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Islam21P.O. Box 21272

London W9 3YN, UKTel/Fax: (+44) 870 0130286Email: [email protected]

Homepage: http://islam21.orgA Global Networking for Muslim Intellectuals & Activists islam21

Issue No. 21, February 2000

The International Forum for Islamic Dialogue (IFID)

Editor: Dr. Mansoor Al-Jamri

Th e need t o t o l er a t e t h e i n t o l er a b l e Despite the assertion of some thinkers, modern liberal

political theory is not essentially pluralistic. In some sense,it is even anti-pluralist. The assumptions behind liberalpolitical theory revolved around a conception of man as an

abstract individual, enjoying formal equality with his fellow citizens, but otherwise part of a homogenous whole. Like thetheoretical abstract economic concept of marginal utility,men just add up or are subtracted as indistinguishable units.

In political theory, pluralism refers to a version of liberalpolitical theory which traces its genealogy to Max Weber. Thisparticular school of thought partly recognises Marx’s criti-cism of liberal political theory on the grounds that its notionof formal political equality does not reflect the reality of thepolitical processes in Western capitalist societies. With Marx,it acknowledged that citizens do not face each other asabstract individuals on political arena. Rather, they congre-gate into groups divided and united by their interests. But it does not concur in Marx's contention that these interests

define the roles of individuals once and for all. Both interestsand membership in groups change continuously in kaleido-scopic shifts and overlapping coalitions which define liberalpolitics. Thus it accepted that individuals do not to figure onthe political sphere as abstract men and women. There arealso members of interest groups, classes, trade union, busi-ness organisations, etc.

But for pluralism, these groups are still clusters of thesame abstract individuals, distinguished from each other merely by their economic interests. Other considerations,such as cultural diversity, are not contemplated here. Thusliberal theory took its time in coming to terms with the real

world. It is interesting to note that although most societieshave been multi-ethnic and multi-cultural, liberal political

theory has been slow to recognise this. But it is not only theorists who insist on closing their eyes. Ancient andmodern in empires, as well as modern national states werereluctant to recognise ethnic and cultural minorities. But

while in the past conformity was imposed even to the extent of genocide, in modern times tolerance was reluctantly recommended. However, in deference to liberal ideals, theUN and postwar practice viewed the guarantee of individualhuman rights as sufficient to protect whatever culturaldiversity was deemed desirable. But too much political andcultural diversity was seen as undesirable, because it mili-tated against the basic assumptions of the liberal politicaltheory and interfered with the plans of state and nation

builders.

Institutional tolerance of cultural diversity is partly novelfrom the perspective of Islam as well. Monotheistic religions,as Hume once remarked, are inclined to intolerance towardscultural diversity. There is some justification for that, as theessence of monotheism is to condemn beliefs which are

inconsistent with the belief in one God. But of the three,Islam was the one more inclined to tolerance, historically anddoctrinally. The first Islamic state was set up as a partnership

with Jews, even though the two groups later fell apart.

Christians in Arabia were tolerated and had a recognizedstatus. The City of Jerusalem was also handed to the Muslimspeacefully in accordance with a treaty guaranteeing therights of Christian's in that city.

These policies and the way they had been practised, hadtheir drawbacks. One can look to what the Balkans are

witnessing today as the direct result of pluralist as practised by the Ottomans in that region. Their policies, it could beargued, shielded these communities from change whichcould have resulted from open interaction within the nationalset-ups where those protections were not available.

On the other hand, the demise of the Ottoman Empirealso revealed how functional the system had been. The Kurds

in Turkey were protected and being Muslim, expected equaltreatment with other groups of the Empire. The Arabs alsooccupied a privileged status in the system. With the rise of

Turkish nationalism, which precipitated the collapse of theEmpire, centrifugal forces were set in motion. Protectedreligious minorities such as the Maronites in Lebanon suf-fered loss of rights, while ethnic minorities such at the Kurdsfound that the emerging national states such as a Turkey

wanted to impose Turkish identity on them, and Arab coun-tries such as Iraq and Syria, wanted to impose Arab identity.

A Pandora's box of ethnic conflicts was thus opened. To makematters worse, European powers played their part in precipi-tating the disintegration of Muslim societies. Muslim reform-ers who admired the European experience in modern state-

building were nevertheless dismayed by European policies,

in particular support for protected groups, which under-mined their attempts to build viable states.

The post-UN era has posed two new challenges to theMuslims. The first challenge, was that posed by modernliberal ideologies, in particular the stress on individualhuman rights. This appeared to undermine some of the coreconcepts entrenched in Islamic traditions. On the other hand, the nation state system has posed its own problems as

we have seen. The world of the Muslim thus faced assaultsfrom two directions: Individualism undermined group soli-darity, and nationalism and undermined the unity of thecommunity. However, these challenges offered new oppor-tunities, some of which were seized and acted upon. Theinsistence on democracy and human rights for all, was one

way in which the opportunity was grasped. The new empha-sis on multi-culturalism offers another opportunity. Multi-culturalism works both ways. It can spell tolerance for theMuslim way of life, and it demands tolerance for the way of life of others.

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PAGE 2, Islam21, February 2000

Dr. Abdelwahab El-Affendi:

The question of freedom of expression in Islam is a very complex issue. It touches on the form which expression has

taken in the modern world and this raises the issue of themedia which is a very complex, modern phenomenon.

Secondly it turns back the concept of legal sanction and what does a society want to do with the law it enacts. What does society think the purpose of this concept is. It toucheson the ways in which freedom of expression is blocked or suppressed, through money, power or other devices.

I think the principle of freedom of expression as opposedto the concept as such is at the heart of the Koran and at theheart of the Islamic message. First of all if you look at the first

verse which allowed the Muslim to go to war, permission wasgiven to those who were "wronged" to fight because they werethrown out of their homes for no reason other than saying

God is their Lord. And the right to fight was linked to the right of freedom of expression. "Fight them until repression against the believers stops" , said the Koran. "Fitna" means trying toforce someone to give up his beliefs. So the right of freedomof worship, which was also linked to the right of freedom of expression, was seen as the heart of the Islamic message. It is the only reason which gives you the right to fight when youare prevented from expressing yourself.

More importantly, all the stories of the Prophets which aretold in the Koran relate to the issue of why prophets weredemanding things from their people. The right to deliver their message. The right to express themselves and to deliver themessage of God. This is the only thing which they asked for.

They did not ask to have an Islamic state or a Jewish state.

They asked to be given freedom of expression. When this wasdenied God's anger has fallen on the people who wereresponsible.

So the concept of the freedom of expression is not a modern thing. It is at the heart of the Islamic message. It cannot be separated from the Islamic message. As you know,some of the people who looked at tradition saw the freedomof expression in Islam not as a freedom but as a duty.

It was looked at as a duty that people should speak. Those who keep silent when they are supposed to speak aredestined for exemplary punishment even for the unbelievers.

That takes care of the principle of freedom of expression

and its centrality to the Islamic religion and to religion ingeneral. Religion in general is a free exercise of worshippingGod. Any laws which are enacted by the believers aresupposed to protect this right, more or less.

If we come to the principle of freedom itself, freedom doesseem to privilege the strong. I think this is only natural

because only the strong who can do things ask for freedom.In most of our countries where 80 percent of the people areilliterate you cannot expect them to go out on the street andagitate for the freedom to publish, because they can't write.

The people who ask for freedom are the people who cando and therefore the demand for freedom always comes frompeople who are denied freedom. This brings us to the next question. Who are the people who deny others their rights.

You can look at it from two points of view, a Marxian or a realistic position which sees that this is conflict between theelite, two groups, one which wants to express itself and theother which wants to prevent them. There is a more plural-

istic way of looking at things. Those people who expressthemselves also benefit others. For example when the ulema speak you cannot expect everybody to be "alem" but when thealem speaks the people benefit from this. There is truth in

both positions but the law as a law is not there to protect the

strong, in spite of some Marxist assertions.

It is usually the case that the strong do not need the law. They can do what they want without the law. The law intervenes either to curb the freedom of these people in order to allow others some rights or to protect the rights of othersor in order to impose some ethical, minimum demandsaccepted by society.

This matter will lead me to the other question, that of themedia and freedom of expression. Professor Shafer who livesand works in Egypt had this very interesting idea that themodern media can never be Islamic. Talking about Islamisingthe media is like talking about Islamising banking - most of the banks are intrinsically unIslamic. The bank is based on

"riba" usury and you can never change that. He said that when the media emerged in the West it emerged in connec-tion with the banking. The first media were funded by usurers

who wanted to subvert the church because the church at that time used to buy the usury. They used to attack the clergy.

The second point he makes about them is that the media have shifted the centre point or the directing point of society from the pulpit and the church -and by extension themosque- to the secular elite and the commercial interests.

This deliberate shifting of knowledge and the forming of public opinion from the religious sphere to the secular sphere

was an aspect of subverting society. The media itself, in itsown structure, cannot function except in this way. For example if you at the basis of the media in news gathering

which is investigative journalism, the way is you try toconfirm suspicions. But in the Koran it says that you shouldnot be suspicious of other people and you should not try tohighlight their defects. So in a Muslim society we should not have this kind of journalism because it is against principle!It is suspicion and it is seeking to confirm suspicion.

So there is an intrinsic conflict between the efforts of themodern media and Islamic ethics. If you look at television it is based on entertainment, quick movement, quick changingscenes. It cannot lend iItself to contemplation, prayer andserenity. It wants movement, entertainment, dance andmusic. These are Schreifer's views and I happen to disagree

with them slightly. I think there has not been such deepreflection in the Muslim world on those issues to look at the

basics, the fundamentals, the ethical and sociological de-mands of this modern media and whether they really conflict

with Islamic ethics or not.

Our problem is not what is the problem in the West. Our problem is not that we are going to investigate the defects of our brothers and sisters in society. There are some defects

which everyone can see and people cannot speak about them.

This leads back to the issue of the basis of the law itself. What do we want to have in Muslim society? A Muslimcommunity as a nation is an ethical community. It issupposed to be based on certain ethical and moral values

which the society seeks to promote. And if there are rulesthey should be promoted to protect this ethical community.In such a community there will be some restrictions oncertain freedoms of expression.

Now what are these restrictions and who should impose

Centrality of freedom of expression in Islam

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them? Under Western consensus these are important ques-tions. But the most fundamental issue is that an ethicalcommunity cannot exist unless people can express freely their commitments to this ethical framework. The role of freedom of expression here is paramount, because without the people speaking openly about making their opinionknown, about what is ethically right or wrong they cannot conduct themselves in the way they would like to conduct

themselves. I am not speaking as an intellectual but about the situation in the Muslim world as things are happeningnow.

We have entire countries, entire nations where people tell you a lot of things when you speak to them in private. But if he goes on television he would not say that because he knowsthat either his salary will be lost or his family might beintimidated, killed or imprisoned. If we are thinking about freedom of expression at the moment we are not speakingabout the ethical issues I mentioned earlier. We are speakingabout this situation. We have a situation where communitiesdo not exist. We cannot say a Muslim community exists today

because a Muslim community exists in secret. It does not exist openly where people are saying I am a Muslim, this is

what I believe, this is what is wrong and this right. This doesnot exist. And I think the challenge in front of us today is torestore this Muslim community and restore freedom of expression.

Freedom of expression

in Quran & Sunnah

Imam Dr. Abdul Jalil Sajid:

I would like to deal with the issue of Islamic approachesto freedom of expression - values and criteria in terms of threeaspects.

(1) What is the definition of freedom of expression interms of Islam (Quran, sunnah and the earlier companions);

(2) The theory - what it should be, the ideal situation of freedom of expression;

(3) Practice.

It is a general notion, and I totally agree that freedom of expression is a relatively new terminology in Islamic debates,among Islamic thinkers and writers. It has not appeared inthe early writings through the use of such an explicit term.

But the Quran has the word "iblagh." It also uses the word"qal" and "qulu lel nass husna," always communicate withother people what is good and what is right. There are alsolimits which the Quran has mentioned very clearly in termsof the definition. Allah does not allow the public utterance of evil expressions, except where the person has been wronged.But when you read the Islamic jurists, there are a number of legal opinions. The word huria (freedom) has never beenused in absolute terms, in any society, in any time, anywhere.It always required responsibility. It has always requiredrestraints, and responsibility and it is always conditional.Even John Stuart Mills text books which have been used inuniversities in the study of freedom of expression, havementioned restrictions. Islamic books dealing with the sub-

ject also have restrictions.

It has been mentioned very clearly and there are a number of quotations that God has created human, free. No human

being has the right to put them under conditions other thanthose which God has commanded us. This is again practised

in many ways.But "huriyat al bayan" has been used. It means the way

of communicating with other people whatever speech Godhas given us. "Huriyat al qawl", the word qal is mentionedmany times. "Huriat al tafkir" means thinking, ponderingupon. All the things are there and you are free to think about them. This is important for us. There is also "huriyat al rai"

which refers to freedom of opinion. These are fundamentally

mentioned by legalistic juristic scholars throughout thecenturies and we can look at the works of various writers andsee references to these types of freedoms.

The fact is that Islam is "din al mu'amalat" and It is a way of life in which we have to deal with other human beings. And

when we deal with other human beings what connotation, arethey coming from, what section of the community? We haveto be fair, we have to be just (adl) and always we should not

be looking at our own selfish interests, but at the general welfare of human beings. This is central to Islam. Seeking thecommon good is very important.

Collectively Muslims in earlier times have been told that their duty is a "hesba." It means that you are going to

command to enjoy good things and also forbid the evil. That is where our limit comes. And it is that connotation "din is alnaseeha". It means we have to guide people to right things.

In theory this is all what we can say. Then we come back to the actual definition of freedom of expression as has beenmentioned by a number of earlier scholars. They make it very clear that no one will be able to stop thinking, either inreligious terms and form an opinion which is not clear interms of the Quran. Omar said I am going to limit the amount a women gets at the time of marriage. A woman stood up andsaid you are wrong. The Quran says "qintar," an unlimitedamount, an amount which one can afford to pay. How can a ruler, just because he has authority, imposes his views on allof us. Let us discuss this issue. He withdrew his opinion, then

and there.

It is a fact that words have power. They can heal, they can wound, they can hurt and they can be effective in a society. That is why the Quran ordered Moses and Haroun to go to thePharaoh and be kind and polite to him. Why? To remind himthat he is a creation of God, he is not God himself. May hecome back to the right path. That is what direction is all about

when we express our views.

The "khawaraj" dissidents in Islam, became a powerful body in terms of expressing their views of extremism. Their views came from the Quran as well. They said there is only God's authority and it must be applied in every life. Ali went into a room and brought a copy of the Quran from which they

were quoting all the time. He said ask the Quran to speak tome what you are saying. They could not answer that question.It was their opinion versus Ali's opinion. That is what the

whole issue is all about.

In each society people have to enter into a debate. But theright to differ is very central in Islam. Either you believe inGod or you do not believe in God. This is fundamental. It isa myth that freedom of expression and freedom of religionshould be equated as they are the same thing. They are not the same thing. Freedom of religion is paramount and quitea different thing. Freedom of expression is the right to differ.

The issues we have to deal with concern what Islam

speaks about in theory, what Islam speaks about, absolutefreedom and freedom of expression and how it was ex-pressed. Ali did not ban the kharawaj even though he wasurged to do so. He refused and said "no not unless they havetaken arms against me, and the confrontation goes to a physical confrontation I am not going to involve myself".

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When there is no threat in a society where people feel they have an opinion, that opinion can be expressed in any way they like. Islam has given that freedom to every human being.

After defining what freedom of expression means in my opinion and according to the Quran and earlier interpreta-tions, I come to the reality and the real problem. We have torealise that we are dividing ourselves into our societies, our countries and our areas to instill the traditional view of "Dar

Al Kufr" and "Dar Al Islam." In my opinion those definitionsare outdated and have no relevance whatsoever. We aredivided into nation states and we have to think about how weare going to address that.

There are so many limitations, from slander to obsceneand hurtful things, saying things about others and alsogeneralisations, stereotyping, resorting to back biting and"riba" and many other things which exist not only in terms of personal conduct but also in collective conduct. The press,

which is the fourth main institution in the modern state andmodern systems of government really needs to be brought tothe line which is expected of us under Islamic norms.

In any Muslim society today Islamic norms do not exist.

The Quran made it very clear that we have to spread goodthings and restrict ourselves where there is a bad thing. "If thepeople are going to spread things which are immoral, they should be punished on this earth and on the day of judge-ment". Having said this we should not be complacent insaying that because the West sees Islam as a threat, freedomof expression is a myth in the West. The fact is that weMuslims, have also lost our importance in terms of knowingourselves, in terms of strength, in terms of power, in termsof applications.

My suggestion is that we should not only think that freedom of expression as an outside term which we cannot look into it. Our societies should not be threatened by divisions or differences of opinion of any kind including those

who believe in God or do not believe in God.

In 1988 when the Satanic Verses were published we believed it was an issue between fairness and freedom. Wesaid that Muslims should not be considered fanatics who aretrying to protect the honour of the Prophet (p.b.u.h.) through

words and letters. For us, the issue was: does anyone havethe right to insult us and treat us as a people who do not haveanything to do with reality in life? We saw at the time that the secularist inquisition was even worse than the Christianinquisitions against Muslim in the medieval ages whereSpain was mentioned and every Muslim was kicked out. Wefelt very clearly that Muslims and the whole world has been

besieged on this absolute right to freedom of expression. Wemust overcome this issue and make our society realise that

we have to go back to old tenants of Quran and Sunnah wherefreedom of expression was allowed and even during the timesof Omarand Ali. But later on when monarchs came andauthority was vested in dynasties, they did not tolerateanyone.

We know from "Hajjaj" and others who gave their first sermon after acquiring authority. Hajjaj said "heads are ripeand I am going to cut them off." This expression is still foundin our books and in our educational institutions. In nationstates, secularism is the problem. In the West they see"might as right" and they can say anything against countrieslike Sudan or other places. And there is no way to stop them.

This is where our power has been lost. We have the school

of thought to accommodate debate, discussion and different opinions.

We are required to tolerate each others points of view,respect other views and agree to disagree. Then we have tolearn from each other in order to progress so that human

knowledge and intellect try to move on.

I think the weakness with us is that we say this is foreignand it has nothing to do with us. And when we look at our societies we see that we try to impose one dominant view and

we cannot accept other views. In my humble opinion, Godhas created us individually. We do not have a central body todecide for us and we all have the right to interpret the Quranand Sunnah according to our own understanding and knowl-

edge. But as collective in society we have to create a codification of laws and institute the restrictions which theQuran and the Sunnah has laid down. From that point of

view, in my opinion, freedom of expression is relative, it is a reality and we cannot say this has nothing to do with us.

The media and human

rights

Andrew Puddephatt

ExceutiveDirector, Article 19

"Where a man cannot call his tongue his own, he canscarce call anything his own" Cato

"Give me liberty to know, to utter and to argue freely according to conscience, above all liberties"

Milton Areopagitica

Freedom of expression has long been seen - at least in Western countries - as a founding right - one that it important in itself and one upon which the exercise of other freedomsand rights depends.

Partly this is a result of history. The struggle for politicalfreedom in Western Europe often centred on the fight for freedom of expression. During the great constitutional clash

between King and Parliament in England in the C17th, oneof the hottest issues was the attempt by the King to control

what the press or members of Parliament could say. Thepress was dealt with by prior licensing of the press; Parlia-mentarians by show trials and imprisonment. The strugglefor free speech became a key struggle.

During the consequent civil war, the Parliamentary forcesat first lifted state censorship but then almost immediately reimposed it when they became alarmed at the volume of radical publications that poured forth. The English poet

John Milton (who at the time was working for the rebels) then

wrote his famous attack on censorship, Aeropagitica, whichset out the classic case for freedom of expression.

Milton defends freedom of the press as essential to the lifeand progress of the nation. He argues against prior licensingof the press (the then mode of censorship in England) and nopunishment after publication unless there was a legally proven charge of libel or blasphemy. His arguments are thetraditional case for freedom of expression and freedom of thepress: -

· Censorship is a barrier to learning· No-one can know the truth unless they have considered

all points of view and chosen freely · A strong nation requires the unity that come from

blending individual differences, not imposing it from above· Freedom of expression is necessary for material progress· No-one is wise enough to serve as a censor, no-one is

infallible· Truth will defeat falsehood in open competition

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The media are crucial to the exercise of freedom of expression because that freedom only has meaning if it isexercised in public - what I say privately is one thing, but tohave greater effect it needs public expression where otherscan hear or read it. The media act as our voices. This functionof the media is to act as a vessel for information and ideas, a

vessel through which we communicate with each other. Thisconcept makes necessary the idea of objectivity, the journal-ist as a neutral observer, unengaged with events but faith-

fully recording them.

Freedom of expression is of course broader than this roleof the media as vessel. Vessels need filling and freedom of expression requires access to information and ideas and theability to impart those ideas freely. While this might be done

by a journalist (a columnist for example) even more important are elected representatives and wider civil society. It is they

who are likely to be the source of ideas and information. That is why an early demand of English parliamentarians was legalimpunity for statements made in the House of Commons (stillin existence today). This is a problem characteristic of emerging democracies - politicians who criticise the govern-ment are charged with defamation and often threatened withpunitive fines or imprisonment. It is not just journalists who

need.

Since WWII this view of the media as a vessel developedalongside the paradigm of human rights, which sets the stateagainst the individual. In this paradigm, the state is a potential abuse of human rights against which people needprotection through legal and institutional means. But it isalso the legal guarantor of rights, developing and adhering tostandards and providing legal means to enforce and policehuman rights problems.

