The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume | Issue | Article ID 3485 | Dec 31, 1969

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Let's Turn Korea's West Sea (the Sea of Dispute) into a Sea ofPeace and Prosperity　　朝鮮の西海（紛争の海）を平和と繁栄の海へ

Man-bok Kim

Let’s Turn Korea’s West Sea (the Seaof Dispute) into a Sea of Peace andProsperity

Kim Man-bok

(Director of the South Korean NationalIntelligence Service under the Government ofPresident Roh Moo-hyun, 2003-2007)

Translated by Gavan McCormack

1. Sea of Dispute, The West Sea

Despite the fact that the Korean War, thegreatest tragedy in modern Korean history,ended on July 7, 1953 with an armistice, theWest Sea remains contested, a powder kegcapable of exploding into a second Korean Waror a third World War.

Under the armistice agreement was reached ona Military Demarcation Line (MDL) on landaccording to the military line of contact (LC),but at sea no such Military Demarcation Linecould be agreed. At that time, the UN forces,possessing overwhelming naval power,controlled most of the regions of the East Sea(Japan Sea) and West Sea (Yellow Sea) and theislands in them, and also some contiguous landareas to the north. After prolonged debate, itwas agreed to leave the five islands in the WestSea south of the 38th parallel line under UNforces and hand the islands to the north of the38th parallel to North Korea. Both sides agreedthat the MDL should extent horizontally intothe East Sea.

However, the problem was the West Sea. Whilethe UN side, following the international customof the time, sought to define territorial watersas within three nautical miles of the coastline,North Korea claimed twelve nautical miles. Justover a month after the settlement of armistice,on August 30, 1953, the commander of the UNforces, Mark W. Clark, unilaterally and withoutprior discussion with the north, proclaimed“the mid-point line between the five West Seaislands [Baengnyeong, Daecheong, Socheong,Yeonpyeong, and U] and the North Koreancoast” as a Northern Limit Line (NLL) or line oflimitation of naval patrol activities, in order to“prevent accidental naval conflict betweensouth and north and for the sake of stablemanagement of the armistice system.”

Up until 1973, North Korea made no particularissue of the NLL, even though crossing it fromtime to time. But over a period of two monthsfrom October of that year, North Koreadeliberately transgressed the NLL on 43occasions. Further, at the Military ArmisticeCommission at Panmunjom in December, itunilaterally declared “Navigation Rules for theFive Islands of the West Sea” under which“since the maritime areas to the North-west ofthe provincial boundaries of Hwanghae andKyongki provinces belong to us, South Koreanvessels need a permit from our authorities togo to and from the five West Sea islands.”Since then, North Korea began openly crossingover the NLL.

Despite its persistent encroachments over theNLL, turning it into something in name only, inthe Inter-Korean Basic Agreement of 1992

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North Korea agreed to treat the NLL as an“inviolable maritime boundary.” Furthermore,North Korea raised no objection to the (draft)amendments to its “Flight InformationRegions” made by South Korea in its May 1993‘Flight-Navigation Plan,’ as published by theInternational Civil Aviation Organization,between 1993 when it was published andJanuary 1998 when it came into effect, or evenafterwards. Furthermore, there were cases, inJune 2002 and November 2003, when NorthKorea de facto recognized the existence of theNLL by its patrol vessels crossing the NLL tocollect shipping being returned by the SouthKorean side.

Nonetheless, North Korean patrol boatscontinually transgressed the NLL especiallyduring the crab-fishing season in May and Juneevery year, under the pretext of protectingNorth Korean fishing boats.

Even under the Northern-embracing policies ofthe Kim Dae-jung government from February1998, the “first Yeonpyeong naval battle”occurred on June 15 1999 during the crab-fishing season. Because of the overwhelmingSouth Korean naval advantage, one NorthKorean torpedo speedboat was sunk and fiveother warships severely damaged and fourothers moderately damaged. At least 30 NorthKorean soldiers were killed and another 70injured. On the South Korean side, one patrolship and four high-speed vessels suffered minordamage and nine soldiers suffered minorinjuries. It was an overwhelming victory for theSouth. The South Korean government thendirected the implementation of a five-stagerules of engagement “in order to clearlyindicate our determination to defend the NLLand to prevent accidental tension over NLLfrom escalating.” In case of North Koreanvessels crossing the NLL, 1) first, a warning isto be broadcast, 2) second, a show of force, 3)third, if North Korean vessels still do notretreat, start to drive the vessels away,followed by 4) a warning shot, and 5) if the

North Korean vessel shoots back, then weshoot back to destroy it.

