1. Imbong v Comelec 35 SCRA 25

Imbong v Comelec September 11, 1970

RA 6132: delegates in Constitutional Convention

Petitioner: Imbong

Respondents: Ferrer (Comelec Chair), Patajo, Miraflor (Comelec Members)

Petitioner: Gonzales

Respondent: Comelec

Ponente: Makasiar

RELATED LAWS:

Resolution No 2 (1967) -Calls for Constitutional Convention to be composed of 2 delegates from each representative district who shall be elected in November, 1970.

RA 4919 -implementation of Resolution No 2

Resolution 4 (1969)-amended Resolution 2: Constitutional Convention shall be composed of 320delegates a proportioned among existing representative districts according to the population. Provided that each district shall be entitled to 2 delegates.

RA 6132-Concon Act 1970, repealed RA 4919, implemented Res No. 2 & 4.

Sec 4: considers all public officers/employees as resigned when they file their candidacy

Sec 2: apportionment of delegates

Sec 5: Disqualifies any elected delegate from running for any public office in the election or from assuming any appointive office/position until the final adournment of the ConCon.

Par 1 Sec 8: ban against all political parties/organized groups from giving support/representing a delegate to the convention.

FACTS:

This is a petition for declaratory judgment. These are 2 separate but related petitions of running candidates for delegates to the Constitutional Convention assailing the validity of RA 6132.Gonzales: Sec, 2, 4, 5 and Par 1 Sec 8, and validity of entire law Imbong: Par 1 Sec 8

ISSUE:

Whether the Congress has a right to call for Constitutional Convention and whether the parameters set by such a call is constitutional.

HOLDING:

The Congress has the authority to call for a Constitutional Convention as a Constituent Assembly. Furthermore, specific provisions assailed by the petitioners are deemed as constitutional.

RATIO:

- Sec 4 RA 6132: it is simply an application of Sec 2 Art 12 of Constitution

-Constitutionality of enactment of RA 6132:

Congress acting as Constituent Assembly, has full authority to propose amendments, or call for convention for the purpose by votes and these votes were attained by Resolution 2 and 4

- Sec 2 RA 6132: it is a mere implementation of Resolution 4 and is enough that the basis employed for such apportions is reasonable. Macias case relied by Gonzales is not reasonable for that case granted more representatives to provinces with less population and vice versa. In this case, Batanes is equal to the number of delegates I other provinces with more population.

- Sec 5: State has right to create office and parameters to qualify/disqualify members thereof. Furthermore, this disqualification is only temporary. This is a safety mechanism to prevent political figures from controlling elections and to allow them to devote more time to the Constituional Convention.

- Par 1 Sec 8: this is to avoid debasement of electoral process and also to assure candidates equal opportunity since candidates must now depend on their individual merits, and not the support of political parties. This provision does not create discrimination towards any particular party/group, it applies to all organizations

2. Miriam Defensor- Santiago vs. COMELEC

G.R No. 127325

March 19, 1997

FACTS:

On December 6, 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin, founding member of the Movement for People's Initiative, filed with the COMELEC a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative" citing Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. Acting on the petition, the COMELEC

set the case for hearing and directed Delfin to have the petition published. After the hearing the arguments between petitioners and opposing parties, the COMELEC directed Delfin and the oppositors to file their "memoranda and/or oppositions/memoranda" within five days. On December 18, 1996, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin filed a special civil action for prohibition under Rule 65 raising the following arguments, among others:

1.) That the Constitution can only be amended by people’s initiative if there is an enabling law passed by Congress, to which no such law has yet been passed; and

2.) That R.A. 6735 does not suffice as an enabling law on people’s initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative.

ISSUE:

WON R.A. No. 6735 sufficient to enable amendment of the Constitution by people’s initiative.

WON RA 6735 was intended to include initiative on amendments to the Constitution, and if so WON the Act as worded adequately covers such initiative.

WON COMELEC Res. No. 2300 regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to the constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific provisions on the conduct of such initiative?

WON the lifting of term limits of elective national and local official, as proposed in the draft petition would constitute a revision of , or an amendment of the constitution.

