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Islam21P.O. Box 21272

London W9 3YN, UKTel/Fax: (+44) 870 0130286Email: [email protected]

Homepage: http://islam21.orgA Global Networking for Muslim Intellectuals & Activists islam21

Issue No. 19, October 1999

The International Forum for Islamic Dialogue (IFID)

Editor: Dr. Mansoor Al-Jamri

Islamists are sometimes accused of being uto-pian in their approach. Critics point out that whatIslamists tend to do is to create a picture of an"Islam" that had rarely, if ever, existed in the past1400 years or so. Such an ideal picture vary ac-cording to the mind-set of its imaginers. Thencefor-ward, followers are motivated to "yearn" for theglory of the past and to embark on a "defensive",mostly futile, approach in the face of an advanc-ing modernisation process.

Successful mobilisation

Islamist have proved to be effective and pow-erful mobilisers of the masses. The vast majority of the Muslim populations are disgruntled with thefailure of post-colonial secularists or traditionalmonarchs who imported means of power andcontrol but neglected basic rights of their people.

The Islamists are viewed as authentic and indig-enously-rooted populist leaders for the their com-munities and many of them have not been stainedby corrupting materialism.

Less successful statesmen

Once in power, the Islamists are faced with theharsh rea lities of today's world and the populationis more interested in the present rather than theglory of the past, whether such a past existed ornot. The issues relating to social development andthe economy, political stewardship and plurality,international relations, justice and human rights,etc., are real and critical ones requiring vision andcapabilities that match the challenges of thepresent.

Austerity of vision

While the yearning for the past proved its suc-cess in mobilising the masses, it lacked the richnessof vision that is needed for creating a better future.Much research has been accomplished about the

Sh a p i n g t h e f u t u r e, n o t y ea r n i n g f o r t h e p a s t

"Muslim Mind" and the "Arab Mind", but most of thecritical assessments came from outsiders, ratherthan insiders. Many Islamist insiders opted for self-glorification and expression of satisfaction with theavailable packages of tradition (turath) and prac-tices (seerah), thus losing the opportunity to criticisethe inherited mind-sets which limited the visionand saturated the thinking process. This approachprevented the imagining of a better future.

Self-criticism is a first step

Islamists have by now experienced oppositionand some of them achieved power. Such experi-ences were all based on the images created of aglory once achieved. The vast majority of Muslimcountries are yet to start developing. The culture of the people is pre-industrial in nature, while mostWestern countries are going through a post-indus-trial, or postmodern, era. Many parts of the inher-ited culture is austere and is incapable of produc-ing solutions for complex environments.

The inherited masculinity, for instance, blocksthe emergence of a superior role for Muslim women.

The inherited tradition does not provide guidelinesfor a multi-dimensional age similar to the one we

live in. This has nothing to do with the completenessof the message of Islam. This is not a point of difference amongst Islamists. What they differ on isthe way to understand and interpret the scripture.

Static understanding prevails in most traditionalcircles. The revival of Islam in the modern age cannot be successful so long as the need for dynamismis neglected. And a dynamic understanding startswith self-criticism.

There is a view that ideology is dead and more

interaction is taking place across nations and cul-tures. If this is so, then Islam can fill the gaps that existin many of the global trends. But to play this role,Islamists ought to start shaping the future instead of yearning fort her past.

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PAGE 2, Islam21, October1999

Perhaps the best point of entry in this highly seminal fieldis Mohammad Hashim Kamali's original contribution to thedebate over 'Freedom of Expression in Islam' that is truly a labour of love and a work of devotion and piety. (Freedom of Expression in Islam. By Mohammad Hashim Kamali. TheIslamic Text Society, Cambridge, 1994. Pp 349. ISBN 0-946-62160-8.) It is uncompromisingly 'Islamic' in temperament,approach and method, a normative study in the 'traditional'mould that consciously strives to remain within the indig-enous paradigm of fiqh. And yet, it is also quite radical andoriginal in that it treats a thoroughly 'modern' theme and by so doing, willy-nilly, gets involved in ideological polemics withmodernity. As a pioneering effort, it is both daring andimaginative, sober and scholarly and has won the 'Isma´il al-Faruqi Award for Academic Excellence'. Fulfilling a genuineneed and initiating an authentic discourse, its merits have

been duly recognized by the scholarly community.

However, in its dialogue with modernity, in its perceptionand response to the polemics of secular modernism, it is far from satisfactory. In reflecting over the problem of 'freedomof expression in Islam', the author may not have envisagedand planned entering into polemics with modernity but suchis its sway over the moral and intellectual clime today that nocontemporary discourse may claim authenticity if it ignoresthe modernist context of our world. Least justifiable is thisnegligence in a study that deals with a theme, freedom of expression, which is the gift, as it were, of modernist con-sciousness. In dealing with an uncompromisingly modernsubject, there's no escaping its polemics and criticism of 'traditional' worldviews. True enough, Kamali is not totally insensitive to the modernist context and subtext of his work and his diffidence and humility at the treading of this virgin

territory are quite genuine and touching. Nevertheless, it ismy conviction that a sharper intellectual vision of modernity and a more vigorous encounter with its polemics would haveenhanced the already considerable worth of this work. Thefew following remarks, it is hoped, would put the polemicalsubtext of 'freedom of expression' in sharper focus.

