Meiji University

　

Titleマス･カスタマイゼーションと関係特定的資源:サプラ

イヤー-メーカーを中心に

Author(s) 臼井,哲也

Citation 明大商學論叢, 86: 39-52

URL http://hdl.handle.net/10291/2010

Rights

Issue Date 2004-03-26

Text version publisher

Type Departmental Bulletin Paper

DOI

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　https://m-repo.lib.meiji.ac.jp/

39

MassCustomizationandRelation-Specific

ResourcesintheSupplier-Manufacturer

Relationship

マ ス ・カ ス タ マ イゼ ー シ ョン と関係 特 定 的 資 源:

サ プ ラ イ や 一一メー カ ー 関係 を 中心 に

TetsuyaUsui

臼 井 哲 也☆

Contents

Introduction

1.InitiationPointsofCustomizationancProductArchitecture

2.Relation-SpecificResourcesintheSupplier-ManufacturerRelationship

3.ModelandSomeImportantPropositions

Conclusion

Introduction

Masscustomizationhasreceivedconsiderableattentionintheproductionandopera-

tionmanagementliterature.Masscustomization(MC)isbasedontheideaoftyingcom-

puter・basedinformationsystemstogetherwithnewmodesofoperationsuchasflexible

manufacturingandjust-in-time(JIT)productionandthenusingthoselinkedsystemsto

makeitpossiblet6provideeachcustomerwiththeattractive,tailor-madebenefitsofthe

pre・industrialcrafteraatthelowcostofmodernproduction(Hartl995,DurayetaL2000,

andDuray2002).TheexistingliteraturesofMCsuggestthattherecannotbeonlyone

conventionalmasscustomizationmodelforallbusinesses,firmswilldecidetheirown

customizationlevelsinaccordancewiththeirownstrategicview,perceivedmarketpres-

sures,andcapabilities(Usui2004).Sinceallbusinesseshaveconducteddifferentlevelsof

customizationofproductsandservicesduetoreachingmoreclosetoindividualcustomers,

severalauthorsproposeacontinuousframeworkuponwhichMCmayoccuratvarious

pointsalongthevaluechain,rangingfromthesimple"adaptation"ofdeliveredproducts

bycustomersthemselves,uptothetotalcustomizationofproductsale,design,fabrication,

☆社会科学研究所RA

40『 明大商学論叢』第86巻 特別号 .(508)

assembly,anddelivery.

TheoneofthemainissueshasbeenquestionedinMCstudyistodefinethedetermi-

nantsforthechoiceofinitiationpQintsofcustomizationactivitiesalongwiththevalue

chain.Inotherwords,alittleisknownaboutunderwhatconditions ,thefirm(SBU)

choosesthepossiblerangeofproductconfigurationsforcustomizationactivities .Figure

ldescribestherelationshipbetweeninitiationpointsofcustomizationandoperational

capabilitiesoffirms(Usui2004)1.Whilemarketrequirementsinmanyindustrieshave

beenshiftedmoretowardcustomizingtheirofferings(Kotler1989Pine1993,Windand

Rangaswamy2001),differenceinthefocusofoperationalcapabilitiesoffirmsmaydiffer

wh・nfi・m・a・ei・th・ ・am・i・d・ ・t・y・rc・mp・ti・gwithinthesam・p・ ・du・t・at・g・ ・y(・ .g

consumerproductsthathaveacomplexproductarchitectureandproductionprocess) .

Whenotherconditions(e.g.marketrequirements)areequaltofirms,differencesinfirm's

resourcesthatcanbedistinguishedfromonesincompetitorscanbethedeterminantsfor

thechoiceofinitiationpointsofcustomization.ThemainpurposeQfthisstudyistoiden-

tifytheoperationalcapabilitiesthatinfluenceoverthedecisionwherethefirmshould

initiateitscustomizationactivitiesandproposethebasicmodelwithsomeimportant

propositionsamongidentifiedfactors.