After its crushing defeat in “the f irstYeonpyeong naval battle,” North Koreacompletely rejected the NLL, substituting for ita “West Sea Maritime Military DemarcationLine” based on a “12 nautical mile limitprinciple” that began from a line through themid Han River estuary. This “West SeaMaritime Military Demarcation Line” not onlytransgressed South Korean sovereignty bycompletely cutting off the South Korean islandsof Baengnyeong, Dae-cheong, Seocheong, andYeonpyeong, but was also in breach of generalprinciples of international law which includednot only land territorial coast line but alsoisland coast lines.

Subsequently, in March 2000 North Koreapromulgated new “Regulations concerningNavigation in Vicinity of the Five Islands in theWest Sea” which required that “any US militaryvessels or South Korean civilian ships enteringthe region to the north of the militarydemarcation line must use one or other of thetwo routes designated by North Korea.”

In June 2000, one year after “the firstYeonpyeong naval battle,” President Kim Dae-jung visited Pyongyang for an historic summitmeet ing with North Korean DefenceCommission chairman Kim Jung-il. However,despite the dramatic progress in the South-North relationship after their “June 15 South-North Joint declaration,” the “secondYeonpyeong naval battle” nevertheless tookplace on June 29, 2002. On this occasion, whileSouth Korean high-speed vessels were at Phase2 (show of force) under the 5 stage “Rules ofEngagement,” in response to a North Koreanpatrol vessel that had encroached over theNLL, the North Korean patrol vessel attackedthem. Six of our soldiers were killed andeighteen wounded, and while being towed awaythe high speed vessel from our side sank. Onthe North Korean side one vessel was badly

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damaged and towed away and it was estimatedthat around 30 members of its crew, includingthe captain, were injured. North Korea’ssudden attack was retaliation for defeat in “thefirst Yeonpyeong naval battle.” Conservativecritics in South Korea were critical that “ourofficers and men died because of followingmistaken rules of engagement.” Consequently,the “five stage rules of engagement” wereamended by the Lee government that tookoffice in February 2008.

The West Sea: Sea of Dispute (Wikipedia)

A. Northern Limit Line (NLL, the borderclaimed by South Korea since 1953)

B. Military Demarcation Line (the borderclaimed by North Korea since 1999

1. Yeonpyeong Island (Site of artilleryclash in November 2010)

2. Baengnyeong Island (Site of sinking ofCheonan, March 2010) 3. Daecheong

Island 4. Jung-gu (Incheon Intl. Airport)

5. Seoul 6. Incheon 7. Haeju 8. Kaesong 9.Ganghwa County 10. Bukdo Myeon 11.

Deokjeok Myeon 12. Jawol Myeon

13. Yeongheung Myeon

2. The South-North Korean Agreement on

Establishing a Sea of Peace and Prosperity

(i) The Special Directive issued by PresidentRoh on the Prevention of Military Clashes inthe West Sea

As soon as he assumed office in February 2003,President Roh Moo-hyun issued specialinstructions deigned to prevent any such South-North military clashes as the first and secondYeonpyeong naval battles. Thereafter, betweenMay 2004 and December 2007, at the initiativeof the South Korean side, high-level talksbetween South and North Korean seniormilitary officers were conducted on sevenoccasions, alternating between locations in theSouth and in the North. Notably during thesecond talks between senior military officers ofSouth and North held at Mt Sorak in June 2004,both sides agreed on a common inter-ship radiofrequency as a means to prevent accidentalconflict. At subsequent South-North talksbetween senior military officers, both sidesagreed on the “establishment of commonfishing grounds in the West Sea,” on “directsea access for North Korean civilian ships tothe port of Haeju,” and on “necessary militaryguarantee measures for South-North economicexchange and cooperation.” Although the gapbetween the two could not be bridged when itcame to military matters, still, it was thanks tosuch measures that placed an emphasis onbuilding military trust, even if at an elementarylevel, that there was not a single militaryconfrontation along the NLL in the West Seaduring the period of the Roh government.