Student of politics will often focus on the legal andinstitutional forms of protection regarded as essential in a democracy. These are familiar to us now - separation of powers, Bills of Rights, supervision by the courts. But just

as important is the culture of a society - the willingness toargue and question, the knowledge among ordinary people of political issues, the ability to organise a discussion in a way that effective action can emerge, the experience of volunteer association and activity. All of this was set out by De

Toqueville in his classic "Democracy in America" written inthe early C19th. It is the absence of such a culture that makes the development of democracy in central and easternEurope so fraught and problematic - the legal changes arecomparatively easy, the cultural changes less so.

The role of the media is vital in generating such a democratic culture. It is through the press that peoplegeneralise their experience, learn from others, become awarethat government do not always tell them the truth. It is why,again to use an English example, the emergence of a masspopular press in the early C19th, ran in parallel to the growthof working class self-organisation and was so fiercely con-tested by the ruling elites.

This highlights another crucial role of the media - as a watchdog of the powerful state, always on guard in the publicinterest. This watchdog role, exposing abuses of power,ensuring transparency and thereby uncorrupted govern-ment, exposing the abuse of state power by sectional inter-ests - sits alongside the role of the media as a vessel.

It is this watchdog role that explains why Western govern-ments have laid so much emphasis on the importance of an

independent media is the process of building a democracy. It is why freedom of expression is not just defended as a right in itself but why it is seen as a right that underpins theexercise of all other rights. In the Cold War period, control of the press and the media message was crucial and censorshipa sine qua non of authoritarian states. A genuinely free media

- free to be a vessel and free to be a watchdog is now regardedas one the badges of a democracy.

Globalisation

But of curse, it is more complicated than that. And it ismore complicated with the developing tide of globalisationand the kinds of changes and challenges it is bringing. By globalisation, I mean a process that is increasing the interde-

pendence of states and which is creating a global site for social, economic and political activity. While there havealways been global relationships, what is new is the intensity of global networks and exchanges, the "velocity" of globaltransactions and the impact of these changes.

Key changes

Firstly the ending of the Cold War has reconfigured globalpolitics and changed the nature of the world fundamentally.For perhaps the first time in history there is no real balanceof power. Instead there is one hegemonic military power - theUSA, then a group of powers with more limited global reach.Conflicts are increasingly internal, often taking on an ethniccharacter and concentrated in areas where the formation of

nation states has been incomplete or suppressed (e.g. NIS, Africa). For the media this means that there are often nosimple stories - no good guys versus bad guys. How does onetell a simple story about Angola or the Democratic Republicof the Congo (DRC)?

Secondly, states emerging from de-colonisation, or thecollapse of empire, tend to be weak and in many parts of the

world the biggest problem is not the strong state but the weak state. If we define a state as an entity exercising jurisdictionover a demarcated area, with a monopoly of force, andsecuring legitimacy through the support or consent of thepeople, then one characteristic of the modern world is theabsence of such bodies in many areas of conflict around the

world. In fact, increasingly the state itself is not the problem- human rights violations are as likely to be committed by paramilitary groups in civil conflict as by state forces. Themedia can no longer look to the state for protection or toprovide a framework within which they can be neutralobservers (like the Red Cross). Reporting is hazardous anddependent upon the combatants providing access - at theprice of shaping the story. So a journalist now goes on patrol

with the KLA, or visits rebel held DRC - all of which compro-mises the tradition of neutrality.

Finally global governance, in its broadest sense, is becom-ing more significant. Global governance has a long history (which could be dated to the founding of the International

Telegraph Union in 1865). Initially global governance ex-tended to those regulatory functions necessary to make trade

work - communications, maritime law etc. But now there is vast network of IGOs (from 39 in 1909 to 260 in 1996), witha global regime of rules, procedures, conventions that regu-late everything form air travel to the status of Antarctica, fromnuclear testing to the preservation of the whale. (Between1946 and 1975 the number of international treaties in forcegrew from 6,351 to 14,061). Increasingly we live in a world

with a global regime of governance, which has enormousimplications for the state. The problem for the media is that global governance is diffuse, harder to read, operates at a very slow speed, is consensual (and therefore frequently couchedin dull bureaucratic-speak) and lacking in a clear centre of authority on which the media can focus.

Human rights, free speech and globalisation

The globalisation of communications is changing the world of the media dramatically. Global markets have pow-erful implications for freedom of speech and access toinformation offering both new opportunities and new dan-

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gers. Partly this is technical. Growth in telephone use isproceeding around 20% a year and has increased 12 foldsince 1982 (although just five countries account for 20% of all use). Sheer volume of traffic makes censorship moredifficult. Moreover new technologies such as the Internet or satellite broadcasting can open up closed societies. Oftenthis is controversial as we see with concerns about hatespeech and pornography on the Internet. But it is a weaponagainst oppressive regimes. For example when Anwar

Ibrahim's trial began in Malaysia, over 60 websites sprang upcovering the trial and sales of the government controlledStraits Times fell from 200,000 to 130,000. The availability of CNN during the Gulf War encouraged interest in satellite

broadcasting throughout the Middle East and led to thecreation of lively new channels such as Al Jazirah). There aremany such examples.

The increasingly instantaneous nature of global commu-nications has also changed the context in which foreign policy (including human rights policy) is conducted. Conflicts aremedia accessible in real time. The growth in the volume of news coverage, the need to fill airtime in the broadcast media

with fresh images and stories has produced a new phenom-enon - the media as mobiliser of public opinion. When US TV

showed the body of a dead American Ranger being draggedthrough the streets of Mogadishu, it had a more significant impact on US foreign policy than a hundred UN resolutions.

When European people saw lines of refugees from Kosovo at the Albanian or Macedonian border they wanted somethingto done - albeit painlessly and at little cost.

This trend changed the role of media in an important way.No longer is the media the vehicle through which ideas areexpressed and information imparted; the media becomespart of the politics of the events they are covering. This was

wholly evident in the wars in former Yugoslavia and particu-larly Bosnia. Neither side was strong enough to win the war out right and all sides were desperate to influence westernpublic opinion. Often the wars themselves were conducted

with more of an eye on media coverage that on military objectives - or rather - winning the media became a military objective. Objective reporting became the first casualty -indeed many journalists rejected the concept in Bosnia. AsChristiane Amanpour said "When you're neutral in a situa-tion like Bosnia, you are an accomplice - an accomplice togenocide". Or Martin Bell of the BBC - "I am not sure about objectivity any more. What I believe in now is what I prefer to call the journalism of attachment".

Alongside this self-prescribed changing role of the media is the breaking down of the ability of national governments tocontrol telecommunications. There has a wave of market driven privatisation in recent years, fuelled by the 1997 WTOagreement to liberalise telecommunication markets. Many free speech advocates saw this has heralding a new era in freeof censorship. The reality is more complex. Repressiveregimes still seek to maintain control of communications,through regulation or high tariffs, through controlling theimport of newsprint, access to distribution, to the renting of property. But nevertheless, control; is weakening and new opportunities to promote freedom of expression are con-stantly growing.

However the global communications market is dominated by twenty to thirty MNCs, all based in OECD countries andmost based in the USA. Whether handing over globalcommunications to a small number of MNCs will improve freespeech is debatable. Concentrated ownership can reduce

diversity of speech in a number of ways. It limits the rangeof opinions that can be expressed, particularly those whospeak from the point of view of the economically dispos-sessed. Intense competition leads to success being meas-ured purely in market share rather than by any publicinterest criteria. In depth investigative reporting suffers at

the expense of populist game shows. In a highly "marketised"media world, digital technology (while in theory creatingmany more possibilities) can reduce quality by reducing theamount of money available for individual programmes.

For those of us who believe that the media still have animportant role in relation to human rights and democracy,this raises fundamental questions. How can we can takeadvantage of the liberalisation of communications to further

free speech and greater openness in the context of a growingMNC domination?

Conclusion

We need to recognise that globalisation is a complex process, or set of processes. It is changing the role of thenation state and abolishing its historic claim to sole sover-eignty, but it is not abolishing states themselves. One of the

biggest challenges facing the world in the C21st is how tomaintain the legitimacy and authority of the public realm,including the state, in an insecure, globalised world.

Such evidence as there is suggests that liberal democraticstates - with representative institutions, guaranteed human

rights, a free press etc. - will survive the strains of globalisation best. It is they, which can continue to provide the basis for legitimate authority. But they will need to broaden their concept of citizenship, breaking down the historic distinction

between the citizen (inside the polity and protected) and thenon-citizen (outside and a threat). In an interdependent

world we will need to learn to share sovereignty and create a citizenship that can exist in a plural, non-national, non-stateframework. The media have an important role to play here asthe voice of what some writers have called an "imagined"community. To take Britain as an example, there is no doubt that one of the major roles of the BBC is to reflect a sense of national unity in a country made up of different nations,

jurisdictions, cultures and faiths? The tragic example of theFederal Republic of Yugoslavia is an example of what hap-pens when such a project fails.

But for human rights standards to be sustained, thehuman rights movement and the media must adjust to therealities of the new structures of global governance. In thepast we have tried to have international standards adopted by certain international bodies (the UN, the Council of Europe).

We then seek to create national awareness of these standardsand encourage local monitoring (developing the local capacity on the way). We must now expand this work to incorporatethe developing regime of global governance, including most of all, the new structure of economic global governance.

This is particularly easy when it comes to free speech andfreedom of information. There is a powerful economicargument for freedom of expression and access to informa-tion as set out above. Markets require open information,transparent rules and a contract culture. If consumers andproviders have access to information, if there is a vigorousmedia with a tradition of investigative journalism, thenopenness, transparency and a rule-based culture can flour-ish. The media is a vital part of all this. As a watchdog in a democracy, it can expose that which otherwise remainssecret and provide the basis for informed debate.

A media agenda for this work would include the following.

We need a set of human rights standards that issues asdiverse as access to information laws, guarantees of freedom

of expression, public sector broadcast guidelines, publicinterest codes, principles of investigative journalism. Thesestandards can then be expressed in a variety of forms, frominternational legal standards, where appropriate, to a set of objectives that could be incorporated in trade agreements.

The latter could be developed in conjunction with other

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PAGE 7, Islam21, February 2000 interested NGOs and with bodies such as the World Bank.

They can be sponsored through aid programmes originating with the IMF. They could even be incorporated in WTOsponsored proposals to liberalise communications. They could even be incorporated in multi-lateral trade agreements(e.g. Lome Convention or Euro-Med) or bi-lateral trade agree-ments. Reputable local NGOs can monitor them in country.

We might even try to persuade governments to createfunds from trade agreements that can be used to resource

trusts that can fund independent journalism.

There is no reason why general standards of openness andfreedom of expression - with guaranteed protections for

journalists - should not be incorporated in other forms of international agreements. In particular they might be very useful incorporated in peace agreements - such as Dayton,or any deal that settles the current conflict with Yugoslavia over Kosovo.

The possibilities are considerable if we are flexible, imagi-native and open in our thinking. For centuries the struggle for a free press has been central to the wider fight for democracy and human rights. That remains the case. But there are new challenges and problems to which as yet there are no clear answers. The exciting feature of modern times is that we areon unknown territory. The collapse of Marxism and theeclipse of neo-liberalism has opened up the world to freshthinking in a way unimaginable in the days of the Cold War.Far from being the end of history, it is a new beginning.

Roundtable discussion on Islamist

Approaches to Freedom of Expression

Rashid Benaisa:

Is the question of freedom of expression in Islam an

internal question or an external one? Is it derived from our needs, from our internal development or is it a deducedquestion coming from outside? Why do we ask the question,in London? At which historical moment of the theoreticalproduction? At which time of history do we produce a thought? This is very important. At what time, according to

what balance of power and what is the balance of power between us and the other? Can we reverse the question andask: Is it really a proper and urgent question?

Many times we were asked about Islam and socialism andone of our friends was saying that the most urgent questionis Islam et le pierce de tache. We may have a problem of spareparts. The livelihood of a lot of Muslim people is threatened.Millions of Muslims have very little access to water and thisis decreasing security. This is the other face of the question.

Asking this question does not mean it cannot be legitimateeven when it is deduced or borrowed from outside.

Whatever we say it is not a proper debate. It does not develop in the proper atmosphere. We have problems of great magnitude. What rights do we have? The Muslims in Francehave one right, the right to shut up.

We should consider the when, why and where of thequestion. We should also study and inquire about thepractice of the society which asks the question.

All the questions raised, Rushidie, Taslima Nasreen, etc,

they were not too big to exist if they were not sure of havingencouragement in the West. But when Druelman who ismuch more serious than insulting the wife of the Prophet andHans Coumb who he is a giant of thought found a cause inthe Muslim world to justify their thought they were expelledfrom university, and nothing happened. When the French

government suspended or suppressed 17 books in one issueof Journal Official, how many Arab or Muslim newspapersreported the fact. The French authorities stopped Didat whois 75 years old entering France from South Africa. In Egypt

you have a man ruling under a state of emergency for 16 years. And nothing happens, he is welcome in the West, hehas the blessing of the West. But if something happens inanother country not favoured by the West, immediately thefacts are magnified. So we have to think about Islam outside

the pressure. There are a lot of problems in Muslim society but we should think as much as possible and be aware that there is a pressure which does not try to promote good.

Dr. Mostafa Abdul Aal:

So far you did not touch on the issues of freedom of expression or the approaches of Islam towards this politicalissue. What we heard is that somebody has been blaming the

West, and they have always been dreaming that the West must be a just body. Someone said that there is no absolutefreedom. What we are asking about here is not the absolutefreedom but what is the minimum criteria for freedom in theMuslim world. In the Muslim world today there is no state

where a human being could live with dignity. We do not evenhave the minimum criteria. So we must speak about theminimum criteria for us to advocate. Citizenship does not exist in the Muslim world. A citizen in a Muslim country isoppressed totally.

Freedom of expression is not a valuable matter in theMuslim World today. It can only be valuable when it enables

you to change the situation. In Egypt we have a margin of freedom of expression but this is useless because it does not allow us to change matters. This is what human society is allabout. The problem with the Islamist discourses is that they are not talking about reality, they are not dealing with reality,the feel alien to modern art, modern media, cinema, dancing,to singing, they are outside all of these things. When they talk

about these, they only say this is correct or incorrect from thepoint of view of manners without talking about how we usethese tools to influence change.

There are Muslims who believe that we should usemodern media, like the TV, to broadcast 24 hours of theQuran or religious sermons. We have to counter the view

which says if we live in modernity we have to reject religion.I can see that there are nations which keep their religious

values but have entered modernity. What is the problem withMuslims? I believe that the freedom of expression has beenthere in Islam when Omar (the second Caliph of Islam) said"You must spell out your advise, and we must listen to you."

This is trust. This is what we believe. This is a matter of general culture.

Socially and culturally speaking we have not undergonethe cultural processes others have gone through. It is theprocess of rationality, philosophy, modernity as a whole

which brought the concept of freedom of expression.

Roger Hardy:

It is tricky for a non-Muslim to speak at a function like this but I will take my chances. I am not only a non-Muslim, I amalso a journalist. I am very interested in the other dimensionsof the Rushdie affair. It took me ten years to understand theRushide affair. I am not joking when I say this.

What do I mean for me personally? I sat in London and Idid not understand it because the intellectuals of the media saw it in one way about ideas, principles, freedom andreligion. Why did the guy in Bradford burn the book? I went to talk to some of them and I learned that some of the young

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Muslims did not know a lot about Islam. It is not their fault and it is not a virtue of mine.

As a journalist I managed to pick up more than he pickedup even though he was born in Bradford. He went out on thestreets for totally different reasons than the intellectuals inLondon. I asked him why. I am a journalist and I have thischance which I regard almost as a luxury if I take it. Hedemonstrated about Rushide because he lives in a society

where he is marginalised. You might say almost that he went out onto the street because he is unemployed. The termIslamaphobia was not used during the 80s. We use it now andthank God we do it. It has entered the vocabulary of thiscountry. It existed before but we did not call it that. It wasprejudice. We didn't know if it was racial prejudice. You see

what I am talking about. We can't separate out the socialcontext which means of course the economic and the politicalcontext in which freedom of expression is used or is deniedthere or is not there or is used in one way or the other.

I am making a very big point and I am making it very briefly and I don't know if I will succeed. I want to link this in a finalcomment by saying that there is something very astonishinggoing on in the Muslim world, which means in the world. It

means in any place where the Muslims live. You speak about the ummah and you speak in a specific sense but Muslimslive in every country now.

Therefore, your concerns are with every country if your concerns are with all Muslims. One reason why you can't separate the inside and the outside is that there is no longer an inside and an outside in any clear cut way. They are not foreign policy issues or domestic issues. These are issues.

The common ground, and this is what I meant when I said it is astonishing to me and I would be interested to know if people think I am talking a lot of nonsense or not.

There is a psychology which effects the freedom of expres-sion and many of the issues you have debated in the past and

you will debate in the future. It is about the psychology of thestrong and the weak. It is not surprising that the youngMuslim in Bradford may feel he is in the camp of the weak.He lives in minority community, in a marginalised commu-nity. He himself embodies a tiny island of Islam even if hisknowledge of Islam is very imperfect, within an enormous sea of non-Islam.

How come the Muslim in Islamabad and the Muslim in Jakarta feels weak or the Muslim in Cairo feels weak. You see what I am saying. I cannot elaborate on this point but I canonly suggest to you that it is one of the ingredients that underlies this issue. I think it is very important. Why doMuslims perceive themselves as weak. I would add , may be

just to provoke you a little bit more, one of the strange thingsto me is having reached this conclusion, how come the West,

whatever we mean by this, how come they think you are sostrong?

Intervention:

We have to think objectively about what we are talkingabout. In my opinion the word freedom does not appear in theQuran in the Western sense. This is very clear from the

beginning. Two words are used, one is liberty and one isfreedom. We believe that God has given the liberty to human

beings to believe in Him or not to believe in Him. That is thechoice. And from that the word huriyah (freedom) is clear.

What we are talking about in terms of freedom of expressionis communication, iblagh. This has appeared in the Quranseveral times. If you don't convey the thing which you haveconveyed you are not a Prophet. That is absolutely explicit from the verses in the Quran. It has also been mentioned by the Prophet himself that you have a duty, individually as a

Muslim to go and convey. That is an expression for the peopleto speak about a matter which they believe in. Even in early times, and this is confirmed by the Quran, that people havethe right to differ. But no one in authority has the right tosuppress them.

Earlier, rulers who had the power to suppress the differ-ent views, even though they were later proved to be a very dangerous element. But they made their decision, rightly or

wrongly not to suppress these views. This is the historicalimpression we have to take onboard. I am not an apologist.

If you have something to say as a Muslim, you must say it calmly and politely. You must say the right thing. TheProphet said either you say good things or shut up. We must stop talking nonsense and we have no right to spread things

which are hurtful. These commandments relate to expres-sion and how you are going to make your views heard. Andthese all come from the original sources, the Quran andSunnah.

Some spoke of the latest jurists but I can quote sourcesfrom a thousand years ago which mentioned "ashab al rai",freedom of opinion and "jumhur al ummah". If you open a

book by Imam Al Shaukani you see 30 different opinionsabout a subject. These are theories and opinions.

Intervention:

All of us agree that there are moral roots for such freedomsin Islam. I think the objection was only about the conceptsand the methodology, not about the substance. All of us areconvinced that there are a lot of verses about freedom inIslam.

Intervention:

But where is the practice? If the concepts are there andthere is no practice.

Intervention:

There is someone who said there is an internal question which needs to be answered and this would answer a lot of our external questions. Forget about external influence. But in Iran, for example now, there are the children of theRevolution and what is different between them has nothingto do with America and Iran. As Muslims we are disagreeing.

Intervention:

I have a problem with the idea that there is this essencein Islam which is freedom. I think freedom is a very modernconcept and principle which in fact has been produced by

Western society by a number of technologies. It went along with the invention of the "individual" or the modern self,disconnected from the family and other networks. So in a sense we are pushing into the past a very modern notion andfinding verses and hadith for this concept. This is highly problematic. In fact what we should be doing as an intellec-tual project is tracing the geniality of a discourse whichapproximates to something like freedom.

But I think it is more indicative of us wanting to besomething we may not possibly be at the moment, modernand Western. It is probably because of the legacy of colonialhegemony, Western hegemony that we have to think in theseterms. This unfortunately is the situation. We have to think not only through purely Islamic categories but through a sort of hybrid form of knowledge which is a mixture of Islamicthought and theology and Western categories. This is the

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situation. There is no pure movement. We can no longer say that television or the media have un-Islamic origins. There isso much which has unIslamic origins which we just have tolive with. There is so much in the West which does not have

Western origins but has been made to be seen as the very essence of Western culture.

So much comes from Islamic cultures in the West that has been domesticated. So my one concern was to talk about

essences and then projecting into the past a kind of essence.So the issues that you raised as to why people burn books and

why other people are expelled from countries. We may haveto introduce in a much broader cultural analysis which showsthat the people who burn books are poor people who are onthe margins of society and are very bitter. In the Egyptiancontext no peasant or working class person will know about Nasser Hamid Abu Zayed. A few intellectuals will know about him. And in the West, in the United States, the notion of a cultural politics was rife in the 1990s with multi-culturalismand so on.

Maybe what we are talking about here is a kind of culturalpolitics which is but one expression. We are talking about hegemonic struggle and what we feel we need to do is to use

freedom in a transformative capacity. That is what we want,to use the space of freedom. But freedom to me isn't neutral.It was a production in the West at a certain historical moment

when notions of the south were born. Now you are obliged to be free. There is no other thing other than to be free. And youget produced in this way. In Muslim societies what is thisnotion of freedom? What usefulness does it server? There isobviously a usefulness now because of the oppression andrepression.

Intervention:

First of all I want to say that the historical thing is very important. We can say that Islam is tolerant. The Muslims

were living with the non-Muslims when Islam was the rulingforce. But the reality is not like that because Islam itself consisted mostly of repression between the Muslims them-selves. If we look at our culture and the way we are living weshould frankly say that the influence of the occidental cultureis deeper and deeper. Any other discourse about this problem

will be hypocritical. What you read, what you feel, what youeat is a product of this civilisation. We criticise this civilisation

but it has all the keys.