Operational

Capabilities 、 も

、

StrategicVision

ofthefirm

、、

、

鴨、

InitiationPointsof

Customization

Market

Requirements

Source:AdaptedfromUsui(2004)

FigurelTheConceptualFrameworkforMCstudy

Thisarticleisdividedintothreesections.Inthefirstsection,howthedifferencein

pointsofcustomizationonthevaluechainrelateswiththepotentialbenefitswillbedis・

cussed.Thechoiceofinitiationpointsmayprovidedifferentbenefitsforthefirm .In

addition,therelationshipbetweenpointsofcustomizationandproductarchitecturewillbe

discussed.Here,Iproposethatincreasingmodularityofproductarchitecturewillencour-

agetomaketheinitiationpointearlieronthevaluechain.Increasingmodularityofprod-

uctarchitecturehasgainedhighattentionamongresearchersrecently(Sanchezand

lTheinitiationpointofcustomizationthatonceselectedbythefirmwillnotbeunchangedorfixed

approach,ithastobereevaluatedt6seektheoptimallevelofcustomizationovertime .ThebackwardloopinFigurelshowsthatthemarketexperimentsmayrequirethefirmtomodifyits

operationalcapabilitiesandfurtherstrategicvisioninlong-termbasis(alsoseeUsui2004) .Theinitiationpointisalsoknownasthe"decouplingpoint"whereonthevaluechainfirmsstarttheir

customizationactivities(LampelandMinzberg1996 ,vanHoekl998).

(509)MassCustomizationandRelation-SpecificResources41

Mahoney1996,Schilling2000,AokiandAndo2002).Thechoiceofearlierinitiationre-

quireshighseparatabilityamongcomponentsofproduct(Schilling2000).Whensepara・

tabilityamongcomponentsislow,itcanbeassumedthatthefirmisbelimitedtoensure

enoughrangeofproductconfigurationstomeetwithindividualcustomerorders.

Inthesecondsection,themain.ideaofthisarticlewillbeproposed.Therelation-

specificresources(RSR)thataccumulatewithinthespecificinterfirmrelationshipsbe-

tweensupplierandmanufacturerwillbefocusedastheimportantfactorthatinfluenceto

thedegreeofproductmodularityandopennessoftransactionsinorganizationalbounda-

ries(e.g.marketororganization).Thisargumentisbasedonthenotionthatdifferences

infirm'sresourcesthatgeneratethecompetitivenessoverotherscanbethemaindetermi-

nantfordecisionoverimplementationofmasscustomizationwhenotherconditions(e.g.

marketrequirements)areequaltofirlnsinthesameindustry.Inthelastsection.accord-

ingtothetheoreticalbasisinprevioussections,themodelandsomeimportantproposi-

tionsamongidentifiedfactorswillbepresented.

1.InitiationPointsofCustomizationandProductArchitecture

PointsofCustomizationandPotentialBenefits

Thepointofcustomizationcanbereferredastheinitiation・pointsoffirm'scustomiza-

tionactivitiesonthe.valuechain.Asitisgenerallyknown..theword"masscustomiza-

tion"isacoinedwordof"massproduction"and"customizationofproducts(orservices)".

Firstfactor"mass"referstomassproductionorthesystemproduceitemsbasedonhigh

volumesproductioncycleforrelativelyalargersizeofcustomergroup.Ingeneral,the

mainbenefitofmassproductionofitemsisachievinghighdegreeofcostefficiencyonits

valuechain.

TablelsummarizesseveraldifferentMCmodelsproposedbyresearchers.Itsuggests

thatacontinuousframeworkuponwhichMCmayoccuratvariouspointsalongthevalue

chain,rangingfromthesimple"adaptation"ofdeliveredproductsbycustomersthem-

selves,uptothetotalcustomizationofproduct(summarizedinUsui2003,2004).The

simplestcustomizationoccursonlyatdistributionstagebyindividualizingofpackages

andusagesofproducts,incontrastthetotalcustomizationstartsfromtheinitialstageby

individualizingproductdesignitself.Sincethecostsofcustomizationtendtoincreasein

proportiontothenumberofproductchanges,itmakessensetocustomizethedownstream

functionsfirst(LampleandMintzberg1996,p.25).

Thepoterltialbenefitsthatgainedbyfirmsmaybedifferdependinguponthechoice

ofinitiationpointofcustQmizationthefirmselects.Logically,thepotentialbenefitswhen

afirmchoosestoinitiatetheircustomizationactivitiesfromearlierstageofitsvaluechain

are1)reducingthelevelofinventoryand2)buildingtherelationshipwithcustomer

throughcustomerinvolvementfromearlierstageofproductdeliveringprocess.Onthe

42「 明大商学論叢』第86巻 特別号(510)

TablelPointsofCustomizationandMCModels

GenericLevels StagesofMC MCApproach MCStrategiesMC

Configuration=,P/SStrategies

MCModeI

Pointsof

Customizatio

Silveiraetal,(2001)

Pine(1993)GilmoreandPine(1997)

LampelandMintzberg(1996)

Durayeta1.