On the basis of adapting and developing the“sunshine policy,” the Roh governmentproposed a “peace and prosperity policy” as itsdiplomatic policy for North Korea andNortheast Asia. It was a plan for the peacefuldevelopment of the Korean peninsula thatcombined “peace” at the security level with“prosperity” at the economic level. Even duringthe period of heightened crisis that followedNorth Korea’s “nuclear possession declaration”

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on February 10 2005, the Roh governmentaffirmed the “‘3 No’ principles of policytowards the North: ‘no war on the Koreanpeninsula,’ ‘no sanctions or blockade of NorthKorea,’ and ‘no attempt to cause the collapse ofthe North Korean regime’.” The Roh Moo-hyungovernment’s Peace and prosperity policiesbore fruit in the historic “October 4 South-North Summit Declaration,” in which bothsides agreed on the establishment of “West SeaSpecial Zone of Peace and Cooperation”designed to convert the West Sea from a “seaof conflict” to a “sea of peace and prosperity.”

(ii) “The West Sea Special Zone of Peace andCooperation” – The Agreement

In the fifth article of the South-North SummitDeclaration signed at Pyongyang on October 4,2007, president Roh Moo-hyun and chairmanKim Jung-il agreed that “the South and Northwould pave the way for a ‘West Sea SpecialZone of Peace and Cooperation’ in the Haejuregion, establish a joint fishery zone and amaritime zone of peace, construct an EconomicSpecial Zone centering on the port of Haeju,allow the direct sea access to Haeju for civilianships, and positively promote shared usage ofthe Han River estuary.”

From the beginning of August 2007, whenagreement was reached to hold the secondSouth-North Summit in Pyongyang betweenAugust 27 and 30, 2007, President Rohdirected the drawing up of a plan forconverting the West Sea, the “Sea of Conflict,”into a “sea of peace and prosperity,” personallycollecting data and materials and organizing aseries of discussions with related officials. Asthe summit was postponed to the periodOctober 2-4 due to flood damage in mid-Augustin North Korea, closer attention was paid to theplan for a “West Sea Special Zone of Peace andCooperation” and a talks strategy was drawnup that included “Draft Items for Agreement atthe Summit Plenary” and “Draft Items to bedrawn up separately for signature.”

When President Roh Moo-hyun proposed hisplan for the “West Sea Special Zone” duringthe morning session of the Second South-NorthSummit on October 3 2007, National DefenceCommission chairman Kim Jong-il seems tohave considered it impractical in light of theexisting situation of military confrontation inthe West Sea and so evaded the discussion bysaying, “let the various problems be referredfor discussion at the Prime Ministerial level.” Inresponse, president Roh Moo-hyun madegreater efforts to press his point, emphasizingits importance from three aspects: first, as theoptimal way to resolve possible militaryconfrontation in the West Sea; second, that theWest Coast Special Zone of Peace andCooperation would become the axis of jointSouth-North prosperity in a future “West SeaCoastal Era,” and third, that not only would itconstruct peace by ending confrontation in theWest Sea but that it was also a comprehensiveplan for developing South-North economiccooperation in the West Sea.

Kim Jong-il visits the lodging of the RohParty during The South-North Summit,

Pyongyang, October 2007. Kim Man-bok ison the right.

At the afternoon session on the same day,Chairman Kim Jong-il welcomed President

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Roh’s proposal for a West Sea Special Zone ofPeace and Cooperation, saying, “I discussed thematter over lunch with senior responsibleofficials of the National Defense Commission.When I raised the possibility of a HaejuIndustrial Complex, they replied that thatwould present no problem. Not only wouldHaeju itself be fine but Kang-ryŏng township,linking Haeju and the Kaesong industrialcomplex, and Haeju port, could also bedeveloped.”

