BAP Pacocha (Resumen del accidente)

El BAP Pacocha, ex-USS Atule, que sobrevivió la guerra combatiendo a los japoneses hundiendo un numero considerable de buques de guerra y mercantes enemigos y que fue vendido al Perú en 1974.  Encontro un triste final la noche del 26 Agosto de 1988, el submarino Peruano regresaba de un entrenamiento de torpedos y estaba dirigiéndose a la Base Naval del Callao, cuando fue embestido por la proa rompehielos del pesquero japonés Kiowa Maru que le abrió un boquete de 2 metros por 10 cm, en la popa y se hundió.  El comandante Daniel Nieva logró cerrar la escotilla de acceso principal del puente pero murió en el intento al quedar atrapado en el compartimiento que se inundó al hundirse el submarino.  El Teniente 1ro. Roger Cotrina, en la sala de torpedos, logró cerrar la puerta estanca y comenzó a bombear aire en el compartimiento.   Venciendo la resistencia del agua que entraba a raudales, Cotrina cerró también la escotilla de proa que estaba abierta mientras el submarino se hundía.  23 tripulantes lograron saltar al mar, 8 murieron y el resto quedó atrapado en la sala de torpedos de proa.  La nave se asentó en el fondo a unos 50 metros de profundidad. 

No todos los 22 tripulantes atrapados en el buque habían recibido entrenamiento de salvamento usando el sistema de escape de la escotilla Steinke, porque La Armada Peruana canceló los entrenamientos con ese sistema, cuando EEUU suspendió el programa debido a la muerte de un marinero, en ese país y puso el programa en revisión.  Esos submarinos no utilizaban boyas con teléfono, por lo que no había forma de que se comunicaran con el exterior.  Sólo pudieron lanzar la boya de marcación, bengalas y eyectar mensajes.  Hubo un pequeño conato de incendio y las baterías de proa emitieron gases por lo que debieron sellar el compartimiento de baterías. 

Al día siguiente, luego de un pequeño entrenamiento dado por el Tte. Cotrina a los tripulantes y cuando en la superficie estaba todo listo, incluyendo los helicópteros para llevarlos al Hospital Naval para recibir el tratamiento de descompresión, se inició la evacuación del submarino. 

Durante el escape, el OM1 Carlos Grande, radioperador de abordo, estuvo a cargo de las comunicaciones con el grupo de salvamento mediante golpes en el casco, lamentablemente, Grande falleció horas después  a consecuencia de problemas de descompresión.

El BAP Pacocha fue reflotado 11 meses después por personal de la Armada Peruana.

B.A.P. Pacocha

El BAP Pacocha ingresó a la Armada Peruana en el año 1974, antes de eso formó parte de la flota norteamericana que luchó en la Segunda Guerra Mundial.

 

Antecedentes Históricos

El B.A.P. Pacocha fue construido para la Marina Norteamericana con el nombre de U.S.S. Atule (SS-403), era un submarino tipo "Flota", de la clase Balao.

Su construcción se inicia durante la Segunda guerra Mundial, en los Astilleros de Portsmouth, N.H., el 25 de noviembre de 1943. Su comisionamiento se realizó el 21 de junio de 1944, bajo el mando del Capitán de fragata U.S.N. John Howard Maurer.

Recibió la orden de incorporarse a la fuerza de Submarinos del Pacífico. En el transcurso de su servicio en la Marina Norteamericana, cumplió eficientemente importantes misiones, entre ellas:· Conducir ataques coordinados para destruir o impedir el tráfico marítimo enemigo en su zona asignada, las aguas del Pacífico Oriental.· Operó en las aguas del Pacifico Sur, patrullando entre el estrecho de Luzón y el Sur del Mar de la China, controlando el tráfico marítimo entre Hong Kong - Manila, en la costa de Corea y el Mar Amarillo.

Estuvo presente en la batalla de Cabo Engaño y en la Batalla de Leyte.

En su record de hundimientos, cuenta con más de 27,000 toneladas, figurando como sus blancos principales: el submarino Japones Iawu Toyo, el destuctor Igushi Tojo, el transporte Asame Maru de 16,975 toneladas, el buque Barreminas N 38, el transporte

El Pacocha combatió en la Segunda Guerra Mundial

Santos Maru de 2,660 toneladas, el transporte Taima Maru N 1 de 6,888 toneladas, este buque averiado por sus torpedos fue finalmente hundido por disparos de cañón.

Después de la capitulación del Japón en agosto de 1945, regresó a su base en New London. Luego, fue asignado al Golfo de México y New Orleans para entrenamiento de personal de reservistas (en una celebración de la ciudad hizo inmersión en el Río Missisippi).

El Atule, por su participación en la Segunda Guerra Mundial, se hizo acreedor de cuatro Estrellas de Batalla.

Fue puesto fuera de servicio el 6 de abril de 1970.

inicio

En la Marina de Guerra del Perú

 

En 1974, el Comandante General de la Marina Peruana, el Vicealmirante, Luis E. Vargas Caballero, inició las gestiones para la transferencia de dos submarinos ante el Jefe de Operaciones navales de los EE.UU., todo esto en el marco del programa de conformación de la Fuerza Submarina y de renovación de unidades.

La comisión seleccionó los submarinos Atule y Sea Poacher y el 1 de julio de 1974 se llevó a cabo la ceremonia de entrega formal de estas unidades y el afirmado del pabellón nacional en el B.A.P. La Pedrera (ex Sea Proacher). En el B.A.P. Pacocha (ex Atule) se realizó el 1 de octubre del mismo año.

Durante los diez años de operación del B.A.P. Pacocha en la Marina de Guerra del Perú, fue una excelente unidad, cumpliendo eficientemente todas las operaciones de entrenamiento y patrullajes programadas, logrando estar entre las tres unidades con mayor número de millas navegadas; superando de esta manera a los submarinos alemanes de última generación con que contaba la Marina en aquellos tiempos.

La tarde del 26 de agosto del 1988, la tripulación del B.A.P. Pacocha se preparaba para llegar a la rada del puerto del Callao. Un pesquero japonés se encargaría de hacer que el viaje dure más tiempo del imaginado.  

El Regreso al Callao

Actual Escuela de Submarinos en Peru

El día 26 de agosto de 1988 el submarino Pacocha, realizó ejercicios programados, que involucraron a otras unidades navales; desde las 7:45 de la mañana hasta las 4:45 p.m.

Luego de verificar el rumbo y la velocidad de regreso a puerto, el comandante ordenó: Prepararse para salir a superficie. A las 17:01 el submarino salió a superficie y se abrieron algunas escotillas; como es normal cuando se navega en superficie.

A las 18:00 se encendieron las luces reglamentarias de navegación y se relevó la guardia de mar. Unos minutos más tarde se ordenó a todo el personal: Prepararse para entrar a puerto.

Hasta este momento el regreso a puerto, luego del entrenamiento, era el acostumbrado; no se había presentado ningún contratiempo.

A las 18:36, la calma se terminó. Se escuchó una larga pitada de la sirena del submarino y la orden: Adelante a toda fuerza.

A pesar de las maniobras efectuadas nada se pudo hacer. De pronto un gran estruendo remeció todo y logró desestabilizar a todos los que se encontraban en el submarino. El sonido inicial hizo creer a más de uno que se trataba de una explosión pero inmediatamente corrió la voz: ¡Colisión por proa!

La Colisión

El choque provocó un incendio en la maquina de controles por lo cual el submarino perdió propulsión y la energía eléctrica estaba cortada; la oscuridad solamente era interrumpida por alguna de las linternas que aun funcionaban.

El oficial Cotrina, quien asumió el control de la situación por ser el Jefe de Ingeniería, se dirigió a la sala donde se producía el incendio y encontró a dos oficiales y un técnico, tratando de sofocar el fuego con extintores. El ruido de las maquinas del submarino obligaba a gritar para poder ser escuchados. Mientras ayudaba a apagar el fuego, Cotrina se percató que la nave se estaba inundando. El agua del mar estaba entrando a la embarcación y se mezclaba con el petróleo derramado a consecuencia del choque.

Se ordenó el cierre del compartimiento de controles y se tomaron medidas para neutralizar la inundación, pero no dieron resultado. Se encontraban en una situación muy

Vigía en la vela del submarino

difícil; el agua que se introducía al submarino haría que este aumente de peso pero solo por la parte trasera, lo que ocasionaría que la parte delantera se eleve peligrosamente.

El submarino empezó a ganar punta, es decir a levantarse notoriamente, lo cual hacia muy difícil el tránsito. Habían transcurrido 4 minutos desde la colisión.

Se tomaron las medidas extremas de emergencia para evitar que la nave se hundiera. Mientras tanto el Oficial Cotrina subió al puente de navegación para verificar cual era la situación en el exterior. Afuera reinaba la oscuridad de la noche y las olas inclinaban de un lado a otro la nave.

Colisión del EX - B.A.P. “PACOCHA”

.. En la reconstrucción de los hechos la Comisión Investigadora destacó la negligencia del Capitán del Kyowa Maru ya que navegaba -Sin vigías, justificando esta acción erróneamente con el uso contínuo de su radar, el mismo que según el Capitán no tuvo contactos. -Este pesquero, además de sus luces de navegación verde y roja, llevaba encendidas luces adicionales en el mástil de proa, pasadizos, y en cubierta ampliamente visible desde el exterior, dificultando la observación de su dirección de movimiento, contraviniendo lo dispuesto en el Reglamento Internacional para Prevenir Abordajes en la Mar.

Escudo de la Fuerza de Submarinos del Perú

.. -El Capitán del pesquero manifestó que la visibilidad no era buena estimando una visibilidad máxima de 2,000 yardas, después se comprobó que la visibilidad se encontraba entre los 3,500 y 4,000 yardas; asimismo éste declaró que la pitada del submarino, al momento que éste cayó con todo timón derecha, fue la primera indicación de su presencia. -El Capitán del Kyowa Maru no tuvo excusa ni atenuante, se comprobó el buén funcionamiento de su radar, pues en la reconstrucción de los hechos el pesquero tuvo contacto con el submarino antes de las 6,000 yardas, así también está probado que la distancia mínima de avistamiento era de 1,800 yardas, distancia que era suficiente para poder reaccionar y ejecutar cualquier tipo de maniobra evitando el abordaje, como así lo interpretó el oficial de Guardia del Submarino y como así lo manda el Reglamento Internacional para Prevenir Abordajes, ya que un buque que divisa a otro con luz roja debe mantenerse apartado de su derrota. -Y lo más lamentable en la actuación de éste Capitán fue su frialdad y falta de sentido humanitario al no socorrer al personal del submarino que logro saltar al mar momentos después del impacto, lo que causó la muerte

de 3 tripulantes durante la espera de auxilio.

..

El Milagro

Los procedimientos de emergencia no estaban dando los resultados esperados. Una gran tragedia parecia inevitable, pero a bordo del submarino estaba a punto de suceder un hecho inexplicable.

Crisis en el B.A.P.

Gran parte de la tripulación tenía puestos sus chalecos salvavidas y debido a los golpes de las olas algunos caían al mar y otros se arrojaban y nadaban para alejarse de la succión del submarino al hundirse. Luego de dudarlo por unos instantes Cotrina regresó al interior del submarino para ayudar a los que aún se encontraban adentro luchando por salvar la nave.

La orden principal en el interior era la de colocarse los chalecos salvavidas y evacuar el submarino.

Se inicio la evacuación, pero cuando el cuarto tripulante, de apellido Panana, se disponía a salir, una gran cantidad de agua ingresó por la escotilla, haciendo caer a los que aun estaban dentro.

Panana intento salir del submarino pero su pierna quedó atascada en la escotilla superior. La nave seguía hundiéndose y arrastraba al marino con ella. En medio de la oscuridad del mar, solo podía sentir que el agua fluía de abajo hacia arriba a través de su rostro. En medio de su desesperación Panana exclamó en su mente: Dios mío, ayúdame, Dios mío, ayúdame. De pronto sintió que la escotilla que aprisionaba su pierna se abría y pudo nadar a la superficie y juntarse a los otros tripulantes que flotaban en el mar.

Dentro del submarino, la cantidad de agua que ingresaba hacía imposible que se continúe con la evacuación. Cotrina sintió de pronto un golpe en el rostro; era la pierna de Panana que estaba atascada y luchaba por desengancharse de la escotilla. En un primer intento Cotrina trato de abrir la escotilla pero no logró ni siquiera moverla pues la presión del agua lo hacia muy difícil. Volvió a intentarlo y consiguió, con mucho esfuerzo, liberar a Panana pero a la vez recibió el golpe de una gran masa de agua que ingresó con tanta fuerza que lo hizo caer desde una altura de tres metros.

Teniente 1ro. Roger Cotrina.

Escotilla similar a la del B.A.P. Pacocha

El Milagro

Cotrina quedó muy aturdido por el golpe, pero al oír el ruido que hacía el agua al golpear contra todo lo que había a su paso, rápidamente recordó que la escotilla había quedado abierta y tenia que cerrarla.El oficial se levantó e intentó acercarse a la escotilla pero el caudal lo arrojó contra una pared que se encontraba a 3 o 4 metros de distancia.

Fue una caída muy dura, casi no podía respirar, el agua lo revolvía y la oscuridad no lo dejaba ver nada. Una serie de imágenes vinieron a su mente: escenas de su infancia, de su adolescencia, de la época en el colegio militar, etc. Repentinamente aparece en la mente del oficial la imagen de Sor Maria de Jesús Crucificado Petkovic; recordó diversas imágenes y pudo sentir su mirada de tranquilidad y paz.

En medio de toda la desesperación, una luz intensa, como la de un artefacto pirotécnico, estalló en su mente e hizo que Cotrina encuentre la calma y la fuerza para regresar e intentar cerrar la escotilla.

El agua seguía ingresando y era muy difícil movilizarse; trepando por las escaleras el oficial logró llegar y a pesar de las trabas de seguridad que tenia la escotilla finalmente pudo cerrarla evitando así que el submarino continúe hundiéndose y con ello que muriesen todos en un breve tiempo.

En otro lado del submarino, el teniente Luis Roca Sara, el motorista Juan Oré y el maniobrista Rigoberto Gonzáles Pisfil, se encontraban en el compartimiento de maquinas y debido a la inclinación de la nave no pudieron cerrar las válvulas de ventilación, el agua lo ocupó todo y fue imposible la salida. Después de treinta minutos los tres tripulantes murieron ahogados.

El tiempo transcurrido entre la colisión y el hundimiento fue aproximadamente de cinco a siete minutos. Las diferentes aberturas en el casco de la nave hicieron que fuese más rápido el naufragio.

Mientras ocurría todo esto, el Comandante Daniel Nieva fallecía ahogado, atrapado en la vela del submarino.

Al querer ingresar a la torre de combate vió que el agua de mar ya ingresaba hacia interiores y con el temor de ser arrastrado por la vía de agua hacia interiores, sin poder cerrar la escotilla, la cerró desde afuera y fue en ese momento que el mar se devoraba al Pacocha, entrando toneladas de agua por el puente haciendo remolinos y golpeando al Comandante Nieva, luego de haber cumplido se cometido , el cual era haber salvado con su acción a todos los hombres que se encontraban dentro del submarino, a costa de su propia vida. (Parrafo tomado del libro"B.A.P. Pacocha Testimoni Vivo de un Milagro" del sobreviviente Hilton Sandoval Palacios)

El Escape

Los tripulantes sobrevivientes se encontraban casi sin alimentos, con muy poca luz pero con muchas esperanzas del exito del rescate que se preparaba en la superficie.