(2000)

PaghandCooper(1998)

Design Pure

Customization

Earlier Fabrication Collaborative/Transparent

Tailared

Customization

Fabricators/Involvers

TheFull

Postponement

Assembly ModularProduction

Customized

Standardization

The

Manufacturing

Postponement

Additional

CustomWorkPointofDelivery

Customization

Additional

Services

Costomized

Services

Modularizers/Assemblers

TheLogistics

Postponement

Packageand

DistributionCosmetic

Segmented

Standardization

Later UsageEmbedded

CustomizationAdaptive

StandardizationPure

Standardization

TheFull

Speculation

拳MC=MassCustomization

*P/S=PostponementandSpeculation

Source:AdaptedfromUsui(2003),p.69

Table2TheContinuumforInitiationPointsofCustomizationandPotentialBenefits

Potential

Benefits

Pointsof

Customization

ProductionCostInventory

LevelLeadTime

Customer

InVOIVement

InitialStageProhibited

HighCostReduced Longest MoreRelational

Earlier

LaterMassCustomization

LastStageLowwithMass

BasedProductionHigh Shortest NoInvolvement

otherhand,thepotentialbenefitsstemfromchoosingtheinitiationpointatlaterstageare

1)lowerinunitproductioncostbasedonmassproductioncyclesand2)shorterintotal

leadtime(seeTable2).

Forinstance.whenthefirmchoosestoinitiatecustomizationactivitiesfromearlier

point,itwillbethefactorstoincreaseproductioncostandthelengthofleadtimeofpro・

ductionbecauseitmakesthefirmtoproduceanddeliverdifferentlyconfiguredproducts

basedoneachcustomerorder,Offeringproductoptionstocustomersshouldcausetobe

delayedtheprocessesoftotalproductiontime,Bucklin(1965)presentedtheframeworkof

postponement-speculationstrategies;whilepostponementinvolvesdelayingvalue-adding

activitiesuntilacustomerorderisreceived(earlierpointofcustomization),speculation

involvesaddingvaluebeforetheorderreceived(laterpointofcustomization) .

(511)MassCustomizationandRelation-SpecificResources43

Fromthemarketingviewofpoint,customerinvolvementhasgainedthegreatest

attentionamongotherbenefitsinMCstudies(Kotlerl989,SanchezandMahoneyl996,

Durayetal.2000,WindandRangaswamy2001).Throughtwo-wayscommunicationwith

customers,firmsexpecttqdevelopthestrongrelationshipswithcustomers.Furthermore,

itprovidestheopportunitytoenhancecustomerloyaltybyofferingtheabilitytofindand

ordesignproductsandservicesthatmeettheirneeds.Whenthefirmofferscustomization

activitiesfromearlierstage,itenablescustomerstocreateendproductsthatperform

functionsmorecloselysuitedtotheiridiosyncraticneeds(Schilling2000,p.320).

Modu豆arityofProductArchitectureastheSolutionforMCimplementation

Toaccomplishdeliveringcustomizedproductsforindividu .alsandreducingproduc-

tioncostandcUttingleadtimeshortersimultaneously,firmsmustdevelopefficientwayto

configure(assemble)differentcomponentsgatherintocusto阻erdesiredproducts.Modu-

larproduction,thecrucialsolutionforachievingcostefficiency,isintensivelydiscussedin

theproductionandoperationmanagementliteraturesaswellasinMCliteratures(Pine

l993,SanchezandMahoney1996,Durayetal.2000,Schilling2000).Designingproduct

moduleshasbeenexpectedtoallowforflexibilityinproductassembly(Starrl965,

BaldwinandClarkl997).Componentscanbeproducedinvolumeandassembledintoa

varietyoffinalproductforms.Basicmodulescanbeproducedthroughmassproduction.

butareincompleteuntiltheyareattachedtoothermodules.Byproducingstandardized

modularcomponentsinmassproductionbasisthatconfigureproductitself,firmscould

producecustomizedproductswithoutscarifyingeconomiesofscaleinproduction.