Let me turn to freedom of expression. At the beginning of this century our religious men were against everything. They

were against the press, radio, television, female education. This happened many times. Religious figures clashed withother religious figures on these issues and we transferred

from one situation to another situation. Some positive changeshave taken place in our countries. The Egypt of today is not the pre-1954 Egypt. It is now a new, large country which hasrelations with the world.

Freedom of expression is not impossible if we can shareour views with the world. If we can have an exchange withother civilisations and other cultures we can have our freedom of expression. We can't divide the world into East and West, Muslim and non-Muslim. The world is one but thecultures are different. This is what will give me the answer.If I have freedom of expression it means I am a Muslim in thecontemporary world and I share what I am.

Intervention: As Muslim thinkers we have the right to deconstruct this

doctrine of freedom of expression. Modernity is a doctrine, it confronts us as an absolute in intellectual terms and in moralterms. A speaker said we should not forbid anything which in

my language means that nothing is haram. This is exactly what they mean, nothing is haram, nothing is forbidden,nothing is sacred. It comes to exactly the same thing. We haveto look into it and fight it. The intellectual, philosophical sideis as important as the practical. I agree we have a lot of problems with the repressive regimes that we have in theMuslim world.

But I think some of the blame, and I will be very blunt

here, goes to the the Islamists or Muslim thinkers becauseMuslims have found some sort of a compromise between

what the Christians call the temporal power and the spiritualpower. They have reached some sort of modus vivendi. Now they want to say we have to turn Islam into a coercivedoctrine. And I say that we have to deal with the language of politics and the language of theology for the immediate day to day concerns. This is what the West has done. But the statecannot transform itself into a church. Islam has never beena church. So we have to be careful we do not do an injusticeto the Western doctrine because it has its own intellectualand moral law. In the same way Islam is very deep. It cannot

be trivialised. That is why I said that freedom of expressionin Islam is a non-issue. Freedom of expression is only a debate about the political and sociological space. In this

sense it is a modern issue.

I will never agree that Islam rejects human freedom or freedom of conscience. If you do not believe the state cannot make you believe. So basically Islam is not the issue. Theissue is evolving a kind of political practice which is morehumane. Here we could learn from the West.

Intervention:

We need to develop parameters as to how to create a culture of tolerance in our societies. Now someone aid that freedom to spread your message is central to our religion.Okay. What about the freedom to get somebody else to

spread their message. This is the problem which we areconfronting in our societies, whether it is religious, political,societal or cultural. What are the parameters for this? What is the sacred space we want to defend? How do we want todefend this sacred space? And who is going to defend you? Inall of this you have the complicity of power and wealth andother elements which are present in every society. So we needto find some way of weaving these together and creating a

balance, because unless we do we will always be in a defensive posture.

If we want to go into a more interactive and a more positiveposture we have to have this balance secure within ourselves.For example in this society if I say something as a Britishcitizen they cannot do anything to me. But if somebody else

who is not a British citizen but is resident here says some-thing he could be arrested under anti-terrorism laws, he hasnot rights and he is thrown out. So the definition is not basedon what you can or cannot do but on who you are. In our societies also we could create a formula whereby we say theseare people who are within the orbit, who have given some kindallegiance to a code of ethics. Then, there is culture of tolerance between them because there is no question of them

being disobedient or treacherous to the whole ideal. Then wecould see some way forward.

Lastly I want to say that this question which we havealways dealt with historically, suggests we should not justify a compromise in the name of "maslaha." This has been a central problem in our politics, right from the beginning

because intolerance has come in the name of justifyingoppression in the name of "masalaha" or the greater good of the community. We should find a formula whereby thecommunity itself would reject this.

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Now the problem of freedom in our societies lies not withthe governments but with the people. We have never yet developed mechanisms to protect the right of dissent of others, collectively. It can be done. Even if the government decrees otherwise. For example I was in Egypt last year andon every corner you see an agency which says tours to Israeland everywhere. But you see very few people going to Israel.

The people en masse have not adopted their government'spolicy with rapproachement to Israel. At the same time in the

same kiosk you see tours to Libya and you see thousands of people going to Libya although the government says youshould not go to Libya at the moment because we do not agree

with them.

So society in itself can negate what governments decree.So if governments decree oppression societies can negate it

by rallying around the people who have been oppressed or symbols which have been oppressed. This could be against

your ideas. So, if for example a Christian is killed, or oppressed we rally ought to and say this is not right, a cultureis created which we could support. We have not developedthese mechanisms and these are the mechanisms we need tolook at. Developing these mechanisms helps to entrench theculture of tolerance in our societies.

Intervention:

What is the freedom of non-Mulim and even anti-Muslimpeople in Muslim society? In a certain society ruled by certainethical parameters it is a very important question which I donot propose to answer here but I would like to raise. If theChristians and the Europeans or the Westerners say you canlive freely according to Islam here and propagate your message that is fine. And if the Christians want to come to our Muslim land and propagate their message, okay, they are

welcome. That I think is a principle we people should accept. The final point is about the issue of Salman Rushdie andothers. It is an important issue and it is not an issue which

is specifically Islamic.

I think it has been a mistake from the beginning to look at this issue as a religious issue. Some of the Muslims herehave regarded this issue as an issue of blasphemy and I think this was totally the wrong idea. If you apply the principle of

blasphemy here all of the Muslims will be crucified. Blas-phemy here is opposing Christanity so I think it is a nonstarter. The issue here is an issue of civil society and how people should be civil about each other. If you say, for example that all Jews, black people or Asians are this andthat it doesn't matter what religion these people believe in.

They might come at you and fight you. It is part of the natureof Muslims society and the Muslim community that they aresensitive to certain issues. In India you can be an atheist, you

can insult God, nobody will bother. But if you insult Moham-med complete madness will begin.

There are two issues here because everybody believes inGod but Mohammed is specific to the Muslims. So if you areinsulting Mohammed you are insulting the Muslim commu-nity. Salman Rushdie knew this. He is an Indian and he wasaware of the sensitivities of the Muslim community. But he

went and rubbed the salt into their wounds. I think thismakes people angry. It is only an issue of keeping civility insociety that people should refrain from anti-Semetic andother types of insults. Any civilised person would not resort to such insults and if he does there should be some law which

will protect the people.

At present there is no such law and Salman Rushdie isprotected but other people are not protected. So if you want to protect everybody you have to reach agreement on thenorms of civilised behaviour.

Intervention:

The discussion has brought home the question that wehave to answer. Could the media be Islamic when they areintrinsically anti-religious and anti-establishment? We arenow governed by the media and it is a more instantaneousmedia. Globalisation has made things known to us so quickly and we cannot run away from reality. Muslim communities

are still living in secret. This is the opposite to what we wouldlike to think. The traditional methods of expressing Muslimopinion are under attack and if we consider this is a secretivesociety what would a non-secretive society be?

The other question that could be thrown in here is: areIslamists or Muslims who are advocating freedom of expres-sion, and this is more a political question than a theoreticalquestion, are they advocating it to reach power and thereafter robbing it away or taking it away from the others because they themselves have not come forward with a theory for thesecritical issues. Islamists have come to power in Iran andSudan but they do not yet have the answers to many of thequestions that face modern state and society and thereforethe easiest approach is to ban, prevent or stop these things.

Intervention:

I teach comparative religion and politics. I can sincerely say I enjoyed this discussion very much. A free exchange of

views is expected. Therefore you will allow me if I slightly disagree with some of the things which have been said

because it is the very essence of our discussion. In today's world Islam is the real other. It is the real other. At least the West has made the Islamic world the anti-thesis, the other toitself. I believe the question of what happens to Islam andIslamic countries is going to be the most important questionin the next century. There are more than 1 billion Muslims inthe world. There are 55 countries where Muslims are in a

majority and whether they like it or not the West has takenthem as a challenge. The reaction of Muslims to the West caneither be a negative confrontational, defensive reaction. Or it can be a positive reaction based on dialogue. And I think oneproblem we have noticed is that we are taking quite rightly a defensive position because for better or for worse we are theoppressed and the West is much more powerful. But what weshould do is to really look back at the West and at our ownhistory.

It has been mentioned that Islamic societies by compari-son have been much more tolerant and free societies inhistory to the time of the caliphs and the Abbasids, when evenatheists could come and speak in public. I have written anarticle about Jean Chardan, the French traveller in Iran in the

16th and 17th century. He spoke about the coffee houses inthe time of the Savafids when an atheist gets up and openly harangues the masses. Then a mullah gets up and openly speaks about Islam and the shariah, then a Sufi gets up andspeaks about mystical ideas and nobody bothers them. For heavens sake this was in the 17th century when the wars of religions were going on in the West.

One thing which I want to stress is that the concept of freedom of expression and freedom of conscience and belief is not an alien concept which is to be imposed on us by the

West. Why? Because we had the freedom of expression whenthe West did not have it. And the other point which I want tomake is that the freedom of expression in the West is not a secular idea, it is a religious idea. If you really study the whole

course of liberalism, civil society and freedom of expressionin the West, it came from the heart of religious debate. It was

when the Americans were trying to create a society of all thesecompeting factions that they discovered you cannot say its a Catholic state or a Protestant state or a Puritan state. You

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have to put this aside.

I was reading some words of Thomas Jefferson. He wassaying you cannot impose religion for two main reasons. Thefirst reason is that religion is a matter of conscience betweenman's belief. The Quran says "la ikraha fi din." Islam is a purist religion. There can be no better expression than"lakum dinakum," yours is your religion and mine is mine.

Therefore religion basically cannot be imposed. And the

second point he makes is that if you impose religion youdivide the community into two groups. A large number of people would be turned against religion and the other half willpretend to be religious because if force is used they have topretend. This is absolutely right. And this man was not anirreligious person. He was a religious person.

There is a sentence by Ernest Rolland who is anti-Christian. He says if Christianity is not imposed on the people

you will find the people will return back to Christ in the same way they did in the beginning. I would say the same thingabout Islam, take away the pressure. What are we sufferingfrom in Islamic countries? Not Western oppression at themoment. The problem in each of these countries is that thedominant powers have imposed their views on society in the

name of Islam. Which of these Islams are you going to takeor rather are you going back to the essence of it.

Someone mentioned John Stuart Mill. Let us talk about John Locke. In his essay on tolerance he makes two very important points. When he spoke in the 17th century what he said was very revolutionary, now it is very obvious. He saidreligion cannot be imposed because it is a matter of con-science. He also said something which is very important andapplicable to us at the present time. There is a distinction

between the powers of the government and the power of thechurch. If the government imposes some laws on taxation it has to implement them because this affects society and themoney must be collected. The same does not apply to thechurch.

You cannot go and say you must dress like this becausereligion is not of this order. It is about man's relationship withGod and you cannot use the same techniques as the govern-ment uses. These are very important points to bear in mind.I think this is the question for the next century. Either thereis a true and proper dialogue, which means we listen we donot just criticise or we take a negative attitude and then weare going to have the clash of civilisations as Samuel Huttingtonis talking about.

On the first anniversary of his election as president,Khatemi said something which was very interesting. He saidtwice freedom has been challenged by two powerful forces.

On both occasions freedom won and those forces lost. One was during the age of enlightenment and the church wasgoing to try and prevent, the church lost and freedom one.

The second time was in our time. Again a concept likesocialism, public welfare because it prevented freedom,socialism and communism lost and freedom won. If Islamicmosques and institutions try to prevent freedom we can besure that freedom will win and we will lose. This is important

because Islam is the religion of conscience, it is the religionof "rahmah". If we try to impose hundreds of points of view onour societies we are going to lose.

Intervention:

We have to consider how much historically Islam hadfreedom of expression and other freedoms. I think today there is need for some prerequisites before calling for free-dom of expression because I am afraid that even some so-called moderates in Islam are sensitive to criticism of some of the Islamic principles, Islamic history, Islamic concepts. I am

afraid if we call for freedom of expression before reforming theMuslim mind we might be asking for trouble. It is not that oneshould go before the other, maybe at the same time.

What I am afraid of is that sometimes when we call for freedom of expression we want the freedom to express what

we think but we do not want others to express what they think about us. So it is a two way thing. We do not want secularists in the Muslim world to speak, we do not want

extremists among Muslims to speak and we definitely do not want Westerners to speak. We will be very sensitive to that kind of criticism if our mind set doesn't change. This, as many of you here said, is a result of a general cultural problem anda cultural weakness. Despite our historic concepts of rich-ness and freedom the culture we have developed for a long,long time is a culture which is not conducive to freedom of expression.

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7/29/2019 Islam 21200002



One thing about the Muslim world is that those people who claim to believe in democracy don't seem to practise it and those who say they don't believe in democracy want topractise it. In a sense we have a situation where liberals in the

Muslim world, naturalists and secularists make many claimsabout democracy and the need for democracy and democra-tisation. But at the same time they are very reluctant to allow democracy to proceed in terms of the natural victories for Islamic parties. I think that the case in Algeria is a very goodexample of this, where you have FIS winning the election andcoming to win the second ballot. And you know what hap-pened. The army intervened and stopped the whole process,saying this is not democracy.

At the same time there are Islamists who say we do not believe in democracy, it has nothing to do with us, it is a Western device. But at the same time they are the ones whosay they represent the people, they represent opposition tothe government and a political structure to control the

Muslim world.

In this kind of division I am trying to look at how democracy can be understood within the context of theMuslim world and then try to see what its relationship withIslamism should be or could be.

Before I can do this I need to sketch my approach andhow I pose this question about democracy. The way tounderstand this question is to take the primacy of thepolitical. In oother words, I think, one of the most important questions about relations in society is that relating to thepolitical. By the political I don't mean a specialised kind of activity. I do not mean things that people do in parliament or government ministries. I do not necessarily mean things that people do when they protest against parliament or govern-ment ministries. The political is simply a condition that arises whenever you can make a distinction between friendand enemy. In any situation where it is possible for you to say these are my friends, these are my enemies, you have thepolitical. So when you can draw a line between us and them

you can have the political. That is to say that any sphere of social life can become politicised and can be politicised whenthere are conflicts if there is no special privilege to any kindof activity which is political by its definition.

Fifty years ago you had the emergence of the politicisationof gender roles in many Western countries where you had theargument that women should have equal rights such as the

right to vote and education. This issue was not consideredpolitical or a matter to be contested. It was considered a part of the natural order. Suddenly this matter began to bequestioned and contested within feminism to the extent that now you rarely have anyone questioning whether womenshould be able to vote, or that women should have access toeducation. This has become part of the accepted norm.

You can look back twenty years from now and see how difficult the idea of women going to work was. In Westerndemocracies it was a major issue and a major problem but now it is taken for granted in most places and in most contexts. So the political can arise in any kind of socialrelationship once you make the distinction between friendand enemy. And there is no privileged space of where the

political is. I want to emphasise this because there is a tendency for Western thought to try and say that there issomething called religion, which is the things that you do onSunday, Saturday's or Friday's, depending on your faith, andthere is politics that you do the rest of the time.

There is the idea that there is a distinction betweenreligion and politics, there is distinction between ethics andpolitics and there are other distinctions. I am trying todemonstrate that once you assert the primacy of the political

it is difficult to make those kinds of distinctions betweenreligion and politics stand.

I want to say something about the political. Politics issimply the way in which different contexts cope with thepolitical. If the political is about having friends and enemiesand having something which is contested that people don't agree upon, politics is a mechanism for people to deal withthat contestability and those antagonisms.

In offices and work places politics is managed differently than in parliament or other places. Different places havedifferent ways of managing things. Families do it in different

ways. So politics is simply the mechanism for coping with thepolitical. Once you make the distinction between friend and

enemy, once you decide that this is something you cannot agree upon than how do you make a rules for trying to deal

with that issue.

And in most situations you have some kind of agreement as to which things are considered to political and which arenot. The parliamentary system in this country works inissues where there may be discussion, for example, as to

whether the Bank of England should be controlled by parliament or it should be independent. It is a political issue

because it is something that must be discussed and agreedupon. But the rules for arriving at that agreement are agreedupon. So you go through parliament, you vote and it isaccepted that the majority party wins and the decision will

be carried.

So in a sense politics is simply a mechanism for coping with the political in any social order and in different contexts where the political may arise. For example you may have voting but in the family context you may not have voting. Youmay simply have parents deciding for their children what isright and how things are decided or not.

One of the ways democracy is represented is as a form of politics. It is a way that people argue that society shouldlearn to live with conflicts and differences. There are twomechanisms available. One is the idea of pure elections andsecondly the idea of representation.

The idea of elections is simply that in situations where youhave contestation rather than deciding things by use of violence you will go through the ballot, the ballot will deter-mine your interests and the elections act as a safety valve for

working out what the interests are. It is presented as a way of maintaining civil peace. And the second part which islinked to that is that the elections are seen to be representa-tive. This is quite crucial. The idea is that in the electiondifferent view are put forward and then they are actually represented through that process.

The idea of representation in this definition is actually pre-political. It suggests that people have intrinsic interests

which then need a plural mechanism like elections. There isno reason, logically, why you can't have representation

simply in one person or in one party. It does not require anelection. The idea is that there is plural representation.

Now this is one kind of idea for democracy. It is the onethat most people instinctively turn to when they definedemocracy. When, for example people talk about democrati-

Democracy and Islamism - Part 1By: Dr. Bobby Sayyid

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sation in the Muslim world, they suggest elections should beopen free and fair and there should be some representationof interests.

The difficulty with this technocratic understanding of democracy is that it is actually quite mechanistic in itsaccount. Firstly, and I think most people in this room areaware that having elections in itself doesn't guarantee any true representation, it doesn't guarantee safety, it doesn't

guarantee anything.

Very soon the president of Egypt will be elected with 97%of the vote. We know that the Soviet Union in its entire history managed to have elections all the time. In time, you can haveregimes like in the United States where you have elections for the president by something like 40 percent of the electorate.

And you have a large section of the population which iscompletely disenfranchised and has no political participa-tion. As one American writer put it in the United States youhave a one party system but the American give it the labelsof Democrat and Republican. But ultimately you simply have a one party system that works for itself.

This may be a slight caricature but there is a different

problem here with the idea of democratic deficit, namely that you can have elections which are rigged. I would suggest to you that most elections which take place in different parts of the world are rigged and if you haveelections which are not rigged you have the possibility that the elections themselvesdo not allow accurate choices to be made representingpeople's will.

You can argue that the same thing happened with thequestion of representation. Representation itself only worksin the context when you have strongly entrenched pre-political interests but it does not take into account that theinterests themselves are being constructed through a politi-cal process itself.

So even within this kind of technocratic understanding of democracy you can see that it can be flawed, it can be opento corruption. There is another way in which democracy operates and that is as a metaphor. Here the idea is that democracy may be incomplete, it may have many difficulties

with it but it is the only system which is viable and it is theonly system which can bring any kind of social good to thepeople.

The argument here is that democracy works not as a substantive set of procedures. It is a metaphor for goodgovernance. So democracy becomes what we imagine goodgovernment to be. It becomes a way of guaranteeing the goodlife among human beings. We can experiment with different

mechanisms but thats what it is really about.

The distinction with the idea that democracy is a goodgovernment really operates within the context of Westernpolitical thought. What it important to see is how democracy emerges as a marker not of specific practices, not of a set or procedural arrangements but as a cultural mark. It is very clear that when the Greeks talked about democracy theymeant it in contrast to the despotism of the Persian Empire. Andthey said we Greeks are democratic compared to the PersianEmpire which is despotic. They have a great king and all hissubjects are slaves, whereas we are free men.

Now let is unwrap this one. We are not talking about allGreeks but about Athenians. Women, slaves and foreigners

did not have any political rights. But the crucial idea is to what extent was the average Greek man of Athens freer than theaverage Persian man of the Persian Empire? This is what the

whole debate is centred around. It depends on how youactually talk about freedom. But certainly if you look at thecontext, most Greek societies including Athens itself were

fairly small scale, they were extremely policed not necessar-ily by having an effective police force but by having communalpressures on peers, neighbours etc etc.

Anyone who has lived in a small town knows how claus-trophobic it can be. The idea that one is free in a small towncan be compared to a vast organisation like the PersianEmpire where the king had no idea about what you weredoing and didn't care what you were doing. As long as you

paid your taxes and didn't say too much he left you alone.

Who was more free? After all it was the Athenians whoasked Socrates to take hemlock for his beliefs. The PersianEmpire managed to contain within itself people who believedin many gods, no gods, some gods or one god without necessarily getting too excited about it. But in the Atheniancase you have quite a controlled idea of the individual. So

what I suggest here is that the difference between democracy and despotism is culturally discussed as the difference

between tyranny and freedom or any of its analogues. It isactually more about the difference between the Westernculture and others. And that is why I suggest that democracy actually operates more often as a cultural marker.

Think for a moment if you can about any regime anywherein the world about a regime that was anti-Western and that

would still be described problematically as democratic. I would suggest to you that it is almost impossible to think of these two things together. You cannot imagine an anti-

Western regime that is democratic.

There are a number of reasons for this. One is the way in which over a number of years the idea of what is the trueessence of human kind has now become related to being thesame as what is true within Western cultural practices.

The idea is that only in the West are humans truly humanand everything else is either cultural accretions or deviationsfrom that norm. Now within that idea of course you have thepossibility then that only within Western democracy can thetrue spirit of human beings realise itself. But within that course is a caveat that the true human looks like, talks like,

walks like, eats like someone from the West. There is somesort idea here that as you get to the West you become freer and freer and that the idea that somehow maybe the ultimatehuman being is a Californian in some way and once we all

become Californian we will truly be in touch with ourselvesand be truly human.