En el fondo del mar

"Nos hemos detenido a 120 pies". El submarino había tocado el fondo marino. La idea de un escape libre, aun cuando parte del personal no estaba preparado para ello, pasó por la mente de Cotrina. Se dieron ordenes de realizar la menor actividad posible para evitar el consumo de oxigeno.

En total sumaban 22 tripulantes atrapados dentro del submarino en el fondo del Mar.

La situación comprendía preparar a todo el personal superior y subalterno, en los procedimientos necesarios para realizar un escape exitoso, que se recuperen del estrés causado por la situación y que espiritualmente estén decididos a asumir este gran riesgo, en el que estarían en juego sus vidas.

A partir de las nueve de la noche un grupo de oficiales que habían seguido cursos en la escuela de buceo dieron una charla acerca del procedimiento de escape.

Durante la madrugada el Oficial Cotrina redactó un comunicado para la Comandancia de la Fuerza de submarinos informando la situación que se vivía dentro de la nave hundida, así como una relación de los que estaban atrapados.

Durante el transcurrir de la noche hubo un incendio en el compartimiento de puesto central lo cual hizo que el oxígeno disminuyera. El personal se agitaba con mayor facilidad y el ruido de la respiración era cada vez más fuerte.

A las 7 de la mañana se dispuso la distribución de la comida que consistía en un cuarto de torta de chocolate que había quedado del día anterior.

A las 10 am. Cotrina decide, debido a la falta de aire, efectuar el escape libre. Las maniobras necesarias para dicha tarea requieren de una gran precisión, un mínimo error podría causar el fracaso del escape y por lo tanto una muerte segura para todo el personal.

Mientras el primer grupo realizaba el escape, el submarino se iluminó repentinamente. La luz del sol había podido traspasar los 42 metros de profundidad en que se encontraba el submarino hundido. Dentro de la nave esa luz trajo esperanza y animo, sintieron como si fuese un mensaje de Dios indicando que estaban haciendo bien las cosas. El Oficial Cotrina dijo: Es el Espíritu Santo, Dios esta con nosotros... muchachos todo va a salir bien.

Grupos de escape

El primer grupo que escapó del submarino lo hizo a las 11 de la mañana y el último a las 6 de la tarde. En la superficie, a la espera del éxito del escape, se encontraban todas las Fuerzas Navales (Buceo y Salvamento, Fuerza de Operaciones Especiales, las Patrulleras Guardacostas, la Fuerza de Aviación Naval, los Submarinos, las unidades de Superficie, etc.)

Todos los tripulantes pasaron por diversos y delicados momentos durante su ascenso en el escape libre, pues lo hicieron desde una profundidad de 90 pies, aproximadamente 40.5 1p.p.c. de presión en sus pulmones, que debieron liberar durante la subida hacia la superficie, en solo 18 segundos aproximadamente. Además del tratamiento de la cámara de descompresión, tuvieron que seguir un tratamiento medico especializado por enfermedades que acarreaban fuertes dolores en diferentes partes del cuerpo, como en hombros, rodillas, codos, tobillos, muñecas, dolores de abdomen, enfisemas subcutáneas, intoxicación por gases, etc.

El OM2 Carlos Grande falleció por complicaciones neurológicas y severo trastorno hemodinámico.

El OM2 Alberto Reyes murió años después por trastorno neurológico severo.

Reflotamiento

La misión consistía en hacer que el B.A.P. Pacocha vuelva a surcar las aguas del mar de Grau y pueda regresar a su base en el puerto del Callao.

  Preparativos

El trabajo de reflotamiento del B.A.P. Pacocha demoró 11 meses, desde el 30 de agosto de 1988 hasta el 23 de julio de 1989. Durante ese tiempo todos los buzos del Servicio de Salvamento de la Marina, así como el personal de la base naval del Callao Apoyando en el sembrado del campo de anclas y el remolque del submarino, etc.

Terminadas las operaciones de rescate de los sobrevivientes del B.A.P. Pacocha, los días 26 y 27 de agosto de 1988, las actividades fueron encaminadas a ubicar y recuperar a los tres tripulantes desaparecidos que se presumía habían quedado atrapados en los compartimientos de popa. Es así como el 14 de setiembre se procede al área de operaciones y se inician los trabajos para ingresar a los compartimientos del submarino. Debido a la profundidad y de acuerdo a las tablas de descompresión, los buzos podían permanecer en el fondo máximo una hora, debiendo descomprimirse por el mismo lapso al salir. Los últimos días de Septiembre, se termino con los buceos de inspección, determinándose que el submarino estaba asentado en el fondo con un ángulo de aproximadamente 6º punta arriba. El lugar del impacto se encontraba completamente enfangado, teniéndose que inyectar aire al compartimiento de controles y así poder detectar las fugas por la avería.

Estrategias

 

Durante las tres primeras semanas del mes de octubre se efectuó el planeamiento inicial, para poder cumplir con la tarea de levantar el B.A.P. Pacocha, de 1.219 toneladas de peso en inmersión y luego remolcarlo hasta el dique en la base Naval del Callao.

B.A.P. Pacocha luego de su reflotamiento en el Callao.

B.A.P. Pacocha en pleno reflotamiento, 1989.

Debido a los complejos sistemas del submarino, en el interior de cada compartimento se tenían que maniobrar aproximadamente de 25 a 30 válvulas de diversos tamaños, trabajo que los buzos ensayaron cuidadosamente en el B.A.P. La Pradera, submarino gemelo, ya que disponían de muy poco tiempo de permanencia a esa profundidad y estas debían ser encontradas en lugares muy estrechos, tanteando en la oscuridad, pues la visibilidad era nula, sumándose a éste el difícil acceso con los equipos de buceo. Se consideró que era vital parchar la avería, de lo contrario todo el aire se escaparía, siendo prácticamente imposible continuar con las operaciones.

Once meses después, el 30 de agosto de 1988 hasta el 23 de julio de 1989 la Marina peruana realizó un trabajo de  reflotamiento del BAP. Pacocha, que constó de seis fases que se iniciaron con una preliminar de inspección y evaluación para terminar en la fase de soplado final.  

                               

El Pacocha durante las maniobras de salvamento.

Reflotamiento: 1989

Reflotamiento.

El Pacocha navega el mar de Grau nuevamente.

Documentos

DOD REPORT

Reporte sobre el accidente hecho por la Marina Norteamericana (En inglés).

Prensa

Recortes periodisticos de la época del accidente.

Fuentes

Principales fuentes para la elaboración de esta página web.

Infografía

Infografía explicativa sobre el accidente.

Noticias

ELECTRIC BOAT CORPORATIONA GENERAL DYNAMICS COMPANY

 Enclosure (1) to 491:MW-96-79558

    

The B.A.P. PACOCHA (SS-48) Collision:The Escape and Medical Recompression

Treatment of SurvivorsSpecial Report SP89-1

  

By Captain C. Harvey, M.D., MC, USNAnd Commander J. Carson, M.D., MC, USN

Naval Submarine Medical Research LaboratoryBox 900, Naval Submarine Base New London

Groton, CT 06349-5900 

30 March 1989 1 

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THE B.A.P. PACOCHA (SS-48) COLLISION:THE ESCAPE AND MEDICAL RECOMPRESSION

TREATMENT OF SURVIVORS   

By 

Claude Harvey, M.D.John Carson, M.D.

     

NAVAL SUBMARINE MEDICAL RESEARCH LABORATORY

SPECIAL REPORT SP89-1   

NAVAL MEDICAL RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT COMMAND

Research Project 63713N M0099.01A.5012  

  

Approved and Released by 

C. A. Harvey, CAPT, MC, USNCommanding Officer

NAVSUBMEDRSCHLAB 

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  The B.A.P. Pacocha (SS-48) Collision:

The Escape and Medical Recompression

Treatment of Survivors   By  

 Claude Harvey, M.D.   John Carson, M.D.Capt, Medical Corps   CDR, Medical CorpsUnited States Navy   United States Navy

  

 3 =============================================================================================

===========ABSTRACT

  

At the invitation of the Peruvian Navy, a U.S. Navy Team review the circumstances surrounding the collision, sinking, and subsequent escape and rescue of members of the B.A.P. PACOCHA. Approximately half were rescued after immediate escape before the sinking with a 2-4 hour cold-water exposure, and the other half were trapped for over 20

hours in the forward torpedo room. They escaped by buoyant ascent, after having been subjected to pressure from partial flooding and air being introduced from the air banks. Escapees suffered decompression sickness and gas emboli after surfacing. The medical response, rescue, evacuation, and recompression treatment of survivors using all available equipment and personnel is reviewed. Some observations are presented that might diminish morbidity and mortality in the future.  

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SUMMARY PAGE The Problem At the request of the Peruvian Navy, a United States Navy Assist Team, consisting of two experienced Undersea Medical Officers, reviewed the medical response, rescue, evacuation, and recompression treatment following the sinking of the B.A.P. PACOCHA on 26 August 1988. The Findings Approximately half were rescued after immediate escape before the sinking with a 2-4 hour cold-water exposure. The other half were trapped for over 20 hours in the forward torpedo room after sinking. Escapees suffered decompression sickness and gas emboli after surfacing. Procedures and treatments were revived. Application Some observations are presented that might diminish morbidity and mortality in the future.   

ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION  The research was carried out at the request of the Peruvian Navy and under Naval Medical Research and Development Command Work Unit 63713N M0099.01A-5012, “(U) Medical problems associated with pressurized submarine rescue.” This special report was approved for release on 30 March 1989 and designated NSMRL Special Report SP89-1.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS  

Executive Summary ………………………………………………...

Introduction …………………………………………………………

Narration of Events …………………………………………………

Discussion ……………………………………………………………

****Pressure in the Disabled Submarine ………………………….

****Atmosphere Replenishment via Salvage Connections ………

****Carbon Dioxide Removal Within the Disabled Submarine….

Medical Recompression Treatment …………………………….….

****Introduction ……………………………………………………

****Recompression Facilities and Medical Support Equipment ..

****Medical Personnel ……………………………………………..

****Treatment ………………………………………………………

****Discussion of Medical Issues …………………………………..

Lessons Learned …………………………………………………….

Recommendations ………………………………………………….. Appendices: 

Collision Diagram of KIOWA MARU and B.A.P. PACOCHADiagram of Compartments of B.A.P. PACOCHAList of Escapees by Escape GroupSimplified Diagram of Forward Escape Trunk of B.A.P. PACOCHADiagram of High and Low Salvage lines in a Submarine CompartmentNo Decompression limits for Air Diving from U.S. Navy Diving Manual

Submarine Escape Depth LimitsSummary of Symptoms and Treatments among EscapeesNames and TitlesUnits of interest During the Visit

  

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY A United States Navy Assist Team, consisting of two experienced Undersea Medical Officers, Visited the Peruvian Navy from 31 January thru 2 February 1989 to review the lessons learned from escape and rescue operations following the sinking of the B.A.P. PACOCHA on 26 August 1988. This report summarizes the information available, discusses implications, and makes recommendations for consideration by both countries. The B.A.P. PACOCHA was transiting to its homeport on the surface, when it was struck on the aft, port quarter by the ice-breaking bow of the KIOWA MARU at 1850 on 26 August 1988. No Collision alarm was sounded and bulkheads were not sealed at the time of impact. PACOCHA sunk to a keel depth of 140 feet in 5 minutes and the KIOWA MARU continued on to port, unaware of what it had hit. Twenty-three people escaped into the water as the boat sank. Three of these died of exposure prior to the arrival of help two and 1.2 hours later. Three people died in flooded compartments and the Captain of the vessel died in the sail while closing the bridge access hatch. Twenty-two people survived in the PACOCHA, ultimately retreating to the forward torpedo room as the atmosphere in the boat became contaminated. Pressure in the submarine was elevated from the start and later was calculated to have reached 54 feet of sea water gauge pressure over the next 17 ½ hours. The United States Fly-away McCann rescue system was activated, but aborted in transit when deterioration of the atmosphere within the PACOCHA led to a decision to use buoyant escape techniques. The escape, completed by the twenty-three hour mark, resulted in twenty of the twenty-two escapees developing symptoms of decompression sickness. All were ultimately treated with recompression therapy. One died, one is severely brain injured, and several have residual injuries

from decompression sickness. Implications for procedures training, support and equipment modifications are discussed in this report. 

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INTRODUCTION The following narration of events was complied from interviews conducted 31 January – 2 February 1989, with numerous parties, including Rear Admiral Guillermo Tirado, Commander of the Submarine Flotilla, five survivors who were trapped in the submarine, four divers involved in the escape, five physicians involved in the recompression treatments, and four physicians involved in subsequent hospital treatments. The members of the Assist Team from the United States were Captain C. A. Harvey, MC, USN, Commanding Officer, Naval Submarine Medical Research Laboratory and Commander J. F. Carson, Senior Medical Officer, Submarine Development Group One. Both are Undersea Medical Officers familiar with submarine escape and rescue techniques in the U. S. Navy. Fluency in English was variable. Rear Admiral Tirado, a 1962 graduate of the U. S Naval Academy, was highly fluent and most cooperative. He spent an entire morning providing a candid narrative of events as recorded in his investigation. Two of the dives and one of the physicians involved in the recompression treatment were able to converse in English, and two of the hospital physicians were also conversant in English. All others possessed little or no English capabilities. Since neither of the interviewers spoke Spanish, much of the information was narrated through an interpreter. We were most fortunate in this regard to have the services of a Peruvian Medical Officer, LT Guillermo “Willie” Alexander Smith, who was highly fluent in English. Although he was not trained in Diving or Submarine Medicine, which might have helped us gain better information more quickly, he was interested, , motivated, and did an outstanding job. We were most grateful for his services, without which we would not have been able to function or resolve conflicts in information. The combination of a language barrier, elapsed time since the accident and perhaps misinterpretation of statements may have produced

errors in this report. If so, the team members apologize. Nevertheless there are valuable lessons and experiences to share with all who serve beneath the sea. It is in this spirit that this report is submitted. 

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NARRATION OF EVENTS 

Friday, 26 Aug 88 1820 - Sunset. 1850 - Collision. Following torpedo exercise, the PACOCHA, (Former USS Atule SS-403, transferred to Peru in 1974), was transiting to the Port of Callao on the surface with a 1900 hr ETA. The forward torpedo room, and bridge hatches as well as the main induction valve were open. Forty-nine people were aboard, including the Squadron Commander to conduct an operational readiness inspection. The KIOWA MARU, a 412-ton Japanese fishing trawler was sighted by lookouts and by the Officer of the Deck prior to the collision. It apparently was “lit up like a Christmas tree and those on board had difficulty determining its bearing. The personnel of the PACOCHA felt they had the right of way and waited for the KIOWA MARU to maneuver, which it didn’t. Last minute maneuvers by PACOCHA failed to avoid the collision, which occurred at 1850 hours when the bow of the KIOWA MARU struck the PACOCHA in the aft port quarter (Appendix 1) Damage was severe because the KIOWA MARU’s bow was reinforced for ice breaking and had a sub-surface protrusion for that purpose. The PACOCHA was opened like a tin can. The ballast tank and fuel oil tank in the area of impact were ruptured, and a 2 meter by 10 centimeter split in the pressure hull resulted along the weld seam where the pressure hull widens aft of the ballast tanks (Appendix 1 and 2). Through this split, both fuel oil and water rushed into the “Control Cubico” or maneuvering room, the compartment just forward

of the aft torpedo room. The watertight door between maneuvering and the aft torpedo room could not be closed because it was warped by the collision. The watertight door to the aft engine room was closed, however. Unfortunately, the collision alarm was never sounded. Whether individuals on the bridge failed to sound the alarm or the alarm was not operational is unclear. Either way, the result was the same. Individuals forward of the “Control Cubico,” other than those on the bridge, were not aware that there had been a collision. Individuals began moving to the scene, both through the interior of the ship and via the forward hatch, moving aft topside. The true nature of events was revealed almost immediately, however, when PACOCHA began to assume an up angle.