(iii) The Significance of the “West Sea SpecialZone of Peace and Cooperation”

The West Sea: Sea of Peace andCooperation

Within the West Sea Special Zone of Peace andCooperation, a joint fishery zone and a marinezone of peace were to be set up with an equalarea on either side of the NLL. The naval forcesof both sides were to be withdrawn beyond thatzone and replaced by patrols of lightly armedmaritime police vessels. A Haeju SpecialEconomic Zone was also to be developed oncontiguous shore land to the northeast of thejoint fisheries zone and the maritime zone ofpeace. As North Korean armed forces wereredeployed to the rear to allow the KaesongIndustrial Complex and the tourist road to MtKumkang to go ahead, so a significantproportion of North Korea’s heavy militaryconcentration in Haeju would presumably haveto be withdrawn. Further, if the Haeju

economic special zone were to be connected byland with the Kaesong Industrial Complex andIncheon Industrial Zone, the West Sea coastalarea would be transformed from “frontlinemilitary confrontation” to “National EconomicCommunity,” thus contributing not only topeace on the Korean peninsula but to theunification that is the deep desire of the Koreanpeople.

The undeveloped area of the Han River estuarycould also be jointly developed. The total areaof the estuary, stretching from downstream onthe Imjin River at the end-point of the MDL toMal Island, west of Kanghwa island where theNLL begins, is around 280 square kilometers.Enough gravel has accumulated around themouth of the Han River to meet the needs ofSeoul and the capital region for more than 20years. It goes without saying that jointdevelopment of the Han River mouth wouldserve to ease military tensions. After dredgingthe river and solving military problems, itshould be possible to renovate the waterwaysof Han River maritime routes. Further, if adirect route is opened to Haeju, that wouldcontribute not only to a dramatic reduction inthe cost of moving freight as South-Northeconomic cooperation evolves, but it would alsoalleviate military tensions in the West Sea area.

The West Sea Special Zone of Peace andCooperation would be nothing short of acomplete paradigm shift, transforming theWest Sea, a danger zone where there is alwaysthe risk of military confrontation, so that Southand North come together not in military waysbut in terms of permanently reducing tensionand establishing peace through economiccooperation and mutual prosperity. Theepochal, counter-intuitive quality of the “WestSea Special Zone of Peace and Cooperation”lies in the fact that it does not stir up theproblem of the maritime border line but insteaddevelops a mutually beneficial economicsystem, thus converting a “zero-sum” militarygame into a “win-win” economic game.

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(iv) Measures Subsequent to the Agreement forthe Establishment of “West Sea Special Zone ofPeace and Cooperation”

In concrete terms, the West Sea Special Zoneof Peace and Cooperation included thefollowing: 1) establishment of a Joint FisheryZone, 2) establishment of a Maritime Zone ofPeace, 3) establishment of a special economiczone and uti l ization of Haeju port, 4)permission for direct access to Haeju forcivilian vessels, and 5) shared usage of the HanRiver estuary. Although no part of theagreement was without significance, inparticular the military and economic impact ofthe establishment of the joint fishery zone andits consequences for the development of South-North relations could easily be imagined. Onthe southern side, we made efforts to have thisspelled out in more concrete terms in theOctober 4 South-North Summit Declaration,but time ran out before we could come to adetailed agreement.

At this point the leaders of South and Northagreed to conduct a Second Round of South-North Defense Ministers Meeting at Pyongyangfor three days from November 27, 2007 todiscuss and come to agreement on the detailedblueprint of the “West Sea Zone of Peace andEconomic Cooperation,”” and this was includedin the October 4 South-North SummitDeclaration. However, at the second South-North Defense Ministers’ Meeting, betweenDeputy Defense Minister Kim Chang-su fromthe South and Korean People’s Army militaryaffairs Chief Kim Il-chol from the North, it wasonly possible to come to an agreement inprinciple “that South and North would adoptmilitary guarantee measures for the ‘West SeaSpecial Zone of Peace and Cooperation.” Aserious error was made by agreeing to “referthe matter of military guarantees in concretecases to be discussed and agreed as a matter ofhighest priority at a separate meeting of South-North working-level military officials.” This issomething that will have to be dealt with in

concrete terms by the convening of a thirdSouth-North Defense Ministers’ meeting.