WON the COMELEC can take cognizance of or has jurisdiction over the petition.

WON it is proper for the Supreme Court to take cognizance of the petition when there is a pending case before the COMELEC.

HELD:

NO. R.A. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution.

Under the said law, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people are not accorded the power to "directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution" through the system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or resolutions." The use of the clause "proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed" denotes that R.A. No. 6735 excludes initiative on amendments to the Constitution.

Also, while the law provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum and for Local Initiative and Referendum, no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This means that the main thrust of the law is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. If R.A. No. 6735 were intended to fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have

provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national and local laws.

While R.A. No. 6735 specially detailed the process in implementing initiative and referendum on national and local laws, it intentionally did not do so on the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution.

COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is hereby declared void and orders the respondent to forthwith dismiss the Delfin Petition . TRO issued on 18 December 1996 is made permanent.

WHEREFORE, petition is GRANTED.

3. PIRMA v. COMELEC GR. No. 129754. Sept. 21, 1997

Facts: On June 23, 1997, PIRMA filed with the COMELEC a Petition for Initiative to Propose Amendments to the Constitution (PIRMA Petition). The PIRMA Petition was supported by around five (5) million signatures in compliance with R.A.6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, and prayed that the COMELEC, among others: (1) cause the publication of the petition in Filipino and English at least twice in newspapers of general and local circulation; (2) order all election officers to verify the signatures collected in support of the petition and submit these to the Commission; and (3) set the holding of a plebiscite where the following proposition would be submitted to the people for ratification: Do you approve amendments to the 1987 Constitution giving the President the chance to be re-elected for another term, similarly with the Vice-President, so that both the highest officials of the land can serve for two consecutive terms of six years each, and also to lift the term limits for all other elective government officials, thus giving Filipino voters the freedom of choice, amending for that purpose, Section 4 of Article VII, Sections 4 and 7 of Article VI and Section 8 of Article X, respectively?

The COMELEC dismissed the PIRMA Petition in view of the permanent restraining order issued by the Court in Santiago v. COMELEC. PIRMA filed with this Court a Petition for Mandamus and Certiorari seeking to set aside the COMELEC Resolution dismissing its petition for initiative. PIRMA argued that the Courts decision on the Delfin Petition did not bar the COMELEC from acting on the PIRMA Petition as said ruling was not definitive based on the deadlocked voting on the motions for reconsideration, and because there was no identity of parties and subject matter between the two petitions. PIRMA also urged the Court to re-examine its ruling in Santiago v. COMELEC.The Court dismissed the petition for mandamus and certiorari in its resolution dated September 23, 1997. It explained: The Court ruled, first, by a unanimous vote, that no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to the public respondent COMELEC in dismissing the petition filed by PIRMA therein, it appearing that it only complied with the dispositions in the Decision of this Court in G.R. No. 127325 promulgated on March 19, 1997, and its

Resolution of June10, 1997.The Court next considered the question of whether there was need to resolve the second issue posed by the petitioners, namely, that the Court re-examine its ruling as

regards R.A. 6735. On this issue, the Chief Justice and six (6)other members of the Court, namely, Regalado, Davide, Romero, Bellosillo, Kapunan and Torres, JJ., voted that there was no need to take it up. Vitug, J., agreed that there was no need for re-examination of said second issue since the case at bar is not the proper vehicle for that purpose.

Five (5) other members of the Court, namely, Melo, Puno, Francisco,Hermosisima, and Panganiban, JJ., opined that there was a need for such a re-examinationx x x x9In their Separate Opinions, Justice (later Chief Justice) Davide and Justice Bellosillostated that the PIRMA petition was dismissed on the ground of res judicata.

4. IN RE CUNANAN 94 PHIL. 534

FACTS:

Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is known as the Bar Flunkers Act, in 1952. The title of the law was, “An Act to Fix the Passing Marks for Bar Examinations from 1946 up to and including 1955.”

Section 1 provided the following passing marks:

1946-1951………………70%

1952 …………………….71%

1953……………………..72%

1954……………………..73%

1955……………………..74%

Provided however, that the examinee shall have no grade lower than 50%.

