limketkai v ca.pdf

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3/11/2015 Limketkai Sons Milling Inc. vs. CA : 118509 : March 29, 1996 : Francisco, J. : Third Division http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1996/mar1996/118509.htm 1/11 [Syllabus] THIRD DIVISION [G.R. No. 118509. March 29, 1996] LIMKETKAI SONS MILLING INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., respondents. RESOLUTION FRANCISCO, J.: In this motion for reconsideration, the Court * is called upon to take a second hard look on its December 1, 1995 decision reversing and setting aside respondent Court of Appeals’ judgment of August 12, 1994 that dismissed petitioner Limketkai Sons Milling Inc.’s complaint for specific performance and damages against private respondents Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) and National Book Store (NBS). Petitioner Limketkai Sons Milling, Inc., opposed the motion and filed its Consolidated Comment, to which private respondent NBS filed a Reply. Thereafter, petitioner filed its Manifestation and Motion for the voluntary inhibition of Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa from taking part in any “subsequent deliberations in this case.” The Honorable Chief Justice declined. [1] The Court is swayed to reconsider. The bottomline issue is whether or not a contract of sale of the subject parcel of land existed between the petitioner and respondent BPI. A reevaluation of the attendant facts and the evidence on record, specifically petitioner’s Exhibits “A” to “I”, yields the negative. To elaborate: Exhibit “A” [2] is a Deed of Trust dated May 14, 1976, entered into between Philippine Remnants Co. Inc., as grantor, and respondent BPI, as trustee, stating that subject property covered by TCT 493122 (formerly TCT No. 27324) [3] “has [been] assigned, transferred, conveyed and set over unto the Trustee” [4] expressly authorizing and empowering the same “in its own name to sell and dispose of said trust property or any lot or parcel thereof” [5] and “to facilitate [the] sale of the trust property, the Trustee may engage the services of real estate broker or brokers, under such terms and conditions which the Trustee may deem proper, to sell the Trust property or any lot or parcel thereof.” [6] Exhibit “B” is a Letter of Authority for the petitioner issued by respondent BPI to Pedro A. Revilla, Jr., a real estate broker, to sell the property pursuant to the Deed of Trust. The full text of Exhibit “B” is hereby quoted: “Trust Account No. 7509 23 June 1988 ASSETRADE CO. 70 San Francisco St. Capitol Subdivision

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  • 3/11/2015 LimketkaiSonsMillingInc.vs.CA:118509:March29,1996:Francisco,J.:ThirdDivision

    http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1996/mar1996/118509.htm 1/11

    [Syllabus]

    THIRDDIVISION

    [G.R.No.118509.March29,1996]

    LIMKETKAISONSMILLINGINC.,petitioner,vs.COURTOFAPPEALS,ETAL.,respondents.

    RESOLUTIONFRANCISCO,J.:

    Inthismotionforreconsideration,theCourt*iscalledupontotakeasecondhardlookonits December 1, 1995 decision reversing and setting aside respondent Court of Appealsjudgment of August 12, 1994 that dismissed petitioner Limketkai Sons Milling Inc.scomplaint for specific performanceanddamagesagainst private respondentsBankof thePhilippineIslands(BPI)andNationalBookStore(NBS). PetitionerLimketkaiSonsMilling,Inc.,opposed themotionand filed itsConsolidatedComment, towhichprivaterespondentNBSfiledaReply.Thereafter,petitionerfileditsManifestationandMotionforthevoluntaryinhibition of Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa from taking part in any subsequentdeliberationsinthiscase.TheHonorableChiefJusticedeclined.[1]

    TheCourtisswayedtoreconsider.Thebottomline issue iswhetherornotacontractofsaleof thesubjectparcelof land

    existedbetweenthepetitionerandrespondentBPI. A reevaluationof theattendant factsandtheevidenceonrecord,specificallypetitionersExhibitsAtoI,yieldsthenegative.Toelaborate:

    ExhibitA[2] isaDeedofTrustdatedMay14,1976,entered intobetweenPhilippineRemnantsCo.Inc.,asgrantor,andrespondentBPI,astrustee,statingthatsubjectpropertycovered by TCT 493122 (formerly TCT No. 27324)[3] has [been] assigned, transferred,conveyedandsetoveruntotheTrustee[4]expresslyauthorizingandempoweringthesameinitsownnametosellanddisposeofsaidtrustpropertyoranylotorparcelthereof[5]andto facilitate [the] sale of the trust property, the Trusteemay engage the services of realestate broker or brokers, under such terms and conditions which the Trusteemay deemproper,toselltheTrustpropertyoranylotorparcelthereof.[6]