3. The West Sea Transformed into a “Seaof War”

(i) The Lee Myung-bak Government’s Hard-Linepolicy toward North Korea and the Worseningof the South-North Relationship

By reinforcing its exclusive strategiccooperation with Japan and the United Statesunder the US-South Korea alliance, and bytaking the lead in resolutions at the UnitedNations denouncing North Korea on humanrights matters, the Lee Myung-bak governmenthas followed a consistent line of containment ofNorth Korea. By linking the North Koreannuclear issue and the South-North Korearelationship, it has also reverted to Cold Warpolicies of confrontation with the North,insisting that, “in case of a North Korean pre-emptive nuclear attack being imminent, SouthKorea would not hold back from a pin-pointattack on the North’s nuclear facilities.” In thiscontext, on May 25, 2009, North Korea carriedout its second nuclear test, and South Koreathe following day declared that it wouldparticipate in full in the Proliferation SecurityIni t iat ive (PSI , des igned to preventproliferation of weapons of mass destruction),meaning that South Korean warships mightinspect or detain North Korean cargo boats.

Furthermore, adopting the conservativecritique of the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun“ r u l e s o f e n g a g e m e n t b a s e d o nproportionality,” designed to “prevent localconflicts escalating into all-out war,” that underthem the lives of soldiers became collateral, theLee Myung-bak government reduced the rulesof engagement at sea to the following steps: 1)after broadcast of a warning, (skipping theprocess of intimidation and moves to intercept)to proceed directly to 2) warning fire and then3) and then to attack designed to destroy. Bydoing this, the Lee Myung-bak governmentmade clear its intention to “make a determined,

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preemptive attack in the event of any NorthKorean NLL provocation.” At this point, theDaecheong naval battle occurred on November20 2009, resulting in destruction of NorthKorean naval guns and machine guns andpartial destruction of their patrol vesselwithout any harm on our side. The battle endedin unilateral victory for the South Korean side.

(ii) The Cheonan Incident and its Significance

After its “great defeat” in the Daecheong navalbattle, North Korea declared that, for theperiod from January to March 2010, fivemaritime areas in the vicinity of the NLL were“prohibited zones for navigation” and carriedout live fire drills along the coast. Then, onMarch 26, the South Korean anti-submarinepatrol vessel, Cheonan, split in two and sank.Following an analysis of the announcements ofthe South Korean Ministry of Defense andmedia reports from both Korea and overseas,the sinking of Cheonan gave rise to thefollowing serious security problems.

First, it demonstrated problems in SouthKorea’s anti-submarine patrolling.

Second, the possibility that a conflict in theWest Sea might lead to the outbreak of asecond Korean War emerged as a realisticconcern. Because of the Cheonan Incident,South Korea suspended aid to North Korea,discontinued relations, and accused NorthKorea of a “torpedo attack” before the UNSecurity Council. North Korea respondedangrily that, it “had nothing to do with thesinking of the Cheonan.” And it reinforced itsconfrontation with South Korea by declaringthat it would have “no further discussions orcontact with South Korea during the presidencyof Lee Myung-bak.” With the United States andJapan affirming total support for the findings ofthe South Korean government’s investigation,but China and Russia supporting North Korea,the situation surrounding the Korean peninsulawas thrown back to the Cold War. The conductof joint US-South Korea anti-submarine drills in

the East Sea late in July escalated militarytensions on the peninsula to new heights.

Third, frictions within South Korean societydeepened, eroding the national strength.Twenty one percent of the people, and inparticular forty nine percent of young people intheir twenties, did not believe the governmentreport which claimed the “sinking of theCheonan” was due to an act of North Korea.Since the Government hurried to publish itsfindings without clear explanation of matterssuch as “the precise moment of the Cheonan’ssinking,” or “the reason for Sokcho firing itsgun,”1 or “the escape route of the North Koreansubmarine,” various doubts remainedunresolved. Furthermore, when one considersthe findings of the independent Russianinvestigation as reported by the media, thefollowing become apparent: 1) there was adiscrepancy of five minutes between the lastmoment captured by CCTV on the Cheonan as“11:17.03 pm on 26 March,” and the threetimes revised hour of the sinking (“11:22 pm”)according to the South Korean government, 2)all of the propeller blades on the right side andtwo on the left side were damaged where thevessel made contact with the sea floor, and 3) itwas possible that the Cheonan might have beenblown up by a mine. On July 27, 2010, theSouth Korean Department of Defense rebuttedthe findings of the Russian investigation bysaying 1) although there were, in all, elevencameras on the Cheonan, they had not beenadjusted since their installation and thereforethere might be difference between the timethey showed and the actual time, 2) based onthe law of inertia, the blades on the propeller’sright side had been bent inwards due to asudden stop caused by the explosion and 3) allthe mines that had been set in the vicinity ofwhere the Cheonan sank had been disabled.Still, many specialists were not persuaded bythe rebuttal. And, according to an opinionsurvey conducted after the findings of theindependent Russian investigation had beenrevealed, only 32.5 percent of the people