AccordingtoSchilling(2000),modularityofproductarchitecturehastwodistinctive

characteristics:1)separabilityofcomponentsand2)standardizedinterface.Thehigh

degreeofmodularityreferstothesystemthattheircomponentscanbedisaggregatedand

recombinedintonewconfigurationswithlittlelossoffunctionality.Themodularityof

productarchitectureallowsfirmstobeputallcomponentsbacktogetheragainandthen

continuetofunctionasbefore.Thestandardizedinterfaceallowsproductcomponents

compatibilitywithotherfunctions.Whentheinterfacebecomesthestandardintheindus-

try,itenablesfirms(manufacturers)tousecomponentsfromavarietyofdifferentsuppli-

ers,ratherthanbeinglockedintoasingleprovider.Theoretically,whenthefirnlem-

ployeesthehighdegreeofmodularityforitsproductsandthestructureofinterfaceamong

componentsissharedintheindustry,theproductwillhavewiderrangeofofferingswith

greatextendibilitytomeetwithuniqueneedsofindividuals.Thissuggestshighdegreeof

modularityofproductarchitectureisoneofthenecessaryconditionstoinitiatecustomiza-

tionactivitiesfromearlierstage(e.g.assembly)onthevaluechain.

Integralproductarchitecture,incontrast,requiressynergysensitivitiesorinter・

dependabilitiesamongfunctions(ClarkandFujimotol997,Fujimoto2001).Functionsofthe

productcannotbeseparatedoneanotherwithoutlossoffunctionality.Thosefunctionsare

44『 明大商学論叢』第86巻 特別号(512)

ratherinterdependenteachothertoperformbetter.Ifallcomponentsmustbetightlyinte-

gratedandoptimizedforeachother,theirproductionoftenrequiresthatallindividuals

involvedinsuchdesignandproductionalsoworkinclosecontact(Schilling2000,p.320).

Proposition1:Thehigherdegreeoプ7πo伽 」α吻 ノ(Zプpry)ductarchitecturewillbe,itenablesthe

firmtochoosetoinitiateitscustomizationactivitiesfrc〃zearlierstageo〃hevaluechain.

2.Relation-SpecificResourcesintheSupplier-ManufacturerRelationship

TheEmergenceofInterfirmGovernanceandRSR

StrategicmanagementliteraturessuggestthatinterfirmgovernanceinthesupPly

chainisexpectedtobecomeasourceofhighbusinessperformancegenerator(Dwyer,

Schurr,andOh1987,JohnstonandLawrence1988,Dyer1996a,1996b,DyerandSingh1998).

Especially,relation-specificresources(RSR)thatareaccumulatedininterfirmrelation-

shipsthatoperatetheirtransactionsandbusinessdevelopmentthroughbeingarelatively

longer-termofpartnershipcanbetheimportantfactorstoempiricallyidentifyasthe

generatorofcompetitivenessoffirms.

Summarizing30yearsdiscussionontheissueofgovernancestructureoffirmbounda-

ries,thereareatleasttwodifferentperspectivesthatexplaintheemergenceofinterfirm

governancemechanism.First,intransactionscosteconomics(TCE),twoopposedgovern-

ancestructures,transactiontakesplaceeitherinthemarketorhierarchy(withinthe

organizationorverticallyintegrated),haveofferedthemostconventionaltheoretical

backgroundtoacademics.ThecriticismagainstdichotomyviewofTCEhasleadtoextent

theframeworktowardthedevelopmentofintermediategovernancestructureoffirm

in-betweenmarketandhierarchystructure(Williamsonl985,1991,Imai,Itami,andKoike

1982).Thesecondexplanationisbasedonresource-basedviewoffirm.Severalempirical

studiessupportthatcooperativespecializationwithininterfirmrelationshipincreases

productivityofresourceowners(DyerandSinghl998)andthecostscreatingandacquir-

ingresourceswithinasinglefirm(andverticallyintegratedorganization)areincurred

andittendstoavoidthosecostsunderhighdegreeofuncertaintyofdemandandtechno-

logicalchanges.Thisperspectiveassumestheemergenceofinterfirmgovernanceoccurs

whenfirmrecognizestheeffectivenessofcreatingandaccumulatingresourcesorcapabil:一

tieswiththepartners;rathernotwithinownorganization.Themainpremiseofthisper-

spectiveisthatfirmswillseektoreduceuncertaintyandmanagedependencebypurposely

structuringtheirexchangerelationshipsmeansofestablishingformalorsemiformallinks

withotherfirms.