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===========   1850 – 1853 Surface Escape. As PACOCHA’s stern sank, crewmembers exited from the bridge hatch and from both the forward and the aft torpedo room hatches. Before PACOCHA sank, a total of twenty-three personnel escaped into the sea, most, but not all, with life vest or some form of buoyancy device. Some used Steinke hoods as buoyancy devices. Fortunately, surface conditions were calm with less than two-foot seas, allowing twenty of the twenty-three to survive. Three deaths resulted from drowning or exposure in the 14 degree Celsius (57 degree Fahrenheit) water. One of the three individuals who perished in the water was responsible for closing the main induction valve. He failed to do so before abandoning ship. Hence, as soon as PACOCHA’s induction mast was below water both engine rooms also rapidly flooded. Fortunately, the watertight door between the forward engine room and the aft battery compartment had been secured. Otherwise, the entire ship might have flooded. Three crewmembers, a lieutenant, a chief, and a petty officer, were trapped in the flooded compartments. Their bodies were recovered three weeks later.  The Captain of the ship, Commander Nieva, lost his life

securing the bridge access hatch. Divers located his body the following morning inside the deck access door to the sail. In the forward torpedo room, Lieutenant Cotrina, the senior survivor aboard, secured the forward torpedo room watertight door and began to blow air to the compartment. He then went to the forward torpedo room hatch to secure it. Instead, however, he had to force the hatch open to free a sailor whose leg was caught as the hatch fell closed due to the 40 degree up angle PACOCHA assumed before sinking below the surface. As the PACOCHA began her slide to the bottom, water rushed in the forward hatch, washing lieutenant Cotrina down the ladder, but fortunately, shortly afterwards, forcing the hatch closed. Lieutenant Cotrina considered this miracle. 1855 – PACOCHA: On the Bottom. Survivors estimate the time lapse between collision and settling on the bottom to be no more than five minutes. LT Cotrina secured the blow to the forward compartment, which he estimated lasted forty seconds from the time the forward torpedo room hatch closed until the blow was secured. Because of the pressure created, the watertight door leading aft could not be opened initially. When tried later it opened, suggesting that pressure equalized slowly, probably through valves and vents rather than across the door. 

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=========== Meanwhile in main control, the ballast tank blow was secured. A strong odor of chlorine from the aft battery compartment prompted a check of all valves and vents to be sure water was not entering this, or any other compartments. The aft battery was disconnected and this compartment was sealed from the rest of the forward compartments. Keel depth was noted to be 140 feet with a 9 degree up angle. 1900 – Scheduled Return to Port Initially, the failure of PACOCHA to return to port on time was not of great concern to watch personnel. She had been in

radio communication less than an hour previously. She had surfaced and was transiting to port. But as time passed, concern grew, especially after several attempts to make radio contact failed. Other ships and the Maritime Authority were contacted to see if anyone knew of PACOCHA’s whereabouts. At first no one had any information. Then a radio conversation between the KIOWA MARU and its agent in Lima, in which the KIOWA MARU stated that it may have hit another vessel, was passed to watch personnel. 2002 – Emergency Declared. Maritime authority boats were dispatched to search along PACOCHA’s route. The tug JENNIFER II was sent to the KIOWA MARU to investigate. 2020 – Admiral Tirado Arrived at the Callao Naval Base and Assumed Command. Following notification and arrival at his headquarters, Admiral Tirado dispatched the submarine DOS DE MAYO to search. As yet there was no hard evidence that PACOCHA was involved in a collision, let alone that she had been sunk. 2030 – PACOCHA: Released Messenger Buoy. In addition to releasing their messenger buoy, those in the forward compartments of PACOCHA attempted to call aft compartments on the sound powered telephone. There was no response. 

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=========== 2050 – Collision Confirmed by JENNIFER II Arriving at the KIOWA MARU, the personnel of the JENNIFER II had difficulty communicating with the Japanese crew. Initially, they were distracted from discovering the collision by requests to take one of the Japanese in SCUBA to the bow of the ship to investigate for damage. Eventually, they learned from a Peruvian fisherman, accompanying the

Japanese as a guide, that there had been a collision with something. On the way into port, the KIOWA MARU had apparently gone a few hundred yards after the collision before coming to a stop in the water and then continuing into port unaware of what she struck. 2050 – Recall of Divers Commenced. 2050 – PACOCHA: Fired a Red Distress Flare. As the JENNIFER II was reporting the collision on their radio, the collision area was illuminated by the first red distress flare fired from PACOCHA. The flare revealed many of the survivors in the water—but no boat. The fate of PACOCHA was now known. 2051 – Surface Survivors Rescued. By 2100, many small boats from other ships were involved in the rescue effort. By 2240, twenty were rescued and three bodies were removed from the water. The last crewmembers rescued spent almost four hours in 14 degree Celsius (57 degrees Fahrenheit) water. Since only twenty-three crewmembers had been accounted for, surface search for survivors continued through the night. Those on the surface had no way of knowing that all remaining crewmembers were still aboard PACOCHA. 2100 – PACOCHA: Roll Call. Survivors in the PACOCHA held a meeting in the forward torpedo room. A roll call was taken which revealed twenty-two survivors. Of these, there were four officers, four chiefs, and fourteen junior enlisted personnel. Crewmembers were instructed to minimize activity. Many were wet and changed into dry clothes, which were obtained by opening lockers of crewmen normally berthed in the surviving compartments. Temperature in the boat was 21 degrees Celsius (70 degrees Fahrenheit). Contrary to expectations, the temperature actually rose over the next 24 hours to 25 degrees Celsius (77 degrees Fahrenheit), in spite of an estimated water temperature at depth of 11 degrees Celsius (52 degrees Fahrenheit). 2120 – PACOCHA: Fired Another Flare.

 This flare led searchers to PACOCHA’s messenger buoy. 2131 – Messenger Buoy Located Unfortunately, the messenger buoy on this class of submarine did not have a telephone, so communication could not be established with PACOCHA. Those on the surface realized, however, that someone was probably alive to release the buoy and fire the flare. 

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=========== 2145 – PACOCHA: Steinke Hood Training. Training in the use of the Steinke Hood for escape was conducted. Crewmembers had received very little training in the use of the Steinke hood. The Peruvian Navy, like the U.S. Navy, stopped formal in-water escape training from depth several years previously. This change in Peru came after a sailor died during a training exercise. 2240 – The Last Survivors were Rescued from the Water. Twenty-three personnel were accounted for. Unbeknown to the rescuers, the remainder of PACOCHA’s crew was in the submarine. 2250 – PACOCHA: Chlorine Gas. The smell of chlorine gas in main control prompted another assessment of the boat’s condition. A vent valve was found that had not been tightly closed, and more water had seeped into the aft battery compartment. All lithium hydroxide canisters were brought forward, and the survivors sealed themselves in the forward torpedo room. 2330 – PACOCHA: Settled for the Night. Two canisters of lithium were opened and spread on the upper bunks. They recognized that spreading the lithium hydroxide on lower bunks would have been more effective, but the lower bunks were damp. The crew was put to bed.

 2330 – Admiral Anderson Notified of Potential Need for a Rescue System. 2345 – The Director of the Naval Hospital was Altered that Help Would be required. 2400 – Survivors Ashore. By 2400 all twenty survivors and three bodies had been brought ashore. Survivors were taken to the nearby Naval Hospital. Although all were suffering from hypothermia, none had significant injuries. No subsequent deaths occurred among this group. 

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=========== Saturday, 27 August 1988 0000 – Divers Arrived on Scene. By midnight an assortment of vessels were on the surface including the submarine, DOS DE MAY; a torpedo retriever; a floating crane; and several small craft. Only eight divers were initially located. Locating divers during their off-duty hours was hampered by the lack of telephones in many of their homes. They were now on scene ready to begin diving in SCUBA gear. Depth to the deck of the ship was between 125 feet aft and 110 feet forward, with the ship variably reported as having between a nine and fifteen degree up angle. The first team of divers followed the messenger buoy’s line, which had played out to a significant distance. Since it was not located directly over PACOCHA, a second line was tended straight down to the sail. The divers tapped on the hull and received a response from the forward compartment of the boat. Unfortunately, they were unable to interpret the tapping initially, since they were unfamiliar with the code used. 0040 – Request for U.S. Navy Assistance. Admiral Tirado called Captain Schillingsburg, U.S. Defense Attaché, to request rescue assistance from the U.S. Navy.

Short delays were encountered establishing communication between Admiral Tirado and Captain Schillingsburg and between Captain Schillingsburg and the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). Although Captain Schillingsburg did not have a file on the agreement between Peru and the US Navy to provide rescue assistance, the CNO watch officer was familiar with the agreement. 0100 – PACOCHA: Messages were sent to the Rescuers on the surface that the survivors should be able to survive for 48 hours. 0200 – PACOCHA: Reassessed the Boat’s Status. Three volunteers donned OBA’s and walked through compartments as far aft as main control. The aft battery compartment was noted to have water over the deck, so it was not entered. 

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=========== 0200 – Salvage Air Connections. Personnel ashore including several divers studied the salvage air connections on PACOCHA’s sister ship, LA PEDRERA. Salvers discovered that they did not have salvage air hoses or fittings. Ultimately, MK-V diving system umbilicals were used with fittings manufactured during the night on two frigates. (MARK V Diving hoses are negatively buoyant, ½ inch inner diameter, 600-psig pressure rated hoses, U.S. MIL-H-2815) 0227 – Communications Established. After two frustrating hours, improved communications with PACOCHA were finally established using the signal ejector to pass written notes to the divers. This pair of divers, the last of the initial group of eight, surfaced shortly thereafter. Each diver made one SCUBA dive, working in pairs, in wet suits to 110 feet for 20 minutes with a 3 minute decompression stop at 10 feet. None of the divers developed decompression sickness. 

0350 – U.S. Navy Rescue System. Word that the U.S. Navy was sending its rescue system brought great relief to those in charge of the rescue operation. Unfortunately, over the next few hours the estimated time of arrival of the rescue system shifted steadily to a later arrival time. 0420 – PACOCHA: Fired a Yellow Flare. Not having had any communication from the surface for approximately two hours and unaware that there were currently no divers available, PACOCHA fired another flare. Yellow was picked so as not to give the impression that something new was seriously wrong ---they just wanted to express concern that they had not heard anything in a couple of hours. 0440 – PACOCHA: Fire in Control Although details were not clear, a small electrical short/fire occurred in main control. Fortunately it was brief and self-extinguishing, but it was a new cause of concern for their atmosphere. Should there be a fire in their compartment, only carbon dioxide extinguishers were available. 

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=========== 0500 – Diving Resumed. A new group of divers arrived on scene in the early morning. Ashore, they had reviewed salvage connections, escape trunk configuration, and other details on the PACOCHA’s sister ship, LA PEDRERA. Shortly after the divers went to work, they discovered and recovered the body of PACOCHA’s Commanding Officer, Commander Nieva, just inside the deck access door to the sail superstructure. 0600 – PACOCHA: Reveille. Breakfast. Utilizing the signal ejector, communication was passed that the crew was in good spirits with enough air to last for seventy-eight hours based on calculations of available

oxygen and lithium hydroxide. They also had adequate supplies of water, but no food after eating what little they had, including cake, for breakfast. A heavy black cloud was noted to be rising from below the deck in the forward battery compartment. No one entered this compartment again. Two more canisters of lithium hydroxide were opened and spread on the upper bunks. Later in the morning another four canisters were opened. Approximately twenty canisters were unopened. One 8 cubic foot oxygen cylinder was bled into the compartment; three oxygen cylinders were left unused. 0630 – PACOCHA: Escape Training. Information on the use of the escape trunk and the Steinke Hood was passed from the surface. The crew was divided into five groups and one member from each group trained in the operation of the escape trunk. Groups were arranged by seniority, with one officer in four of the five groups, and by other factors such as swimming ability and self-confidence. 0645 – PACOCHA: Survivors Identified. Via message, PACOCHA informed those on the surface that there were twenty-two survivors. 0730 – U.S. Navy Rescue System. A message was sent to PACOCHA informing them that the fly-away rescue system was on the way from the U.S. This provided a visible boost to morale among the crewmen. 

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=========== 0950 – PACOCHA: Atmosphere Deteriorating. Lt. Cotrina became increasingly concerned about the submarine’s atmosphere when he noted that the crew was becoming listless, agitated, and hyperventilating. The lithium hydroxide did not seem to be doing the job. There fore, he spread four additional canisters. Unfortunately the boat’s only atmosphere monitoring equipment was aft in the flooded

compartments. Their only light, the emergency light located at the bottom of the forward ladder, was periodically flickering on and off, and the beam from their only battle lantern was steadily growing weaker. 0950 – Permission to Escape. When Lt. Cotrina requested guidance, Admiral Tirado granted permission for the senior man onboard PACOCHA to use his best judgment to decide if and when escape should be executed because of deteriorating conditions. 1000 – PACOCHA: Decision to escape was unanimous with one exception. One of the Lieutenants voiced his opinion against escape for various reasons. If he had to escape, he wanted the divers to provide scuba tanks since he had been trained in SCUBA. The senior officer placed him in the first group of escapees. Hence the first group to escape was a group of four, composed of two officers and two enlisted. 1130 – Salvage Air Divers completed connecting high and low salvage using Mark V diving umbilicals for hoses and the manufactured fittings. The high salvage was connected to air bands on the submarine, ABTAO.These banks were charged by thirty-five year old, oil lubricated compressors. There are no filters on the system, and air samples of the air banks have never been taken. Lieutenant Cotrina briefly opened and air valve from PACOCHA’s air banks to the compartment to help circulate the air. He may have done so on other earlier occasions as well. 

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=========== 1130 – PACOCHA: Escape Group One (Appendix 3) During escape training, crew members decided to inflate their Steinke Hoods in the compartment before entering the escape trunk. For reasons that are unclear, they elected to use the Steinke Hoods as a flotation device, but not to enclose their heads in the hoods. One member of this group, Chief Monzon,

did wear the hood. He was to be the third most seriously injured of the twenty-two escapees. After inflating the escape devices, the four entered the escape trunk (Appendix 4) and controlled flooding and pressurizing from inside the trunk. The water flooding the trunk was so cold that the escapees wee sure they would die. They were all extremely frightened. After the side access hatch was opened, they spent at least ten minutes arguing over who would exit first. Finally LT Gomez, the senior man, ducked under and began his ascent, he was followed in turn by Chief Monzon and Petty Officer Reyes. LT Gomez described how he began blowing out, but fearing he would not have enough air to reach the surface, he held his breath for a moment, and then resumed breathing out again. He felt that his lungs were empty on arrival at the surface. After being on the surface for two or three minutes, he noted that his chest and neck felt “puffy.” He described what could be interpreted as crepitus in his neck. Not long thereafter, he developed considerable pain in both shoulders. Both enlisted crewmen also surfaced and initially seemed to be in good condition. After several minutes, however, they too became symptomatic. They became disoriented and unsteady, and developed pains and shortness of breath.  The fourth member of the group, however, failed to surface. Since those on the surface had been told to expect four in the first group they began to search but held little hope for the fourth escapee. While they searched, those in the forward compartment drained and opened the escape trunk. They found the fourth member of the team alive and well, still in the escape trunk. 1215 – PACOCHA: Escape Group Two. Lieutenant Nieri and Three Enlisted Personnel. This group completed their escape by 1225 hours without serious incident. Following an indeterminate delay, Lieutenant Nieri and possibly others in this group were flown by helicopter to the recompression chamber. Proper advice was given by Admiral Tirado, so that the helicopter flew low over the water. Further delay occurred before this group was recompressed, as the one usable chamber was in use. Immediately after the second group surfaced, air was supplied through the high salvage connection. Aboard PACOCHA,

water came from the line since it had not yet been blown dry. The high salvage was immediately secured from inside the ship and never reopened according to the senior officer on board, lieutenant Cotrina. Low salvage as best can be determined, terminated above the surface of the sea and was open to the atmosphere. It originated below the surface of the water in the bilge, and thus was filled with seawater to a depth equivalent to the pressure in the boat. 

