medieval greek commentaries on the nicomachean ethics (studien und texte zur geistesgeschichte des...

Medieval Greek Commentarieson the Nicomachean Ethics

Studien und Textezur Geistesgeschichte

des Mittelalters

Begründet von

Josef Koch

Weitergeführt von

Paul Wilpert, Albert Zimmermann undJan A. Aertsen

Herausgegeben von

Andreas Speer

In Zusammenarbeit mit

Tzotcho Boiadjiev, Kent Emery, Jr.und Wouter Goris

BAND 101

Medieval GreekCommentaries on the

Nicomachean Ethics

Edited by

Charles BarberDavid Jenkins

LEIDEN • BOSTON2009

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Medieval Greek commentaries on the Nicomachean ethics / edited by Charles Barber, DavidJenkins.

p. cm. -- (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters; 101)Includes bibliographical references and index.ISBN 978-90-04-17393-4 (hardback : alk. paper) 1. Aristotle. Nicomachean ethics. 2.

Ethics. I. Barber, Charles, 1964- II. Jenkins, David. III. Title. IV. Series.

B430.M43 2009171’.3--dc22

2008055371

ISSN 0169-8028ISBN 978 90 04 17393 4

Copyright 2009 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands.Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Hotei Publishing,IDC Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and VSP.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored ina retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical,photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher.

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printed in the netherlands

Charles Barber dedicates this book to his daughters,

Cleome and Josephine

David Jenkins to his parents, Marv and Joyce Jenkins

CONTENTS

Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ixAcknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiiiAbbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv

Classical Scholarship in Twelfth-Century Byzantium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1Anthony Kaldellis

The Literary, Cultural and Political Context for theTwelfth-Century Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics . . . . . . . . . 45Peter Frankopan

Aristotelian Ethics in Byzantium. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63Linos G. Benakis

Neoplatonic Source-Material in Eustratios of Nicaea’sCommentary on Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71Michele Trizio

Eustratios of Nicaea’s ‘Definition of Being’ Revisited . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111David Jenkins

Eustratios of Nicaea on the Separation of Art and Theology . . . . . . . 131Charles Barber

The Anonymous Commentary on Nicomachean Ethics VII:Language, Style and Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145Elizabeth A. Fisher

Michael of Ephesus on the Empirical Man, the Scientist and theEducated Man (In Ethica Nicomachea X and In de Partibus

Animalium I) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163George Arabatzis

Some Observations on Michael of Ephesus’ Comments onNicomachean Ethics X .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185Katerina Ierodiakonou

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223

PREFACE

Most of the papers collected in this volume were first presented at aworkshop held in February 2006 at the University of Notre Dame. Thismeeting was organized by Charles Barber and David Jenkins and wasdevoted to discussion of twelfth-century Byzantine commentaries onthe Nicomachean Ethics. This topic gave the participants in the meetingan opportunity both to evaluate the condition of philosophy in twelfth-century Byzantium and to advocate for the real significance of theoften-overlooked contribution of Byzantine thinkers to the medievalreception of classical philosophical texts.

Given the enduring importance of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, itis remarkable to find that there is no extensive surviving commen-tary on this text from the period between the second century andthe twelfth century. Our workshop focused on the first of the medievalcommentaries: that produced in the early twelfth century by Eustratios,Metropolitan of Nicaea (ca. 1050–ca. 1120), Michael of Ephesus (fl. firsthalf of the twelfth century), and an anonymous author in Constantino-ple. Under the patronage of the imperial princess Anna Komnene,these Byzantine scholars prepared commentaries on books I, V, VI,VII, IX and X. This endeavor was to have a significant impact on thereception of the Nicomachean Ethics in Latin and Catholic Europe. Inthe mid-thirteenth century, Robert Grosseteste translated into Latin amanuscript that paired these Byzantine commentators with anonymousancient commentary on books II, III, IV and V as well as Aspasius’second-century commentary on book VIII. Both Albertus Magnus andBonaventure then used this translation as a basis for their discussionsof Aristotle’s book. Given the potential significance of this Byzantineproject, it is surprising to find that discussion of these commentarieshas not been extensive and that the quality of the philosophical enquirycontained within them remains little known and certainly undervalued.In order to go some way towards correcting this situation, the collec-tion of papers contained within the present volume attempts to con-textualize the production of these twelfth-century commentaries and,from a variety of disciplinary perspectives, to offer some precise inves-tigations of aspects of the philosophical thought to be found in theseworks.

x preface

The first three papers, those by Anthony Kaldellis, Peter Frankopanand Linos Benakis, offer some framings for our readings of these com-mentaries. Kaldellis’ essay positions the work of these twelfth-centuryphilosophers within the compass of a diffuse and creative classicalscholarship in twelfth-century Byzantium. In so doing, he not onlyargues that Byzantine scholarship has provided the defining modelfor the study of the classics, but that our recognition of the value ofthis particular legacy can continue to enrich and inform the fieldsfound within Classical Studies today. Frankopan’s paper also consid-ers this philosophical project in light of the classical past. In particu-lar, Frankopan shows that Anna Komnene’s patronage of these schol-ars was part of her wider interest in Hellenism. For Anna, Hellenismoffered a means by which to articulate the distinctiveness of Byzan-tine culture in an age when its power seemed to have fallen away andinto the hands of the Seljuk Turks and the Latin Christians. Benakis’paper provides the reader with an introduction to the circulation of theNicomachean Ethics and the production of commentaries on the Ethics

in Byzantium. While this survey reveals an extensive interest in ethicalquestions, the implications of this interest, as Benakis indicates, remainto be fully studied.1

The next three essays focus on the writings of Eustratios of Nicaea.Eustratios had been a student of John Italos in the years around 1080.He had then, perhaps in the early 1090s and while he served as a dea-con of Hagia Sophia in Constantinople, written two short discourseson icons. These were directed against Leo the Metropolitan of Chal-cedon’s understanding of the image. In the 1110s we find Eustratios act-ing as a court theologian and engaged in debates with Latin Catholicsand Armenian Monophysites. This role came to an end in 1117, whenEustratios was condemned for his theological method and recorded inthe Synodikon of Orthodoxy for having been overly attached to syllogisms.It is in the years following this condemnation that Eustratios appearsto have written his commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics. Eustratioswrote commentaries on two books of the Ethics, I and VI. He alsowrote a commentary on the second book of Aristotle’s Posterior Ana-

lytics. Michele Trizio’s paper demonstrates that Eustratios’ commentaryon book 6 was profoundly indebted to the language of Proklos. In par-

1 This paper was originally published in Greek: Linos Benakis, “Η Αριστ�τελικ�Η ικ� στ� Βυ��ντι�”, in Η Αριστ�τελικ� Η ικ� και �� επιδρ�σεις της, ed. D.N. Koutras(Athens: 1995) 252–259.

preface xi

ticular, Trizio argues that even when Eustratios differs from Proklos’position, he articulates his own philosophy in the language of his distin-guished forebear. David Jenkins’ essay questions whether it is appropri-ate to describe Eustratios as a nominalist. Jenkins shows that this iden-tification is an oversimplification, even as he demonstrates that Eustra-tios limited his discussion of being to the formal logic of predication.Charles Barber’s paper examines Eustratios’ extensive writing on art.In particular, Barber argues that while Eustratios’ discussion of art inbook VI of the Nicomachean Ethics betrays continuities with his essays onthe icons from the 1090s, these later comments also reveal that Eustra-tios wished to distinguish art from theology.

The next study is Elizabeth Fisher’s philologist’s reading of the anon-ymous commentary on Book VII of the Nicomachean Ethics. The anony-mous writer of this commentary has long been considered an incom-petent linguist, stylist, and philosopher. Fisher’s essay shows that, whilenot of the highest philosophical order, Anonymous’ language, style andlearning would not have been out of place in a twelfth-century school-room. This knowledge does not, however, allow for a more preciseidentification of this particular scholar.

The final two essays are written by George Arabatzis and KaterinaIerodiakonou and are devoted to Michael of Ephesus. Michael was aprodigious Aristotelian commentator, who worked in the first half of thetwelfth century and who wrote commentaries on books V, IX and X ofthe Nicomachean Ethics. In addition to these books from the Nicomachean

Ethics he commented on the Metaphysics, the Sophistical Refutations, theGeneration of Animals, the Parva naturalia, the Parts of Animals, the Movement

of Animals, the Progression of Animals, the De coloribus, the Politics, the Prior

and Posterior Analytics, the Topics, the Physics, the De caelo, and the Rhetoric.This breadth of work suggests that there was an extensive interest inAristotle’s writings in the early twelfth century Constantinople. Ourtwo essays focus on the commentary on book X. Arabatzis argues thatMichael of Ephesus draws careful distinctions between the educatedman and the scientist. In having drawn this distinction, Arabatzis isable to show that Michael then uses the scientist and the educatedman as models of the classificatory process. Ierodiakonou, in turn,argues that it is only by a close reading of particular texts and byattending to the play of particular concepts (such as eudaimonia) thatwe can begin to characterize appropriately both Michael’s work as aphilosopher and the nature of philosophical thought in twelfth-centuryByzantium.

xii preface

The papers gathered together in this volume remind us that muchwork remains to be done in the field of Byzantine philosophy. Westill have far too many works that remain unedited and far too fewcommunities of scholars who are willing and able to bring the workof these Byzantine thinkers into the wider discourses of intellectualhistory. For these Byzantine commentators did not simply reiterate orparaphrase an existing and extensive tradition of commentary. Rather,we witness acts of reading and interpretation that both belong to andspeak from the Greek world of the twelfth century, voices that openthese texts to their world and inform our reading of these texts for ourworld.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Many institutions and colleagues contributed to the success of the work-shop that produced the papers published in this volume. Financialsupport came from the Graduate School of the University of NotreDame, from the Medieval Institute at the University of Notre Dame,and from the Institute for Scholarship in the Liberal Arts in the Collegeof Arts & Letters at the University of Notre Dame. Harriet Baldwinprovided logistical support. Kent Emery, Andreas Speer, Sten Ebbesen,and Stephen Gersh brought additional lively and intelligent discussionto the workshop and contributed to a roundtable on Byzantine Philos-ophy that was joined to the Nicomachean Ethics workshop and that wasorganized by Kent Emery under the auspices of the Société Internationale

pour l’Étude de la Philosophie Médiévale. Finally, the organizers of this work-shop would like to thank all of the participants for their contributionsto this intensive and rewarding weekend of convivial conversation.

ABBREVIATIONS

Mansi Mansi, J.D. Sacrorum Conciliorum Nova et Amplissima Collectio. Florenceand Venice: A. Zatti, 1759–1798.

PG Patrologiae cursus completus, Series graeca. Ed. Jacques-Paul Migne. 161vols. in 166 parts. Paris: Migne, 1857–1866.

CLASSICAL SCHOLARSHIP INTWELFTH-CENTURY BYZANTIUM

Anthony Kaldellis*

This chapter aims to survey what may justly be called classical schol-arship in twelfth-century Byzantium, especially the commentaries onancient texts. By discussing the different methods, goals, audiences, andideological parameters of these largely neglected works, I intend to sit-uate the commentaries on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics into a vibrantculture of scholarly production and consumption. But the very notionof classical scholarship in Byzantium calls for explanation and requiresan ideological accounting.

1. Byzantium vs. the Classics

Byzantine “classicism,” both creative and scholarly, has received amostly negative press in modern discussions. It has been denied itsrightful place in the history of classical scholarship largely because itsstrengths and contributions have been taken for granted by those whohave delighted in highlighting its shortcomings. This calls for a swingin the opposite direction. But the ideological obstacles are formidable,especially the notion that has been widely disseminated in the Westregarding the position of Byzantium in our “system of civilizations.”This notion is fatally entangled in the ideological construction of theenlightened West itself and its leading nations in opposition to des-ignated Others. The effect can be observed in popular perceptions,where Byzantium stands in conceptual opposition to the classical (boththe ancient and its modern “rightful” heirs), and in specialized liter-ature on the history of classical scholarship, which practices a specialform of forgetfulness. The two volumes of R. Pfeiffer’s History of Classi-

cal Scholarship cover antiquity to the end of the Hellenistic Age and thenthe years 1300–1850 (of course, in the West). The entries on “schol-

* The author thanks Niels Gaul for his valuable comments on an earlier draft ofthis study.

2 anthony kaldellis

arship” in the Oxford Classical Dictionary reflect this division while theOxford Dictionary of Byzantium has no entries on scholarship. Studies ofthe “transmission” of ancient texts overwhelmingly favor the Hellenis-tic and modern periods, limiting discussion of the Byzantine period—which was as long as the other two put together and just as crucial ifnot more so for the formation of the classical “canon”—to just a fewpages.1 N.G. Wilson’s Scholars of Byzantium, the only study devoted to theissue, is useful and immensely learned but also condescending: virtuallyevery page contains derogatory comments and unnecessary adjectives.One can stand in awe of its erudition yet find it an unpleasant readdelivering an unfair verdict. Wilson takes the Byzantines’ groundbreak-ing contributions for granted and focuses on their failings. I will do theopposite.

In modern scholarship, Byzantium as a cultural system has rarelybeen studied on its own terms, free of comparison, that is, with itsneighbors and antecedents. I will concentrate here on the most influen-tial of these comparisons, the one with classical antiquity. Byzantine lit-erature, philosophy, and society have until recently been measured andbasically defined against the yardstick of their classical antecedents—and found wanting. Theology is the one exception among textual gen-res, though normally the modern scholar has to be a believer for thebalance to tilt in its favor. Byzantine art and architecture have estab-lished themselves on their own terms. But when it comes to intellectualhistory and literary culture, antiquity stands for reason, originality, and“literature” while Byzantium is associated with “rhetoric,” imitation,and superstition. Countless quotations can be given to this effect fromboth Byzantinists and non-specialists. There are historical and disci-plinary reasons why this culture has been so closely linked to anotherand defined in relation to it. Many Byzantinists were and often still aretrained in Classics before moving to “later” material. Byzantine history,including the state, society, and language, emerges gradually during thecourse of late antiquity, allowing for the transference of scholarly skillsfrom one culture to the other, a temptation that occludes many pit-falls. As their written languages were virtually identical, classical Athens

1 E.g., Sandys (1921) devotes 37 pages (out of 1700 in the three volume set) toByzantium (namely v. 1, 387–424); Groningen (1963) almost none. Reynolds and Wilson(1991) offer 26 pages (48–54, 58–78) out of 240, which is an improvement. Dickey (2007),a major new resource, appeared after this chapter was finished; only targeted citationsto it could be included.

classical scholarship in twelfth-century byzantium 3

and Byzantium are superficially easy to compare despite being sepa-rated by 1,500 years. In part, the Byzantines brought this on them-selves by admiring and preserving ancient literature and thought. Theydrew attention to the inferiority, belatedness, and derivativeness thatthey often felt in the presence of their classical models. In some respectstheir cultural practices were fundamentally defined in relation to antiq-uity.

As a result, Byzantium has been dealt with unfairly, especially whenit is approached by observers whose expertise and commitments lieelsewhere, and it was precisely such scholars who constructed the fieldin the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and who fashioned therepresentations of it that hold sway in the general culture. Classically-oriented scholars were predisposed, even trained, to view it unfavorablyin comparison to Greece. Moreover, Byzantium generally gained theattention of Medievalists in the context of its shameful defeats, bothmilitary and ideological, to the Crusaders. One such defeat was theinsistence of the medieval West that the Byzantines were not trueRomans as they claimed but merely degraded Greeks—Greeklings—to be conquered as the ancient Greeks were conquered by the ancientRomans. This suppression of the Roman identity of Byzantium infavor of a model of Greek “degeneration” (whether ethnic, cultural,or linguistic) fundamentally shaped the field and still holds sway.2

Finally, as a culture with a modern progeny, Byzantium was observedindirectly by European travelers to the Ottoman empire, who as ethno-graphers were prejudiced against Orthodox society in its oppressed anddegraded state. They naturally viewed Europe as the legitimate heir ofGreece, not Byzantium, which they blamed even for the effects of cen-turies of Turkish rule. Western travelers sought a genuine encounterwith classical Greece, and imagined it by suppressing all that they asso-ciated, rightly or wrongly, with the post-classical culture that had sosullied and degraded it.3 For these reasons, and others that have to dowith the discipline of philology, Byzantium has been unable to escapefrom the shadow of ancient Greece.

The damage done to our view of Byzantium may prove to be per-manent unless a serious concerted effort is mounted. Yet we need not

2 Cf. Kaldellis (2007) c. 2 for a rehabilitation of Byzantium as Romania; c. 6 for thepolemic with the medieval West.

3 The contribution of this group to the making of modern notions about Byzantiumhas been insufficiently appreciated. A good place to start is Augustinos (1994).

4 anthony kaldellis

engage in a form of scholarly cultural wars, taking on the values thathave created and sustained our basic perceptions of ourselves and oth-ers. At this preliminary stage, we are not dealing with irreconcilabledifferences in “values” but with politically motivated misrepresentationsand double-standards, lies, and ignorance. It will suffice for now to statesome basic facts and establish a sense of proportion.

My topic is classical scholarship. Here too Byzantium has been putdown, although in a special way. The problem is this: the Greek classicsdid not fall out of the sky into the waiting hands of modern Europeans.There was a long process of transmission and a thousand years of itpassed directly (and even exclusively) through Byzantium. The Byzan-tines are occasionally praised for preserving what otherwise might havebeen lost, but this praise is double-edged for it implies that they havedone us a service, not that they were doing anything for themselves,at least not anything that was significant to them (because conceptu-ally Byzantium and the classics are opposites). So they are thanked forserving as a conduit, for inexplicably and against their own values andtastes preserving Greek literature in order that Europe could one dayrevive the true spirit of antiquity, however that revival is imagined (asthe Renaissance; Enlightenment; science; or critical scholarship). In thisschema, then, Byzantium is only a vessel, one moreover that is imag-ined as so well insulated as to leave no permanent mark on its preciouscontents. “It is as if the classical scholar thinks of our cherished texts ashaving survived in cold storage for the thousand years between the endof antiquity and the beginning of the Renaissance”;4 or “as if culturalgoods existed in a sort of strong box, separated from the process bywhich one appropriates them.”5 The opposite is in fact true: the Byzan-tines not only established the canon of what we today regard as theclassics but they also set down some of the basic modes and orders ofclassical scholarship as we practice it today.

