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Gestures are typically discrete and self-terminating, with a definable beginning and end

(Kendon, 1986). This requirement aligns gestures with verbal utterances, which have

analogous properties. However, signs, including words, have a different and dissociable

brain basis from gestures (Marshall, et al. 2004). Arbitrary gestures come closest to

illustrating the discontinuous nature attributed to gestures. An example would be the

Masonic handshake. But more emotionally driven gestures are less isolated, and may

occur in concert with postural shifts and facial expressions that emphasize and clarify the

meaning that is being communicated. Analogous to shouting rather than speaking,

gestures embedded in somatic adjustments turn up the volume, and act as a more forceful

signal. Such amplification serves a purpose. High intensity stimuli have the biological

function of inducing their recipient to withdraw from confrontation.

Numerous taxonomies of gesture exist, of which subdividing them into “ arbitrary”,

“mimetic”, and “deictic” is an example (Nespoulous and Lecours, 1986). Such categories

are convenient reductions that transect a continuum of gestural properties that extends

between the discrete arbitrary and deliberate gesture on the one extreme, and more

“instinctive”, even automatic, gestures, embedded in facial and somatic rearrangements,

on the other extreme. Among the latter types are movement patterns that reflect the

organization of the human motor control system rather than any social construct or

specifically learned formula. This gestural type appears not previously to have been

singled out for description. In exploring the extent to which gestures can be naturalized, I

invoke the neurologically shaped type of gesture.

People approach one another, withdraw from one other, reciprocally engage and

disengage. Or, hesitating to commit themselves, they indicate their intention or

inclination with corresponding gestures or signs, either deliberately or unintentionally.

They use fragments, rudiments and simplifications of the overt patterns of the movement

they are contemplating as stand-ins for the activity in question. These fragmentary

movements and shifts in posture assume a semiotic role, as do corresponding inscriptions

and other recordings. Since the neurological organization of motor control is the same in

people everywhere, it is to be expected that beyond culture-specific minor details, similar


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meanings will be non-verbally represented by similar movement patterns, even in

cultures that have never been in contact. Such functional convergence from disparate

origins would make it unnecessary to invoke spread by information transmission. Rather,

the nervous system constrains the motor expression of the major categories of meaning,

regardless of epoch and culture.

2. Organization of Motor Control

A newborn child can move every one of her voluntary muscles, but not individually, in

isolation. Rather, her movements are compulsorily conjoint into patterns that are called

“synergisms”. Each synergism plays a particular adaptive role, such as orienting and

approach, withdrawal in fear or disgust, startle to a loud sound or sudden loss ofequilibrium, grasp, and nuzzling for the breast. For example, when orienting to one side

of space, the infant manifests the “asymmetrical tonic neck reflex”. She points with

extended arm, swivels gaze and turns her head toward the indicated location. Her

opposite arm flexes. Her leg extends on the side of the target, and flexes on the opposite

side. Her mouth opens, as if to ingest. When the infant undertakes any one of these

component movements, the other components of the synergism automatically co-occur

(Kinsbourne, 1986).

As the nervous system matures, basic underlying synergisms continue to be represented,

but become latent as they come under inhibitory control from later maturing higher levels

of organization. The individual becomes able to decompose the synergisms, and

undertake one component movement while inhibiting the rest. Or, he can intend or

consider a movement pattern, but hold its outward manifestation in abeyance by

inhibition. He can combine elements of unrelated or even incompatible synergisms by

dint of effortful learning and sustained practice (Kinsbourne, 1993).

When people think about an action it becomes represented in their brains, but the output

instruction that would otherwise realize it in movement are inhibited. This inhibition

tends to be imperfect, however, so that fragments of the envisaged movement actually


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occur. This may be a gaze shift only, or a slight head turn, which signal approach, or a

gaze or head turning away, indicating withdrawal. A component of basic synergisms,

such as for approach or withdrawal, may inadvertently seep through, and betray the

underlying thought. Or it will deliberately be released, to indicate the thought without

committing the person to overt and irrevocable action. In both cases, gestures that

communicate are the result; for instance the observer learns by body language that her

company is desired, or rejected, as the case may be, without a word spoken.

Even when they approach or withdraw overtly, normal adults do not exhibit in full the

corresponding synergisms as they are seen in infants. And yet, that the synergisms remain

hardwired into the nerve net is revealed by their dramatic enhancement in athetosis. This

is a movement disorder in which both the limbs and the axial musculature are ceaselesslyin motion. The informed observer noted that the movements are alternating approach and

withdrawal synergisms, involving, as they do, head, trunk and limbs together. On account

of the lesion in the basal ganglia, higher-level control is in abeyance, and the circuitry for

approach and withdrawal is released from inhibition.