Section 2 of the Act provided that “A bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75% in any subject shall be deemed to have already passed that subject and the grade/grades shall be included in the computation of the general average in subsequent bar examinations.”

ISSUE: Whether of not, R.A. No. 972 is constitutional.

RULING:

Section 2 was declared unconstitutional due to the fatal defect of not being embraced in the title of the Act. As per its title, the Act should affect only the bar flunkers of 1946 to 1955 Bar examinations.

Section2 establishes a permanent system for an indefinite time. It was also struck down for allowing partial passing, thus failing to take account of the fact that laws and jurisprudence are not stationary.

As to Section1, the portion for 1946-1951 was declared unconstitutional, while that for 1953 to 1955 was declared in force and effect. The portion that was stricken down was based under the following reasons:

1. The law itself admits that the candidates for admission who flunked the bar from 1946 to 1952 had inadequate preparation due to the fact that this was very close to the end of World War II;

2. The law is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of the court on the petitions of the said candidates;

3. The law is an encroachment on the Court’s primary prerogative to determine who may be admitted to practice of law and, therefore, in excess of legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the Rules of Court. The rules laid down by Congress under this power are only minimum norms, not designed to substitute the judgment of the court on who can practice law; and

4. The pretended classification is arbitrary and amounts to class legislation.

As to the portion declared in force and effect, the Court could not muster enough votes to declare it void. Moreover, the law was passed in 1952, to take effect in 1953. Hence, it will not revoke existing Supreme Court resolutions denying admission to the bar of an petitioner. The same may also rationally fall within the power to Congress to alter, supplement or modify rules of admission to the practice of law

5. Bautista v. Juinio [GR L-50908, 31 January 1984] En Banc, Fernando (J): 7 concur, 2 took no part

Facts: Letter of Instruction 869 was issued on 31 May 1979 to respond to the protracted oil crisis dating back to 1974, banning the use of private motor vehicles with H and EH plates on weekends and holidays from 12 am Saturday to 5:00 am Monday, or 1 am of holiday to 5:00 am of the day after the holiday; but exempting service, truck, diplomatic, consular corps, and tourist cars. Pursuant thereto, Alfredo L. Juinio, then Minister of Public Works, Transportation and Communications and Romeo P. Edu, then Commissioner of Land Transportation Commission issued on 11 June 1979, Memorandum Circular 39, which imposed "the penalties of fine, confiscation of vehicle and cancellation of registration on owners of the above-specified vehicles" found violating such Letter of Instruction. Memorandum Circular 39 does not impose the penalty of confiscation but merely that of impounding, fine, and for the third offense that of cancellation of certificate of registration and for the rest of the year or for ninety days whichever is longer. Mary Concepcion Bautista and Enrique D. Bautista questioned the validity of LOI 869 and MC 39 through a prohibition proceeding with the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether LOI 869 and Memorandum Circular 39, banning certain vehicles from using the motorways in specified time, are constitutional and/or valid.

Held: A regulatory measure enjoys a presumption of constitutionality or a presumption that such an act falls within constitutional limitations. When a questioned statute deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the police power, and which is asked to be declare void on the ground that the specific method of regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of law, the presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the statute. Herein, as to LOI 869, the determination of the mode and manner through which the objective of minimizing the consumption of oil products and measures conducive to energy conservation (require and establish taxi stands equipped with efficient telephone and communication systems; strict implementation and observance of cargo truck hours on main arteries; strict observance of traffic rules; effective solution of traffic problems and decongestion of traffic through rerouting and quick repair of roads and efficient operation of double decker buses; rationing of gasoline to avoid panic buying and give the private car owner the option and responsibility of deciding on the use of his allocation; allow neon and electrically devised advertising signs only from five o'clock p.m. to nine o'clock p.m.; prohibit immediately the importation of heavy and luxury cars and seriously re-examine the car manufacturing program) are left to the discretion of the political branches. The question before the Court is limited to whether or not LOI 869 as implemented by MC 39 is violative of certain constitutional rights. On the other hand, as to MC 39, while the imposition of a fine or the suspension of registration under the conditions therein set forth is valid under the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the impounding of a vehicle finds no statutory justification. To apply that portion of MC 39 would be ultra vires. It must likewise be made clear that a penalty even if warranted can only be imposed in accordance with the procedure required by law.

