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Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006


Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 BELGRA 06122 171524Z

11ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W --------------------- 048902R 171301Z SEP 76FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADETO SECSTATE WASHDC 8095INFO USMISSION NATOAMEMBASSY MOSCOW

S E C R E T BELGRADE 6122

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDSTAGS: PFOR NATO YOSUBJ: YUGOSLAVIA AND NATO

REF: (A) USNATO 4942, (B) BELGRADE 6058 (NOTAL),(C) BELGRADE 2522

1. STRONGLY AGREE WITH MY COLLEAGUE STRAUSZ-HUPE THATNATO MUST CONSULT REGULARLY AND INTENSIVELY ABOUT YUGOSLAVIA.FRENCH AND ITALIAN OBJECTIONS SILLY. AS YOUGOSLAVS KNOWOF PAST NATO TALKS, THEY WOULD BE TROUBLED TO LEARNALLIANCE HAD LOST INTEREST. AND SENIOR FSFA OFFICIALHIMSELF PROVIDED JUSTIFICATION (AND BEST REBUTTAL TO ANYFOR-THE-RECORD OBJECTIONS THEY PREDICTABLY WOULD MAKESHOULD CONSULTATIONS BECOME PUBLIC) WHEN HE REMARKED TO TWOOTHER NATO AMBASSADORS AND TO ME (IN THE AFTERMATH OFSONNENFELDT FLAP) THAT SHOULD YUGOSLAVIA BE INVADED IT WOULD BEAN ILLUSION TO EXPECT THAT CERTAIN COUNTRIES COULD SIT BACK AND"CHEER ON THE HEROIC YUGOSLAVS" LIKE ACTORS ON A STAGE. HECLAIMED THAT YUGOSLAVS WOULD INSURE THAT ANY INVASION OF YUGOSLAVIAWOULD CAUSE A FULL-SCALE EUROPEAN WAR (PEF REF C.)

2. REAL ISSUE IS NOT WHETHER WE SHOULD HAVE CONSULTATIONSBUT WHAT SHOULD BE THEIR GOAL. INFORMATION EXCHANGE ISDESIRABLE AND FOR OUR PART WE WILL CONTINUE TO INCLUDEUSNATO ON SIGNIFICANT CABLES. BUT CLEARLY CENTRAL ISSUE SECRET

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IS WHAT WE SHOUD DO TO SUSTAIN AND INCREASE YUGOSLAV



INDEPENDENCE OF THE SOVIET UNION, WHILE REDUCING DAMAGEYUGOSLAVS DO THE INDUSTRIALIZED DEMOCRACIES IN WESTERNEUROPE AND REST OF WORLD.

2. AS REF B AND PREVIOUS HAVE MADE CLEAR, WE BELIEVEREPEATED OPEN-ENDED AND SEEMINGLY NERVOUS STATEMENTS OF SUPPORTFOR YUGOSLAVIA EITHER ADDRESSED TO SOVIET UNION OR YUGOSLAVSTHEMSELVES ARE DISTINCTLY COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE. THEY WILL BE TAKENMORE AS A SIGN OF WEAKNESS THAN STRENGTH. TITO AND SOME OTHERYUGOSLAV LEADERS BEGINNING TO BELIEVE WEST IS IN EARLYSTAGES OF DECLINE, AND THINK THAT WHILE OUR "REACTIONARYFORCES" STILL REPRESENT A THREAT TO THEM, ON THE WHOLE THEWEST CAN BE SIMULTANEOUSLY TAKEN FOR GRANTED AND NOT RELIEDUPON (A CONFIDENTIAL YUGOSLAV STUDY RECENTLY NOTED WITHRELIEF THAT US STANCE TOWARD SOVIET UNION GROWING TOUGHERAND THAT THIS WAS IN YUGOSLAVIA'S INTEREST). OUR RESPONSESHOULD BE ONE OF FIRMNESS TOWARDS YUGOSLAVIA (AS WELLAS SOVIET UNION), COMBINED WITH WILLINGNESS TO DEVELOPRELATIONS ON BASIS OF MUTUAL INTEREST -- PARTICULARLYIN THE MILITARY FIELD.