Some people say rather factiously that the reason theBerlin Wall fell was that people wanted to wear Levy jeansand they wanted to express themselves and embrace theculture of consumerism. The culture of consumerism is a

historical culture, it is something universal, it is somethingimprinted on our DNA etc. So there is the whole idea that either the West, because of its genius was able to uncover thetrue human being. Or if you want to be a little more subtle youcould say that the West just happened to run into thisdiscovery that what it does is what human being are like.

But regardless of the approach you take, the conclusionis very similar and that is that universal values are locked into

being Western and democracy becomes a mechanism for allowing those true universal ideas to erupt and allow us to

be human. So in a sense democracy is no longer definedsimply as a set of political arrangements which may bepragmatically. It actually becomes linked to a wider horizonof what the world is like, the question of human nature and

ultimately what is the destiny of the world itself.

Now what is the relationship between democracy andIslamism? This is the issue to be tackled in the second part of the article. [To be continued..]

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Faith without Represent at ion:

The notions of state and citizen, which underpin the modern

discourse of Human Rights, are problematic in that they bothare conspicuously absent in the classical civilization of Islam.Despite the intimate connection that has always existed

between the Islamic doctrine and the exercise of politicalpower, Muslim tradition never developed any concept of thestate - a territorial entity which is ‘sovereign’ within its

boundaries and whose authority is binding both on the ruler and the ruled. It conceived of Islamic order in transcendentalterms as the rule of Divine Law (Shari a ) and defined Muslim

body-politic as a sacred moral community (umma) whichstands above all mundane institutions. Traditional thought,consequently, accepts no institution, be it secular or clerical,native or foreign, as representative of Islam, as incarnatingthe body-politic/body-islamic. Hence the modern debate,

which reproduces endless variations on the single theme of the citizen’s negotiation with the state, largely escapes theMuslim audience.

To speak of Human Rights (henceforth abbreviated as HR) isessentially to speak about the claims of the citizen against thestate . For the moral costume of Human Rights fits only the

body-secular of our humanity, the modern system of paro-chial nation-states that are sovereign within their own terri-tories. The beneficiary of these rights then is the citizen andthe not the believer , the normal category for apprehending anideal individual in the Islamic tradition. Given also the fact that the modern state is ‘secular’, that it professedly makesno claims to guiding its citizens’ destinies beyond the mun-

dane, that it offers no doctrine of ‘salvation’, it is not surpris-ing that it does not define the core of Muslim identity or constitute the highest locus of a Muslim’s loyalty. Hence, thefirst problem that demands recognition in any Muslim debateon HR concerns the nature of the political order which themodern Muslim can accept as his/her own. (The historicalsituation of our age needs emphasis as the classical theory of the Islamic rule (Hukuma ) does not seem to answer our needs. In fact, it cannot be reconciled with the prevailinginternational order and its legal tenets.) Without resolving thequestion of the nature and constitution of Muslim publicorder today, it is futile to participate in the HR discourse andmake any worthwhile contribution. For the crucial, nay controversial, question forced upon the Islamic tradition by HR is: Whether citizenship is, or can be made, synonymous

with the membership in a ‘faith community’, or whether thetwo are based on contrary principles of historical order.

Alternatively, we may phrase the question as: How can theMuslim become a citizen, and hence a beneficiary of the HRsscheme, without renouncing his obligations to the sacred law and the community of his faith?

It also needs emphasizing that that contemporary Muslimdebate has been plagued by intellectual confusion and moraltimidity. Finding themselves on the receiving end of thecivilizational exchange, Muslims of our times have been moreconcerned with the preservation of their heritage than with

any explorations of their future. Muslim response to secular world-order, a creation of Islam’s former rival, the Christian West, which is also its principal beneficiary, is a case in point.Because the modern state appropriates the Divine attributeof ‘sovereignty’ and claims for itself the right to ‘legislate’(hence, standing above the Revealed Law), it has been

received with much suspicion and considerable hostility inthe Muslim world. None of its otherwise appealing tenets,such as freedom of conscience and equality before law, have

made any headway in contemporary Muslim consciousness.

Muslim societies, preoccupied as these have been with thepreservation of the ‘dignity and integrity of the believer’, havenot discerned the significant improvement of civil liberties

which such a minimalist, secular, state also heralds. Against the onslaught of foreign ideologies, Muslims instinctively rose to defend their tradition – despite the fact that the task entailed upholding dated and worn out interpretations of medieval fuqaha, which even appeared to deplete the moral

vitality of the Qur’anic text itself. And this happened with therecognition that every Muslim state flouts the letter and thespirit of the sacred Law, just as every Muslim ruler today scouts at any secular demand for the safeguard of the rights

of the citizen. So in actual fact, neither the civil liberties of thecitizen nor the sacred dignity of the believer have beenaccorded any respect beyond the perfunctory lip service, a sad state of affairs which makes the culture of human rightsa veritable oddity in the Muslim world.

Strange Bed-mat es :

Much confusion was also spread by uninformed and unsus-pecting ideologues who coined blatantly self-contradictory neologisms like ‘The Islamic State’ and made them part of theindigenous discourse. Believing that ‘state’ is simply a mod-ern euphemism for political order, they were led to equatefaith with coercion, and ended up by conferring legitimacy to

totalitarian structures they called Islamic! Little did they realise that these vacuous abstractions could not be re-deemed by historical analysis, or that ‘Islam’ defined as ‘state’

was nothing but a secular heresy. (One need not confoundthe modern theory with the classical f iqhi (juristic) models of kh i la fa or imama . The latter were veritable doctrines of authori ty /pow er but they lacked the idea of statehood that iscontingent on the claims of territorial sovereignty and imper-sonal rule.)

This transformation - disfigurement - of Islam into an ideol-ogy did produce at least one casualty - the Islamic tradition.It could no longer assert its right to be judged on its own terms

but had to prove its legitimacy by out-secularising the secular state, by accepting that goods and gadgets are as salubriousas salah and zakah ! But even secular ideology suffered as a consequence; it was never given proper hearing in the court of appeal of Islamic conscience. Even its self-imposed neu-trality in matter of faith, its putatively agnostic creed whichregards the ‘teleological’ question about the end and meaningof human existence outside of its jurisdiction, has beendismissed as of no consequence. Perhaps the secular statedoes not appeal to the Muslims because it has no answer tothe ultimate question of the goal of human existence, whileIslamic conscience demands guidance as well as governance from the state.

Given the fact that no proper discussion of HR is possible without acquiescing in to the modern - secular - theory of thestate, it is imperative that we closely examine the Muslimsentiment with regard to the cardinal tenet of secularity,namely the separation of Church and State. The instinctiveMuslim response, which is now aggressively propagated as a

Islam and Human Rights: A Modernist Guide - Part 1By: Dr. S. Parvez Manzoor

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sacred tenet of the Islamic doctrine, maintains that not only is such a ‘bifurcation’ un-Islamic, but it is also impossible toimplement as there is no ‘church’ in Islam. And yet, nearly everyone is also willing to concede that the faith of Islam istranscendent, spiritual and eternal while the existentialreality of the Muslims is immanent, political and historical. Inshort, no one contests that that there exists now, as it hasexisted since the time of the Prophet and his righteous

successors, a gulf between the ideals and realities of Islam. True enough, Muslims have never despaired of this failingand construed it either as a shocking paradox, or as a crueland irreconcilable contradiction between faith and existence,

between Islam and history.

What is characteristically Islamic here is then not the sepa-ration but the refusal to construe this contradiction as ananti-historical doctrine that deprives Islam of any moral andpolitical role in the world. The Muslim contention is not withthe keeping of the two orders of reality, the temporal and theeternal, separate and distinct but with the debasement anddevaluation of the existential and the historical that alsocomes with this separation and which is the very heart and

soul of many religious traditions. The reasons for Islam’sunflinching commitment to the historical - the this-world of theology - are not far to seek. The historical and the existen-tial is the testing ground of morality and Islam, which isunconditionally committed to upholding the sovereignty of the moral, cannot do without them. Politics as the quest for a just historical order is therefore intrinsic to Islam andincumbent upon its community. It does not however consti-tute the end and the goal of the believer’s faith.

Confess ion vs . Conscienc e

The ruling idea of the modern state, and that of HR, it needsreminding, arose out of the European experience that had

been conditioned by the institutionalisation of the spiritualand the temporal as the realms of the pope and the prince.

The ideology and morality of the HR is therefore intelligibleand meaningful only within this dualistic framework. Thestate as a secular institution rose in response to confessional

wars which plagued European polities during the seven-teenth century. With time, even the believers came to prefer the non-confessional state to the supremacy of the rivalchurch that made religious affiliation a benchmark of politi-cal loyalty. In other words, it was an experience not unlikethat of the Muslims in their early history, where too sectarianstrife and civil wars were instrumental in the constitution andconsolidation of the ‘apolitical’ Sunni community (Ahl a l- Sunna w a’ l Jam a a ). It was the failure of religious bodies toagree upon a single locus of authority that made the searchfor an alternative source of sovereignty possible. As theChristians came to the realisation that no agreement inmatters of public importance was possible on the basis of faith, they chose a new authority that was trans-confessional,though with time it also came to be, anti-confessional.

Be that as it may, the important point for Muslims to reflect over is that the modern state is not , as is generally acclaimed,neutral with respect to religion. No, it cannot tolerate religionas an institutional and political force: It banishes religiosity,as it were, from the domains of power and knowledge andpours it into individual conscience. The freedom of con-

science and religion, which the secular state is proud touphold, is therefore a vacuous kind of freedom; it does not allow those who enjoy it any degree of autonomy with respect to the actualisation of their ideals. For the secular state doesnot accept that either statecraft or public morality may bederived from religious consciousness. Religion in the secular

world-view and practice is something personal, trans-histori-cal and politically innocuous. It has no aspiration to the re-making of the world.

That freedom of conscience or religion has evolved into sucha sacrosanct tenet of secular morality, including that of theHR ethos, is understandable, given the backdrop of religious

wars against which the modern state makes its debut. Nor

may it be denied that a confessional state does not, andprobably cannot, guarantee full freedom of religion andconfession to its subjects (Freedom of conscience is a tauto-logical euphemism; for conscience is always free. It is itspublic - political - manifestations that provoke the coercivepowers of the state.) The man of a different faith andconfession represents, after all, the other of the religious self .

The other of the secular self, similarly, is not the believer but the citizen of a different, potentially rival, state. Not surpris-ingly, just as the confessional state discriminates against itsother, the member of a rival faith or church, so does thesecular state, except that its discriminatory treatment ismeted out to the non-citizen, the veritable alien of our times.

That great moral stigma is attached to the ‘other’ of theconfessional state, whereas everyone takes the legal dis-crimination of a foreign citizen for granted, is a tellingcommentary on the irrelevance of religion and religiouscommunity in the modern political system. I t has very l i t t le bearin g on the question of morali ty , as no poli t ical system is kn own to man that d oes not make a dist inct ion betw een the pol i t ical ‘sel f ’ and i ts ‘other’ , favouring the former an d penal is- ing the latter . (Politics is quintessentially parochial and per-force entails the judgment of inclusion and exclusion , of separating friends from foes. Systems claiming universality,usually religions, churches and ideologies, are universal only in their ‘transcendent’, apolitical and ahistorical, aspects.)Similarly, the much acclaimed equali ty of all cit izens in a

secular state is matched by the equally emphatic claim of theequali ty of all believers in a faith-community. Nor can weoverlook the fact that the secular state-system produces itsown ambiguities. For instance, the richer states of the worldare already under pressure, and guilty of moral dubiousness,in the face of the influx of refugees and asylum-seekers. Thecontradictions of the legal doctrine of equality of all citizensand the moral sentiment of solidarity with all humans areclearly exposed in their policies, causing much tension

between the moral and the pragmatic sections of their populace.

Pragmatic Option s

Whatever the attraction and justification for the Islamicthinker to apprehend and delineate the ideological andmetaphysical parameters of the secular state, it must bereserved for another forum. On this occasion, we need to start from the reality of the secular system of territorial states to

which all Muslim regimes have given their full allegiance.Every Muslim community today is part of the global state-system and ostensibly exercises ‘sovereignty’ within the

borders of a parochial and territorial entity. Muslim states arealso signatories to the United Nations’ ‘Charter of the Funda-mental and Universal Human Rights’ and as such morally and legally bound to honour and implement its provisions.Moreover, with few exceptions, contemporary Muslim rule is

alien, arbitrary and predatory. Hence, it must not be allowedto use ‘Islam’, or the medieval formulations of Muslim jurists,as the legitimising argument for its oppression and denial of the fundamental rights of their citizenry. Cynicism against HR is also cynicism against Islam. Despite our - theoreticaland metaphysical - reservations against the secular-human-

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ist ethos of HR, we must, Muslims qu a citizens, promote thecause of HR; for the theoretical resolution may come later,and not to be beneficiaries of a humane political culture

would be infinitely more grievous.

Far more appealing and congenial to the Muslim tradition isthe alternative strand of HR morality that constitutes a reflection on the theme of a Jus t Wor ld Orde r. There can be

no denying that it is fully consonant with the Qur’anic themesof Khi lafa andAmana , humanity’s collective responsibility for the care and subsistence of the world. Hoping that Muslimthinkers will take up this challenge and enrich the discourseof HR from this Qur’anic vantage-point, which is morecongenial to the collective notion of Hum ani ty Rights rather than the incumbent one that places individual liberty at thecentre, it would be proper to re-focus our attention on thenature of the HR theory and its implications for Muslimthought.

Sentim ental i ty not Rationality

Despite the unsteady and lopsided philosophical founda-

tions of the HR doctrine, it has become the spearhead of moral consciousness in our days. Indeed, such is its emo-tional sway that to contest the notion of human rights, even

within a philosophical context and in good faith, is to invitethe inquisitional fury of the liberal Church. And yet, ironi-cally, the political tradition most ardently committed topromoting an individualistic view of the world, liberalism,seems to be ill at ease with the notion of the ‘universality’ of rights. Its philosophical scepticism and core claims about theimpermanence and intractability of moral argument do not cohere with the postulation of ‘transcendence’ that consti-tutes the normative ground of the HR civil morality. Whilesome supporters of HR strike a Kantian posture and promotea cross-cultural vision of the HR, others are highly censorious

of any effort to ground HR in a timeless, ahistorical andunsituated rationality. Equally adamant is their refusal toaccept any theoretical justification for divorcing ethics frompolitics. Thus the mood of the philosophical discourse of HR oscillates between universalism and scepticism, between theeuphoria of transcendence and the sobriety of contingency.

Against the kind of foundational approach to HR morality that is represented by the Kantians, postmodernism repre-sents a most potent antidote. The search for a foundation tohuman nature and rationality, and the concomitant propen-sity to take ontology or history as a guide to life, thepostmodernist guru, Richard Rorty contends, is quite mis-guided. If anything, the argument proceeds, history andanthropology make us think of ourselves as ‘the flexible,protean, self-shaping, animal rather than as the rationalanimal or the cruel animal.’ Indeed, the only fact of our natureis ‘our extraordinary malleability’. (How could there be a ‘self-shaping’ animal without the possession of wi l l , which in itsturn requires rationali ty , is beyond my comprehension? Andif there is no human ‘nature’, what is this entity ‘self’ that wemay perpetually shape and re-shape?) Notwithstanding thelogical backslides of the argument, the postmodernist mes-sage is quite unambiguous: HR theory needs no foundationin deeper moral knowledge or knowledge of human nature.

The de facto acceptance of global “human rights culture”renders HR foundationalism outmoded and superfluous. In

short, the categorical imperative to the defence of HR needhave no cognitive basis!

Consistent with this anti-foundationalism is the assertionthat not ‘rationality’ but ‘sentimentality’ is the faculty through

which human solidarity is promoted. Hence, the suggestion

is that we should concentrate on ‘manipulating our feelingsrather than increasing our knowledge.’ Only through ‘senti-mental education’ may we enlarge our self-image and ‘ex-pand the reference of the terms “our kind of people” and“people like us”.’

Certainly, the argument has some force. For, who can deny that through its total control of the agencies of sentimental

education, its unchallenged monopoly of over all the media of propagation, the West is in the unique position of promotinghuman solidarity as never before. Unfortunately, however, sofar this awesome power to influence minds and hearts of people has been used only for the aggrandisement of the

western man, just as the demonizing of Islam and theMuslims has been the principal ambition of this propaganda machine. Whatever its other discomforts, these insight wouldseem to suggest that for the promotion of a genuine HR culture, an equitable distribution of the means of ‘sentimen-tal education’ is a prerequisite.

The Sec ular Indictme nt

We must realise that the Muslim indecision, or inability, to bepart of the formative HR debate is bound to have disastrousconsequences for the Islamic tradition. For what, in itsoriginal setting, is, at best, a fluid theory, a wishful moralsentiment, or a misguided foundationalism, may easily present itself in a cross-Islamic context as a sacred canon, a legal fa i t accompli , and a binding charter, to which the only permissibleMuslim response is compliance and submission. Further,rightly and wrongly, HR activists feel that their most ardent opponent is the Muslim tradition, especially its ‘fundamen-talist’ wing. That they confound the genuine Islamic re-sponse, which is yet to be articulated, with the politicalexpedient statements by the hired spokesmen of despoticMuslim regimes, is no doubt disturbing to the committed

Muslim thinker, the focus of whose loyalty is no politicalestablishment of the day.

As for the HR’s criticism of the Islamic tradition, it is deliveredas a standard secular-liberal indictment of the f iqhi model of Islamic order in which the ‘state’ (i.e. community) figures asa - problematical, ambiguous and opaque - metaphor of faithand which expresses ‘metaphysical’ tents like nul la sa lus extra ecclesiam as the civil inequality of the believer and theprotected. Predictably, then, the locus of the critique is on‘discrimination against women and non-Muslims’, ‘restric-tions on the rights and freedoms of women’, and ‘freedom of religion in Islamic human rights schemes.’ The only novelty of the HR discourse is that the secularist inquisition isconducted not in the language of power but in that of morality, not within the courtroom of Weltgeschichte but inside the sanctuary of HR.

The HR idea, it is my conviction, does not present Muslimthought with any insurmountable moral challenge. Islam hasthe moral and intellectual resources to meet all the demandsof HR conscience. The recurrent Muslim insistence on taqwa rather than fa twa clearly testifies to the fact that the f iqhi model of Islamic order is not coterminous with Islam. OnceMuslims, as the civil society of the Umma, have succeeded inharnessing indigenous polities, which at present are only serving alien interests, and have delineated their idea of statehood, all the provisions of the HR charter can be met.Further, Muslim states too can relate to the rhetoric of HR ina spirit of genuine compliance, or cynically in terms of self-interest. They have after all the benefit of learning from the

Western powers! [To be continued... . . . . . .]

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PAGE 17, Islam21, February 2000 As for those who accept the facile dichotomy of modernisa-tion-traditionalism as a moral fact, it should be impressedupon them that the kind of antiquated evolutionism they soardently espouse is inimical to the very idea of morality! For the modern society, which incarnates the superior morality of HR, is either the outcome of - an inevitable and pre-determined - historical process, or, it is the product of contingent and blind forces. In either case, it owes nothing tothe actions and decisions the moral will which, per definition,

operates neither in necessity nor in chance! Historicism andHR morality, in other words, are based on contradictory principles.

Universal ism and its Discontent s

To claim universality for a manifestly contingent and expedi-ent charter of HR, then, is either to lack all philosophicalsophistication or to possess exceptional political guile. For the theory of universal human rights can only be reconciled

with the notion of historical development, if history hasalready come to an end and civil morality has reached itsfinality in the ethos of the modern civilisation. If so, theapprehensive Muslim may justifiably wonder, whether the

rhetoric of the universality of HR masks the claim of themodern society to be the End? Further, does this coming of the End abrogate every other historical project, Islam in-cluded, and abolish its future? These fears may not beunfounded: Western hegemony, after all, is always legiti-mated as a theory of the end of history. The HR debate merely alerts us to the making of a new polemics according to whichresistance to western hegemony is no longer a resistance toany actual historical power group but to the universalmorality of human rights, nay to the moral aspirations of thehuman community itself! Surely, then, the universality of human rights is as much of a political claim as a moral one.

As such, it deserves more than a casual scrutiny or perfunc-tory lip-service.

Whatever the philosophical discomforts of the universaltheory of HR, it cannot be gainsaid that the notion of humanrights is able to call upon a consensus that is far wider andmore universal than that of western civilisation. Indeed, it has captured Muslim imagination and stirred Islamic con-science as well. Modern Muslim scholars, who have exam-ined the concept of Haqq (Right) in Islamic law, have come tothe conclusion that despite the fact that traditional juristsnever articulated a precise definition, Islamic law not only

was cognisant of haqq but it even developed other morecomprehensive and precise concepts such as hukm (moral

values) which subsumed the former.

In the West, however, despite its ‘natural’ and ‘universal’appeal, the theory of natural or human rights has had many critics and detractors. For Jeremy Bentham, for instance, the

very idea of such rights was ‘nonsense on stilts’; for EdmundBurke, their ‘abstract perfection’ was also their ‘practicaldefect’; for Alasdair MacIntyre, human rights are fictions...like ‘witches and unicorns’; and for Cathrine MacKinnon,‘international human rights are so abstract that people whoconcretely believe polar opposites can agree on them onprinciple and give them equally to no one. Both a Stalin anda Solzhenitsyn can embrace them.’

Of course, these strictures apply only to the legal positivismof the HR theory and are not meant to debunk the ideal of a humane political culture of mankind. To have misgivingsabout HR is therefore neither to renounce the ideal of a common humanity nor to abandon the quest for humanepolitics. It is, as expressed by its most cogent and passionatefeminist critic, Catharine MacKinnon, ‘to look beyond the

legal formalism of formal equality to social consequences’. It is to realise ‘that although inequality hurts individuals, it only hurts them as members of social groups.’ The tragedy of Chechnya clearly shows that international guarantees of HR are no substitute for collective political struggle.