Thissectionaimstoidentifythecharacteristicsofresourcethatgeneratesandaccu-

mulateswithintheinterfirmgovernance(boundaryoffirms)inthesupplier-manufacturer

relationship.Theintermediatecoordinationmechanismhasbeenexpectedtogeneratethe

(513)MassCustomizationandRelation・SpecificResources45

distinctiverelation-specificresources(RSR)thatcompetitors(andverticallyintegrated

groupofcompetitor:)canhardlyimitate.Theresourceaccumulationhasbeensubjectto

examiningempiricalsettingsduetoexplainthefirm'sperformance(Dyer1996a,Dyerand

Ouchil993).Theemergenceandmechanismofinterfirmgovernancehasbeenwidely

discussed,especially,inthebusinessliteraturesandinterfirmgovernancehasbeende・

scribedbyavarietyofterms,includingrelationalexchange(Dwyer,Schurr,andOh1987),

hybrids(Williamson1991),interorganizationalgovernance(Hiedel994,DyerandSingh

l998),cooperativeinterorganizationalrelationship(RingandVandeVenl992,1994),and

bilateralapproach(JoshiandStump1999).

Whiletransactioncosteconomicsaimtodescribethemechanismhowtransactioncost

isrhinimizedwithouthavingincreasedopportunitycostinthemarkettransactions

(Williamson1979),resource-basedviewofthefirmhavearguedthatdifferentialfirm

performanceduetofirmheterogeneity(Wernerfeltl984,Barney1991).Bothperspectives

describethesamegovernancestructurefronldifferentpointofviews;however,theyboth

havebeenappliedfortheempiricalstudiesthatattempttoexaminethefirmperformance.

Intherestofthissection,Iwilldiscusstwodifferentperspectivesofinterfirmgovernance,

TCEapproachandRBV,andfurtherIfocusonrelation-specificresourcesintheinterfirm

governanceofsupplierandmanufacturertorevealtheattributestheyhave.

TransactionCostEconomicsPerspectiveofInterfirmGovernance

Togivenconventionaltheoryoffirmboundarydecision,transactionsbetweenfirms

canbethemostcriticalunitofanalysistoexplainthedecisionwhetherfirmschooseto

formaverticalintegration(hierarchy)orchoosetomaketransactionsatmarket.Tradi-

tionalviewofinterfirmexchangesisbasedontransactioncosteconomics(TCE)thatsee

transactionsamongfirmsasthemostfundamentalunitsofanalysis(Williamsonl985).

Thebasisofthisdominanttheoryaimstoexplainthemechanismthathowfirms,indyadic

relationship,choosetheirgovernancestructurealongwithtwoends,atoneend,transac-

tionstakeplaceatmarketandatanotherend,transactionsinternalizeintoorganization

(hierarchyorverticallyintegrated).

TCEresearchersoperateonanassumptionforthequestionofselectinggovernance

structures,tominimizethecostoftransactionsandavoidtheopportunisticattitudesof

partner(Williamsonl979).Marketgovernanceisthebestdescribedaspurchasinggaso・

1ineatthegasstationwhenpeopletraveLNocohtinuoustransactionrelationshipbetween

supplierandcustomerischaracterizedinthisspecificcase.IntheoriginalTCEperspec・

tive,withmarketgovernance,firmisabletominimizetheopportunitycostbutexpected

tohaverelativelyhighertransactioncost.Firmemployingarnarketgovernancetakes

advantageofopportunitiestodealwithnewcontractorswhomayhaveinnovativetech-

nologies,whilethetransactioncost,includingsearchingpartnersandinformationseeking

costs,monitoringcosts,andcoststhatenforcingcontractualperformancewillberelatively

46『 明大商学論叢』第86巻 特別号(514)

high.Becauseonetimespottransactionwillnotgeneraterepeatable,long-termrelation-

ship,itassumeseasiertoavoidtheoppQrtunisticattitudesofpartner.Thisdiscreteex・

changerelationshipinmarketgovernancegivesthemanufacturertheflexibilitytopursue

transactwithseveraldifferentsuppliersconcurrentlyand/orovertimeforagivencompo-

nents(Williamsonl985,JoshiandStump1999).

Incontrast,hierarchygovernanceattemptstointernalizealltransactionswithinthe

firmorthegroupoffirms(organizationorverticallyintegratedorganizations).Itmini-

mizestransactioncoststemsfromsearchandinformationcosts,monitoringcosts,and

coststhatenforcingcontractualperformance.ateverytransaction,whileverticallyinte-

gratedfirmfacestotheinflexibilityinexchangerelationshipsthatmayleadtoproduction

costinefficiency.

