ioc white paper

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The Internet of Communities

A new set of collective incentivesto maximize social engagement

Abstract

The Internet of Communities (IoC) is a vision of a social Web willfully designed to maximizesocial engagement by introducing a new set of collective incentives. Inspired by close-knitcommunities, the IoC promotes a crowd sourced environment where individuals thrive togetherthrough the process of mutual support. First, assuming that bad reputation repels and goodreputation attracts, the IoC aims to explore how collective reputation can be used as a catalystto regulate social interactions. If individuals reputation affect each other, a collective reputationmechanism could act as a systematic incentive to inhibit behaviors that are detrimental to thecollective reputational asset, and to foster those that are beneficial to the group. Secondly, theIoC promotes internally rewarding incentives rooted in positive emotions and in reciprocity tospark social engagement without the prior need to mobilize financial assets. Collectivereputation is chosen as a means for collective governance and internally rewarding incentivesare chosen as the prime motive for action. Within this scheme, influence is more likely to shift to

those who positively impact their communities, to those who lead by example, and to those whoreciprocate with fairness. Designed from first principles, this proposal for a new socialenvironment introduces both a collective intelligence mechanism and a resource allocationsystem to actualize greater human, social and economic value from online communities.

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Human-sized networks as model for the social WebClose-knit and emotionally bonded communities like sport teams offer an ideal environment forcooperation as they allow informal relationships, provide mutual support and are bond by

intertwined interests. To optimize their opportunities, these communities rely on social trust.Trust is a belief in the benevolence of another person, and because granting trust to othersmeans taking a risk, those special relationships based on mutual trust can only be shared with ahandful of people. Anthropologist Robin Dunbar confirmed a cognitive limit known as theDunbars number that prevents people to maintain significant relationships beyond a limited setof peers. Yet, a human-sized approach where social trust can propagate more easily among1

peers does not yet translate on the social Web.

Indeed, even though we now have a much greater breadth and rate of interaction, the numberof trusted peers we have today is pretty much the same as it was before the rise of social

networks.

And while they provide an unprecedented opportunity to meet new people, currentsocial platforms designed for communication offer little tools for users to build confidenceamong themselves. As a result, the cooperative behaviors of cohesive communities remainuntapped. Mark Zuckerberg states: We are not trying to build a community [...] We dont seeourselves as a community. What we're trying to do is just make it really efficient for people to

communicate. We always try to emphasize the utility component.2

Therefore, while social trust is pervasive in all human affairs, it still does not thrive on socialnetworks primarily aimed at communication. Rachel Botsman, a prominent figure of thecollaborative economy asserts that:

[..] The real disruption taking place is not technology it's a

trust shift that will open the doors to new and sometimes counter-intuitive -- ways of designingsystems that will change human behavior on a large scale. For this shift to happen, new social 3

technologies must adapt to the reality of social interactions, not the other way around. Indeed,With so much user-interaction and user-generated content, trust becomes a critical issue and 4

[...] the social media outlets available could largely mold the ways in which individuals meet and

interact.5

1Robin Dunbar, Neocortex Size as a Constraint on Group Size in Primates, Journal of Human Evolution 20 (6), 1992, pp. 469-493.2Mark Zuckerberg interviewed by Laura Locke, The Future of Facebook, Time magazine, July 17 2007.3Rachel Botsman, Technology is Making it Easier to Trust Strangers, Wired, January 29 2016.4Jennifer Golbeck, Computing with Social Trust, Jennifer Golbeck editor, Human-Computer interaction series, Springer, 2009.5Kathryn Porter, Effects of Social Media Use on Relationship Satisfaction, Open Journal Systems, Chapman University, 2012, p. 24.

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A new set of collective incentives

Collective reputationWhile personal reputation currently gets a great deal of attention, the literature on collectivereputation is still in its infancy, and a collective reputation mechanism has not yet - to the best ofour knowledge - been explored on the social Web. The premise of collective reputation is thatpersonal reputation is to some degree affected by the reputation of the networks of individualsor of the organizations one is affiliated to. Conversely, a groups reputation is only as good asthat of its members. This reciprocal influence induces that each members welfare andincentives are thus affected by the groups reputation.6

Fig. 1.Joint dynamics of personal and collective reputation affecting each other.Collective reputation is here understood as an aggregate of individual reputations.

