W
[2004]2FLR499andTB–v‐JB(Abduction:GraveRiskofHarm)[2001]2FLR515.AnEnglish
court will take into account measures which the alleged abductor could reasonably be
expectedtotakepriortooruponherreturntoprotectherself.Further,itistobepresumed
thatthecourtsinthecountryofhabitualresidenceareready,willingandabletoassistthose
whoarethevictimsofabuse. This includes,whereappropriate,punishing theperpetrator
forbreachoforders. If it issubmittedthatthat isnotthecase,goodandcogentevidence
willberequired.
SeealsoReH(Children)(Abduction:GraveRisk)[2003]2FLR141,whereareturnorderwas
made despite compelling evidence that the abductor had endured brutalisation, violence
andthreats. ItwasheldthattheBelgiancourtcouldprotectthemotherand thechildren,
albeit the returnorderwasnot tobe enforceduntil a structureofprotectionandsupport
wasputinplace.
Thehigh‐watermarksinrelationtothisdefencecameinReS(AChild)[2002]2FLR815and
ReM(Abduction:IntolerableSituation)[2000]1FLR930.Theformerinvolvedadecisionto
returnachildtoIsraelnotwithstandingarecentescalationofsectarianviolence,whichhad
inturnimpacteduponthemother’sabilitytofunctionandtheparent. Thecourtaccepted
thatastateofcivilunrestorwarintherequestingStatecouldgiverisetoadefence,butnot
onthecircumstancesastheystoodatthetimeinthatparticularcase.Thelatterrelatedto
thereturnofachildtoNorway,notwithstandinghismother’sfearofphysicalharmfromher
husband who, having been imprisoned for murdering someone whom he believed was
havinganaffairwiththemother,wasduetobereleased.
Foranexampleofacasewherethedefencehassucceeded,seeReD(Article13(b): Non‐
Return) [2006] 2 FLR 305. There, the court was asked to direct the return of a child to
Venezuelaincircumstanceswheretherehadalreadybeenanearlierdirectattemptonthe
mother’slife.TheCourtofAppealfoundthatthespecificandtargetedriskofphysicalharm
to the children and extremely strong evidence of a risk of justified refusing to return the
children.SeealsoKlentzeris–v‐Klentzeris[2007]2FLR996andReM(Abduction:Leaveto
Appeal)[1999]2FLR550.
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ThedifficultyinmakingoutthisdefenceiscompoundedbythewillingnessofEnglishJudges,
consistentwithConvention’sobligations,toacceptundertakingsfromtheleft‐behindparent
designedtoaddressandtoameliorateanyshort‐termharmorintolerabilitythatispleaded.
For example, there are now “standard” undertakings offered and sought in these cases
relating to short‐term financial provision and accommodation, concerned with non‐
harassment(usuallywithoutadmission),andconfirmingthenon‐removalofthechildfrom
thecareoftheabductorpendingahearingonnotice inthecourtsoftheStateofhabitual
residence.
In addition, it is not uncommon now for quite inventive arrangements to be put in place
whereby a return order is made, but not implemented immediately pending steps or
hearings to beundertaken in the other Contracting State. SeeRe H (Children)(Abduction:
GraveRisk)[2003]2FLR141,JPC–v‐SLWandSMW(Abduction)[2007]2FLR900andReR
(Abduction: Immigration Concerns) [2005] 1 FLR 33. In the last case, enforcement of a
return to Germanywas deferredpending resolution of immigrationdifficulties thatmight
otherwisehaveresultedintheseparationofthemotherandthechild.
Another difficulty facing parties seeking to argue this defence is the trend towards
international judicialcollaboration. EnglishJudgesareshowinganincreasingwillingnessto
engage directly with the judiciary in other Contracting States to secure the Convention’s
objectives(seeReMandJ(AbductionandInternationalJudicialCollaboration)[2000]1FLR
803, where Singer J spoke to several Judges in California and a warrant for the mother’s
arrestwasrecalledquashed).