    ExhibitBisaLetterofAuthorityforthepetitionerissuedbyrespondentBPItoPedroA.Revilla,Jr.,arealestatebroker,tosellthepropertypursuanttotheDeedofTrust.ThefulltextofExhibitBisherebyquoted:

    TrustAccountNo.7509

    23June1988

    ASSETRADECO.70SanFranciscoSt.CapitolSubdivision

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    Pasig,MetroManila

    Attention:Mr.PedroP.Revilla,Jr.ManagingPartner.

    Gentlemen:

    ThiswillserveasyourauthoritytosellonanasiswhereisbasisthepropertylocatedatPasigBlvd.,BagongIlog,Pasig,MetroManila,underthefollowingdetailsandbasictermsandconditions:

    TCTNo.:493122inthenameofBPIastrusteeofPhilippineRemnantsCo.,Inc.Area: 33,056.0squaremeters (netof 890sq.m. sold to theRepublicof the

    PhilippinesduetothewideningofPasigBlvd.)Price:P1,100.00persq.m.orP36,361,600.000.Terms:CashBrokersCommission:2%

    Others:a)Docuemntary(sic)stampstobeaffixedtoDeedofAbsoluteSale,transfertax,registrationexpenses,andothertitlingexpensesforaccountoftheBuyer.

    b)Capitalgainstax,ifpayable,andrealestatetaxesupto30June1988shallbefortheaccountoftheSeller.

    Thisauthoritywhichisgoodforthirty(30)daysonlyfromdatehereofisnonexclusiveandonafirstcomefirstservebasis.

    Verytrulyyours,

    BANKOFTHEPHILIPPINEISLANDSastrusteeof

    PhilippineRemnantsCo.,Inc.

    (Sgd.)(Sgd.)FERNANDOJ.SISON,IIIALFONSOR.ZAMORAAssistantVicePresidentVicePresident

    [Note:Italicssupplied]

    securityguardondutyatsubjectpropertytoallowhim(Revilla,Jr.)andhiscompaniontoconductanocularinspectionofthepremises.[7]

    ExhibitD isaletteraddressedbyPedroRevilla,Jr.torespondentBPIinformingthelatterthathehasprocuredaprospectivebuyer.[8]

    ExhibitE is thewrittenproposal submittedbyAlfonsoY.Lim inbehalfofpetitionerLimketkaiSonsMilling,Inc.,offeringtobuythesubjectpropertyatP1,000.00/sq.m.[9]

    Exhibit F is respondent BPIs letter addressed to petitioner pointing out thatpetitionersproposalembodiedinitsLetter(ExhibitE)hasbeenrejectedbytherespondentBPIsTrustCommittee.[10]

    Exhibit G is petitioners letter dated July 22, 1988 reiterating its offer to buy thesubjectpropertyatP1,000/sq.m.butnowoncashbasis.[11]

    ExhibitH referstorespondentBPIsanotherrejectionofpetitionersoffer tobuythe

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    propertyatP1,000/sq.m.[12]

    Andfinally,ExhibitIisaletterbypetitioneraddressedtorespondentBPIclaimingtheexistenceofaperfectedcontractofsaleofthesubjectpropertybetweenthem.[13]

    Theseexhibits,eitherscrutinizedsinglyorcollectively,donotrevealaperfectionofthepurported contract of sale. Article 1458 of the Civil Code defines a contract of sale asfollows:

    ART.1458.Bythecontractofsaleoneofthecontractingpartiesobligateshimselftotransfertheownershipofandtodeliveradeterminatething,andtheothertopaythereforapricecertaininmoneyoritsequivalent.

    Acontractofsalemaybeabsoluteorconditional.

    Article1475of thesamecodespecificallyprovideswhenacontractofsale isdeemedperfected,towit:

    ART.1475.Thecontractofsaleisperfectedatthemomentthereismeetingofmindsuponthethingwhichistheobjectofthecontractandupontheprice.