Before we explore the potential of collective reputation, it is worth to outline what reputation is.Reputation is an information used to make a value judgment about an object or a person wedont know yet". People make use of reputation when they do not have first hand information. In 7

other words, strangers generate claims for other strangers with the belief that collective opinionis better than ignorance. A reputational claim is thus second hand information which is bydefinition subject to distortion: [] When we refer to a person's reputation, we recognize thatreputation is our perception of the person, that it is externally derived and not necessarily

intrinsic to that individual. In other words, we understand that a person may not have complete

control over the perception that has been created.8

Besides, reputation evolves over time, depends on context, and suggests different things todifferent people. It is not too far fetched to agree that, by default,

no information out there is

trustworthy, only the one emanating from a trusted source may. Away from weak trust systems 9

based on unreliable reputation statements, the IoC takes a reverse approach and by promotinga strong reputation system based on trust. The main difference resides in the fact that, while it

6Jean Tirole,A Theory of Collective Reputation, The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 63, No. 1, Jan 1996, 1-22.7Randy Farmer, Bryce Glass, Building Web Reputation Systems, Yahoo! Press, 2010, p. 8.8Governor Sarah Bloom Raskin, Reflections on Reputation and its Consequences, at the 2013 Banking Outlook Conference at theFederal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Atlanta, Georgia, February 28, 2013.9Randy Farmer, Bryce Glass, Ibid.

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does not cost much to individuals to express biased reputational claims for strangers, a breachin confidence with trusted peers might have devastating effects for those concerned. Theincentive to provide fair, accurate and relevant information is therefore much stronger if trustedrelationships are at stake.

Going from large to strong, a network of interconnected human-sizedcommunities bond by trust, could help individuals to build confidence among themselves, reach

more easily a viable cooperation threshold and unlock the enormous stores of value that remainidle on the social Web.

Investing trust in others, the social portfolio

Everyone knows people who can be trusted for certain qualities, expertise, knowledge,know-how, street wisdomand life experience. This social fabric based on mutual trust one hasaccess to, is here understood as a portfolio of talented and connected individuals who can beeasily mobilized thanks to the nature of their privileged relationships (Fig. 2). The value of thissocial portfolio or social capital comes from the ability for individuals to engage each other. 10

Everyone is therefore the gatekeeper and entry point of a social asset of potential value. The

IoC encourages people to join, on one hand, with those they trust because they are bonded bystrong emotional ties, and on the other hand, with those they trust because they have a fairchance to reach positive outcomes. Therefore the IoC relies on both strong and weak social tiesto increase the prospects of meeting new opportunities.

Fig. 2. Individuals are the gatekeepers and entrypoints of a portfolio of trusted people and talents.Personal profiles become the doors and windows

to the social asset one has access to.

Fig. 3.Medium icons are the trusted portfolio of thebig icon and small icons are the trusted portfolios ofmedium icons. Medium icons are trusted by both

big and small icons and therefore can act asbrokers in both directions and benefit from it.

Because individuals are at the center of their own micro social worlds and at the verge of manyothers, they can act as middlemen by matching the resources and expertise of their portfolio

10 Francis Fukuyama defines social capital as a capability that arises from the prevalence of trust in a society or in certain partsofit. Francis Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and The Creation of Prosperity, Free Press, 1995.

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with the demands and offers that are flowing in other groups (Fig. 3). The incentive forindividuals to bridge different micro social worlds is manifold. Some may wish to expand theirtrusted social landscape, explore new horizons and get access to additional resources in thepursue of their personal projects. Some may wish to relay opportunities to their peers in thehope that somewhere down the line they will receive in return. Some may wish to increase their

social capital while others might want to be the catalysts and buildings block of a success story.

A systematic incentive for responsible relationships

As individuals follow their own agendas, and consequently as they interact to maximize theirown personal advantage, it becomes increasingly difficult to resolve conflicting interests. Rulesand regulations have virtues but they also have limits that can and will be trespassed. Thereforea centralized authority will have hard times to cope with the amount of problems that arise whenthings scale up. To circumvene these systemic issues on governance, the IoC proposescollective reputation as a behavioral incentive that makes narrow advantages less desirablethan honest and long lasting relationships. This added layer of social trust to frame online

relationships opens the way for a more resonant leadership as influence derives fromcommunity validation.

