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Norms for emotions: biological functionsand representational contents

Matteo MameliKing s College, Cambridge CB2 1ST, UK

Received 10 July 2004; received in revised form 2 September 2004

Abstract

Normative standards are often applied to emotions. Are there normative standards thatapply to emotions in virtue solely of facts about their nature? I will argue that the answer

is no. The psychological, behavioural, and neurological evidence suggests that emotions arerepresentational brain states with various kinds of biological functions. Facts about biologicalfunctions are not (and do not by themselves entail) normative facts. Hence, there are no nor-mative standards that apply to emotions just in virtue of their having various kinds of biolog-ical functions. Moreover, the peculiar features of emotions make the view thatrepresentational content is essentially normative very implausible. Hence, the representationalproperties of emotions cannot be seen as entailing normative standards. The conclusion is thatthere are no normative standards that apply to emotions solely in virtue of their nature.

2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Emotions; Normativity; Biological functions; Representational content; Cognitivism; Non-cognitivism

1. Introduction

Are there normative standards for emotions? If there are, where do they comefrom? These are difficult questions. One sub-question is whether there are any nor-

1369-8486/$ - see front matter 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.doi:10.1016/j.shpsc.2005.07.007

E-mail address: [email protected] (M. Mameli).

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mative standards for emotions entailed solely by facts about the nature of emo-tions. This sub-question is the topic of the present essay. I argue that there areno normative standards that apply to emotions just in virtue of their nature. Thismeans that either there are no normative standards for emotions or these norma-tive standards have their origin in something other than facts about the nature of emotions.

To believe that there are normative standards that apply to emotions just in vir-tue of their nature is to believe that there are genuine oughts that apply to emotions just in virtue of their nature. An instance of this view is someone who believes that,simply in virtue of the nature of fear , one ought to be in a state of fear only whenone is seriously threatened; or that, simply in virtue of the nature of guilt , one oughtto feel guilty when one has done something for which punishment is deserved. Inorder to decide whether there are normative standards that apply to emotions so-lely in virtue of their nature, we need to have some theory about the nature of emo-tion. Section 2 contains the outlines of such a theory. According to this theory,emotions are representational brain states with various kinds of biological func-tions. From this theory, it follows that, if there really are normative standards thatapply to emotions in virtue solely of their nature, these normative standards mustbe due to the representational properties of emotions or to their biological func-tions. Section 3 explains and rejects the view that there are normative standardsthat apply to emotions in virtue of their biological functions. Section 4 explainsand rejects the view that there are normative standard that apply to emotions invirtue their representational properties. If what argued in these two sections is cor-rect, then there are no normative standards that apply to emotions in virtue solelyof their nature.

2. The nature of emotions

There are two different kinds of theories of emotion: cognitivist and noncognitivist .Cognitivist theories say that the tokening of an emotion necessarily entails the tok-

ening of a judgement or the tokening of something judgement-like, such as a belief, aconstrual, or a thought. 1 In contrast, according to noncognitivist theories, the tok-ening of an emotion does not necessarily entail the tokening of a judgement, belief,construal, or thought.

Let us focus on cognitivist theories rst. Most cognitivist theories say that anemotion necessarily entails the tokening of an evaluative judgement-like mentalstate, a mental state that has the structure of a judgement and that is about the rela-tion between something (object, event, organism) and the well being of the emoting

1 I will assume that all judgements are beliefs but not the other way around. For example, innate beliefsare not judgements. Only those beliefs acquired by means of a very specic psychological process (judging)can be called judgements.

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organism itself. 2 For example, a cognitivist might claim that fear entails a judgement(or belief) that something is dangerous for the organism. Or she might claim that an-ger entails a judgement (or belief) that one has been wronged and that someone de-serves to be blamed or punished for this. Cognitivism can be pure or impure .According to pure cognitivism, emotions are identical with the tokening of judge-ment-like states. In contrast, according to impure cognitivism, emotions involvemore than the tokening of judgement-like states. On some impure cognitivist theo-ries, emotions have judgement-like states as necessary constituents . On other ver-sions, emotions have judgement-like states as necessary concomitants . Thedistinction between pure and impure cognitivism is interesting but irrelevant with re-spect to the views presented here.

There exist some strong arguments against cognitivism ( Prinz, 2004c; De Lancey,2002; Griffiths, 1997). Here is a summary:

1. Judgements are meaningful mental particulars constituted by other meaningfulmental particulars called concepts .3 The tokening of the judgement that Chirac is thePresident of France requires the tokening of the concepts Chirac , President ,France and so on. Thus, if one does not possess the concept President , one cannot

judge that Chirac is the President of France . According to cognitivists, a state of anger entails the tokening of a judgement that someone has wronged me and de-serves to be blamed for it . Thus, if one does not possess the concepts wrong , de-serve and blame , one cannot ever be angry. Nonhuman animals and humaninfants can be angry and yet they do not seem to possess sophisticated evaluativeconcepts such as blame . If emotions occur in organisms that do not possess sophis-ticated evaluative concepts, then emotions do not entail the tokening of sophisticatedevaluative judgements.