The most powerful objection to the legal formalism of therights theory, which disregards the political and social con-text of the right situation and takes no notice of the commu-

nal mooring of the individual, is articulated by Leo Strauss, who says: ‘Liberalism stands or falls by the distinction between state and society, or by the recognition of a privatesphere, protected by law but impervious to the law, with theunderstanding that above all, religion as particular religion

belongs to the private sphere. Just as certainly as the liberalstate will not “discriminate” against its Jewish citizens, so it is constitutionally unable and even unwilling to prevent “discrimination” against Jews by individuals and groups. Torecognise the private sphere in the sense indicated means topermit “private discrimination”, to protect it and thus in fact to foster it. The liberal state cannot provide a solution to the

Jewish problem, for such a solution would require a legalprohibition against every kind of “discrimination”, i.e. the

abolition of the private sphere, the denial of the difference between state and society, the destruction of the liberalstate.’ Unfortunately, what was once the Jewish problem, isnow the Muslim problem. Liberal European states accord fullcitizenship rights to its Muslim population, liberal civilsocieties persecute them. Similarly, liberal world-order treatsMuslim states as outcasts and pariahs. It is high time that werealise that HR-talk is power-talk and learn to deal with it sagaciously and pragmatically.

The moral impasse in which humanity finds itself today requires a cure far more potent than the anodyne of HR: Allthe men and horses of Human Rights cannot put the Humpty-Dumpty of our forlorn humanity together again. The current

Charter of HR does not contain any viable solution to theproblem of global injustice; it does not constitute a blue-print for a Just World-Order. Nor is any cross-cultural approach tothe universalism of the HR’s ideology anything but a delu-sion. After all, what legitimacy does a cross-cultural dialoguecarry when ‘Western’ technology and gadgetry has taken theplace of religion in being the opium for the people. Unless one

believes that goods do not convey ideas, or that cross-culturaldialogue is matter of trading goods not ideas, or that culturalexchange is merely a one-sided transfer, one must see themoral futility of such a ‘dialogue’ in an unjust and hegemonic

world as ours. Further, the Charter of HR does not say anything about the ‘rights of humanity’ or ‘rights of nature’

because such a discourse would be subversive of the wholeethos of industrial and post-industrial society.

Utopia or Transc ende nce ?

The greatest problem with the HR idea is that it is based ona misreading of man’s political nature. For if everyone isgratuitously assured of certain rights (privileges?), then what point is there in collective political struggle by which, our human experience shows, rights are wrested from those inpower. And most virile nations would rather be donors thanrecipients of rights. Further, only by political action do wemake history to submit to our will. Must we, then, accept thecurrent Charter of HR as a fait a ccompli and be swallowed by

the Western – Hegelian - myth of ‘the end of history’? Must our global morality be merely an extension of the WesternRealpolitik ? Or, expressed in traditional Islamic rhetoric,must the Muslim, in facing the HR tribunal, renounce hisright to political struggle, to cultural and moral autonomy? To

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ensure the universality of the HR idea, we would need a conception of a universal Gemeinschaft of man, and not merely a globalGesellschaft of warring states. Whether sucha universal human community can be erected on the contin-gent morality/legality of HR, or whether it requires thepermanence of Divine imperative and human submission(Islam ) remains to be seen.

Whatever the nature of the cynicism and political guile that vitiates the practice of HR today, Muslims need to espouse itsmoral and utopian aspirations. We must realise that thecitizen does not live by order alone; s/he demands virtue as

well. Human existence within a political society cannot beexhausted by the politics of power and utility, it also needs a ‘metaphysical’ infrastructure of morality and transcendence.Ironically, even the Secular City, which once revolted against tradition in the name of realism and substituted political

virtue for human excellence, today prescribes a set of ‘funda-mental’ commandments that are anything but realistic. Andit proclaims a ‘universal’ charter of public morality that isintransigently and militantly provincial. Out of the Machi-avellian bag of ra ison d ’éta t jumps the utopian cat of HumanRights!<O:P</O:P

Modern conscience now demands that the state, the linchpinof all pragmatic order, submit to the dictates of a morality that is universal. It must limit the claim of legal sovereignty andrestrict the authority of the general will. Both the HobbesianLeviathan, the Mortal God, and the Hegelian Geist, God’smarch on earth, must bow before the sovereign individualand acknowledge his inviolability. And this goes even for theIslamic state which lays claim to the mandate of Divine

Vicegerency (Khi lafa ). For within the moral scheme of HumanRights, the actual member of a historical community, le citoyen , is subordinate to the abstract being, l ’ homme . Thelatter alone is the full beneficiary of civil liberties. Relinquish-ing of the communitarian attributes, then, is a necessary precondition for the enjoyment of ‘inalienable’ rights!

Against the genocidal backdrop of Chechnya, Bosnia andNazi Germany, the real test of the humanity of a society, thepontifical Western theory is in need of some humility. But sois the modern Islamic one, which has produced few, if any,humane ideas during the last two centuries. Away from theutopian pastures of individual rights and on the existential

battlefield of politics, classical Muslim civilisation may have behaved as humanely and civilly as any other, its moderninheritors however are not following its tradition in the battleof ideas. Their discussion with the proponents of HR needs to

be honest and realistic, but it must also be moral and visionary. The HR debate must not become a sermon to thealready converted but must provide a forum for the moralconscience of humanity. Not only religions but also statesand state-systems, not only the traditional civilisation of Islam but also the modern Leviathan of secularism, must bearraigned before the court of universal moral conscience.Such a discourse, if and when it comes to actuality, must beassured the fullest collaboration of the Islamic intellect andconscience.

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Modernity and Intellectual Imperialism

<O:P</O:P

<O:P</O:P

The discourse of modernity constitutes the principal mode of articulationabout our age. It delivers the most authoritative account of the present as

the best of all possible worlds. As such, it seeks to legitimize the current

hierarchy of powers and lend credence to the self-authenticating

narratives of those who serve its cause. However, the very justification of modernity as a critique of the past engenders a reflection on its legitimacy

that cannot be exhausted by circular logic and self-referential claims.

Thus, to pursue the theme of modernity is not to remain confined to the

prison of the present, or to glorify the secular man in the mirror of

history. Nay, it is to cross-over from the realm of history to that of theory,

to enter that normative kingdom where transcendence competes with

temporality, and where pragmatism, expediency and will-to-power maynever fully remove the fig-leaf of idealism, morality and will-to-truth.

Like all seminal myths, then, the meta-narrative of modernity is ambigu-

ous, polymorphous and self-contradictory. In our times, it may just aswell provide an apology for the current world-order as it may yield an

argument against its legitimacy. Little wonder that any theory of

modernity, whether it explicitly denounces Islam or implicitly censures it,

whether it stridently rejects its claims or expediently ignores them, is of

capital importance to the Muslim. It is an indispensable part of the self-critical inquiry through which contemporary Islam enhances its con-

sciousness and purifies its conscience.

<O:P</O:P

One highly suggestive and ambitious account of our world, of modernity

as the progressive secularization of the realms of power and knowledge,

has been provided by the French scholar and professor of social sciences,

Marcel Gauchet. (The Disenchantment of the World: A Political Historyof Religion.Translated by Oscar Burge. Princeton University Press,

1997.) Whatever its intellectual daring, academic erudition, ideological

insights or other merits, the work cannot be characterized, in the view of

this critic, but as a hymn to the glories and passions of the modern,

western man. The coming of the his world is here presented as a

narcissistic tale that may equally be viewed as an impudent monument of

intellectual imperialism. Hence, by purporting to impart new meaningand significance to the myth of salvation through secularity, it merely

reinforces the ideological claim of modernity. It is a tract of speculative

history viewed through the Eurocentric prism of Hegelian philosophy and

Weberian sociology, even if its overall intellectual orientation derives

from the quasi-mystical vision of Durkheimian anthropology. For all its

seductive appeal, however, it is a work of ‘grand theory’, a suggestive but

unsubstantiated reading of the ‘human condition’ as ‘universal history’,and an apology of the present and the status quo.

<O:P</O:P

Pivotal in this edifying tale of humanity’s march towards the utopia of

modernity (for such is the ideological tenor of this tract) is the role and

function of ‘religion’. Religion, according to this ‘global theory’, was the

primordial mode of being that provided the first model for social

orientation towards the world. Gauchet does not, however, reproduce asimplistic evolutionist theory. No, religion, he insists, is not merely a set

of beliefs, a primitive and naïve cosmology that requires man to humble

himself before the powers of nature. On the contrary, his argument is that

we must have a theoretical paradigm that allows us to recognize that ‘the

traits of civilization which we equate with the absence of development

mightalso have completely different ends than development.’ Humanity

is not oriented in only one direction, is his clear pronunciation. Neverthe-less, the original religious mode of being was one of resignation, of

‘dispossession’ in that man’s defining potentialities were peremptorily

abandoned. Religious man, as it were, voluntarily emptied his pockets so

as to spare himself the pain of being robbed. A more meaningful way of

construing this dispossession would be, according to Charles Taylor who

introduces this work, to view it as an effort ‘to foreclose the endless

search for meaning and to establish firmly the sense of reality.’

<O:P</O:P

The rest of human history which ultimately lands us in the secularity of modernity is, according to Gauchet, the story of the break up of the unityof religious consciousness. It is a paradigmatic shift, or a quantum leap if

you will, from the religious belief in the priority of the world and the

established scheme of things to the modern one which accepts the

priority of humans and their ability to shape their own worlds. The radical

originality of the modern Western world, accordingly, ‘lies wholly in its

reincorporation in the very heart of human relationships and activities, of

the sacral element, which previously shaped this world from outside.’ Forout of ‘the decline of systematic exteriority’ has emerged that ‘totality of

factors’ which distinguish, according to Gauchet, ‘our civilization’s

foundations from those of previous societies.’ Some of the key elements

of modernity, thus, are: ‘politics based on representation, systematic

investment in the future, knowledge based on objective causes, control-

ling nature and increasing productivity as an end in itself.’ Though ‘thisreversal of the age-old organizing influence of religion’ is normallyapprehended in terms of the ‘secularization of the sacred’, the above

characterization of modernity by Gauchet leaves no doubt in our mind

that it may just as rightfully be perceived as the ‘sacralization of the

secular.’ Indeed, the dichotomy of sacred-secular appears misguided here

as the paradigmatic shift is far more fundamental and metaphysical: it

testifies to the replacement of the consciousness of transcendence by that

of immanence. At any rate, it validates the Muslim insight (anxiety!) that

modernity, mediated as it is by incarnationist Christianity, signals thedeath of transcendence!

<O:P</O:P

For Gauchet, the two most seminal agents of this transformation are theinstitution of the state and the theological discoveries of Christianity: the

state, by following the pragmatic, political logic of this world, weakened

the power of religion, and Christianity, by proclaiming an eschatologicalutopia beyond the ambit of the temporal state, devalued the authority of

politics. It created that fateful split between heaven and earth which

initially led to the autonomy of the political state from the authority of the

Church but ultimately, of its sovereignty over the Church itself. Signifi-

cantly, though Gauchet is quite sympathetic, nay lyrical, about the

contribution of Christianity to modernity, he eulogizes a Christianity

which no Christian would accept as his/her own. It is a purely culturalphenomenon which has/can have no claim to any trans-temporal truth or

Divine Revelation. (For a self-professed non-believer, these are not

intellectually defensible options.) Like its founder, then, Christianity’s

real worth lies in its sacrificial salvation: by its death it redeems the world

of politics and make possible the naissance of the secular state! As for

Islam and Judaism, Gauchet’s sparse comments and summary insights

do not stretch beyond the regurgitation of the crassest medieval preju-

dices. (Cf.: ‘ A god with no empire: This is what separates the ChristianGod from the terrifying God of Israel, preoccupied with the victory of his

followers, or from the God of Muhammad and his true believers’ duty

the expand the realm of the true faith through arms.’! Perhaps, it is not

squeamish to add that the only snag with this claim is that it has no

collateral in actual history! Further, leaving aside Islam, one wonders how

many of the Jewish victims of Christian sovereignty would accept the

claim that the Christian God was/is ‘a god with no empire’.) Finally, itmust be underlined that Gauchet’s pivotal category, ‘religion’, that

universal and primeval ‘mode of being’ which relegates all the historicaltraditions of monotheism to the status of the heralds of the modern state

(!), is a secular construct. Its sole function is to provide legitimacy to the

secular politics of modernity and has nothing to do with the personal faith

of the countless number of believers.

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PAGE 21, Islam21, February 2000 <O:P</O:P

For all its ideational richness and analytical acumen, Gauchet’s theory is a

panegyric to the unique achievements of the modern, western man. Both

Christianity and secularity are his mistresses and humanity his

handmaiden. Surely these are the tenets of the new intellectual imperial-

ism that is spreading its wings in the wake of the modernist dawn!

<O:P</O:P

<O:P</O:P

Stockholm S Parvez

Manzoo

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Iqbel, the Philosopher of Islam

Through his unremitting endeavours to revive Islamic thought, to

rejuvenate the dynamism and creativity of Islam, his revolt against thepolitical moral and intellectual decrepitude of his times, Muhammad Iq'belhas earned the title of the philosopher of Islam par excellence. Iqbel's chief merit lies in the keen perception of, and systematic expression to the spirit of a far reaching cultural movement that constituted his inheritance; and oneof which he is a most brilliant product. In the genius of his work, the anti-classical spirit of the Q'uran asserts itself in its full glory, against Greek philosophy with its penchant for abstract speculation, which found its ally inthe fatalism of ascetic Sufism with its world rejection that stultified Muslimintellect and imagination and obscured the Muslim's vision of himself as anactive agent incessantly seeking fresh scopes for self- realisation. Intellectu-ally, Iqbel is a descendant of Ghazali with his sharpened critical insights, IbnTaymiyya with his soul so ardent and indefatigable that it sparked animmensely powerful rebellion against scholasticism and the magian tenden-cies fostered by ascetic Sufism which had arrested the movement and

creativity of Islam in times fraught by tragedy, Ibn Khaldun's keen historicalsense and reverence for the great fact of change, and Rumi's vibrant spiritualfervour. A theologian, philosopher, jurist and poet, Iqbel is the expression of the synthetic organic nature of the Islamic system of ideas which knows nochasm separating the ideal and the real, the life within and the one that abideswithout, the spiritual and the temporal. Whether in prose or in verse form,the writings of Iqbel are permeated by the illumination of the Quranic spiritof unity through and through, such that each of his thoughts mirrors all theothers and the whole all at once. The idea of unity, is indeed, the bane of Iqbel's system of thought around which all-else falls. The traditional dualismsplaguing human thought since the time of the Greeks are denounced by himas spurious, merely serving to shatter the organic wholeness of reality,bifurcating what is in fact a unity into painful oppositions between a subjectthat entertains thoughts, knows, speaks and acts and an object contem-plated, known, spoken and acted upon. In the relation between the human

and the divine, such dualisms dictate the vision of an estranged God, whichthe universe confronts as its other independently standing in opposition tohim within the void receptacle of infinite space. The ultimate being is thuseither a passive spectator who, having manufactured his article, motionlessgazes upon it from afar -creation being but an accidental event in his lifehistory-, or a domineering tyrant who sways over the human world stiflingit whenever it rears its head with a faint desire of coming to its own. Anyvictory the human scores over the forces of nature obstructing his march isa blow to the authority of the oppressive supra-mundane sovereign.

In response to its self fashioned dualisms the Western mind soughtrefuge either in a philosophy of salvation that preached world- abnegation,thereby casting the believer in a permanent state of tension with the externalworld, or in a philosophy of materialism that dissolved the individual and thedivine alike into the determinism of an over- mechanised cosmos. It therebyabolished the reign of transcendence, to inaugurate that of immanence. To

the elimination of all transcendental referents from knowledge and ethicsand the perception of the human situation as purely temporal is traceable thecrisis of nihilism and relativity of values characteristic of our times. Onlywith the admittance of the unity of reality can a scheme of human existenceaspiring at meaning be conceivable. Such is the greatest service Islam mayrender human thought, one the essence of which is embodied in what is infact its foundation stone: the idea of tawheed that affirms the radicalmonotheism of this religion. This is the recognition that "reality is essentiallyspirit". All the immensity of matter that is the universe down to its smallestdetails is the expression of the ultimate reality as it reveals itself to the senseperception of man. As Iqbel puts it, "the world, in all its details from themechanical movement of what we call the atom of matter to the freemovement of thought in the human ego, is the self revelation of the 'GreatI am'". Talk of 'the profane' as opposed to 'the spiritual' becomes whollyredundant, since the material is nothing but the revelation of the spiritualwithin the conditions of sensory experience. The Prophet of Islam puts it sobeautifully when he says: "The whole of this earth is a mosque". The'religious' and the so- called 'secular' are so intensely intermingled as to rendereven the suggestion that the two are sides of the one same object utterlyabsurd. Islam is an all- encompassing unanalysable whole which is "one or

the other as your point of view varies". It is 'religion' or 'state' depending onthe vantage point thence it is considered.

The religious as such is as current and extended as the soil of this earth,recognising no restrictions, or the monopoly of an official institution orhierarchy. It is in this context that Iqbel repudiates the model of the theocraticstate founded on the institutionalisation of the religious and the sacralisationof politics. Equally objectionable is the secular instrumental Hobbesian state

that admits of no moorings or categorical imperatives outside itself, moti-vated by nothing but a blind unrestrained pursuit of power and national, ortribal glory. This Iqbeli vision of the nature of the state has its roots in theworks of his forefather the great Muslim historian Ibn Khaldun who deemsthe sphere of the political one of ijtihad anchored on the balancing of religious interests and detriments, and also one of consensus established onthe legitimacy which the ummah bestows upon it. Indeed, although IbnKhaldun views politics as intrinsic to Islam itself -as opposed to Christianitywhich, he maintains, is structured around spiritual redemption, and as suchis alien to the political which, under the sway of historical developments, wascompelled to espouse-, he declares its realm one of free interpretation orijtihad, but one which receives its guidance from two limits, horizontally bythe consensus of the wide community of believers and vertically by thespiritual directions of Islam or shari'ah, which is itself immanent within theummah. Neither a sacred religious vocation nor a secular instrumental affair,

politics is the terrain of a historically embodied reason shepherded by thelight of God. Though it is superior to its natural counterpart that rests on thesole element of force, the rational state sees itself incorporated within therevelational state (dawlat esharaa') and elevated to the level of spiritualactivity with reason receiving its illumination from the glorious light of God.This is indeed the political order; Muslims must aspire at realising, one theessence of which is the synthesis of the revelational state and the rationalstate. For this, it would seem, is their sole way out of a one-way road that endseither in secularism or in theocracy. And this is without a doubt truest to thespirit of their Islamic religion.

Indeed, the principal distinction between politics in its secular overlayingand politics in its authentic Islamic abode, is not that the one appeals to apositivist reference while the other seeks a mooring in transcendence. It isone of immanent profanism versus transcendental profanism. The statefrom an Islamic point of view is a vessel for the realisation of the great ideals

of Islam incarnated in the value of Tawheed within the human order. Itwould appear fair to say then, that any political body aspiring at thetransformation of the lofty values of justice, equality, freedom and solidarityinto concrete forces is quintessentially Islamic. Conversely, should a stateproclaiming to be Islamic degenerate into the capricious quest for domina-tion, no longer attending to the needs of its citizenry referring to no valuesbeyond or outside itself, it thereby strips itself of its Islamic specificity to becast into the level of rationalism, which inevitably decades into naturalism,away from transcendence back into tribal immanentism.

For the antinomy of norm and history, the rational and the actual to beovercome, for the human being to resist dissolving into "the nothingness of being", for him to bestow its chaos meaning and order, to become apermanent element in its constitution, man must realise its kinship to it,regaining contact with the reality that confronts him from every side, of which he and all else is a symbol. Thus doing the human assumes his God-

given role of the vicegerent (elmustakhlaf), the shepherd of the earth fromwhose soil he sprung and to which he shall be returned, whose forces he mustmould to carry out the will of his Creator. Indeed, in the great words of thephilosopher of Islam Iqbel, "Of all the creations of God he alone is capablein consciously participating in the creative life of his maker". He alone hasbeen blessed with the power of transforming what is into what ought to be,with sharing in the ongoing process of creation guided by the illuminationof his Lord.

Soumaya GhannoushiA Masters of Philosophy Student at the University College of London.

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The underlying reason for women's oppression isnot Islam but Biological determinism

The notion that the differences between thesexes is inherent in their natures and determined by

their biological differences which in turn leads topsychological differences have been used both inthe East and the West to justify the social inequali-ties of women. Biological determinism and the emo-tion/reason dichotomy is not specifically Islamicand in parts is in fact contradictory to the teachingsof the Qur'an. The biological differences, "inad-equacies", of female biology is used to negate herspirituality and relationship to her creator. It ishighly probable that the rational of male/femaledifferences, if not the rights themselves are heavilyinfluenced by Greek philosophy, particularly theworks of Aristotle and Plato, which have been present

in the curriculum of our religious schools from theearly formative years.

In Islam, nature (including human nature) isdivinely ascribed. The argument which is often usedis that the female is more emotional, less rationaland therefore subservient to the rational and logicalmale. The question of human culture and historymediating concepts and normative rules of behavioras "natural" or "unnatural" is hence dismissed. In theQur'an there are no direct references to the dif-ferences in male and female nature. The argumentswhich emphasis differences between the male and

the female as justification of female subordinationare based on secondary interpretations of theQur'anic verses. The Qur'an itself is both timelessand a-historic, but the same cannot be said of itsinterpretations. In this respect cultural influencesin defining human nature become relevant and decid-ing factor.