Reputational interests being strongly intertwined, if people were to abuse others, they wouldexpose themselves to bad feedback loops that would negatively impact the reputation of thepeople they are bonded with. Because individuals might lose the support of their biggest asset,the people they trust, misconducts amount to shooting oneself in the foot. As social portfoliosare connected to each other through a continuum of trust, they also run the risk of losing accessto the larger group of people behind their peers. Knowing the dynamics they are into, individualswill refrain from harmful behaviors that may lower their reputation. On the contrary, upstanding

interactions that are more likely to generate positive evaluations and increase the social capitalof the group will become more desirable. Complacent feedback loops can artificially boost thesocial capital of a group of individuals. Nevertheless, individuals take a reputational riskthemselves by introducing peers who are not aligned with their reputational score. Made of

joined interests, collective reputation is a new systematic incentive that is foreseen to act as aregulatory mechanism that: (1) dampens harmful behaviors that are perceived to threaten thereputation of the group (2) promotes principled behaviors that are perceived to be beneficial tothe group.

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Fig. 4.Green as an interest in Blues social portfolio. Green reaches out to Blue and enquires about thepossibility to get in touch with one of the purple people. Because new interactions represent both anopportunity and a threat, Blue will assess Greens demand carefully. Blues motivation is to protect andincrease his social capital. If Blue decides to connect Green and Purple, and in case of a positiveoutcome between Green and Purple, Blue will benefit from an increased reputation which will shine backon the group. As a result, each member of the group gains in attraction and therefore in influence. If the

outcome of the relationship is rather negative, Blue might want to proactively address issues in the fear oflosing credit and getting ostracized by his peers thus losing access to the crowd of people behind them.Being the gatekeepers of their trusted social circles, individuals have a strong incentive to filter out thewheat from the chaff and to bring meaningful opportunities to their groups.

The potential effects of collective reputation

A collective reputation incentive could have the potential effect to: increase group participationas individuals seek to remain attractive to those who have the best reputation create socialclusters of higher value as individuals primarily look to team up with reliable peers protectprivacy as information is highly contextualized and only provided on a case by case basis

enable a dynamic leadership aimed toward the collective as influence continuously shifts tothose who benefit the group the most promote a more vibrant economy by giving a reputationalincentive to those who reciprocate.

Increased participation

To increase groups participation, an internal leaderboard shows the accomplishments of theindividuals who are members of ones social portfolio. Unlike unidimensional ratings that onlyexpress popularity, the IoC proposes to use a multidimensional star rating system so thatindividuals have more opportunities to excel in at least one area and to join the leadership oftheir community. As human qualities are part of the evaluation, a more human approach toeconomic relationships may follow. Being affected by the input of many individuals, the internalleaderboard continues to evolve over time which creates a pull toward an increasedparticipation and toward excellence as individuals want to keep pace with those who lead.

Fig. 5.Internal leaderboard to the social portfolio.

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While people may be experienced or gifted in some areas, they may be lagging behind in someothers. Willing to pursue their relationships but concerned about some lacks that one may have,they will raise flags and proactively address the issues one may be facing. Knowing that whilethey help others, they help themselves, the general incentive is for everyone to be strong.

Collective reputation leads to the recognition that ultimately

one is alland

all is one. Yet, thosewho cannot or do not want to keep up with their group to avoid the tyranny of performance, canalways team up with people more in line with their personality and level of expertise. Eventually,people might achieve the balance they are comfortable with.

Social clusters of higher value and influence

The social portfolio being limited in size, it is foreseen that individuals will primarily choose toteam up with peers who represent the greatest perceived potential either because of theirtalents or because they are doorways to other valuable portfolios. As these human-sizedcommunities are limited in capacity, having the chance to belong to a popular group might

become extremely valuable and sometimes priceless. A

qualitative easingwhere individualscoopeteto attract and retain the most outstanding peers could help to create social clusters ofhigher economic value. Dynamic networks that encourage individuals to unite with peers whohave the most relevance to their momentum could help to improve peoples attractiveness andopportunities.