Many will be surprised by this statement. Yet when we look at theLoeb Classical Library (the green shelves), or the orange Teubners, orthe blue OCTs, what we are seeing is basically a Byzantine classicallibrary, that 10% of ancient Greek literature that the Byzantines choseto keep. For many of the authors in that library, including all thosewhom we regard as most important today, the choice was a meaningfulone, that is they were deemed worth preserving by most educated

4 Smith (1996) 395.5 Brague (2002) 150.


Byzantines. Others survive due to the decisions and efforts of smallergroups (reflecting an interest in a specialized field or the eccentricities ofpersonal taste), and a few due to chance. Also, there are more survivingancient authors than are found in the standard collections namedabove. All in all, the preservation of ancient texts was a massive culturaland economic enterprise, larger than is usually imagined. Moreover,this was a distinctly Byzantine cultural enterprise (there is a strikingdescription of its early phase in one of Themistios’ orations).6 Ourclassical library is a Byzantine classical library.

This is not the only way in which we should gaze upon this cor-pus, but it is one with which every Hellenist should be familiar, thoughtoday most are not. Ancient Greek texts are reconstructed entirelyfrom Byzantine manuscripts with the exception of a small numberfound on papyri, stone inscriptions, and gold tablets. Yet classiciststend to take the composition of this corpus for granted, as though (torepeat the metaphor) it fell from the sky and was not fundamentallyshaped by Byzantine choices. Astonishingly, there has been no con-certed effort to determine why the Greek corpus is what it is, an effortthat would require long-term and far-reaching collaboration betweenclassicists and Byzantinists. I know of only scattered, partial, and briefinquiries, usually by Byzantinists and a few paleographers.7 The mostdetailed studies focus on the incidence, the material mechanisms, andthe strictly circumscribed contexts of transmission and do not oftenpose the matter of Byzantine classical scholarship as a cultural prob-lem in its own right. Besides, we are too used to defining the Byzantineson the basis of what they said they believed rather than on what they did

(consider, by contrast, how differently we come to terms with ancientGreek culture). This too serves to limit the Byzantines to a separate

6 Themistios, Oration 4 To Constantius 59d–60c; cf. Lemerle (1971) 56–57.7 Cavallo (2002) 31–175 is excellent for late antiquity but does not reach far into

Byzantium; 206–233 briefly surveys the Byzantine period; also Treadgold (1984) for theperiod 600–900 and the Byzantine preference for later Greek literature; Dain (1954)for the period 850–950; Lemerle (1971) c. 8 for Arethas’ contribution, and 280–300for tenth-century encyclopedism; Easterling (2003) for Sophokles; Easterling (1995) andBlanchard (1997) for the comedian Menandros; Brunt (1980) 477–478 and Treadgold(2007) c. 1 for historians and tragedians; Browning (1964) 12 for Marcus Aurelius’Meditations; Cavallo (2002) 186–194 for Dioskorides; Wilson (1983a) 19–20 on the roleof the curriculum, and 41–42 for Epiktetos; Fowden (1986) 8–10 for the Hermetica; Jones(2001) 13 for the loss of ancient local antiquarianism. For transmission as a culturalproblem, see Brague (2002) c. 4, who largely omits Byzantium.

6 anthony kaldellis

sphere (defined theologically) and eliminate them as active participantsfrom a different process that has been claimed by others.

Among classicists, on the other hand, aloofness and utility tend toprevail: antiquity is surgically extracted from the mechanisms of Byzan-tine transmission and then treated as a self-standing corpus whose formand content require no explanation. Fragments are cut out from theauthors who quote them, and it is assumed that students of pre-Socraticphilosophy need not study Simplikios or know his name, and that stu-dents of Polybios need not know who Constantine VII Porphyrogen-netos was and what his circle did to the History. Moreover, few edi-tors of ancient texts recognize those Byzantines who prepared our bestmanuscripts as professional counterparts. Most postulate a direct rela-tionship between themselves and ancient authors that is illusory, if notmisleading. Not all “scribes” were mere “copyists” who mindlessly pre-served (and invariably corrupted) texts that were effectively meaninglessto them (see below), for some were diligent scholars.8 In the case of onemodern editor of Aristophanes, Victor Coulon, it has even been sug-gested that “one consequence of his procedure was concealment of thefact that some good emendations attributed by him to editors of themodern era were actually made by Byzantine scholars before 1350, andwhen the attributions have been corrected we get a much better idea ofByzantine scholarship.”9

2. The Concept of Classical Culture

Byzantium was not merely a conduit for classical literature that we candiscard given that we have received its contents. Its scribes, scholars,and even the complex ideology of its intellectual culture played acrucial role in the formation of the very notion of classical scholarshipand devised many of its basic tools that we take for granted today.

8 E.g., Lemerle (1971) 167–171 and c. 8; Markopoulos (1982); Hunger (1989) 65–69,132–133; Wilson (1983a) 193–194, 201–202; Reynolds and Wilson (1991) 60–61, 76–77;and Gaul (2007), for various figures of the middle and later period; Cavallo (2006) 71–73for ecclesiastical texts. The survival in greater numbers of later manuscripts tilts thebalance of interest toward the Palaiologan period, as do Demetrios Triklinios’ metricaldiscoveries. The basic studies of the manuscript traditions of ancient authors are listedby Friis-Jensen et al. (1997) 199–205, but I know of no sustained inquiry into Byzantinetextual-critical practices of the middle period.

9 Dover (1994) 77.


These tools were both practical and ideological. I will briefly discussthe latter first.

Modern classical scholarship studies ancient Greece at a huge his-torical remove. Most of us are not Greeks, we do not believe in thegods of the Greeks, and, despite our interest in or enthusiasm for Greekthings, we also feel the pull of modern systems of society, technology,and knowledge. The Byzantines were in fact the first culture to con-sume classical literature from such a detached albeit respectful perspec-tive. They did not see themselves as Greeks but as Romans and Chris-tians. They did not believe in the gods who figure so prominently inmuch Greek literature, as Julian had awkwardly pointed out; and theywere loyal to different social and political systems, which they did nottrace back to the ancient Greeks. Byzantine classical scholarship was,therefore, the study of an admired but foreign society. In the polarities of“inside” vs. “outside,” Greek vs. Christian, “ours” vs. “theirs,” Greecewas almost always the Other, and could destabilize Byzantine assump-tions if it were not kept carefully in check; this threatening aspect hasbeen a feature of modern classicism too.10

The taming, domestication, and transformation of ancient Greecefrom a living culture into a discipline of scholarship was a Byzan-tine achievement, and could in fact only have been accomplished byGreek-speaking Christians, “inside outsiders.” We take it for grantedthat Homer can be appreciated by those who do not believe in hisgods, but this assumption is itself a product of Byzantine technologiesof scholarship. It was not held by Julian, or the Neoplatonists, or, forthat matter, most ancient readers. For instance, one commonly findsmodern summaries of the plot of the Iliad that, like many Byzantineparaphrases of the poems, omit the role of the gods, despite the factthat Homer signals the crucial importance of Zeus in the first verses.11

As we will see, Byzantine summaries of the Trojan War also tended toomit the gods, because one could not regard as literature a text that wasreligious. But when did it become “literature?” And when did ancientart—largely statues of gods and temples—become “art”? To be sure,such approaches can be traced in antiquity. Julian was wrong thatThucydides was inspired by the Muses, and the aesthetic appreciationof religious art can be documented for most periods of antiquity.12 But

10 See Goldhill (2002) for some moments; Kaldellis (2007) for Byzantium.11 E.g., Alden (2000) 13.12 Bounia (2004).

8 anthony kaldellis

these were not the dominant modes of perception in antiquity and,more importantly, they never coalesced into a discipline with interpre-tive authority over the cultural productions of “the Greeks” defined asan ancient and foreign people. That was a Byzantine moment. We canobserve its emergence in the fourth century, for instance in Basil ofCaesarea’s Address to young men on how they might profit from Greek literature

(ca. 370), which became a standard discussion of the problem in Byzan-tium and early modern Europe. We also observe the transformation ofstatues and architecture into “art” in the edicts and practices of the firstChristian emperors, who legislated against its religious use and for itspreservation on aesthetic grounds, and who put it on display in theircapital.13

In short, the idea of classical scholarship (as “outside paideia”) waslargely created by the Byzantines. It would be nice to say that this factis obvious, but the reality is that it their role in this story has beenobscured. The Byzantines receive credit for preserving some things butnothing more, and prejudice has managed to drain even that of value.Consider Nigel Spivey on the assemblage of ancient statuary in Con-stantinople: “beyond whatever good intentions . . . they were, we mightsay, simply knocking around: components of an urban pastiche whichwas effectively meaningless.”14 Many statements to the same effect canbe adduced regarding the Byzantine attitude toward ancient litera-ture in particular (they are known and need not be rehearsed here).To support this preposterous conclusion Spivey notes that the Byzan-tines did not try to imitate ancient sculptural art. That they went toall the trouble to gather it from the provinces and transport it tothe capital; established special collections; wrote poems and antiquar-ian works about it; incorporated its architectural elements into theirchurches; and lamented its destruction by the Crusaders; is all, appar-ently, “meaningless” by comparison to the absence of imitation. Butthis is a dubious criterion, perhaps one designed to result in this preciseconclusion. And the Byzantines cannot win this fight, for even imita-tion can easily be turned around and presented negatively as sterility, ashappens in the case of their (often very successful) attempts to imitateancient literature.

13 For Julian, Basileios, and the contest over ancient literature, see Kaldellis (2007)c. 3; for statues and temples, see Bassett (2004).

14 Spivey (1996) 11.


What is going on here? The ideological imperative has again pre-vailed according to which Byzantium is—and must be upheld as—theantithesis of all that “we” stand for, e.g., classical antiquity, the Renais-sance, Enlightenment, science, scholarship, etc. They had no right toit and their labor of preservation has no claim on us; we may freelyplunder what they saved, because we cannot “effectively” steal fromone who has no conception of the worth of what is stolen. It was inthis way that the conquering West, more broadly, conceived its relationto the New World (to look in one direction) and the Orient (to lookin the other). To ameliorate the debt (or deny it), it has become almostmandatory in the case of Byzantium to cite palimpsests where a work ofancient literature was erased to make room for a monastic or liturgicaltext. The problem is not that this did not happen (though cases wherethe opposite happened are less frequently noted),15 but rather with theideological work that this evidence is supposed to do.

A critical evaluation of the polarity Classics-Byzantium is long over-due, for in addition to making “antiquity” possible in the first place theByzantines devised or perfected many of the practical tools of the disci-pline which “we” took—and still take for granted. In this chapter, I willsurvey, first, the basic tools of classical scholarship in Byzantium andthen highlight the specific forms that they took in the twelfth century.The rich and vibrant picture that emerges from this survey should layto rest the idea that the classics were “effectively meaningless” for theByzantines, that they “made no contribution to progress,” or that they“never comprehended the spirit of the pagan classics.”16 It will also, aspromised, provide a broader context against which the commentarieson Aristotle can be appreciated more fully.

3. Tools of the Trade

Basic things are most easily taken for granted. In the ninth century, thebook took on the form that it basically still bears today, namely boundhard-cover pages with margins around a text in minuscule script. Thecodex had finally replaced the roll during late antiquity, while theminuscule bookscript became established ca. 800ad. Gradually, sur-viving texts were recopied (“transliterated”)—at least, all that were

15 Cf. Hunger (1989) 20.16 Treadgold (1984) 95 citing P. Lemerle, I. Sevcenko, and C. Mango.

10 anthony kaldellis

deemed worthy of passing to this next phase of transmission. We knowsome of the scholars who were involved in this unprecedented project,for example Leo the Philosopher and Arethas of Caesarea in the ninthcentury. The physical aspects of the learned professions were hence-forth unlike those of antiquity, which relied on papyrus rolls inscribed incapital letters. Each ancient roll individually contained only a fractionof what a book could hold, and many were collected together in boxes,taking up much more space and being less easy of access and reference.Minuscule economized on both material and time.17 In this sense, thephysical appearance of the edition of classical texts has changed littlesince the ninth century, certainly in comparison with the changes thatwere introduced then. Printing has, of course, made crucial changes,among which are cheap mass production, standardization, and conven-tional numbering systems such as page and line numbers (although thepages of some manuscripts were numbered).18 But otherwise the basicformat remains the same.

Many of the non-Semitic vowel names (epsilon, omikron, omega,ypsilon) were of Byzantine origin and made possible only by the con-flation of sounds in the Byzantine pronunciation: e-psilon had to be dif-ferentiated from ai; o-mikron from o-mega; and y-psilon from oi. The iotasubscript and regular use of breathing marks and accents were alsofeatures of what specialists on Greek scripts name “the Byzantine sys-tem.”19 The Byzantines were aware of the Phoenician origin (via Kad-mos) of the alphabet, a point on which many ancient Greek, Jewish,and Christian writers had insisted. It is worth noting in this connec-tion a daring hypothesis that was made by the twelfth-century scholarJohn Tzetzes. In a chapter of his Histories (to be discussed below), Tzet-zes reviews many theories about the invention of the alphabet, chieflythose which ascribed it to Kadmos or Palamedes. He claims that theyare false. Seizing on Homer, Iliad 6.167–170, the verses on the “banefulsigns on a tablet” given to Bellerophontes, and calculating the date ofthat hero to before both Kadmos or Palamedes, Tzetzes arrived at thecorrect conclusion that the Greeks had a script before the Trojan War.It would be too much to expect him to know about Linear B, though

17 Basic surveys of these developments are Hunger (1961) and (1989); Lemerle (1971)109–122; Roberts and Skeat (1983); Wilson (1983a) 63–68; Ronconi (2003).

18 Hunger (1989) 25.19 E.g., Allen (1987) 20, 41, 69, 84, 125, 130, 173; Powell (1991) 10, 43–44, 123 n. 15.

See Mazzucchi (1979); Hunger (1989) 128–129.


some historians of the Greek Bronze Age take this passage of the Iliad,the only one in Homer in which writing is indicated, as reflecting amemory of the more ancient system. What is important is that Tzet-zes was eager and able to propound a new theory about an importantphilological matter—he called such theories his “Tzetzian inquires”—and that did so successfully on the basis of his detailed knowledge ofHomer.20

Next to the ancient texts on our scholar’s desk lay dictionaries.Glancing there, we plunge into the tangled jungle of Byzantine lexi-cography. Given the near total loss of Hellenistic and Roman-perioddictionaries, the partial state of publication of their Byzantine descen-dants, and the largely unexplored history of this tradition, it would beprudent to avoid discussing its development and focus instead on whatwas available in the twelfth century. The outline of some high impe-rial works of Attic lexicography have been reconstructed from the mid-dle Byzantine compilations, for instance Ailios Dionysios and Pausa-nias from the evidence of Eustathios of Thessalonike’s Commentaries onHomer (see below) and from some of the lexika.21 But the completion ofthis major labor, which is now in suspension, must await the publicationof the Byzantine dictionaries themselves, for which the outlook is bleak:such an effort would require teams of philologists, funding, and canprobably not be carried out in the US, given the structure of academiccareers.

The Lexikon of the patriarch Photios (ninth century) included some8,000 brief entries. A complete manuscript was discovered in Greecein 1959, but the whole has still not been published. The Lexikon ofZonaras was larger—19,000 entries—and proved to be more popular,supplanting its competitors. Over 100 manuscripts survive, which is inpart why we have no comprehensive edition. This massive work datesto the twelfth or the thirteenth century; its ascription to the twelfth-century historian and canonist John Zonaras still finds defenders. Theselexika were used for both reading and composition, as a comparison ofrare words in Anna Komnene’s Alexiad and the Lexikon of Zonaras hasdemonstrated; conversely, the latter cites usages from John Tzetzes andseems to have culled entries from his commentary on Aristophanes.

20 John Tzetzes, Histories 12.29–118 (pp. 469–472). For hints in the classical periodregarding a pre-Phoenician script, see Pfeiffer (1968) 21.

21 Erbse (1950). For Byzantine lexicography, the basic survey is Hunger (1978) v. 2,33–50.


This dictionary, then, has been described as “the product of a seriousand industrious effort to present a source of reference which combinesa wealth of entries with brevity and comprehensiveness of expression.”22

It was popular with scholars and put to good practical use.Another class of Byzantine dictionaries were the so-called Etymolo-

gika. There is no reason to go into their messy textual and editorialhistories.23 The only ones that have been published (both in the nine-teenth century) are the Etymologicum Gudianum of the ninth century andthe Etymologicum Magnum of the twelfth; we still await the full publi-cation of their ninth-century prototype, the Etymologicum Genuinum (i.e.,Magnum). The published Magnum is a massive volume, the size of theLSJ, but with a larger font. It has 2,306 columns of text on 14-inchpages, though about half of each page consists of modern commentary.Each section begins with an entry on the letter itself. Most entries are3–4 lines long, though sometimes longer. Focusing on etymology, theyalso offer basic and variant meanings, occasionally synonyms and cross-references to other entries, and quotations illustrating the word. Thereare also entries on rare names and places. We do not know who theeditors of the Etymologicum Magnum were, but their work was used byEustathios, a contemporary, for one.

These dictionaries are a major source of ancient poetic fragmentsand continue to yield new words and verses.24 But this “treasure-trove”approach minimizes their importance for the history of scholarship.It was based on these works, brought to the West in the fourteenth-fifteenth centuries by Byzantine scholars, that all modern lexika ofGreek are ultimately based, given that their ancient sources were longlost by that time. The genealogy of the LSJ, in other words, goes backthrough Henri Estienne’s (a.k.a. Henricus Stephanus, 1531–1598) greatThesaurus graecae linguae (1572) to the dictionaries that sat on the desksof the scholars who wrote the commentaries discussed in this volume,and were among the first Greek books to be printed (the Etymologicum

Magnum in Venice as early as 1499).25

22 Grigoriadis (1998) 183–208, quotation from 208. For the manuscript tradition, seeAlpers (1981) 22–35.

23 The key study is Reizenstein (1897), and is not likely to be superseded soon; for asummary, see Hunger (1978) v. 2, 45–47; see now Dickey (2007) 87–92, 99–103. For theconcept of etymology, see Robins (1993) 21, 47.