Modernity espouses a metaphysics of immanentism within which the state, or existential body-politic, assumes certainattributes that theistic religions ascribe to the Transcendent God. And yet, paradoxically, though secular modernity (os-tensibly) passes no judgement on the question of God'sexistence, it insists that religious and transcendent tenets be

banished from politics, from the governance of the state. Or,differently expressed, questions of God's existence or non-

existence, and other similar 'metaphysical' issues, it claims, belong to individual conscience with respect to which thestate and its legal order must remain neutral. But, the statealso insists that there are other issues, not pertaining toconscience, where it is the highest, sovereign, authority andthat these constitute the crux of politics and statecraft. Theindividual is free with respect to religious and metaphysical'beliefs', but not with respect to civil matters such as taxation,property, matrimony etc. Here the state has the right to useforce to secure compliance. State laws are thus not laws of conscience but those of coercion. Freedom of expression isthe outward, public, side of the inward, individual, freedomof conscience. However, despite its neutrality with regard toquestions of conscience, the state does get involved in theissue of their 'expression', their manifestation in the com-

mon, public, space. It is this very neutrality that stipulates,it is argued, that all individual consciences have the right tofree expression in the public sphere and that guaranteeingthat right is a state obligation. The state is concerned,however, only with the legal aspect of public expression andnot with the moral content of private conscience. Freedom of

expression, in short, pertains not to truth but to the logisticsof its 'self-disclosure': it is not an individual issue but an'affair of the state'.

Any discussion of 'freedom of expression', it ought to beunderlined, is contingent upon the dialectics of individualand state, conscience and society, public and private, religionand politics that are all peculiar to secular modernity.(However, not only is the definition of what constitutes a private act of conscience, in contradistinction to a public act of politics, always historically conditioned and dependent upon the prevailing societal consensus, even the distinctionitself, namely between private conscience and public politics,is a contested claim of secular modernity and not a given fact of human existence.) Without taking full cognizance of thesedialectics, or rejecting these dichotomies on normativegrounds, in other words, there cannot be any meaningfulprobing of the theme of 'Freedom of expression in Islam.'

Without any delineation of the Islamic vision of the state,albeit in modern times, the project of discovering (the dialec-tic of?) 'Freedom of Expression in Islam' cannot even belaunched: it does not even lift off the ground, to use a modernmetaphor.

One may, of course, regard Islam as an autonomous, self-referential, system that is in no need of corroboration or correction from other worldviews and philosophies. Moder-nity and adherents of secularism may, in such a case, enter into dialogue with Islam, but only on Islamic terms, only onthe pre-condition of acknowledging the possibility of tran-scendence in human affair. Such a stance, had it beenadopted in this study, would have entailed the task of deconstructing modernity, exposing its metaphysical foun-

dations and charting the moral parameters of its secular project. It would have certainly not required the borrowing of a patently and self-consciously polemical topos of modernity and transplanting it in the Islamic intellectual and morallandscape as has been done here. For to launch a project of delineating the parameters of 'Freedom of expression inIslam' is tantamount to acquiescing in to the moral validity of the modernist claims, if not accepting them as the yardstick of Islamic theopolity. Then there are the notorious conun-drums of the concept of freedom that are logically andmetaphysically intractable. Again, for the purpose of manag-ing them within a pragmatic discourse, modern theory reduces their scope to certain civil and political 'liberties', i.e.absence of legal and practical constraints from the authority and power of the state. To define freedom as 'the ability of the

individual to do or say what he or she wishes, or to avoid doingso, without violating the rights of others, or the limits set by the law' (p 7) is to turn it into an empty tautology. For, if freedom is simply identical with the licit, the legally valid, onemay dispense with the concept of freedom altogether, retainonly that of law and not a whit need be modified of the moraldiscourse! Little wonder that prior to the advent of modernity,rights and liberties did not form the stock motives of thepolitico-religious discourse and, as Kamali himself realizes,the introduction of the expression 'Freedom of Expression'into the political vocabulary of Arabic is of recent origin.

Kamali, who has been forced to approach this subject without the benefit of any precedent or prior model of reflection, declares in the beginning that the principal ques-

tion that he addresses in the study is 'whether or not theShari´ah subscribes to freedom of conscience.' If so, the titleof the book fails to pay tribute to his intellectual labour, for it announces that the work is about 'Freedom of Expression',and the two are by no means identical. Sure enough, aninquiry into this subject is worth a sizeable volume and may

'Freedom of Expression' and Islam Dr. S. Parvez Manzoor

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demand a close examination of the traditional sources of fiqh,something that Kamali does quite judiciously before saying'yes'; nevertheless, to ordinary believers like this writer, thequestion admits of only one, affirmative, answer - with or

without the ransacking of the brains of our illustrious fuqaha! The modern query leads to a single, foregone conclusion asthe very concept of submission (Islam), as found in theQur'an, denotes an act of voluntary assent, a receiving of Godin the soul as it were. Islam and fettered conscience are

contradictions in terms. Only a jurisitic intellect, whichidentifies Islamic reason with raison d'état, could be so

befuddled as to regard 'freedom of conscience' an original fact of modernist consciousness that needs authentication fromindigenous legal sources!

Though Kamali remains firmly anchored in the fiqhitradition, his perception and conceptual schemes show unmistakable signs of having acquired modernist influences,nay prejudices. A clear, and for this critic quite distressing,sign of this is Kamali's indiscriminate use of the prejudicialterm, 'religion', which modernity regards as synonymous

with private conscience. (The concept of a universal andessential 'religion', it has been cogently demonstrated, is part of the polemical repertoire of modernity and a historicalconstruct of secular forces (Cf. Talal Asad, 'The Constructionof Religion as an Anthropological Category', (Genealogies of Religion, Baltimore, 1993)). Another, far more grievous, signof jurisitc positivism comes from the reified perception of thepivotal concept Sharíah: it is used such that it can be totally identified with the extant corpus of fiqh. Needless to say that from the Islamic point of view, there are very convincingarguments for keeping the transcendent vision of the Shariá distinct from its fallible appropriation in the juridic tradition,for keeping the text of the law separate from its interpreta-tions. Nor is Kamali's disregard of the modern distinction

between the legal and the moral going to cut much ice withthe critics of the tradition for whom it merely represents theobsolete and the archaic. He is least likely to convince

modernists like Habermas with his contentions that actionslike slander, insult and blasphemy are part of the modernpolitical discourse.