3. Learning of Gestures, Signs and Rituals

Whatever their form, individuals have to acquire facility in the movements that are

involved in the gestures. In the cases of most gestures, simple spontaneous imitation

would seem to suffice, and the movement sequence is easily retained when it conforms to

the neural organization of human movement control. Episodes of imitation are

remembered. With repeated exposure and use, the practice of gesturing becomes part of

the knowledge base and habitual, and finally becomes procedural, an automatized motor

skill that is performed outside awareness in its specific detail. However, specific learning

is required for skilled sequences such as dance. The learning will be effortful to the extent

that the requisite movements violate the prewired organization of the nervous system and

have to overcome it. Yet gymnasts prove that even the most daring and improbable

revisions of one’s neural organization are feasible for individuals who exert

disproportionate effort over a disproportionate period of time. The virtuoso musical


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performer parallels in fine motor skill what the gymnast achieves in gross motor skill.

The ability to override nature flaunts the agent’s skill and safeguards his exceptionality.

The acquired knowledge is classified as “procedural”. It is not factual, or “semantic”. Nor

is procedural learning a matter of recollecting in sequential detail the episodes during

which it was acquired. When perfected, it is nonverbal, ultimately fluent and automatic,

and relies on the function of the basal ganglia more than the cerebrum. Sign learning

may involve semantic as much or more than procedural memory, in that though the sign

may not be complex in motor execution, it might have been deliberately made arbitrary in

design. Semantic learning is attributed to the cerebral cortex.

What types of distinctions are inherent in the design of the human brain, and prewired

into it? The human and animal brain programs behavior along major dichotomies ofattention and action. The most ancient and ubiquitous in phylogeny is approach versus

withdrawal. A crucial subset of this dichotomy is mutual social engagement versus

disengagement, as in conversation, both for social interaction between equals and

between unequals, indicating domination versus subordination. A second domain is

looking up and away versus down to nearby. The dopaminergic ventral frontotemporal

system of the cerebrum programs upward and distance orientation, whereas posterior

parietal circuits direct orientation down to personal and peripersonal space, the body and

its immediate surround (Previc, 1990).

Actions that conform to the universal prewiring of the human brain are both easier to

execute and easier to remember or relearn than those which do not. This large class of

gestures/symbols is ideally suited for purposes of wide dissemination. For purposes of

meanings that are more specialized, an alternative is to formulate gestures, etc., in a

deliberately arbitrary fashion, and even in a fashion that runs counter to the neurological

prewiring. Insofar as these activities are harder to learn, and may require constant

practice to maintain, they are less suitable for wide dissemination and more adapted to

the effortful maintenance of the elite status of subgroups. Many art forms, heraldry, types

of dance, and sporting activities, conform to this category of gestures and signs.


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Is a universal science of gesture possible? A science is possible, but one that is far less

than universal. Meanings that when expressed are intelligible to anyone are ones that

conform to the organization of motor control. Precisely because they do so, they also

reveal what the person thinks, feels or intends, even inadvertently. In contrast, private

meanings may show only traces of the predispositions of the brains that created them.

4. Brain Mechanisms

The brain is a continuous network of neurons, nested within which are neuronal

assemblies, which are specialized for quite different forms of processing. Its means of

expression in terms of control of overt behavior, are far less plentiful. Thus it is versatile

in the range of information that it takes into account, and yet selective and unified in theaction that it consequently generates. The output bottleneck reduces the nuances that go

into decision making to the simplicity of the decision when made.

Unitary action is implemented in part by an extensive system of opponent processors.

Opponent processors influence each other in either of two ways. The negative feedback

variety establishes a balance between opposing tendencies in the form of a stable

graduated vector resultant, on the lines of a thermostat or any homeostat. For instance,

the direction of attention along the right-left plane is determined by the relative activation

of mutually inhibiting opponent processors in the right and left hemisphere. The alternate

type of opponent processing is based on positive feedback along the lines of “winner-

takes-all”, as exemplified by a seesaw. Many responses are possible, but one only is

chosen at a time. This response competition is resolved in such a way that the response

which is most activated, even marginally, gains in activation, whereas the other responses

reciprocally weaken. The animal’s resulting behavior is adaptive; unequivocal and

definitive, rather than tentative and vacillating. Generally speaking, the dichotomies of

interest in this discussion are represented in the brain by opponent processors either

laterally between the hemispheres, front-back between frontal and parietal areas of the

two hemispheres, or superior and inferior, in the form of dorsal stream versus ventral

stream.


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5. Approach/withdrawal

As a general rule, motile species are preprogrammed to approach soft stimuli, suggesting

prey, and withdraw from strong stimuli, suggesting a predator (Schneirla, 1959). The

parietal lobes are specialized for approach, and the frontal lobes for withdrawal (Denny-

Brown, Meyer and Horenstein, 1952). In humans, approach behavior is also represented

at numerous levels of abstraction, and on its higher conceptual level is fueled by left

hemisphere activity (Kinsbourne, 1978). Withdrawal, which is also represented at

cumulative levels of abstraction, is more the prerequisite of the right cerebral hemisphere.