24 E.g., Tsantsanoglou (1984).25 Hunger (1989) 137.


Byzantine scholars had more specialized dictionaries and referenceworks as well, for instance of Attic or legal words. In the eleventhcentury, for example, Michael Psellos had drawn up a list of Athe-nian place-names (with commentary) from Strabo; an explanation ofAthenian legal terminology; and a list of Roman legal doctrines andRepublican leges by name. I note them because Psellos was revered bythe twelfth-century humanists.26 There were encyclopedias too. Theepitome of Stephen of Byzantion’s Ethnika (sixth century), originallyin fifty-five books, provided an exhaustive list of places, peoples, andethnonyms, along with grammatical instructions on how to use them.Better known is the Souda, a tenth-century encyclopedia with 30,000entries on prosopography, places, rare words, sayings, and other infor-mation that help one understand ancient texts (in all, then, an Oxford

Classical Dictionary of sorts). This too was very widely used in the twelfthcentury.27

Lexicography in motion requires grammar and leads to rhetoric.Scholars were well equipped with ancient and late antique treatisesand manuals, which they relied on heavily in their own studies, forteaching, and for writing more commentaries. Some of the scholia andprolegomena to Hermogenes in Walz’s Rhetores Graeci may date fromthe twelfth century.28 I consider here the works of two early twelfth-century scholars, both of whom become bishops, Niketas of Herakleiaand Gregory Pardos of Corinth. But before looking at these figureswe must outline the social background of scholarship in this period.Both men began their careers as professors of rhetoric, possibly affil-iated with the sequence of “chairs” established in Constantinople forteaching rhetoric and Scriptural exegesis, which has become known asthe “Patriarchal Academy.”29 Holding these posts they were as likely toproduce handbooks of classical rhetoric, for lecturing perhaps, as theywere to write scholia on the Church Fathers or compile commentarieson the Gospels. Like so many professors, orators, and scholars of the

26 Michael Psellos, On Athenian Place-Names; To his students, on trial terminology; On NewDoctrines and Definitions of Roman Legal Terms; see Rhoby (2001) for the first; for Psellos inthe twelfth century, see Kaldellis (2007) 225–228.

27 For the genesis and purpose of these works, see Lemerle (1971) 297–299; Hunger(1978) v. 2, 36–37, 40–41; Wilson (1983a) 145–147.

28 For grammatical and rhetorical theory in Byzantium, see Hunger (1978) v. 2,10–18 and v. 1, 75–91 respectively; Robins (1993) and Schneider (1999) for aspects ofgrammar, and Kustas (1973) for rhetoric; Conley (1986) focuses on teaching.

29 Browning (1962–1963) esp. 15–17, 19–20; further studies cited in Kaldellis (2005a)143–144.


Komnenian age (e.g., Eustathios), they were subsequently appointedbishops in provincial cities, where many felt they had basically beenexiled to uncultured backwaters. Still, there is reason to think that theymay have continued teaching there. Eustathios’ student in the capital,Michael Choniates, who was appointed to Athens, instructed a local,George Bardanes, who went on to become an important bishop ofKerkyra in the early thirteenth century. So we cannot draw a firm dis-tinction between secular and ecclesiastical careers, authors, or differentcareer “phases,” in this period. To be sure, some men were occupiedexclusively or mostly with secular studies and literature (e.g., John Tzet-zes, Theodore Prodromos) and others only with theological or liturgicalworks, but most of the men whom we may call classical scholars fellsomewhere in between.30

Niketas of Herakleia, for instance, wrote scholia on orations of Gre-gory of Nazianzos and a series of catenae on books of the Bible (thesewere excerpted quotations from different commentaries, arranged inthe order of the original text so that one could handily consult every-thing that had been written on, say, John 18.38). He was also involvedin the condemnation of Eustratios of Nicaea in 1117, another bishop-scholar and the author of commentaries on Aristotle (whom we willdiscuss below).31 Niketas wrote mnemonic-didactic poems on grammat-ical-lexicographical subjects, for the benefit of students mastering Atticcomposition. One is fascinating, being a list of the epithets used foreach of the twelve gods of Olympos, only set to the “tune” of vari-ous hymns of the Orthodox Church, for mnemonic reasons most likely.This is a strange mixture of the most pagan and the most Christian ele-ments of Byzantine civilization.32 A set of orthographical poems werealso modeled on liturgical kanons.33

Another of Niketas’ works is a synopsis of grammar and syntax in1,087 verses addressed “to a noble and decent young man,” but thisneed not refer to a particular student. Niketas claims that he wroteit in one night (v. 5). Most of the material is taken from DionysiosThrax’s Grammatical Art (of the second century bc), the standard workon grammar and syntax used throughout the Byzantine period. Niketas

30 In general, see Kaldellis (2007) c. 5.31 Niketas of Herakleia, Apologia; with Joannou (1954).32 Niketas of Herakleia, Verses on the Epithets of the Twelve Gods; cf. the ancient treatise

of Apollodoros on the gods’ names: Pfeiffer (1968) 261–262.33 See Antonopoulou (2003), citing the latest bibliography on Niketas.


refers students to Dionysios for further elaboration on certain topics(vv. 29–30) and lifts examples from him, such as citing “the son ofPeleus” as the aristos among heroes, Homer as the “wisest” amongpoets, and Zeus as the “greatest” among gods, all under the categoryof superlatives (vv. 41–43). There is no overt Christian editorializing incalling Zeus the greatest among the gods, even if only as an illustrationin a grammatical work, except perhaps in the subtle intrusion of theclause “according to Homer.” A few verses later he cites under activenouns the “Judge of the living and the dead, the Maker of all, andCreator and Demiurge, God, He Who was before the Ages” (vv. 50–51).We thus observe the classical (even the pagan) and the Christian sittingside-by-side, a recurring feature of the poem (cf. Saul and Dareios invv. 156–157) and typical of twelfth-century scholarship.34

Gregory Pardos wrote ecclesiastical works and liturgical commen-taries, but much of his scholarly activity focused on language, primarilyrhetorical composition. First, let us note a singular treatise that fell fromhis hand, On the Dialects (of Greek), the most important surviving exam-ple of its kind. By printing between 0 and 5 lines of this text per pageand filling the rest with his comments, the modern editor (in 1811) man-aged to extend this treatise to 624 pages! A new edition is desired. Gre-gory acknowledges as his main authorities Tryphon (late first centurybc) and John Philoponos (sixth century ad), then surveys the featuresof Attic, Doric, Ionian, and Aiolic. He cites authors for each dialect,whom he knew at first-hand (even Synesios of Cyrene is cited forDoric), and uses their scholia as well (except for Aiolic, which sectionis oddly truncated).35 The treatise was possibly used by Eustathios forthe Homeric Commentaries, showing again how interconnected scholarlyactivity was during this period.36 It also provided the basis for the mod-ern study of the dialects: a Latin paraphrase was appended by HenriEstienne to his Thesaurus graecae linguae, and Gregory even today pro-vides a springboard for the study of the Greek dialects.37

34 Niketas of Herakleia, Verses on Grammar; for the attribution and discussion, Tovar(1969).

35 For Gregory Pardos in general, see Kominis (1960) esp. 61–73 for On the Dialects;also Bolognesi (1953), a positive verdict; Hunger (1978) v. 2, 29–33; Wilson (1983a) 187–190 (typically negative); Dickey (2007) 82–83. It is preposterous to judge this work bythe critical standards of modern linguistics and peer-reviewed publication (though thisis frequently done for the purpose of putting down Byzantine scholarship).

36 Kominis (1960) 20 n. 2.37 E.g., Davies (2002).


Gregory’s main rhetorical commentary was on Hermogenes’ Περ�με �δ�υ δειν�τητ�ς (On Method of Forceful Style). The original treatise isnot considered an authentic work of Hermogenes, and Gregory wasof course following previous Byzantine scholars in compiling his com-mentary, but it is worth outlining the nature and goals of this work asit throws light on the practices of commentary-writing in this period.Hermogenes’ work is 43 pages long (in the Walz edition); Gregory’sis 262 (in the same edition). Hermogenes has 37 categories of forcefulstyle, to each of which he devotes roughly a page. Gregory has the same37 types, but each of his entries is longer by far. His entries are dividedinto smaller sections that correspond to specific words in the originaltreatise: these lemmata enabled Gregory to comment on the examples,historical episodes, and texts used by Hermogenes while expanding,elaborating on, and illustrating the main points. The commentary isthus philological, historical, and theoretical-rhetorical. Gregory addsexamples and case-studies of his own, many from Scripture, therebyagain mixing classical and Christian elements. This is a book for use byscholars, not beginners. The contemporary context of learned debateis again present: Gregory twice cites Tzetzes’ Epitome of Hermogenes’

Rhetoric. On the first occasion he comments derisively (but fairly) onTzetzes’ “garrulous little verses” (�λυαρ�στι��δια); the second mentionis on the distinction between a hetaira and a pornê. Gregory also quotessome of Tzetzes’ iambic verses on the establishment of public funeralsin Athens.38 (It has been suggested that these references are later inter-polations, as the chronology of Gregory’s life and the authenticity ofthe works ascribed to him are still not secure.)

Before we discuss Byzantine scholars’ critical engagement with theancient poets and philosophers, we should note one aspect of thisculture that can easily be overlooked because it does not loom as largein modern scholarship, namely imitation. The Byzantines had a farcloser and natural relation to the language of ancient Greek literaturethan we can ever hope to achieve and their scholars were trained toimitate it both in writing and in performance. In his History of Classical

Scholarship, 1300–1850, Pfeiffer says this about Henri Estienne: he “was

38 Gregory Pardos, Commentary on Hermogenes’ On Method of Forceful Style, esp.pp. 1098–1099, 1186, and 1157–1158 for Tzetzes. For this work, see Kominis (1960) 73–77. For the tradition of rhetorical commentaries in Byzantium, Conley (1986) esp. 344–345 on Gregory’s borrowing from Demetrios’ On Style and 365–366 for some of therhetorical-theoretical matters he treated.


imbued with the deepest love for the Greek language and becameincredibly familiar with its idiom. He really thought in Greek and couldspeak it; to him it was simply not a foreign language at all.”39 The prideof modernity in such scholars must be tempered by the realization thatByzantine intellectual life consisted entirely of such people, who tookthe qualities that are here ascribed to Estienne to a level that few orno Europeans have ever attained. This is not the place to discuss thetheory and practice of mimesis in Byzantium or counter the polemicaladjectives attached to it (e.g., “sterile,” “artificial”). What is importantis that we not forget the practical dimension of the study of ancientliterature in Byzantium: it provided models in the sense that they weresupposed to be imitated, not only appreciated and studied. Gregorydid not write commentaries on Hermogenes merely to make readingHermogenes easier but so that the dozens of orators at the court andtheatra of the capital could better put his prescriptions into effect (on anethical level, the same may be said of the commentaries on Aristotle’sEthics; see below). Byzantium under the Komnenoi was one of the greatages of Greek rhetoric, and this was a rhetoric rooted in scholarship.The principles of Hermogenic style have accordingly been detectedin Eustathios’ panegyrics, as consciously followed and cleverly adaptedguidelines.40 “Students were trained to master the classical language fortheir own use, not just to be able to read and appreciate the great worksof the past.”41 Their level of attainment and command of the languagefar surpassed our “Greek prose comp.”

In a separate brief treatise on style, Gregory Pardos recommendedfour speeches as models for imitation: Demosthenes’ On the Crown,Ailios Aristeides’ Panathenaïkos, Gregory of Nazianzos’ Funeral Oration for

Basil of Caesarea, and Michael Psellos’ Encomium for his Mother, striking,again, a typical balance between Greeks and Christians.42 He goeson to cite various ancient authors as exemplars of “flowery grace,”“sober grace,” “solemnity,” and so on. Many of these same aesthetic-stylistic categories are employed by Photios in his reviews of ancient

39 Pfeiffer (1976) 109.40 Stone (2001). For the apogee of rhetoric in this period, see Magdalino (1993) c. 5;

Kaldellis (2007) c. 5.41 Webb (1994) 84.42 Gregory Pardos, [On Composition] 31–33, 36, 38 (pp. 320–322); see Kominis (1960)

80–89, 127–129; Donnet (1967) 110–111; Wilson (1983a) 185–187; for the theoretical-grammatical aspect of this work, see Robins (1993) c. 9.


literature in his Bibliotheke.43 These categories remind us that in at leastthis one respect, that is, in having a feel for the style of the language,Byzantine readers had a definite advantage over us. Our appreciationof Greek is almost one-dimensional by comparison, based on readingrather than on hearing and on content rather than on composition.We can instantly and perhaps instinctively tell the difference in stylebetween, say, Francis Bacon, Edward Gibbon, and A.H.M. Jones, but itis unlikely that we could do the same with Demosthenes, Gregory, andPsellos, or with different orations of Libanios, if we were given a blindtest.

4. Scholia and Commentaries: An Introduction

Equipped, then, with their editions of the texts, lexika, etymologika, gram-matical and rhetorical manuals, encyclopedias such as the Souda, andprosopographical guides to the main ancient writers (typically ascribedto Hesychios of Miletos),44 Byzantines scholars were well prepared for ascholarly engagement with classical literature, chiefly with the ancientpoets and philosophers. (I draw a distinction between scholarly and cre-

ative engagement with the classics; the latter also calls for fundamentalrehabilitation, and is receiving it now on many sides.)

First, a word on “scholia,” a tool that lies somewhere between lexika

and interpretive commentaries. There were, of course, specialized lexi-

ka, keyed to individual authors or genres (e.g., for Plato or the Atticorators), but these were self-standing texts of their own. Most scholiain Byzantium were not. The history of their transmission was roughlyas follows. Though ancient papyrus rolls could have short commentson the verso, in the margins, in indented block sections, or interlin-eally, ancient commentaries were generally written on separate rollsand keyed to the text through lemmata. With the adoption of thecodex, scholia and longer commentaries were gradually copied intothe margins of new editions (or even interlineally) and could be writ-ten in a different “font” or color ink. Toward the end of the eleventhcentury, scribes found a way of breaking the original text into sectionsand adding the commentary in the bottom half of the page, which cre-

43 Cf. Wilson (1983a) 103–109; Efthymiades (2000) 34–39. The best place to start withthis vocabulary is rhetorical theory: Kustas (1973).

44 See Kaldellis (2006).


ated a format similar to our own. Sometimes the commentary took upthe bulk of the page, engulfing the few lines of primary text, and oftendifferent commentaries were amalgamated in the preparation of a newedition (resulting in brief catenae on a single page). This transfer to themargins was effected partly in late antiquity and partly after the ninthcentury (one of its casualties were the names of the authors of the now-excerpted ancient commentaries themselves).45

For the most part, then, Byzantine scholia contained carefully ex-cerpted ancient material, going in some cases as far back as the thirdcentury bc, though some scholia on individual words were copiedfrom their etymologika entries and some scholars added original com-ments of their own, especially after the twelfth century. It was notuntil the eighteenth century that modern philologists began to system-atically reassemble the scholia, most importantly of Homer, into sep-arate editions that we have today (though their state of publicationstill leaves much to be desired in some cases).46 This procedure hadByzantine precedent. To give one example, in the fourteenth centuryDemetrios Triklinios collected the scholia on Hesiod’s Works and Days,Aristophanes, and the tragedians.47 For the most part, however, whena Byzantine approached a well-prepared edition of a classical text, itsappearance must have made ours seem stripped naked by comparison.There was no apparatus criticus, but the commentary, being on thesame page, was more user-friendly in some respects.

Scholia clarified various aspects of the text, ranging from the gram-matical to the lexicographical and even the historical background oftopics mentioned in the primary text (which is why scholia are cited sofrequently in discussions of Greek religion). They were typically goodfor classroom use, or rather for the instructor’s preparation for theclassroom, but also facilitated individual study of the text.48 What isdistinctive, then, about the twelfth century, is the sudden and unprece-

45 Wilson (1967); (1983a) 33–36, 136–142; (1984); Irigoin (1984) esp. 99, with a galleryof illustrative plates; additional studies cited by Budelmann (2002) 143–144; Dickey(2007) 11–17. For a list of published scholia, see Friis-Jensen et al. (1997) 215–226; fora study of ancient literary theories in the scholia, Meijering (1987). Wilson (1983b) is anindispensible survey of the ancient scholia; for the scholia, old and new, in Byzantium,Smith (1996).

46 Smith (1996) 395–399.47 Budelmann (2002) 146.48 For late Byzantine grammatical scholia on Philostratos and their use, see Webb

(1997), an excellent study marred by one instance of prejudice on 16: “an educationsystem whose final aim was the active use of the classical language, rather than the


dented production of independent commentaries on so many ancientauthors, including Homer, Pindar, Hesiod, Aristophanes, Lykophron,Aristotle, and others, by scholars such as Eustratios of Nicaea, Michaelof Ephesus, John Tzetzes, Eustathios of Thessalonike, John Galenos,and others who remained anonymous. This movement represented anew direction in classical scholarship whose importance and originalityhas not been recognized. It was not, however, as coherent as it mightappear at first sight: the commentaries on Aristotle were part of a dif-ferent tradition than those which were now written on the poets, andaimed at different audiences. These differences can partly explain thevariety of their forms and methods.

Self-standing interpretive commentaries had been the rule since an-tiquity for philosophical, scientific, rhetorical, and theological works (aswe saw in the case of Gregory Pardos’ commentary on Hermogenes).A huge corpus of them had been produced in late antiquity and copiedin Byzantium. Scholia were not unknown for thinkers such as Platowho were also regarded as model authors and whose works could betaught to less philosophically advanced students, but they tended tocluster mostly around poets and orators. However, the revival of philo-sophical commentaries was not an innovation of the twelfth century.It was the original intention of Michael Psellos in the eleventh cen-tury to bring Greek philosophy back up from the depths in which hebelieved it had been buried. He studied Plato, Aristotle, and the Neo-platonists, and infused their thought into the lectures that he deliveredon every conceivable topic. Psellos’ authority among contemporariesand succeeding generations was immense, stemming from his awesomepolymathy, eloquence, and patronage (as Consul of the Philosophershe was in charge of higher education in the capital, though his dutiesand powers remain unclear). Psellos’ engagement with ancient thinkers,however, was more philosophical then scholarly: he was more interestedin promoting philosophical ways of thinking among his students thanin merely “commenting” on ancient thought. His lectures and treatisesconstitute a training in looking at every aspect of the world philosoph-ically. But he did write paraphrases and scholia on some of Aristotle’sworks.49

interpretation of classical texts,” i.e., Byzantine classicism was purely linguistic and hadno “meaning.”