2. The causal role of emotions differs in many important respects from the causalrole of paradigmatic judgements: (1) emotions can be tokened through subcorticalpathways, whilst judgements cannot; 4 (2) emotions can be triggered thro ugh facialfeedback (and other kinds of bodily feedback), whilst judgements cannot; 5 (3) emo-tions normally cause stron g dispositions to behave in certain characteristic ways,whilst judgements do not; 6 (4) the ways emotions interact with other emotionsand with judgeme nts are different from the ways judgements usually interact with

other judgements;7

(5) genuine (as opposed to pretend) emotions can be triggered

2 Here is a list of authors who hold some kind of cognitivist theory: Nussbaum (1990, 2001); Solomon(1976, 2003); Davidson (1980); Greenspan (1988, 1995, 2003); BenZe ev (2000); Lazarus (1984, 1991, 1994,1999); Scherer (1984); Marks (1982); Ortony et al. (1988); Nash (1989); Armon-Jones (1989); Roberts(1988, 2003); Robinson (1983); Schatcher & Singer (1962); Stocker (1987); Stocker & Hegeman (1996) ;Goldie (2001); Matthen (1998) .

3 Fodor (1998a) .4 LeDoux (1994, 1996) ; Zajonc (1984, 1994).5 James (1890, 1894); Zajonc et al. (1989, 1993); Ekman (1980, 2003) .6 For example, guilt normally causes the disposition to act in a reparatory way; the evaluative judgement

that one has done something wrong does not (by itself) cause such a disposition ( Damasio, 1994, 1999 ).7 For example, a fear of X often coexists with the judgement that X is not dangerous; in contrast, only

rarely (if at all) a judgement that p coexists with a judgement that not p.

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by works of ction in ways that genuine (as opposed to pretend) judgements cannot; 8

(6) judgements can be directly acquired by deliberating to accept a proposition astrue, whilst emotions cannot, and so on.

3. Emotions have valence (they can be pleasant or unpleasant) and intensity (theycan be strong or mild), whilst judgements do not.

4. The evidence collected through neuroimaging techniques indicates that emo-tions do not occur in areas of the brain where judgement tokening and concep tmanipulation occur; rather, emotions occur in the somatosensory areas of the brain. 9

These arguments provide strong reasons to resist the view that emotions necessar-ily entail judgements. Similar arguments can be levelled against the view that emo-tions necessarily entail beliefs, or construals, or thoughts.

Let us now look at noncognitivism. The rst thing to say is that there are manydifferent versions of noncognitivism. One theory is the commonsense view accordingto which emotions are feelings . On this view, for example, fear is just a certain kindof irreducible and characteristic feeling. The main problem with the commonsenseview is that it does not explain much. James (1884, 1890, 1894) tried to improve uponthe commonsense view and identied emotions with feelings of bodily changes . On hisview, for example, fear is the feeling of the characteristic changes that occur in one sheart, stomach, lungs, muscles, and so on, when a fear-triggering situation is present.When (in the rst half of the twentieth century) feelings became unfashionable, emo-tions were identied with simple behavioural dispositions . On this view, for example,anger is disposition to shout, growl, hit, break things, and so on ( Ryle, 1949). Behav-ioural dispositions (not necessarily simple ones) are important in a theory of emo-tions, but they are not everything. When behaviourism became unfashionable (inthe second half of the twentieth century), so did the behaviouristic theory of emotions.

One of the reasons why behaviourism was abandoned was that it could not pro-vide a satisfactory explanation of the internal mechanisms involved in the generationof emotional behaviour. Emotion researchers started to investigate these internalmechanisms and another noncognitivist theory soon became fashionable. This isthe affect program theory. On this view, emotions are coordinated sets (or syn-dromes) of bodily changes : changes in skeletal posture, muscular tension, facial

expression, heartbeat, blood pressure, skin conductance, hormone production, respi-ratory activity, gastrointestinal activity, and also changes in the mind/brain, such aschanges in cognitive style, attentional mode etc. These coordinated changes may but need notbe accompanied by evaluative judgements (beliefs, construals, orthoughts). 10

Affect program theories do not usually deal with emotional feelings. Damasio(1994, 1999) attempts to combine the Jamesian theory of emotional feelings with

8 De Lancey (2002) .9 LeDoux (1994, 1996); Panksepp (1998); De Lancey (2002); Prinz (2004c) .

10 Here is a list of authors who can be said to hold some kind of affect program theory: Ekman (1980,1992, 1993, 2003); Frijda (1986); Plutchik (1980, 1984, 1994); LeDoux (1996); Griffiths (1997); De Lancey(2002); Panksepp (1998, 2000); Leventhal (1984) .


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the affect program theory of emotional behaviour. According to Damasio, emotionsare coordinated sets of bodily changes and emotional feelings are brain states thatregister the occurrence of emotions. On this view, emotional feelings are brain statesthat keep track of certain characteristic kinds of bodily changes, that is, they keeptrack of the occurrence of emotions. Emotional feelings can be conscious or uncon-scious and they can sometimes occur without the corresponding bodily changes.Damasio calls this mechanism the as if body loop .