    Fromthatmoment,thepartiesmayreciprocallydemandperformance,subjecttotheprovisionsofthelawgoverningtheformofcontracts.

    The Court in Toyota Shaw, Inc. v. Court of Appeals[14] had already ruled that a definiteagreementonthemannerofpaymentofthepriceisanessentialelementintheformationofa binding and enforceable contract of sale. Petitioners exhibits did not establish anydefinitiveagreementormeetingofthemindsbetweentheconcernedpartiesasregardstheprice or term of payment. Instead, what merely appears therefrom is respondent BPIsrepeated rejection of the petitioners proposal to buy the property at P1,000/ sq.m.[15] Inaddition,evenontheassumptionthatExhibitEreflectsthatrespondentBPIofferedtosellthedisputedproperty forP1,000/sq.m.,petitionersacceptanceof theoffer is conditioneduponorqualifiedbyitsproposedterms[16]towhichrespondentBPImustfirstagreewith.

    Onthesubjectofconsentasanessentialelementofcontracts,Article1319oftheCivilCodehasthistosay:

    ART.1319.Consentismanifestedbythemeetingoftheofferandtheacceptanceuponthethingandthecausewhicharetoconstitutethecontract.Theoffermustbecertainandtheacceptanceabsolute.Aqualifiedacceptanceconstitutesacounteroffer.

    xxxxxxxxx.

    Theacceptanceofanoffermustthereforbeunqualifiedandabsolute.Inotherwords,itmustbeidenticalinallrespectswiththatoftheoffersoastoproduceconsentormeetingoftheminds. Thiswasnot the caseherein considering that petitioners acceptanceof theofferwas qualified, which amounts to a rejection of the original offer.[17] And contrary topetitionersassertionthat itsofferwasacceptedbyrespondentBPI, therewasnoshowingthatpetitionercompliedwiththetermsandconditionsexplicitlylaiddownbyrespondentBPIforprospectivebuyers.[18]Neitherwas thepetitionerable toprove that itsoffer tobuy thesubjectpropertywasformallyapprovedbythebeneficialownerofthepropertyandtheTrustCommitteeoftheBank,anessentialrequirementfortheacceptanceoftheofferwhichwasclearlyspecifiedinExhibitsFandH.EvenmoretellingispetitionersunexplainedfailuretoreduceinwritingtheallegedacceptanceofitsoffertobuythepropertyatP1,000/sq.m.

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    TheCourtalsofindsasunconvincingpetitionersrepresentationunderExhibitsE,G,andIthatitsproposaltobuythesubjectpropertyforP1,000/sq.m.hasbeenacceptedbyrespondentBPI, considering thatnoneof thesaidExhibits contained thesignatureofanyresponsibleofficialofrespondentbank.

    It is therefore evident from the foregoing that petitioners documentary evidenceflounderedinestablishingitsclaimofaperfectedcontractofsale.

    Moreover, petitioners case failed to hurdle the strict requirements of the Statute ofFrauds.Article1403oftheCivilCodestates:

    ART.1403.Thefollowingcontractsareunenforceable,unlesstheyareratified:

    (1)xxxxxxxxx

    (2)ThosethatdonotcomplywiththeStatuteofFraudsassetforthinthisnumber.Inthefollowingcasesanagreementhereaftermadeshallbeunenforceablebyaction,unlessthesame,orsomenoteormemorandum,thereof,beinwriting,andsubscribedbythepartycharged,orbyhisagentevidence,therefore,oftheagreementcannotbereceivedwithoutthewriting,orasecondaryevidenceofitscontents:

    xxxxxxxxx

    (e)Anagreementfortheleasingforalongperiodthanoneyear,orforthesaleofrealpropertyorofaninteresttherein.

    xxxxxxxxx.