49 For Psellos and philosophy, see Hunger (1978) v. 1, 20–22, 32–33 for a summary;


Psellos was the progenitor of much of the philosophical, humanistic,and literary interests of the twelfth century. There was nothing quitelike him in the Byzantine past and he was admired by the twelfth-century humanists. I do not wish to imply that the twelfth-century com-mentaries on Aristotle were part of some self-conscious Psellian pro-gram, only that Psellos’ attempt to restore Greek philosophy as a viablesystem of thought spurred later works and was perhaps a necessary pre-condition for them. Anna Komnene idolized Psellos for “attaining thepeak of all knowledge” and for “becoming famous for his wisdom.”Not only did she in some way sponsor the production of at least someof the philosophical commentaries of the twelfth century (see below),she herself wanted to be known for her exact knowledge of Plato andAristotle, boasting of it in the preface of the Alexiad.50 Moreover, one ofthe luminaries of her circle, Eustratios of Nicaea, was a student of JohnItalos, who was in turn Psellos’ famous and controversial student andsuccessor as Consul of the Philosophers. Eustratios was old enough tohave known Psellos as a student himself. In short, whatever they owedto the circumstances of the early twelfth century, the Aristotelian com-mentaries also constituted a revival and extension of a genre that waswell represented in the scholarly world since antiquity and had its rootsin the revolutionary project of a unique man who tried to resuscitateancient Greek thought in eleventh-century Byzantium. They were writ-ten by and for students of philosophy, and aimed to revive the methodand style of the philosophical commentaries of late antiquity.

By contrast, the commentaries on the poets were the products ofdifferent needs, circumstances, and ideological currents.51 Interest inthe Iliad, on the one hand, was deepened by the new Komnenianaristocracy’s need for heroic models that Scripture and the saints couldnot provide. The Alexiad was a prose Iliad for Anna’s father (therebymaking her a rare nexus of the philosophical and literary-Homericcurrents of the time). Theodoros Prodromos wrote panegyrical poemsfor emperors in heroic hexameter verse; in one he declared that Homerwould have to be resurrected from the dead and given ten mouths in

and Duffy (2002) and Kaldellis (2007) c. 4 for more interpretive approaches; for para-phrasis, Ierodiakonou (2002).

50 Anna Komnene, Alexiad 5.8.3 on Psellos; for her “circle,” see Browning (1962);Magdalino (1993) 332; and below.

51 For a fuller study of the context, albeit with different emphases, see Kaldellis(2007) c. 5.


order to praise the emperor John II Komnenos. Such praise was notlimited to the emperors and the aristocracy. Michael Choniates, thestudent of Eustathios and later bishop of Athens, was compared afterhis death by a nephew to the ancient heroes: “whole new Iliads” wouldnot suffice for him.52 Homer was in the air, fueling a shift in valuesamong rulers and writers. Quite possibly, this warrior-aristocracy knewmore about the “spirit” of Homer than do modern philologists in theirstudies. Their zest for war, sex, the hunt, and exquisite artwork wasalso reflected in a new form of quasi-vernacular heroic poetry thatcentered on the frontiersman Digenes Akrites and explicitly tried torival Homer’s fame.53 Nor was Homer less alive in the imagination ofthe sophists. In the hands of politically active scholar-bishops such asEustathios, Homer’s language became a skilful instrument, as praiseand blame sat on a razor’s edge of subtle irony.54 The accusation, then,that the classics were “effectively meaningless” in this society, a mereinstrument of grammar, is false.

On the other hand, the twelfth century witnessed a vast multipli-cation of the occasions that called for the composition of celebratoryorations. The number of orations and honorands swelled out of pro-portion to precedent in Byzantium. More works survive and more per-formers can be named for this period than for any other in the historyof Greek rhetoric (before the nineteenth century, that is). But the aris-tocracy was not so boorish as to patronize only its own praises. Thesophists indulged in original compositions, such as the romance nov-els, another genre that was revived toward mid-century, mostly in verse.References abound to the so-called theatra, a word that signified thevenues for the performance of new works, whether they were physi-cal assemblies or the collective opinion of the educated class.55 All this,required more teachers—who themselves became the objects of praiseby their students—and more textbooks and scholia. In fact, many ofthe commentaries on the poets that survive from this period had theirorigin and fulfilled their purpose in the classroom.

52 For Theodore Prodromos’ life and the imperial Poems, see Hörandner’s editionand introduction (here citing Poem 4.251–257; cf. 11.18–19); Choniates: Anonymous,Monodia for Michael Choniates 2 (p. 237). For the “Homeric” twelfth-century in general,see Basilikopoulou-Ioannidou (1971–1972); for Homer in Byzantium in general, seeBrowning (1975a); Pontani (2005) 137–340.

53 Lasithiotakes (2005).54 E.g., Sarris (1995–1997).55 Mullett (1984).


So both the aristocracy and the class of teachers and orators grewin size and became more self-conscious of their place in society. Thesophists depended on the princes for patronage (though exact proso-pographical ties cannot easily be worked out today), while the latterdepended on the former for the glorification and culture that onlyGreek paideia could offer. From this mutual, albeit uneven, dependency,sprung a new type of commentary, “Classics for Dummies.” Let usthen begin with these and work up to the more technical scholarlyproductions, before situating the Aristotelian commentaries against thisbroader background.

5. Classics Made Easy

Michael and Elizabeth Jeffreys have identified the sebastokratorissa

Eirene—the wife of the sebastokrator Andronikos, the second son of theemperor John II—as the patroness of a large number of contempo-rary poems. What these works have in common is that they are writ-ten in relatively easy Greek, have a simple structure and patronizingdidactic tone, and rehearse information that would have been famil-iar to any educated Byzantine (e.g., a list of the gods and heroes inHomer or, as in Constantine Manasses’ Historical Synopsis, a survey ofworld history). It is likely that the writers of these works were work-ing on commission and needed the money (they are sometimes frankabout that); on the other hand, Eirene was likely a foreign lady, possiblyNorman, married into the Byzantine imperial family. Her native lan-guage was not Greek and so works such as these would have helped herto catch up with her peers, though certainly not to the level of some-one like Anna Komnene. This reconstruction illuminates the nature ofsome of the surviving works by reference to the specific forms of patron-age that produced them. Eirene, after all, was not alone. Other foreignbrides also required primers, for example Bertha-Eirene, first wife ofthe emperor Manuel, commissioned an introduction to Homer fromTzetzes.56 And beyond this class of patrons, there were probably manyin twelfth-century Byzantium, both men and women, native and for-eign, who required elementary instruction and had the coin to procureit.

56 Jeffreys and Jeffreys (1994); for “struggling poets,” see Beaton (1987); Magdalino(1993) 340–343.


This explanation allows us to dispense altogether with the contemptthat has often been directed against these works. We can now see themin a new light, as classics-cribs for an audience of non-scholars. Thefirst author whom we can discuss here was a member of the Komnenosfamily, a born-in-the-purple prince named Isaac, a son of Alexios I.He wrote two brief introductions to Homer for general audiences,though for different personal motives, certainly, than did commissionedwriters like Tzetzes. As we saw with Anna, some of the princes wanted

to be praised by the sophists for their paideia, as Isaac was in fact byProdromos.57 The Preface to Homer, only 190 lines of text, summarizesthe poet’s life, the history of the Trojan War—though carefully excisingthe gods from the narrative of the Iliad—and the fates of Agamemnonand Odysseus. The second text (30 pages long) consists of two parts:first, a narrative summary of The Events Homer Left Out, mostly thefall of Troy to Herakles and then the later one to the Greeks; and,second, The Physical Properties and Moral Qualities of the Greeks and Trojans,a prosopography of names followed mostly by adjectives—Patroklos,it seems, was fat and had a thick beard. The prose is uncomplicatedand Isaac calls his own style “simple and lucid.” It has recently beenargued that these brief treatises originally accompanied Isaac’s editionand commentary on the Iliad, the first of its kind by a Byzantine scholar,which survives in a single manuscript and is not yet fully published.58

In compiling his summaries, Isaac followed ancient sources, espe-cially Diktys of Crete, whom he cites at the end apparently acceptingthe fiction that he was a follower of Idomeneus (the story of the TrojanWar ascribed to this man posed as a translation for the emperor Neroof some “Phoenician” tablets found by some shepherds in the ruinsof Knossos, the only reference to Linear B tablets found in antiquity).Isaac claims to have consulted other authorities too. He calls Homer“wise” and does not editorialize from a Christian standpoint when talk-ing about the gods.

The last question requires further attention, and will recur in thissurvey. The gods were one of the main stumbling blocks in acceptingGreek literature in Byzantium, and the matter had certainly not beencleared up in any decisive way by Isaac’s time. In fact, his own father

57 Theodore Prodromos, Oration for Isaac Komnenos; for Isaac in general, see Kind-strand’s introduction to the Preface; also Hunger (1978) v. 2, 58.

58 Pontani (2007).


Alexios I Komnenos had enforced hard-line Christian strictures againstGreek philosophy, taking down Psellos’ student John Italos in a riggedshow-trial and adding the famous condemnations of autonomous phi-losophy to the Synodikon of Orthodoxy. Alexios may have been promptedmore by cynical policy than conviction, but the chilling effect was thesame. According to the eulogist of his daughter, Alexios had prohibitedhis own children from having too much to do with Hellenic studies,especially poetry. Tornikios says that Alexios and his wife Eirene

believed that grammar, based as it is on poetry, is characterized bypolytheism, or rather atheism; by the qualities of myths, which tell of thelove-affairs of infatuated gods; the rape of maidens; and the abductionsof boys; and contain other such splendid things that are indecent in bothword and speech. All this they deemed dangerous enough for men, butfor women and maidens they rightly deemed it utterly pernicious.59

The imperial couple obviously failed to instill this dread in their chil-dren, who included two among the leading scholars of the first halfof the twelfth century. Isaac wrote prefaces and summaries of Homerwhile Anna learned all about the myths too (secretly, according toTornikios), though armored by her faith. Was it subtle revenge on herpart to compare her parents throughout the Alexiad to Greek gods andheroes? Certainly, she revered her parents’ memory. In the Preface toher Diataxis, she claims that they did not hinder her from learning, butthis statement is oddly defensive, and Anna is an untrustworthy witnesswhen it comes to her family.60

As for Isaac, he may also be the author of some short summaries ofthe Neoplatonist Proklos, the philosopher who had inspired Psellos andled Italos on the path to condemnation. Even after the stern warningsin the Synodikon, a son of the imperial family was dealing in Proklos.It should be noted that the author of these summaries carefully omitsmuch that was offensive to Christians and somewhat distorts Proklos’thought to make it more acceptable. Still, the desire to Christianizesuch a pagan thinker ran counter to the later effort of Nicholas, thebishop of Methone, who, in the spirit of Alexios and the Synodikon,wrote a long refutation of Proklos from an explicitly Christian pointof view. There was a debate going on behind the scenes of our texts on

59 George Tornikios, Funeral Oration for Anna Komnene (pp. 243–245). See also Jeffreys(1984) 205 for the monk Iakobos; for the period in general, Reinsch (2000) 87; for thetrial of Italos, Clucas (1981); for repression, see Browning (1975b); Magdalino (1991).

60 Anna Komnene, Preface to the Diataxis 16 (p. 99); for the authorship, see Buckler(1929) 9–10.


this matter that we cannot see. In any case, the evidence for the study ofProklos and the brazen promotion of Platonic philosophy in the spiritof Psellos is scant for the later twelfth century, when scholarly attentionturned to the poets and orators.61

The most prolific popularizing classicist in this period was undoubt-edly John Tzetzes, whose output was so vast and its publication in mod-ern times still so disordered that we can only discuss a small part of ithere. Consider, for example, three short poems: the Events before Homer

(406 vv.); the Events in Homer (490 vv.); and the Events after Homer (780vv.). These summarize the events of the Trojan War, framing the Iliad.They are written in hexameters, which vary from Homeric to modernGreek in vocabulary and style. But Tzetzes’ aim here was not to imitateHomeric morphology, vocabulary, and meter with scholarly precision(which he probably could do). It was, rather, to provide an introductionto the world of the Iliad in verses that could be read by a beginner.Tzetzes tells events from his own point of view and in his own chattypoetic voice, and even adds material to the Homeric section that is notin the Iliad. In the Events after Homer, he often cites Koïntos, i.e., Quin-tus of Smyrna (ca. third century ad), whose fourteen books of versePosthomerica survive. His physical descriptions of the heroes are adaptedfrom those in Isaac Porphyrogennetos’ short treatise or, more probably,from a common source.

Curiously, Tzetzes wages in these poems a personal polemic againstan Isaac, who appears to have been the governor of the city of Berroiaand had employed Tzetzes, probably as a secretary. In various places inthe poems, the poet alludes to a scandalous episode involving himselfand the governor’s wife, as a result of which Isaac had ordered Tzetzesto leave the city on foot. These bitter digressions, dubiously linkedto the Trojan War, illustrate Tzetzes’ inability to keep his troublesand comically annoying personality out of his scholarship. It is notknown who this Isaac was; it is too premature to identify him withthe Porphyrogennetos scholar. An Isaac Komnenos is the addressee ofTzetzes’ unfriendly Letter 6, though it is not clear that this was actuallysent (see below); the recipient of the letter (in which Tzetzes mentionsDiktys of Crete among other ancient figures) was variously identified

61 Cf. Nicholas of Methone, Refutation of Proclus’ Elements of Theology (and Ange-lou’s discussion in the introduction of philosophy in the twelfth century) with Isaac,On the Hypostasis of Evil (for Christian editing, see Rizzo’s introduction, iii–xxiv; forauthorship, Kindstrand’s introduction to Isaac’s Preface to Homer, 18–20).


with the Porphyrogennetos, the governor of Berroia, or both, but arecent study dissociates them all.62

Tzetzes does not suppress the gods in his summaries, but he does notmake them the central characters that they are in the Iliad either. Inone place he alludes to his favored allegorical-Euhemeristic interpreta-tions, here regarding Zeus.63 He does not, on the other hand, intrudeChristian material. Tzetzes idolized Homer, believing him to have beenperfect in all ways, yet he sang the poet’s praises to a Christian society.This meant that he had to make some sense of the gods, who couldnot be presented at face value. In other poems, he categorically deniesthat Homer actually believed in the “demons,” arguing that the godsin poetry are in fact a concession to the entertainment young readersrequire; or he Euhemerizes them; or he allegorizes them, as natural ele-ments, physic properties, stars, or whatever.64 Tzetzes promoted theseapproaches in exegetical poems addressed to Komnenian patrons, forinstance in his Allegories on the Iliad and Allegories on the Odyssey, writ-ten for Manuel I’s foreign wife Bertha-Eirene. The latter work, forinstance, is a book-by-book explanation of the gods and monsters in thepoem, with between 100 and 200 verses devoted to each book (the Iliad

commentaries are typically longer, with between 200 and 400 verses).65

Tzetzes postures here as an expert interpreter of Homer’s wisdom, butallegory was for him not part of a consistent philosophical approach.When he had to—perhaps, in this case, when he was specifically askedto do so—he faced the problem of the gods head-on with much alle-gory and little apology, but on other occasions he tended to avoid thetopic. This is not surprising, given the condemnation that they elicitedin some quarters. Still, the court of Manuel was unlike that of Alex-ios.

Moreover, Bertha wanted or needed to know who all these heroes,gods, and goddesses were who were constantly being mentioned in all

62 John Tzetzes, Events in Homer 142ff.; Events after Homer 284–290, 620–624, 701, 753–758; Letter 6. Various opinions have been expressed regarding the identity of these men:Wendel (1948) 1961 (still the only survey of Tzetzes’ life) identifies the governor withAlexios’ son; Magdalino (1993) 348–350 implies that identification, but is more cautious;Barzos (1984) v. 1, 286 n. 56 and Grünbart (1996) identify the addressee of the letter withthe son of Constantine Komnenos (the son of Alexios’ brother Isaac).

63 John Tzetzes, Events before Homer 102–106.64 Cesaretti (1991) pt. 2 is the most extensive treatment; more briefly: Hunger (1954)

46–52; Wilson (1983a) 193; Kazhdan and Epstein (1985) 134–135; Budelmann (2002)156–157; Roilos (2005) 124–127; Kaldellis (2007) 301–307.

65 See also John Tzetzes, Allegories from the Verse-Chronicle.


the orations that she had to endure for so many long hours. Havinga riposte handy for the sophists when they made an allusion would nodoubt improve her standing in their eyes; an allegorical comment mighteven earn her praise for wisdom. An anecdote in Psellos’ Chronographia

(6.61) illustrates the scholarly demands that were sometimes placed onimperial women. “A subtle flatterer,” whom Psellos does not name,whispered the following half-verse from Homer to Constantine IXMonomachos’ concubine Maria Skleraina as she passed by: “Surelythere is no blame. . .” She then had to ask him to complete the tag: “ . . .on Trojans and strong-greaved Achaians if for long time they sufferhardship for a woman like this one” (Iliad 3.156–157; tr. R. Lattimore).Note that Psellos does not quote the end of the verse in his account,assuming that we, his readers, will recognize it, as Skleraina apparentlycould not.66

There is no reason to list all the poems and short commentarieswritten in the twelfth-century for the benefit of lay patrons. One lastwork of Tzetzes must, however, be mentioned, because it has not yetbeen studied in detail and is odd enough to warrant comment. Thisis in fact his longest and most cited work, the so-called Histories orChiliades (Thousands, i.e., of verses). It consists of over 12,000 fifteen-syllable (“political”) verses divided into 660 sections, each coveringsome item from ancient history and literature, including people, events,texts, sayings, facts and words of many kinds, so a chrestomathia ofsorts (assemblage of useful knowledge). The Histories remains to thisday a major source for fragments of lost authors and otherwise lostantiquarian knowledge (but mythology is mostly absent, conforming toTzetzes’ habit of either confronting it head-on or largely leaving it out).The style is easy, fluid, and bouncy, and Tzetzes intrudes himself andhis name often, posing, arguing, showing off, and pouting. He knewhow to write in a lively way. I suppose one could read through theHistories as they are and learn (or review) much about ancient history.But that is not how this huge text was meant to be used. The Histories

is in fact a running commentary on Tzetzes’ own 107 Letters, whichare crammed with classical allusions and require all this antiquarianlore to be understood.67 The Letters are written in a more elevated

66 For the training and duties of imperial princesses, see Connor (2004) c. 10.67 The commentary on the Letters proper begins at Histories 4.780; the entries before

that are a running commentary on the “letter” to a grammarian that is included inHistories 4.471–779. In general, see Wendel (1948) 1992–2000.