A finaldifficulty ispeculiar to EUMemberStates,andarisesbyvirtueofArticle11(4). An
EnglishcourtcannotdeclinetoorderareturnunderArticle13(b)ifadequatearrangements
canbemade tosecure thechild’sprotection in theotherMemberState. Given theother
initiatives(deferredreturns,undertakings,judicialcollaboration),itwillbeveryrareindeed
foranintra‐EUcasetoarisewhereit isnotpossibletoputinplaceadequateprotectionto
addresstheparticularArticle13(b)defencethat isasserted. Englishcourtswilloperateon
thebasisthatotherMemberStatesareinapositiontoprovidethatprotection,absentproof
tothecontrary(arecentdistillationof thisprincipleappears inF–v‐M(Abduction: Grave
RiskofHarm)[2008]2FLR1263).
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7. Child’sObjections
EssentialReading
• ReD(AChild)(Abduction:RightsofCustody)[2007]1FLR961
• ReM(Abduction:Child’sObjections)[2007]2FLR72
• ReM(Abduction:Zimbabwe)[2008]1FLR251
• ReC(Abduction:SeparateRepresentationofChildren)[2008]2FLR6
This is by far and awayoneof the “hot” abduction topics of recent years. In conjunction
with general considerations of the separate representation of children in abduction
proceedings, ithasyieldedtwoHouseofLords’decisions,severalfromtheCourtofAppeal
andmorestillatfirstinstance.
Before lookingatthosedecisions, it isusefultodeconstructthedefence. Itariseswherea
child,whohasattainedan“ageanddegreeofmaturity”wherehisviewsoughttobetaken
intoaccount,“objectstobeingreturned”. Eachpleadingofthisdefencethereforerequires
two enquiries: does the child object and is he of the requisite age and maturity? The
defenceisnotmadeoutunlesstheanswertobothquestionsisyes.
Theverb“objects” inthiscontext istobeinterpretedliterally;earlierattemptsto importa
particularstrengthoffeelingweresaidtobeimproper(seeS–v‐S(ChildAbduction)(Child’s
Views)[1992]2FLR492.
Theobjectionmustbetotheparticularreturnthatisundercontemplation.Itisareturnto
thecountryratherthantotheapplicantparent.Amerepreferenceastowishingtolivewith
theabductingparent isnotanobjection for thesepurposes. Awillingnessby thechild to
return to the Contracting State in question with the abducting parent would vitiate the
defence.
However, courts are alert to the reality that, in some circumstances, it is not easy to
distinguishareturntothecountryfromareturntotheleft‐behindparent,anditwouldbe
artificialtotry–seeReT(Abduction:Child’sObjectionstoReturn)[2000]2FLR192.
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Thereisnoparticularageatwhichthedefencebecomesavailable.InReR(ChildAbduction:
Acquiescence)[1995]1FLR716,thecourtwasconcernedwithobjectionsfromchildrenaged
seven and a half and six, whowere held to be mature enough for their objections to be
considered(albeittheydidnotcarrytheday).Childrenagedeightandsevenwerefoundto
besufficientlymatureinB–v‐K(ChildAbduction)[1993]1FCR382.AsBalcombeLJsaidin
ReR, the younger thechild the less likely it is thathewillhave thematurityatwhich it is
appropriatetotakehisobjectionsintoaccount.
In thenormal courseofevents, the enquiryaboutwhether ornota child objectsandhas
attainedthenecessaryageanddegreeofmaturityisundertakenbyaCAFCASSOfficer.Until
relativelyrecently,thatwastheendofthematter,saveforanexceptionalhandfulofcases
wherethechildparticipatedintheproceedings inamoreactivecapacity. Thesetendedto
becaseswheretherewassomeunusualfeature,forexample,achildwhohadbeeninlocal
authority (or equivalent) careprior to the removal,orwho faced theprospect ofa return
intosuchcare.
