(information and communications univ.) 韓國情報通信大學校...

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Votopia will be coming soon ICU (Information and Communications Univ.) 韓國情報通信大學校, http://www.icu.ac.kr IRIS (International Research center for Information Security) 國際情報保護技術硏究所, http://www.iris.re.kr Jan. 31, 2002 Kwangjo Kim,

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Page 1: (Information and Communications Univ.) 韓國情報通信大學校 IRIScaislab.kaist.ac.kr/publication/paper_files/2002/kkj/... · 2018-09-27 · •Anti-hacking such as DDOS attack,

Votopia will be coming soon

ICU(Information and Communications Univ.)韓國情報通信大學校, http://www.icu.ac.kr

IRIS(International Research center for Information Security)

國際情報保護技術硏究所, http://www.iris.re.kr

Jan. 31, 2002Kwangjo Kim, 金 光 兆

Page 2: (Information and Communications Univ.) 韓國情報通信大學校 IRIScaislab.kaist.ac.kr/publication/paper_files/2002/kkj/... · 2018-09-27 · •Anti-hacking such as DDOS attack,

SCIS2002, Kwangjo Kim, ICU 2

Internet Voting Why do we consider ?

• Anyone can vote• Every country wants to be e-government• Anywhere from home, office, overseas, etc. -> Solution for the problem of decreasing the partici

pation rate by the manual voting

What are the problems ?• Digital divide (Slow Internet, PKI is not ready, etc)• Difficult identification in non face-to-face situation• Undetectable coerced or collaborated voting

Page 3: (Information and Communications Univ.) 韓國情報通信大學校 IRIScaislab.kaist.ac.kr/publication/paper_files/2002/kkj/... · 2018-09-27 · •Anti-hacking such as DDOS attack,

SCIS2002, Kwangjo Kim, ICU 3

Motivation & Contributions

Celebrating or boosting 2002 FIFA WorldCup Korea/JapanTM

Trial of Internet voting to the worldwide scale by Korea and Japan joint teams

Participation based on volunteership (non-commercial)

Secure voting system to the real life using PKI

Independent with FIFA’s MVP by press

Page 4: (Information and Communications Univ.) 韓國情報通信大學校 IRIScaislab.kaist.ac.kr/publication/paper_files/2002/kkj/... · 2018-09-27 · •Anti-hacking such as DDOS attack,

SCIS2002, Kwangjo Kim, ICU 4

Similar Approaches MIT-Caltech Task Force

• Panic in Florida 2000 Presidential Election• Reliable electronic voting system

CyberVote• Internet voting system with fixed and mobile terminal• 3-year(‘01-’03) R&D program by European Commission

Electronic Voting system in Belgium• DOS system designed by Quisquater• Served in 1995• 3 Million voters

Other systems

Page 5: (Information and Communications Univ.) 韓國情報通信大學校 IRIScaislab.kaist.ac.kr/publication/paper_files/2002/kkj/... · 2018-09-27 · •Anti-hacking such as DDOS attack,

SCIS2002, Kwangjo Kim, ICU 5

Cryptologic Requirements Basic requirements

• Privacy : All votes must be secret• Completeness : All valid votes are counted correctly• Soundness : The dishonest voter cannot disrupt the voting• Unreusability : No voter can vote twice• Eligibility : No one who isn’t allowed to vote can vote• Fairness : Nothing can affect the voting

Advanced requirements• Walk-away : The voter need not to make any action after votin

g• Robustness : The voting system should be successful regardl

ess of partial failure of the system• Universal verifiability : Anyone can verify the validity of vote• Receipt-freeness : Voter should not be able to prove his or her

vote to a buyer. (Voter does not have any receipt for the vote)

Page 6: (Information and Communications Univ.) 韓國情報通信大學校 IRIScaislab.kaist.ac.kr/publication/paper_files/2002/kkj/... · 2018-09-27 · •Anti-hacking such as DDOS attack,

SCIS2002, Kwangjo Kim, ICU 6

Security & Performance Requirements

Server side• Network and computer security

• Anti-hacking such as DDOS attack, etc

• Huge memory up to 10 M voters and reliable connection• Fault-tolerance and high reliability• Reasonable time ( < 10 sec) of registration and voting