    Inthiscasethereisapatentabsenceofanydeedofsalecategoricallyconveyingthesubjectproperty from respondentBPI topetitioner.Exhibits E, G, Iwhichpetitionerclaimsasproofofperfectedcontractofsalebetween itand respondentBPIwerenotsubscribedbythe party charged, i.e., BPI, and did not constitute thememoranda or notes that the lawspeaksof.[19]ToconsiderthemsufficientcompliancewiththeStatuteofFraudsistobetraythe avowed purpose of the law to prevent fraud and perjury in the enforcement ofobligations.Weshare,inthisconnection,respondentCourtofAppealsobservationwhenitsaid:

    xxx.TherequirementthatthenotesormemorandabesubscribedbyBPIoritsagents,asthepartycharged,isveryvitalforthestrictcompliancewiththeavowedpurposeoftheStatuteofFraudswhichistopreventfraudandperjuryintheenforcementofobligationsdependingfortheirevidenceontheunassistedmemoryofwitnessesbyrequiringcertainenumeratedcontractsandtransactionstobeevidencedbyawritingsignedbythepartytobecharged(AsiaProductionCo.,Inc.vs.Pano,205SCRA458).Itcannotbegainsaidthatashrewdpersoncouldeasilyconcoctastoryinhislettersaddressedtotheotherpartyandpresenttheletterstothecourtasnotestoprovetheexistenceofaperfectedoralcontractofsalewhenintruththereisnone.

    InadherencetotheprovisionsoftheStatuteofFrauds,theexaminationandevaluationofthenotesormemorandaadducedbytheappelleewasconfinedandlimitedtowithinthefourcornersofthedocuments.Togobeyondwhatappearsonthefaceofthedocumentsconstitutingthenotesormemoranda,stretchingtheirimportbeyondwhatiswritteninblackandwhite,wouldcertainlybeuncalledfor,ifnotviolativeoftheStatuteofFraudsandopeningthedoorstofraud,theveryevilsoughttobeavoidedbythestatute.Infine,consideringthatthedocumentsadducedbytheappelleedonotembodytheessentialsofthecontractofsaleasidefromnothavingbeensubscribedbythepartychargedoritsagent,thetransactioninvolveddefinitelyfallswithintheambitoftheStatuteofFrauds.[20]

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    [Note:Italicsadded]

    Corrolarily,asthepetitionersexhibitsfailedtoestablishtheperfectionofthecontractofsale,oraltestimonycannottaketheirplacewithoutviolatingtheparolevidencerule.[21]Itwastherefore irregular for the trial court to have admitted in evidence testimony to prove theexistenceofacontractofsaleofarealpropertybetweenthepartiesdespitedepersistentobjectionmadeby private respondents counsels as early as the first scheduled hearing.While said counsels crossexamined thewitnesses, this, to our view, did not constitute awaiveroftheparolevidencerule.TheTalosigv.Vda.deNieba,[22]andAbrenicav.GondaanddeGracia[23]casescitedbytheCourtinitsinitialdecision,whichruledtotheeffectthatanobjectionagainsttheadmissionofanyevidencemustbemadeatthepropertime,i.e.,xxxat thetimequestion isasked,[24]and that ifnotsomade itwillbeunderstood tohavebeenwaived,donotapplyas these twocases involved facts[25]different from thecaseatbench. More importantly, here, the direct testimonies of thewitnesseswere presented inaffidavitformwherepromptobjectiontoinadmissibleevidenceishardlypossible,whereasthedirecttestimoniesinthesecitedcasesweredeliveredorallyinopencourt.Thebestthatcounselscouldhavedone,andwhichtheydid,underthecircumstanceswastoprefacethecrossexaminationwithobjection.Thus:

    ATTY.VARGAS:

    BeforeIproceedwiththecrossexaminationofthewitness,yourHonor,mayweobjecttotheparticularportionoftheaffidavitwhichattempttoprovetheexistenceofaverbalcontracttosellmorespecificallytheanswerscontainedinpage3,Par.1,thewholeoftheanswer.

    xxxxxxxxx.

    COURT:

    Objectionoverruled.

    Atty.VARGAS.

    YourHonor,whathasbeendeniedbytheCourtwasthemotionforpreliminaryhearingonaffirmativedefenses.Thestatementmadebythewitnesstoprovethattherewasaverbalcontracttosellisinadmissibleinevidenceinthiscasebecauseanagreementmustbeinwriting.

    COURT:

    Goahead,thathasbeenalreadyoverruled.