"This work is a an attempt to explore some of the Islamicresponses to issues of contemporary concern', says Kamali,and 'to develop further the existing positions in the light of prevailing conditions, or failing that, to take a direct approachto the source materials of Shariáh in the quest for analternative solution.' (p 5; Italics added). This reviewer couldn't agree more but would also like to add that in this search thephilosophical and conceptual analysis of the key Qur'anicterms be given priority over the atomistic and literal approachof fiqh. Needless to say that in this regard, regardless of Kamali's commendable effort, the task is yet to begin.

Let me recapitulate the main insights of this review:

1. 'Freedom of Expression' is a problem bestowed to us by modernist consciousness which makes a pragmatic distinc-tion between public and private. Islam, a doctrine of truth,

which transcends the Public-Private divide, does not con-front the problem of the freedom of expression in a purely pragmatic spirit. For it, the content and ethic of freedom aremore paramount than its form and logistics.

2. Freedom of Expression is a problem that demandsattention and resolution within the public realm, but espe-cially within a public realm that does not claim to 'incarnate'any 'transcendental truth', that makes no effort toward the

'salvation' of its citizens. Little wonder that the problem isintimately related to the constitution of the (modern) state(political and existential community) and 'the ultimate ends'toward which it does, or does not, strive.

3. For the secular modern state, the mot paramount

freedom is the freedom of 'religion', or of 'conscience' - whichdoes not entail, however, freedom from taxes or laws! That such a scale of values establishes the sovereignty of thepolitical over the religious is beyond doubt. Nevertheless, thehistorical fact that the modern, non-confessional, state aroseas a consequence of the internecine sectarian wars of pre-modern Europe, should make us sensitive to the sustainingethos and moral pathos of the modern longing for freedom.Despite this, however, modernism cannot claim to possess

any ultimate truth, and, hence, the secularity of its constitu-tion is not the only guarantee for the freedom of conscienceand expression.

4. Freedom of Expression, like everything else in moder-nity, is an instrumental value, since the modern statepretends to be neutral towards - cares nothing about - thefinal goal of the human existence. (All this is of coursedisingenuous and misleading, for the modern state does haveits agenda, its commitment to the, secular, wellbeing of itscitizen; it is not merely a formal and instrumental entity but does have a substantive commitment to the values of this

worldly- meliorism, just as it espouses a metaphysics of immanentism.

5. To pose the problem of the freedom of expression in itsultimate, metaphysical and moral, context (and then trans-pose it to the contrasting metaphysics of Islamic transcen-dentalism) also renders it intractable and beyond the kin of any pragmatic solution. Such a 'fundamentalist' epistemol-ogy, though indispensable for a correct understanding of theproblem, is counter-productive in a world of competingcivilizations and contending moralities. However, if we con-fine our attention to the purely functional and logistic aspectsof Freedom of Expression, then the theme that would merit further exploration and reflection would not be 'Freedom vs.Islam', but the nature and scope of that freedom in a concretehistorical polity, say Turkey, or Iran, or Kuwait, or Pakistan,etc.

6. A logical corollary of the above argument is that Freedom of Expression is essentially a matter of the presenceor absence of 'civil and political liberties' and that it should beproblematized as such. Nevertheless, even within the provi-sion of such a concrete objective, the debate in modern

Western societies, which are assumed to provide yardsticksfor such liberties, is seldom enlightening or capable of unambiguous guidance. That there is a logical, and moral,tension between the ultimate value of 'freedom' and that of 'equality' (or 'justice') has been the cause of much philosophi-cal and moral distress. That any actualization of 'freedom'enjoins a counter-balancing of its effects by the equally obligatory quest for justice, or equality, renders the issue of 'Freedom of Expression' far more problematical than a glib

slogan of civilizational polemics! Nor must we forget theuncomfortable fact that in a hierarchical and hegemonic world, the beneficiaries of freedom are not always the week and the oppressed, but also, and indeed pre-eminently so,the rich and the dominant!

7. Despite all these reservations, and the genuine intellec-tual, philosophical and moral quandaries that, the theme of Freedom of Expression gives rise to in a cross-civilizationalcontext, let's not, as Islamically committed thinkers, shirk our responsibility of exposing all the hurdles - socio-politicaland local but also neo-imperialist and global - that prevent the emergence of a humane regime of civil and politicalliberties in the lands of the Muslims. Let us not produce any apology for the corrupt and oppressive order of the Muslim

regimes that seeks legitimacy by exploiting the name of Islam. And let us not transform Islam, the religious faith

which for the recognition of its truth accepts no constraintson the conscience of man, into a political ideology that for theglories of this world would establish a regime of coercion andforce.

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How do we look at a religion? As a set of rituals, dogmasand institutions? Or as values and thought system? Someemphasise the former and others the latter.

Generally the masses of people are more concerned withrituals, dogmas and institutions whereas the intellectuals lay more emphasis on thought system and values, particulary onthe thought system. For the masses, religion is nothing but performance of certain rituals as laid down and to have belief in certain dogmas formulated by the learned scholars. For them anyone who deviates from performance of these ritualsor questions any of these dogmas is a 'heretic' worthy of condemnation.

The intellectuals may lay more emphasis on the thought system of a religion but there are those who accept thethought system as inherited and there are those who areintellectually quite active and consider it necessary to rethink the thought system of the religion they have inherited. In a

dynamic society , there are much greater possibilities of rethinking the thought system.