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=========== 1230 – Escape Group 3. Five Enlisted Personnel. All five of the survivors in this group completed an uneventful escape by 1240. Unfortunately, after this group left the escape trunk, the outer escape hatch could not be closed from inside the submarine. When the crew attempted to drain the trunk, seawater continued to flood into the submarine until the valves were secured. Attempts to drain the trunk were aborted when seawater had filled the bilge to the just below the deck, thus further increasing the pressure in the boat.  After their plight was communicated to the surface, divers were sent to investigate. Apparently one or more of the hatch’s dogs were obstructing closure. The divers eventually freed the obstruction with a large wrench. 1500 – Escape Group 4. Four Enlisted. This group made an uneventful escape by 1515. On reaching the surface at least one of them was transported to the shore recompression facility by helicopter. 1615 – Escape Group Five. Lieutenant Cotrina and Two Non-swimmers. Survivors in this group made an uneventful escape by 1625. By this time, a recompression chamber was on scene on the floating crane along with two medical officers. All three in this escape group were recompressed within five minutes of surfacing. 1710 – Escape Group 6. Lieutenant Lindley, Chief Bendezu

and Petty Officer Grande. After the fifth group left the escape trunk, divers placed a set of SCUBA bottles in the trunk. Whether this was in response to requests by Lieutenant Lindley is not clear. Possibly it was done because of increasing concern that the atmosphere was becoming contaminated. Whatever the rationale, the final three escapees spent between one-half and one hour breathing from the SCUBA bottles before escaping at 1805. The exact time of entering, flooding, and pressurizing the escape trunk is unknown. During this time, personnel topside were again becoming apprehensive. Investigating divers were present when all three escapees simultaneously emerged from the top escape trunk hatch. Why they didn’t use the side hatch, as had the rest of the escapees is unclear. Since the chamber at the scene was occupied, these individuals were transported by boat to the shore facility. About an hour and a half lapsed between surfacing and recompression, apparently because no chamber was available. Unfortunately one of the three, Petty Officer Grande, develop such severe decompression sickness, possibly combined with gas embolus, that he died during recompression treatment.

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=========== DISCUSSION Survivability in a disable submarine depends upon many factors including oxygen levels, carbon dioxide levels, toxic gases, hypothermia, food, water, and atmospheric pressure in the Submarine. Food and water is rarely a factor which will limit survivability, as evidenced in this case. Toxic gasses may have affected survival time. Whether significant amounts of chlorine gas had found its way into the forward compartment is unknown but the survivors, as a group, did not report lung irritation as a major complaint. Low oxygen levels may well be a factor in survivability, but usually not the limiting factor. High oxygen partial pressures can become toxic but it has been well demonstrated that humans can survive for at least 30days in

compressed air at 60 fswg. Thus that was not likely to have played a part in this scenario. The presence of other toxic agents in the air used to pressurize the compartment initially is possible but probably not as important as the ultimate carbon dioxide accumulation. Usually the limiting factor, especially if the submarine is pressurized, is elevation of the carbon dioxide level rather than hypoxia or other contaminants. In a compressed air environment without replenishment, the partial pressure of carbon dioxide reaches critical levels before the oxygen partial pressure is significantly depleted and requires supplementation. LT Cotrina obviously understood the need to circulated and mix the air in the compartment to maximize mixing of the oxygen released from storage bottles and to enhance carbon dioxide removal by the movement of air across the Lithium Hydroxide. Unfortunately his resources for circulating the air were limited and he had no equipment to monitor the effectiveness of his efforts at atmosphere maintenance. It is possible that the small fire at 0440 hours in Main Control and the black smoke noted above the forward battery well at 0600 may both have been partly related to the increased partial pressure of oxygen and the related increase in fire hazard inherent in a compressed air environment. A release of stored energy from the forward batteries from a battery fire might partly explain the rise in temperature within the PACOCHA from 21 degrees to 25 degrees Celsius. Oxygen was apparently being added to the atmosphere at a rate calculated to match oxygen utilization by the survivors. Thus the atmosphere in the compartments should have approximated the oxygen content of compressed air. The amount of Lithium Hydroxide spread out was, in retrospect, apparently insufficient to keep up with the metabolic production of carbon dioxide by the survivors. It is probably wise to spread out as much carbon dioxide absorbent as surface areas will permit right from the beginning when trapped in this situation. Elevation of atmospheric pressure can multiply the physiological effects of the component gases. Addition of uncontaminated air will not change the partial pressure of Carbon Dioxide or any other component previously present in the compartment. Elevated pressure, however, will not significantly affect the rate at which the partial pressure of Carbon Dioxide in the compartment climbs as people breathe. Accumulation of Nitrogen in body tissues will occur at fairly predictable rates related to the partial pressure of Nitrogen, so that when escape or rescue occurs the survivors may develop decompression sickness.

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=========== PRESSURE IN THE DISABLED SUBMARINE Exact internal pressures and durations of those pressures in the forward torpedo room are unknown. Preparations were made from the beginning to mobilize all recompression chambers and personnel in the area for whatever contingencies developed. Certain information is now available allowing extrapolations and calculations to be made to estimate the variables of pressure and time. a. As PACOCHA sank, water began to pour into the aft compartments of the boat via the rent in the pressure hull, the main induction valve, and the aft escape hatch. The watertight door between the forward engine room and aft battery compartment was closed early in the flooding before the forward hatch was closed. Thus flooding and attempts to pressurize the aft compartments probably contributed very little to pressurization of the forward torpedo room. b. LT Cotrina freed a man’s leg from the side hatch of the forward escape trunk and attempted to close it as the boat sank. However, as the boat sank, water entering the hatch swept him out of the escape trunk before he could finish closing the hatch. LT Cotrina had ordered a high-pressure blow in the compartment as water came in and this lasted for 1 to 2 minutes before the increasing angle off the boat slammed the hatch. The blow then continued for about 40 seconds until it was secured after it was obvious flooding had stopped. Thus, pressure in the compartment was increased above 1 atmosphere from that time on. c. One 8 cubic foot oxygen bottle was vented into the compartment during the time the men were trapped. Since the Carbon Dioxide absorbent (Lithium Hydroxide) was apparently not functioning well, the combination of unused Oxygen valved in plus the unabsorbed Carbon Dioxide produced may have contributed a small component to a pressure increase in the boat. d. High and low salvage connections (Appendix 5) were

completed at 1130 hours on 27 August, some 16 ½ hours after the sinking. However the lines were flooded when connected and naturally sent a stream of water into the boat when pressure was initially applied to the high salvage line. The men in the compartment then secured the valve on that connection and it was never opened again. The low salvage line was underwater in the compartment and, although it apparently remained open at the surface, obviously remained filled with water to a height in the hose equal to the internal pressure in the boat. At that point the hose either collapsed from external water pressure, (It was not an armored hose), or remained open and filled with air the remaining distance to the surface. I neither condition this did not allow air pressure to the surface. Had either line been dry and open between the compartment and the surface, pressure in the compartment would have fallen to 1 atmosphere. Thus the high and low salvage connections apparently did not contribute to any pressure changes in the compartment. Considering the number of cases of decompression sickness that developed when the escapees reached one atmosphere of pressure on the surface, it is fortunate that such a pressure reduction did not develop in the boat when the hose were connected.

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=========== e. The survivors cracked the valves from PACOCHA’s air banks to circulate the air in the compartment on at least one occasion and perhaps more often. This also contributed to increasing the compartment pressure.  f. The flooding and subsequent draining of the escape trunk (Appendix 4) during each of the first five escape evolutions added water to the internal volume of the forward torpedo room and that further increased the pressure. This effect was accentuated following the third group of escapees when the side hatch did not close properly and a large volume of water entered the boat when drain down of the escape trunk was attempted. g. Four hours after the sinking the survivors noted that an incompletely secured vent valve had allowed water to flood the battery well in the aft battery compartment. This volume of water also increased the internal pressure in the forward compartments.

 h. It was noted that initially, after pressurization of the forward torpedo room, the water-tight door leading aft to the forward battery compartment would not open. Later the pressure apparently equalized between the compartments and the door could be opened. It is not clear whether pressure leaked from the forward torpedo room into the aft spaces or whether pressure increased in the aft spaces by some other mechanism. These factors were recognized by the survivors, but there was no recall of a gauge or manometer showing the actual pressure in the forward compartment. However, during conversations with LT Cotrina, who pressurized the escape trunk for the first four groups that escaped, one additional important fact materialized. When the trunk is pressurized to equalized pressure with surrounding water, in order to open the side escape hatch, air pressure is supplied from with the submarine. There was a pressure gauge on that line (Appendix 4) and it reads pressure in the line relative to that surrounding it in the boat. Since the escape trunk was at about 110 feet of sea water gauge (fswg) deep, it should have taken some 48.9 pounds per square inch gauge (psig) of pressure to equalize, assuming the boat were at surface pressure. 

(Assuming 33 fswg – 1 atmosphere of pressure – 14.7 psig)(110 fswg divided by 33 ft – 3.33)(3.33 times 14.7 psig – 48.9 psig)

 LT Cotrina, however remembered that the gauge was showing only 24 to 25 psig. A bit of additional calculations show that there may well have been approximately 54 feet of pressure in the boat at the time of the first escape. 

(25 psig divided by 14.7 psig – 1.7 atmospheres)(1.7 times 33 feet – 56 fswg of pressure needed to equalize)(110 feet – 56 feet-54 fswg of pressure in the boat)

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=========== The duration of this pressure is not clear, but certainly the

incidence of decompression sickness (a minimum of 20/22) certainly indicates the pressure calculated above may be reasonable at the time of the escape evolutions. The historical events suggest an elevated pressure in the compartment from the first few minutes a the submarine sank with at least some minor step increase as events transpired over the remaining hours of their entrapment. Work in the United States and England on pressurized escape and rescue in recent years has led to information from which guidelines for escape and rescue in this type of situation have been recently formulated. The time limit for “No decompression” exposure at 54 feet is 60 minutes as set forth in the U.S. Navy Diving Manual (Appendix 6). Thus after 1 hour at 54 feet, an increasing decompression obligation had been incurred, whether they escaped or were rescued. Further, the additional exposure to 110-fswg pressure followed by rapid decompression during the escape procedure made the risk of decompression even greater. Recent recommendations derived from British and U.S. research show that at a depth of 110 FSWG, increasing exposures to pressures in excess of 1.7 atmospheres of pressure absolute (1.7 ata – 23 fswg) within the boat make it unsafe to escape rather than await rescue (Appendix 7). The lack of guidelines and absence of a pressure gauge to show internal pressure within the submarine made those with the submarine, as well as those on the surface, unaware of the increasing hazard during buoyant escape as time passed. While the possibility of gas embolism had been anticipated, certainly no one on scene or in Peru had the information to anticipate the number and severity of decompression sickness cases that were to develop after the otherwise successful escapes. 

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ELECTRIC BOAT CORPORATIONA GENERAL DYNAMICS COMPANY

 Enclosure (1) to 491:MW-96-79558

 

   

The B.A.P. PACOCHA (SS-48) Collision:The Escape and Medical Recompression

Treatment of SurvivorsSpecial Report SP89-1

  

By Captain C. Harvey, M.D., MC, USNAnd Commander J. Carson, M.D., MC, USN

Naval Submarine Medical Research LaboratoryBox 900, Naval Submarine Base New London

Groton, CT 06349-5900 

30 March 1989 1 

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  THE B.A.P. PACOCHA (SS-48) COLLISION:

THE ESCAPE AND MEDICAL RECOMPRESSIONTREATMENT OF SURVIVORS

   

By 

Claude Harvey, M.D.John Carson, M.D.

     

NAVAL SUBMARINE MEDICAL RESEARCH LABORATORYSPECIAL REPORT SP89-1

   

NAVAL MEDICAL RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT COMMANDResearch Project 63713N M0099.01A.5012

    

Approved and Released by 

C. A. Harvey, CAPT, MC, USNCommanding Officer

NAVSUBMEDRSCHLAB 

  2 

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  The B.A.P. Pacocha (SS-48) Collision:The Escape and Medical Recompression

Treatment of Survivors   By  

 Claude Harvey, M.D.   John Carson, M.D.Capt, Medical Corps   CDR, Medical CorpsUnited States Navy   United States Navy  

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==========================================ABSTRACT

  

At the invitation of the Peruvian Navy, a U.S. Navy Team review the circumstances surrounding the collision, sinking, and subsequent escape and rescue of members of the B.A.P. PACOCHA. Approximately half were rescued after immediate escape before the sinking with a 2-4 hour cold-water exposure, and the other half were trapped for over 20 hours in the forward torpedo room. They escaped by buoyant ascent, after having been subjected to pressure from partial flooding and air being introduced from the air banks. Escapees suffered decompression sickness and gas emboli after surfacing. The medical response, rescue, evacuation, and recompression treatment of survivors using all available equipment and personnel is reviewed. Some observations are presented that might diminish morbidity and mortality in the future.  

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SUMMARY PAGE The Problem 

At the request of the Peruvian Navy, a United States Navy Assist Team, consisting of two experienced Undersea Medical Officers, reviewed the medical response, rescue, evacuation, and recompression treatment following the sinking of the B.A.P. PACOCHA on 26 August 1988. The Findings Approximately half were rescued after immediate escape before the sinking with a 2-4 hour cold-water exposure. The other half were trapped for over 20 hours in the forward torpedo room after sinking. Escapees suffered decompression sickness and gas emboli after surfacing. Procedures and treatments were revived. Application Some observations are presented that might diminish morbidity and mortality in the future.   

ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION  The research was carried out at the request of the Peruvian Navy and under Naval Medical Research and Development Command Work Unit 63713N M0099.01A-5012, “(U) Medical problems associated with pressurized submarine rescue.” This special report was approved for release on 30 March 1989 and designated NSMRL Special Report SP89-1.  