However,theoriginalargumentofTCEassumesthatchoicesofgovernancestructure

areeithermarketsorhierarchies,nothingin-between,thealternativegovernancestructure

forrepeatabletransactionwithhighidiosyncraticassetshastogaintheacademicatten-

tion.Williamson(1979,1985,andl991)stressedthatcertaintypeoftransactionsrequire

theintermediategovernancestructure.Williamson(1991,p.269)hasstatedthat`trans-

actioncosteconomicshasbeencriticizedbecauseitdealswithpolarforms-marketsand

hierarchies-totheneglectofintermediateorhybridforms'.TheoriginalargumentofTCE

then,extendedtotherepeatedtransactionrelationshipsandthisextensionrequiresthe

developmentofintermediate(ormixed)structureforgovernancefirms(Imai,Itami,and

Koikel982,Dyer1996a,1996b).

Resource-BasedViewofInterfirmGovernanceandRSR

IntheTCEperspective,thecostsoftransactionandproductionormixedbothare

accountfortheunitofanalysis.Themainfocusofthisperspectiveishowmanagermake

decisionovertheselectionofgovernancestructuresduetominimizethedescribedcosts

above.Ontheotherhand,resource-basedperspectivefocusesonhowfirmcanenhance

andsustaintheircompetitiveadvantagebycreatingandacquiringitsresourcesandcapa-

bilitieswithintheinterfrimrelationship(Barney1999).Instrategicmanagement

literatures,researchersagreeuponthatsustainablecompetitiveadvantagecanbegener-

atedthroughcontinuousdevelopmentofresourcesorcapabilitiesoffirmsthatprovidethe

valuestocustomers(Werefelt1984,Barneyl991,Peterafl993,Day1994)2.

Thesomemainpropositionsofresource-basedviewarebasedonthenotionthatcom一

21ngeneral,theresource-basedapproachinfirmisdiscussedfromseveraldifferentperspectives;

includingresource-basedview(Barney1991,Peteraf1993,PriemandButler2001),accumulated

assets(DierickxandCooll989,AmitandSchoemakerl993),corecompetence(Praharadand

Hamell990,HamelandPraharad1993),aswellascapabilities(Day1994,Collis1994,Griffithand

Harvey2001).Themainobjectiveofthoseapproachesisto .describehowheterogeneitiesofresourcesandprocessesofstrategicplanninginfirmscanobtainsustainablecompetitiveadvan-

tageoverotherswhileallfirmsareinthesimilarenvironment(seeUsui2004).

(515)MassCustomizationandRelation-SpecificResources47

petitivefieldsofindividualfirmshasbeenmovedtowardcompetitivefieldsofgr6upof

firmsthatconsistofsupplychainoftheirgoods(Achroll991).Nolongerfirmcanextend,

enhanceandsustaintheircompetitiveadvantagewithresourcesinasingleorganization,

resourcesofasinglefirmhavetocombinewithresourceofotherstocomplementone

anotherordevelopnewcombinedresourcesthatleadthesynergyeffectbetweenpartners.

Barney(1999)statedthathowfirm'sresourcesorcapabilitiesaffectboundarydecision

anddescribedthreealternativechoicesregardingtoresourcecreations.

2>bω,Sゆ ρOSθ α伽 η加dsthatita・sen・`ρ ・∬essalltheaゆ 酬 伽S伽 θθds励 θSπ・・θ∫S一

掴.lnthissetting,G伽nhasthreewaysitcangaintotheccゆabilities伽 θθ4S.1)ltcar

cooperatewithfirmsthatalreaめ ゆossessthecapabilitiesitneeds.Here,afirmuses〃3α γ一

θ々∫07intermediategozノ θη3αηcθtogainaccessto'ぬ θsθα4)abilities.2)1`can`η'odevelop

theseaゆabilitieson'itsowr.Thisisanexc勿Zθ(吻S伽9伽 勉 γc配CαZgOη θ㍑ αηCθ'09伽

accesstcthesecapabilities.3)ltcantrytoacquireanotherノ 伽 ηthatalreadypo∬ θssgs

theseaゆabilities.Thisisanother/bη ηqプusinghierarchicalgovernancetogainaccesstc

'んθs2capabilities(;Barnet1999,ρ.140).