Attic style, which suggests an interesting textual relationship. Tzetzesused his own letters, which are brief but dense, to teach Attic prose;he then supplemented linguistic instruction with the content of themore colloquial Histories, which supplied background in an easy formatto students struggling with the Attic style of the letters. These works,then, are more “textbooks” than “sources,” and provide a pedagogy ingrammar, composition, and classical knowledge. (Tzetzes outdid himselfhere, adding additional scholia to both the Letters and the Histories!)Based on this relationship, we may speculate that the Letters, or someof them at least, were not real; they may have been epistolary exercisesposing as letters but in reality designed to include as many launching-points for classical instruction as could be crammed into them (this mayexplain the lists of ancient figures that they sometimes include). Notthat they altogether lack contemporary information—they are, afterall, posing as real letters—but perhaps some were not delivered, e.g.,the angry Letter 6 to the sebastos Isaac. There are indications, however,that the collection did circulate in Tzetzes’ time. This is a problem thathistorians may have to examine in detail.

6. Scholarly Commentaries on the Poets

It is time to turn to professional scholarship, that which was meant foruse by teachers at the higher levels of instruction and by those whowished to deepen their understanding of ancient poetry and thought.Admittedly, it is not always possible to draw a fine line between thisgroup of commentaries and the one that we discussed above, but inmost cases a distinction can be made between texts addressed to laypatrons who wanted summaries and texts meant to be used by pro-fessional classicists. Eirene sebastokratorissa and Bertha-Eirene were notlikely to peruse a commentary on Lykophron’s Alexandra or on Aristo-tle’s Nicomachean Ethics.

The twelfth century witnessed the writing of original commentarieson the poets by known Byzantine scholars; in some cases, these wereself-standing texts. This innovation in scholarly practice has not beenrecognized. A list of the most well-known works should give an im-pression of the extent of this labor. Tzetzes wrote his idiosyncraticcommentaries and scholia on the Iliad, Hesiod, tragedy, Aristophanes,Lykophron’s Alexandra, Oppian’s Halieutika, on two poems of Nikander,and others (for example, the scholia on his own letters). Eustathios


wrote massive commentaries on the Iliad and Odyssey, Pindar, andDionysios Periegetes. A deacon named John Galenos, who has not beenfirmly dated, wrote a commentary on Hesiod’s Theogony. Then we alsohave the commentaries on Aristotle by Michael of Ephesus, Eustratiosof Nicaea, Stephanos (possibly Stephanos Skylitzes), and Anonymous.68

The study of their works is still in its infancy, so we can ask onlypreliminary questions here, some of which have been laid out in FelixBudelmann’s useful study of Tzetzes’ scholia on the Iliad.69 What is therelation between the text and the commentary, and how personal is thecommentator’s voice? Is the commentary a single text, i.e., can it beread by itself ? How was it or how could it have been used?

The original scholarship of the twelfth century does not follow anyone rule in regard to these issues. It includes marginal scholia andcommentaries; self-standing commentaries keyed to the original textthrough lemmata (such as the commentaries on Aristotle); and sep-arate works, such as Eustathios’ Homeric Commentaries. The propor-tion of comment to text also varies. For example, the Hellenistic poetLykophron’s Alexandra has 1,474 verses and would, if printed withoutapparatus, take up 40 pages, while the scholia that Tzetzes compiled(citing over 50 authorities) take up almost 400 pages in the modern edi-tion.70 Tzetzes, moreover, prefaced his scholia with a discussion of thedifferent kinds of poetry, listing the famous ancient poets and the con-texts of their works; he then comments on the life of Lykophron, hisworks, and his Alexandrian context; and gives the background to theplot of the Alexandra. The scholia then go through the text verse-by-verse, giving vast amounts of grammatical, lexicographical, dialectical,rhetorical, mythological, and historical information, in addition to lit-erary parallels and illustrations. Some are small treatises in their ownright, e.g., on Pegasos and Bellerophontes in v. 17. What we need is anexplanation for why all this information is here, an explanation thatattempts to work through the pedagogical and scholarly uses of thesecommentaries, which are not well understood. Grammatical scholiamake sense for the classroom, but all this?71 Granted, Lykophron had

68 In general, see Hunger (1978) v. 1, 34–35, and v. 2, 58–67; Wilson (1983a) c. 9.69 Budelmann (2002); see also Smith (1996).70 The manuscripts attribute the work to John’ brother Isaac, but Tzetzes claims it as

his own in Letter 21, explaining that he had only dedicated it to his brother; see Hunger(1978) v. 2, 62–63; in general, Wendel (1948) 1978–1982.

71 Cf. Webb (1997) for teaching grammar from scholia; Budelmann (2002) 158–161for Tzetzes on the Iliad.


composed a deliberately antiquarian poem that begged for commen-tary, as the Tzetzian poem at the end of the scholia admits; it baitedscholars to show off their knowledge. In his scholion on Aristophanes,Frogs 897, Tzetzes tells a story which implies that text and scholia wereread aloud by him to an audience of either students or colleagues, some(or all) of whom had their own copies of the text, and that correc-tions were made. We need a closer analysis of his account and a betterunderstanding of how all this unsynthesized and unfocused knowledgewas used in practice, given that it often goes beyond what is neededto simply understand the text.72 (We will return to this question below,when we look at Eustathios’ Homeric Commentaries.)

Questions of scholarly form, moreover, or “format,” are as impor-tant as those of content. What we observe emerging in this period areuseful scholarly “editions” of the poets that anticipate ours in having ascholarly introduction that discusses the varieties of ancient poetry, thelife of the poet, and the style of his work; followed by the text with mas-sive scholia compiled by a “modern” scholar such as Tzetzes who hada distinctive personal voice (today we would put the commentary at theback).73 I gather that nothing like this had existed in antiquity. Even ifmuch of the “content” on which these Byzantine editions was basedwas culled from ancient sources, the synthesis was original, as was thedecision to place all this material together and its precise arrangement.So, for example, we have, besides the preface to Lykophron, Tzetzes’prolegomena to Hesiod’s Works and Days, which begin with an attack onProklos’ exegesis, then list the kinds of poetry, and end with a brief lifeof the poet (focusing on the relation between him and Homer), all inTzetzes’ typical style and voice; also, Eustathios’ prologue to the Com-

mentary on Pindar, focusing on topics of literary appreciation, especiallyPindar’s notorious obscurity (asapheia), and concluding with a summaryof what is known about his life; and the preface to Eustathios’ Commen-

tary on the Iliad, which defends the study of the poem against Chris-tian objections (ironically, I believe, as Eustathios considered Homer tobe sublime and the objections are rendered irrelevant anyway by themass of commentary that follows them); he outlines all the benefits con-

72 John Tzetztes, Scholion on Aristophanes’ Frogs 897 (pp. 951–955). The story is dis-cussed by Wilson (1975) 6 and (1983a) 192–193, but its dynamics elude me, and I thinkthat Wilson has also not entirely understood what happened. For scholarly gatheringsin the twelfth century, see also Cavallo (2006) 75–76.

73 Budelmann (2002) 145 for such an edition of Hesiod.


ferred by Homer; explains his own methods; and ends by summarizingHomer’s life and works.74

These works will hopefully soon be studied in their own right. Usu-ally they are mined for fragments of ancient authors and for infor-mation from or about antiquity, and what remains is then discardedas Byzantine. But it should be apparent that no rigid separation canbe enforced between Byzantium and antiquity in these works. For onething, we have to acknowledge the variety of methods followed by theByzantine scholars, in other words, their scholarly decisions that gaveform to everything that they “preserved.” Tzetzes, for his part, madeevery effort to instill his voice and persona in his commentaries. It hasbeen suggested that he did so to escape the oblivion of anonymity andto prevent plagiarism. The history of the scholia, as he knew, had oblit-erated their authors’ names, and he was determined not to let thishappen to him; moreover, he had experience of students taking notesduring his lectures and then publishing them without permission. Thatis one reason why he keeps sticking his name into his writings, a the-sis that improves upon the superficial accusations of vanity and conceitthat have prevailed so far.75 These scholars were people, not anonymous“vessels” for the preservation of ancient “content.”

So the commentaries differed in voice, scope, approach, and pagelayout. Whereas Tzetzes’ were attached to the original text, Eustathios’commentaries on Homer and Dionysios were self-standing continuousprose texts. In fact, he even suggested that one could read his Iliad

commentary straight through.76 In contrast to Tzetzes, however, it ismore difficult to identify Eustathian elements in Eustathios. But thereare some common themes that run through their works, chief amongthem the imperative to protect the poets from Christian odium. Wehave seen Tzetzes’ passionate defense of Homer against the charge ofbelieving literally in the pagan gods. Eustathios marshals the same alle-gorical techniques to defend him, indeed these were a major aspect ofhis approach and he devotes a section of his preface to the Commen-

tary on the Iliad to the problem of reading the myths against the more

74 For the texts, see the bibliography. For Tzetzes’ Hesiod, see Colonna (1953); forEustathios’ Pindar, Kambylis (1991); Negri (2000); Hamilton (2003) 132, 176–177; for hisHomer, Dickey (2007) 23–24.

75 Budelmann (2002) 150–152.76 Eustathios of Thessalonike, Com. ad Hom. Il., preface 2.40–42 (v. 1, 3).


“historical” aspects of the poem.77 On the other hand, he ironically dis-missed the idea that Christians should abstain from the pagan wisdomof the ancient poets.78 In the biographical section of his Prologue to the

Commentary on Pindar, he reports on Pindar’s (pagan) piety as though itwere a virtue; Eustathios and his student Michael Choniates were will-ing to view pagan piety as praiseworthy and undeserving of Christiancondemnation.79 This was genuine humanism.

One more scholar should be mentioned in this connection, a deaconnamed John Galenos, who wrote an allegorical commentary on Hes-iod’s Theogony that runs to 70 pages. It is addressed to young studentsof Hesiod rather than to the non-academic laity, and its chief concernis to protect their piety from the pagan nonsense of the Greeks. Inhis preface, he praises Plotinos and Sokrates, despite the fact that theywere pagans ( �ρα εν), for encouraging their listeners to look beyondthe literal sense of things and on to higher realities, and that is whathe does in his commentary, namely to uncover what he calls the “hid-den truths” of the Theogony. In fact, he adds, the poem should not havebeen called that in the first place, but rather the Physiogonia. The pref-ace is only a page long; the commentary is keyed by lemmata, thoughthere are occasionally large gaps between the verses discussed. This isa problem of the lemma format, but can partly be explained in thiscase by the fact that Galenos was not writing a thorough study of thepoem, but was interested only in ameliorating one aspect of it from aChristian point of view. His Christianization of the Theogony is bold, insome cases turning the gods into Christian figures and concepts, forexample Zeus is God, the Titans evil, Herakles Jesus. Anything will dohere (Pythagorean number theory, physics, astronomy, psychology) if itsaves appearances. He even praises Hesiod for being grateful to theMuses, despite their being goddesses; the virtue of piety again overridesits pagan context. Galenos’ intention, as he puts it, is to “transubstanti-ate” myth “into a more divine form,” to beautify “the ugliness of Greekmyths” by making it look more like “our Truth.” He concludes with aninvocation of “Christ the King.”80

77 Eustathios of Thessalonike, Com. ad Hom. Il., preface 3.10ff. (v. 1, 4); see Cesaretti(1991) pt. 3 for an extensive discussion.

78 Cf. Kaldellis (2007) 314 on Eustathios and Basil of Caesarea.79 Eustathios of Thessalonike, Prologue to the Commentary on Pindar 27.80 John Galenos, Allegories on Hesiod’s Theogony pp. 295–296, 336, 365; see Roilos

(2005) 128–130.


I conclude this section by looking more closely at the most impres-sive scholarly labor of this period, Eustathios’ Homeric commentaries,but these are so vast and have received so little attention in their ownright that I must restrict the discussion to a few general comments ontheir nature and purpose, especially to define their place in the com-plex world of twelfth-century scholarship. They have been criticizedfor being enormous, confusing, unwieldy, and unenjoyable for the stu-dent.81 The Iliad has 15,600 verses; Eustathios’ Commentary on the Iliad(of which an autograph copy survives) has 3,575 pages in the modernedition: this works out to an average of four and a half verses per page,though some verses receive longer treatment (Iliad 1.1 receives elevenpages) while others are clustered together for collective comment. Afterwriting the first draft, Eustathios added further scholia in the marginsand then “on little slips of paper pasted into his copy.”82 But before wegroan at the weight of them, let us not forget that the Iliad is in fact along poem, one of the longest. Four verses discussed per page is reallyrather dense. Eustathios could have written an even longer commen-tary.

In his comments Eustathios tries to cover, well, everything: etymol-ogy, grammar, syntax, meter, dialect, rhetorical theory (largely basedon Hermogenic categories), and mythology, the allegorization of whichwas a chief concern; also the poet’s meanings; the ethical and liter-ary aspects of the plot and characters; the cultural and historical back-ground of words, phrases, and actions; as well as contemporary Byzan-tine sayings and customs that illustrate the ancient text, all the whileciting ancient authorities at first or second hand.83 What purpose couldsuch a work have served? Eustathios provides some hints in the preface,but this must be read carefully.

Eustathios claims that he was not instigated to write the Commentary

by powerful men but rather by friends (πρ�ς ��λων �μιλιτ�ν), which areambiguous words (note that his commentary on Dionysios Periegeteswas dedicated to a certain John Doukas). He then modestly (and, Ibelieve, ironically) states that the work will benefit not the learned, whowill not be unaware of anything in it (!) but rather young men who arestudying as well as those who have studied but need to be reminded

81 E.g., by Browning (1964) 16; Reynolds and Wilson (1991) 70–71.82 Wilson (1984) 110; in general, Hunger (1978) v. 2, 64–66.83 For a sample of Eustathios’ literary reading of Iliad, book I, see Lindberg (1985);

for the contemporary folkloric aspect, see Koukoules (1950).


of certain things—thereby negating his first claim that the learned willnot need it! He goes on to say that he has included only necessaryand not superfluous things, which perhaps we can take at face value,at least at first. Eustathios then lists the categories of analysis for eachverse and explains who will benefit from them, adding that he has alsoincluded “ten thousand more things that are useful for life, and notbriefly either, but rather in a rich variety”—so again undercutting hisinitial disclaimer. When he proceeds to talk about how young studentsshould use the book, we need not believe that they were the onlyreaders he had in mind. There is often irony in Eustathios’ style, inthis as well as in his other works.84 The Commentary can be used in twoways, he says: one can read through it as a work in itself or read it toelucidate specific passages of the Iliad.85

In the preface, then, Eustathios says much about his methods andintents, but he does not always say exactly what he thinks or all of whathe means. We are left with conflicting impressions about the work’sintended audience and use: Is it for those who are now studying orwho have already studied? Is it to be read straight through or con-sulted selectively for individual verses? Eustathios seems to be keepinghis options open, presenting the Commentary safely as a work for teach-ing but implying that it has many more uses as well. After all, on thefirst page of the preface he makes it clear (at length) that Homer hassomething good to offer all people, whether they are thinkers or writ-ers or more active in life. He casts his net widely. This, along withthe nature of the book itself, suggests to me that we should not see itexclusively or primarily as a teaching textbook. Though its compilationmust have been linked to or grown out of Eustathios’ lectures in Con-stantinople, the finished product was probably not read out to studentsjust as it is (far less “assigned,” given the cost) no more than our ownmulti-volume commentaries on the Iliad are meant to be read aloudto students. Sections of it may have been recited just as they are, butthe Commentaries overall were more of a repertoire of material for teach-ers to consult before class on any passage of the text or even to haveat hand for reference and student questions. But Eustathios may havehad something even more ambitious in mind, something that extendedbeyond the classroom.

84 Cf. Sarris (1995–1997).85 Eustathios of Thessalonike, Com. ad Hom. Il., preface 2.17–46 (v. 1, 3).


What we are dealing with here is more a labor of encyclopedismthan of pedagogy, though it certainly had pedagogical uses. This isnothing less than an Encyclopedia Homerica in commentary form for allfuture generations to use, as each has, in its own way. The problemwith the modern disdain for the work is that, again, we take the bene-fits conferred by Byzantine scholarship for granted and then criticize itfor flaws that appear only after we have built our own edifices uponits foundations. Let us consider what was involved. Eustathios musthave collected, sorted through, excerpted, summarized, compiled, andsmoothed out vast amounts of knowledge, not merely scholia, epimeris-

moi, and more philosophical commentaries on Homer, but also textsand information from other authors who, he believed, had somethingto say that was relevant to the Iliad. Moreover, he made the end prod-uct readable by smoothing out the prose into his own Attic standard, sothat modern scholars cannot easily tell where the “fragments” begin orend. The list of his sources is long.86 For all we know, the basic build-ing blocks of his Commentaries were inaccessible or in a wretched statein his time. Who had access or leisure to consult them all, and why gothrough dozens of works to find what could be made available in one?This was basically a work of preservation, compilation, and collation;it was probably intended as a standard reference work. And Homerwas not just any poet; we have seen his importance for many classes ofKomnenian society. Teachers, orators, scholars, historians, scribes, bish-ops, philosophers, and government officials would have benefited fromsuch a reference work. Who of them didn’t have something to lookup in Homer? A few copies of the Commentaries would have served theneeds of the entire capital. And what a delicious rhetorical coup it wasfor one professor to cast, in his preface, all these people as his youngpups!