Prinz (2003, 2004a,b,c) tries to improve upon Damasio s theory. He substitutesDamasio s term emotional feeling with emotional perception . Emotional percep-tions are perceptions of bodily changes. Emotional perceptions, just like visualperceptions, can be conscious or unconscious. Prinz explains Damasio s as-if-body-loop as follows. A visual perception of a tree can occur in the absence of causal contact with a tree; this happens in the case of visual hallucinations butalso in the case of visual imaginings. In the same way, the perception of bodilychanges can occur in the absence of the corresponding bodily changes; such a per-ception might be an emotional hallucination or an emotional imagining. Prinz ar-gues that if emotional perceptions can occur without the corresponding bodilychanges, emotions do not necessarily involve bodily changes. He rejects Damasio sidentication of emotions with bodily changes and instead identies emotions withemotional perceptions. In this respect, his theory is closer to James theory than isDamasio s.

Prinz also makes another important clarication. Not all perceptions of bodilychanges are emotions. Itches and tickles, for example, are not. Emotions are trig-gered by unemotional mental states, such as visual perceptions (including verypoorly processed and verbally unreportable visual perceptions), tactile, auditory,olfactory, and gustatory perceptions, as well as beliefs, imaginings, and suppositions.Perceptions of bodily changes caused directly by the environment (like in the case of tickles) or endogenously (like in the case of itches) are not emotions.

The standard objection against noncognitivism is that it entails that emotionsare not representational and t hereby it cannot explain the complex roles that emo-tions play in our mental lives. 11 But this objection is either wrong or formulated inthe wrong way. For example, according to James and Prinz, emotions represent

bodily changesand their theories are standardly considered to be noncognitivist.The real issue seems to be that this kind of representational content (where thecontent is constituted by bodily changes rather than evaluative propositions) isnot enough for a good theory of emotions. The standard objection against non-cognitivism can then be rephrased as follows: a theory according to which emo-tions represent bodily changes (rather than sophisticated evaluative propositions)cannot explain the complex roles that emotions play in our mental lives. Thisseems to be the best way to make sense of the cognitivists complaints againstnoncognitivism.

11 Nussbaum (2001); Solomon (2003); Greenspan (1988) .


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If this is correct, the cognitivist is certainly right in insisting that the complex roleof emotions can be explained only by a theory that ascribes to emotions an evalua-tive representational content. How can we explain the role of anger in our mentalprocesses without appealing to the fact that anger

tells the emoting subject thatshe has been wronged? But the cognitivist also assumes that only judgement-likemental states can have evaluative contents. This assumption is questionable. Emo-tions can represent both bodily changes and organism/environment relations bearingon well being. Prinz offers an elegant solution. This solution involves an appeal to ateleosemantic theory of content , according to which the content of a mental represen-tation depends on its function. 12 On this view, emotions have the function to trackorganism/environment relations bearing on well being and for this reason they rep-resent these relations. Fear has the function to be tokened in situations when one isin danger; it is for this reason that fear of X represents that X is dangerous . Anger hasthe function to be tokened in situations when one has been wronged by someone andthis someone deserves to be punished; it is for this reason that being angry with Y represents that Y did something wrong and that Y deserves to be punished .

In my view, the best way to make sense of this idea consists in appealing to a dis-tinction between representational format and representational content . This distinc-tion is not explicitly mentioned in Prinz s writings, but it seems to capture more orless accurately Prinz s own view. Emotions have two kinds of representational con-tents : the bodily-perceptual and the evaluative. But they have only one kind of rep-resentational format : the bodily perceptual. It is because the representational formatof emotions is bodily-perceptual rather than judgemental-conceptual that it is possi-ble for nonhuman animals and for human infants to have emotions that constituteevaluations about the way something affects one s own well being. It is becausethe representational format is bodily-perceptual rather than judgemental-conceptualthat there are so many differences between the causal role of emotions and the causalrole of judgement like entities. And it is because the representational format is bodilyperceptual rather than judgemental conceptual that emotions occur in the somato-sensory areas of the brain and not in the judgement-tokening concept-manipulatingareas of the brain. Cognitivists are right about the content of emotions (or at leastabout one of the contents of emotions) but they are wrong about their format. Emo-

tions do not have a cognitive format. They do not have a belief like causal role.There is more to emotions than representational content and non-cognitive format.One important thing about emotions is that they have the function to track organism/environment relations not in direct (non-mediated) ways, but rather by being triggeredby unemotional mental states such as standard sensory perceptions, beliefs, judge-ments, imaginings, and suppositions. Another important thing about emotions is that,as said, they have valence and intensity. And the valence and intensity of emotions arenot random. Emotions have the function to have a valence that corresponds to therelation they have the function to track. If the relation is benecial (things are going

12 Papineau (1984, 1987, 1993); Millikan (1984, 1993); Neander (1995); Price (2001); Dretske (1987, 1995,2000).


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well) then the emotion has the function to be pleasant. If the relation is detrimental(things are not going well), then the emotion has the function be unpleasant.