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TABLE OF CONTENTS  

Executive Summary ………………………………………………... i   Introduction ………………………………………………………… ii   Narration of Events ………………………………………………… 1   Discussion …………………………………………………………… 12   ****Pressure in the Disabled Submarine …………………………. 14   ****Atmosphere Replenishment via Salvage Connections ……… 17   ****Carbon Dioxide Removal Within the Disabled Submarine…. 20   Medical Recompression Treatment …………………………….…. 21   ****Introduction …………………………………………………… 21   ****Recompression Facilities and Medical Support Equipment .. 21   ****Medical Personnel …………………………………………….. 22   ****Treatment ……………………………………………………… 22   ****Discussion of Medical Issues ………………………………….. 25   Lessons Learned ……………………………………………………. 28   Recommendations ………………………………………………….. 32

 Appendices: 

1 Collision Diagram of KIOWA MARU and B.A.P. PACOCHA2 Diagram of Compartments of B.A.P. PACOCHA3 List of Escapees by Escape Group4 Simplified Diagram of Forward Escape Trunk of B.A.P. PACOCHA5 Diagram of High and Low Salvage lines in a Submarine Compartment6 No Decompression limits for Air Diving from U.S. Navy Diving Manual7 Submarine Escape Depth Limits8 Summary of Symptoms and Treatments among Escapees9 Names and Titles

10 Units of interest During the Visit  

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 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

 A United States Navy Assist Team, consisting of two experienced Undersea Medical Officers, Visited the Peruvian Navy from 31 January thru 2 February 1989 to review the lessons learned from escape and rescue operations following the sinking of the B.A.P. PACOCHA on 26 August 1988. This report summarizes the information available, discusses implications, and makes recommendations for consideration by both countries. The B.A.P. PACOCHA was transiting to its homeport on the surface, when it was struck on the aft, port quarter by the ice-breaking bow of the KIOWA MARU at 1850 on 26 August 1988. No Collision alarm was sounded and bulkheads were not sealed at the time of impact. PACOCHA sunk to a keel depth of 140 feet in 5 minutes and the KIOWA MARU continued on to port, unaware of what it had hit. Twenty-three people escaped into the water as the boat sank. Three of these died of exposure prior to the arrival of help two and 1.2 hours later. Three people died in flooded compartments and the Captain of the vessel died in the sail while closing the bridge access hatch. Twenty-two people survived in the PACOCHA, ultimately retreating to the forward torpedo room as the atmosphere in the boat became contaminated. Pressure in the submarine was elevated from the start and later was calculated to have reached 54 feet of sea water gauge pressure over the next 17 ½ hours. The United States Fly-away McCann rescue system was activated, but aborted in transit when deterioration of the atmosphere within the PACOCHA led to a decision to use buoyant escape techniques. The escape, completed by the twenty-three hour mark, resulted in twenty of the twenty-two escapees developing symptoms of decompression sickness. All were ultimately treated with recompression therapy. One died, one is severely brain injured, and several have residual injuries from decompression sickness. Implications for procedures training, support and equipment modifications are discussed in this report. 

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INTRODUCTION The following narration of events was complied from interviews conducted 31 January – 2 February 1989, with numerous parties, including Rear Admiral Guillermo Tirado, Commander of the Submarine Flotilla, five survivors who were trapped in the submarine, four divers involved in the escape, five physicians involved in the recompression treatments, and four physicians involved in subsequent hospital treatments. The members of the Assist Team from the United States were Captain C. A. Harvey, MC, USN, Commanding Officer, Naval Submarine Medical Research Laboratory and Commander J. F. Carson, Senior

Medical Officer, Submarine Development Group One. Both are Undersea Medical Officers familiar with submarine escape and rescue techniques in the U. S. Navy. Fluency in English was variable. Rear Admiral Tirado, a 1962 graduate of the U. S Naval Academy, was highly fluent and most cooperative. He spent an entire morning providing a candid narrative of events as recorded in his investigation. Two of the dives and one of the physicians involved in the recompression treatment were able to converse in English, and two of the hospital physicians were also conversant in English. All others possessed little or no English capabilities. Since neither of the interviewers spoke Spanish, much of the information was narrated through an interpreter. We were most fortunate in this regard to have the services of a Peruvian Medical Officer, LT Guillermo “Willie” Alexander Smith, who was highly fluent in English. Although he was not trained in Diving or Submarine Medicine, which might have helped us gain better information more quickly, he was interested, , motivated, and did an outstanding job. We were most grateful for his services, without which we would not have been able to function or resolve conflicts in information. The combination of a language barrier, elapsed time since the accident and perhaps misinterpretation of statements may have produced errors in this report. If so, the team members apologize. Nevertheless there are valuable lessons and experiences to share with all who serve beneath the sea. It is in this spirit that this report is submitted. 

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NARRATION OF EVENTS 

Friday, 26 Aug 88 1820 - Sunset. 1850 - Collision. Following torpedo exercise, the PACOCHA, (Former USS Atule SS-403, transferred to Peru in 1974), was transiting to the Port of Callao on the surface with a 1900 hr ETA. The forward torpedo room, and bridge hatches as well as the main induction valve were open. Forty-nine people were aboard, including the Squadron Commander to conduct an operational readiness inspection. The KIOWA MARU, a 412-ton Japanese fishing trawler was sighted by lookouts and by the Officer of the Deck prior to the collision. It apparently was “lit up like a Christmas tree and those on board had difficulty determining its bearing. The personnel of the PACOCHA felt they had the right of way and waited for the KIOWA MARU to maneuver, which it didn’t. Last minute maneuvers by

PACOCHA failed to avoid the collision, which occurred at 1850 hours when the bow of the KIOWA MARU struck the PACOCHA in the aft port quarter (Appendix 1) Damage was severe because the KIOWA MARU’s bow was reinforced for ice breaking and had a sub-surface protrusion for that purpose. The PACOCHA was opened like a tin can. The ballast tank and fuel oil tank in the area of impact were ruptured, and a 2 meter by 10 centimeter split in the pressure hull resulted along the weld seam where the pressure hull widens aft of the ballast tanks (Appendix 1 and 2). Through this split, both fuel oil and water rushed into the “Control Cubico” or maneuvering room, the compartment just forward of the aft torpedo room. The watertight door between maneuvering and the aft torpedo room could not be closed because it was warped by the collision. The watertight door to the aft engine room was closed, however. Unfortunately, the collision alarm was never sounded. Whether individuals on the bridge failed to sound the alarm or the alarm was not operational is unclear. Either way, the result was the same. Individuals forward of the “Control Cubico,” other than those on the bridge, were not aware that there had been a collision. Individuals began moving to the scene, both through the interior of the ship and via the forward hatch, moving aft topside. The true nature of events was revealed almost immediately, however, when PACOCHA began to assume an up angle.

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==========================================   1850 – 1853 Surface Escape. As PACOCHA’s stern sank, crewmembers exited from the bridge hatch and from both the forward and the aft torpedo room hatches. Before PACOCHA sank, a total of twenty-three personnel escaped into the sea, most, but not all, with life vest or some form of buoyancy device. Some used Steinke hoods as buoyancy devices. Fortunately, surface conditions were calm with less than two-foot seas, allowing twenty of the twenty-three to survive. Three deaths resulted from drowning or exposure in the 14 degree Celsius (57 degree Fahrenheit) water. One of the three individuals who perished in the water was responsible for closing the main induction valve. He failed to do so before abandoning ship. Hence, as soon as PACOCHA’s induction mast was below water both engine rooms also rapidly flooded. Fortunately, the watertight door between the forward engine room and the aft battery compartment had been secured. Otherwise, the entire ship might have flooded. Three crewmembers, a lieutenant, a chief, and a petty officer, were trapped in the flooded compartments. Their bodies were recovered three weeks later.  

The Captain of the ship, Commander Nieva, lost his life securing the bridge access hatch. Divers located his body the following morning inside the deck access door to the sail. In the forward torpedo room, Lieutenant Cotrina, the senior survivor aboard, secured the forward torpedo room watertight door and began to blow air to the compartment. He then went to the forward torpedo room hatch to secure it. Instead, however, he had to force the hatch open to free a sailor whose leg was caught as the hatch fell closed due to the 40 degree up angle PACOCHA assumed before sinking below the surface. As the PACOCHA began her slide to the bottom, water rushed in the forward hatch, washing lieutenant Cotrina down the ladder, but fortunately, shortly afterwards, forcing the hatch closed. Lieutenant Cotrina considered this miracle. 1855 – PACOCHA: On the Bottom. Survivors estimate the time lapse between collision and settling on the bottom to be no more than five minutes. LT Cotrina secured the blow to the forward compartment, which he estimated lasted forty seconds from the time the forward torpedo room hatch closed until the blow was secured. Because of the pressure created, the watertight door leading aft could not be opened initially. When tried later it opened, suggesting that pressure equalized slowly, probably through valves and vents rather than across the door. 

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========================================== Meanwhile in main control, the ballast tank blow was secured. A strong odor of chlorine from the aft battery compartment prompted a check of all valves and vents to be sure water was not entering this, or any other compartments. The aft battery was disconnected and this compartment was sealed from the rest of the forward compartments. Keel depth was noted to be 140 feet with a 9 degree up angle. 1900 – Scheduled Return to Port Initially, the failure of PACOCHA to return to port on time was not of great concern to watch personnel. She had been in radio communication less than an hour previously. She had surfaced and was transiting to port. But as time passed, concern grew, especially after several attempts to make radio contact failed. Other ships and the Maritime Authority were contacted to see if anyone knew of PACOCHA’s whereabouts. At first no one had any information. Then a radio

conversation between the KIOWA MARU and its agent in Lima, in which the KIOWA MARU stated that it may have hit another vessel, was passed to watch personnel. 2002 – Emergency Declared. Maritime authority boats were dispatched to search along PACOCHA’s route. The tug JENNIFER II was sent to the KIOWA MARU to investigate. 2020 – Admiral Tirado Arrived at the Callao Naval Base and Assumed Command. Following notification and arrival at his headquarters, Admiral Tirado dispatched the submarine DOS DE MAYO to search. As yet there was no hard evidence that PACOCHA was involved in a collision, let alone that she had been sunk. 2030 – PACOCHA: Released Messenger Buoy. In addition to releasing their messenger buoy, those in the forward compartments of PACOCHA attempted to call aft compartments on the sound powered telephone. There was no response. 

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========================================== 2050 – Collision Confirmed by JENNIFER II Arriving at the KIOWA MARU, the personnel of the JENNIFER II had difficulty communicating with the Japanese crew. Initially, they were distracted from discovering the collision by requests to take one of the Japanese in SCUBA to the bow of the ship to investigate for damage. Eventually, they learned from a Peruvian fisherman, accompanying the Japanese as a guide, that there had been a collision with something. On the way into port, the KIOWA MARU had apparently gone a few hundred yards after the collision before coming to a stop in the water and then continuing into port unaware of what she struck. 2050 – Recall of Divers Commenced. 2050 – PACOCHA: Fired a Red Distress Flare. As the JENNIFER II was reporting the collision on their radio, the collision area was illuminated by the first red distress flare fired from PACOCHA. The flare revealed many of the survivors in the water—but no boat. The fate of PACOCHA was now known. 2051 – Surface Survivors Rescued.

 By 2100, many small boats from other ships were involved in the rescue effort. By 2240, twenty were rescued and three bodies were removed from the water. The last crewmembers rescued spent almost four hours in 14 degree Celsius (57 degrees Fahrenheit) water. Since only twenty-three crewmembers had been accounted for, surface search for survivors continued through the night. Those on the surface had no way of knowing that all remaining crewmembers were still aboard PACOCHA. 2100 – PACOCHA: Roll Call. Survivors in the PACOCHA held a meeting in the forward torpedo room. A roll call was taken which revealed twenty-two survivors. Of these, there were four officers, four chiefs, and fourteen junior enlisted personnel. Crewmembers were instructed to minimize activity. Many were wet and changed into dry clothes, which were obtained by opening lockers of crewmen normally berthed in the surviving compartments. Temperature in the boat was 21 degrees Celsius (70 degrees Fahrenheit). Contrary to expectations, the temperature actually rose over the next 24 hours to 25 degrees Celsius (77 degrees Fahrenheit), in spite of an estimated water temperature at depth of 11 degrees Celsius (52 degrees Fahrenheit). 2120 – PACOCHA: Fired Another Flare. This flare led searchers to PACOCHA’s messenger buoy. 2131 – Messenger Buoy Located Unfortunately, the messenger buoy on this class of submarine did not have a telephone, so communication could not be established with PACOCHA. Those on the surface realized, however, that someone was probably alive to release the buoy and fire the flare. 

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========================================== 2145 – PACOCHA: Steinke Hood Training. Training in the use of the Steinke Hood for escape was conducted. Crewmembers had received very little training in the use of the Steinke hood. The Peruvian Navy, like the U.S. Navy, stopped formal in-water escape training from depth several years previously. This change in Peru came after a sailor died during a training exercise. 2240 – The Last Survivors were Rescued from the Water.

 Twenty-three personnel were accounted for. Unbeknown to the rescuers, the remainder of PACOCHA’s crew was in the submarine. 2250 – PACOCHA: Chlorine Gas. The smell of chlorine gas in main control prompted another assessment of the boat’s condition. A vent valve was found that had not been tightly closed, and more water had seeped into the aft battery compartment. All lithium hydroxide canisters were brought forward, and the survivors sealed themselves in the forward torpedo room. 2330 – PACOCHA: Settled for the Night. Two canisters of lithium were opened and spread on the upper bunks. They recognized that spreading the lithium hydroxide on lower bunks would have been more effective, but the lower bunks were damp. The crew was put to bed. 2330 – Admiral Anderson Notified of Potential Need for a Rescue System. 2345 – The Director of the Naval Hospital was Altered that Help Would be required. 2400 – Survivors Ashore. By 2400 all twenty survivors and three bodies had been brought ashore. Survivors were taken to the nearby Naval Hospital. Although all were suffering from hypothermia, none had significant injuries. No subsequent deaths occurred among this group. 

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========================================== Saturday, 27 August 1988 0000 – Divers Arrived on Scene. By midnight an assortment of vessels were on the surface including the submarine, DOS DE MAY; a torpedo retriever; a floating crane; and several small craft. Only eight divers were initially located. Locating divers during their off-duty hours was hampered by the lack of telephones in many of their homes. They were now on scene ready to begin diving in SCUBA gear. Depth to the deck of the ship was between 125 feet aft and 110 feet forward, with the ship variably reported as having between a nine and fifteen degree up angle. The first team of divers followed the messenger buoy’s line, which had played out to a significant distance. Since it was

not located directly over PACOCHA, a second line was tended straight down to the sail. The divers tapped on the hull and received a response from the forward compartment of the boat. Unfortunately, they were unable to interpret the tapping initially, since they were unfamiliar with the code used. 0040 – Request for U.S. Navy Assistance. Admiral Tirado called Captain Schillingsburg, U.S. Defense Attaché, to request rescue assistance from the U.S. Navy. Short delays were encountered establishing communication between Admiral Tirado and Captain Schillingsburg and between Captain Schillingsburg and the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). Although Captain Schillingsburg did not have a file on the agreement between Peru and the US Navy to provide rescue assistance, the CNO watch officer was familiar with the agreement. 0100 – PACOCHA: Messages were sent to the Rescuers on the surface that the survivors should be able to survive for 48 hours. 0200 – PACOCHA: Reassessed the Boat’s Status. Three volunteers donned OBA’s and walked through compartments as far aft as main control. The aft battery compartment was noted to have water over the deck, so it was not entered. 

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========================================== 0200 – Salvage Air Connections. Personnel ashore including several divers studied the salvage air connections on PACOCHA’s sister ship, LA PEDRERA. Salvers discovered that they did not have salvage air hoses or fittings. Ultimately, MK-V diving system umbilicals were used with fittings manufactured during the night on two frigates. (MARK V Diving hoses are negatively buoyant, ½ inch inner diameter, 600-psig pressure rated hoses, U.S. MIL-H-2815) 0227 – Communications Established. After two frustrating hours, improved communications with PACOCHA were finally established using the signal ejector to pass written notes to the divers. This pair of divers, the last of the initial group of eight, surfaced shortly thereafter. Each diver made one SCUBA dive, working in pairs, in wet suits to 110 feet for 20 minutes with a 3 minute decompression stop at 10 feet. None of the divers developed decompression sickness.