6. Lozano v. Martinez [GR L-63419, 18 December 1986] En Banc, Yap (J): 9 concur

FACTS

A petition to quash the charges against the petitioners for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22) was filed before the Court on the ground that the acts charged did not constitute an offense because BP 22 is unconstitutional. BP 22 punishes a person "who makes or draws and issues any check on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of said check in full upon presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment."

The motions were denied by the respondent trial courts, except in one case, wherein the trial court declared the law unconstitutional and dismissed the case, hence this petition for relief.

ISSUE

Whether or not BP 22 is constitutional as a valid exercise of the police power of the State

HELD

Yes, BP 22 is constitutional as a valid exercise of the police power of the State. The enactment of BP 22 is a declaration by the legislature that, as a matter of public policy, the making and issuance of a worthless check is deemed public nuisance to be abated by the imposition of penal sanctions. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order. The police power of the state has been described as "the most essential, insistent and illimitable of powers" which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society. The effects of the issuance of a worthless check , creates not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousand fold, can pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest.

7. Province of Camarines Sur vs CA

FACTS: Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) of Cam Sur passed Resolution No. 129 authorizing the provincial governor to purchase/expropriate property contiguous to the provincial capitol site, in order to establish a pilot farm for non-food and non-agricultural crops and housing project for the government employees. By virtue of the resolution, Cam Sur filed 2 cases for expropriation against private respondents (San Joaquins).

ISSUE: Whether or not Resolution No 129 is a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain

HELD: Yes, the expropriation of the property authorized by the questioned resolution is for a public purpose. The establishment of a pilot development center would ensure to the direct benefit and advantage of the people of the province. Once operational, the center would make available to the community invaluable information and technology on agriculture, fishery and cottage industry. Ultimately, the livelihood of the farmers, fisherman and craftsman would be enhanced. The housing project, on the other hand, satisfies the requirement of public purpose of the constitution.

8. Knecht v. CA 297 scra 173

Term “Owner” as applied in eminent domain cases refers to all those who have lawful interest in the property to be condemned, including a mortgagee, a lessee and a vendee in possession under an executor contract.

9. Zambales chromite v. CA 94 scra 261

Facts: ZCM filed an administrative case before the Director of Mines Gozon to have them be declared the rightful and prior locators and possessors of 69 mining claims in Sta. Cruz, Zambales. They are asserting their claim against the group of Martinez and Pabiloňa. Gozon decided in favor of Martinez et

al. ZCM appealed the case before the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. During pendency, Gozon was assigned as the Sec of Agri. And Natural Resources. He did not inhibit himself from deciding on the appeal but he instead affirmed his earlier decision when he was still the director of mines. ZCM then appealed before the CFI of Zambales. The CFI affirmed the decision of Gozon. It held that the disqualification of a judge to review his own decision or ruling (Sec. 1, Rule 137, Rules of Court) does not apply to administrative bodies; that there is no provision in the Mining Law, disqualifying the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources from deciding an appeal from a case which he had decided as Director of Mines; that delicadeza is not a ground for disqualification; that the ZCM did not seasonably seek to disqualify Gozon from deciding their appeal, and that there was no evidence that Gozon acted arbitrarily and with bias, prejudice, animosity or hostility to ZCM. ZCM appealed the case to the CA. The CA reversed Gozon’s finding and declared that ZCM had the rights earlier attributed to Martinez et al by Gozon. Martinez et al appealed averring that the factual basis found by Gozon as Director of Mines be given due weight. The CA reconsidered after realizing that Gozon cannot affirm his own decision and the CA remanded the case to the Minister of Natural Resources. Now both parties appealed urging their own contentions; ZCM wants the CA’s earlier decision to be reaffirmed while Martinez et al demanded that Gozon’s finding be reinstated. The CA denied both petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not Gozon can validly affirm his earlier decision w/o disturbing due process.