Moreover, emotions have the function to be intense in a way that is proportionalto the importance for the organism of the relation they have the function to track. If the relation is very important (something very dangerous is occurring) then the emo-tion (fear in this case) has the function to be very intense. If the relation is less impor-tant (something less dangerous is occurring), then the emotion (fear) has the functionto be less intense. Anothe r important ingredient is the relation between emotions andbehavioural dispositions. 13 In normal cases, anger produces a disposition to behaveso as to punish the person we are angry with. This disposition may not be able tomanifest itself overtly, for example, when it is not possible to punish the person orwhen we consciously decide (for whatever reason) not to punish the person despitethe fact that we are angry. But even when the disposition does not manifest itself overtly, it manifests itself internally (at least in normal subjects). 14 The dispositioncauses the emoting subject to think in certain characteristic ways. For example, itmay lower the desire to avoid confrontation. It can be argued that the same is truefor all other emotions. That is, each emotion has the function to bring about a dis-position to act or think in some characteristic ways.

Arguably, emotions have also other functions beyond those mentioned above.But there is no room to deal with these other functions here. The account of emo-tions given in this section, obviously, is not uncontroversial. I have only referredto (rather than presented and explained) the evidence that supports this view. Moredetailed arguments for this particular brand of noncognitivism can be found in Prinz(2004c). There are some differences between Prinz s account and the account summa-rized above. But these differences are not important for the purposes of this paper.

3. Emotions, biological functions, and norms

According to the account given in the previous section, emotions have many dif-ferent functions: a function to track relations, a function to be triggered in a certainway, a function to be valent and intense in a certain way, a function to generate cer-tain kinds of dispositions, and so on. These are all intended to be ascriptions of bio-logical functions. Someone who wants to argue that there are normative standardsthat apply to emotions just in virtue of their nature may do this by arguing that thereare normative standards that apply to emotions solely in virtue of their biologicalfunctions. For example, one may want to claim that, just in virtue of the fact thatfear has the function to track danger, fear ought to be tokened only when one isin danger. And one may want to claim that, just in virtue of the fact that emotionshave the function to be intense in proportion to the importance of the relation theyrepresent, one ought to be in a state of intense fear only when confronted with ahighly dangerous situation.

13 Frijda (1986); Griffiths (1997); De Lancey (2002) .14 Oatley & Johnson-Laird (1987) .


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Are biological functions a genuine source of normativity? One might think thatthere is an easy way to answer this question negatively. The easy way would consistin appealing to Hume s famous thesis according to which normative facts are neverentailed by non-normative facts alone ( Hume, 2000 [1739], III.I.I). Hume s thesis iscontroversial. Let us assume that it is correct. The argument would then be this.Facts about biological functions are non-normative. Hence, for Hume s thesis, theydo not entail facts about what ought or ought not to be. Hence, there are no norma-tive standards that apply to emotions just in virtue of their biological functions. Theproblem with this argument is that not everyone accepts the premise according towhich facts about biological functions are non-normative. For example, Dretske(2000) argues that such facts are normative (cf. also Millikan, 1993). Hence, assum-ing that Hume is right is not enough to show that there are no normative standardsthat apply to emotions just in virtue of their having the biological functions theyhave.

Let us assume now that Hume s thesis is wrong and that there are some non-normative facts that entail normative facts. This assumption, by itself, cannot helpus determine whether there are normative standards that apply to emotions solelyin virtue of their biological functions. Even if it is the case that some non-normativefacts entail normative facts, it is certainly not the case that all non-normative factsentail normative facts. We need to know whether facts about biological functionsare the kinds of non-normative facts that (by themselves) can entail normative facts.

All this discussion suggests that, in this context, neither Hume s thesis nor itsnegation are of much help. We should try to determine whether there are normativestandards that apply to emotions solely in virtue of their biological functions independently of any general (and co ntroversial) claims about the relation between nor-mative and non-normative facts. 15 Let us focus therefore on the differences betweenthe various possible accounts of biological functions. Many different theories havebeen proposed:

1. According to intentional design theories , the function of a biological item is deter-mined by the intentions of its designer, usually taken to be God or some otherdivine being.

2. According to etiological theories , the function of a biological item is determinedby its evolutionary or developmental history; most of these theories appeal toselection : a biological item has function F if it has been selected (evolutionarilyor developmentally) to do F. 16 According to some of these theories, what is rele-

15 What I have said about Hume s thesis applies also to G.E. Moore s open question argument (Moore1903), which constitutes a more recent version of Hume s thesis (cf. Gibbard, 2003 ).

16 Wright (1973, 1976); Millikan (1984, 1993, 2002); Papineau (1987, 1993); Neander (1991a,b, 1995);Godfrey-Smith (1993, 1994); Griffiths (1993); Kitcher (1993); Dennett (1995, 1996); Dretske (1987, 1995,2000); Price (2001).


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vant for determining the function of mental representations is their learning his-tory, the way these representations have been acquired or modied by means of learning processes, including cultural learning. 17

3. According to organizational th eories , the function of a biological item is deter-mined by its current causal role; 18 in order to constrain the account, some of thesetheories say that the function of a biological item consists in the systematic con-tribution of items of that kind to the tness of organisms. 19

There is agreement in the literature that every goo d account of biological func-tions must allow for the possibility of malfunctioning. 20 Many of the proposed the-ories are able to account for malfunctioning, in some way or another. 21 If malfunctioning is genuinely possible, then a biological item can fail to performits proper function. Given this, it may be tempting to think that the function / mal-function distinction can be used to give an account of (at least some of) the norma-tive standards that can be applied to biological items. On this view, malfunctioningis a kind of norm violation. If hearts have the function to pump blood, then thehearts ought to pump blood and a norm is being violated whenever a heart doesnot pump blood. If guilt has the function to track one s own moral wrongdoings,then one ought to feel guilty when one has done something morally wrong and anorm is being violated whenever one has done something morally wrong and noguilt is tokened.