 0350 – U.S. Navy Rescue System. Word that the U.S. Navy was sending its rescue system brought great relief to those in charge of the rescue operation. Unfortunately, over the next few hours the estimated time of arrival of the rescue system shifted steadily to a later arrival time. 0420 – PACOCHA: Fired a Yellow Flare. Not having had any communication from the surface for approximately two hours and unaware that there were currently no divers available, PACOCHA fired another flare. Yellow was picked so as not to give the impression that something new was seriously wrong ---they just wanted to express concern that they had not heard anything in a couple of hours. 0440 – PACOCHA: Fire in Control Although details were not clear, a small electrical short/fire occurred in main control. Fortunately it was brief and self-extinguishing, but it was a new cause of concern for their atmosphere. Should there be a fire in their compartment, only carbon dioxide extinguishers were available. 

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========================================== 0500 – Diving Resumed. A new group of divers arrived on scene in the early morning. Ashore, they had reviewed salvage connections, escape trunk configuration, and other details on the PACOCHA’s sister ship, LA PEDRERA. Shortly after the divers went to work, they discovered and recovered the body of PACOCHA’s Commanding Officer, Commander Nieva, just inside the deck access door to the sail superstructure. 0600 – PACOCHA: Reveille. Breakfast. Utilizing the signal ejector, communication was passed that the crew was in good spirits with enough air to last for seventy-eight hours based on calculations of available oxygen and lithium hydroxide. They also had adequate supplies of water, but no food after eating what little they had, including cake, for breakfast. A heavy black cloud was noted to be rising from below the deck in the forward battery compartment. No one entered this compartment again. Two more canisters of lithium hydroxide were opened and spread on the upper bunks. Later in the morning another four canisters were opened. Approximately twenty canisters were

unopened. One 8 cubic foot oxygen cylinder was bled into the compartment; three oxygen cylinders were left unused. 0630 – PACOCHA: Escape Training. Information on the use of the escape trunk and the Steinke Hood was passed from the surface. The crew was divided into five groups and one member from each group trained in the operation of the escape trunk. Groups were arranged by seniority, with one officer in four of the five groups, and by other factors such as swimming ability and self-confidence. 0645 – PACOCHA: Survivors Identified. Via message, PACOCHA informed those on the surface that there were twenty-two survivors. 0730 – U.S. Navy Rescue System. A message was sent to PACOCHA informing them that the fly-away rescue system was on the way from the U.S. This provided a visible boost to morale among the crewmen. 

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========================================== 0950 – PACOCHA: Atmosphere Deteriorating. Lt. Cotrina became increasingly concerned about the submarine’s atmosphere when he noted that the crew was becoming listless, agitated, and hyperventilating. The lithium hydroxide did not seem to be doing the job. There fore, he spread four additional canisters. Unfortunately the boat’s only atmosphere monitoring equipment was aft in the flooded compartments. Their only light, the emergency light located at the bottom of the forward ladder, was periodically flickering on and off, and the beam from their only battle lantern was steadily growing weaker. 0950 – Permission to Escape. When Lt. Cotrina requested guidance, Admiral Tirado granted permission for the senior man onboard PACOCHA to use his best judgment to decide if and when escape should be executed because of deteriorating conditions. 1000 – PACOCHA: Decision to escape was unanimous with one exception. One of the Lieutenants voiced his opinion against escape for various reasons. If he had to escape, he wanted the divers to provide scuba tanks since he had been trained in

SCUBA. The senior officer placed him in the first group of escapees. Hence the first group to escape was a group of four, composed of two officers and two enlisted. 1130 – Salvage Air Divers completed connecting high and low salvage using Mark V diving umbilicals for hoses and the manufactured fittings. The high salvage was connected to air bands on the submarine, ABTAO.These banks were charged by thirty-five year old, oil lubricated compressors. There are no filters on the system, and air samples of the air banks have never been taken. Lieutenant Cotrina briefly opened and air valve from PACOCHA’s air banks to the compartment to help circulate the air. He may have done so on other earlier occasions as well. 

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========================================== 1130 – PACOCHA: Escape Group One (Appendix 3) During escape training, crew members decided to inflate their Steinke Hoods in the compartment before entering the escape trunk. For reasons that are unclear, they elected to use the Steinke Hoods as a flotation device, but not to enclose their heads in the hoods. One member of this group, Chief Monzon, did wear the hood. He was to be the third most seriously injured of the twenty-two escapees. After inflating the escape devices, the four entered the escape trunk (Appendix 4) and controlled flooding and pressurizing from inside the trunk. The water flooding the trunk was so cold that the escapees wee sure they would die. They were all extremely frightened. After the side access hatch was opened, they spent at least ten minutes arguing over who would exit first. Finally LT Gomez, the senior man, ducked under and began his ascent, he was followed in turn by Chief Monzon and Petty Officer Reyes. LT Gomez described how he began blowing out, but fearing he would not have enough air to reach the surface, he held his breath for a moment, and then resumed breathing out again. He felt that his lungs were empty on arrival at the surface. After being on the surface for two or three minutes, he noted that his chest and neck felt “puffy.” He described what could be interpreted as crepitus in his neck. Not long thereafter, he developed considerable pain in both shoulders. Both enlisted crewmen also surfaced and initially seemed to be in good condition. After several minutes, however, they too became symptomatic. They became disoriented and unsteady, and developed pains and shortness of breath.  The fourth member of the group, however, failed to surface. Since those on the surface had been told to expect four in the first group they began to search but held

little hope for the fourth escapee. While they searched, those in the forward compartment drained and opened the escape trunk. They found the fourth member of the team alive and well, still in the escape trunk. 1215 – PACOCHA: Escape Group Two. Lieutenant Nieri and Three Enlisted Personnel. This group completed their escape by 1225 hours without serious incident. Following an indeterminate delay, Lieutenant Nieri and possibly others in this group were flown by helicopter to the recompression chamber. Proper advice was given by Admiral Tirado, so that the helicopter flew low over the water. Further delay occurred before this group was recompressed, as the one usable chamber was in use. Immediately after the second group surfaced, air was supplied through the high salvage connection. Aboard PACOCHA, water came from the line since it had not yet been blown dry. The high salvage was immediately secured from inside the ship and never reopened according to the senior officer on board, lieutenant Cotrina. Low salvage as best can be determined, terminated above the surface of the sea and was open to the atmosphere. It originated below the surface of the water in the bilge, and thus was filled with seawater to a depth equivalent to the pressure in the boat. 

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========================================== 1230 – Escape Group 3. Five Enlisted Personnel. All five of the survivors in this group completed an uneventful escape by 1240. Unfortunately, after this group left the escape trunk, the outer escape hatch could not be closed from inside the submarine. When the crew attempted to drain the trunk, seawater continued to flood into the submarine until the valves were secured. Attempts to drain the trunk were aborted when seawater had filled the bilge to the just below the deck, thus further increasing the pressure in the boat.  After their plight was communicated to the surface, divers were sent to investigate. Apparently one or more of the hatch’s dogs were obstructing closure. The divers eventually freed the obstruction with a large wrench. 1500 – Escape Group 4. Four Enlisted. This group made an uneventful escape by 1515. On reaching the surface at least one of them was transported to the shore recompression facility by helicopter. 1615 – Escape Group Five. Lieutenant Cotrina and Two Non-swimmers.

 Survivors in this group made an uneventful escape by 1625. By this time, a recompression chamber was on scene on the floating crane along with two medical officers. All three in this escape group were recompressed within five minutes of surfacing. 1710 – Escape Group 6. Lieutenant Lindley, Chief Bendezu and Petty Officer Grande. After the fifth group left the escape trunk, divers placed a set of SCUBA bottles in the trunk. Whether this was in response to requests by Lieutenant Lindley is not clear. Possibly it was done because of increasing concern that the atmosphere was becoming contaminated. Whatever the rationale, the final three escapees spent between one-half and one hour breathing from the SCUBA bottles before escaping at 1805. The exact time of entering, flooding, and pressurizing the escape trunk is unknown. During this time, personnel topside were again becoming apprehensive. Investigating divers were present when all three escapees simultaneously emerged from the top escape trunk hatch. Why they didn’t use the side hatch, as had the rest of the escapees is unclear. Since the chamber at the scene was occupied, these individuals were transported by boat to the shore facility. About an hour and a half lapsed between surfacing and recompression, apparently because no chamber was available. Unfortunately one of the three, Petty Officer Grande, develop such severe decompression sickness, possibly combined with gas embolus, that he died during recompression treatment.

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========================================== DISCUSSION Survivability in a disable submarine depends upon many factors including oxygen levels, carbon dioxide levels, toxic gases, hypothermia, food, water, and atmospheric pressure in the Submarine. Food and water is rarely a factor which will limit survivability, as evidenced in this case. Toxic gasses may have affected survival time. Whether significant amounts of chlorine gas had found its way into the forward compartment is unknown but the survivors, as a group, did not report lung irritation as a major complaint. Low oxygen levels may well be a factor in survivability, but usually not the limiting factor. High oxygen partial pressures can become toxic but it has been well demonstrated that humans can survive for at least 30days in compressed air at 60 fswg. Thus that was not likely to have played a part in this scenario. The presence of other toxic agents in the air used to pressurize the compartment initially is

possible but probably not as important as the ultimate carbon dioxide accumulation. Usually the limiting factor, especially if the submarine is pressurized, is elevation of the carbon dioxide level rather than hypoxia or other contaminants. In a compressed air environment without replenishment, the partial pressure of carbon dioxide reaches critical levels before the oxygen partial pressure is significantly depleted and requires supplementation. LT Cotrina obviously understood the need to circulated and mix the air in the compartment to maximize mixing of the oxygen released from storage bottles and to enhance carbon dioxide removal by the movement of air across the Lithium Hydroxide. Unfortunately his resources for circulating the air were limited and he had no equipment to monitor the effectiveness of his efforts at atmosphere maintenance. It is possible that the small fire at 0440 hours in Main Control and the black smoke noted above the forward battery well at 0600 may both have been partly related to the increased partial pressure of oxygen and the related increase in fire hazard inherent in a compressed air environment. A release of stored energy from the forward batteries from a battery fire might partly explain the rise in temperature within the PACOCHA from 21 degrees to 25 degrees Celsius. Oxygen was apparently being added to the atmosphere at a rate calculated to match oxygen utilization by the survivors. Thus the atmosphere in the compartments should have approximated the oxygen content of compressed air. The amount of Lithium Hydroxide spread out was, in retrospect, apparently insufficient to keep up with the metabolic production of carbon dioxide by the survivors. It is probably wise to spread out as much carbon dioxide absorbent as surface areas will permit right from the beginning when trapped in this situation. Elevation of atmospheric pressure can multiply the physiological effects of the component gases. Addition of uncontaminated air will not change the partial pressure of Carbon Dioxide or any other component previously present in the compartment. Elevated pressure, however, will not significantly affect the rate at which the partial pressure of Carbon Dioxide in the compartment climbs as people breathe. Accumulation of Nitrogen in body tissues will occur at fairly predictable rates related to the partial pressure of Nitrogen, so that when escape or rescue occurs the survivors may develop decompression sickness. 

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========================================== PRESSURE IN THE DISABLED SUBMARINE Exact internal pressures and durations of those pressures in the forward torpedo room are unknown. Preparations were made from the beginning to mobilize all recompression chambers and personnel in the area for whatever contingencies developed. Certain information is now available allowing extrapolations and calculations to be made to estimate the variables of pressure and time. 

a. As PACOCHA sank, water began to pour into the aft compartments of the boat via the rent in the pressure hull, the main induction valve, and the aft escape hatch. The watertight door between the forward engine room and aft battery compartment was closed early in the flooding before the forward hatch was closed. Thus flooding and attempts to pressurize the aft compartments probably contributed very little to pressurization of the forward torpedo room. b. LT Cotrina freed a man’s leg from the side hatch of the forward escape trunk and attempted to close it as the boat sank. However, as the boat sank, water entering the hatch swept him out of the escape trunk before he could finish closing the hatch. LT Cotrina had ordered a high-pressure blow in the compartment as water came in and this lasted for 1 to 2 minutes before the increasing angle off the boat slammed the hatch. The blow then continued for about 40 seconds until it was secured after it was obvious flooding had stopped. Thus, pressure in the compartment was increased above 1 atmosphere from that time on. c. One 8 cubic foot oxygen bottle was vented into the compartment during the time the men were trapped. Since the Carbon Dioxide absorbent (Lithium Hydroxide) was apparently not functioning well, the combination of unused Oxygen valved in plus the unabsorbed Carbon Dioxide produced may have contributed a small component to a pressure increase in the boat. d. High and low salvage connections (Appendix 5) were completed at 1130 hours on 27 August, some 16 ½ hours after the sinking. However the lines were flooded when connected and naturally sent a stream of water into the boat when pressure was initially applied to the high salvage line. The men in the compartment then secured the valve on that connection and it was never opened again. The low salvage line was underwater in the compartment and, although it apparently remained open at the surface, obviously remained filled with water to a height in the hose equal to the internal pressure in the boat. At that point the hose either collapsed from external water pressure, (It was not an armored hose), or remained open and filled with air the remaining distance to the surface. I neither condition this did not allow air pressure to the surface. Had either line been dry and open between the compartment and the surface, pressure in the compartment would have fallen to 1 atmosphere. Thus the high and low salvage connections apparently did not contribute to any pressure changes in the compartment. Considering the number of cases of decompression sickness that developed when the escapees reached one atmosphere of pressure on the surface, it is fortunate that such a pressure reduction did not develop in the boat when the hose were connected.

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========================================== e. The survivors cracked the valves from PACOCHA’s air banks to circulate the air in the compartment on at least one occasion and perhaps more often. This also contributed to increasing the compartment pressure.

 f. The flooding and subsequent draining of the escape trunk (Appendix 4) during each of the first five escape evolutions added water to the internal volume of the forward torpedo room and that further increased the pressure. This effect was accentuated following the third group of escapees when the side hatch did not close properly and a large volume of water entered the boat when drain down of the escape trunk was attempted. g. Four hours after the sinking the survivors noted that an incompletely secured vent valve had allowed water to flood the battery well in the aft battery compartment. This volume of water also increased the internal pressure in the forward compartments. h. It was noted that initially, after pressurization of the forward torpedo room, the water-tight door leading aft to the forward battery compartment would not open. Later the pressure apparently equalized between the compartments and the door could be opened. It is not clear whether pressure leaked from the forward torpedo room into the aft spaces or whether pressure increased in the aft spaces by some other mechanism. These factors were recognized by the survivors, but there was no recall of a gauge or manometer showing the actual pressure in the forward compartment. However, during conversations with LT Cotrina, who pressurized the escape trunk for the first four groups that escaped, one additional important fact materialized. When the trunk is pressurized to equalized pressure with surrounding water, in order to open the side escape hatch, air pressure is supplied from with the submarine. There was a pressure gauge on that line (Appendix 4) and it reads pressure in the line relative to that surrounding it in the boat. Since the escape trunk was at about 110 feet of sea water gauge (fswg) deep, it should have taken some 48.9 pounds per square inch gauge (psig) of pressure to equalize, assuming the boat were at surface pressure. 

(Assuming 33 fswg – 1 atmosphere of pressure – 14.7 psig)(110 fswg divided by 33 ft – 3.33)(3.33 times 14.7 psig – 48.9 psig)

 LT Cotrina, however remembered that the gauge was showing only 24 to 25 psig. A bit of additional calculations show that there may well have been approximately 54 feet of pressure in the boat at the time of the first escape. 

