laboratory biosafety and biosecurity i\issues related to brucella research and diagnostics

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Laboratory Biosafety and Biosecurity Issues Related to Brucella Research and Diagnostics Joseph P. Kozlovac, M.S., RBP, CBSP Agency Biological Safety Officer USDA Agricultural Research Service Beltsville, MD 20705-5146 Workshop: An Integrated Approach to Controlling Brucellosis in Africa, Addis Ababa, 29-31 January 2013

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Presented by Joseph P. Kozlovac at a Workshop: An Integrated Approach to Controlling Brucellosis in Africa, Addis Ababa, 29-31 January 2013

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  • 1. Laboratory Biosafety andBiosecurity Issues Relatedto Brucella Research andDiagnosticsJoseph P. Kozlovac, M.S., RBP, CBSPAgency Biological Safety OfficerUSDA Agricultural Research ServiceBeltsville, MD 20705-5146Workshop: An Integrated Approach to Controlling Brucellosis in Africa, AddisAbaba, 29-31 January 2013

2. Brucellosis: Who is at Risk? Farmers Shepherds, GoatHerders, Cattlemen Veterinarians Laboratory Workers Abattoir WorkersOccupational Risk Non-Occupational Risk Travellers Hunters Consumers ofunpasteurized dairyproductsInteresting Factoid: Over the past ~60 years2% of all brucellosis cases have beenlaboratory acquired.Yagupsky, P. and Baron, E.J. Laboratory Exposures to Brucellae and Implicationsfor Bioterrorism, Emerging Infectious Diseases . 2005 . 11(8) 1180-1185 3. Routes of Exposure Human infectious dose10-100 organisms byrespiratory route Mucous membrane,conjunctivae or non-intactskin contact with culturesor infected tissues Ingestion (mouthpipetting) Percutaneous Including accidentalinoculation with vaccinestrains B. abortus stain 19, RB51 B. militensis Rev-1 Person to person transmissionrare Brucella antigenhypersensitivity Rxn is rarehazard in lab staff andoccasional hazard in animalcare staff 4. First documented LAI with Brucellosis (Brucellamelitensis) occurred in 1897 via syringe1930-1978, 426 LAIs, 5 Deaths (Pike 1978)1941, Meyer and Eddie reported 76 Brucella LAIsbeginning in 1897 and 74 lab infections in the UnitedStates between 1922-19391979 -2004, 143 LAIs, 4* Deaths (Beyers 2006)Brucellosis: Historical RecordedLaboratory Associated Infections 5. Biosafety Risk Assessment:Safety Risk Groups Risk Group 1 No or low individual and community risk Unlikely to cause human or animal disease Risk Group 2 Moderate individual risk, low community risk Can cause disease but unlikely to be a serious hazard. Labexposures may cause serious infection, but effective treatment andpreventative measures are available and risk of spread of infectionis limited. Risk Group 3 High individual risk, low community risk Usually causes serious human or animal disease but does notordinarily spread. Effective treatment and preventativemeasures are available. Risk Group 4 High individual and community risk Usually causes serious human or animal disease and can bereadily transmitted. Effective treatment and preventative measuresare not usually available. 6. BSL for Diagnostic Work BSL-2 practices,containment equipmentand facilities. Operations thatgenerate aerosols orsplashes should beconducted within aBiological SafetyCabinetBSL-2 7. BSL-3 for CultureandAnimal Studies Biosafety level 3 isappropriate for handlingBrucella cultures orinfected membranes,fetal tissues and fluids. ABSL-3 practices,containment equipmentand facilities arerecommended for animalstudiesBSL-3 8. 8Lab Procedures That Emit Aerosols Pipetting Mixing Shaking Centrifugation Grinding Blending Vortexing Sonic Disruption Opening LypholizedCultures Flaming bacteriologic loops Entering or openingvessels to sample liquidunder pressure 9. Engineering Controls Primary Barriers Biological SafetyCabinets (BSC) Enclosed Containers Animal Isolators 10. 10Personal Protective Equipment Gloves Coats Gowns ShoeCovers Boots Respirators Face Shields Safety Glasses Safety Goggles Hearing Protection 11. Occupational Health andMedical Surveillance All persons working with virulent Brucellae should bekept under close clinical and serological surveillance Educate staff on human symptoms and have policy inplace for staff to report symptoms Consider providing laboratory workers with medicalcards which include, at a minimum, the followinginformation: Genus and species of organism which they work with 24-hour contact numbers for principal investigator andinstitutions occupational health care provider(s) 12. Occupational Health andMedical Surveillance Emergency Response or Treatment Laboratory exposure Accident or injury in the laboratory Post-exposure samples (recommended sequential serologictesting at 0, 6, 12, 18, and 24 weeks post exposure) Provide treatment (Doxycycline 100mg twice daily andrifampin 600mg once daily for 3 weeks) Re-examination of the patient before allowing them to returnto work after a laboratory exposurehttp://www.cdc.gov/brucellosis/laboratories/risk-level.html 13. Program to prevent loss, theft or misuse ofmicroorganisms, biological materials, and research-related information Protect pathogens from dangerous people Limit access to areas that contain certain biologicalagents or assets Guidance documents WHO Laboratory Biosecurity Guidance, 2006http://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/biosafety/WHO_CDS_EPR_2006_6.pdf U.S. BMBL Section VIPrinciples of Laboratory Biosecurityhttp://www.cdc.gov/biosafety/publications/bmbl5/index.htmDefining Laboratory Biosecurity 14. COMPONENTS OFLABORATORY BIOSECURITY 15. Basic Truism About Security SystemsA security system cannot protect every asset against everyconceivable threat Security resources are not infinite Security systems should be based on the asset or materialthat requires protection Security systems should be designed to address uniqueoperations 16. The Take Home Message Comprehensive biosafety/biosecurity trainingand consistent procedures for all personnelworking with Brucella species is needed Brucellosis has been documented as one of themost frequently acquired laboratory infections.the importance of using appropriate biosafetypractices and facilities cannot be overemphasized. Laboratory security measures should be basedon a sound risk assessment but should notnegatively impact the research mission.