The normative force of natural behavior can-not, and should not, be ignored. The concept ofunnatural behavior throughout the history of hu-mankind has been used to justify and legitimizevarious forms of social oppression. An example ofthis is the way in which belief about the nature ofwomen has been used to justify their social standing.In the history of philosophy the notion of humannature has often been a normative one: being fullyhuman is seen as a goal to be achieved. Concepts of"human-ness" have often been linked to a series ofcharacteristics which are essentially masculine.These characteristics differentiate human beingsfrom other animals and men from women. The mostdefining character of the human being is rationality,by denying women any sense of reason is to excludethem from humanity. Islam does not do this, in fact,the egalitarian message of Islam does not differen-

tiate between the nature of the sexes:"Oh mankind! reverence your Guardian - Lord who

created you from a single person and created of likenature his mate!!..." Sura IV verse I

To deny any sense of human nature is of course

absurd. We cannot however treat nature as com-pletely given without any understanding of norma-tive forces and the socialization process which areessentially both historic and cultural. Many accountsof human nature have appealed directly to biologyand it becomes problematic to distinguish between

natural behavior and social behavior, as the humanbeing is a social being. An important task is to be ableto construct an adequate theory of human naturewhile at the same time rejecting biological deter-minism.

To take into consideration various interpreta-tions of human nature one cannot ignore that theseconcepts are heavily gendered. Firstly, ideals ofhuman potentiality have often been viewed in termsof masculine characteristics, in the sense that theyexclude those qualities termed as feminine. Hence,women are seen as incapable of excellence and self-

realization, they are merely viewed as extensions tothe male. Secondly, some theories of human naturehave suggested that the constraints operating onhuman nature are different and that these con-straints account for both differences in social rolesand psychological characteristics of the sexes. Fi-nally, in the hierarchy of human nature, while themasculine characteristics are at the highest scale,female characteristics are at the lowest.

Most ethical evaluation of human nature in West-ern philosophy have inherent within them a dualismwhich reflects in some way or another, the dualismof good and evil. This dualism is hierarchical . In this

hierarchy, good is assumed to be an absolute andeternal objective existence it is thought to exist ina way that is not reachable through ordinary senseexperience. Because of this it is concluded that thegood can be known only through the conceptualizingpart of the person (usually called the mind), not byfeeling or emotional part of the person (usuallycalled the body). This connection between the no-tions of good as objective and universal, and thenotion of the superiority of the mind over the body,is an important one, for the following reasons:-

Since 'good' is conceived of as an ethical or moral

good, one should know 'good' in order to act inaccordance with it . By what means is this objectiveand universal good to be known? Our everyday aware-ness is of things which change , develop and die. Good, however is unchanging, objective and universalhence these ordinary perceptions and feelings can-not be relied upon to provide us with a knowledge ofgood.

Conceptual relationships, on the other hand, asthese relationships appear in mathematics and logicseem to be permanent and unchanging. For exampletwo plus two equals four seems to be permanent,which no amount of experience can ever change.Thus, if good is the unchanging and permanent it canonly be known by means of these unchanging andpermanent conceptual relationships. The conceptu-

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alizing part of the person is called the mind andoperates in terms of rationality, the feeling, emo-tional, perceiving part of the person is consideredthe body.

In this framework the mind and the body becomeessentially separated, for they serve separate func-tions. These functions placed within the dualisticframework come to be expressed in terms of arelationship of superiority and inferiority. Only themind can know goodness, the body is irrelevant togoodness or detracts from it. The mind should thuscontrol the body . In this dualistic framework ,human beings have a dual nature , their rationality(mind) is closer to good and their animality (body) iscloser to evil . People are judged in accordance to thedegree of rationality manifest within them Womenare denied rationality as they are said to be "not fullyin control of themselves." In this hierarchy, man

(male) stands closer to good than the rest of nature,as a result of his rationality.

Woman stands closer to evil, her behavior isunfree and determined to the extent that she actsout of a sense of emotion, she is identified with thebody. Since that which is good should control thatwhich is evil, it follows that man should control andregulate women. In the same way as the mind shouldcontrol the body .

We have come to inherit this dualistic frameworkalthough it is contradictory to Quranic teachings asa means of justification for the oppression of women.

The Qur'an does not support a specific stereotyperole for its characters, male or female. Many popularand dominant ideas about the role of women do nothave sanctions from the Qur'an , pointing these out,causes problems not so much with the logical analysisof the texts, but within the application of theseideas in the context in which Muslim societies oper-ate. There is no inherent value placed on man andwoman, there is no arbitrary preordained and eter-nal system of hierarchy. The Qur'an does not strictlydelineate the role of women and the role of men tosuch an extent as to propose only a single possibleoutcome for each gender.

From a Quranic perspective the difference be-tween the sexes is not reducible to anatomy orbiology, but in terms of a microcosmic reflection ofa higher reality. The view of male and female differ-ences is not in terms of a dualism is not Islamic. Islamprovides the framework for a polarity which is nothierarchical, but based on mutual fulfillment. Femalenature within this perspective is held at a high valueand as necessary and integral to the nature of man.The relationship between the sexes is not hierarchi-cal but rather mutually interdependent. It is throughthe unity of these two aspects that one attains inner

contentment. Nowadays , Muslim apologists also bringforth all sorts of sociological consideration with aview to answering certain western inspired objec-tions. Answers to the questions that are aboutgender relations can only be answered through the

deeper reason that the intellectual Islamic traditionaddresses.

Women Focus Group

Objectives

1. To restore the status of women in Muslimsocieties by promoting and encouraging the rights ofwomen to assume a public role.

2. To help eliminate violation of women's rights inthe name of Islam.

3. To help promote an awarence for the elimina-tion of gender discrimination, whether in the nameof religion or secularism.

4. To identify the obstacles in this process andbridge the gap between theory and practice.

5. To bring about reform from within the Islamicframework. This can be achieved through anticipat-

ing the counter arguments and the problems we areto encounter and to provide authentic 'Quran- fo-cused' reasons to support our position.

6. To integrate the women's program into anIslamist pluralist charter.

Means

1. To provide a 'Quran focused' program which isenlightened by authentic ahadith to highlight thedoctrinal position of women in Islam.

2. To highlight and publicise particular cases andproblems faced by Muslim Women activists aroundthe world.

3. To provide links and a forum for Muslim Womenactivists around the world.

4. To channel resources and network.5. To use the media to promote a 'positive' image

of Muslim women.6. To utilise the support of public figures for our

agenda.7. To make case studies of Muslim Women's

activities across the world.8. To publish and make available these case stud-

ies to interested parties.9. To provide a point of reference for Muslim

Women activists.10. To link academic activists with grassroots

activists.

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The “Democratic Deficit” in the Muslim World:Preliminary ReflectionsDr. Abdelwahab El-Affendi23 April 1999The Project on Democracy in the Muslim World (PDMW) at the Centre

for the Study of Democracy, University of Westminster is pleased to co-hostthis meeting in collaboration with the International Forum for IslamicDialogue (Islam21 Project), with which we share a commitment to promot-ing democratic values in the Muslim world. The PDMW has been launchedby CSD last year with the aim of exploring the obstacles hindering thedemocratisation process in the Muslim World. Seminars like this fit very wellwith our integrated programme of research, seminars, publications, taughtcourses and joint programmes with other interested academic, research andcivil society institutions inside and outside the Muslim world.

As a number of you know, we have already launched our seminar serieson the Future of Democracy in the Muslim world. You will be informed indue course of our future programmes. A new non-degree course on Democ-racy and Islam will be launched this summer, and degree courses will followsoon. Our research programme is also under way.

The Question of Democracy

The debate we will engage in here is central to understanding the processof democratisation as it pertains to the Muslim world. From the perspectiveof democratic theory, the case of the Muslim world presents an apparentlyinsoluble puzzle. Observers keep wondering why, at a time when the wholeworld appears to be experiencing precipitate democratisation, most Muslimcountries either remain staunchly autocratic, even despotic, or seem to bemoving the other way. But the theses put forth to explain this perplexingphenomenon remain far from satisfactory. Theoreticians of democratictransition started to pay attention to the specificity of Muslim regions onlyvery recently, and treatment remains sketchy. The Muslim World thuspresents both a front-line for democratisation and a new frontier for demo-cratic theory to explore and come to terms with.

The term “democracy” has been rightly referred to as the epitome of acontested term. (Garnham and Tessler, 1995, Parry and Moran, 1994, Held,1987) Any attempt to select a preferred definition would automatically entail

the subscription to a particular theory of democracy. Part of the brief of thisproject is to tackle this issue from the perspective exacted by our subject of research, which will put the utility of the concept to even more challengingtests. However, for our purposes here, the use of the term is dictated by whatwe believe is absent from political practice in our area of concern. In thiscontext, a good starting point for a working definition could be the param-eters emphasised by the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) whichholds that:

democracy involves the right of the people freely to determine their owndestiny… that the exercise of this right requires a system that guaranteesfreedom of expression, belief and association, free and competitive elections,respect for the inalienable rights of individuals and minorities, free commu-nications media, and the rule of law… that a democratic system may take avariety of forms suited to local needs and traditions… [and] that the existenceof autonomous economic, political, social, and cultural institutions is thefoundation of the democratic process and the best guarantor of individualrights and freedoms.

These parameters could in turn be looked in the light of Sartori’sconception of democracy as referring to the presence of elected representa-tive governments based on limited majority rule, (Sartori, 1987) and Held’sassertion that democracy “has been conceived as a way of containing thepowers of the state and of mediating among competing political projects.” Itcan achieve this because “it holds out the possibility of the entrenchment of a principle of legitimacy based on the one hand, on the political involvementof each and all and, on the other, on a process of decision-making which canmediate differences and distill (by virtue of its adherence to this process)acceptable outcomes.” (Held, 1995) In this regard, democracy can be viewedboth as incorporating constitutionalism and the self-imposed limits on thewill of the majority, (Elster, 1988) and also as a mechanism of peacefulconflict-resolution between competing interests and vision, a point empha-sised by Przeworski (1988).

As noted by Held, the term democracy is often used as a short for “liberalrepresentative democracy,” which is centered, in its contemporary manifes-tations, around “a cluster of rules and institutions permitting the broadestparticipation of the majority of citizens in the selection of representatives

who alone can make political decisions, that is, decisions affecting the wholecommunity.” (Held, 1995)

This cluster includes elected government; free and fair elections inwhich every citizen’s vote has an equal weight; a suffrage which embracesall citizens irrespective of distinctions of race, religion, class, sex and so on;freedom of conscience, information and expression on all public mattersbroadly defined; the right of all adults to oppose their government and stand

for office; and associational autonomy - the right to form independentassociations including social movements, interest groups and political par-ties. (Held, 1995)

Democratisation is a term used to depict a complex process, the endresult of which is the creation of democratic systems. Esposito and Volldefine democratisation as “the demand for empowerment in governmentand politics made by a growing portion of populations around the world.”The term also defines, one could add, also the response of the incumbentregimes and political elites to such demands. Democratisation comprises infact a number of interconnected processes: the decay, weakening or collapseof authoritarian regimes; global processes and currents of thought impactingall societies and favouring democracy; the struggle of disadvantaged groupsfor recognition and political participation; and the impact of the activity of avariety of agents seeking to reform the political system. The latter mayinclude reformist governments and political elites, but usually comprises

various coalitions of civil society actors: intellectuals, human rights activists,women groups, political dissidents of various sorts, spokesmen for ethnicminorities, religious leaders, etc.

It is our view that, even if employ a more limited conception of democracy based on minimalist interpretation of the concept of the “rule of people,” (as the existence of stable and self-sustaining systems of govern-ance within a given society, through institutions that permit the peacefulmanagement and resolution of conflicts on a broadly acceptable basis) theMuslim world registers very low marks. This is an indication of how seriousthe problem is. And this is not just a question of image and western“misperceptions,” as some have argued (Shwedler, 1995), but a very realproblem.

The Current DebateThe fact that the current global wave of democratisation, which ap-

peared to have gained an unstoppable momentum since the end of the ColdWar, has tended to pass large tracts of the Muslim World by, did not escapethe attention of those concerned with area studies or with political theory.The Middle East, the heartland of the Muslim world, has been described byone commentator as "one of the least democratic regions of the world and,many believe, the one with the bleakest prospects for the future." (Dorr,1993) One active politician may have overstated the point when he claimedthat even though “the winds of democratization have been blowing all overthe world… Yet not a leaf has been stirred with these winds in the MiddleEast.” (Ecevit, 1993) But the fact is that, with authoritarianism apparentlyso deeply entrenched in this region, "often the only debate is over explana-tions as to why democracy is unlikely to develop [there] in the near future."(Dorr, 1993) Of the explanations offered, Elie Kedourie's claim that "the ideaof democracy is quite alien to the mind-set of Islam," was among the mostaudacious, even though it did gain currency in certain circles. Kedourie

argued democracy has already been tried in the Middle East in the first half of this century, and had failed. It is unlikely to succeed in the near futurebecause of the cultural heritage of Muslim communities which have beenaccustomed to "autocracy and passive obedience." It is in fact the remarkableflourishing of democracy in Europe that stands in need of explanation, notthe persistence of authoritarianism elsewhere. (Kedourie, 1994) Similararguments about the incompatibility of democracy with Islam and general,and Arab culture in particular, have also been made by Lewis (1994) andAjami (1998).

However, a number of much more sophisticated treatments of thequestion have also been attempted, most notably by Esposito and Voll(1996), Salamé and his collaborators (Salamé, 1994), Goldberg and his(Goldberg et. al., 1993), Norton and his (1994, 1995) and Garnham andTassler (1995), among others. In these discussions, a more sustained efforthad been made to understand and explain the problem, adopting a

multidisciplinary approach more fitting to this multi-faceted question. How-ever, what is striking in some of these interventions is that they aresometimes more revealing of the theory and theoreticians than about theirobject of theorisation. This is most notably apparent in the unwarrantedpessimism and anti-democratic prescriptions which emerge from some of

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PAGE 28, Islam21, February 2000 these works. More often than not, the habitual ground of democratic theoryis being abandoned in favour of essentialist analyses of the Orientalist type,which are clearly at variance with the theoretical and normative presuppo-sitions of democratic theory, while no helpful formulas are offered whichcould help the process of democratisation. Rather, with few notable excep-tions, the self-serving arguments of entrenched authoritarian elites aresometimes reproduced in a sophisticated form, and the responsibility for themess the region is in is shifted from the real culprits to mythical and ill-defined entities, such as “cultural traditions,” or even to the victims of authoritarian regimes.

At the heart of the issue is what had come to be known as the "Islamismdebate," (Kramer, 1997) which was described by one writer as "one of thefew remaining intellectual debates on US foreign policy," (now that Vietnamand the Cold War are ancient history). (Satloff, 1997) This debate, and thebroader one on democracy in the Muslim World, appear to have pusheddemocratic and political theory to its limits. Described briefly, the “Islamismdebate” refers to the controversy over whether or not Islamist groups, whichhappen to be the largest active political groups in many Muslim countries,should or should not be admitted into the political process. The fate of democratisation in the Muslim world is, needless to say, closely linked toanswers to this question. If Islamist groups are seen as anti-democratic, andif they appear likely to gain majority support in any genuine political process,then an apparently insoluble dilemma presents itself. On the other hand,there are those who entertain the thesis that, far from being antithetical, therising demand for democratisation and the resurgence of Islamic reassertion,

in particular where moderate groups are involved, are closely related andcould even be mutually supportive. (Esposito and Voll 1996). Others are lesssure (Kramer, 1997, Salame, 1994)

The “Civil Society” DebateClosely related to the Islamism debate, and incorporating it in a sense,

is the “civil society” debate. In line with a broader trend influenced bydevelopments in eastern Europe, interest in the question of civil society andits role has witnessed a revival (or more accurately, this interest has beengenerated anew, for there was nothing here to revive) in the early 1980’s,and the term started to be used widely by academics, writers and evenpoliticians. (Kazziha, 1997, Schwedler, 1995) Two major projects werelaunched in the early 1990’s to look at the question of civil society in theMiddle East. The first, an academic project based at New York Universityand led by Augustus Richard Norton lasted for three years and produced twovolumes of papers which represented a valuable contribution to the debate.(Norton, 1994, 1995) The second, a more activist one, is based at the Ibn-Khadoun Centre in Cairo, and headed by Dr Saad El-Din Ibrahim, is stillgoing on. Other significant contributions to the debate were also made byKawtharani (1988), Centre for Arab Unity Studies (1992) and the SwedishInstitute in Istanbul (Ozdalga and Persson 1997).

A question of relevance to the civil society debate and the debate ondemocratisation is that of the status of the media and press freedoms in theMuslim world. Recent studies continue to show that freedom of expressionin many parts of the Muslim world is either completely non-existent orseverely limited. Draconian measures have been put in place to control pressfreedoms, and the governments enforce these with increasing strictness.Fourteen out of the top twenty-five “enemies of press freedom” listed by theFrench rights group, “Reporters without Borders”, are leaders of predomi-nantly Muslim countries. Moreover, freedom of expression is also under

threat from non-governmental actors and civil society, sometimes actingthrough courts. In the absence of freedom of expression, any discussion of the existence or efficacy of civil society may be largely irrelevant. (El-Affendi, 1994, Article 19, 1991, Rogan, 1996).

The “civil society” debate could not in turn, escape the ideologicalconflicts which tore the region part, and as a matter of fact has bee used bya weapon in the raging battles of mutual exclusion. But more importantly,the debate had revealed the limits of current theoretical paradigms and theirclear inadequacy to capture all aspects of the problem. Questions regardingthe nature and role of civil society in a democratic se-up, the relationsbetween, and demarcation lines separating, state and civil society alsostretched current theories and paradigms to the limit when attempts weremade to apply these to the Muslim context. A lot of work needs to be doneto resolve the theoretical and practical problems which there studies haverevealed.

The Policy DimensionDue to these varied factors and the complex interaction between them,most of the explanations offered to the absence of democracy (and its bleak prospects) are either unsatisfactory, incomplete or both. Most of the pre-scriptions are also either muddled, hesitant, or else horrifying. The distinc-tion between theory and policy recommendations has also been blurred,

since this is no mere "academic" debate. Some theorists, like Kedourie orAjami, dispense high theory from a given parti pris stance, but one that isnevertheless explicitly spelt out. Such authors find no difficulty in subscrib-ing to the assertion made by Lord Balfour some eighty years ago that, unlikewestern nations which display "capacities for self-government," one can"never find traces of self-government," among "Orientals" nor any capacityfor it. (Kazziha, 1997) But many analysts do not make their policy inclina-tions so explicit. Policy is also part of the explanation of the problem, and maybe at its root. Commenting on the Middle East being the "notable exception"in the world-wide surge of democratisation, William Quandt asks: "Is this

because the United States is throwing its weight behind the status quo, astatus quo built around authoritarian political regimes of various sorts? Or isthe reason that something in the Middle East political culture is hostile todemocratic politics? Or is the answer some combination of the two?" Andthe answer Quandt selects is in the question. The US concerns in the region,he argues, have been three: Israel, oil and rivalry with the Soviet Union.Pursuing interests in these areas had invariably meant support for non-democratic regimes. Fatima Mernissi has no doubt as to the central rolemessages from the West have played in subverting democratisation in theArab World. Between the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and the"bombing of Baghdad back to the stone age" thirteen months later, the Arabmasses have been sent on a roller coaster of conflicting emotions, being liftedto untold highs of hope and admiration for Europe and its insuppressible willto freedom and compassion, and then plunged into depth of despair toencounter vivid reminders of recent memories of colonialism as western

generals appeared again on their television screens to dispense the justice of the powerful. Violence triumphed; democracy was buried. (Mernissi, 1993).But policy cannot explain the whole problem, unless we take the policies of national governments in the countries concerned into account.

For a region "accustomed to passive obedience," the Muslim World alsoappears to be a region where violence and turmoil are endemic. This wouldsuggest that the virtues of obedience are not as widely acclaimed here assome people would like. The recent mass revolt in Indonesia also puncturedsome myths of this sort, including some about “Asian values,” thrown in forextra measure. In any case, the uniqueness of the Muslim world in this regardis remarkable and worthy of a closer examination. Whatever the explanationmay be, a vast region like this exhibiting such an overwhelming resistanceto democratisation is something worthy of some reflection. While it isundeniable that a clash of values (originating in the powerful hold the Islamiccultural tradition still maintains over the masses and sections of the elite) isa factor in the democratic deficit characteristic of the Muslim world, it isnevertheless a matter for empirical investigation whether this feature hasbeen a determinant factor, and in what form. For example, while Islamicforces played a leading role in the recent anti-Suharto protests in Indonesia,this did not appear to have been a source of conflict within the pro-democracycamp. Similarly, the Islamists in Tunisia appear to be working in harmonywith human rights groups and a number of secular opposition movementsin that country. Even in Algeria, which came to symbolise the implacablecharacter of the conflict between secularists and Islamists, the major secularand Islamist groups are in broad agreement about the support for democracy,as evident in the Rome Accord signed by the three largest parties in thecountry in 1995. In Algeria again, not all Islamist parties are banned, but onlythose which appear to have enough mass support to win elections. Secularistparties with mass support in authoritarian Muslim countries complain of

similar systematic exclusion. On the other hand, strongly Islamist regimes,such as those in Iran, Sudan, Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia, seem to faceIslamist challenges from both the left (pushing for more democratic freedomsand liberalisation) and right (criticising laxity in implementing Islamicnorms.) The issue is thus much more complex than meets the eye. TheIslamic tradition possesses resources that could be used equally to supportauthoritarianism or mobilise protest.