Asrecentlyas2007,theCourtofAppealwasrefusingtoallowclearlycapacitatedchildrento
engage in the litigationprocess and to file direct evidence about their objections and the
reasons for those (see Re H (Abduction) [2007] 1 FLR 242). In that case, the “child”
concernedwas fifteen. The Court of Appeal nevertheless confirmed the line of authority
that a child should only be made a party in Abduction Convention proceedings in
“exceptional circumstances”. In all other cases, those objections could be adequately
expressed through a CAFCASS Officer, hence there would be no need for separate
representationtoensurethatthechild’svoiceproperlywasheard.
The Houseof Lords took a different view inReD (A Child)(Abduction: Rights of Custody)
[2007]1FLR961.ItsaidthatchildrenshouldbeheardinAbductionConventionapplications
more frequently than had hitherto been the practice. There was a range of approaches
available toascertainingachild’sview. Inmostcasesan interviewwithaCAFCASSofficer
wouldbesufficient,but inothercases itmightalsobenecessaryforthejudge tohearthe
child, especially if the child had requested this. Only in a few cases would full scale legal
representation be necessary, but whenever it seemed likely that the child’s views and
interests might not be properly presented to the court, in particular if there were legal
argumentswhichtheadultpartieswerenotputtingforward,thechildshouldbeseparately
represented.BIIrrequiredthecourttoaddressattheoutsetwhetherandhowthechildwas
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to be given the opportunity of being heard and therewas no reasonwhy this should not
happen innon‐Europeancasesaswell; themoreuniformthepractice thebetter,and the
earliertheissueofthechild’sviewswasaddressedthelesslikelythattheissuewouldcause
delay.
The House of Lords returned to separate representation inReM (Abduction: Zimbabwe)
[2008]1FLR251.BaronessHalehadthistosayabouttheissue(@269):
“[57] Iwould finally comment that, ‘exceptional’ or not, this is a highly unusual
case.CasesunderthesecondparagraphofArt12are,inanyevent,veryfew
and far between. They are the most ‘child‐centric’ of all child abduction
casesandvery likelytobecombinedwiththechild’sobjections.Aspointed
out in ReD, it is for the court to consider at the outset how best to give
effecttotheobligationtohearthechild’sviews.Wearetoldthatthisisnow
routinelydonethroughthespecialistCAFCASSofficersattheRoyalCourtsof
Justice. I accept entirely that children must not be given an exaggerated
impressionoftherelevanceandimportanceoftheirviewsinchildabduction
cases. To order separate representation in all cases, even in all child’s
objectionscases,mightbetosend themthewrongmessages.But itwould
not send the wrong messages in the very small number of cases where
settlement is arguedunder the secondparagraphof Art12. These are the
cases in which the separate point of view of the children is particularly
important and should not be lost in the competing claims of the adults. If
thisweretobecomeroutine,therewouldbenoadditionaldelay.Inallother
cases, the question for the directions judge is whether separate
representationof thechildwilladdenough to thecourt’sunderstandingof
theissuesthatariseundertheHagueConventiontojustifytheintrusion,the
expenseandthedelaythatmayresult.Ihavenodifficultyinpredictingthat
inthegeneralrunofcases itwillnot.But Iwouldhesitatetousetheword
‘exceptional’.Thesubstanceiswhatcounts,notthelabel.”
TheJudgeatfirstinstanceinReC(Abduction:SeparateRepresentationofChildren)[2008]2
FLR6adopted thisdistillationof theproper enquiry tobeundertaken,namely: “whether
theseparaterepresentationofthechildwilladdenoughtothecourt’sunderstandingofthe
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issues that arise under theHagueConvention to justify the intrusion and the expense and
delaythatmayresult”.
8. BurdensofProof
Theburdenofestablishingonthebalanceofprobabilitiesthataparticulardefenceismade
out lieswith the alleged abductor. If he or she cannot satisfy that evidential burden, the
defencefailsandthemandatoryobligationtodirectareturnprevails.