7. The Commentaries on Aristotle

Let us then turn, finally, to the original commentaries on Aristotle’sNicomachean Ethics.87 They fit well into the patterns of scholarly activ-ity in the twelfth century, despite being slightly earlier in date than the

86 Cf. van der Valk’s introduction, v. 1, lix–cxix.87 See, in general, Mercken (1973) c. 1 and (1990); Wilson (1983a) 182–184; for all

Aristotelian commentaries in Byzantium, Benakis (2002).


poetic commentaries, addressing a more specialized audience, and self-consciously imitating an ancient tradition of philosophical scholarship.They are scholarly works, rather than philosophical, in three importantsenses. First, in attempting to fill the gap left by the late-antique com-mentators, Eustratios, Michael, and the rest were subordinating them-selves to a larger ongoing project of textual elucidation and clarifica-tion; it was this project that defined what and how they wrote.

Second, it was a collaborative project, something for which we havelittle evidence in Byzantium since the days of Constantine VII Porphy-rogennetos’ team that produced the Excerpta and other encyclopedicworks.88 In a brief section of his long funeral oration for Anna, GeorgeTornikios says that it was she who had commissioned these works. Theorator adds that he had personally heard Michael of Ephesus complainthat the all-night labor involved had ruined his eyes.89 And in the pref-ace to his commentary on book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics, Eustratioshails and praises his learned royal patron—a woman, though he doesnot name her—in terms that are very reminiscent of Tornikios’ ora-tion; he says that it was she also who had previously asked him to writethe commentary on book I. Anna, in turn, praised Eustratios for hiswisdom, “both divine and external ( �ρα εν),” in the Alexiad (14.8.9).

Third, as a collaborative project the commentaries theoretically (butnot fully in practice) subsumed the individuality of the contributors;they were assigned books of the Ethics in a way that made them seeminterchangeable as scholars. It is fitting from this point of view thatsome of the contributors remain anonymous.

The new commentaries were placed in manuscripts along with theold, in the order of the Ethics’ books. They were more self-standing textsthan the scholia on the poets, but less so than Eustathios’ Commentary on

the Iliad, being keyed to the original text through lemmata and notcovering every single line of Aristotle. We saw above that John Galenos’commentary on the Theogony jumped across long sections of the poem.What is the extent of the coverage in the Aristotelian commentaries?Predictably, they vary. Books I and II of the Ethics are roughly as long(about 20 OCT pages), but Eustratios’ commentary on book I has 121pages in the CAG edition with almost 200 lemmata, while the scholiaon book II have 18 pages with 27 lemmata; only the length of theaverage entry remains the same, at about two-thirds of a page. Michael,

88 Cf. Lemerle (1971) 280–300; Sevcenko (1992).89 George Tornikios, Funeral Oration for Anna Komnene (p. 283).


on the other hand, tended to write longer entries for each lemma,twice as long in fact. For example, his commentary on book IX is68 pages long with only 50 lemmata, thus half in length compared toEustratios on book I but with only one-fourth the number of lemmata.In other words, Eustratios goes through the text of book I very closely,leaving few lines without comment, whereas Michael makes longerjumps from lemma to lemma. This impression, however, is in partdeceptive, because each of Michael’s entries actually goes on to discusslater portions of the text than that quoted at the head. We are dealingwith different ways of organizing the material and of breaking theoriginal text into sections.

Michael is a lucid writer of philosophical Attic Greek. He prefersshort and concise sentences, illustrates the basic points with appropriateand vivid examples, and is a very competent scholar.90 He stays closeto the text, avoiding digressions and editorials. Moreover, he sticks toAristotle’s ideas and eschews grammatical and historical commentary.The standards of relevance in these commentaries are much higherthan what we find in, say, Tzetzes: the works are for those who want tounderstand the ideas of Aristotle’s philosophy. Whether what Michaelwrote is useful or not will depend, as always, on who reads him andwhy. Throughout he maintains a sense that Aristotle is immediatelyrelevant to “us,” creating a textual space in which the moral worldof the Ethics and of twelfth-century Constantinople do not differ intheir essentials, which is possible to believe on the assumption that inAristotle we find discussions of perennial problems of human nature.On occasion, Michael makes this relevance direct, as when he refersto “those thrice-damned loan-sharks we have (κα ’ �μ ς)” to illustratea point about contracts (IX; 469.35–36); or when he notes that theeducation of children in Constantinople is handled haphazardly, byeach man as he sees fit, like Homer’s Cyclopes (X; 610.11–16).

On the other hand, he does not allow Christian values to interferewith his explication of Aristotle’s virtues and vices, staying close to thephilosopher’s spirit and to his text. He sometimes uses Byzantine morallanguage—e.g., �!τ�ι δ" ε#σιν �$ α%ματα &δελ��ν κα' συγγεν�ν )κ�"�ν-τες κα' $ερ* συλ�ντες, & "σμ��ς τε γ�μ�υς γαμ�+ντες κα' �δ�να,ς &λλ�-κ.τ�ις κα' α#σ��τ�ταις /αυτ�0ς καταρρυπα�ν�ντες (IX; 484.18–20)—butthere is nothing here that an ancient thinker would take issue with. At

90 For a discussion of Michael’s commentaries on the Politics, see Triantari-Mara(2002) c. 3.


one point, Michael even mentions the rewards given by “our” God—� &π� τ�+ δημι�υργ�+ �μ�ν ε�+ &μ�ι2�—to support an Aristotelianposition (IX; 506.31–32). He uses Greek exempla for illustration, exceptwhen he cites Basil of Caesarea and Gregory of Nazianzos as an exam-ple of perfect friendship (IX; 462.19–20, 479.5–6; the Christian traditionwas wrong about their relationship, but Michael could not have knownthat). His comments are sometimes opaque. In discussing unequal rela-tionships, he has this to say: “but the friendship of the father for theson or of the son for the father are not simply of the same kind orequal, given that the father is not equal to the son—but consider thisin relation to our beliefs ()�’ �μ�ν)—and vice versa” (IX; 462.21–24).What exactly does he want us to “consider”? It may have been some-thing that he could not have said openly in a period when intellectualswere in danger of being tried precisely for “considering” such problemsagain.91

One final passage from Michael illustrates the verbal skill of thesescholars who had to weave together the classical and Christian tradi-tions. Commenting on the phrase that “one does not sacrifice every-thing to Zeus,” Michael notes that “there were things that the Greekswere not permitted to sacrifice to Zeus . . . who was the father, accord-ing to the Greeks (κα ’ 3Ελληνας), of both men and gods; likewise, wedo not owe everything to our fathers, for we will not obey if they shouldcall on us to turn away from the living God (τ�+ ��ντ�ς ε�+) or betrayour fatherland” (IX; 473.7–13). The paradox of a father forcing his sonto betray his fatherland is nice, but note also that, having used a famousHomeric verse for Zeus, Michael appropriately then quotes a Biblicalexpression for the God of his Byzantine readers.

In turning from Michael to Eustratios, I want to conclude with a dif-ferent point about the purpose of the commentaries, one partly linkedto this constant juxtaposition of Greek and Christian texts, exempla, andideas. Eustratios, as is well known, had close personal experience of the-ological repression. His teacher Italos was condemned in 1082 and hehimself in 1117. He probably wrote the commentaries after that; at anyrate, in the preface to the commentary on Ethics VI he refers to old ageand illness. His condemnation in 1117 involved the charge of employingGreek philosophy to clarify the faith and lapsing into heresy. This is

91 Browning (1975b); Clucas (1981) 3–8, 67–73. For Father-Son rhetoric and theKappadokian Fathers, see Van Dam (2003).


not the place to ascertain the truth behind this or to follow Eustratios’subtle negotiation of (Greek) philosophy and (Christian) theology in hisvarious works. In any case, the accusation of philosophizing accordingto the Greeks was very unfair in that it was difficult if not impossi-ble to rebut, as the entire intellectual and ecclesiastical class of Byzan-tium was acquainted with and relied on Greek thought to some degree.For example, in a doctrinal letter against the Armenian Monophysites,Eustratios had cited as his theological sources “the wise thinkers amongthe Greeks” and “those who dogmatize about God on our side.”92 But,as we have seen, this juxtaposition was common among the scholars,philosophers, churchmen, and humanists of the twelfth century. Con-sider two of Eustratios’ own enemies within the Church, from differ-ent periods. Leo of Chalcedon, a stiff-necked hardliner on the matterof icons and opposed by Eustratios on the emperor Alexios’ behalf inthe 1080s, cited the legal status of temples in antiquity in his defenseof ecclesiastical property; for his part, Alexios had cited Perikles’ useof the treasury of Athena to justify his confiscations (at least so saysAnna).93 And Niketas of Herakleia, one of Eustratios’ chief accusers in1117, wrote, as we have seen, poems on the epithets of the gods in theform of liturgical hymns. It was not possible to avoid doing such thingsin an intellectual culture whose roots were so diverse and so tangled.

We noted above the same juxtaposition of passages from both paganand Christian authors in Gregory Pardos’ commentary on Hermogenesas well as in his prescriptions for what authors one should imitate. Thestudy of rhetoric, as we saw, was not entirely theoretical, as it is withus, but was supposed to help Byzantine orators imitate the classics: itwas practical. So too ethics. The twelfth-century philosophical com-mentators hoped and expected that their texts would help readers notmerely to understand Aristotle better but also to become better peopleby applying his Ethics to their lives. Eustratios is explicit about this inthe preface to his commentary on book I (2.1ff.). “Ethics is a branchof practical philosophy” and can morally benefit individuals, cities, oreven whole nations. “And one may find many exempla in books, bothours (κα ’ �μ ς) and those that are outside ( �ρα εν). For many good

92 Eustratios of Nicaea, Refutation (pp. 163–164); for his condemnation, see Joannou(1954); for Christian and Platonic passages in the Ethics commentaries, see Mercken(1973) 12*–13*.

93 Glavinas (1972) 110–111; cf. Alexios in Anna Komnene, Alex. 6.3.3 (this may be anelaboration or addition to the speech by Anna herself).


men lived well among both the barbarians and the Greeks.” He goeson to name Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Job, Moses, Jesus the son of Nun,“and, if you want, Solon among the Greeks. But enough about them”(I; 3.26–4.8).

8. Conclusions

Classical scholarship flourished in twelfth-century Byzantium; it hada diverse and extensive social background; its constituent branches—grammar, rhetoric, philosophy, manuscript editions, etc.—were inter-connected at all levels; and it was pursued by serious and intelligentscholars who had a sound knowledge of Greek history and literature.Byzantine scholars, in short, were not interested only in the “preser-vation” of ancient texts but they wanted to understand them, to cometo terms with their otherness, to find a way to integrate their virtuesinto their Christian society. They were willing to consider a wide rangeof strategies to make that possible. As a result, one can actually learn

much about antiquity by studying the works of these scholars in a waythat would not have been possible in the West for many centuries. Thiswas because it was during the middle and late period of Byzantiumthat the basis for all subsequent Classical Studies was established. Muchhas been written about how methodologies, critical tools, and scholarlyhabits were transported from Byzantium to Italy in the Renaissance,“active” skills to complement “inert” manuscripts, the “form” to goalong with the “matter.” I will mention here only Robert Grosseteste,a scholar of a slightly earlier period (the thirteenth century), who trans-lated the new commentaries on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and otherGreek works into Latin using, among other aids, the Souda and the Ety-

mologicum Genuinum.94

More importantly, in ways both ideological and practical the Byzan-tines basically invented what we recognize today as Classical Studies.Whether we like it or not, it was they who made most of the keydecisions, and their choices about what to keep and what not wereessentially “what ours would have been.”95 In part, that is because we

94 Mercken (1973) c. 2; Dionisotti (1988). For the Byzantine scholars’ role in theRenaissance, see the studies by D.J. Geanakoplos, N.G. Wilson, J. Monfasani, andothers.

95 Littlewood (2004) 19.


are their heirs; as classicists we are all Byzantines. This is difficult toaccept if we subscribe to the polarity of Classical vs. Byzantine, but thatpolarity is not legitimate; it was devised for polemical ideological pur-poses. Certainly, there were some in Byzantium who were fundamen-tally opposed to all that the ancient Greek world stood for (or at leastwhat they thought it stood for), but that was precisely how the idea ofclassical culture as something foreign yet compelling at the same timeoriginated in the first place. Moreover, hard-line elements were neverdominant in Byzantium and could be mocked or ignored by scholars.Besides, modernity has likewise defined itself in fundamental ways inopposition to antiquity,96 but most of its scholars have not on that countgiven up in their endeavor to access or even revive the “spirit” of theancient world.

The implications of this must be as practical for us as scholars as theyare challenging ideologically. For example, it is being recognized that“fragments” of ancient authors can no longer be so neatly extractedfrom the later sources that quote them. We must look more closely atthe authorial practices and literary contexts of those sources.97 As hasbeen said about a comparable art-historical topic, “the taste of a laterage is as much a part of an ivory’s ‘biography’ as its production andpurpose, even if this truth inordinately complicates the job of those whoseek to write its history.”98

There are hopeful signs of progress. “Late” antiquity is graduallybeing reintegrated into the study of antiquity, so that one day we mayagain enjoy the holistic view that the Byzantines took for granted.99

Diachronic studies of the Greek tradition are also picking up, in differ-ent disciplines, which now recognize that the philosophical and schol-arly reception of the classics did not jump from antiquity to the Renais-sance (the standard western view, with brief nods to the Arabic andByzantine contributions). But serious obstacles must be overcome be-fore Byzantium can be restored to its rightful place in this history.100

There is a widespread reluctance to engage with untranslated texts,

96 Philosophers such as Nietzsche and others forcefully argued that modern scholar-ship makes a travesty of classical Greece precisely because it is entangled in the ideo-logical imperatives of modernity.

97 E.g., Flintoff (1976) 365; Brunt (1980); Pelling (2000). Many classicists who rely oncollections of fragments are unaware of these problems.

98 Culter (1994) 141.99 Cf. Treadgold (1984).

100 And the dangers pointed out by Brague (2002) 138 should be carefully avoided.


especially when they come from a foreign and forbidding culture. Onthe other hand, there is also too much ignorance about Byzantiumamong classicists, the very ones who have the linguistic skills with whichto approach it. This ignorance is not merely of the esoteric aspects thatI have surveyed, but of its basic history and society.

In this respect we are now worse off than in the nineteenth cen-tury, when modern Altertumswissenschaft was created. The pioneers ofthat discipline—and not only the likes of Mommsen and Bury—wereessentially Byzantinists in that they were conversant with the material,were not afraid of it, and recognized its worth.101 That many of themdid not call themselves Byzantinists is an ideological question. Classi-cists who now work with the basic tools crafted in the nineteenth cen-tury, have largely forgotten where it all came from. I will close with astory told about Arnaldo Momigliano by Peter Brown, both rare birdsin this respect:

He was as active in the early Byzantine period as ever Baynes and Joneshad been. . . To a suggestion that the library might cancel its subscriptionto the Byzantinische Zeitschrift, on the grounds that it was unlikely to befrequently consulted, he replied that he himself consulted it regularly andthat, in any case, if this should ever be so, the problem would not be whatto do with the Byzantinische Zeitschrift, but what to do with a professorof ancient history who remained ignorant of such a periodical.102

101 See the portraits in Momigliano (1994).102 Brown (1988) 423.

THE LITERARY, CULTURAL ANDPOLITICAL CONTEXT FOR THE TWELFTH-CENTURY

COMMENTARY ON THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS

Peter Frankopan

One of the great challenges posed by study of the age of the Kom-nenian Emperors is that of trying to work out what kind of EmpireByzantium was in the late eleventh and the twelfth centuries. Was thisan Empire that was introverted or one which looked to the outside forinspiration? Was it an Empire which was buoyant or one struggling tostave off imminent destruction by the forces which surrounded it? Wasit an Empire which was becoming more and more liberal or one whichwas increasingly repressive and dogmatic? The answer, of course, is thatit was both and it was neither. Under the Komnenoi, Byzantium washighly stratified, and yet individuals of low and obscure origin couldand did rise to the summit; it was closed in some ways, and yet open tooutsiders in others; it was deeply conservative, and yet it was also opento new ideas. One of the reasons for this ambivalence is that there arecompeting images at play for the period which started with the usurpa-tion of Alexios I in 1081. The evidence for the century or so whichfollowed is abundant and often colorful, and as such allows for a widerange of perspectives. The skill, then, is to set out conclusions which areboth suitably nuanced, but which do not simply park contradictory ordifficult source material on one side in order to drive home expansivearguments which raise as many problems as they solve.

A case in point is that of assessing the interest in, value and impor-tance of philosophy in Byzantium in the twelfth century, a topic thatis not as straightforward as might first seem. The aim of this paperis to try to provide a context for the commissioning of Eustratios ofNicaea’s commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics, or, to be more precise,his commentaries on a part of that work. It will seek to provide a lit-erary, cultural and political context for the observations on Aristotle’swork, which proved enormously influential not least in Western Europeand to Western European political thought.