Client side• Fast and easy, user friendly

• Web Interface

• No tamper-proof device provided• Various kinds of platforms, OS and browsers• Don’t disturb voter’s privacy

Page 7: (Information and Communications Univ.) 韓國情報通信大學校 IRIScaislab.kaist.ac.kr/publication/paper_files/2002/kkj/... · 2018-09-27 · •Anti-hacking such as DDOS attack,

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Secure Voting Scheme FOO92 Scheme

• Fujioka, Okamoto, Ohta, “A Practical Secret Voting Schemefor Large Scale Elections”, Auscrypt’92

• Features: Blind signature + Mix-net + Bit commitment

Implementation examples• Sensus : L.F. Cranor, Washington Univ. http://www.ccrc.wus

tl.edu/~lorracks/sensus• EVOX : M.A. Herschberg, R.L. Rivest, MIT http://theory.lcs.mit.edu/~cis/voting/voting.html

OMAFO99 Scheme• Improved version of FOO92

• Features : Blind signature + Mix-net (hybrid-mix) +threshold encryption

Page 8: (Information and Communications Univ.) 韓國情報通信大學校 IRIScaislab.kaist.ac.kr/publication/paper_files/2002/kkj/... · 2018-09-27 · •Anti-hacking such as DDOS attack,

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System Configuration

CA

Voter

Admin Web Server (RA)

BB Server

Mix Server

Tally Server

(0) Registration

(1) Certificate Issue

(3) Ballot Casting

(4) Mixing

(5) Tallying

6) Counting Results

Registration stage : 0, 1Voting stage : 2, 3Counting stage : 4, 5, 6

(2) Blind Sig.

Page 9: (Information and Communications Univ.) 韓國情報通信大學校 IRIScaislab.kaist.ac.kr/publication/paper_files/2002/kkj/... · 2018-09-27 · •Anti-hacking such as DDOS attack,

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Implementation

Voting scheme : extension of NTT C prototype• Txt-based to Web interface

• Add encryption function and PKI

• C-library change from UCB to V5

• DB update from Berkeley to Oracle

Public-key Infrastructure• Needed for “one certificate - one vote” principle

• Simplified X.509v3 certificate for one-time use

• ElGamal encryption and Schnorr blind signature

Page 10: (Information and Communications Univ.) 韓國情報通信大學校 IRIScaislab.kaist.ac.kr/publication/paper_files/2002/kkj/... · 2018-09-27 · •Anti-hacking such as DDOS attack,

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Partners

Votopia

IRIS

NTT

U. of Tokyo

LG-CNS

STI

KSIGN KISTI

Project Coordination& System Management

Voting system C-srcPrototype

Verification

Voting Servers PKI service

Java Crypto Library

User Interface DB management

SECUi.COM

Security Management

Korean Japanese

InSol

System Programmingand Integration

ORACLE

DB

MIC

Reddevils

Sports Press

Supporters

Ultra Nippon

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Contributors IRIS : Kwangjo Kim, Byoungcheon Lee, Jinho Kim, Myoungsun Kim,

Hyunrok Lee, Jaegwan Park, Manho Lee, Wooseok Ham, JongseungKim, Hyunggi Choi, Kyuseok Ham, Vo Duc Liem, Xie Yan

LG-CNS : Daehun Kim, Minhyung Kim, Jongyoon Choi Insolsoft : Mina Jung, Junghan Kim, Sunjoo Hyun KSIGN : Ki-Yoong Hong, Jadong Ku, Eunsong Lee, Jinsoo Lim STI : Donnie Choi, Seoungho Heo KISTI : Younghwa Cho, Jungkwon Kim, Jun Woo SECUi.COM : Kyoungsoo Oh, Moonseok Seo, Wonkeun Hur, Hyunwo

n Ko MIC : Hyun Lee, Kwanghyun Seo

U. of Tokyo : Hideki Imai, Kazuguni Kobara NTT : Tatsuaki Okamoto, Atsushi Fujioka, Masayuki Abe, Koutarou S

uzuki

Page 12: (Information and Communications Univ.) 韓國情報通信大學校 IRIScaislab.kaist.ac.kr/publication/paper_files/2002/kkj/... · 2018-09-27 · •Anti-hacking such as DDOS attack,