It is very easy to make sense of the view that facts about functions entail norma-tive facts from the point of view of intentional design theories. Biological functionsare seen as determined by God s intentions, which in turn are seen as a source (orperhaps the source) of normativity. God designed hearts to pump blood, so heartsought to pump blood. God designed guilt to track one s violations of the Ten Com-mandments, so one ought to feel guilty when one violates the Ten Commandments.God s plans determine not only what biological items ought to do but also what theyought not to do. God did not design penises to be used in homosexual sex, so penisesought not to be used in homosexual sex. God did not design the emotion of sexualdesire to be triggered by members of one s own sex, so one ought not to feel sexualdesire for members of one s own sex. It is the desires of the divine designer that deter-

mine what this or that particular natural item ought or ought not to do.There is wide agreement that intentional design theories are to be rejected. 22 Theyare to be rejected because they appeal to divine existences and intentions, which thesedays do not carry much explanatory weight. More importantly, they are to be rejected because the shape and structure of natural items is best explained by a theory

17 Papineau (1993); Millikan (1993); Dretske (1987); Price (2001); De Sousa (1987) .18 Cummins (1975, 2002); Boorse (1976, 2002) ; Bigelow & Pargetter (1987); Amundson & Lauder (1994);

Walsh & Ariew (1996); Walsh (1996); Davies (2001) .19 Lewens (2004).20 Davies (2001) is an exception.21 This includes organizational theories, or at least some of them (cf. Lewens, 2004).22 Plantinga (1993) is an exception.


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(the evolutionary Darwinian theory) that does not appeal to the intentions of a de-signerdivine or otherwise. Since they do not appeal to divine intentions, etiolog-ical and organizational theories can be said to be naturalistic theories of biologicalfunctions.

23

Given that the intentional design theory is to be rejected, can we still say thatthere are norms that apply to biological items just in virtue of their biologica l f unc-tions? Many of the proponents of naturalistic theories seem to think so. 24 Buteither these authors are using normative language metaphorically or they arewrong. 25 Facts about intentions are normally taken to ground facts about whatought or ought not to be the case. This practice may be right or wrong, but itis standard practice, especially in the case of human artefacts. In contrast, thereseems to be no reason to think that facts about selective historie s or causal rolescan ground facts about what ought or ought not to be the case. 26 That is, thereseems to be no reason to adopt ought-language when talking about selective histo-ries and causal roles. If natural items are not divine artefacts, then there are nointentions involved in their coming to existence; and if no intentions are involved,then the standard reason for extending ought language from human artefacts tonatural items disappears.

If we agree that biological functions have nothing to do with the intentions of some designer, the fact that penises have the biological function to be used in het-erosexual sex becomes irrelevant with respect to whether penises ought or oughtnot to be used in homosexual sex. And the fact that lust has the biological functionto be triggered by members of the opposite sex becomes irrelevant with respect towhether one ought or ought not to feel sexual desire when perceiving or imaginingmembers of one s own sex. Natural selection is a designer only metaphorically. So,naturalized biological functions cannot determine real norms, only metaphoricalones, which is like saying that they cannot determine any normative standardsat all. This is certainly one of the things Fodor (1996b) had in mind when he saidthat Darwin s theory of natural selection killed not only God but also Mother Nat-ure. And it is something that holds independently of a satisfactory characterizationof genuine normativitywhich, despite the efforts of many philosophers, remainselusive.

Searle (1995) argues that there are no biological functions, only artefact function s.Functions, according to Searle, are the projection of human intentions or interests. 27

On this view, there are no norms that apply to biological items in virtue of the factthat they have a function simply because biological items do not have a functionat

23 In explaining in what sense emotions have a representational function, Prinz appeals to a naturalistictheory of the etiological kind. But since the point I want to make is of a general nature, I will remainneutral on the issue about which of the naturalistic theories of function is the right one.

24 Millikan (1984, 1993); Price (1995, 2001); Neander (1991a,b, 1995) ; Post (1998, 2001, 2004); Dretske(1995, 2000); McGinn (1989); Jacob (1997, 2002) .

25 Cf. Millikan (2002) .26 Cf. Lewens (2004).27 See also Hardcastle (2002) .


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least not a biological function. This is not the view endorsed here. The theory of emotions presented in the previous section entails a commitment to the existenceof biological functions. The view endorsed here is that there really are biologicalfunctions but that, in contrast with artefact functions, biological functions are notintentionally generated and thereby cannot ground normative facts.

In contrast to Searle, Davies (2001) argues that functions really exist but mal-functions do not: malfunctions are just projections of our frustrated causal expec-tations. From this he concludes that functions cannot be sources of genuinenormativity. Davies assumes that functions are sources of genuine normativity if and only if malfunctions exist. And since he thinks that functions cannot possiblybe sources of normativity, he has to deny the existence of malfunctions. But thereis no reason to accept Davies s assumption. The view endorsed here is that, despitethe fact that both biological functions and biological malfunctions are real, if theintentional design theory is wrong, then we have no reason to think that factsabout biological functions can ground facts about what ought or ought not tobe the case.