Among the number of recent studies which attempted to tackle theissues involved, (about half a dozen works with the title "Islam andDemocracy" are in circulation), some have tried to look at the matter fromthe angle of the rise of new Islamist movements and ideologies, and howthese impact on possible or actual democratisation attempts (Sisk, 1994).Yet others adopted a broader perspective, trying to examine how the Islamiccultural heritage could hinder to advance democratisation in the Muslimworld. (Esposito and Voll, 1996). A number of studies tried to examine the

historical, economic and political factors involved, as well as the doctrinaland ideological questions. (Goldberg et al., 1993, Dorr, 1993, Salame, 1987,1994, Garnham and Tassler, 1995, Degan, 1993). Other analysts attemptedto look at the doctrinal and conceptual problems involved, in particular withregards to how Islamic doctrine viewed the issues of human rights, civilliberties, and basic freedoms. (Mayer, 1991, An-Na'im, 1991, Lindholm and

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PAGE 29, Islam21, February 2000 Vogt, 1993). And yet others attempted to examine the deeper issues relatingto the structure of Muslim societies and the legitimation behind thesestructures, and what form civil society could and did take in the Muslimcontext. (Kazziha et. al, 1997, Gellner, 1996, Binder, 1988, Kawtharani,1992, Norton, 1994, 1995 and Schwedler, 1995, Ozdalga an Persson,1998).

The Internal DebateAs expected, the current situation has also generated a heated debate

within the Muslim world itself. The ongoing debate primarily takes the formof polemics between Islamists and their various political rivals. But there are

also intensive debates taking place within each camp, as well as a mountingcontribution from civil society groups, in particular human rights andwomen groups. This has created a dynamic process which is continuouslyevolving and changing. Thus while the problem concerned defies any mono-causal explanation, the more important aspect of it is that it also defies staticcharacterisations. The proliferation of works on democratisation in theMuslim world may thus not be, by itself, adequate for a proper understandingof the situation. In particular, works like Kedourie's and Gellner's, which notonly treat the current fast moving situation as static, but want to fit into thestraitjacket of unchanging cultural norms, may be wide of the mark.

In order to achieve a proper grasp of the issues involved, a very complextask, indeed a number of interrelated tasks, need to be performed. First, it isessential to attempt to comprehend the actual situation in all its complexityand dynamism. The intensive and continuously evolving debates need to befollowed in order to find out how the issues are seen from the perspectives

of the parties involved: what are the aspirations of different (and oftenconflicting) Islamist groups? What ideas and norms guide their action? Also:what are the fears and misgivings of liberals, secularists, women groups andnon-Muslim minorities? What solutions are they proposing? And how areruling elites reacting to all these demands? Last but not least, how are theinfluential external actors (Israel, Europe, the US, Japan etc.) reacting to thesituation? Are these reactions helping or hindering democratisation? Howdoes the processes of globalisation and the information revolution impact thesituation in its various dimensions: cultural, political, economic and social?

Secondly, the conceptual and ideological presuppositions at work in andbehind these debates also need to be captured and evaluated. Again, this isa complex task, since the way ideas are advanced and expressed is also partof the contest. Rival parties are not only continuously contesting the thesesof each other, but they even contest the veracity and commitment of rivalsto the values they profess. Secularists claim that Islamists are not sincere intheir commitment to democracy, and point to perceived contradictions intheir political discourse, while Islamists hurl the accusation back at theirrivals, and point to the authoritarian actions and omissions of liberals andsecularists (e.g. failure to condemn human rights abuses directed againstIslamists).

In view of these multiple conflicts, there is a need for a thoroughexamination of the discourse being generated, in particular the dominantstrands of political thought, rival interpretations of Islamic doctrine andhistory, rival conceptions of democracy, various alternative democraticformulas proposed, and various prescriptions for transition to democracybeing offered by elites and challengers alike. As a result, it could be possibleto evaluate the compatibility and incompatibility of various proposals, andthe viability (or lack of it) of rival projects. Here also we must not restrict theproblem to a focus on the Islamist-secularist dichotomy, important though

it is. The prevalent "democratic deficit" predates the rise of active Islamism,and persists in states which remained predominantly Islamic (like SaudiArabia), in newly Islamised ones (Iran and Sudan) and many others wherethe Islamist threat could not be taken seriously (Tunisia, Libya, Syria, CentralAsia, etc.). The scope of the investigation must thus be widened anddeepened.

Thirdly, in the light of the examination of the conditions that led to thecurrent impasse in the Muslim world, one may need to re-examine and re-evaluate some of the basic theses and presuppositions of democratic andpolitical theory, in so far as they apply to the specific Muslim situation. If theparticular Muslim situation has posed such a problem to democratic theory,there is a case to argue to the effect that the whole problem could not haveoriginated in the situation itself. Some of the key presuppositions of demo-cratic theory must be critically examined, not least because it had failed topredict the current problems. Terms such as "Islam", "democracy", "human

rights", "pluralism", "secularism", "modernisation," etc. are contested termsand concepts that are usually heavily loaded with normative content, andoften employed differently by different players and in accordance with thecontext. Theoretical concepts such as "civil society", "citizen", "state","power", "authority", "violence", "governance," "legitimacy," etc., also posetheir own set of problems, especially when employed in cross-cultural

contexts, and could acquire different meanings and uses in accordance withthe theoretical framework in which they are being employed. The task istherefore to adopt a doubly critical attitude: towards democratic theory andits theoretical, philosophical and normative presuppositions, and equallytowards Islamic self-perceptions and interpretations of the world and of doctrine. This critical attitude is to be deployed at three levels: at the level of the conceptual and theoretical tools being employed; at the level of theempirical investigation of the phenomena in question; and at the level of evaluating the normative and conceptual presuppositions that are operativein the context under study.

Conclusion:The debate on democracy in the Middle East (and by extension the

whole Muslim World) has thrown up more questions than it has answered,and had answered few satisfactorily. We contend that this is no coincidence,and that it raises some fundamental questions about the adequacy of democratic theory as it stands today. The problem on the ground alsoremains as acute as ever. Far from espousing the present anomaly as theexpression of some “cultural authenticity,” the status quo is the target of increasingly vociferous, and often violent, protests. The issue is so importantand serious that it needs to be tackled in a sustained way, bringing togetherall possible resources and talents, and engaging minds from within andoutside the Muslim world in a continuing dialogue that may yield somesatisfactory answers.

The project has been designed precisely to generate, sustain and enrichsuch a dialogue. We have no objection to the project in the end being itself

shaped by and in the course of this dialogue. In fact, we would welcome thisvery much, since it would spell the project's ultimate success. If the projectis successful in its aims, then it will not only stimulate the debate on politicaldevelopments in the Muslim World and help explain them, but could alsocontribute positively towards a deeper understanding of the democraticprocess, and a sharpening, or possibly a radical rethinking, of the conceptsand theoretical constructs underpinning democratic theory.

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Modern Islam and the Search for a Humane Political OrderDr. S. Parvez Manzoor23 April 1999Perhaps, the most radical, and reckless, way for a Muslim thinker to start

this reflection would be to turn the modern discourse upon its head. For s/ he may then, legitimately and self-consciously, expound Islam as an autono-mous and self-referential system that is in no need of corroboration orcorrection from other worldviews and philosophies. Modernity and theadherents of secularism may, in such a case, enter into dialogue with Islam,but only on Islamic terms, only on the pre-condition of acknowledging thepossibility of transcendence in human affairs. Such a stance, whatever itsvalidity for other systems of thought, when adopted by the contemporaryIslamic thinker entails the task of deconstructing modernity, exposing itsmetaphysical foundations and charting the moral parameters of its secularproject. Applied to the modern doctrine of statehood, it leads to the followingreflection:

The Myth of the Modern State:Modernity espouses a metaphysics of immanentism within which the

state, or secular body-politic, assumes certain attributes that theistic religionsascribe to the Transcendent God. Thus, though the modern state is definedby a discernible territory, the actual locus of its sovereignty, to which boththe ruler and the ruled are equally subservient, remains elusive and uniden-tifiable. Unlike earlier polities, where the actual person of the Sovereign -either in his capacity as the deputy of God or on his own - literally representedthe body-politic, the modern state does not reveal the ultimate seat of itsauthority; it remains immanent and hidden within the 'myth of the state',behind the mass of the nation, people or citizenry. The state as the embodi-ment of the 'spirit' of a nation or people is therefore as emotive, mystical andintractable an idea as 'God' in the traditional discourse of theocracy. How-ever, unlike God whose sovereignty often translates into a moral code thattranscends, indeed devalues, the purely mundane concerns of the politicalcommunity, the nation as such is not the source of any morality; it does notincarnate any categorical imperative beyond the preservation of the political

self.The most salient feature of the modern state, which devolves from itsacceptance of territory as its 'body', is the renunciation of all claims touniversality. The jurisdiction of a state, of its laws and institutions, isconfined within the bounds of its territory, or, in some exceptional cases,even outside its boundaries but applicable only to its citizens. However,because of this self-imposed restriction on state-sovereignty, the politicaldiscourse of the nation-state for all intent and purpose abandons theuniversal for the parochial; instead of espousing common norms, it propa-gates a morality of 'thick and thin'. Alas, by the denunciation of the ideals of a universal polity, the secular state has effectively managed to strangle theutopian idea of a single humanity. Similarly, the doctrine that the telos of thestate is located within history, that the End is nothing but an immanent orderof society, the secular state abandons the quest for transcendence altogether.Little wonder our civilisation no longer represents any cosmic truth, it

partakes of no transcendent order of being and recognises no human purposebeyond existence.Another, equally seminal, trait of the modern secular state is the

reduction of politics to economics and the consequent 'fall of the public man'.For politics in the modern sense is quintessentially the craft of distributingand redistributing common goods; it embodies the art and science of managing the economic enterprise through the exercise of which the wealthof the nations is created and increased. Paradoxically, however, thoughpublic discourse today is nothing but a conversation about wealth, the richesthat it seeks to disseminate are meant to be enjoyed in private! Little wonderthat the market which earlier demanded secure national borders, and thushelped create territorial states, is now turning into a global empire of gadgets.

Indeed, the distressing fact is that Mammon not God reigns supreme inour lives and that it is goods not ideas that undermine religious faith. For our'postmodernist ethos incarnates a faith in goods and not in ideas; it worships

the immanent god of flesh rather than the transcendent one of spirit.Islamism between the debasement and idolisation of History:To claim that the universalist demands of Islamic conscience cannot be

appeased by a coercive order of parochial states or that the transcendent

rationale of the Islamic commitment cannot be compromised by the boonsof the global market is however not to renounce historical existence asinauthentic and sub-Islamic.

Nor is it to carry out a spurious ideological transaction whereby theMuslim barters the inauthentic and ignoble present for an authentic andglorious past. No, neither a politics of cultural despair, nor an orthodoxy of pristine faith need be the outcome of looking our modern world straight in

the eye.Far more grievous than the transcendentalist's disregard of history is theimmanentist temptation that seeks to reduce faith to a politics of immediatereturn. For to plead that there are no other options for the Muslim to givetestimony to his faith save that of fully reinstating the fiqhi regime as amodern 'Islamic' state is to abdicate one's responsibility as a Muslim thinker.It is also to betray Islam's trust in humanity, subjugate faith to power andbequeath to Islamic conscience an irredeemable identity of raison islamiqueand raison d'état.

We must therefore challenge those uninformed and unsuspectingideologues who coined blatantly self-contradictory neologisms like ‘theIslamic State’ and made them part of the indigenous Muslim discourse. Letus not be misled into believing that the ‘state’ is a mere euphemism forpolitical order and ignore the metaphysical and moral foundations of themodern 'state-myth'. Nor may we equate faith with coercion and legitimise

totalitarian structures in the name of Islam! We must realise that thesevacuous abstractions cannot be redeemed by historical analysis, or that‘Islam’ defined as ‘state’ is nothing but a secularist heresy. (One need notconfound the modern theory with the classical fiqhi (juristic) models of khilafa or imama. The latter were veritable doctrines of power but theylacked the idea of statehood, impersonal authority and sovereignty of thepeople.)

The transformation - disfigurement - of Islam into an ideology hasproduced at least one casualty - the Islamic tradition. For it may no longerassert its right to be judged on its own terms but has now to prove itslegitimacy by out-secularising the secular state, by accepting that goods andgadgets are as salubrious as salah and zakah! But even secularism, as a theoryof governance, has suffered as a consequence of the superficial reading of the modernist text; it has never been given a proper hearing in the court of appeal of Islamic conscience. Even its self-imposed neutrality in matters of

faith, its agnostic creed which regards the 'teleological' question about theend and meaning of human existence outside of its jurisdiction, has beendismissed as of no consequence. Perhaps the secular state does not appealto the Muslims because it has no answer to the ultimate question of the goalof human existence, while Islamic conscience demands guidance as well asgovernance from the state. But let us not pre-judge the issue.

Secularity and the culture of rights and freedoms:Given the fact that no proper discussion of the political culture of rights,

including the sacrosanct charter of Universal Human Rights, is possiblewithout acquiescing in to the modern - secular - theory of the state, it isimperative that we closely examine the Muslim sentiment with regard to thecardinal tenet of secularity, namely the separation of Church and State. Theinstinctive Muslim response, which is now aggressively propagated as asacred tenet of the Islamic doctrine, maintains that not only is such a

‘bifurcation’ un-Islamic, but it is also impossible to implement as there is no‘church’ in Islam. And yet, nearly everyone is also willing to concede that thefaith of Islam is transcendent, spiritual and eternal while the existential realityof the Muslims is immanent, political and historical. Or expressed differentlyas a theory of history, it enunciates that the true form of Islamic government,the Righteous Caliphate of Medina, lasted only a short time; what cameafterwards was dynastic rule and not a model Islamic theopolity. (Shi´ismmakes some very strong reservations even against this orthodox rule.) Inshort, any 'political' vision of Islam is forced to concede that there is a gapbetween the ideals of faith and the realities of history.

True enough, Muslims have never despaired of this duality and positedit either as a shocking paradox, or as a cruel and irreconcilable contradiction.What is characteristically Islamic is then not the separation but the refusal toconstrue this contradiction in such a way that it devalues historical existenceand transforms itself into an anti-existential doctrine. The Muslim conten-tion is not with the keeping of the two orders of reality, the temporal and theeternal, separate and distinct but with the debasement and devaluation of theexistential and the historical that also comes with this separation and is thevery heart and soul of many religious traditions. The reasons for Islam’sunflinching commitment to the historical - the this-world of theology - are

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PAGE 31, Islam21, February 2000 not far to seek. The historical and the existential is the testing ground of morality and Islam, which is unnegotiably committed to upholding thesovereignty of the moral, cannot do without them. Politics as the quest fora just historical order is therefore intrinsic to Islam and incumbent upon itscommunity. It does not however constitute the end and the goal of thebeliever’s faith.

It also needs emphasizing that that contemporary Muslim debate hasbeen plagued by intellectual confusion and moral timidity. Finding them-selves on the receiving end of the civilizational exchange, Muslims of ourtimes have been more concerned with the preservation of their heritage than

with any explorations of their future. Muslim response to secular world-order, a creation of Islam’s former rival, the Christian West, which is also itsprincipal beneficiary, is a case in point. Because the modern state appropri-ates the Divine attribute of ‘sovereignty’ and claims for itself the right tolegislate (and hence stands above the Revealed Law), it has been receivedwith much suspicion and considerable hostility in the Muslim world. Noneof its otherwise appealing tenets, such as freedom of conscience and equalitybefore law, have made any headway in contemporary Muslim conscious-ness.

Muslim societies, preoccupied as these have been with the preservationof the 'dignity and integrity of the believer’, have not discerned the significantimprovement of civil liberties which such a minimalist, secular, state alsoheralds. Against the onslaught of foreign ideologies, Muslims instinctivelyrose to defend their tradition, even if it entailed upholding worn outinterpretations of medieval fuqaha, which appeared to deplete the moral

vitality of the Koranic text itself. This was in spite of the fact that everyMuslim state was then flouting the letter and the spirit of the sacred Law, justas every Muslim ruler today scouts at any secular demand for the safeguardof the rights of the citizen. So in actual fact, neither the civil liberties of thecitizen nor the sacred dignity of the believer have been accorded any respectbeyond the perfunctory lip service. Little wonder that the culture of rightsand freedoms is a veritable oddity in the Muslim world.

The separation of Church and State - for which there are no authenticIslamic models simply because Islam lacks a church - can, in my opinion, beaccepted by the Islamic conscience. After all, even the classical fuqahaaccepted a division of the sacred law into fard ‘ain and fard kifaya, intoobligations that are indispensable and incumbent for ‘salvation’ and obliga-tions that may be dispensed, or delegated to others. This classification, whichis incontrovertibly authentic and has never been anathematised, possesses allthe intellectual and moral justification for the bifurcation of the law into acivil and public and a religious and private sphere.

What militates against such a development in Muslim societies is not anyIslamic propensity for violence or fundamentalism, as the anti-Islamicrhetoric so brazenly proclaims, but the refusal of current regimes to granttheir Muslim citizenry the most fundamental of the rights of the secular state– freedom of conscience and religion. Secularism in the Muslim context isconstrued not as a formal separation of church and state but as an absoluteban on Islamic political conscience, an adamant denial of its right to partakein public debate and propose public policies – no matter how peacefully and‘democratically’ this civic conscience articulates its societal aspirations! Inthe final analysis, it is not an issue of Islamic obduracy or militancy but thatof the despotic, absolutist and undemocratic nature of the secular Muslimregimes. A democratic Muslim state, by contrast, I am fully convinced, isable to meet all the challenges of secular morality and appease all the

demands of Islamic conscience!Confession vs. Conscience:The ruling idea of the modern state arose in Christian Europe which had

institutionalised the spiritual and the temporal as church and state. The stateas a sovereign secular institution rose in response to confessional wars whichplagued European polities during the seventeenth century. With time, eventhe believers came to prefer the tutelage of the non-confessional state to thesupremacy of the rival church that made religious affiliation a benchmark of political loyalty. It was the failure of religious bodies to agree upon a singlelocus of authority that made the search for an alternative source of sover-eignty possible. As the Christians came to the realisation that no agreementin matters of public importance was possible on the basis of faith, they chosea new authority that was trans-confessional, though with time it also cameto be, anti-confessional.

Be that as it may, the important point for Muslims to reflect over is that

the modern state is not, as is generally acclaimed, neutral with respect toreligion. No, it does not, probably cannot, tolerate religion as a rivalinstitutional and political force: It banishes religiosity, as it were, from thedomains of power and knowledge and pours it into individual conscience.The freedom of conscience and religion, which the secular state is proud touphold, is therefore a vacuous kind of freedom; it does not allow those who

enjoy it any degree of autonomy with respect to the actualisation of theirideals. For the secular state does not accept that the tenets of either statecraftor public morality be derived from religious consciousness. Religion in thesecular world-view and practice is something personal, trans-historical andpolitically innocuous. It has no aspiration to the re-making of the world.

That freedom of conscience or religion has evolved into such a sacro-sanct tenet of secular morality, including that of the Human Rights ethos, isunderstandable, given the backdrop of religious wars against which themodern state makes its debut. Nor may it be denied that a confessional statedoes not, and probably cannot, guarantee full freedom of religion and

confession to its subjects (freedom of conscience is a tautological euphe-mism; for conscience is always free. It is its public - political - manifestationsthat provoke the coercive powers of the state.) The man of a different faithand confession represents, after all, the other of the religious self. The otherof the secular self, similarly, is not the believer but the citizen of a different,potentially rival, state. Not surprisingly, just as the confessional statediscriminates against its other, the member of a rival faith or church, so doesthe secular state, except that its discriminatory treatment is meted out to thenon-citizen, the bona-fide foreigner of our times.

That great moral stigma is attached to the 'other' of the confessional state,whereas everyone takes the legal discrimination of a foreign citizen forgranted, is a telling commentary on the irrelevance of religion and religiouscommunity in the modern political system. It has very little bearing on thequestion of morality, as no political system is known to man that does notmake a distinction between the political 'self' and its 'other', favouring the

former and penalising the latter. (Politics is quintessentially parochial andperforce entails the judgement of inclusion and exclusion, of separatingfriends from foes. Systems claiming universality, usually religions, churchesand ideologies, are universal only in their ‘transcendent’, apolitical andahistorical, aspects.) Similarly, the much acclaimed equality of all citizens ina secular state is matched by the equally emphatic claim of the equality of allbelievers in a faith-community. Nor can we overlook the fact that the secularstate-system produces its own ambiguities. For instance, the richer states of the world are already under pressure, and guilty of moral dubiousness, in theface of the influx of refugees and asylum-seekers. The contradictions of thelegal doctrine of equality of all citizens and the moral sentiment of solidaritywith all humans are clearly exposed in their policies, causing much tensionbetween the moral and the pragmatic sections of their populace.

A Clash over Metaphysics?The ultimate conflict between Islam and modernity, it ought to be clear

by now, is neither over governance, nor over technology, not even oversociety and social engineering but over transcendence and the nature of ultimate reality. As against the immanentist claim of modernity, Islam holdsthat the ultimate reality is transcendent, trans-temporal and trans-secular.Consequently, human reality, inasmuch as it is part of the ultimate reality,stretches beyond the authority of the state and the coercive world-order thatsustains it.

Modernism embarked on its voyage of ideological discovery by rejectingthe ‘classical answer’ to the political problem. Thus, whereas the goal of political life for all classical political philosophers is virtue, and the order mostconducive to virtue is the aristocratic republic, the modern position is to deemthe classical solution as 'unrealistic'. Indeed, there is a general turn away fromtranscendentalism to immanentism, from normativism to positivism andfrom idealism to historicism, all in the name of realism. Obviously, we are

dealing with a new conception of 'reality' in modern political philosophy, themost spectacular annunciation of which is the sacrosanct modernist doctrineabout the abolition of theocracy by secularism. Pre-modern theory, accord-ing to the modernist polemics, confounds political order with transcendentorder. By intermingling the political problem of peace in the city with themoral quest for truth in the soul, traditional societies created political systemsthat were perforce inefficient, parochial and tyrannical. Modernist systems,by contrast, engender political communities that honour and even actualisefreedom, justice and equality.