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believed the finding of the South Koreangovernment’s investigation report that “thesinking of Cheonan was due to an act of NorthKorea.”

At the same time, the United States, with theworld’s best intelligence capacity, was negativeon the involvement of North Korea, saying onMarch 30, right after the incident, “there areno grounds for thinking that any third partywas involved in the sinking of the Cheonan.”However, following the May 20 publication ofthe South Korean government’s investigationf indings, and without reveal ing anyinvestigation or analysis of its own, the US justkept repeating that “the United States fullysupports the findings of the South Koreangovernment’s investigation,” leaving to theSouth Korean government the responsibility ofresolving the doubts.

(iii) Lessons from the Cheonan Incident

Since there is no guarantee that a tragedy suchas the Cheonan incident will not recur, andsince it is possible that an all-out war couldensue from clashes over the NLL, we have todraw out the lessons from the present incidentand make concentrated efforts in order toprevent its recurrence.

First, new defences against any asymmetricattack by North Korea in the West Sea arenecessary.

Second, we must strengthen our security. TheRoh Moo-hyun government set a goal of anannual increase of 9 per cent in outlays onsecurity and self-reliant national defense, andin fact did actually increase spending by 8.8per cent. The rate of increase in nationaldefence expenditure under the currentgovernment of Lee Myung-bak is only around3.4%.

Third, the government should heed the demandof citizens who desire peace not war. Since itbecame clear from the results of June 2 local

government elections that people want peace,not war, we have to seek ways to constructpeace on the Korean peninsula. For this, allchannels of South-North communication haveto be quickly restored and expanded and theaccumulation of problems between the twosides resolved through dialogue. In particular,communication must be restored between theships and naval commands of South and North,and the system of emergency communicationsbetween responsible staff offices of both sidesmust be restored. If necessary, unofficialdelegates should be exchanged, and as afurther step in this direction, a third South-North Summit Meeting should be promoted.

Fourth, the frictions within South Koreansociety over North Korea must be resolved.Though divided like us due to the Cold Warconfrontation between the US and the SovietUnion, it is already twenty years since Germanywas unified. Still divided, we remain theworld’s only “Cold War desert island.” Thereare various factors that made Germanreunification possible, but the most significantis that there was no history of internecinekilling in Germany. It goes without saying thatbecause of this tragic history unification isdifficult for us, frictions within South Korea areexacerbated, and South and North contendfiercely, shouting abuse at each other.

Fifth, South Korea must keep working tostrengthen diplomatic ties with China,overcoming the slight estrangement that hasaffected the relationship recently due to theCheonan incident, and improving therelationship.

Lastly, the most certain measure to prevent anysecond Cheonan sinking is to implement theSouth -North Summit Agreement byestablishing the “West Sea Special Zone ofPeace and Cooperation,” thereby transformingthe “West Sea, the Sea of Conflict” into the“West Sea, Sea of Peace and Prosperity.” To dothat, our government must fulfill its historic

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responsibilities by restoring trust betweenSouth and North, fulfilling the “October 4South-North Summit Declaration,” establishingpeace, and paving the way for reunification.

Postscript

The above text was written prior to theYeonpyeong incident of November 23, 2010. Atthat time, the author asserted that “there mustbe no repetition of South-North military clashesa l o n g t h e N L L . T o t h a t e n d , w h i l estrengthening the country’s defences, the LeeMyung-bak government should implement theSouth -North Summit Agreement onestablishing the ‘West Sea Special Zone ofPeace and Cooperation.” This author also feltthat the Lee Myung-bak government couldlearn a lesson from the sinking of the Cheonanand take effective measures for peace andsecurity along the NLL.