Advancing and retreating are analogous in their figurative connotations. One movesforward, putting things behind one, where no actual advancing or retreating is involved.

Foresight is favorably contrasted with hindsight. One can be mentally advanced, or

alternatively mentally backward. The speaker’s postures conform to the spatial metaphor.

At the greatest level of generality, approach involves flexion movements and withdrawal

involves extension. Consider the flexed position of the predator ready to pounce or of the

runner in starting position. In contrast, consider the extended position of limbs, head and

trunk of the one who rejects temptation in Renaissance painting (“Noli me tangere”). In

dyadic interaction, eye contact, pointing for joint regard, joint symmetrical actions such

as high-fives, face-to-face imitation and generally conversation are approach behaviors.

They serve to orient two people to a shared perspective or state of mind. In contrast,

reciprocal domination and submission are signaled along the vertical axis, by failure to

establish eye contact, an upward and backward extension of the head of the dominant

person and conversely the head lowering and bowing, if not kneeling, of the submitter.

6. The Vertical Axis

Further elaborations along the vertical axis are raising one’s hat in the air or otherwise

making an upward sweeping gesture as an expansive aspiration/domination gesture, as


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opposed to doffing one’s hat to another, curtsying, or performing the courtier’s sweeping

gesture downward to indicate submission. The arm is raised for salute, and pumped

upward to indicate triumph in a sporting event. One jumps for joy, but hangs one’s head

in shame. The symbolism of upward versus downward orienting is not only exemplified

nonverbally in direction of gaze and postural orientation, such as thumbs up versus

thumbs down, but also by verbal surrogates, such as verbally indicating “thumbs up

versus thumbs down” and such locutions as having “lofty goals” when “things are

looking up” versus having base “underhand” objectives. People are “upright” or

“crooked”. Lofty sentiments are assigned upward, base ones down, progressive ones to

the front, homespun ones to the rear, based on what was incorrectly thought to be reliable

evidence, the distribution of bumps on the surface of the skull (Kinsbourne, 2000). In

conversation, raising one’s voice at the end of a sentence implies that one wants to hear areaction from the listener, whereas dropping it implies that one does not. In accepting

someone, one looks up to him or her; in rejecting, one looks down upon them. If two

individuals accept one another as equals, the one’s speech and body rhythms are

entrained with those of the other. We aspire to the stars, rise to the challenge, place

prophets on mountaintops, and envisage a city on a hill, look up to the throne. In contrast,

we are “downcast”, and “abysmal” plumbs the depth of despair, and confirms the threat

“you’re going down”. Sir Walter Raleigh left this message to Queen Elizabeth: “Fain

would I rise, but that I fear to fall”. She did not think he was going rock climbing.

Two extensive neural networks are associated with attending/acting upward versus

downward. The dorsal system, involving superior parietal and dorsolateral prefrontal

cortex is associated with downward attending, and the ventral system, temporal and

orbitofrontal with upward gaze. Gestures directed upward implicate the latter system, and

downward the former. So the differential valence of upward and downward directed

metaphors spreads a dimension of valence out in circumpersonal space (Johnson and

Lakoff, 1999). In turn, the metaphors are abstracted from physical gestures. These

relationships lead again to the conclusion that gestures can be recognized and

remembered for their general intent without their meanings having to be memorized from

scratch as arbitrary actions.


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Research has shown that searching for items with positive valence is faster if they are in

the upper part of the visual field, whereas items with negative valence are more quickly

found in downward locations (Meier and Robinson, 2004).

7. Rituals

In contrast to gestures, the neural infrastructure of rituals does not deploy opponent

systems. Rituals have specific contents that distinguish them from each other, but a

shared format. They consist of stereotyped sequences of gestures that are usually repeated

over relatively long periods of time. Rituals are used to modify and manipulate

mental/social state. For the individual, as the ritual continues, it gradually serves tomoderate uncomfortable overarousal/anxiety in humans, and so-called ritualistic

behavior, described as displacement behavior, also does so in animals (Kinsbourne,

1980). Electrophysiological evidence in animals and people demonstrates that repetitive

high frequency actions are dearousing, and lessen anxiety. When undertaken in a group

setting, gathered for religious or quasireligious military purposes, rituals mediate

affiliation to the group’s common perspective or cause. Rituals are a vehicle for crowd

control and manipulation. The individual relinquishes his independence, merges with that

of the group, and adopts the group purpose. Among the many instances are religious

ceremonies and prayer meetings, military and political rallies, ritual dances, revivalist

meetings and similar gatherings that are intended to persuade, cement loyalties, and

relieve participants of their money. I have suggested that the affiliative effect is mediated

primarily by the entrainment of the individual’s actions with those of the group. The

power of entrainment in fostering affiliation can be traced back in development to the

“interactional synchrony” that obtains between infant and caretaker. This refers to the

shared and alternating rhythms of movement and vocalization as adult and child face and

engage each other, interact by word, and, failing that, by body language. The facility to

entrain may be a specifically human trait, which fosters our extremely sophisticated

socialization.