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Voting Servers

VLAN 1

VLAN10

Server-1 Server-2 Server-8 DB-Server NFS Server Compaq

CSS 11800

6509

………

Internet

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Level of voting Plain mode

• Web interface by Java and JSSWEB+• Minimum secure voting by Explorer 4.0 over

Cipher Mode I• Plain mode +• Encrypted voting is guarded by blind signature• Fast tallying without mix-net

Cipher Mode II• Plain mode + OMAFO99• Meet most cryptographic requirements

* Depending on the allowable capability of voting server and Internet

Page 14: (Information and Communications Univ.) 韓國情報通信大學校 IRIScaislab.kaist.ac.kr/publication/paper_files/2002/kkj/... · 2018-09-27 · •Anti-hacking such as DDOS attack,

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Time Schedule 2002 FIFA World Cup Korea/JapanTM

• Period : May 31 ~ June 30, 2002

• Place : Major cities in Korea and Japan

• Participants : 32 teams from the world

2 times Voting• Best 10 MVPs and goal-keeper

• Preliminary Voting• Period/ Result : June 1 ~ 10, 2002 (10 days) / June 15

• Main Voting• Period /Res ult: June 16 ~ 25/ June 30 (Just after final game)

Web-page• http://mvp.worldcup2002.or.kr

Page 15: (Information and Communications Univ.) 韓國情報通信大學校 IRIScaislab.kaist.ac.kr/publication/paper_files/2002/kkj/... · 2018-09-27 · •Anti-hacking such as DDOS attack,

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Conclusion

Page 16: (Information and Communications Univ.) 韓國情報通信大學校 IRIScaislab.kaist.ac.kr/publication/paper_files/2002/kkj/... · 2018-09-27 · •Anti-hacking such as DDOS attack,

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OMAFO99 schemeOMAFO99 scheme

System overview

Mix-net

(3) Opening(Threshold decryption)

Admin

Voter Tally

Board

(1) Voter Authentication(voting +encryption

+blind signature)

(2) Voting(voting + encryption + signature)

Page 17: (Information and Communications Univ.) 韓國情報通信大學校 IRIScaislab.kaist.ac.kr/publication/paper_files/2002/kkj/... · 2018-09-27 · •Anti-hacking such as DDOS attack,

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Registration stage

CA7) Key

Generation7) Key

Generation

ID & Passwd,name, etc …

ID & Passwd,name, etc … 4) Encrypted Data

AdminWeb Server

Voter

11) CertificateRequest

12) CertificateIssue

8) Private key

9) Public key

6) Down

RA10) Registered Info + public key

2) Down

1) Access Web Page

3) Registration

5) Check &Store

13) Certificate

AdminDB

Page 18: (Information and Communications Univ.) 韓國情報通信大學校 IRIScaislab.kaist.ac.kr/publication/paper_files/2002/kkj/... · 2018-09-27 · •Anti-hacking such as DDOS attack,

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Voting Stage

2) Authenticated Channel

10) Ballot Casting

7)Blind Sig.7)Blind Sig.

BB Server

AdminWeb Server

4) If not vote Voting Applet

5) Select Vote.Encrypt bycounter key.Blinding.

9) Unblinding.Encryptionby mixer key.Sign.

ID & PasswdID & Passwd

Voter

1) Log In

3) Check Double Voting

6) Requests blind sig.

8) Send blind sig.

AdminDB

BB DB

11) Sig. Verify &Store ballot

Page 19: (Information and Communications Univ.) 韓國情報通信大學校 IRIScaislab.kaist.ac.kr/publication/paper_files/2002/kkj/... · 2018-09-27 · •Anti-hacking such as DDOS attack,

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Counting Stage

CountersThreshold decryption

Mix Server

1) Mixing

2) Tallying

3) Results Publish

4) Announce

BB Server

AdminWeb Server

BB DB