Eustratios makes it clear that his commentary on the Ethics was nothis own idea. Rather, as he tells us at the start of his observations on

46 peter frankopan

Book I, he was prompted to write by a person of high status in con-temporary Constantinople. Refusal was out of the question, accord-ing to Eustratios, since this individual had been his benefactor in thepast, including through some very difficult times.1 The author giveslittle else away as to the identity of his patron, saying nothing moreabout who this individual was, or what their motivation was for seek-ing a guide to the Ethics. At the start of his commentary on Book VI,however, he returns to the subject of his patron, whom he describesthis time as a high-ranking member of the imperial family, addressingher as ‘2ασιλ'ς ε�σε2�ς, 2ασιλ'ς �ιλ�λ.γε, 2ασιλ'ς �ιλ�γα ε κα' �ιλ.-καλε’.2

Although Eustratios does not provide the name of the ‘empress’in question, there is little doubt that he must be talking about AnnaKomnene, the eldest daughter of Alexios I Komnenos, sister of John IIand aunt of Manuel I.3 Anna was the author of one of the most famousall medieval texts and one of the most celebrated Byzantine histories,the Alexiad, which covers the reign of Alexios I from his seizure ofthe throne in 1081 to his death in 1118. This cavernous text providesample opportunity to pick out areas and themes of specific interest tothe author. These certainly include philosophy in general and perhapsAristotle specifically, who is quoted directly or indirectly on a handfulof occasions in the Alexiad.4

Coupled with Anna’s own composition is the reputation that sheacquired during and shortly after her lifetime from other intellectu-als in Byzantium. Theodore Prodromos called her “wise Anna, abso-lute intellect, home of the Graces”, and referred to her as the fourthGrace and as the tenth Muse, stating that she loved both truth andphilosophy.5 We learn of her love of literature, her unquenchable thirstfor truth, and, again, her keen interest in philosophy from an oration

1 τιν�ς τ�ν μ�λιστα λ.γ�υ &5�ων �μ ς πρ�ς τ�6ργ�ν &νερε �σαντ�ς κα� τινα )κ "σ αισα��νειαν τ�+ πρ7τ�υ τ�ν 8Αριστ�τ"λ�υς 8Η ικ�ν Νικ�μα�ε�ων )ντειλαμ"ν�υ, :ν �;κ <νπαραιτε,σ αι δι* τ� )ν π�λλ�,ς α;τ�ν &ναγκα��ις ε=ρε,ν �μ ς ε6 )ργασ�μεν�ν> & ετε,ν δ?τ�ν �@τω πρ�ς �μ ς διακε�μεν�ν κα' παραιτε,σ αι τι τ�ν δυνατ�ν )πιτ�ττ�ντα Aγνωμ�νBμα κα' &�ιλ.σ��ν. In EN 1.13–18. On this passage, see also Mercken (1973) 10* f.

2 In EN 256.3 f. For the full dedicatory passage, see 256.3–257.12.3 Browning (1962) 1–12, esp. 6–7.4 Alex. Prologue, I.2.13, p. 5; II.1.26ff., p. 6; II.4.v.84 f., 89 f., p. 64; III.6.iv.52 f.,

p. 101; V.8.v.93 f., p. 163; V.9.i, p. 165; V.9.iv.82 f., p. 166; X.11.iv.63ff., p. 318; XII.5.ii.85,p. 371; XII.5.iv.33ff., p. 372; XIII.1.iii.32 f.; XIII.4.i.40 f., p. 394; XIV.7.iii.16 f., p. 450.

5 Kurtz (1907), 88.43 f.; Epithalamium col. 1401.

the literary, cultural and political context 47

delivered by George Tornikios in her honor some time after her deathin the early 1150s.6

It is helpful too, then, that Anna’s reputation is confirmed by twoauthors hostile to the Komnenoi, for this allows us to allay concernsthat Prodromos and Tornikios’ praise is biased by their own pane-gyrical praise for the porphyrogenneta—that is to say, that their recordof Anna’s intellectual curiosity should be read primarily as a rhetoricaldevice in the portrayals of the imperial princess. That Choniates praisesAnna for her philosophical interests is significant therefore; so too areZonaras’ comments about her natural intelligence and the sheer hardwork which led to her mastery of the Greek language.7

Zonaras also reveals that Anna not only engrossed herself in books,but also surrounded herself with scholars or learned men, and, more-over, took discussions with them very seriously.8 This strikes a chordwith Tornikios’ oration too, for the author of this speech specificallytalks of a group of scholars who surrounded Anna and who wereengaged in intellectual pursuits.9 So striking is this image that mod-ern historians have come to talk of a circle or ‘salon’ of Anna Kom-nene.10

Tornikios goes further than Zonaras, though, for while the latterpresents Anna Komnene as being surrounded by intelligent men, Tor-nikios suggests that she did not simply allow a circle of intellectualsto gather around her, but lay at the very heart of this group. It wasAnna, according to Tornikios, who prompted, cajoled and inspiredthose around her. It was Anna, says George, who sought out individualsand prompted them to work on Aristotle and Plato, on Euclid andPtolemy.11 She was no passive patron, therefore, indulging those aroundher with funds and scholarly comforts; rather, her patronage was active,at times even aggressive. One scholar from Ephesus, certainly Michaelof Ephesus, whom she commissioned to work on Aristotle, complainedthat Anna’s relentless goading to provide commentaries had made himlose his sight, as he had been forced to work through the night by

6 Lettres 221–323. For the dating of the speech to c. 1155 and Anna’s death to c. 1153,see 21 f.; cf. Browning (1962) 4.

7 Historia 10.13–16; Epitome Historiarum v. III, XVIII.26.12–15, p. 754.8 Epitome Historiarum v. III, XVIII.26.15 f., p. 754.9 Lettres 281ff.

10 Browning (1962) 8 (although Browning does not emphasise the word, preferringthe less contentious ‘circle’); Magdalino (1993) 332.

11 Lettres 281.

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flickering and weak candle-light, presumably in order to meet deadlinesof some kind imposed by his patron.12

We can identify other members too of the circle of intellectualswhom Anna surrounded herself with. To Eustratios of Nicaea andMichael of Ephesus should perhaps be added two scholars who wroteon the Rhetoric, one of whom remains anonymous but the other, oneStephen, most likely Stephen, metropolitan of Trebizond, also taughtTheodore Prodromos.13 Whether this identification is correct or not,the fact that we know that Stephanos had previously written on theEthics (as well as on the Rhetoric) makes him a prime candidate forinclusion as one of Anna’s scholars—even though, as far as we know,his views on the Ethics have not survived to the present day.

There is, of course, a reason to seek to identify scholars who werepatronized by Anna, other than simple laziness to associate any writeror commentator on philosophy in the mid-twelfth century with a light-ning rod patron. This comes from the fact that it is possible to deducean obvious coherence to what Anna was trying to achieve, and to assertthat her choice of texts, if not of scholars, was deliberate and specific.George Tornikios makes much of Anna’s interests in Aristotle, Plato,Euclid and Ptolemy (repeating this grouping of authors’ names twicein his speech).14 It goes without saying that Anna may have sought,commissioned and even received commentaries on works by all theseauthors, and it is simply a matter of chance that we posses those onAristotle’s treatises but not on those of any of the others. However,there may be another explanation here, namely that Anna’s interestswere primarily directed at the works of Aristotle specifically, an obser-vation not without some significance.

The obvious clue here comes from the work of Michael of Ephesus.We know that in addition to providing a commentary on Books V,IX and X of the Nicomachean Ethics, Michael also provided notes on awide range of other Aristotelian works, including the Organon, the Meta-

physics, the Rhetoric and the Politics, as well as on the zoographical andanthropological works.15 It is no coincidence then that it was Aristotlewhom Michael of Ephesus was studying as his eyesight failed: he had

12 Lettres 283.9–12.13 Magdalino (1993) 332; Browning (1975b) 17; Wilson (1996) 182.14 Lettres 281.15; 301.16.15 Tatakis (2003) 174; Browning (1975b) 16; Browning (1962) 6; Wilson (1996) 182;

Mercken (1973) 24*.


been set the task of providing commentaries on all those treatises onwhich either none existed or which were, for whatever reason, consid-ered inadequate.16

The sheer workload and productivity of Michael of Ephesus andthe obvious commissioning of Eustratios of Nicaea to work on theEthics has perhaps understandably led to the view that Anna haddevised a collaborative approach which was focused on providing anew corpus on Aristotle, and on Aristotle alone—a conclusion whichquite naturally and obviously begs the questions of how she set aboutaddressing his works, what she hoped to achieve by commissioningcommentaries and why this particular author stood out for Anna.17

It is difficult to be precise about the mechanics of how Anna dele-gated work on the Ethics for there are precious few clues provided inthe commentaries as to when they were composed. Moreover, the factthat individual scholars did not address consecutive sections of the textdoes not make it any easier for us to understand how (or why) Aristo-tle was parceled out to Anna’s stable of commentators. We know, forexample, that Eustratios did his commentary on Book I before turningto deal with Book VI, because he tells us this himself.18 What is moreobscure, however, is why this individual did not cover Books II–V, or ifhe did, why these do not survive.

Certainly, in the absence of any meaningful evidence, particularlyon Michael of Ephesus (who has been variously placed in the first halfof the eleventh century to the 1080s but now seemingly decisively tothe first half of the twelfth), it is hard to assert who wrote what when.19

Inferences which we can draw from Eustratios’ career and the apparentstart-point of Anna’s patronage of scholars might lead us to concludethat he preceded Michael—which is to say that the commentaries wereconsecutive, rather than collaborative, with the obvious implication thishas for our understanding of the why Anna was seeking to address thetext.

Eustratios was a deacon, apparently at Saint Sophia by the early1080s, and so by the time of Alexios’ death must have been in his sixties

16 Lettres 283.9–12.17 Browning (1962) esp. 7 f.; Wilson (1996) 181ff.; Magdalino (1993) 332.18 In his introduction to his commentary on Book VI, Eustratios writes: τ��νυν )πε'

πρ� �ρ.ν�υ τιν�ς )��τησας �μ ς )κ "σ αι σα��νειαν ε#ς τ� πρ�τ�ν τ�ν Νικ�μα�ε�ωντ�+ 8Αριστ�τ"λ�υς 8Η ικ�ν, κα' �με,ς σ�ι πεισ "ντες : &πC�τησας πεπ�ι�καμεν . . . In EN256.26–257.3.

19 See Mercken (1991) 13*–17*.

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at the very least.20 Meanwhile, his limited output on Aristotle might siteasily with a hypothesis that he did not have the chance to producemore than the two books that survive, whether because of infirmity, oldage or death. In this respect, we might also note that George Tornikiosdoes not mention Eustratios by name. This could be because the latterhad been involved in scandal, as we shall see.21 It was not long afterTornikios delivered his oration in the early 1150s, though, that we findEustratios’ name being used in a context which suggests that the stigmawhich may have been attached to it had dissipated somewhat.22 Soperhaps another explanation for his omission from Tornikios’ speechis that he was not part of living memory (as Michael of Ephesusobviously was), and had been alive too long ago to have a resonancewith Tornikios or Tornikios’ audience.

If it is difficult to draw any firm conclusions about when the com-mentaries were commissioned (other than in the first half of the twelfthcentury), which order they were tackled in, and how or indeed if theywere divided up, then at least we can say something about whom Annaturned to in order to address the texts in question. Michael of Ephesus,for one, may not have been an entirely original thinker, and indeed hislimitations have been stressed, perhaps a little unfairly, by at least onemodern scholar who argues that his interest in the biological works andhis unfailing observations on physiology and psychology may indicatethat he was a physician.23 However, whatever he may have lacked invision, he made up for in terms of his diligence, for his output wasprodigious, an indefatigable accumulator who paid for his hard workwith his eyesight.

Eustratios of Nicaea, in contrast, had an impressive pedigree as atheologian, prominent as a leading authority on icons during the trialsof Leo of Chalcedon in the 1080 and 1090s, and, later, on the errorsof the Latins as well as on the Armenian heresy.24 Eustratios is modestabout his abilities in his commentaries, stating that he had turned his

20 Mercken, following Draeseke, gives Eustratios’ dates as c. 1050–c. 1120 (Mercken(1973) 6*), although within this there is room for manouevre. In 1082, at the time ofthe trial of John Italos, Eustratios and his fellow accused were termed ε;λα2"στατ�ιδι�κ�ν�ι. Gouillard (1985) 59.432.

21 Cf. the comments by Mercken (1991) 24*.22 See above, note 24.23 Mercken (1991) 16* f.24 For the various stages of Eustratios’ career, see Mercken (1973) 6* ff.


hand to them not because of any particular aptitude, but because hehad been forced to undertake this task, for reasons he leaves obscure.25

Eustratios, it should be stressed, had been a loyal supporter of Anna’sfather, the Emperor Alexios. But he had become a tainted figure inConstantinople: he had saved his skin once in 1082 when he hadbeen tried alongside other pupils of John Italos, only to be acquittedon signing a document denouncing and anathematizing his formermaster.26 But in 1117, he had not been able to escape the hounding ofother members of the clergy, in particular by Niketas Seides. In spite ofthe efforts of the Emperor and the Patriarch to intervene on his behalf,Eustratios had been anathematized, with his errors promptly added tothe Synodikon, the register of Byzantine Orthodoxy—even though hehad publicly renounced all the errors of which he had been accused.27

It is true that even the most severe punishments that came withanathematization did not necessarily mean that Eustratios became anoutcast. A compelling case has been made, for example, that JohnItalos was rehabilitated and played a role at Antioch liaising with theCrusaders some fifteen years after his condemnation. But exceptionalcircumstances—and in this case Italos’ knowledge of southern Italy andhis personal involvement in diplomatic relations between Byzantiumand the Normans in the 1070s—lay behind John’s re-emergence laterin Alexios’ reign.28 It is likely and indeed probable that the stain ofEustratios’ condemnation lived with him for some time. So even thoughwe know that Eustratios’ reputation eventually was restored, or at leastwas restored sufficiently for him to be cited as an authority at one ofthe Blachernai councils of 1156, there should be little doubt that Anna’spatronage of and involvement with him should be seen as striking, notleast since the commentaries logically post-date Eustathios’ disgraceand for that matter, that of Anna shortly after her father’s death in1118.29

25 In his commentary on the Posterior Analytics, Eustratios insists that he is not aprofesional commentator, but has done the work )ν παρ"ργDω. Mercken (1991) 25*. Atthe beginning of his commentary on Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics he is also verycoy about his abilities (In EN 256.22–26), but this is very much a topos.

26 Gouillard (1985) 133–174; for Eustratios’ involvement, see esp. 158–161.27 Gouillard (1967) 1–313; for Eustratios, esp. 68–71.28 Magdalino (2003) 50 f.29 For Eustathios’ rehabilitation (at least in so far as being cited positively) see

Magdalino (1993) 279. For Anna’s fall following an apparent attempt to seize the thronefor herself and for her husband, see for example, Hill (2000) 45–62.

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This is particularly true given the ultra-conservative views that Annaregularly articulates in the Alexiad, and particularly in matters to dowith the church. John Italos receives a brutal treatment from the au-thor; Leo of Chalcedon and Neilos of Calabria fare little better.30 Notsurprisingly, given her own championing of Eustratios, the trial andcondemnation of this individual is not even mentioned in the text,with Anna instead mentioning her favoured scholar in suitably fondand adulatory terms.31 Nevertheless, there should be little doubt thatAnna had turned to a figure whose reputation had been tainted incontemporary Byzantium.

It may be that it was Eustratios’ disgrace which lay behind hisopaque identification of Anna as his patron. Anna is not named byEustratios, perhaps for fear of embarrassing her or compromising her,or possibly both.32 But while it is tempting to see his reticence as ashield to protect his sponsor, it is also important to stress that Annatoo at this time was persona non grata in Constantinople and Byzantinesociety. According to Anna herself, she had been secluded in a conventand excluded from contact with her friends, family and peers.33

Some modern scholars have tried to pair the scandal of the clericwith that surrounding Anna herself—although the issue of Anna’s ap-parent disgrace and isolation following her father’s death is perhapsless dramatic and certainly more complicated than is usually assumed.34

The logical extension of the argument here—of seeing Anna and thosearound her such as Eustratios, and presumably others too, as a concen-tration of victims of Komnenian power—is too outlandish to take seri-ously; and in any event leads discussion in a direction which is neitherwelcome nor useful, since this predicates a view that Aristotle and Aris-totelian thought was somehow part of a Komnenian counter-culture—something which should be dismissed out of hand.

In fact, the more productive question to ask here is not whether thepersonal circumstances of Anna Komnene and Eustratios of Nicaeaare significant and interesting, but rather why it was that there wasa specific focus on Aristotle in the early part of the twelfth century.The answer here lies in the first instance in assessing the philosophical

30 On John Italos: Alex. V.8–9, pp. 161–167. On Leo of Chalcedon: Alex. V.2.iv–iv,p. 144ff.; VII.4.i, p. 215. On Neilos: Alex. X.1, pp. 281–283.

31 Alex. XIV.8.ix.28ff.32 Mercken (1973) 10* f.33 Alex. XIV.7.vi, p. 452.34 e.g. Thomas (1991) 294ff.


enquiry prompted and funded by Anna in the wider context of a periodof profound change in Byzantine social, literary, and intellectual culturein this period. This was, after all, a time that saw increasing experi-mentation with literary forms. Texts such as the Timarion, Digenis Akritis

and even the Alexiad itself are but a small number of writings from thetwelfth century which are (rightly) perceived as doing something new inByzantine literature and Byzantine thought.35

Alongside literary innovation, we can note evidence of increasingsocial mobility. The founding of the Orphanotropheion, set up with theexpress intention of educating not only the poor but also foreigners,can be seen as the prime example of the expansion of access to educa-tion and the obvious implications that brought with it.36 We can pick upsmatterings from the sources about the greater availability of the writ-ten word, with Theodore Prodromos noting with approval the effortsof the Patriarch John IX Agapetos (1111–1134) to put more books intocirculation—including, it is worth noting here, those by Aristotle—byhaving teams of scribes make copies of selected texts.37 Even the intro-duction of schedography, a light-weight short-cut to gaining knowledgeof the classics, can be seen as a companion to the increasing dissemi-nation of ideas—even if Anna Komnene and John Tzetzes can barelycontain their horror at the impurity of this approach.38

Indeed, we might go even further still and try to place Anna’s desirefor commentaries on Aristotle in the context of the multiple heresiesthat were proclaimed and dealt with in the reign of her father, Alex-ios, and of her nephew, Manuel I, though apparently not in that ofher brother. What the various trials show, of course, is that Ortho-doxy was coming under greater scrutiny, that it was being stretchedtime and again beyond its traditional defense of simply being able toanswer theological and Christological questions from authority.39 In thecase of Eustratios himself, the offence which he caused stemmed fromhis claim that Christ had argued with the help of Aristotelian syllo-gisms, something which provoked a wild reaction from enough senior

35 For an overview of changes in Byzantine literature in the 12th Century, seeKazhdan (1984). Also Magdalino (1993) 1–26.

36 Alex. XV.7.iii–vii, pp. 482–485.37 Logos 239–241.38 For Anna’s brief comments on schedography: Alex. XV.7.ix.31 f., p. 485. For Tzet-

zes, see Chiliades IX.710–715, p. 351; XI.575–576, p. 424.39 See e.g. Angold (1997) 141ff., 260–266. Also Browning (1975b) esp. 12–19.