    ATTY.VARGAS:

    Somaywereiterateourobjectionwithregardstoallotherportionsoftheaffidavitwhichdealontheverbalcontract.(TSN,Feb.28,1989,pp.35Italicssupplied.)[26]

    xxxxxxxxx

    ATTY.CORNAGO:

    Beforeweproceed,wewouldliketomakeofrecordourcontinuingobjectioninsofarasquestionsandanswerspropoundedtoPedroRevilladatedFebruary27,1989,insofarasquestionswouldillicit(sic)answerswhichwouldbeviolativeofthebestevidenceruleinrelationtoArt.1403.IrefertoquestionsNos.8,13,16and19oftheaffidavitofthiswitnesswhichisconsideredashisdirect

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    testimony.(T.S.N.,June29,1990,p.2)

    ATTY.CORNAGO:

    MaywemakeofrecordourcontinuedobjectiononthetestimonywhichisviolativeofthebestevidenceruleinrelationtoArt.1403ascontainedintheaffidavitparticularlyquestionsNos.12,14,19and20oftheaffidavitofAlfonsoLimexecutedonFebruary24,1989xxx.(T.S.N.,June28,1990,p.8).[27]

    Counsels should not be blamed and,worst, penalized for taking the path of prudence bychoosing to crossexamine the witnesses instead of keeping mum and letting theinadmissible testimony in affidavit form pass without challenge. We thus quote withapprovaltheobservationofpublicrespondentCourtofAppealsonthispoint:

    Asalogicalconsequenceoftheabovefindings,itfollowsthatthecourtaquoerredinallowingtheappelleetointroduceparolevidencetoprovetheexistenceofaperfectedcontractofsaleoverandabovetheobjectionofthecounselforthedefendantappellant.Therecordsshowthatthecourtaquoallowedthedirecttestimonyofthewitnessestobeinaffidavitformsubjecttocrossexaminationbytheopposingcounsel.Ifthepurposethereofwastopreventtheopposingcounselfromobjectingtimelytothedirecttestimony,theschemefailedforasearlyasthefirsthearingofthecaseonFebruary28,1989duringthepresentationofthetestimonyinaffidavitformofPedroRevilla,Jr.,plaintiffappelleesfirstwitness,thepresentationofsuchtestimonywasalreadyobjectedtoasinadmissible.[28]

    [Italicssupplied.]

    WHEREFORE,inviewoftheforegoingpremises,theCourtherebyGRANTSthemotionfor reconsideration, and SETS ASIDE its December 1, 1995 decision. Accordingly, thepetition is DENIED and the Court of Appeals decision dated August 12, 1994, appealedfromisAFFIRMEDintoto.

    SOORDERED.Narvasa,C.J.(Chairman)andDavide,Jr.,J.,concur.Panganiban,J.,joinsJusticeMelosdissent.

    * The Third Division of this Court was initially composed of Justices Feliciano, Romero, Melo, Vitug andPanganiban.AfterthepromulgationoftheDecember1,1995decisionandinviewofJusticeFelicianosretirement, the different Divisions of the Court were reorganized. Consequently, the present ThirdDivision is now composed of Chief Justice Narvasa and Justices Davide, Melo, Francisco andPanganiban.

    [1] In a Memorandum dated March 18, 1996, addressed to the members of the Courts Third Division, theHonorableChiefJusticeAndresNarvasanotedpetitionersbaselessmotion.Thus:

    2.Theinformationuponwhichpetitionerreliesisutterlywithoutfoundationinfactandisnothingbutpurespeculationorwishfulyearning.TheChiefJusticewishestostatefortherecordthatwhilestillinprivatepractice,heneverhadoccasiontorepresenttheNationalBookstoreand/oritsprincipalowner,theRamosfamily,inanycaseormatterwhatsoeverthathehasneverhadanytransactionatallwiththemandthatindeed,hehasnorecollectionofeverhavingevenpurchasedanythingfromsaidstoreandthathedoesnotknow,andasfarasheknowshenevermet,anymemberoftheRamosfamilydescribedasprincipalownersoftheNationalBookstore.

    3.ThereisthusabsolutelynoreasonfortheinhibitionoftheChiefJusticeinthiscase,andhewillcontinuetotakepartinallsubsequentdeliberationsinthiscase.

    [2]Records,pp.1014.

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    [3]Complaint,p.2Records,p.2.[4]DeedofTrust,p.2Records,p.11.[5]Id.[6]Id.[7]TheFullTextofExhibitCisasfollows:

    TrustAccountNo.7511

    08July1988

    TheSecurityGuardOnDetailUniversalSecurity&InvestigationAgencyc/oPhil.RemnantsCo.,Inc.PasigBlvd.,BagongIlogPasig.MetroManila

    DearSir:

    PleaseallowMr.PedroRevilla,Jr.,whosespecimensignatureappearsbelow,andcompanytoenterthepremises that you are securing located at the abovegiven address for the purpose of conducting an ocularinspectionandverificationsurveyofthesame.