Inthisarticle,inaccordancewiththetheoreticalbackgroundsdescribedabove,Ide-

finerelation・specificresourcesasthetransaction-specificinvestmentsbysupplierand

manufacturerthatareonlyfunctionallyeffectivewithinthespecificrelationshipwith

partners.Dyer(1996b,1998)modifiedthemeasurementsforassetspecificitythatwere

originallyidentifiedbyWilliamson(1985)inordertodevelophisownoperationalmeas-

urementsinhisempiricalstudies3.Inthisarticle,Iwouldnotrigorouslyidentifythediffer-

encesamongthetermsresource,asset,andcapability;ratherIwouldfollowBarney's

originalstatement(Barney1991).Hedefinesthatfirmresourcesincludeallassets,capa-

bilities,organizationalprocesses,firmattributes,information,knowledge,etc.controlled

byafirmthatenablethefirmtoconceiveofandimplementstrategiesthatimproveits

efficiencyandeffectiveness'..Withthisreason,Iwouldapplytheterm`resource'insteadof

`asset'or`capability'inthisarticle.

Relation-specificresourcesaregeneratedwithfourqperationalfactorsbasedonthe

commonagreementsamongresearchers:1).humanresourcesspecificity,2)physicalre-

sourcesspecificity,3)sitespecificity,and4)synergysensitivityamongRSRs(Williamson

1985,DyerandSingh1998).

Human㎎ ∫oπ κ θspecificityreferstotheknowledgethroughhumantransactionsthat

accumulatedwithinthespecificrelationshipbetweenmanufacturerandsupplier(Dyer

3Williamson'soriginalargumentfocusedonthenegativeeffectsofassetspecificityovergovern-

ancestructureinfirm'sboundaries.Itassumesthathighinassetspecificitywillleadopportunis-

ticattitudesbypartnersduetotheirlocked-inrelationship.

4Seefootnote2.

48'『 明大 商学論叢』 第86巻 特別号(516)

andSighl998),Itincludesmanufacturer'sinvestmentand/orjointinvestmentwithsup-

plierintrainingofitsownand/orsupplier'spersonne1(JoshiandStump1999).Physical

擢soπ κ θspecific勿referstotransaction・specificcapitalinvestments(e.g.,incustomized

machinery,tools,dies,assemblylines,andsoon)thattailorprocessestoparticularex-

changepartners(e.g.suppliers).S∫'θ 碑)θc加c∫ 砂referstothesituationwherebysuccessive

productionstagesthatareimmobileinnaturearelocatedclosetooneanothertoimprove

coordinationandeconomizeoninventoryandtransportationcosts(DyerandSigh1998).

TheempiricalstudybyDyer(1996a),comparingJapaneseandU .S,automotivefirms,

suggeststhatsite・specificinvestments,inthemostcasesconductedbyJapanesefirms,can

substantiallyreduceinventoryandtransportationcostsandcanlowerthecostsofcoordi-

natingactivitiesbetweensupplierandmanufacturer.

Unlikethreemajorfactorsabove,synergy:ysensitivityamong㌔RS1～shasgainedalittle

attentioninthestrategicmanagementandproductionmanagementliteratures.Sソnergy

sensitivityofRSRsreferstothecombinedresourceendowmentsweremorevaluable,rare,

anddifficulttoimitatethantheyhadbeenbeforetheywerecombinedinthedyadicrela-

tionshipinthesupplier-manufacturer(DyerandSingh1998,p.667).However,Syη θ㎎:y

sensitivityα 〃song1～S1～srequirestoaddtheconditionthatrelation・specificresourceshave

beenaccumulatedwithinthedifferentdyadicsettingsareinter・dependentoneanotheras

thefirm's(manufacturer)resourcesandthosedifferentRSRswillresultinasynergistic

effectasthewholeresourceofthefirm(manufacturer).Whileasynergysensitivityof

RSRmayenhancemoreclosed,exclusive,andlong-termrelationshipinthedyadicsetting

inbetweenthesupplierandmanufacturer,∫:yη θ㎎:ysensitivityamongRSRsmayenhance

moreclosed,exclusive,andlong・termrelationshipwithinthegroupofpartners(suppliers)

ofthefirm(manufacturer).