One last problem must be considered. As said, there are accounts of the biologicalfunction of mental states that appeal to the role that learning (including culturallearning) plays in the acquisition and modication of these mental states. Whatshould we think of these accounts? One possible thought is this: if the function of emotions is determined by cultural learning and if culture is a source of normativity,then there may well be normative standards that apply to emotions just in virtue of the fact that they have certain functions.

Let us consider, for example, De Sousa s theory (1987). This author (like manyothers) believes in the existence of innate emotional responses. But on his view,these innate responses are not emotions. They are not emotions because they donot represent organism/environment relations bearing on well being. Accordingto De Sousa, innate emotional responses become genuine emotions during develo p-ment because they acquire the function to track organism/environment relations. 28

They acquire this function by becoming associated with paradigm scenariosthrough cultural and language-mediated learning. His discussion suggests thatthese culturally acquired tracking functions determine normative standards for

emotions: they determine the

criterion of success of an emotion. Is this suggestioncorrect? Suppose that in our culture some innate emotional responses acquire thefunction to track sexual indelity by being culturally associated with scenarios con-taining paradigmatic instances of behaviours that our culture classies as indica-tors of sexual indelity. Does it then follow that someone brought up in ourculture ought to feel jealous when confronted with possible indicators of sexualindelity? It does not. The fact that jealousy acquires its tracking function throughcultural learning does not mean that this tracking function has some special norm-ativity that other functions do not have. Cultural values may (perhaps) have nor-

28 Cf. also Nussbaum (2001) .


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mative authority, but this does not mean that cultural learning by itself confersnormative status to anything.

Another example is given by culturally variable display rules. 29 Japanese subjectslearn not to show disgust in certain circumstances, such as when they are in the pres-ence of someone who is in a position of authority. By means of cultural learning, dis-gust in Japanese people acquires the function not to be displayed in certaincircumstances. But this does not entail (at least not by itself) that disgust oughtnot to be displayed by Japanese people in those circumstances. Let me clarify. Theclaim that functions acquired through cultural learning are not a source of genuinenormativity must not be confused with the claim that culture and society are not asource of genuine normativity. This latter claim is much more general and muchmore plausible. The statement Japanese people ought to avoid the display of disgustin front of an authority may be true and it may be true because of things that haveto do with Japanese culture and society. For example, one view is that this statementis true because Japanese people share values that are incompatible with the display of disgust in front of an authority. This view is consistent with what I have said againstthe thesis that the functions acquired through cultural learning are a source of norm-ativity. The fact that disgust in Japanese people has a culturally acquired functionnot to be displayed in the presence of an authority is a fact about the nature of dis-gust in Japanese people. In contrast, the fact that Japanese people share a valueincompatible with the display of disgust in front of an authority is a fact about Jap-anese values rather than a fact about Japanese emotions .

It is undoubtedly true th at socially shared cultural values play an important cau-sal role in cultural learning. 30 And it may or may not be true that cultural values area source of genuine normativity. But even if cultural values are a source of normativ-ity concerning emotions, cultural learning involved in emotional development neednot be a source of normativity. In fact, cultural values can be a source of normativityeven if and when they are not very effective in bringing about cultural learning. Sup-pose, again, that Japanese people ought to avoid the display of disgust in front of anauthority because of the existence of some socially shared Japanese values that areincompatible with the display of disgust in front of an authority. Even so, it maybe that many Japanese people (all those who watch too many Hollywood lms) fail

to learn to avoid the display of disgust in front of an authority. And it may be thatthey fail to learn to do this even when they acquire the value that is incompatiblewith the display of disgust in front of an authority. That is, these people fail to learnto do what they ought to do even if (by assumption) what they ought to do is deter-mined by culturally shared values.

There are no norms that apply to emotions just in virtue of the various biologicalfunctions they have, and this is true independently of whether emotio ns acquire someof their biological functions through a process of cultural learning. 31

29 Friesen (1972); Ekman (1972, 1980, 2003); Fridlund (1994) .30 See for example Boyd & Richerson (1985) .31 It is important to notice that, even in this case, the argument does not rely on any general assumptions

about the relation between normative and non-normative facts.


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the organism. That is, there are norms that apply to happiness just in virtue of theorganism/environment relation it represents. More generally we can say that, on thisview, necessarily, one ought not to believe that p, perceive that p, or have an emotionthat represents that p, if p is not the case. That is, there are normative standards thatapply to emotions just in virtue of their representational content.

There are many problems with the view that it is constitutiv e of being a belief, per-ception, or emotion that one ought not to have it if it is false. 35 One problem is thatthis view is in tension with the intuition that there are many cases in which one oughtto have a false belief, perception, or emotion. It makes perfect sense to say thatsomeone who is terminally ill ought to believe that there are good chances of recov-ery, whilst in fact the chances are slim. And it makes perfect sense to say that oneought to be happy even when the benecial organism/environment relation that hap-piness represents does not obtainbecause, say, happiness is good for you, no mat-ter what.