(25 psig divided by 14.7 psig – 1.7 atmospheres)(1.7 times 33 feet – 56 fswg of pressure needed to equalize)(110 feet – 56 feet-54 fswg of pressure in the boat)

 22

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 The duration of this pressure is not clear, but certainly the incidence of decompression sickness (a minimum of 20/22) certainly indicates the pressure calculated above may be reasonable at the time of the escape evolutions. The historical events suggest an elevated pressure in the compartment from the first few minutes a the submarine sank with at least some minor step increase as events transpired over the remaining hours of their entrapment. Work in the United States and England on pressurized escape and rescue in recent years has led to information from which guidelines for escape and rescue in this type of situation have been recently formulated. The time limit for “No decompression” exposure at 54 feet is 60 minutes as set forth in the U.S. Navy Diving Manual (Appendix 6). Thus after 1 hour at 54 feet, an increasing decompression obligation had been incurred, whether they escaped or were rescued. Further, the additional exposure to 110-fswg pressure followed by rapid decompression during the escape procedure made the risk of decompression even greater. Recent recommendations derived from British and U.S. research show that at a depth of 110 FSWG, increasing exposures to pressures in excess of 1.7 atmospheres of pressure absolute (1.7 ata – 23 fswg) within the boat make it unsafe to escape rather than await rescue (Appendix 7). The lack of guidelines and absence of a pressure gauge to show internal pressure within the submarine made those with the submarine, as well as those on the surface, unaware of the increasing hazard during buoyant escape as time passed. While the possibility of gas embolism had been anticipated, certainly no one on scene or in Peru had the information to anticipate the number and severity of decompression sickness cases that were to develop after the otherwise successful escapes. 

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==========================================

Prensa, Noticias

El Comercio, a dos días de la tragedia.

Noticias sobre acciones de rescate.

El milagro del submarino PacochaEl 26 de agosto de 1988, el submarino Pacocha de la armada peruana naufragó en

las turbulentas aguas del Pacífico. Cuando se creía que todos sus tripulantes morirían, algo inexplicable ocurrió. El teniente Roger Cotrina recuerda la historia del milagro que les salvó la vida a los 22 marineros que vivieron horas de terror.

l día en que ubiqué al comandante (r) Roger Cotrina para hablar sobre el milagro ocurrido en el submarino Pacocha, me advirtió que no me

daría la entrevista si no cumplía con tres requisitos.El primero era sencillo: leer el libro titulado Testimonio de amor, de Atanasio Matanic, en el que se pasa revista a la biografía oficial de la nueva beata consagrada por el papa Juan Pablo II en el puerto de Dubrovnik. La segunda era ubicar a los demás sobrevivientes del hundimiento del submarino Pacocha que pudieran corroborar su testimonio. Finalmente, quería que visitara en el distrito de Ventanilla a la hermana Alejandrina, directora del colegio de la congregación Hijas de la Misericordia fundada por María de Jesús de Croacia.Roger Cotrina es el tipo de hombre que los filósofos llamarían estoico. Su felicidad reside en el cumplimiento del deber. De

Este marino, bautizado por sus subalternos como monsieur, parece frágil, pero no lo es.

La versión oficial dice que Cotrina vio la imagen de la monja croata María de Jesús Crucificado Petkovi en el submarino Pacocha, justo en los segundos cruciales en los que su buque se hundía producto de un violento choque con un pesquero japonés. El agua entraba con una enorme presión por una escotilla abierta esa noche y de no ser cerrada a tiempo por él se hubieran ahogado todos. Según los investigadores traídos por el padre Paolo Lombardo, postulador de la Congregación para las Causas de los Santos, sólo alguien capaz de desarrollar una fuerza capaz de levantar cinco toneladas pudo cerrar dicha escotilla y salvar a sus compañeros de una muerte segura. Cotrina inexplicablemente lo hizo.

baja estatura, delgado como un sietemesino, pequeños bigotes, ojos menudos, Cotrina es el mejor ejemplo de que las apariencias casi siempre engañan.

Texto completo en la edición impresa.Suscribase a GATOPARDO aquí.

Fuentes

Las imágenes y la información presentada en esta página web forman parte del documental "Milagro en el Pacocha", producido por Miranova, Proyectos de Comunicación:

 

BAP Pacocha (SS-48)From Wikipedia, the free encyclopediaJump to: navigation, search

Career

Class and type: Balao -class diesel-electric submarine

Laid down: November 25, 1943

Launched: March 6, 1944

Acquired: From the United States Navy, 1974

Commissioned: 28 May 1974 into the Peruvian Navy

Status: rammed and sunk by Japanese trawler, 26 August 1988

General Characteristics

Displacement: 1,870 tons surfaced2,440 tons submerged

Length: 93.8 m

Beam: 8.2 m

Draft: 5.2 m

Propulsion: three 4800 hp (3.6 MW) diesel enginestwo 5400 hp (4 MW) electric motors

Speed: 18 knots (33 km/h) surfaced15 knots (28 km/h) submerged

Complement: 85 officers and men

Armament: 10 × 21 in (533 mm) torpedo tubes (six forward, four aft)

BAP Pacocha (SS-48) was a submarine of the Marina de Guerra Peruana (Peruvian Navy) named for the 1877 Battle of Pacocha, in which the Peruvian ironclad Huascar humiliated the Royal Navy. Formerly USS Atule (SS-403) , a Balao -class submarine with a GUPPY IA upgrade, she had been sold to Peru and commissioned on 28 May 1974.

At 18:50 in the evening of 26 August 1988, Pacocha was transiting on the surface with the forward torpedo room and bridge hatches as well as the main induction valve open. Forty-nine men were aboard, including the Squadron Commander, to conduct an operational readiness inspection. About half an hour after sunset, ten minutes from Pachocha’s expected arrival at the port of Callao, the 412 ton Japanese fishing trawler Kiowa Maru (also spelled Kyowa Maru and Hyowa Maru) rammed her in the after port quarter. Kiowa Maru was equipped with an ice-breaker bow, with a sub-surface protrusion designed to penetrate and break apart what it struck. Pacocha sank quickly.

Four men died immediately in the collision and sinking: her commanding officer, Capitán de Fragata Daniel Nieva Rodríguez, died securing the bridge access hatch; Teniente Segundo Luis Roca Sara and two enlisted men were trapped in flooded compartments and drowned. Twenty-three of her crew succeeded in abandoning ship.

In the sinking submarine, Teniente Roger Cotrina Alvarado secured the forward torpedo room watertight door. He then tried to secure the forward torpedo room hatch, but it was jammed by a sailor whose leg had been caught as the hatch fell shut. As Pacocha began to sink, water rushing in the forward hatch washed Cotrina down the ladder. Cotrina prayed for the intercession of Marija of Jesus Crucified Petković, a Croatian nun revered for her good work throughout Latin America. Pacocha had assumed a 40 degree up-angle, and lifting the hatch required enormous strength. Nonetheless, Cotrina climbed

back to the hatch, freed the sailor, and shut and dogged the hatch. Cotrina credited this sequence of events to a miracle by the nun, testifying, “I saw a light and I experienced an ineffable power that allowed me to shut the hatch.” There is little doubt that if that hatch had not been shut, no one inside the submarine would have survived. Two commissions, one conducted by the Peruvian military, the other by the Vatican came to the conculsion that with the water pressure, it would have been technically impossible for anyone to close the hatch. The Roman Catholic Church's Congregation for the Causes of the Saints authenticated the miracle. This is unusual, as normally miracles in the causes of saints, are those for cures believed by the Church to be through the saint's intercession, but in this case the declaration of a miracle was the obtaining of superhuman strength by someone in a disaster situation. On 6 June 2003, Pope John Paul II celebrated Marija's beatification Mass ironically in the Croatian port city of Dubrovnik. Cotrina Alvarado received Holy Communion from the pope on this occasion, and afterwards gave him a small replica of the Pacocha as a memento.

Less than five minutes after the collision, Pachoca settled on the bottom. Survivors aboard her noted her keel depth to be 140 feet with a 9 degree up angle.

At 20:02, with Pachoca an hour overdue, the Peruvian Navy declared an emergency. Boats were dispatched to search along Pacocha’s route. The tug Jennifer II was sent to rendezvous with Kiowa Maru and investigate. Some twenty minutes later, Contralmirante Guillermo Tirado, Commander of the Submarine Flotilla, arrived at the Callao Naval Base, assumed command, and dispatched the submarine BAP Dos de Mayo (SS-41) to search.

At 20:30, the survivors trapped in Pacocha released their messenger buoy and attempted to call aft compartments on the sound-powered telephone. There was no response.

By 21:00, the crew of Jennifer II had confirmed that Kiowa Maru had collided with something, and radioed their report to the base. While that report was in progress, the survivors in Pacocha fired a red distress flare. The Navy immediately issued a call for rescue and salvage divers to report for duty. Rescue of the survivors on the surface began at once, and within an hour and a half, twenty survivors and three bodies were drawn from the water. Three enlisted men had died of hypothermia during the four hours they had spent in the 14 °C (57 °F) water.

Meanwhile, 22 survivors mustered in Pacocha’s forward torpedo room: four officers, four chiefs, and fourteen junior enlisted personnel. The senior officer transpired to be Cotrina. At 21:20 they fired another flare that led searchers to the messenger buoy at 21:31. Messenger buoys on Balao -class submarines do not have telephones, so communication could not be established, but those on the surface did realize that the buoy and flares probably meant that someone was still alive. The survivors held training in the use of the Steinke hood, with which most crewmen were unfamiliar. (The Peruvian Navy, like the United States Navy, had stopped in-water escape training from depth several years previously.)

At 22:50, the smell of chlorine gas in main control prompted another assessment of the boat's condition. A vent valve was found that had not been tightly shut, and more water had seeped into the aft battery compartment. All lithium hydroxide canisters were brought forward, and the survivors sealed themselves in the forward torpedo room. By 23:30, two canisters of lithium hydroxide were opened and spread. The crew was put to bed.

By midnight on Saturday, 27 August 1988, all twenty survivors and three bodies had been brought ashore. Survivors were taken to the nearby Naval Hospital. Although all suffered from hypothermia, none had significant injuries. At the scene, an assortment of vessels were on the surface including the submarine, Dos de Mayo, a torpedo retriever, a floating crane, and several small craft.

Locating divers during their off-duty hours was hampered by the lack of telephones in many of their homes, but by midnight, eight were at the scene in SCUBA gear. Depth to the deck of the ship was between 125 feet (38 m) aft and 110 feet (34 m) forward, with the ship variably reported as having between a nine and fifteen degree up-angle. The first team of divers followed the messenger buoy's line, which had played out to a significant distance. Since it was not located directly over Pacocha, a second line was tended straight down to the sail. The divers tapped on the hull and received a response from the forward compartment of the boat. However, they were unfamiliar with the code used, so were unable to interpret the tapping.

At 00:40, Contralmirante Tirado called Captain Schillingsburg, the United States Defense Attaché, to request rescue assistance from the United States Navy.

By 01:00 the survivors had sent messages to the rescuers that they should be able to hold out for 48 hours. By 0200, three volunteers in Pacocha had donned oxygen breathing apparatuses (OBAs) and walked through compartments as far aft as main control. The aft battery compartment had water over the deck, so it was not entered. Meanwhile, personnel ashore including several divers studied the salvage air connections on BAP La Pedrera (SS-49) (the former USS Sea Poacher (SS-406) , also a GUPPY IA Balao -class submarine) and discovered that they did not have appropriate salvage air hoses or fittings. Ultimately, Mark V diving system umbilicals were used with fittings manufactured during the night on two frigates. (Mark V diving hoses are negatively buoyant, ½-inch inner diameter, 600 psig (4.2 MPa) pressure rated hoses, MIL-H-2815.)

After two frustrating hours, improved communications with Pacocha were finally established at 02:27 using the signal ejector to pass written notes to the divers. Word was received at 0350 and passed to the survivors that the United States Navy was sending its rescue system. However, over the next few hours the estimated time of arrival of the rescue system shifted steadily later.

Having had no communication from the surface for nearly two hours and unaware that there were currently no divers available, Pacocha fired another flare at 04:20. Yellow was picked so as not to give the impression that something new was seriously wrong—

they only wanted to express concern that they had not heard anything in a couple of hours. However, at 04:40 a small electrical short and fire broke out in main control. It was brief and self-extinguishing, but renewed concern for the survivors' atmosphere. Only carbon dioxide extinguishers were available for fire-fighting.

A new group of divers arrived on scene at about 05:00 after reviewing salvage connections, escape trunk configuration, and other details on La Pedrera. Shortly after the divers went to work, they recovered the body of Pacocha’s Commanding Officer, Capitán de Fragata Nieva, just inside the deck access door to the sail.

At 06:00 the survivors held reveille and prepared breakfast. Utilizing the signal ejector, communication was passed that the crew was in good spirits with enough air to last for seventy-eight hours based on calculations of available oxygen and lithium hydroxide. They also had adequate supplies of water, but no food after eating what little they had, including cake, for breakfast. While inspecting the submarine, the survivors noted a heavy black cloud rising from below the deck in the forward battery compartment. No one entered this compartment again. Two more canisters of lithium hydroxide were opened and spread on the upper bunks. Later in the morning another four canisters were opened. Approximately twenty canisters were unopened. One eight cubic foot (230 L) oxygen cylinder was bled into the compartment; three oxygen cylinders were left unused.

Information on the use of the escape trunk and the Steinke hood was passed from the surface. The crew was divided into five groups and one member from each group trained in the operation of the escape trunk. Groups were arranged by seniority, with one officer in four of the five groups, and by other factors such as swimming ability and self-confidence. Via message, Pacocha informed those on the surface that there were twenty-two survivors.

At 07:30 a message was sent to Pacocha informing them that the fly-away rescue system was on the way from the United States. This provided a visible boost to morale among the crewmen, and all involved in the casualty planned to wait for that equipment.

However, by 09:50, the crew was becoming listless, agitated, and hyperventilating. The boat's only atmosphere monitoring equipment was aft in the flooded compartments, but the lithium hydroxide did not seem to be working as well as expected. Cotrina was becoming concerned about the submarine's atmosphere. He spread four additional lithium hydroxide canisters. To exacerbate the situation, their only light, the emergency light located at the bottom of the forward ladder, was periodically flickering on and off, and the beam from their only battle lantern was steadily growing weaker. Cotrina passed a message to the surface requesting guidance. Contralmirante Tirado instructed Cotrina to use his best judgment in decided when to escape. Cotrina consulted his crew; their recommendations to escape were unanimous with one exception. Teniente Lindley offered various reasons to wait, and if he had to escape, he wanted the divers to provide SCUBA tanks since he had been trained in their use. Cotrina ordered him to join the first group of escapees.

At 11:30, divers completed connecting high and low salvage using Mark V diving umbilicals for hoses and the manufactured fittings. The high salvage was connected to air banks on the submarine BAP Abtao (SS-42) , named after the Battle of Abtao. These banks were charged by thirty-five-year-old, oil-lubricated compressors. There are no filters on the system, and air samples of the air banks had never been taken.

During escape training, crew members decided to inflate their Steinke hoods in the compartment before entering the escape trunk, and to use them as flotation devices, but not to enclose their heads in the hoods. One member of the first group, Chief Monzon, did wear the hood. He was to be the third most seriously injured of the twenty-two escapees. After inflating the escape devices, four men entered the escape trunk and controlled flooding and pressurizing from inside the trunk. After the side access hatch was opened, the four men spent at least ten minutes arguing over who would exit first. Finally Teniente Gomez, the senior man, ducked under and began his ascent, followed in turn by Chief Monzon and Petty Officer Reyes. All three men reached the surface and were promptly rescued. However, within minutes of reaching the surface, they began suffering great pain in their joints, became disoriented and unsteady, experienced shortness of breath, and displayed symptoms of crepitus.

The rescuers on the surface had been told to expect four men in the first group. Finding only three, they began to search for the missing Teniente Lindley. While they searched, the survivors drained and opened the escape trunk, where they found the teniente, alive and well, still in the escape trunk. Lindley reentered the submarine, and was added to the last escape group.