In a stagnant or a closed society such possibilities aresmothered. The early Islamic society was highly dynamic andfull of vitalities. Islam was a great revolution, not only religious but also social and economic. It had upturned all oldideas and ideologies. It gave human society a new valuesystem and heightened the human sensitivity for change for the better. Islam put greater emphasis on change and calledeverything old into question. It encouraged people to rethink the beliefs of their ancestors. All that ancestors believed in

was not necessarily right and beneficial.

Thus in early Islam change was never thought to be a 'sin'.

The Qur'an laid great emphasis on 'ilm as well as 'amal(knowledge and practice). The Arab peninsula was an area of darkness in many ways. Only poetry was their passion. Theother area of information they were proud of was what they called ansab i.e. the family tree. For them the nobility (sharf)of ancestors was more important than their own. They weregreatly proud of their ancestry. Islam changed all this. It

brought about complete revolution in the Arab mind set which spread to other areas conquered by the Arabs. Theemphasis was on present and future, not on the past. TheIndividual was brought at the centre, not the tribe. Theindividual was made responsible for everything, not the tribeone belonged to.

Knowledge and practice: There was no quest for knowledge in the pre-Islamic

Arabia. In fact any knowledge except that of ones tribalancestry was derided upon. The Qur'an, on the other hand,put all the emphasis on 'ilm (knowledge) which is a very comprehensive word in Arabic. 'Ilm is used for science as

well. It includes knowledge of everything created by Allahincluding the knowledge of creator himself. Allah inviteshuman beings to think, to brood and to reflect on the wholeuniverse, on the creation of Allah, the stars, the earth, theplants and the animals. Also, the Qur'an lays great emphasison induction rather than deduction. The former leads toobjective knowledge of the universe and latter to speculation.Modern science is based on induction rather than deduction.

Also, knowledge was given further practical orientation by laying equal emphasis on 'amal (practice). 'Ilm without 'amal

was projected as bereft of any benefit to humanity. Correct knowledge ('ilm al-yaqin) and healthy practice ('amal salih) isthe most desirable synthesis. The word 'ilm al-yaqin (i.e.

knowledge with conviction) is of great value. It is thus clear that the Qur'an neither encourages superficial knowledgenor allows its instrumentalisation. Qur'an has been de-scribed as hudan lil muttaqin i.e. a guide for the God fearingor the pious. Thus the term 'ilm is not only comprehensive but also value-oriented. Knowledge must not only be true but should also be based on conviction; it should not only advance the state of information about the universe but should also serve the humanity.

Similarly 'amal (practice) as pointed out above, has to benothing but salih (healthy). The practice, based on knowledgeand conviction, must promote the health of society. What kind of revolution it was in a stagnant society of Arabianpeninsula whose whole universe was its own tribe cannot beeasily imagined by us today. It was nothing short of a total

break from the past; a break which changed the whole quality of social life and brought about tremendous advancement inknowledge. The ritual system of Islam - 'ibadat - was also not

devoid of value-system.

Islam does not accord any priority whatsoever to race,tribe, language, creed or colour. The Qur'an makes categori-cal statement to this effect (see 49:13 and 30:22). It alsostrictly forbade the Muslims from making any distinction

between an Arab and non-Arab and a white and a black. TheProphet, in order to effectively demolish any such hierarchi-cal distinctions, appointed a black liberated slave fromEthiopia, Bilal Habshi, to give azan ( i.e. call Muslims toprayer), a distinction, many Arabs close to the Prophet,intensely desired. But the Prophet accorded this distinctionto a black slave to emphasise the importance of equality of allhuman beings.

As anthropologists tell us, in a tribal society the mainfulcrum of knowledge is knowledge of received traditions andtribal customs. Any other knowledge which is not related tothe tribe is totally meaningless. The ideas of cosmos, creationand all related notions originate from the tribal practices. Thefrontiers of knowledge, in other words, cannot transcend the

boundaries of the tribal universe. Islam, however, brokethese tribal boundaries and made knowledge coterminous

with the universe i.e. the entire creation of Allah.

It is also very interesting to note that the Arab world whichhad never known beyond tribal customs and traditions,

became the fore-runner in the world of jurisprudence. Wemay have several problems today with the Shari'ah formula-tions. But, the juris corpus of Islam, was a highly progressive

body of laws in those days.

Justice:

The notion of justice is very central to Islam (5:8). And it is justice in its absolute and varied sense. The Qur'anicnotion of justice is quite comprehensive. No Muslim jurist could ever ignore the significance of justice in his legalformulations. But how justice was understood to have beendone has of course been debatable. There may be argumentsabout how justice was thought to have been done in medievalages and what is modern notion of justice. But that does not reduce the significance of justice as a Qur'anic doctrine. Therelativity of medieval notion of justice and its modern notion

is understandable.

The Qur'anic notion of justice was not tribal but universal. And this made all the difference. The Qur'anic notion of justice is so universal that it laid down that even the enmity with any one else should not come in the way of dispensing

Reconstruction of Islamic Political ThoughtDr. Asghar Ali Engineer

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justice (5:8). In a tribal society justice was confined to withinthe tribal limits. There was no question of justice vis a visother tribes. Islam, on the other hand, lays down that justice

be done even to an enemy. The Qur'an gives the principle of justice as a norm; the legal doctors applied it to various issues which arose from time to time, according to their own ability,understanding and socio-cultural background.

It is necessary to understand that it is justice which hasto be rigorously applied to all the issues in framing laws. It isthe very foundation of the juris corpus of Islam. It is morecentral than the corpus of laws inherited by us. As the legaldoctors applied the notion of justice in keeping with their owncircumstances we must rethink the issues in Shari'ah laws

based on the notion of centrality of justice particularly in thesphere of family laws.