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E. JudicialDiscretion(andhowtouseit)
EssentialReading
• ChildAbductionandCustodyAct1985(Schedule1,Articles12and13)
• H–v‐H(Abduction:Acquiescence)[1996]2FLR570
• ReM(Abduction:Zimbabwe)[2008]1FLR251
1. Introduction
AswehaveseenfromthetextofArticles12and13,establishingsettlementoradefenceis
not an absolute answer to a Convention application. It is instead a “gateway” finding. It
opensupjudicialdiscretion. Itrelievesthecourtoftheotherwisemandatoryobligationto
directareturn.Thatisnottosaythatitdrivesthecourttorefuseareturn.
WhetherareturnisdirectedafteradefenceismadeoutdependsonhowtheJudgehearing
thecaseconsidersheorsheoughttoexercisethediscretionnowavailable.
Toanextent,themanner inwhichjudicialdiscretionfallstobeexercisedwilldependupon
theparticular case and the circumstances of thedefence that has beenmadeout. There
are, however, some principles of general application relevant to the exercise of the
discretion.
2. GeneralPrinciples
Therehithertowasatwo‐stageapproachofexceptionalityappliedtoConventiondefences
in this country. First, the abductor had to make out an exception to the general rule of
return(thatis,tosuccessfullypleadadefence).Second,shehadtothenshowthatthecase
justified an exceptional exercise of the judicial discretion, so that the Judge could depart
fromConventionprinciplesandthespiritofthetreatyanddeclineareturn.
TheHouseofLordssaidinReM(Abduction:Zimbabwe)[2008]1FLR251thatthatapproach
was erroneous. There was no additional test of exceptionality built‐in at the discretion
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stage. Thecircumstances inwhichareturnmightberefusedweresufficientlyexceptional.
It was unnecessary and undesirable to add a layer of complexity to the Convention.
Therefore,oncethedefenceismadeout,thediscretionwasatlarge.
ThecourtwasentitledtotakeintoaccountthevariousaspectsoftheConventionpolicy,but
alongside the issueor issues thathad given the court itsdiscretion in the firstplace. The
widerconsiderationof the child’s rightshad its place,asdidwelfare. Itwasnot thecase
thatthespiritoftheConventionshouldalwayscarrytheday,andtheweighttobegivento
Conventionconsiderationswouldvaryfromcasetocase.Thefurtherawayaparticularcase
was fromaspeedy return, the lessweightwouldbe given to thespiritof theConvention.
PerBaronessHale@266:
“[43]MyLords,incaseswhereadiscretionarisesfromthetermsoftheConvention
itself, itseemstomethatthediscretionisat large.Thecourt isentitled to
takeintoaccountthevariousaspectsoftheConventionpolicy,alongsidethe
circumstances which gave the court a discretion in the first place and the
wider considerations of the child’s rights and welfare. I would, therefore,
respectfullyagreewithThorpeLJ inthepassagequoted inpara[32]above,
save for theword ‘overriding’ if it suggests that the Convention objectives
should always be given more weight than the other considerations.
Sometimestheyshouldandsometimestheyshouldnot.
[44]That,itseemstome,isthefurthestoneshouldgoinseekingtoputaglosson
thesimple termsof theConvention.As is clear from the earlierdiscussion,
the Convention was the product of prolonged discussions in which some
careful balances were struck and fine distinctions drawn. The underlying
purposeistoprotecttheinterestsofchildrenbysecuringtheswiftreturnof
thosewhohavebeenwrongfullyremovedorretained.TheConventionitself
has defined when a child must be returned and when she need not be.
Thereafter theweight tobe given toConventionconsiderations and to the
interests of the child will vary enormously. The extent to which it will be
appropriate to investigate those welfare considerationswill also vary. But
the further away one gets from the speedy return envisaged by the
Convention,the lessweightythosegeneralConventionconsiderationsmust
be.”