The goal of political theory, accordingly, is to swear unswerving fidelityto ‘historical realities’ and demonstrate the validity of its vision by conceiv-ing political structures that are viable in the world of history hic et nunc.Paradoxically, however, the world of history has refused to redeem themodernist pledge. For once the metaphysical scale had been tipped in favourof immanence and historicity, political philosophy had no option but to go

through all the motions of intellectualisation and humanisation, includingthe proclamation of ‘end-of-history’, in order to cling on to whatever littlemeaning that a disenchanted historical world would yield. With eachempirical advance, with each encroachment of the transcendent by theimmanent, political reflection was left with an ever smaller chunk of meaningful reality to feed on. The politics of temporal meaning commis-

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PAGE 32, Islam21, February 2000 sioned the recasting of eternity in the mould of history, but it received, on thecompletion of the project, nothing but an amorphous rubble of ‘contin-gency’!

Modern revulsion against transcendence now extends to all forms of societal discourse and has indeed become the central motif of modernity’sself-definition. Here are a few, random examples: A contemporary politicalscientist asserts: ‘Civil Society [read: Bourgeois society.] is the first socialformation in history which derives its legitimation from immanent asopposed to transcendent norms’. Similarly, a perceptive student of contem-porary Muslim discourse defines modernity, perhaps uncannily, as ‘the sort

of politically relevant discourse mediated by intellectuals once the idea of rationality is recognised as embodied in society, no longer confined to atranscendent logos’

Unless the philosophers of modernity debunk some of their unprovenmetaphysical assertions about the ultimate truth of immanentism, not untilideologues of the secular state-theory learn to modify their absolutist claimthat no public discourse must ever include any allusion to transcendence, solong as the guardians of ‘the lay state’ refuse to recognise that the sacredprovisions of the freedom of conscience and expression embrace even trans-historic visions of revealed faith, there is little chance that the city of Islamand humanity and its unfortunate inhabitants will ever experience anythingremotely approaching the bliss and harmony glimpsed through the Utopianvision. For peace in the city and bliss in the soul are two sides of the samehuman longing.

Pluralism and Civil Society:

Whatever the attraction and justification for the Islamic thinker toapprehend and delineate the ideological and metaphysical parameters of thesecular state, it must be reserved for another forum. On this occasion, weneed to start from the reality of the secular system of territorial states to whichall Muslim regimes have given their full allegiance. Every Muslim commu-nity today is part of the global state-system and ostensibly exercises ‘sover-eignty’ within the borders of a parochial and territorial entity. Muslim statesare also signatories to the United Nations’ ‘Charter of the Fundamental andUniversal Human Rights’ and as such morally and legally bound to honourand implement its provisions. Moreover, with few exceptions, contempo-rary Muslim rule is alien, arbitrary and predatory. Hence, it must not beallowed to use ‘Islam’, or the medieval formulations of Muslim jurists, as thelegitimising argument for its oppression and denial of fundamental rights.Despite their strong - albeit theoretical and metaphysical - reservationsagainst the secular theory of state and world-order, Muslims qua citizensmust promote the cause of rights, freedoms and pluralism. For the theoreticalresolution of the conundrums of historical order and faith community maycome later, but the urgency to be beneficiaries of a humane political cultureis immediate and acute.

Modern Islamic thought's encounter with secularity that took placewithin the matrix of state-theory has given us a scheme of public order thatis religiously an immanentist heresy and politically a totalitarian nightmare.It was the failure of the fiqhi intellect that caused the paralysis of Islamicconscience and confounded our vision of faith and humanity. It produced areading of modernity that was superficial and uncritical; while outwardlydenouncing modern secularism, Muslim critics did inwardly bow down tomodernity's immanentist untruth. However, secularism, modernity's darlingchild, need not be accepted as mere form and procedure; as a methodstipulating a separation of church and state that has no truth claims of its

own! No, secularism possesses a substantive and normative content as well.Apologists of secularism are prone to present it, either humbly, as arejection of ecclesiastical authority, a model for pluralism, a theory of society,a doctrine of governance; or augustly, as a philosophy of history, a creed of atheism, an epistemology of humanism; or even more grandiosely, as ametaphysics of immanentism that corresponds to the ultimate scheme of things. Within the academic discourse, it is also customary to accord it analmost Socratic definition and distinguish its various manifestations as aprocess of history (secularisation), a theory of mind and culture (secularity)and a doctrine of truth (secularism). We must realise that not every aspirationof the secularist, this-worldly, conscience and morality is antithetical orinimical to Islam. Nor may it be conceded that the only path towards thecreation of a pluralistic society and humane political culture is the acceptanceof liberalism/secularism as the very truth of the human condition.

Though historically Islam may boast of a civilisation and a culture which

was as tolerant, if not more, as any other civilisation of its day, Muslimpolitical culture today embodies all the horrors of despotic, arbitrary andcorrupt rule. Indeed, it has become a byword for cruelty and incompetence.Re-designing a humane, democratic and moral political order for Muslimsocieties is the foremost challenge faced by Islamic intellect and conscience.The crisis of modernity, which is manifest in its dissipation as a number of

postmodernities, and which has helped shift the gaze of its theoreticiansfrom the universal state which is the incarnation of the World-Spirit to theglobal market that is the shopping-mall of the bourgeoisie, presents Muslimthinker with a fresh opportunity to reflect over God's primordial covenantwith all the children of Adam, and renew our commitment to the unity of thehuman community. Let this challenge be met, and this opportunity availed,not through the exercise of the jurist's reason, the cognition of fiqh that isperforce reductionist and parochial, but through the cultivation of a visionaryand utopian discourse that is fully alert to the moral and ethical demands of the Qur'anic universalism and the Islamic conscience that it engenders. Let

Islamism's struggle for a just temporal order in Muslim homelands, in otherwords, not eclipse Islam's quest for eternal peace in the soul of man and inthe city of humanity.

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A Note on PluralismDr. Abdelwahab El-Affendi23 April 1999

Modern liberal political theory is not essentially pluralistic. In somesense, it is even anti-pluralist. The assumptions behind liberal political theoryrevolved around a conception of man as an abstract individual, enjoyingformal equality with his fellow citizens, but otherwise part of a homogenouswhole. Like the theoretical abstract economic concept of marginal utility,men just add up or are subtracted as indistinguishable units.

In political theory, pluralism refers to a version of liberal political theorywhich traces its genealogy to Max Weber. (Held, 1984) This particularschool of thought partly recognises Marx’s criticism of liberal politicaltheory on the grounds that its notion of formal political equality does notreflect the reality of the political processes in Western capitalist societies.With Marx, it acknowledged that citizens do not face each other as abstractindividuals on political arena. Rather, they congregate into groups dividedand united by their interests. But it does not concur in Marx's contention thatthese interests define the roles of individuals once and for all. Both interestsand membership in groups change continuously in kaleidoscopic shifts andoverlapping coalitions which define liberal politics. Thus it accepted thatindividuals do not to figure on the political sphere as abstract men andwomen. There are also members of interest groups, classes, trade union,business organisations, etc.

But for pluralism, these groups are still clusters of the same abstractindividuals, distinguished from each other merely by their economic inter-ests. Other considerations, such as cultural diversity, are not contemplatedhere. Thus liberal theory took its time in coming to terms with the real world.It is interesting to note that although most societies have been multi-ethnicand multi-cultural, liberal political theory has been slow to recognise this.(Kymlicka, 1997) But it is not only theorists who insist on closing their eyes.Ancient and modern in empires, as well as modern national states werereluctant to recognise a ethnic, cultural minorities. But while in the past

conformity was imposed even to the extent of genocide, in modern timestolerance was reluctantly recommended. However, in deference to liberalideals, the UN and post-war practice viewed the guarantee of individualhuman rights as sufficient to protect whatever cultural diversity was deemeddesirable. (Kymlicka, 1997) But too much political and cultural diversitywas seen as undesirable, because it militated against the basic assumptionsof the liberal political theory and interfered with the plans of state and nationbuilders.

Pluralism and Islam:Institutional tolerance of cultural diversity is partly novel from the

perspective of Islam as well. Monotheistic religions, as Hume once re-marked, are inclined to intolerance towards cultural diversity. There is some justification for that, as the essence of monotheism is to condemn beliefswhich are inconsistent with the belief in one God. In practice, if thesemonotheistic creeds did show intolerance. But of the three, Islam was the

one more inclined to tolerance, historically and doctrinally. The first Islamicstate was set up as a partnership with Jews, even though the two groups laterfell apart when Jews were accused of betrayal and evicted. Christians inArabia were tolerated and had a recognized status. The City of Jerusalem wasalso handed to the Muslims peacefully in accordance with a treaty guaran-teeing the rights of Christian's in that city. Throughout Islamic history, Jewsand Christian were accepted as a recognised minorities. This recognitionwas later extended to other groups. Of course these groups were not givenequal status or full citizenship, but the granting official recognition of minority rights was in itself quite an advance on contemporary and even laterpractice. Or could only compare this what Catholics did n Spain in the 16thcentury to appreciate this advance.

These policies and the way they had been practiced, had their draw-backs. One can look to what the Balkans are witnessing today as the directresult of pluralist as practiced by the Ottomans in that region. Their policies,

it could b argued, shielded these communities from change which couldhave resulted from open interaction within the national set-ups where thoseprotections were not available.

On the other hand, that the demise of the Ottoman Empire also revealed

how functional the system had been. The Kurds in Turkey were protectedand being Muslim, expected equal treatment with other groups of theEmpire. The Arabs also occupied a privileged status in the system. With therise of Turkish nationalism, which precipitated the collapse of the Empire,centrifugal forces were set in motion. Protected religious minorities such asthe Maronites in Lebanon suffered loss of rights, while ethnic minoritiessuch at the Kurds found that the emerging national states such as a Turkey

wanted to impose Turkish identity on them, and Arab countries such as Iraqand Syria, wanted to impose Arab identity. A Pandora's box of ethnicconflicts was thus opened. To make matters worse, European powers playedtheir part in precipitating the disintegration of Muslim societies. Muslimreformers who admired the European experience in modern state-buildingwere nevertheless dismayed by European pollicies, in particular support forprotected groups, which undermined their attempts to build viable states.They complained that interference by Europeans on the pretext of protectingcertain minorities undermined respect for the law and for the state.

Modern Pluralist ChallengesThe post-UN era has posed two new challenges to the Muslims. The first

challenge, was that posed by modern liberal ideologies, in particular thestress on individual human rights. This appeared to undermine some of thecore concepts entrenched in Islamic traditions. On the other hand, the nation

state system has posed its own problems as we have seen. The world of theMuslim thus faced assaults from two directions: Individualism underminedgroup solidarity, and nationalism and undermined the unity of the commu-nity.

However, these challenges offered new opportunities, some of whichwere seized and acted upon. The insistence on democracy and human rightsfor all, was one way in which the opportunity was grasped. The newemphasis on multi-culturalism offers another opportunity. multi-culturalismworks both ways. It can spell tolerance for the Muslim way of life, and itdemands tolerance for the way of life of others

In this way, it can probably off an answer to the question: what justification is there, from a Muslim perspective, for pluralism and religioustolerance? If religion, as some sociologists define it, is the expression of

"ultimate values", then what justification is there for tolerating situationswhich are abhorrent to one’s core values ? An interesting question. Oneanswer must be: because others are prepared to tolerate you. Another maybe founded in these “ultimate values" themselves. Perhaps, like God, menmust train themselves to tolerate the intolerable because of respect forhuman freedom and responsibility, to which the Almighty himself has sofirmly committed Himself.

References:Kymlicka, Will (1997) Multi-Cultural Citizenship: the Liberal Theory

of minority rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press)Held, David (1984) "Central Perspectives on the Modern State" in the

McLennan, Gregor, et. al (eds.) The Idea of the Modern State (MiltonKeynes: Open University Press)

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Islam21 Seminar on Freedom of Expression16 October 1999

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Democracy and Islamism - Part 2

Dr Bobby Sayyid

Now what is the relationship between democracy and Islamism? Letme quickly sketch out what I mean by Islamists because it is a term whichis used quite often not always as precisely as one should use this term.

Very simply I understand an Islamist as someone who puts Islam at thecentre of their political practise. I don't make any particular claims about whatkind of Islam they choose and allow for the fact that there are many differentversions, many different thinkers many different answers. But I seeIslamicism as simply a project to start saying that as a Muslim one must tryand understand ones relationship through ones own historical formation,and that historical formation is that of Muslim history and those are thetraditions and inheritances we must work within. That is also the horizon.

In other words an Islamicist who wants to go towards a utopia whichis described using language from texts which they consider to be Muslim, a

language which they consider to be inspired by the example of Islam inits various formations. Now in that context there is a difficulty

between democracy and Islamacism to the extent that from the differentdefinitions that I gave of democracy [democracy as politics, democracyas a metaphor for good government] there is implicit between both of these ideas the idea of democracy as a Western cultural formation.Now linked with that argument is a very strong argument that manypeople make which is that what is good, what is valuable for all humanbeings can only be found in one particular tradition.Either they make that argument very explicitly and give you very strongreasons that it was only during the enlightenment for a number of reasons that people came to this conclusion. Or the argument is leftimplicit. But there is a suggestion, nonetheless, that universal values,values that we would like everyone to have, are not something that youcan find everywhere. The universal can't be generated from every

historyor from every region. It has a home, it has a particular history and if

you want to have these universal values you have to follow thathistorical sequence.I would argue that those I call Kamalists did this exactly. I do not

refer specifically to Moustafa Kamal but I think Kamalism is a generalideology which extends to people like Nasser. It includes most of theMuslim beliefs which emerged after de-colonisation. For them the key

tomodernisation was Westernisation. This comes up most explicitly in thecase of Mousfata Kamal. Why, for example, did he decide that we shouldnot be allowed to wear a fez? What does the fez have to do with iron andsteel production? Does it somehow restrict the flow of blood to yourhead? What was the reason for banning Turkish music in favour of European opera? If you have listened to European opera you may decidethat this was enough punishment for the Turkish people.There adopted these kind of measures in a similar way to what is goingon now in Central Asia(?) There was the Latinisation of Turkish.

Turkishis very badly adapted to the Arabic script even though it was used for400 - 500 years. But of course what you do by changing the script isyou make a whole generation of scholars illiterate overnight. The wholeOttoman heritage is completely obliterated. So modern Turks cannot

readOttoman texts. They cannot read there history. There is a rupture. Andthe argument which nolinguist of any repute would accept now that

theirlanguage cannot be adequately expressed in a variety of scripts.But what is the purpose behind all of these measures which you see?Simply to make Turkey a stronger, more powerful nation. It is actuallyto take Turkey and say that it is a European country.This is why the

Turkish establishment keeps getting upset every time the EuropeanUnionkeeps raising the rules for entry. Yes, you are European but not quite.

And it gets really upset, when after twenty years of queuing it findsthat countries like Poland and Czechoslovakia are suddenly ahead of itin the queue to join the European Union.Now this example of Moustafa Kamal, I think is something that

resonatedthroughout the Muslim world partly because I would argue that Turkey

at

the turn of the century was the most powerful Muslim country,thereforewhat happened there was tremendously important. And the key symbol

of that was the abolition of the caliphate which I think had majorpolitical repercussions.Moustafa Kamal gives the reasons for its abolition in a famous speechwhich goes on for three days. He said we can't have the caliphatebecause it would make us the laughing stock in the civilised world. Heknow who the civilised world is. It is the colonising European countrywhich was carrying out major violence, but civilisedly, throughout thecolonies at the time. So the Western gaze is there and it is foundthrough the spirit of various nationalist discourses and secularistdiscourses.Given then that the majority of the elite and the ruling circles in the

Muslim have Kamal's orientation, it follows that from themWesternisation and modernisation are xxxxx And I don't want anyone

tothink this is because these people are ignorant and they do notunderstand things very well. This confusion between Westernisation

andmodernisation exists among most people in the West as well.When push comes to shove, when you want to give an example of whatmodernity looks like you will end up taking an example from Westernhistory or Western cultural practices.Now what that does of course is to suggest to you that whatever historyhappened in the West you need to try and reproduce that kind of historical sequence if you are going to get the same kind of results.So, for example, the case is made out for secularisation. It is arguedthat secularisation is necessary for developed societies. It is

necessary to maintain civil peace and it is necessary to for progress.Hence people in Turkey and people in pre-revolutionary Iran got veryupset when women started wearing headscarves. They said this wouldsomehow destroy the republic. We must have secularisation.What they have forgotten is that the reason for secularisation emergedin Europe was because of the particular history of Europe. In otherwords secularisation grew out of the fact the Europe had wars of religion around protestantism and catholicism which were devastating.There was therefore an attempt to detach the Christian religion fromstate authority to try and bringpeace.I would argue that in Muslim history you would not find any analog tothose wars of religion. Therefore the idea that secularism is needed inMuslim society to maintain peace doesn't have the same kind of urgency. No doubt there were conflicts between Shias and Sunnis, nodoubt there were conflicts between Christians and Muslims. But none

of these conflicts ever extended into systematic programmes of annihilation. There were conflicts and tensions, but the Ottoman Em-

pire,a largely Sunni state, managed to contain within its boundaries, Jews,Christians and Shias, more or less happily.One thing that people forget is that up to the 12th or 13th Christiancentury Muslims were always the minority in the areas which they ruled.And given the technology and the means of the time there had to be somesort of collaboration between them and the subject population. And

therewas.So there is no reason to take an example from European history and saythat because this happened in Europe this must necessarily happen in

Muslim cases.Now you have a very odd situation here. So you have to havesecularisation for democratisation but in Muslim countries you don'thave secularisation so you need an almost dictatorial imposition of secularisation so that you can have democratisation. I hope you can seethe paradox of that. That to start off you have to have this kind of

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PAGE 40, Islam21, February 2000 tyrannical situation as a way to future liberation.What I am trying to say is that the argument that Western history actsas a model for Muslim societies is at best flawed and at worse dangerousfor Muslims. In that sense we move to a second proposition. If we acceptthat then what kind of political arrangements, what kind of politicalarrangements, what kind of government structures do Muslims need tohave a better life and why won't democracy do.There are two ways of looking at this question. You can have the bestconstitution in the world but it doesn't mean anything unless itactually reflects the relationship of power. xxxxxxxxx had an ideal

constitution. It was free. If you read the constitution you think myGod it must be the freest society on earth. It was undermined by manyclauses and other relationships.For the last thirty odd years Muslim activists and thinkers have beendrafting ideal constitutions for Islamic states and differentorganisations are producing different Islamic constitutions. Somehowthe argument is that if we get an appropriate Islamic constitution wewill be able to re-write (?) the perfect Islamic state. So we have thisgame of saying that this constitution is closer to the Koran than thatone. You can find many of these constitutions and most of them aresubconsciously patterned on the American constitution. Constitutions

donot make good government for a start.Secondly the question arises of what kind of governmental structure arewe talking about if we say that democracy has this kind of culture. Ithink if you ask anyone from anywhere what kind of government they

wouldlike to live under they would probably say they would like a goodgovernment, leaving completely open the fact that what you consider is

agood governmentmay not be what your neighbour considers a goodgovernment.You will always have that kind of conflict.The question then comes that within Muslim societies you have areservoir of traditions, sources and values which can be used togenerate plans and understandings which have the same kind of applicability. We do not need first to have a process of Westernisation,then modernisation then you will get democratisation. That is a gamethat the Bolsheviks played for long time and it is a game that mostMuslim leaders now play. First we can't have proper elections, we can't

have proper government because the people are not ready yet. We needtoget ourselves Westernised, modernised then we will be able to havedemocracy.I would like to suggest that the kind of values we would like tomention like human rights, equality, re-distribution of wealth etc areall capable of being generated from within the Muslim tradition. We donot necessarily need to make references and detours through otherhistorical developments. We have our own historical development

which isnot the same in every single place but shares a certain agreement andthat in itself provides us with sufficient resources to generate ideasabout what the good life should be.There is no way of legislating how that will come about. One of thetragedies of the Muslim world has been that many people who have

takenthis idea that only universal values, values that can be generated fromthe West have abandoned trying to look at Islam as a way of generatingthem.And the result is that Islam is turned into a museum piece and peopletalk about it in terms of texts. Muslims are told you are not a goodMuslim because in the 5th century hijri this was what Islam was and youare not doing it.There are more Muslims alive today then there have ever been. One of the main stories that we have been told about Muslim history is one thestory of historical decline. Islam had a great first ten to hundredyears and that is long gone. The picture can't be one of historicaldecline. Why do have so many millions of Muslims in numbers as well

as apercentage. This story does not take into account have things have been

commonality. So you may find that many Muslims disagree on princi-ples of

good government. Some would argue that there is nothing in the Koranabout government while others would argue that Khomeini being a

Muslimmade it incumbent on him to live under an Islamic government. They

maydisagree about these two things but that disagreement is not any moredecisive than the disagreement between Marx and John Stuart Mills.In the Western tradition you could have different thinkers saying

different things and that shows how wide the tradition is but whenMuslims disagree with each other it shows how incoherent Islam is. Idon't think thisfollows. I think that as Islam enters into dialogues andconversation and that as more Muslims join in that conversation the

morethe future holds for us. It is better for us to hold a conversationwithin our own tradition about our own future then simply trying tofollow the footsteps of a pattern which has very little to do with ourhistory and where we are going.If we follow those footsteps and those arguments we will always be onestep behind. We as Muslims must start to have conversations within ourtradition about our future and to recognise that dialogue is not justabout the past but also about the future. We the need to look somewhereelse for the future. It is something that can be articulated through itsown resources.

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