Women:

Here we would like to point out that the position of womenin the Qur'an is not subordinate to that of man. Certain verses(like 4:34) are used selectively, and out of context, to project subordination of woman to man ignoring several other verses(like 2:228, 9:71, 33:35 and others) which clearly indicateequality of man and woman. The verses 9:71 and 33:35 arequite central in this respect. In verse 9:71 men and womenare not only shown each others friends but also charged withequal responsibilities of enjoining good and forbidding evil,keeping up prayer and paying the poor-rate (zakat). How could then women be inferior to men?

Thus we should not hesitate in having a second look at theShari'ah laws which have in built medieval biases towards

women. The Qur'an was the first scripture in the world toaccord equal dignity to man and woman. Prior to Islam evengreat Greek philosophers thought that animal and womenhave no soul and hence women deserve no legal rights.

Women could not inherit, let alone holding property in her own right, even in Roman law, prior to Islam.

The spirit of the Qur'an is more important than theopinions of medieval legal doctors and hence entire corpus of Shari'ah laws in this regard should be re-examined and re-thought. Also, as pointed out in some of my books (Rights of

Women in Islam, The Qur'an, Women and Modern Society and Status of Women in Islam) there never was unanimity onthese issues among the legal doctors themselves.

The opinions differed from one legal doctor to another andon several issues even the disciples differed from their masters. While some legal doctors do not even admit wom-en's evidence on hudud matters, others, like Imam Abu

Hanifa, maintain that a woman can even become qadi on the basis of verse 9:71. The Shari'ah laws as formulated by early Muslim fuqaha' (i.e. legal doctors) need to be thoroughly reviewed. The centrality of justice must be asserted.

Rationality:

Knowledge, as pointed out above, was quite central toIslam. Some of the 'ulama, however, confined knowledge toknowledge of din (i.e. religion of Islam). But there is no strongevidence in the Qur'an or sunna in this respect. It is product of theologians' own mind. Since theologians were primarily concerned with religious or theological matters, they tried toconfine knowledge to theological issues alone. Imitating

these theologians many people still argue that 'ilm should beconfined to the 'ilm al-din and reject other spheres of knowledge. But this view is no more a central view in the

world of Islam today. In fact this view that knowledge in theQur'an is confined to the knowledge of din did not gouncontested even in the early history of Islam. Knowledge

from different sources and from different fields was not only accepted by early Muslims but was also creatively advanced

by them. The entire corpus of Greek knowledge in varioussciences, mathematics and philosophy was transferred into

Arabic language and passed on to Europe. No wonder thanthat H.G.Wells, the noted British historian, has described

Arabs as foster father of knowledge. The Europe had lost contact with the Greek treasure of knowledge and they re-established contact with it only through the agency of Arabs.

The House of Wisdom (Dar al-Hikmah) established by the Abbasids fulfilled this task.

The Muslims assimilated this knowledge and also en-riched it immensely. Their own contribution in enriching theGreek knowledge acquired by them was no mean contribu-tion. Also, they imbibed knowledge from other sources as welli.e. Persian and Indian sources, besides their own Islamicsources. The Mu'tazila were a party of rationalists who gaveprimacy to reason. For them reason was the test of faith andnot vice versa. Thus if reason holds something good, Shari'ah

will also hold it good. The Asha'irah, on the other hand, heldsomething good because Shari'ah held it good even if reasoncontradicted it.

The Mu'tazila also gave primacy to justice along withreason. this is what the modern rationalists also plead. Thusthe Mu'tazilah were as fervent advocates of reason and justiceas the modern rationalists are. But the modern rationaliststend to be atheists which Mu'tazilah were not. Mu'tazilah

were also known as the party of tawhid wa al-'adl i.e. party of unity of Godhood and justice. Thus Mu'tazilah were essen-tially theists but also rationalists.

Islam, as all of us know, had arisen in Arabian peninsula and had its vitality and practicability. Practical rationality remained quite central to it. But when it spread to the ancient centres of great cultures like parts of Eastern Byzantianempire, or Persian empire and India, it was confronted with

entirely different mind set. These great civilizations were based, as pointed out before, on speculative reason andsophisticated intellectual achievements. This had both posi-tive and negative impact on Islamic thought.

Resisting outdated cultures:

The Islamic thought became inward looking on one hand,and, lost some of its most fundamental concerns like justicefor weaker sections of society. These centres of civilization

were centres of feudal culture and along with feudal sophis-tication, feudal values were also imbibed. Thus what Islamicthought gained in swing, lost in its sweep. Islam spread withgreat rapidity because of its great concern with justice for

weaker sections of society but now it became an integral part of a huge Islamic empire and nearly lost its sensitivity towards suffering of the downtrodden of the society.

The Qur'an which was so direct and simple in its teach-ings, became a target for exercises in sophisticated inner meanings justifying hierarchical values which came to beacquired through feudal cultures of Roman and Persianempires. Monarchy became an acceptable institution and

blind and uncritical obedience to the ruling monarch on onehand, and religious establishment of the time, on the other,

became very common. Disobedience to them was construedto be disobedience to Allah and His Book.

The earlier critical faculty and concern for justice was

totally lost. It was in this atmosphere that Islamic thought became totally stagnant and part of oppressive establish-ment. There is great need to recapture its earlier vitality,dynamism and sensitivity. Critical evaluation and not blindobedience, is closer to the Islamic spirit. What predominatestoday, however, is Islamic theological thought, on one hand,

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and, age-old shari'ah formulation, on the other. It has madeIslamic thought totally stagnant.