Fig. 6.Qualitative easing for social clusters of highvalue. The social portfolio being sharply limited insize, individuals have a systematic advantage toteam up only with the best peers available.

Fig. 7. As leaders need the traction of many peersto translate their vision into action, a birds eye viewat the big picture shows where and how theirinfluence propagates across the network.

Privacy

Trusted portfolios being private groups, interactions with new individuals are first mitigated by acommon trusted peer. This peer is able to provide highly detailed information that goes beyond

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what any reputational metrics can offer. Yet, this information being timely, personalized andcontextualized, gatekeepers do not have to disclose further information about their socialportfolio until an agreement is met. Because A person has no legitimate expectation of privacyin information he voluntarily turns over to third parties" the third party remains in all case a 11

common trusted peer. In the IoC, privacy is not absolute but function of the social distance

between individuals.

Fig. 8 - 9.Privacy: Green has detailed information about Blue as they are both in each others portfolio.Green has full access to Blues reputation while he only has access to the aggregate reputation of thegroup Purple belongs to.

In summary, collective reputation is perceived as a self-regulatory mechanism that minimizesthe risk of defaults by proactively addressing the challenges that arise in the community. And bycreating a suction effect toward excellence, collective reputation also stimulates the creation ofsocial clusters of high value and of good governance. Mutual interests being stronglyintertwined, the enlightened strategy is for individuals to take the collective interest in the sameesteem as their own personal interest. Being

on the same boatso to speak, their main concern

is to steer the ship to a safe harbor collectively.

A systematic behavioral incentive that prompts acapacity to recognize and embrace mutual interest could participate to more vibrantcommunities which value is held collectively.

Internal rewards to spark engagement

Financial incentives are nowadays the main drivers behind economic action. Yet, relying onsuch incentives have several limitations. First, money being scarce, a limited amount ofresources can be activated. Second, because financial incentives are a compensation for awork that would not been done otherwise, when the financial reward stops, so does the

participation. Third, within emotionally bonded communities where a feeling of equivalence ispreferred over strict accounting, the use of payments would eventually induce mistrust amongpartners. In a relational economy, financial retribution is neither the most natural nor the mosteffective way to leverage resources. The Internet of Communities wishes to explore how to

11Google Inc, Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979). Case5:13-md-02430-LHK Document44 Filed 06/13/13 Page 28 of39, Case No. 5:13-md-02430-LHK, September 5, 2013.

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better spark social engagement through internally rewarding incentives such as positiveemotions and reciprocity.

Positive emotions

Game theory and positive psychology assert that positive emotions and intrinsic motivations arepowerful drivers at fostering participation. They claim that the

state of flowor

the mental state ofoperation in which a person performing an activity is fully immersed in a feeling of energized

focus, full involvement, and enjoyment in the process of the activityis the optimal strategy tospark engagement. The pleasure to belong, to share, to teach, to learn while having fun, to12

discover, to take part in epic adventures, to impact together and to be recognized, are a set ofpositive emotions that are grounded in intrinsic motivations. When individuals have the chanceto embrace activities that are internally rewarding, they are more prone to act from their highestplace with the lowest reliance possible on external rewards and future outcomes. This is notrivial matters as neuroimagery demonstrates that our brains neurologically compute positiveemotions as being as valuable as money. Respectively, the IoC promotes a crowd sourced 13

environment where individuals can deploy their talents, where they can freely engage inactivities that are aligned with their core motivations and where they can team up with likeminded to tackle challenges that matter to them. The destination being less important than the

journey, motives for participation do not primarily depend on financial incentives or otherexternal rewarding schemes. Not knowing whereit goes, individuals rejoice the process of howit goes.