However, at the Yongsan War Memorialmuseum on May 24, 2010, President LeeMyung-bak commented on the Cheonanincident that, “the sinking of the Cheonan wasa North Korean military provocation and anattack on the Republic of Korea” and “NorthKorea will have to pay a price for its action.”Also, the Lee Myung-bak governmentannounced that “we will proceed withdetermination to take necessary measures topursue North Korea’s responsibility,” and saidthat it was “annulling the South-NorthMaritime Agreement and suspending trade andexchange between South and North.” Sincethen, the South Korean government filed itscomplaint about the sinking of the Cheonanwith the UN Security Council. However, on July9, 2010, the UN Security Council, able only toloosely cobble together the demands of Chinaand Russia on the one hand, and Japan, the USand South Korea on the other, simply issued aStatement in the name of the president of theCouncil, which said, “taking note of the resultsof the joint civil-military investigationconducted by five countries under the direction

of South Korea which came to the conclusionthat North Korea was responsible for thesinking of Cheonan, we express our deepconcern. We are also concerned with NorthKorea’s response denying any connection withthis incident, and with the responses fromother related countries.”

Amid the deterioration in the security situationon the Korean peninsula caused by the sinkingof the Cheonan, the “Yeonpyeong attack”occurred on November 23, 2010. FromNovember 22, South Korea’s military had beenconducting live shooting training into the seasaround Yeonpyeong Island as part of “Hokukexercise.” It ignored North Korea’s repeatedwarnings by telephone during the morning of23rd that these South Korean shootingexercises “constitute de facto an attack on theNorth,” and, at 2:25 pm on November 23,North Korean troops fired a barrage of 150artillery shells at Yeonpyeong Island. 13minutes later, South Korean forces retaliatedby shooting 50 artillery shells to which NorthKorea responded with 20 artillery shells ataround 3:12. Three minutes later, our troopsresponded with 30 more artillery shells. Wehave no way of knowing the damage inflictedon the North Korean side, but the South Koreanside lost two marines and two civilians. To putit simply, “defeat in the battle of Yeonpyeong”blew a large hole in South Korea’s securitysystem.

After “defeat in the battle of Yeonpyeong,”there was dissension in the ranks of the SouthKorean government. The immediate responseof President Lee Myung-bak to the attack onYeonpyeong Island was to order “resoluteresponse while managing things carefully toavoid escalation.” However, as time passed andcriticism of “the lukewarm presidentialdirective” spread, he changed it to “retaliatewith double the force” and “attack them ifthere is any sign they are about to fire.”Furthermore, the President defended himselfsaying that there had been “mistakes” in the

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process of communication of directives fromthe head of National Security Council and theBlue House spokesman. However, the Ministerof National Defense, Kim, Tae-young, who hadbeen a participant in the National Assembly’sDefense Committee meeting, said that thedirective of “resolute response while managingthings carefully to avoid escalation” had beenissued. The people knew who to believe.

It is not surprising that people were confusedby the conflicting statements. Although he wasthe responsible minister, Kim Tae-young, cameone hour late to the emergency ministerialmeeting called by the president’s office todiscuss the attacks on Yeonpyeong Island.Responding to congressional representativeswho criticized the “belated response of themilitary,” he explained that actual battle wasdifferent from computer games and that“anyone who had served in the military wouldknow this,” thereby insulting core officials whohad not served in the military. Subsequently,Defense Minister Kim was reshuffled withoutany clear reason being given.

Around this time, on November 28 ‘Wikileaks’released some of the 250,000 US StateDepartment diplomatic cables it had acquired,including seven cables from the US embassy inSeoul to Washington. The summary they gaveof what had been said by senior officials inSeoul included the following:

1) North Korea is likely to sell tosome other country not onlynuclear technology but alsoplutonium.

2) Chairman Kim Jung-il is notlikely to live more than anotherthree to five years and NorthKorea would likely collapse withintwo or three years after his death.

3 ) Nor th Korea ’ s m i l i t a ryprovocation against South Korea is

a l a s t - d i t ch s t rugg le by acollapsing dictatorship.

4) The Lee Myung-bak governmenthas resolved to put a freeze onSouth-North relations for theremainder of its term.