3. IF THE WEST COULD JOIN TOGETHER ON SUCH AN APPROACHTHERE WOULD BE FAR LESS BILATERAL TURBULENCE THAN THEREHAS BEEN IN RECENT MONTHS (THE GERMANS, AUSTRIANS, FRENCHAND OURSELVES HAVE ALL BEEN THROUGH OR ARE STILL UNDER-GOING STRAINS DUE CHHIEFLY TO YUGOSLAV BELIEF IN THEEFFICACY OF PRESSURE AND DIVIDE AND CONQUER). CHIEFPROBLEM WITH THE BE-NICE-TO-THE-YUGOSLAVSAPPROACH IS THAT IT HAS LED YUGOSLAVIA TO MISCALCULATEHOW FAR THEY CAN PUSH US WITHOUT TAKING INTO ACCOUNTINEVITABLE AND JUSTIFIABLE DOMESTIC POLITICAL REACTIONSINSIDE EACH OF OUR COUNTRIES -- LATEST EXAMPLES ARECARLOS, BITTER FIGHT WITH AUSTRIA, AND TOTH CASE. RESULTIS PUBLIC IN WEST NOT PREPARED TO SACRIFICE MUCH FORYUGOSLAVS' SAKE. AND AS VIETNAM AND ANGOLA DEMONSTRATED,UNLESS OUR ALLIES IN THE REGION ARE WILLING TO HELP DEFEND ACOUNTRY, THE AMERICAN CONGRESS AND PUBLIC ARE CERTAINLYNOT WILLING TO DO SO. OUR ACTIONS FOR OR AGAINST YUGOSLAVS AREINEXTRICABLY LINKED TO YUGOSLAV ACTIONS VIS-A-VIS ISSUES OFCONCERN TO US. THEY MUST ABOVE ALL BE BROUGHT TO RESPECT SECRET

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THE WEST AT LEAST AS MUCH AS THEY DO THE EAST, IF THEY ARETO SUSTAIN THE WILL TO RESIST THE SOVIET UNION AND WEARE TO DEVELOP A GREATER WILL TO HELP.SILBERMAN

SECRET



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Message AttributesAutomatic Decaptioning: ZCapture Date: 01 JAN 1994Channel Indicators: n/aCurrent Classification: UNCLASSIFIEDConcepts: POLICIES, RELATIONS WITH REGIONAL ORGS, BRIEFINGSControl Number: n/aCopy: SINGLEDraft Date: 17 SEP 1976Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEWDisposition Action: RELEASEDDisposition Approved on Date: Disposition Authority: coburnhlDisposition Case Number: n/aDisposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEWDisposition Date: 28 MAY 2004Disposition Event: Disposition History: n/aDisposition Reason: Disposition Remarks: Document Number: 1976BELGRA06122Document Source: COREDocument Unique ID: 00Drafter: n/aEnclosure: n/aExecutive Order: GSErrors: N/AFilm Number: D760353-0113From: BELGRADEHandling Restrictions: n/aImage Path: ISecure: 1Legacy Key: link1976/newtext/t19760951/aaaabqzf.telLine Count: 111Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILMOffice: ACTION SSOriginal Classification: SECRETOriginal Handling Restrictions: EXDISOriginal Previous Classification: n/aOriginal Previous Handling Restrictions: n/aPage Count: 3Previous Channel Indicators: n/aPrevious Classification: SECRETPrevious Handling Restrictions: EXDISReference: 76 BELGRADE 6058, 76 BELGRADE 2522Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVEDReview Authority: coburnhlReview Comment: n/aReview Content Flags: Review Date: 07 APR 2004Review Event: Review Exemptions: n/aReview History: RELEASED ; APPROVED Review Markings:

Margaret P. GrafeldDeclassified/ReleasedUS Department of StateEO Systematic Review04 MAY 2006

Review Media Identifier: Review Referrals: n/aReview Release Date: n/aReview Release Event: n/aReview Transfer Date: Review Withdrawn Fields: n/aSecure: OPENStatus: NATIVESubject: YUGOSLAVIA AND NATOTAGS: PFOR, YO, US, NATOTo: STATEType: TEMarkings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006

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