Reciprocity

Reciprocity is a means to redeem favors by giving back and is yet another power tool that helpsto improve cooperation within communities. Reciprocity is not about scrupulous accounting but

about a lasting feeling of equivalence which involves mutual expectations and responsibilities.As such, reciprocity is a demand for commitment as an end in itself. The unspoken agreementthat

they would do the same for you, helps to prevent against defaults because it has somefeatures of a contractual obligation. By perpetuating relationships of social indebtedness,reciprocity helps to propagate social trust which is the glue that binds communities. Theeconomic value of reciprocity comes from that it permits to initiate an exchange when money isunavailable or when the use of currencies, and therefore the use of strict accounting, would feelawkward or even offensive. In the relational economy of the social Web, reciprocal exchangecould provide additional leverage when traditional economic means of exchange are lesseffective at fostering participation. Reciprocity being usually delayed, the IoC proposes to keep

a memory of meaningful interactions to make sure that favors can be redeemed in due time.The timing, the nature and the perceived value of reciprocity are left at the discretion ofindividuals. Because a feeling of equivalence is built over time, and because the amount of aparticular commitment is never recorded in its details, there is no objective means to calculate

12Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, Flow: The Psychology of Optimal Experience, Harper & Row, 2010.13

Gregor Thut et al., Activation of the Human Brain by Monetary Reward, Neuroreport, National Center for BiotechnologyInformation, U.S. National Library of Medicine, 1997.

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ones participation. Instead, collective recognition, be it fair or unfair, becomes the means toassess the tendency of individuals to reciprocate. Reciprocal behaviors raise personalreputation, build confidence and therefore help to secure future exchanges.

Fig. 10. Human-sized portfolios of individuals being limited to maximum 144 people, a large pool ofexpertise is easily reachable on the 2nd degree through a continuum of trust while the zone of influenceon the 3rd degree soars exponentially.

ConclusionThe Internet of Communities proposes a set of new collective incentives that are more attunedwith the relational economy of the social Web. These incentives are foreseen to impact bothleadership - and therefore governance - and social engagement. On the first part, the breach ofconfidence in formal leadership offers both an opportunity and an empty space for social 14

innovation. The promise of peer-to-peer networks allowing people to reach consensus withoutthe need of a central authority recently showed the stiffness of a governance system purelywritten in the code. Coupled with new technologies, an additional layer of social trust nested in 15

cohesive communities and secured by collective reputation, might unlock new social strategiesthat could be the next great Internet disruption. An incentive for a more resonant leadership, anda systemic approach to collective governance could advance the progress of self-regulatedsocial networks also coined as Distributed Autonomous Organizations (DAOs). What is reallychanging in the world is not technology, or the globalization of capital, but the relationships

between people, relationships that were once hierarchical and based on the force of authority.

This has been radically flattened. What matters most now are the connections between people,

the inter-dependencies and networks that can be formed and the unimpeded flow of

information. And "By the end of this decade, power and influence will shift largely to those16

people with the best reputations and trust networks, from people with money and nominal

power. [] It is time to go ahead of that curve.17

On the second part, the IoC proposes to tackle the question of participation and engagement bymimicking the dynamics of human-sized and close-knit communities which levels ofengagement remain unmatched. The amount of underused resources awaiting to be activated is

142016 Edelman Trust Barometer, http://www.edelman.com/news/2016-edelman-trust-barometer-release/15 Critical update on DAO vulnerability: Unlike traditional contracts, the idea was that smart contracts were going to eliminate theneed for enforcement or dispute resolution. So that law is enshrined in code. But this incident has set a precedent, at least within

Ethereum, that the project leadership will intervene to enforce the spiritof a smart contract, Infodroid on Hacker News, June 2016.16Robert Green, Google and the Napoleonic Model: Business in Revolutionary Times, The Huffington Post, 05/06/2010.17Craig Newmark, American Internet entrepreneur best known for being the founder of the San Francisco-based internationalwebsite Craigslist.

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staggering: a structural credit crunch for entrepreneurs who need to find new channels to reachthe market high rates of systemic unemployment and high levels of disengagement at work 18 19

that prevent large pools of talents to be deployed and the unmet demand for apurpose-oriented economy that repels many from participating more. With incentives like20

positive emotions and reciprocity which better correspond to the reality of online communities,

this new framework could open new avenues, bridge the sharing economy to the mainstream byactivating idle resources. When users have tools for free and responsible association forcommon purposes, the value of the network soars exponentially [...] the best way to unlock

enormous stores of value on networks is to develop a network architecture and software

systems that can enable people to build trust and social capital in user-centric, scalable ways.21