Another problem for this view is that it entailson a plausible understanding of what a norm isthat an organism can have beliefs, perceptions, and emotions onlyif the organism is sensitive to the norm (or norm scheme) according to which oneought not to believe, perceive, or have an emotion that represents that p if p isnot the case. But this is implausible. It is implausible for beliefs and it is even moreimplausible for perceptions and emotions. Bees have perceptual states, but it seemswrong to say that they are sensitive to the norm that one ought not to perceive that pif p is not the case. Mice have emotional states, but it seems wrong to say that theyare sensitive to the norm that one ought not to have an emotion that represents that p if p is not the case.

Yet another problem is that it is not clear what the status of these content gener-ated norms is supposed to be. How should we understand the force that these normsexert on us? Some authors claim that these norms should be taken as primitive. 36 Butthis position is unsatisfactory. If these norms exist, why should it be impossible togive an account of their force?

Humberstone (1992) is one of the few authors who think that the content-gener-ated norms can actually be explained. He gives an account of them in terms of inten-tions. According to him, a mental state S of a thinker T with a mind-to-world

direction of t and a content that p is constitutively (and thereby necessarily) a statethat T intends to not be false. That is, T intends not to have S if p is not the case. If T does not have this intention about S , then S is not a state with mind to world direc-tion of t.

Humberstone may or may not be right in thinking that intentions are sources of genuine normativity. It may well be the case that if one intends to do something then(at least ceteris paribus ) one ought to do it. Even assuming he is right on this, his ac-count faces a difficult problem. The account entails that organisms unable of token-ing intentions cannot have states with a mind-to-world direction of t. That is, they

35 The considerations I am going to present are adapted from Papineau (1999) .36 Cf. McDowell (1994) .


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cannot have beliefs, perceptions, and emotions. The problem is that beliefs, percep-tions, and emotions are developmentally and evolution arily prior to intentions.Intentions are mental states of a very sophisticated sort. 37 Someone may perhapsdoubt that beliefs are evolutionary and developmentally prior to intentions. Butthere cannot be any reasonable doubt that emotions and perceptions are. Thereare also other problems with Humberstone s account, but I will not analyze themhere.

Luckily, there are non-normative ways to make sense of direction-of-t talk.When we say that beliefs, perceptions, and emotions aim at truth we may be sayingtwo different things. First, we may be speaking metaphorically. Beliefs, perceptions,and emotions aim at truth in the same way that hearts aim at pumping blood. Tosay that hearts aim at pumping blood is just a metaphorical way to say that heartshave the biological function to pump blood. And, similarly, to say that beliefs, per-ceptions, and emotions aim at truth is just a metaphorical way to say that thesestates have the biological function to be true, that is, they have the biological func-tion to track actual states of affairs. Moreover, just like the biological function of pumping blood is partly constitutive of being a heart, the biological function of beingtrue is partly constitutive of being a belief, perception, or emotion. But the biologicalfunction of hearts does not entail that hearts ought (literally) to pump blood. In thesame way, the biological tracking function of beliefs, perceptions and emotions doesnot entail that these representational states ought (literally) to be tokened only whenthey are true. As we saw in the previous section, since natural items are not artefacts,no genuine normativity can come from biological functions. 38

Second, when we say that beliefs, perceptions, and emotions aim at truth, we maybe speaking literally. In this case we are saying that our beliefs, perceptions and emo-tions are states that we desire or intend to be true. We aim at truth (we want truth)and, as a result of this, those of our mental representations that can be true (our men-tal representations with a mind-to-world direction of t) are also aimed at being true.But when we say that our beliefs, perceptions, and emotions aim at truth because wedesire or intend them to be true we cannot be making a claim about their nature.Otherwise we would be in a position similar to Humberstone s. It is very likely thata desire for truth is something that appears (both in evolutionary and developmental

terms) after the appearance of beliefs and judgements. And it is beyond any reason-able doubt that a desire for truth is something that appears (both in evolutionary anddevelopmental terms) after the appearance of perceptions and emotions.

The fact that we desir e truth is contingent. Not every human being aims at truth,at least not all the time. 39 So, our beliefs, perceptions, and emotions do not always

37 Cf. Bratman (1987) .38 Millikan (1984, 1993) argues that the function of being true is constitutive of beliefs and other states

with the same kind of (mind-to-world) content. But she also argues that an appeal to the function of beingtrue is the way to account for the essential normativity of meaning (cf. also McGinn, 1989; Neander, 1995;Price, 2001; Jacob, 2002 ). But there is no essential normativity of meaning. And if there was, biologicalfunctions could not account for it.

39 Stich (1990); Nozick (1993) .


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aim at truth in the literal sense. Moreover, infants and nonhuman animals do notaim at truth: they do not have the relevant desires or intentions. So, on this literalinterpretation, the beliefs, perceptions, and emotions of these creatures never literallyaim at truth. The representations with a mind-to-world direction of t of an organ-ism aim at truth (literally) only if and when the organism desires or intends (forwhatever reason, or for no reason at all) these representations to be true.