What is to be noted is that what goes in the name of theology is human construct and divine commandments asunderstood by human agency under a set of socio-culturalinfluences. For example, 'Ilm al-Kalam (Islamic dialectics)came into existence as a reaction to the widening influenceof Greek philosophy and Greek sciences during the Abbasid

period. This became an integral part of Islamic theology.Kalam, undoubtedly influenced the great minds of Islamic

world of the time and also the succeeding generation for several centuries. But now Kalam cannot be treated asunchangeable. There is urgent need for a new ilm al-kalamin the light of modern corpus of scientific knowledge.

Advocating a change culture:

A religion consists of several sub-systems like ritualsystem ('ibadat), institutional system (like zakat, etc.),thought system and value system (like equality, justice,compassion etc.).

Of these ritual and valuesystem are permanent andcannot be changed under any circumstances. But the thought system could and must change, if religion has to keep pace

with time, its thought system should change. There ismisconception among Muslims about the Qur'anic verse 5:3(i.e. This day have I perfected for you your religion andcompleted My favour to you...). They think that now what wehave inherited is perfect in every respect and there is no needfor re-thinking in any sense at all. Our din is perfect. The dinis undoubtedly perfect but the meaning and significance of din should be understood properly. One cannot include thekalam, for example, in din. The Islamic thought system has

been evolved by theologians who are human beings and nohuman person can ever be perfect.

Human beings think under certain influences which they cannot transcend as human beings. All Divine commands aresought to be understood by human agents under certainsocio-cultural influences and these influences are reflectedin the religious-thought system. Once we understand thisthere will be no resistance to change in the thought system.

This will bring about a great revolution.

The Islamic Shari'ah is also an embodiment of Islamic values. Islamic Shari'ah is nothing but a sincere attempt by the fuqaha' (Islamic jurists) to apply divine commands andthe Islamic values to a number of issues like marriage,divorce, inheritance, nature of evidence, crimes like theft,rape, adultery, division of property etc.

This attempt to approach these issues in the light of Islamic values and divine commands was also influenced by the socio-cultural circumstances of the time. They could not have applied Islamic values and divine commands to theseissues in vacuum. There is great deal of change in theseexternal influences and hence many of these shari'ah formu-lations stand in need of change. This change does not amount to tempering with the divine commands but making yet another human attempt in the light of our own experiencesand our own circumstances.

If we evolve this understanding of religion the dynamicsof problem changes and religion will be even greater force to

bring about spiritual transformation for the better. Naturally

there will be differences in opinion while bringing about thesechanges. We should not be afraid of differences. Thesedifferences, if honest and sincere, provide greater vigour tohuman thought. The founders of the different schools of

jurisprudence during the second and third centuries of Islam were not afraid of differences. Why should we be?

Can a feminist reinterpretation of Islamic sources be set in the context of Islamic theology? In other words: Can there

be a feminist interpretation of Quran and Sunna? Was there

one in the past, and if not…can we initiate one in the future?

These questions have appeared on the agenda of women’sdebates in the Muslim world in the past two decades…stressingthe “feminist” as different…currently absent and …urgently needed.

Introductory issues:

1- Women’s contribution to Islamic sciences dates back toearly Islam, and has not seized through the centuries, withinterruptions here and there in history due to different reasons in each case. This history of women’s involvement in‘Ilm and Fiqh was recorded by male scholars themselves in

books of history of Islamic sciences. The issue is not initiated by contemporary Western feminism but has its roots in our culture. This is important to clarify that the liberating poten-tial of Islam is inherent in Islam itself and its history and isnot a result of forces outside the culture and civilisation of Islam or a result of the contact with the West in the colonialera. The issue is not necessarily “feminist” and other termi-nology can –and sometimes should- be used instead of theconfusion and the enforcement of the concept “feminist” onthe Islamic concepts and their semantic field as a key concept.

2- The text dealt with in Christianity (the Bible) differssubstantially from the Book (Quran) in Islam regarding thestatus of the text , its origin , its legacy , and its position in

the religion. While Jesus is the logos of the Christian faith ,Muhammad is not the logos in Islam, but the revelation…theBook…the Quran. This gives the text - as well the Sunna that put it into action - a centrality in the process of jurisprudenceand legislation that is quite unique. This raises the question

whether one can talk about an international cross-culturaland cross religious, unified or common agenda for women inthis matter.

3-While in the back of mind of the Western discourse of the matter is only related to the text , in Islam the interpre-tation can not be completed without the a complex interac-tion with the Sunna , a thorough understanding and criticalreading of the fiqh , and a continuous process of Ijtihad and

Tajdid to place the divine and absolute within the relative and

present. The knowledge of related Islamic disciplines andmethodologies is a must, along with a profound updatedknowledge of the social and political contexts. Not only average Muslims are required to study carefully the Islamicsciences, but Islamic scholars are also required to know therealities of life - a strict condition of Fatwa and Ijtihad that isknown to everyone.

4-Contemporary Muslim women have been involved instudying and teaching the Islamic sources, and IslamicUniversities have distinguished women scholars…the most prominent Bint Al-Shati -the professor of Tafsir in Egypt andMorocco who died recently, as well as many female professorsat Al-Azhar and in all Islamic Universities. It has beenneglected in recent writings that started giving attention to

the role of women within the Islamic movements in transmit-ting and studying the Islamic sources that they, too, contrib-uted to the knowledge and Ijtihad. Ann Sophie Roald (InK.Ask & M.Tjomsland 1998 ) for example studied Bint Al-Shati, yet forgot Zainab A-Ghazali - the leading Egyptian

Women and the

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Muslim activist of the Muslim Brotherhood - who publishedan interpretation of the Quran 1994. Though published by the famous Dar Al Shorouk publishers, and forwarded by a

praise by a (male) professor of Tafsir at Al-Azhar University,Karam did not even refer to that volume when studyingGhazali’s “feminist” ideas. (A.Karam , 1998) Women’s read-ing and interpretation of the Islamic sources is then anongoing process in the Islamic as well as Islamist circles.