HELD: The SC annulled the decision of Gozon calling it as a mockery of justice. Gozon had acted with grave abuse of discretion. In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate officer might not turn out to be a farce, the reviewing officer must perforce be other than the officer whose decision is under review; otherwise, there could be no different view or there would be no real review of the case. The decision of the reviewing officer would be a biased view; inevitably, it would be the same view since being human, he would not admit that he was mistaken in his first view of the case. The SC affirmed the 2nd decision of the CA.

10. People v. Cayat 68 Phil 12

Facts: Accused Cayat, a native of Baguio, Benguet, Mountain Province, and a member of the non-Christian tribes, was found guilty of violating sections 2 and 3 of Act No. 1639 for having acquired and possessed one bottle of A-1-1 gin, an intoxicating liquor, which is not a native wine. The law made it unlawful for any native of the Philippines who is a member of a non-Christian tribe within the meaning of Act 1397 to buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed to prior to the passage of the law.

Issue: Cayat challenges the constitutionality of Act 1639 on the grounds that it is discriminatory and denies the equal protection of the laws, violates due process clause, and is an improper exercise of police power.

Held: It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.

Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real or substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical distinctions. It is not based upon “accident of birth or parentage,” as counsel for the appellant asserts, but upon the degree of civilization and culture. “The term ‘non-Christian tribes’ refers, not to religious belief but in a way, to the geographical area and more directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities.” (Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindora, supra.) This distinction is unquestionably reasonable, for the Act was intended to meet the peculiar conditions existing in the non-Christian tribes.

The prohibition enshrined in Act 1397 is designed to insure peace and order in and among non-Christian tribes. It applies equally to all members of the class evident from perusal thereof. That it may be unfair in its operation against a certain number of non-Christians by reason of their degree of culture, is not an argument against the equality of its application.

11. Tudor v. Board of Education 14 NJ 31

Facts:

Gideon Society, a religious group engaged in the distribution of free copies of the Bible in obedience to the scriptural mandate to “go forth and spread the word of God”, enlisted the services of public school teachers who, among other things, distributed the request forms among the students, collected them after they had been accomplished by the students’ parents, returned them to the Society, later received the copies requested and then delivered these to the students.

Issue: WON the distribution of Bibles by the teachers in a public school falls as a religious activity

Held: The U.S. Supreme Court declared that the teachers, employing government time, were participating in a religious activity as they were an essential cog in the machinery of the distribution of the Bibles. This is prohibited and unconstitutional for public school districts to allow these groups to distribute bibles during school day at public schools during instructional time.

12. Zorach v. Clauson 343 US 306

Synopsis of Rule of Law. This case stands for the proposition that the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution (Constitution) does not advocate hostility toward religion and mere acknowledgment of a religious program, without participation, is not unconstitutional.

Facts. The Petitioners, Zorach and other taxpayers and residents of New York City (Petitioners), brought suit challenging the constitutionality of a “released time” program, which allowed children to leave school, with parental permission, for religious instruction.

The “released time” program allowed children, with parental permission, to be released from school for religious instruction. The instructions took place away from the school grounds and no school involvement was required, other than acknowledging the students’ participation. The Petitioners brought suit challenging the constitutionality of the program alleging that the prohibition against any laws respecting the establishment of any religion also prohibited this voluntary program. The Petitioners appealed from a judgment for the Respondents, Clauson and other member of the Board of Education of the City of New York (Respondents) and the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) granted writs.

Issue. The issue is simply whether New York, through its acceptance of the “released time” program, has engaged in the respect of an establishment of religion, within the meaning of the First Amendment of the Constitution.

Held. Affirmed.

The Supreme Court held for the Respondents, noting that because instruction occurred away from the schools and did not require school participation, no respect for a particular establishment had occurred.

Additionally, the Supreme Court held that a philosophy of hostility toward religion cannot be read into the Bill of Rights. Just because the First Amendment of the Constitution prohibits the making of a law which will respect the establishment of religion, it does not necessarily follow that the government should be hostile toward the exercise of religion, which would also be an abrogation of the Free Exercise Clause of the same amendment.

While the establishment clause prohibits governmental support of religion, it does not prohibit students from exercising their religions.