5) When President Lee Myung-bakraised the situation in North Koreaduring the China-South Koreasummit meeting with President HuJintao in 2008, asking whether“China has contingency plans,” Hupretended that he had not heard(according to a US diplomat).

6) In the event of a North Koreancollapse, there is no dissent amongSouth Korean governmentdepartments from the propositionthat South Korea and the UnitedStates would have to move swiftlyto unify the Korean peninsula..

7) In case of its unification of thepeninsula, South Korea planned toplacate China by guaranteeingp a r t i c i p a t i o n b y C h i n e s eenterprises in the development ofNorth Korea’s rich undergroundresources.

8) The new generation of leadersin China would not be worriedabout unification of the Koreanpeninsula under South Korea orabout a “purely benign” alliancebetween a unified Korea and theUS.

Reading the above reports in the media, thisauthor becomes even more firmly convincedthat the present situation of heightened tensionon the Korean peninsula was due to “the Leegovernment exacerbating relations with thenorth because it is convinced that North Korea

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will collapse.” Even in the short periodremaining of his term of office, President LeeMyung-bak must make efforts to resume theSix Party conference to achieve a peacefulresolution of the North’s nuclear problem andcontribute to the peace and stability ofNortheast Asia by implementing existingagreements for the establishment of the “WestSea Special Zone of Peace and Cooperation,”towards the ultimate goal of peacefulunification of the Korean peninsula.

We must not sacrifice any more of our officersand soldiers, or see the lives and property ofmore innocent civilians destroyed, because ofthe freeze in South-North relations.

Author on front page of Joongang ilbo,January 10, 2008

Kim Man-bok, b. 1946, served as Director ofthe South Korean National Intelligence Serviceunder the government of President Ro Moo-hyun (2003-2007) and is now a steeringcommittee member of the Korean PeninsulaPeace Forum. This article was first published inKorean in October 2010 in a book published bythe Korean Peninsula Peace Forum, under thetitle (as translated) “Again, Querying the Pathof the Korean Peninsula.” It was translated andpublished in Japanese (together with apostscript written after the November 2010South-North clashes and the bombardment ofYeonpyeong Island), in the February 2011 issueof Sekai (published early January).

On 26 January 2011, the Seoul ProsecutorsOffice launched an investigation, charging MrKim for revealing in the Sekai article mattersonly known to him through his official positionas head of the National Intelligence Service.Days later (31 January), Sekai editor OkamotoAtsushi commented on the home page of Sekaithat the charges seemed to signify “oppressionof views critical of the Lee Myung-bakgovernment’s policies,” adding that “SouthKorea since its democratization has earned theprofound respect of democratic countries forthe free and vigorous expression of opinion. Itwould be a matter of deep concern if it werenow to revert to military government stylepractices under which once again the stateintimidated and oppressed opinion…”

The As ia -Pac i f ic Journa l grate fu l lyacknowledges the permission of the editor ofSekai and of the author, Mr Kim Man-bok, totranslate and publish this article in English.

Gavan McCormack is a coordinator of The Asia-Pacific Journal and an emeritus professor ofAustralian National University.

Recommended citation: Kim Man-bok, Let’sTurn Korea’s West Sea (the Sea of Dispute) intoa Sea of Peace and Prosperity, The Asia-PacificJournal Vol 9, Issue 6 No 2, February 7, 2011.

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Notes

1 The South Korean Navy’s combat corvetteSokcho fired northward at an unidentifiedobject near Baengnyeong Island in the YellowSea shortly after the sinking of the Cheonan.The National Defense Ministry later explainedthat the target on the radar was identified as aflock of birds. (translator’s note).

Articles on related themes:

Sheila Miyoshi Jager, Cycles of History: China,North Korea and the End of the Korean War

Mel Gurtov, Averting War in Northeast Asia: A

Proposal

Paik Nak-chung, Reflections on Korea in 2010:Trials and prospects for recovery of commonsense in 2011

Tim Beal, Korean Brinkmanship, AmericanProvocation, and the Road to War: themanufacturing of a crisis

Wada Haruki, From the Firing at YeonpyeongIsland to a Comprehensive Solution to theProblems of Division and War in Korea

Nan Kim and John McGlynn, Factsheet: WESTSEA CRISIS IN KOREA