The second group, led by Teniente Nieri, completed their escape by 12:25 without incident, and were flown by helicopter to the recompression chamber. The helicopter flew low over the water, to keep the air pressure as high as possible.

Immediately after the second group surfaced, air was supplied through the high salvage connection. When the connection was opened aboard Pacocha, high-pressure seawater came from the line since it had not yet been blown dry. The survivors immediately shut the high salvage connection valve and never reopened it. The low salvage line was open to atmosphere on the surface, not pressurized, but was connected to the submarine below the level of water in the bilge. Thus, that line was filled with seawater to a depth equivalent to the pressure in the boat, and did not allow air flow.

All five of the survivors in the third escape group completed an uneventful escape by 12:40. However, after they left, the outer escape hatch could not be shut from inside the submarine, so when the crew attempted to drain the trunk, seawater continued to flood into the submarine until the valves were secured. After the problem was communicated to the surface, divers investigated, discovered that the hatch’s dogs were obstructing closure, and freed the obstruction with a large wrench.

The fourth escape group made an uneventful escape by 15:15. On reaching the surface at least one of them was transported to the shore recompression facility by helicopter. The

fifth group then made an uneventful escape by 16:25. By this time, a recompression chamber was on scene on the floating crane along with two medical officers. All three in this escape group were recompressed within five minutes of surfacing.

After the fifth group left the escape trunk, divers placed a set of SCUBA bottles in the trunk. The final three escapees spent between one-half and one hour breathing from the SCUBA bottles bottles before escaping at 18:05, by which time personnel topside were again becoming apprehensive. Divers were sent to investigate the delay and were present when all three escapees simultaneously emerged from the escape trunk.

Since the chamber at the scene was occupied, these individuals were transported by boat to the shore facility. About an hour and a half lapsed between surfacing and recompression, apparently because no chamber was available. Oficial de March 2o. Carlos Grande Rengifo developed such severe decompression sickness (the "bends"), possibly combined with gas embolus, that he died during recompression treatment.

The Peruvian Navy's efforts to salvage Pacocha began on 30 August 1988, immediately after the crew escaped, and continued for eleven months. One hundred fifty men, seventy of them divers from the Salvage Service, worked eight hundred hours, two hundred of preliminary inspection and six hundred diving. The submarine broke the surface again on 23 July 1989, eleven months after she was sunk. After being studied for the effects of the ramming and sinking, her hulk was cannibalized for spare parts for other Peruvian submarines.

[edit] References "The B.A.P. PACOCHA (SS-48) Collision: The Escape and Medical

Recompression Treatment of Survivors," by Claude Harvey, M.D. and John Carson, M.D., published 30 March 1989 as Special Report SP89-1 by the Naval Submarine Medical Research Laboratory, Naval Medical Research and Development Command

the Web site of the Peruvian Submarine Command, http://www.marina.mil.pe/comandancias/submarinos/comad_sub.htm

the Holy See's biography of Blessed Marija of Jesus Crucified Petković, http://www.vatican.va/news_services/liturgy/saints/ns_lit_doc_20030606_petkovic_en.html

Hi

HOMESUBMARINOS - ACCIDENTES Indice Inf. General

Détente a Perestroika - 1976 / 2000Submarino Nacionalidad Fecha Tipo de accidente

 K-47  Ruso  26 Septiembre 1976  Incendio

 U.S.S. Ray (SSN-653)  Americano  20 Septiembre, 1977  Encallo en inmersion

 K-122  Ruso  21 Agosto 1981 Accidente de reactor K-123  Ruso  08 Agosto 1982  Accidente de reactor K-131  Ruso  18 Junio 1984  Incendio K-431  Ruso  Diciembre 1985  Accidente de reactor U.S.S. Nathaniel Greene (SSBN-636)  Americano  13 Marzo, 1986  Encallo en inmersion

 K-219  Ruso  06 Octubre 1986  Explosion U.S.S. Bonefish (SS-582)  Americano  24 Abril, 1988  Incendio Komsomolets (K-278)  Ruso  07 Abril 1989  Incendio K-192 (ex. K-131)  Ruso  25 Junio 1989  Accidente de reactor U.S.S. Baton Rouge (SSN- 689) / Barracuda

 Americano / Ruso  11 Febrero, 1992  Colision

 Emeraude  Francia  30 Marzo 1994   Accidente de ingenieríaBAP Pacocha Peruano  26 Agosto de Colision y hundimiento

1988

              

Todo Callao

Carguero chipriota hunde nave panameña en bahía del CallaoUn desaparecido por colisión de buques extranjeros en el CallaoTomado de RPP, Diario El Comercio, Perú 21, etc.

Viernes, 27 de enero 2006 - 05:23:51

Trabajos de rescate de los tripulantes. (RPP-Noticias) Una persona de nacionalidad indonesa desaparecida dejó como saldo la colisión de tres buques de bandera extranjera frente al puerto del Callao, informó la Dirección de Capitanías y Guardacostas de la Marina de Guerra del Perú.

A través de una nota de prensa, explicó que por la mañana el “Twin Star” (Panamá) chocó contra la motonave chipriota

“Pintail”, que ese momento abandonaba la bahía.

Indicó que posteriormente a dicha colisión, el “Twin Star” impactó contra la embarcación “Alice” de Malta.

Como consecuencia de ambos choques, continuó, se produjo el hundimiento parcial del “Twin Star” y la caída al mar de un tripulante de nacionalidad indonesa de “Alice”.

La Marina precisó que ante esta situación, la Autoridad Marítima del Callao dispuso la búsqueda con unidades guardacostas del tripulante caído al mar, así como el rescate y evacuación de los 20 tripulantes del “Twin Star”.

Asimismo, el inicio del proceso de investigación sumaria para determinar las causas que originaron el accidente, así como establecer responsabilidades.

Precisó finalmente que “el lugar del hundimiento no afecta el normal ingreso y salida de naves al puerto del Callao”.

Ver Video de Canal N >>>

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Causas del accidente (Tomado del Diario Expreso)Las investigaciones de ley determinarán cuales fueron las causas del accidente, pero se presume que éste se habría originado debido a las malas maniobras de los conductores de las naves de mayor tamaño, a lo que se sumó la fuerte neblina que se registró ayer en el puerto chalaco. A las 7:17 horas de ayer el carguero Twin Star, que no llevaba mercancía, ingresaba el primer puerto peruano, en tanto que el navío de igual condición “Pintail” de Chipre salía del muelle chalaco cargado de diversos productos.

En esas circunstancias se produjo el accidente, a cuatro millas del embarcadero en la Plaza Grau, a la altura de la Boya Racón, la cual señaliza la entrada al Puerto del Callao. El teniente Manuel Rodríguez Ruiz, oficial encargado de Relaciones Públicas de la Dirección de Capitanías y Guardacostas, informó que la posterior colisión del navío “Alice” con el

“Twin Star” agudizó el impacto en la segunda, resultando la embarcación panameña la más perjudicada: recibió el golpe de la punta de metal del “Pintail” en la zona del medio, lo que originó que el barco panameño se partiera en dos y se hundiera a 30 metros de profundidad.Asimismo, se supo que el “Twin Star” tenía 22 tripulantes, de los cuales dos resultaron con heridas leves, y el“Pintail” tenía 25, los cuales no sufrieron daño alguno. Sobre la cantidad de personas que viajaban en la nave “Alice” no se precisó la cantidad.Sólo era visible la proa, donde se ubicaba la sala de mando y las habitaciones de los tripulantes, y la popa del “Twin Star”, además, el embate causó que el combustible del carguero se derrame. Ante la contaminación del mar, la Marina de Guerra realizó las respectivas labores de limpieza.

Otro choqueLa tarde del 26 de agosto de 1988 se enlutó el mar peruano. Aquel día un barco pesquero japonés de nombre “Kiowa Maru” chocó contra el submarino peruano BAP “Pacocha”. Durante el intento de escape fallecieron 8 de los 30 tripulantes de la nave.El teniente Roger Cotrina tomó las riendas de la nave ante la muerte del capitán. Luego de lo sucedido, el efectivo de la Marina atribuyó el éxito del escape gracias al apoyo divino que recibió de la beata croata María de Jesús Crucificado Petrokovi, cuya imagen vio en la nave y le dio la suficiente fuerza para cerrar una pesada escotilla, evitando así que la nave se hunda.

Alarma total (Tomado de Diario Ojo)En el puerto chalaco se comunicó lo ocurrido y de inmediato el alcalde Alex Kouri, como cabeza de Defensa Civil, se dirigió al lugar para realizar las coordinaciones con la finalidad de conocer los pormenores del hecho, al tiempo que se movilizó a los bomberos y a la Policía Nacional, quienes también se desplegaron hacia el lugar del accidente para auxiliar a los tripulantes de las naves siniestradas. “Se está realizando todas las coordinaciones como el rescate y evacuación de los 20 tripulantes de la nave ”Twin Star“, además de activar con la Marina el Plan de Contingencia Local ante posibles derrames de hidrocarburos y sustancias

nocivas para evitar la contaminación del medio ambiente acuático y la señalización de la zona del accidente en coordinación con la Dirección de Hidrografía y Navegación de la Marina de Guerra, para alertar a los demás embarcaciones de lo ocurrido”, señaló el burgomaestre chalaco.

¿Falla Humana? Por su parte, el presidente de la Autoridad Portuaria Nacional, almirante (r), Frank Boyle Alvarado, informó sobre el accidente naval y explicó que se realizarán las investigaciones de manera sumaria y para ello se aguarda los informes que deberá emitir la Marina de Guerra. Pero remarcó que en esta clase de accidentes el 90 por ciento se producen por errores humanos. “Es muy improbable un problema técnico, pero tampoco la dejamos de lado. Los resultados se tendrán en el momento que los peritos culminen las pesquisas del caso”, explicó.

Principal Miercoles, 17 de Enero 2007

ESPECIALESEDICIONES

ANTERIORES 28/1/2006

El final de un ‘gigante’

TRES BUQUES CHOCAN EN EL CALLAO • Barco ‘Twin Star’, de bandera panameña, se partió en dos y se hundió frente a la bahía del Callao.• Veinte tripulantes fueron rescatados vivos por guardacostas.• A las 7 y 10 am fue impactado por buque chipriota ’Pintail’ que además chocó con otra embarcación de bandera malteña.

Por Óscar Chumpitaz.Fotos: La República y EFE.

Desde hace mucho tiempo la neblina en Lima no había sido tan densa como ayer. A las 7 y 10 de la mañana, cuando el sol de verano se  negaba a aparecer en la bahía del Callao y la visibilidad era tan escasa como en un puerto londinense, un ruido aterrador silenció de golpe el sonido de las olas y crispó los nervios de cuanto marino lo escuchó.

A dos millas y media de la línea costera, tres buques cargueros de bandera extranjera colisionaron aparatosamente. Fue tan fuerte el choque que una de las embarcaciones se partió en dos y –vencida– empezó a hundirse.

Más de 70 marinos mercantes corrieron peligro de muerte. Unos se mantuvieron hasta el final en sus navíos, corrigiendo con premura los destrozos. Otros, desesperados, saltaron al mar temiendo lo peor.

La rápida intervención de guardacostas de la Armada Peruana fue determinante para evitar la pérdida de vidas humanas. No obstante, un ciudadano de Indonesia que cayó al mar desde una de las embarcaciones, ha sido declarado como desaparecido.

Debido a la magnitud del accidente fue necesario cortar el flujo marítimo cerca del punto de colisión, a fin de evitar que otros buques se estrellaran con los ya siniestrados.

La Capitanía de puerto adoptó la medida para facilitar el desplazamiento de los grupos

El Twin Star quedó partido en dos ante fuerte impacto. La tripulación fue rescatada por guardacostas de la Marina. Haga click en la imagen para ver paso a paso la colisión.

     

 

Para tener en cuenta

El capitán del barco ‘Twin Star’, fiel a la  tradición naval, trató de inmolarse sumergiéndose con la embarcación.

   

de auxilio y permitir que peritos del instituto del mar evalúen los daños ecológicos causados por el derrame de pequeñas cantidades de hidrocarburos y otras sustancias nocivas.

Pánico en alta mar

El pánico se apoderó de los 20 tripulantes del buque “Twin Star” al amanecer . El gigante panameño, de 150 metros de longitud fue impactado por el buque “Pintail” (de bandera chipriota) diez minutos antes de llegar a la rada del puerto. El “Pintail” acababa de zarpar del puerto del Callao con un cargamento de nitrato de amonio.

Minutos antes, esta embarcación había chocado levemente contra la motonave “Alice”, de bandera de Malta, que se encontraba anclada en la zona conocida como Boya Recon.

Si bien aún se están investigando las causas del accidente, lo cierto es que la colisión provocó el hundimiento del “Twin Star” y que el bulbo de la proa estribor del “Pintail” lució una rotura horizontal de aproximadamente dos metros. Un forado más pequeño quedó en la proa del “Alice”.

Fuentes de la Capitanía indicaron que lo más probable es que el choque haya sido consecuencia de la neblina, sin embargo no descartaron un error de maniobra.

Intentó inmolarse

Cuando las primeras brigadas de rescate llegaron a la zona del desastre encontraron al “Twin Star” partido en dos: solo la proa y la popa (donde se encuentra la sala de máquinas) se mantenían a flote. La parte central de las bodegas estaba sumergida.

Efectivos de la Marina llegaron al lugar del accidente a bordo del BAP “Río Huarmey”. Encontraron a los 20 tripulantes en la popa, tratando de mantener la calma y  luchando por sus vidas en medio de un caos de cabos, mástiles y contenedores.

Todos fueron rescatados menos el capitán de la nave que procedió a actuar tal como –dicen– manda la tradición naval: morir con su barco.

El hombre de mar finalmente declinó. A las 12.50 de la tarde –siete horas después de que la nave empezara a hundirse– fue convencido por un oficial de la Marina a abandonar el siniestrado buque.

Marinos del ‘Twin Star’

1.  Myo Zay Min (28)2.  Lwin Soe (42)3.  Phone Myint Zaw (46)

4.  Maung Maung Tha (32)5.  Saung Aung (40)6.  Nyi Nyi Aye (47)7.  Win Zaw (37)8.  Moe Zaw Myint (30)9.  Aung Ko Tun (32)10.  Myo Min Soe (26)11.  Tum Tum (39)12.  Sam Win (36)13.  Ya Maung Soe (37)14.  Myo Min Do (25)15.  Aung Zam Moe (43)16.  Min Aung Kyam (27)17.  Maung Maung Myint (22)18.  Zaw Mih Thu (32)19.  G. Pinca Servillano (52)20.  Fernández Fredoie (47)

Hace 18 años buque japonés chocó al ‘Pacocha’

1. La tarde del 26 de agosto de 1988, la tripulación del B.A.P. Pacocha se preparaba para llegar a la rada del puerto del Callao. Un pesquero japonés se encargaría de hacer que el viaje dure más tiempo del imaginado. El capitán Daniel Nieva se inmoló entonces tras cerrar la escotilla y salvar a la tripulación.

2. El choque provocó un incendio en la sección de controles por lo que el submarino perdió propulsión y la energía eléctrica se cortó; la oscuridad solamente era interrumpida por alguna de las linternas que aún funcionaban en la embarcación.

3. El oficial Cotrina, quien asumió el control de la situación por ser el Jefe de Ingeniería, se dirigió a la sala donde se producía el incendio y encontró a dos oficiales y un técnico, tratando de sofocar el fuego con extintores. El ruido de las máquinas del submarino obligaba a gritar para poder ser escuchados.