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8. Mirror Neurons

“Mirror neurons” have been credited with the ability to activate a mental state in the

observer that corresponds to another person’s mental state. In non-human primates, these

frontally located neurons fire in relation to specific actions, whether they are undertaken

by the individual himself or by another animal that the individual observes. They might

appear ideally suited to imitation, but the monkeys in whom these neurons were

discovered do not imitate. Do they imitate covertly, anyhow? According to “simulation

theory”, mirror neurons implement an empathic experiencing by the observer of the

observed individual’s point of view and state of mind. It is implied that without those

neurons we would be unable to determine other people’s states of mind, and empathize

with them. In other words, we would be autistic. This is a leap of faith. That mirrorneurons become active in the two scenarios suggests that when one does something, and

when another does the same thing, circuitry represents the thing being done. Whether the

one who is observed and the agent feel the same way about it is simply not in evidence.

In terms of their implications for higher-level social behavior, I believe mirror neurons

have been massively oversold. More conservatively, mirror neurons help represent an

action, regardless of who performs it, and so fire indiscriminately when the action occurs,

leaving it to other areas of the brain to concurrently identify the agent, be it the self or

someone else (Kinsbourne, 2004). Voluntary movement is initiated with a goal

representation, which envisages the completed act, and is perceptual, as of course is

viewing what someone else does.

The generality of the ability of mirror neurons to code observed gestures has not yet been

established. Do they only code actions on the part of others that the individual has already

himself performed? Or do they code perceived actions and thereby facilitate the

individual’s ability and predisposition to perform them herself? If the latter is the case,

and if they are found to code a wide range of observed actions, then they could

potentially be a vehicle for recording seen gestures, and thereby automatically make the

gesture available to the owner of the mirror neurons. This would be an instance of

learning for which deliberate effort is not required.


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9. Rituals in Psychopathology

Some psychopathologies involve exaggerated and/or deviant use of gestures, postures

and rituals. Autistic individuals are noted for their rituals and mannerisms, which I

believe serve a dearousing function (Kinsbourne, 1980). They are not communicative in

intent, in line with their general failure to entrain with other people. A lack of

“interactional synchrony” is basic to their deficiency in social skills. Their “proximal

preference” for touching, feeling, and sniffing, rather than listening and looking into the

distance, is a clue to the extreme internalization of their attention. Some of these features

are also found in the rituals of obsessive-compulsive disorder. In contrast, psychotics tend

to fantasize and hallucinate in terms of upward located and distant events. Their distal preference tends to transcend mundane proximal concerns. The significance, if any, of

schizophrenic’s hebephrenic gestures and catatonic postures is opaque to the observer.

Perhaps they express inner meanings.

10. Concluding Comment

Some gestures in their forms and some rituals in their formats conform to the

organization of the agent’s nervous system. Thus the agent’s mind is prepared to learn

these gestures and rituals, and this lightens the load on his memory and learning. The

recipient likewise has a prepared mind, and will grasp their meanings with little or no

specific instruction. Gestures and rituals that reveal aspects of the universal organization

of the nervous system therefore afford an effective and natural way to express one’s

feelings and intentions, with reasonable assurance that they will be understood, even in

cross-cultural encounters.


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References

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Kendon, A. (1986). Current issues in the study of gestures. In J-L Nespoulous, P. Perron

and A. R. Lecours (Eds.) The Biological Foundations of Gestures: Motor and Semiotic

Aspects. Hillsdale, New Jersey, Erlbaum.

Kinsbourne, M. (1978). Biological determinants of functional bisymmetry and

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Kinsbourne, M. (1980). Do repetitive movement patterns in children and adults serve a

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Kinsbourne, M. (1986). Brain organization underlying orientation and gesture: Normal

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Kinsbourne, M. (1993). Development of attention and metacognition. In I. Rapin and S.

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Johnson, M. & Lakoff, G. (1999). Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its

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Marshall, J., Atkinson, J., Smulovitch, E., Thacker, A. and Woll, B. (2004). Aphasia in a

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Meier, B.P. & Robinson, M.D. (2004). Why the sunny side is up: Associations between

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Nespoulous, J.-L and Lecours, A.R. (1986). Gestures: Nature and function. In J-L.

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Previc, F.H. (1990). Functional specialization in the lower and upper visual fields in

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