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Pre‐dating the decision in Re M by many years, the decision in H –v‐ H (Abduction:
Acquiescence)[1996]2FLR570stillprovidesausefulchecklistoffactorsthatacourtmight
consider weigh in the balance when deciding how to exercise the judicial discretion that
arises(perWaiteLJ@574‐575):
“(1) the comparative suitability of the forum in the competing jurisdictions to
determinethechild’sfutureinthesubstantiveproceedings;
(2) the likely outcome (inwhichever forum they be heard) of the substantive
proceedings;
the consequences of the acquiescence, with particular reference to the extent to
which the childmayhavebecomesettled in the requestedState [thiscase
concernedacquiescence– read theconsequencesof thedefence thathas
beenfoundtobemadeoutinthiscase];
the situation which would await the absconding parent and the child if
compelledtoreturntotherequestingjurisdiction;
(5) the anticipated emotional effect upon the child of an immediate return
order(afactorwhichistobetreatedassignificantbutnotasparamount);
theextenttowhichthepurposeandunderlyingphilosophyoftheHagueConvention
wouldbeatriskoffrustrationifareturnorderweretoberefused.”
ReD(AChild)(Abduction:RightsofCustody)[2007]1FLR961isauthorityfortheproposition
that the exercise of discretion ought not to take account of the court’s view of the
“morality”oftheabductor’sactions,andseeBaronessHale@981:
It was said byWaite J inW–v‐W (Child Abduction: Acquiescence) [1993] 2 FLR 211 that
thesefactorsshouldnotbeappliedrigidlyandmathematically,butinsteadusetoinforman
overallimpressiongainedfromtheevidence.Thisstatementwasmadeinthecontextofa
defenceofacquiescence,but itapropositionthat istruegenerallyofthemanner inwhich
thecourtshouldexerciseitsdiscretion.
3. DiscretionandSettlement
It isdifficult toenvisage,giventheJudgment inReM(Abduction: Zimbabwe) [2008]1FLR
251, that judicialdiscretionwouldbe exercised in favourofdirecting the returnofa child
found to be settledhere. See in particularwhat BaronessHale had to say about the less
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weighttobegiventoConventionconceptswherewhatonesoughtwasnotaspeedyreturn
(referred to above). See also in particular the following paragraph from Baroness Hale’s
speech(@267):
4. DiscretionandConsent
SeeReK(Abduction:Consent)[1997]2FLR212andReD(Abduction:DiscretionaryReturn)
[2000] 1 FLR 24. Both support theproposition that, if a defence of consent ismadeout,
thenineffectthereisnoabductionandtheresultisthatthespiritoftheConventionisaless
potentfactor.ReKisadecisionofHaleJandReDofWilsonJ,whichgivessomeinsightinto
howtheHouseofLordsandtheCourtofAppeal,respectively,mighttreatthequestion.
InReD,however,returntoFrancewasdirecteddespitethefactthatadefenceofconsent
was established. Thiswas on account of the connectionof the family to France, and the
relativeeasewithwhichthecourtstherecoulddealwiththefamilydispute.
It will accordingly not always be the case that discretion will be exercised in favour of
directingareturnifconsentismadeout.
5. DiscretionandAcquiescence
H –v‐ H (Abduction: Acquiescence) [1996] 2 FLR 570 was an acquiescence case, and the
factorslistedthereremaingoodlawastowhichissuesarerelevant.
6. DiscretionandGraveRisk/Intolerability
In light of Re D (A Child)(Abduction: Rights of Custody) [2007] 1 FLR 961, a finding that
Article13(b) ismadeoutwillalsoalmost invariablyresolvethatthediscretionoughttobe
exercisedtodeclinethereturn.PerBaronessHale@981:
7. DiscretionandChild’sObjections
Thebalance to be struck is between the child’s objections and enforcing the spirit of the
Conventiondespite thoseobjections. Thecourt inReD (Abduction: DiscretionaryReturn)
[2000]1 FLR24 expressed the viewthat itwasmore likely fora return tobe refused ina
child’sobjectionscase,asopposedtocaseswheredefencesofconsentoracquiescencehad
beenmadeout.