5-Taking the awareness about women’s problems and theunjust treatment of women in Islamic societies with different Islamic pretexts as the criteria according to which oneclassifies writings as “feminist” or not (sometimes regardlessof the sex/gender of the author], one can find indeed that male scholars have been more outspoken and “revolution-ary” than women scholars. Hence insisting on “feminist” asdescription for the reading or interpretation, places femi-nism as a frame of reference and a basically secular paradigm

to be the point of reference. Within the Islamic circle adjec-tives such as : “fair” , “just", “methodologically correct” and“nearer to the general aims of Islam (Maqasid)” are moreaccurate.

Methodological reflections:

Established Islamic methodology to approach the Islamicsources has been challenged lately by secularist writings,either generally as a whole, or focusing mainly on the issueof women. In this respecr Fatima Mernissi (Morocco) can beconsidered to be the most sophisticated one. Her work discusses –among other things- the compatibility of somenarrators of the Hadith and their hostile position towards

women that affected their integrity and credibi lity,deconstructing by that some crucial Hadith on women that

were narrated in Al-Bukhari and accepted as authenticHadith. (Merrnissi,1996) .

Her work was attacked by many Islamic scholars, not because of its feminist nature but because it challenges theestablished, widely accepted, methodology. Others such asNawal Saadawi (Egypt) or Farida Banani (Morocco) are moregeneral in their arguments. These writings state that Ijtihadis needed to initiate new ideas and perspective that are morecompatible with the modern notions of human rights, whileat the same time accepting and advocating intellectually

Western notions and concepts on “gender” and “patriarchy” without much revision or criticism.

A researcher with a secular paradigm when dealing withthe Islamic sources rejects established Islamic sciences’methodology and usually bases his/her analysis on ap-proaches that deal with “texts” regardless of the origin of these texts - revealed or human. Any contribution will always

be classified as a secular critique to the transcendental and will hence be rejected and refuted by the mainstream Islamicschools of thought and jurisprudence - even if insightful and

worth discussing.

The political situation and polarization is dominant in a lot of discussion spaces. The arguments of secularisits arenot read and understood by Islamic scholars, while any effort or new Ijtihad on the Islamic side is usually accused of being

for propagandist, not serious, for political purposes andtemporary. Especially in the issues of women the political is

very much linked with the methodology, the selection of topics and the way these are addressed from both sidesaccording to the hot issues on the political agenda. The lack

of a real intellectual environment for dialogue blocks changeon the grass root level for the best of the majority of women.

A second point is that attempts to bridge the gap betweensocial sciences and Islamic sciences have been going on inmany academic circles in the Muslim world. Disciplines likeeconomy were given more attention than other disciplinessuch as political science and sociology.

It is very important to realize that any reform in womenissues by combining a contemporary reading of the sources

with a knowledge of social sciences requires Ijtihad on bothsides. Till now only attempts to reform the reading of the text have been in process, while the Ijtihad on the social scienceslevel has been almost non-existant. A simple example for that is the attempt to seek new fatwas allowing women to partici-pate in politics by voting as well as become political repre-sentatives. Little has been done to introduce a new political

theory that would revise the centrality of the state major actor, or revise the whole issue of ploitical representation andits problems.

Democracy , as people have to be constantly reminded,can take many forms, not necessarily representative democ-racy, and not necessarily in a party system. Authoritarianismor totalitarianism are not the only option to the former statement, but a vriety of forms for political governance that are definetly NOT the simple non-sophisticated talk about an“Islamic State” that is always more of a State than it is…Islamic. The Ijtihad has to be on all tracks, otherwise one

will end up defending just and equal women participation ina political system that is not just nor fair or equal itself – structurally speaking .

Discussing the issue of women and politics one findsdifferent approaches. Following you will find two different ones. The first is called here the selective anti-Sunna methodas it is based on the selection of the source (reference),denying and refusing the whole of Sunna and Hadith. It isshort and brief as it saves itself the path of Ijtihad andargumentation.

The selective anti-Sunna method:

“Can a woman take the leadership role? Is it prohibited? The answer will be different if you look at the Quran, or if you

look at the the Hadiths, that most of them were written about 200 years after the Prophet's death. When God tells us a story in he Quran, He does not do so just for entertaining us, but to teach us a lesson.

"We narrate to you the most accurate history through therevelation of this Quran. Before this, you were totally una-

ware." 12:3. "In their history, there is a lesson for those whopossess intelligence......" 12:111.

The role of an important woman in the history of the old world, as much as Muslims are concerned, is shown in thestory of Belquees, the Queen of Sheba. See 27:22-44. Godmentioned her history in the Quran to let us know that a

woman in a ruling position is not offensive as far as God isconcerned. She represented a democratic ruler who con-sulted with her people before making important decisions,See 27:29. She visited Solomon, talked to him , madedecisions for herself and her people, not hiding behind walls,or shying behind another man. After witnessing what God

interpretation of Islamic SourcesHeba Raouf Ezzat

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gave Solomon, she became a submitter (Muslim), while stillthe Queen of Sheba. "She was told, "Go inside the palace."

When she saw its interior, she thought it was a pool of water,and she (pulled up her dress) exposing her legs. He said, "Thisinterior is now paved with crystal." She said, 'My Lord, I have

wronged my soul. I now submit with Solomon to God, Lordof the universe".

Here we witness one of the first Muslim women in charge

of a nation, ruling them as a queen of Sheba. Can we learn a lesson from the Quran? we should. The lesson is that, Godin the Quran never put restrictions on a woman in a rulingposition. Contrary to what the traditional Muslim scholarsand Hadiths teach, a woman in a leading political position isnot against God's system or against the Quran. It might beagainst the chauvinistic views of the men who wrote thecorrupted history of Hadiths.