    KindlyextendtoMr.Revillayourusualcourtesiesandassistanceonthismatter.Thankyou.

    Verytrulyyours,

    BANKOFTHEPHILIPPINEISLANDSAsTrusteesFor

    PhilippineRemnantsCo.,Inc.

    By:

    (Sgd.)ROLANDOV.AROMINAssistantVicePresident

    (Sgd.)PEDROREVILLA,JR.[8]ExhibitDreadsasfollows:

    July9,1988

    BankofthePhilippineIslandsBankofP.I.BuildingAyalaAvenue,Makati,MetroManila

    ATTN:Mr.AlfonsoR.ZamoraVicePresident

    and

    Mr.FernandoJ.SisonIIIAsst.VicePresident

    Gentlemen:

    I refer to the authority you gaveme on June 23, 1988, in your capacity as Trustee of the PhilippineRemnantsCo.,Inc.,inconnectionwiththesaleofone(1)parcelofland,locatedalongPasigBoulevard,BagongIlog,Pasig,MetroManila,withanareaof33,056squaremetersandcoveredbyTransferCertificateofTitleNo.493122.

    IampleasedtoinformyouthatIhaveprocuredabuyerfortheabovedescribedpropertyinthenameofLimketkaiSonsMilling Inc.,withofficeaddressatLimketkaiBuilding,Greenhills,SanJuan,MetroManilaand

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    representedbyitsExecutiveVicePresident,Mr.AlfonsoLim.

    Itisunderstoodtherefore,thatpursuanttomyauthority,Ishallbepaidabrokersfeeof2%ofthegrosspurchasepriceintheeventthesaletotheabovenamedbuyerisconsummated.

    Verytrulyyours,

    (Sgd.)PedroP.Revilla,Jr.

    [Note:Italicssupplied][9]ExhibitEhasthesesalientportions:

    Gentlemen:

    ThisconfirmsourconversationthismorningregardingthepurchaseofaparceloflandinBarrioBagongIlog,MunicipalityofPasig,coveredbyTransferCertificateofTitleNo.493122oftheRegistryofDeedsofRizal,(specified thereinashavinganareaof33,946sq.m.minus890sq.m.previouslysold to theRepublicof thePhilippines, or a net area of 33,056 sq. m.), registered in your name as trustee of the Philippine RemnantsCompany.Specifically,thisconfirmsyouroffertosellthesaidpropertyatOneThousand(P1,000.00)Pesospersquaremeter,andouracceptanceinprincipleofthatoffer,subjecttothefollowingterms.

    a)We are to give an initial amount equivalent to Ten (10%) Percent of the total purchase price asearnestmoney

    b)Thebalanceistobepaidbyuswithinninety(90)daysfromtheexecutionoftheagreement

    c) If the balance is not paidwithin the abovestated period, by reason of any cause other than thosementionedinparagraphs

    (d),(e)and(f)below,Twenty(20%)PercentofTheTen(10%)Percentpaidunderparagraph(a)shallbeforfeited inyour favor, theremainingEighty(80%) is toberefundedtous in theevent thenonpaymentof thesaid balance is causedby nonperformanceof any of the stipulations in paragraphs (d), (e) and (f) below, theentiresumpaidasearnestmoneyshallberefundedtous

    d)TheTitleofthepropertyshallbefreefromallliensandencumbrancesandthepropertyitselffreefromallsquatters

    e)TheBPIastrusteetitleholderistowarrantthatitthelegalrightandtitletotransferownershiptous

    f)Physical possessionbyusupon thepayment of theTen (10%)Percent referred to in paragraph (a)above

    Anticipatingyourfavorableaction,wethankyouforyourpromptattentionandearlyreply.

    Verytrulyyours,

    LIMKETKAISONSMILLING,INC.