Thecooperativespecializationwithintheinterfirmrelationship,especiallyinbetween

supplierandmanufacturer,hasbeenfoundtoallowforproductdifferentiationandmay

improvequalitybyincreasingproductintegrityorfit(ClarkandFujimoto1997,Fujimoto

2001,Dyer1996a,1996b,DyerandSighl998,Schilling2000).Inthenextsection,Idevelop

themodelshowstherelationshipamongthedegreeofRSR,modularityofproductarchi-

tecture,andinitiationpointsofcustomization.

3.ModelandSomeImportantPropositions

Inthissection,relation-specificresourcesthataccumulatedwithintherelationship

betweenmanufacturerandsupplierwillbefocusedastheimportantfactorstoinfluenceto

the.decision .overwherefirmsinitiatecustomizationactivitiesonitsvalechain.Thetwo

stagedpropositionswillbedeveloped.Inthefirststage(seesectionone),Iproposedthat

whentheproductarchitecturefirmemploysismoretowardmodularity/openedorienta・

tion,itmakesitpossibleforthefirmtoinitiatecustomizationactivitiesearlierstageofthe

(517)MassCustomizationandRelation-SpecificResources49

valuechainbecausethestructureofmodularcomponentsallowcustomerstoconfigure

morepossiblecombinationsofproductwithoutscarifyingtheefficiencyofmassbased

productionthanintegral/closedproductarchitecture.Theintegral/closedproductarchi-

tecturecanbecharacterizedaslowinseparatabilityofcombinedcomponentsintheprod・

uctinnature.Inthesecondstage,Iproposethatintheproductdevelopmentprocess,when

thehighdegreeofaccumulatedrelation-specificresourceswillbe,manufacturerwilllikely

toadoptintegral/closedproductarchitectureinsteadofmodularity/openedproductarchi-

tecthre.Figure2summarizesthosetwostagedpropositio血s.

InitiationPointofCustomization

EarlierLater

一 十Modularityof

Product

Architecture

Relation-Specific

Resource

IntegralProduct

Architecture

Figure2Modelofhypothesizedrelationshipsamongrelation-specificresources,productarchitecture,andinitiationpointsofcustomization

AsIdescribedintheprevioussection,thehighdegreeofaccumulatedRSRhasbeen

foundtoallowforproductdifferentiationandmayimprovequalitybyincreasingproduct

integrityorfit.Thissuggestsusthatwhenthefirmemployeesintegralproductarchitec-

ture,thecharacteristicofproductcanbeaddedthemostcriticalvalueofthatproductat

initialstageofproductdevelopmentchain.Theseclosed,exclusive,andlong-termrelation-

shipswithinthegroupofpartners(suppliers)ofthefirm(manufacturer)willdiscourage

theadaptationofmodularityproductarchitecture.Themodularityrequiresproductsto

continuetofunctionasbeforewhenallcomponentsdisaggregateandputbacktogether

againandallowsproductcomponentscompatibilitywithotherfunctions.Whentheinter-

faceissharedwithintheindustry,itenablesfirms(manufacturers)tousecomponents

fromavarietyofdifferentsuppliers,ratherthanbeinglockedintofixedpartners,

Proposition2:Thehigherdegree(ゾ1～SRωfπbe,〃zθ ノ乞ηηenables'oad¢ptmoreintegral

ρπ)ductarchitectureandthiswi〃encouragethefirminitiatesitscustomizationactivities

atlaterstageofthevaluechain.

Conchlsion

Thisarticleproposesthatdifferenceinthefocusofoperationalcapabilitiesoffirms

reflectchoiceofappropriateinitiationpointofcustomization.Themainissueofthisarti-

cleisthatrelation・specificresourcesthatinterfirmgovernancestructureinthesupplier

andmanufacturerrelationshiphasdevelopedcanbethedeterminantsforchoiceofinitia-

tionpointsofcustomization,itcanbeeitherearlierorlaterstageofthevaluechain.Be-

causethefirm'sinvestmentsforitsspecificrelationshipswithpartnerscanenhancethe

50「 明大商学論叢』第86巻 特別号(518)

exclusiveand/orinter-dependentrelationshipswithinthegroupofpartners,itencourages

firms(manufacturers)toadaptmoreintegralproductarchitectureintheirproductdevel-

opmentprocesses.Thelowseparatabilityofproductfunctionsanddifferencesamong

interfacesinthecomponentconfigurationsmaylimitthepossiblecombinationsofcus-

tomizationofferingsforfirms.Inthefutureresearch,Iwouldfurtherdeveloptestable

hypothesesbasedontheoriginalargumentofthisarticle.

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