Reasoning from first principles, the IoC introduces the idea of a new set of collective behavioralincentives to resolve the conflict between personal and collective interests. As offline storiesincreasingly shape online presence and because the wealth that lies in social relationshipscannot be measured but can be acknowledged, we witness a transition from an economy where

we

ratethe individual inputs of human resources to an economy where we

narratethe stories ofresourceful humans. This upcoming paradigm is more aligned with the idea of Gross NationalHappiness which provides a self-portrait of a society in flux, and offers [people] the opportunityto reflect on the directions society is moving, and make wise and determined adjustments. 22

Indeed, new incentives and indicators that allow communities to maximize social engagementboth in terms of participation and leadership might be timely. Beyond the

Invisible Hand, Adam 23

Smith, the father of modern economists, stated that How selfish soever man may be supposed,there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others. If 24

we can identify and resolve these underlying principles, we would be able to upgrade our socialoperating system for the needs of the Homo Socialis of the 21st Century.

18Circa 20% for the youth in the EU28, Eurostat 2015.19More than 70% of employees feel disengaged, Gallup report 2016.20Deloitte Millennial Survey 2016.21 David Bollier and John H. Clippinger, The Next Great Internet Disruption: Authority and Governance, in FromBitcoin to BurningMan and Beyond, The Quest for Identity and Autonomy in a Digital Society, Published by ID3, 2014.22Dasho Karma Ura, Director of the Centre for Bhutan Studies and GNH Research, http://bit.ly/2atrp8k23Elinor Ostrm, 2009 Nobel Laureate in Economic Science, Governing the Commons, The Evolution of Institutions for Collective

Action, Cambridge University Press, 1990.24Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments,Part 1, Of the Propriety of Actions, Chap. 1, Of Sympathy, Edinburgh 1759.

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ReferencesDavid Bollier and John Henry Clippinger, The Next Great Internet Disruption: Authority and Governance, in FromBitcoin to Burning Man and Beyond, The Quest for Identity and Autonomy in a Digital Society, Published by ID3,

2014.

Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, Flow: The Psychology of Optimal Experience, Harper & Row, 2010.

Dee Hock, One from Many: Visa and the Rise of the Chaordic Organization, Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 2005.

Robin Dunbar, Neocortex Size as a Constraint on Group Size in Primates, Journal of Human Evolution 20 (6), 1992,pp. 469-493.

Randy Farmer, Bryce Glass, Building Web Reputation Systems , Yahoo! Press, 2010.

Jennifer Golbeck, Computing with Social Trust, Jennifer Golbeck editor, Human-Computer Interaction Series,Springer, 2009.

Mark S. Granovetter,

Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness

, American Journal ofSociology, Volume 91, Issue 3 (Nov., 1985), 481-510.

Aaron Hurst, The Purpose Economy: How Your Desire for Impact, Personal Growth and Community Is Changing theWorld, Elevate, Gld edition, 2014.

Thomas Malone, R. Laubacher, C. Dellarocas, Harnessing Crowds: Mapping the Genome of Collective Intelligence,MIT Center for Collective Intelligence, Working paper 2009 001, 2009.

David Graeber, Debt, The First 5,000 Years, The Moral Grounds of Economic Relations , Melville House Publishing,2011.

Marcel Mauss, The Gift, Forms and Functions of Exchange in Archaic Societies , Cohen and West Ltd, London, 1966.

Avner Offer, Between the Gift and the Market: The Economy of Regard, Economic History Review, vol. 50, 3 (Aug.

1997), pp. 450-476.

Chamath Palihatpitiya, The Genius of Silicon Valley, Youtube (Oct., 2014), http://bit.ly/1LEJTgX.

Alex Pentland, Social Physics: How Good Ideas Spread,The Lessons from a New Science, Penguin Press, 2014.

Richard Ryan, Edward Deci, Self-determination Theory and the Facilitation of Intrinsic Motivation, SocialDevelopment, and Well-being. American psychologist, 2000, 55 (1): 6878.

Markus Schatten and Miroslav ugaj, Biomimetics in Modern Organizations, Laws or Metaphors?, InterdisciplinaryDescription of Complex Systems 9(1), 39-55, Faculty of Organization and Informatics, University of Zagreb, Varadin,Croatia, 2011.

Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments , Edinburgh 1759.

Gregor Thut et al., Activation of the Human Brain by Monetary Reward, Neuroreport, National Center for

Biotechnology Information, U.S. National Library of Medicine, 1997.

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