    [Note:Italicsadded](Sgd.)ALFONSOU.LIM

    ExecutiveVicePresident[10]ExhibitFstates:

    Attention:Mr.AlfonsoU.LimExecutiveVicePresident

    Gentlemen:

    Re:Bo.BagongIlog(Pasig)Property

    In connectionwith subject property,we regret to inform you that theBanks TrustCommittee did notapproveyourproposaltopurchasesaidpropertyunderthetermsandconditionsofyourlettertoourMr.MerlinA.Albanodated11July1988.instead,theTrustCommitteeinstructedustoconsideroffersfromotherinterestedparties.

    Inameetingheldon20July1988,SeniorManagement instructedus tooffer the sameproperty toallinterestedbuyersunderthefollowingtermsandconditions:

    a.15%downpaymentuponnotificationofacceptancebyBPI

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    b.balancepayableuponsigningoftheDeedofSale

    c.pricetoBPIshallbenetofbrokerscommission

    d. thepartywith thebestpriceshallhave five (5)dayswithinwhich topay thedownpayment,otherwise,thepartywiththenextbestpriceshallbeentertained.

    Shouldyoustillbeinterestedinsubjectproperty,kindlysubmittousnotlaterthan12:00noonof22July1988yourwrittenoffertogetherwiththepricepersquaremeter.TheBankshallnotentertainproposalsreceivedaftersaidcutofftime.

    It isunderstood,however, thatacceptanceofanyoffer isstillsubject to theapprovalof theBeneficialOwnerofthepropertyaswellastheTrustCommitteeoftheBank.

    Verytrulyyours,

    (Sgd.)(Sgd.)ALFONSORZAMORAFERNANDOJ.SISONIIIVicePresidentAsst.VicePresident[Note:Italicsadded]

    [11]ExhibitGquotedinfullisasfollows:

    July22,1988

    TheChairmanTrustCommitteeBankofthePhilippineIslandsMakati,MetroManila

    DearSir:

    Weare,inreceiptoftheletterdatedJuly20,1988,signedbyMr.AlfonsoZamoraandMr.FernandoJ.SisonIII,copyofwhichweareheretoattaching.

    PleaseconsiderourletterofJuly21,1988addressedtoMr.XavierP.Loinaz,BankPresident,andcopyfurnishedyourcommittee,asourreplythereto.

    Wearetherefore,herebyadoptingandreiteratingourformeroffertobuythelotofP1,000.00persquaremeterbutoncashbasis.

    Verytrulyyours,

    (Sgd.)LIMKETKAISONSMILLING,INC.

    (Sgd.)ALFONSOU.LIM

    [Note:Italicsadded]ExecutiveVicePresident[12]ExhibitH'spertinentportionsreadasfollows:

    Attention:Mr.AlfonsoU.LimExec.VicePresident

    Gentlemen:

    Wereplytoyourletterdated29July1988addressedtotheChairmanofourTrustCommittee.WeagainregrettoinformyouthatyouroffertopurchasetheBo.BagongIlog,Pasigproperty(TCT493122)atP1,000.00persquaremeterhasnotbeenapproved,aspreviouslycommunicatedtoyouperourletterdated20July1988.

    PertheDeedofTrustenteredintobyandbetweentheGrantorofsaidpropertyandourselves,theBankasTrusteeisdutybound.intheeventofsaleoftheproperty,toselectthetermsandconsiderationitdeemstobemostadvantageousto theGrantor. The30dayauthoritygiven toyourbrokeralsopresupposed thatduringsaidperiod,theBankonitsownwouldalsoconsiderotheroffers.ThisiswhynooffertopurchasewasdeemedfinalandaccepteduntilformallyapprovedbytheTrustCommittee.

    xxxxxxxxx

    Verytrulyyours,

    (Sgd.)(Sgd.)NELSONM.BONAFERNANDOJ.SISONIII

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    VicePresidentAsst.VicePresident[Note:Emphasisadded]

    [13]ExhibitIpertinentlyprovides:

    August8,1988

    Mr.NelsonM.BonaVicePresidentandMr.FernandoJ.SisonIIIAsst.VicePresidentBANKOFTHEPHILIPPINEISLANDSManila

    Gentlemen:

    Thisrefers toyour letterof2August1988regardingouragreement topurchasetheBarrioBagongflogpropertyunderTCTNo.493122atP1,000.00persquaremeter.