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ThecurrentthinkingonhowdiscretionfallstobeexercisedinthesecasesisalsofoundinRe
M (Abduction: Zimbabwe) [2008] 1 FLR 251 and again in the speechof Baroness Hale@
266‐267:
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F. Non‐AbductionConventionCases
EssentialReading
• ReJ(ChildReturnedAbroad:ConventionRights)[2005]2FLR802
1. Introduction
The late 1990s and early 2000s saw twodivergent lines of authority arise concerning this
speciesofabduction.Thefirst,favouredbyWardLJ,wasthatthewelfareoftheparticular
child concerned was the court’s paramount consideration in non‐Convention abduction
cases.Acourthadadutytodeclinetoorderareturniftodosowouldnotbeinthatchild’s
paramountwelfareinterests.SeeReJA(ChildAbduction:Non‐ConventionCountry)[1998]1
FLR231).
The competing line of authority, preferred by Thorpe LJ, was to apply the Convention
machineryanalogouslytonon‐Conventioncases.Therewasastartingprinciplethatitwould
beinachild’s interestsforthecourts inthecountryofhishabitualresidence todecideon
hisfuture,andexceptionalcircumstanceswererequiredtodepartfromthatstartingpoint–
see Re E (Abduction: Non‐Convention Country) [1999] 2 FLR 642, Re M (Abduction:
PeremptoryReturnOrder) [1996]1FLR478andReZ (Abduction:NonConventionCountry
[1999]1FLR1270.
The latter approach gained currency and was the preferred approach until the question
reached the House of Lords in 2005 in Re J (Child Returned Abroad: Convention Rights)
[2005]2FLR802.
2. ReJ
ReJconcernedaSaudifatherandamotherwhowasadualnationalofSaudiArabiaandthe
UK. Theyhadachild. Theirmarriagefell intodisrepair. Themotherobtainedthefather’s
consenttocometoEnglandwiththechildtostudy.ShelaterresolvednottoreturntoSaudi
Arabia.ThefatherstartedproceedingsinEnglandforthechild’speremptoryreturntoSaudi
Arabiaunder thecourt’s inherent jurisdiction. That application failedat first instance,but
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succeededonappeal.ThemothertookthecasetotheHouseofLordsgiventheconflicting
Court of Appeal authorities. Her case was that she would be prevented a fair hearing in
SaudiArabia,andthatshewouldnotbeabletomoveacourttheretograntherpermission
torelocatetoEnglandwiththechild.
BaronessHale(foritwasshe)gavethespeechonbehalfoftheHouse.Thecourtnippedin
thebud the competing line of authority that sawa quasi‐AbductionConvention approach
applying to thesecases. Thecourtcouldorderan immediate return inappropriate cases,
but that should not be the automatic reaction in the absence of a treaty obligation.
Likewise, a convenient starting propositionmight be that itwould bebetter for a child to
havehis future decided in his home country. There could beno “strongpresumption” in
favour of a return. The court must focus on the particular child in the particular
circumstances.Whatwasinthischild’sinterests?
Baroness Hale went on to suggest factors that might be relevant in such cases to
determiningapplicationsforsummaryreturn(seeparagraphs[33],[34],[37],[39]and[40].
ThefollowingepitomeofthosefactorsistakenfromtheheadnoteinFamilyLawReports:
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3. Post‐ReJDecisions
Re H (Abduction: Non‐Convention Application) [2006] 2 FLR 314 and Re H (Abduction:
Dominica:CorporalPunishment)[2007]1FLR72bothwarrantreadingiftimepermits.