What did the books of man, the Hadith books ,teach about women in leadership positions? Completely the opposite,and then they claim that Hadiths do not contradict theQuran.. Of course the reason is that, the Prophet Muhammed

would have never contradicted the Quran, but those whoinvented these stories about him did.

In one of the most famous Hadiths that is often raised inthe face of any Muslim woman seeking higher education or higher position in her career is one by a man called Abu Bakra

who narrated a Hadith reported in Bukhary that states that any community ruled by a woman will never succeed. Thefallacy of this Hadith is not only proven in history but in thefact that Abu Bakra himself was reported in the Muslimhistory books to be punished publicly for bearing false

witness. Despite this known story of his bearing false wit-ness, Bukhary did not remove his Hadith from among hiscollected Hadiths according to the rules that Bukhary himself claimed to follow. Such a bearer of false witness should never

be allowed or accepted as a witness ever, according to the

Quran (24:4).

The Tajdid method:

Access to political positions is dealt with in the dominant feminist discource as a gain that women should target for power and influence. “Power” is also the reason why Islamistsdeny them that right so they would have no authority over thesupposedly wiser males. It is usually forgotten that politicalpositions are not gains to be sought but rather responsibili-ties to be carried. They necessitate specific competence

which, according to Ibn Taymiyya, is based on two factors:strength and integrity. Strength is dependent on the natureof the jurisdiction. Strength in judgments is based on theknowledge about the Qur’an and the Hadith and the ability to implement them. Personal integrity all depends on the fear of God.

It is also neglected that whoever takes that power isobliged to abide by the laws of the Shari’a - be that person a man or a woman. Their decisions concerning the public law and the codes of ethics should be issued through themechanisms of Shura. They are obeyed in as far as they do;otherwise, there is no obedience to those who disobey Godand “Obedience is conditioned by the virtues” and “If theruler judges unfairly or in contradiction to the establishedrules, his judement is rejected.” Reading literature on thetopic reveals that the disagreement arises in Fiqh from thedifferent readings and interpretation of the Islamic sources

that we can discuss as following:

Scholars disagree on the possible meaning of the verse, which goes, “Men are in charge (qawwamun) of women, because of what God has graced some of them over the othersand because they spend of their property (for the support of

women).” (IV:34). Some interpretations argue that being “incharge” is exclusive for men since they possess superior attributes over women with respect to the management of affairs, the physical and psychological strengths, etc. Tothem, this makes it unfeasible that a woman takes over any public jurisdiction that can make her “in charge” or even let her share such responsibility. In their view, the text statesexplicitly that responsibility is given to men.

It is also argued that even if the responsibility stated in the

above-mentioned verse is meant to be in the specific family context, the argument is still valid, since a woman is neces-sarily then incompetent in managing wider public affairs.

Other scholars maintain that the relationship betweenmen and women in general is based on equality and that theQur’an here only refers to the family in a regulative manner not to the human nature or the competence of women ingeneral. This does not indicate that women are less compe-tent, but rather suggests the more appropriate party who can

be replaced by the other if necessary in cases of the absenceof the father due to any reason.

Views are at variance concerning the Prophet’s Hadithnarrated by al-Bukhari in the authority of Abu Bakra who

said, “When the Prophet was informed that in Persia, thedaughter of the King (Kisra) succeeded to the throne, he said,‘No success is destined for a folk whose ruler is a woman’.”Some literature debate that this includes all women in allpublic jurisdiction. The statement is seperated from itscontext and taken as a divine rule. Other opinions see that,in general, this is exclusive to the caliphate -the highest position in an Islamic political system.

Some contemporary scholars deny the authenticity of thehadith altogether, describing it as “fake”, maintaining that it is at best a “Hadith Ahad” - a Hadith narrated by a solenarrator-, a case which excludes it as a source of Sharia’ inserious matters of legislation and constitution. The first party have done no attempt to interpret the above-mentioned

Hadith in the light of the other relevant Qur’anic verses (thesimple next step in interpretation that is usually forgottenhere!), or the other Prophetic tradition on the issue. Thesecond group basically adhered to the same approach except that they made it specific and have not associated it withcompetence but with certain positions.

Book ReviewPolitical Islam and the United States, A Study of US Policy towards

Islamist Movements in the Middle East, By: Maria do Ceu Pinto,Ithaca Press, ISBN 0 86372 245 8, 1999.

In the West and particularly in the United States, Islamism has come tobe seen as a disruptive force that threatens friendly Arab regimes, has a stronganti-Western bias, is anti-democratic and a source of terrorist activity.

Attacks against foreign tourists in Egypt and the savage events in Algeriahave added fuel to these feelings.

The political Islam debate in the United States has become one of themost controversial debates in academic circles. In this book, Dr. Pinto depictsthe two major schools of thought on political Islam that have emerged. Oneconsiders the Islamist movement to be a healthy grassroots response to thefailure of Arab governments to tackle growing soci-economic problems. Theother argues that political Islam is inherently hostile to the western world thatIslamists are only rhetorically committed to democracy and pluralism butthat their real aim is the establishment of a religious dictatorship.

This book discuses the process whereby political Islam has been identi-fied as one of the major security threats to the new international order, andbrings to light the vested interests if certain political groups within the UnitedStates in disseminating this idea. It then goes on to look as the cases wherepolitical Islam poses a series of challenges under different guises to the

United States: terrorist acts against the US, attempts to derail the Middle Eastpeace process, the Islamist states in Sudan and Iran, and the Islamist politicalmovements that challenge the regimes.

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