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    UndertheaforequotedprovisionoftheDeedofTrust,yourBankasTrustee,hastheabsoluteauthoritytosellanddisposeof thepropertyunder trustwithoutconsulting theGrantoras topriceand terms.Moreover,undersaidquotedstipulation, theBankmayengage theservicesofa realestatebrokerorbrokersundersuchtermsandconditionswhichtheTrusteemaydeemproper.Consequently,on23June1988,youauthorizedMr.Pedro P. Revilla, Jr. as broker to sell the property covered by Title No. 493122 on a firstcome firstservebasisasperwrittenauthoritysignedbyMr.FernandoJ.Sison IIIandMr.AlfonsoR.Zamora inbehalfof theBankasTrusteeofPhilippineRemnantsCo.,Inc.

    Wewould liketo inviteyourkindattentionthatwearethefirstcomeofferorof the lot.And,whiletheprice mentioned in the authority granted to Mr. Revilla is P1,000.00 per square meter, nonetheless, in thenegotiationsbetweenusandyour responsiblebankofficialsdone in thepresenceofMr.Revilla, thepricepersquaremeterwasfinallyagreedatP1,000.00.

    True, we requested for payment of the price on terms but, should the terms we requested be notacceptedbyyourbank,wewerereadytopayincashperourunderstandingwithyourMr.AlbanoandMr.ArominandwhichwehaveclearlymadeknowninourJuly22,1988letters.Asamatteroffact,evenbeforeJuly21and22,1988wepersonallytenderedacheckfortheentirepurchasepricetoMr.Albanobutherefusedtoacceptthecheck because, according to him, the authority to transact the sale was taken away from him. The sameproposaltopayincashwasmadebyusinameetingwithMr.Bona,Mr.SisonandotherBankofficials,andweweretoldthatthematterwillberesolvedbytheBankofficialsconcernedinduetimebutnothingpositivecameabout.WearestillreadytobuythesubjectpropertyatP1,000.00persquaremeteroncashbasis.

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    Through this letterwewould like tomakeknowntoyourBank thatwemaintainourposition that therehas been a perfected contract between your Bank as Trustee and our Corporation insofar as the sale of thepropertytousisconcernedbecauseinthewrittenauthoritygrantedbyyoutoMr.PedroP.Revilla,Jr.signedbyno less than the Assistant VicePresident and VicePresident of the Bank as Trustee, there is no conditionimposed that the sale of the property transacted by himunder said authority is subject to the approval of theTrustCommittee.

    Wehope yourBankwill understandour position andweexpect that the sale of the subject lot in ourfavorbeconsummatedasearlyaspossible.

    Verytrulyyours,

    (Sgd)ALFONSOU.LIM

    Exec.VicePresident/Director[14]244SCRA320,328,citingVelascov.CourtofAppeals,51SCRA439(1973).[15]SeeExhibitsFandH.[16]SeeExhibitE.[17]SeeLoganv.Phil.AcetyleneCo.,33Phil.177Beaumontv.Prieto,41Phil.670Zaycov.Serra,44 Phil.

  • 3/11/2015 LimketkaiSonsMillingInc.vs.CA:118509:March29,1996:Francisco,J.:ThirdDivision

    http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1996/mar1996/118509.htm 11/11

    326.[18]SeeExhibitF.[19]SeeParedesv.Espino,22SCRA1000.[20]CADecision,pp.1112Rollo,pp.5455.[21]Rule130,Section9,RulesofCourt.[22]43SCRA473.[23]34Phil.739.[24]Abrenica,(supra)atp.746,citingKreighv.Sherman,105Ill.4946Am.Dig.,CenturyEd.,932.[25]InTalosigv.Vda.deNieba, for instance,adeedofsaleexecutedbetweenthepartieswasundisputed,as

    well as the existence of receipts evidencing payment while in Abrenica v. Gonda and De Gracia,counselforthedefendantneverraisedanyobjectiontotheexaminationofthewitnesseswhichelicitedtestimonytendingtoprovethecontract.Onlyaftertheexaminationwasterminateddidcounselmovetostrikeoutallthegiventestimony.

    [26]CADecision,pp.1314Rollo,pp.5657PedroRevilla,Jr.,TSN,February28,1989,pp.35.[27]MemorandumForRespondentBankofthePhil.Islands,April24,1995,p.16Rollo,p.229.[28]CADecision,pp.1213Rollo,pp.5556.