4. BilateralArrangements
The UK has a bilateral arrangement with one other State, namely Pakistan, which is of
relevance to issues of the cross‐border movement of children. Additionally, there is a
bilateralarrangementinplacebetweenEgyptandEnglandandWales.
ThearrangementwithPakistanisintheformofaProtocol.ThetextoftheoriginalProtocol,
concludedon17 January2003,appears inFamilyCourtPractice(inPart IV). Itcanalsobe
found(amongstotherplaces)onthewebsiteoftheForeignandCommonwealthOffice,at
thefollowingaddress:
http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/word/uk‐pakistan‐protocol
TheProtocolhasbeenrevisitedtwicesince,inSeptember2003andFebruary2006,andsee
thefollowinglinksforthedocumentsemergingfromthosesessions:
http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/word/UK‐Pakistan‐protocol‐guidelines
http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/word/uk‐pakistan‐points
The Protocol is primarily concernedwith child abduction cases, but cases that involve the
cross‐borderrecognitionofordersastocustodyandaccessalsofallwithinthe“spirit”,ifnot
theletter,oftheagreement.
In terms of practical operation, the Protocol looks to appoint liaison judges in the two
jurisdictions; in England and Wales, the liaison judge is Lord Justice Thorpe. The liaison
judgesareintendedtoworktogethertoadvancetheobjectsoftheProtocol.
The arrangement with Egypt is styled as an agreement known as the Cairo Declaration,
whichwasconcludedon17January2005.AcopyoftheDeclarationisreproducedinFamily
CourtPractice(inPart IV). Itcomprisesaseriesofagreedprinciplestobeappliedtocross‐
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border cases, whether relating to abduction or recognition/enforcement of orders, as
betweenthetwojurisdictions.
Far less has been written about the Cairo Declaration than the Anglo‐Pakistan Protocol.
However,thespiritoftheagreementsissufficientlysimilartoenabletheguidanceissuedin
relationtothelattertobeappliedanalogouslytotheformer.
NeithertheProtocolnorthedeclarationisabindingarrangement.Further,bothconcluded
priortotheHouseofLords’decisioninReJ.Accordingly,anythingsaidineitherdocument
mustbereadassubjecttotheprinciplesfoundinthatcaseaboutthetaskandapproachof
theEnglishcourt.
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G. Sequestration
EssentialReading
• Richardson–v‐Richardson[1990]1FLR186
• ReS(Abduction:Sequestration)[1995]1FLR858
1. Introduction
AWritofSequestrationisaWritofExecutionintheHighCourt.Traditionally,itwasaform
ofpunishmentthatthecourtwouldconsiderapplyingwhendealingwithacontemnorwho
hasfailedtoperformanactwithinaspecifiedtime,orelsewhohasdisobeyedaninjunction.
Sequestrationhasbeenused inabductionproceedingsasa fulcrumtomoveanabductor,
especiallyinnon‐Conventionproceedings,toobeyordersrelatingtothereturnofachildto
EnglandandWales.
AWritofSequestrationordersthirdpartiestotakepossessionofthepropertyorassetsof
thecontemnor,andtomanagethemorotherwiseapplytheminaparticularway.
2. Whenisitappropriate?
Giventhatitisdesignedtoaddresscontempt,theremustbeanordertobeenforced,which
must have been served personally on the contemnor. Alternatively, the court must be
persuadedthatitcandispensewiththerequirementforpersonalservice,onthebasisthat
theorderhasbeenbroughttotheattentionofthecontemnorinsomeotherway.
Theordermustalsobeendorsedwithapenalnotice.
There must be property within the jurisdiction that is susceptible to the Writ of
Sequestration.Thiscanincluderealandpersonalproperty,freeholdorleasehold interests,
choses inaction,pensionsandstocks. Sequestrationcannotbedeployedagainstproperty
ownedbythecontemnorastrustee.
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3. Procedure
Sequestration isonlyavailable in theHighCourt,andcasesproceedingatother levelswill
needtobetransferreduptoenablesequestrationtobedeployed.