I have discussed the view that representations with a mind to world direction of tare constitutively items that ought to be true . We can call this the truth-normativityversion of the theory that representational content of the mind-to-world variety isessentially normative. Another version of this theory is the one according to whichrepresentations with a mind-to-world direction of t are constitutively items thatought to be justied . We can call this the justication-normativity version. Considerthe statement one ought not to be in a state of fear unless one is justied in havingan emotion that represents that one is in danger or the statement one ought not tobe angry unless one is justied in having an emotion that represents that one hasbeen wronged .40 According to the justication-normativity view, these normativestatements are true just in virtue of what fear and anger represent.

Objections analogous to those levelled against the truth-normativity view can belevelled against the justication-normativity view. First, it is not clear what is the sta-tus of these ought-to-be-justied norms allegedly entailed by the representationalproperties of beliefs, perceptions, and emotions. Second, it is not true that in all cir-cumstances beliefs, perceptions, and emotions ought to be justiednot even ceteris paribus . Third, it is not true that all organisms with beliefs, perceptions, or emotionsare sensitive to these ought-to-be-justied norms.

Arguably, the property of being justied is the property mental representationshave when they are generated by reliable (truth preserving, truth conducive) pro-cesses. If beliefs, perceptions, and emotions have the biological function to be true,then perhaps they also have the biological function to be produced by reliable pro-cesses. That is, if they have the biological function to be true, they may also have thebiological function to be justied. But even assuming that emotions have the biolog-ical function to be justied (and it is a questionable assumption), it does not followthat they ought to be justied. Again, no normativity comes from biological func-

tions alone.It is true that some (but only some) of the organisms with representations of themind-to-world variety aim (at least sometimes) at having justied representations.These organisms desire or intend their beliefs, perceptions, and emotions to be jus-tiedperhaps as a result of desiring their beliefs, perceptions and emotions to betrue. Just like for truth, the beliefs, perceptions, and emotions of an organism can besaid to aim at being justied (literally) only if and when this organism desires its be-liefs, perceptions, and emotions to be justied.

The theory that there are norms that apply to mental states just in virtue of theirhaving a certain kind of representational content is a much debated theory and it is

40 Cf. Greenspan (1988); Nussbaum (2001) .


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not possible to discuss all the different aspects of this issue here. In this section, Ihave tried to show that the arguments against this theory are strong and that theybecome even stronger when we focus on emotions rather thanas it usually hap-pens in the literatureon beliefs or judgements. The conclusion is that there areno norms that apply to emotions just in virtue of their representational properties.

5. Conclusions

In Section 4, we saw that there are no norms that apply to emotions solely in vir-tue of their representational properties. In Section 3, we saw that there are no normsthat apply to emotions solely in virtue of their biological functions. It follows that, if the theory of emotions outlined in Section 2 is correct, there are no norms that applyto emotions solely in virtue of facts about their nature. So, either the theory of emo-tions given in Section 2 is fundamentally mistaken or there are no norms that applyto emotions just in virtue of facts about their nature. 41

If there are no norms that apply to emotions just in virtue of their nature, what isthe origin of the norms that apply to emotions? Some normative standards for emo-tions may have their origin in moral and social valuesas suggested in Section 3.There is a case for saying that one ought not to feel sexual desire for children notbecause of anything about the nature of the emotion of sexual desire, but simply be-cause sexual desire for children is immoral. And there is a case for saying that a Jap-anese person ought not to display disgust in front of an authority not because of anything about the nature of disgust, but simply because the display of disgust infront of an authority is incompatible with socially shared Japanese values.

Moreover, some normative standards for emotions m ay have their origin in whatorganisms desire or intendas suggested in Section 4.42 First of all, agents mayhave desires or intentions about their emotions. If an agent desires or intends tobe in a state of fear only when there is some real danger, then there is a case for say-ing that fear ought to be present in this agent only when the agent is in real danger.And if an agent desires or intends never to experience the emotion of guilt (say, be-cause she despises guilt), then there is a case for saying that the emotion of guilt

ought never to be present in this agent. Secondly, emotions may constitute meansto the satisfaction of desires in general , and not just to the satisfaction of desiresabout emotions. If feeling guilty in certain circumstances is a means to be acceptedby a certain community, and an agent wants to be accepted by that community, thenthere is a case for saying that the agent ought to feel guilty in those circumstances. If John wants to be loved by Mary, and not being jealous is a means to be loved byMary, then there is a case for saying that John ought not to be jealous.

41 See also the interesting discussion about emotions and normative kinds in Griffiths (Forthcoming) .42 These are the so called normativity of desires and normativity of intentions , which have been at the

centre of (both old and recent) debates about the nature of practical reasoning; cf., for example,Korsegaard (1996) and Broome (1999, 2001).


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These suggestions seem to be in tension ( prima facie ) with the traditional viewaccording to which emotions are passive and, thereby, beyond volitional control.If emotions are beyond volitional control, then we need to explain how they can con-stitute means to the satisfaction of desires through practical reasoning and how theycan be subject to moral and social norms.

Acknowledgements

Many thanks to Paul Griffiths, Tim Lewens, David Papineau, Jesse Prinz, NeilManson, Lisa Bortolotti, and Finn Spicer for comments and discussion.

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