TheleaveofthecourtisrequiredtoissuetheWrit.TheapplicationforleaveisbyNoticeof
Motion stating the grounds of the application. This must be supported by an affidavit.
Consentstoactonthepartofthewould‐besequestratorsmustalsobefiled.
TheNoticeofMotionmustbeservedpersonallyonthecontemnor(althoughthecourtcan
provide for substitutedserviceordispensewith italtogether if satisfied that theNoticeof
Motionhascometothecontemnor’sattentionthroughsomeothermeans).Whetherleave
shouldbegrantedisamatterofjudicialdiscretion.
If leave is granted to issue aWrit, four sequestrators takepossessionof the contemnor’s
property.Thecourtmayauthorisepaymentsoutforparticularpurposes,maysanctionthe
sale,mortgageorlettingofproperty,etc.
The sequestration lasts until the contemnor has cleared his contempt, when it will be
discharged.Thecourtmaydischargeitsooneronapplication.
RSCOrder45,rules5to7apply.
4. Inaction
InRichardson‐v‐Richardson[1990]1FLR186, thecourtwasaskedwhethersequestrators
shouldbepermittedtoraisemoneyagainstthesecurityofapropertyleftbehindinEngland
byanabductingmother,and toprovide thatmoney to the father touse to fund litigation
abroad. Thecourthadnodifficulty inconcluding that itwasappropriate tosanction that
course of action; to dootherwisewould render the sequestrationnugatory. This had the
desiredeffect;thechildrenwerepromptlyreturnedtoEngland.
InMir –v‐ Mir [1992] 1 FLR 624, the court permitted the sale of a property in England
belonging to a father who had abducted aWard of court to Pakistan, for the purpose of
ensuringthatthemothercouldfinancelitigationinPakistan.
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The contemnor in Re S (Abduction: Sequestration) [1995] 1 FLR 858 was a third party, a
friendoftheabductingmother.Thecourtwassatisfiedthatthemother’sfriendknewofthe
ordersmadebythecourt,andwascomplicitintheirdeliberatefrustrationofthoseorders.
Permission was granted to issue a Writ of Sequestration against the property of the
mother’sfriend.
5. Disadvantages
Sequestration is notoriously expensive, involving as it does four professionals in the
management of the contemnor’s assets and properties. It is not uncommon for the
sequestrators’ costs quickly to run into figures measured in tens, or even hundreds of
thousandsofpounds.
Theskillsetrequiredtoactasasequestrator isaspecialistone,whichrestrictsthepoolof
individuals towhomonemight turn. This specialisationadds to the cost issue referred to
above.
Thecourtwillbeunlikelytosanctionacourseofactionthatwillnotenrichanybodybutthe
sequestrators–that is,therewillneedtobeenoughavailable intermsofthecontemnor’s
assetstomaketheexercisecommerciallyviable(seeClark–v‐Clark[1989]1FLR174).
As a general rule, I would not consider sequestration as being sensible unless therewere
unencumbered assets belonging to the contemnorwithin the jurisdiction in the region of
£100,000.
6. AlternativestoSequestration
If one hopes to cut off financial supply to an abductor, for example, by preventing him
accessing bank accounts that are enabling him to operate abroad and continue to stay
beyond the reach of court orders, this can readily be achieved by way of a freezing
injunction,withouttheaddedcomplicationandcostofsequestration.
Where a fighting‐fund is sought to enable a left‐behind parent to take part in litigation
abroad,thismightbealternativelyobtainedundertheMatrimonialCausesAct1973(seeAl
Khatib –v‐Masry [2002]1FLR1053,wherea fighting fundof£2.5millionwasawarded in
ancillary relief proceedings to enable awife to engage in litigation abroad to recover her
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abductedchildren)and/orundersection15of,Schedule1to,theChildrenAct1989(ReS(A
Child:FinancialProvision)[2005]2FLR94).