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members of clergy to outgun both Emperor and Patriarch and, ofcourse, the metropolitan of Nicaea, Eustratios himself.40 In this respect,therefore, it only seems natural to seek to place Anna Komnene’sinterest in Aristotle within a framework of innovation, of new ideas,of stretching the boundaries and taking theology and philosophy intonew territory.

But we need to caution excitement about the apparent suddenchange in Byzantium in the twelfth century. There should be no doubt-ing that all the indicators pointing towards liberalism, experimenta-tion and innovation are valid. As Paul Magdalino has rightly stressed,though, these can be easily counter-balanced with negatives too. Forexample, any discussion about an ignition of interest in philosophyshould be off-set by at least noting that, as far as we know, the posi-tion of hypatos ton philosophon lay vacant for much of the twelfth cen-tury, until finally filled by Michael (later Patriarch of Constantinople)towards the end of the 1160s.41 The placing of Theodore of Smyrnafirmly in Hades in the Timarion likewise gives an important signal thatnot everyone in Byzantium was thrilled by change, or at least by philo-sophical inquiry.42

And we should also add that, while the trials of John Italos, Neilos ofCalabria, Leo of Chalcedon, Eustratios and others in this period mightat first glance seem to provide examples of reactions by a conservativeregime, desperately trying to defend itself, a more convincing case canbe made that the condemnation of these individuals had little or noth-ing to do with their ideas; rather, they tell us more about more practicalproblems experienced in contemporary Byzantium, principally that ofimperial image-making, and, later, of imperial control of the clergy.

So what was it about Aristotle that Anna Komnene was so interestedin? Why, of all the authors she could have sought enlightenment on,did she choose this one? Was her choice reflective of an attempt toreconcile the pagan world with Christianity, and, if so, why was therea greater effort to do this in the twelfth century than in previousgenerations? Was Anna’s interest in philosophy in any way driven byher personal experiences, and indeed by her education, where by all

40 Angold (1995) 73ff.41 Browning (1975b) 16; also, for Michael’s presentation of Aristotle, philosophy and

theology in his inaugural lecture, see Browning (1961) 181 f., 189 f.42 Browning (1975b) 16; Timarion 71ff.


accounts—including her own, but also those of her contemporaries—she was remarkable for her curiosity and intelligence; that is to say,was her interest the natural culmination of a life which had seen herstudy grammar and rhetoric in secret without her parents knowingand which had progressed to take in more erudite and challengingquestions?

Anna Komnene answers this last question for us emphatically inthe Alexiad. According to the author, philosophical inquiry had allbut died out before her father took the throne. The result was thatmost people enjoyed fatuous pursuits, seeking out luxury and pleasure,and wasting their time doing things like catching quail, or playingdraughts.43 As Anna makes quite clear on regular occasions in thetext, the study of philosophy was the highest prize for an individualto pursue.44 Unfortunately for those concerned, figures like John Italosand John Solomon were simply poor scholars, who in spite of theirapparent vast learning had entirely failed to grasp the deepest truths ofphilosophy—according to Anna Komnene at any rate.45 Both, indeed,were guilty of misunderstanding Aristotle specifically, a point whichAnna labors in an obvious attempt to contrast her own aptitude onAristotle with the failings of these others.46

As a matter of fact, Anna’s study of Aristotle appears in almost thevery first line of the Alexiad. Her proud claim to have studied the trea-tises of Aristotle (τ*ς 8Αριστ�τελικ*ς τ"�νας) as well as the dialogues ofPlato, appears in the same sentence in which Anna introduces herselfin the text. In other words, she chooses at the outset to define her-self as an Aristotelian and Platonic scholar, a point she underlines bystressing that she has not only studied these texts, but has done soat great length.47 Indeed, Anna’s affirmation of her own philosophi-cal interests is a theme that runs through the course of the Alexiad. Thefact that the theme of authorial objectivity is also pervasive is perhapsno coincidence, then. In each case we can read into Anna’s interestsand pre-occupations a desire to parade both her classical training and

43 Alex. V.8.ii.50–57, p. 162; XV.7.ix.25, p. 485.44 e.g. Alex. V.9.iii, p. 165 f.45 On Italos’ inability to grasp the depths of philosophy: Alex. V.8.iii.68ff., p. 162ff.;

on John Solomon’s philosophical pretensions and inadequacies: Alex. XII.5.iv.33–36,p. 372.

46 Ibidem.47 Alex. Prologue, I.2.9–17, p. 5 f.

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her scholarly pretensions, something which is in turn underscored bythe frequent allusions to antique literature and imagery which appearin the text.48

This, then, brings to a head Anna Komnene’s promotion of philoso-phy, her patronage of Aristotle, the funeral oration of George Tornikiosand the Alexiad itself. The ideal, of course, would be to find a con-sistency between Anna’s interests and her life and work, a connectionbetween her patronage of Eustratios of Nicaea and her compositionof the Alexiad. However, a reading of the Alexiad proves highly disap-pointing in this regard. Anna devotes precious little coverage to seriousphilosophical discussion. Apart from the occasional dismissal of quailhunting or of schedography, coupled with appropriate token commentsabout the importance of study, of literature and of philosophy, there isalmost nothing that would indicate that the author had more than thebriefest of interests in Aristotle, let alone had commissioned the firstcommentaries on some of his works.49

Indeed, Anna deliberately passes up the opportunity to go into anydetail, even when offered the perfect opportunity to do so. For example,the author devotes considerable attention to the heresy of John Italos,whom she exposes to a brutal personal attack, which focuses on theshortness of his temperament, the crudeness of his grammar, and theroughness of his style. While noting that he had a particular exper-tise on Aristotle (indeed, the first of the anathemata proclaimed againsthim concerned his use of syllogisms), she neither goes into what thisexpertise was in order to critique it positively or otherwise (as we mighthave expected), nor considers whether the charges which were broughtagainst him had any merit or intellectual value.50

If Anna’s reluctance to engage is surprising for someone whoseavowed interests, according to herself and to George Tornikios, andwitnessed to by her patronage of the commentaries, were firmly cen-tered on Aristotle, then so too is the limited use she makes of hiswork. Aristotle is quoted, directly or indirectly, fewer than ten timesin the Alexiad. This is scarcely more than the number of times Annadraws on Euripides, John Chrysostom or Galen, and is similar to her

48 Buckler(1929) 165–221.49 See for example, Alex. V.8.iii.57–68, p. 162, XV.7.viii.25–34, p. 485.50 For Anna Komnene’s vitriolic condemnation of Italos, see Alex. V.8.i–V.9.vii,

pp. 161–167. The author notes Italos’ specific focus on Aristotle, V.8.v.93–94, p. 163.For the proclamations against him, see Gouillard, (1967) 137–161.


use of Plato. In other words, to judge from the Alexiad alone, indepen-dent of Eustratios’s dedication and the speech of George Tornikios, itwould be fair to say that there is nothing in the Alexiad that would sug-gest that the author of the text had devoted a considerable amount oftime, energy and resources to overseeing work on Aristotle or on theEthics.

The significance of this should be stressed by noting that Anna’scommissioning of the commentaries certainly pre-dates the composi-tion of the Alexiad; that is to say, therefore, that the omission of dis-cussion of Aristotle, of the Ethics and of philosophy in general is allthe more surprising. We can assert this time-line with some confidence.First, Tornikios states that Anna brought her intellectual interests fullyinto the open following the death of her father in 1118.51 Secondly, tojudge from the formulaic speech, it would seem that Anna’s philosoph-ical investigations certainly preceded the death of her own husband,Nikephoros Bryennios, at the end of the 1130s.52 Moreover, the pre-sumptions we can make about Eustratios’ age again points clearly tothe fact that Anna’s patronage naturally dates to 1120s and perhaps the1130s. By contrast, then, we learn that Anna only began work on theAlexiad after the death of Bryennios and, indeed, only took up her his-tory of Alexios’ reign following the accession of Manuel I Komnenosin 1143, a statement which sits comfortably with the subtext providedby this Emperor’s reign which runs right through the course of thetext.53 That is to say, therefore, that Anna’s interest in and concern withAristotle were well-established by the time that she came to write anaccount of her father’s reign.

The invisibility of Aristotle in the Alexiad should prompt the questionof why Anna had sought out commentaries in the first place, and whatshe hoped these would teach. One thing is clear: they certainly didnot teach her a great deal about Aristotle. Of the seven references tothe Nicomachean Ethics in the Alexiad, three are inaccurate. Moreover, inmore than one case, Anna has misunderstood the fundamentals of whatAristotle was saying. In the case of John Taronites, for example, Annaseems to equate her cousin’s flattery of the Emperor with Aristotle’s

51 Lettres 269–271.52 Ibid. 295.53 There seems little reason to doubt Anna’s comment that she began work in

earnest during the reign of Manuel I Komnenos, Alex. XIV.7.v.47–51, pp. 451–452. Forthe context of Manuel, see Magdalino (2000) 15–43.

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model of the Magnanimous Man, failing to see that Taronites’ praise ofAlexios is precisely the opposite of the quality Aristotle advocates for anindependent check on a ruler and his power.54

More troubling still is a quote which comes towards the very endof the Alexiad, which either represents a case of show-boating by theauthor, or is remarkable for its sloppiness. Returning to the theme thathers is an objective account of Alexios’ reign, she is at pains to note thather first love was not the law of nature (i.e. her father), but rather thetruth. In a casual throwaway, Anna notes that a philosopher once said(Eς π�� τις F�η �ιλ.σ��ς) that both were dear, but of these the truthis the most excellent.55 Perhaps we should understand Anna’s stand-offishness in the most generous way we can, that is, as an aside forthose who knew whom she was quoting, and an almost ironic nodto Aristotle. The simplicity of the quote does nothing to re-assure us,however, and it is hardly the level of intellectual artistry practiced byskilled performers like Michael Psellos.

Indeed, if we advance the argument further, we soon find other hintswhich support the conclusion that Anna was perhaps not as interestedin philosophy or in Aristotle’s philosophy as might be inferred fromher sponsorship of the commentaries. There is little, for example, inGeorge Tornikios’ oration which suggests that Anna’s interests werehigh-powered. If anything, Tornikios says rather the opposite, offeringenough to paint a picture of an intellectual butterfly, flitting from gram-mar and rhetoric one minute, to medicine the next and philosophy theminute after that.56 We can surely read something into his commentsabout Anna, which even for a panegyric are on the edge of being far-fetched: according to George, although Anna was fascinated by Euclid,Ptolemy, Plato and Aristotle, she did not always agree with these sages.Indeed, many a time came that she did not yield to them. In fact, saysTornikios, Anna often took these ancient scholars on, with the implicitsuggestion that she was able to out-manoeuvre them with ease. It comesas no surprise that George does not go into detail here, and chooses not

54 Alex. XIII.1.iii.22–28, pp. 384–385. Anna appears to think that by indulging andflattering her father, Taronites was a true dialectician (‘διαλεκτικ�ν’), meaning thisapprovingly. Not only does Aristotle use this word in a negative sense, but he specificallystates that tyrants appreciate weak men—like Taronites in other words—who praisethem, EN, VIII.6, p. 1157.

55 Alex. XIV.7.iii.13–17, p. 450.56 Lettres 269–271, 283.


to record which points Anna specifically disagreed with, nor whatarguments she articulated which dealt with these once and for all.57

But the intention here is not to belittle Anna, whose erudition,curiosity and intellect are patently clear from the Alexiad as well as fromher peers. She was emphatically not a cosseted and vacuous patron ofimperial blood who allowed herself to be flattered and manipulated bydullard scholars. Rather, a re-evaluation needs to be done of preciselywhat her interests and indeed her aims were when it came to commis-sioning commentaries from Eustratios of Nicaea and others. For thereis a coherence here that unites the various elements and which we canpull together about her life—her patronage, her intellectual interests,and her own work.

The theme that unites these more naturally and credibly than thepursuit of philosophy itself is that of Hellenism. This is the prism thatwe need to look through if we are to understand Anna’s work and,indeed, her interest in Aristotle. Anna Komnene was not so much inter-ested in the ideas that Aristotle or, indeed, the other classical philoso-phers was promoting, as in what he and they stood for. And whatthey stood for was an identity that Byzantium was rapidly coming toembrace as it sought to define itself relative to the peoples aroundit. The Alexiad is nothing if not a modern re-working of an ancientGreek epic. Its name, self-consciously lifted from Homer, places thenarrative from the outset in a classical tradition—something Annarapidly confirms at the start of the text by reference to the greatest ofthe scholars of classical antiquity and, specifically, of classical Greece:Plato and Aristotle. Alexios and his actions are repeatedly describedin heroic language in the course text, the struggles facing Emperorand Empire routinely compared with those of Herakles, or Odysseus,the qualities and characteristics of the eponymous hero likened tothose easily identifiable in classical Greek literature—that is, militaryprowess, tirelessness, religious orthodoxy (albeit in a Christian con-text) and above all courage in the face of seemingly insurmountableodds.58

Anna’s own interests too fit the mould of the classical scholar, witha focus on rhetoric, style and grammar. For Anna, far more impor-tant than Italos’ heresies or even his use of Aristotelian methodology—a charge which led to the condemnation of Eustratios and, more-

57 Ibid. 301.58 Dyck (1986) 113–120; Buckler (1929) esp. 197 f.

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over, something which she implicitly promoted herself through her ownpatronage of the commentators—was his improper use of the Greeklanguage, his failure to stick to the rules of grammar, and his lack ofliterary style. Anna was less interested in the wider philosophical ques-tions about the eternity of matter, or about the relationship betweenthe human and the divine Christ, than she was about the integrity of aHellenic ideal in Byzantium. This was why she paid little attention todetailed discussion and barely referred to the former in the Alexiad, butfocused closely on the latter, repeatedly articulating characteristics thatshe considered to be truly Byzantine, and those that she did not.

In this context, then, there is an obvious and striking consistencyto Anna’s account of her father’s reign that is significant here. Forthe author of the Alexiad, all foreigners, or more specifically, all non-Byzantines, were barbarians. The term ‘2�ρ2αρ�ς’ is used indiscrimi-nately about the Turks and steppe nomads; and tellingly, also appliesit willingly to Christians, frequently referring to Latins, whether Cru-saders or not, as barbarians.59 And in fact, Anna does rather more, foras Jonathan Shepard astutely noted, she identifies characteristics com-mon to all those outside the sphere of Constantinople, regardless of eth-nic origin, linguistic or social background, or indeed religious persua-sion. Latins, Turks and nomads (the three major groupings of peoplesin the text) are all untrustworthy, avaricious, immoral and inconsistent.In other words, then, an important part of the Alexiad is as much aboutsetting up an ideal in terms of the figure of the Emperor Alexios Kom-nenos, as it is about establishing a strong sense of behavior, ethics andnorms which are specifically not Byzantine—and consequently under-scoring those which are.

And of course, Anna was not alone in her promotion of Hellenism,nor conversely in her treatment of the world outside Byzantium. Theattempts to reconcile the classical (pagan) scholars with Christianityhad moved on a long way since John Chrysostom dismissed the ancientphilosophers’ views uniformly as ashes and dust, comparing theirthroats to an open grave with everything inside it reeking of foulness,and calling their teachings worm-eaten.60 By the eleventh century, wecan even find John Mauropous not just defending Plato, as his friendJohn Xiphilinos had done, but praying for his soul and that of Plutarch

59 Shepard (1988) 97–98.60 Tatakis (2003) xxii, citing Homily 66 of John Chrysostom, 224 f.


(though curiously not that of Aristotle).61 Other writers too routinelytalk of ‘barbarians’ and barbarianism—even when talking about theChristian west in this period.62 But it was in the twelfth century, at pre-cisely this time, that the concept of Hellenism, the renewed and sus-tained interest in the classical Greek world, really took off.

It is in the context of Hellenic and indeed Hellenistic inspirationbehind works such as those of Theodore Prodromos and ConstantineManasses on Rodanthe and Dosikles and Aristandros and Kallithea respec-tively, that we should place Anna Komnene’s patronage of Eustratiosof Nicaea. Anna’s primary interest was in linking the Byzantium ofher father, her brother and her nephew with the classical world. Andindeed, this is precisely what the Alexiad is—a text where Gods, giants,heroes and impossible quests feature alongside mortals, their struggles,and the protection shown by (a Christian) God. In this sense, then,the references to the authors of classical Greece, and to the imagery ofantique Hellenism is significant in so far as it showcases the frameworkin which Anna sought to present not only Byzantium during the reignof her father, but which also reflects the time of the composition ofthe text in the 1140s and the context which that in turn provides. ThatAnna was not concerned with consideration of philosophical analysis,but rather with the promotion of philosophy per se and more impor-tantly, with Hellenistic philosophy, is something which is consistent dur-ing the course of the Alexiad, but which also carries a resonance withher promotion of Aristotle through her stable of commentators.

For Anna Komnene’s primary concern was with resurrecting or atleast promoting scholarship (including but not limited solely to phi-losophy). In spite of her criticisms of the rich and powerful in Con-stantinople who had allowed figures like Italos, Theodore Blachernitesand even Bogomils into their houses, Anna was herself interested in thepromotion of ideas. The fact that it is possible to identify a specific setof ideas that she sought to advance in the Alexiad and beyond throughher commissioning of the commentaries on Aristotle is invaluable in sofar as it establishes not only what she was trying to promote and alsowhat she was avoiding through her silence.

In this way, therefore, the significance of her patronage of Eustratiosof Nicaea lies in precisely the act of sponsorship, rather than necessarilythe value (or even the understanding) of precisely what was being pro-

61 Tatakis (2003) 129.62 Shepard (1988) 96–97.

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moted. For Anna Komnene, the age of Classical Greece brought withit parallels with Byzantium in the late eleventh and twelfth centuriesthat were appropriate and natural. It is no coincidence, then, that Latinscholars of both republican and imperial Rome are entirely ignored inAnna’s own writing as well as by her circle of scholars (at least by impli-cation); not for nothing either, then, that Tornikios too excludes thesefrom her funeral oration. In death, as in life, Anna Komnene was aHellenist.

ARISTOTELIAN ETHICS IN BYZANTIUM

Linos G. Benakis

This paper is primarily technical in nature. It will argue that whenone begins to examine a less investigated area of the field of ByzantinePhilosophy, research in the primary sources must still precede everyinterpretative act and critical approach. Here, research in the primarysources means:

a. The gathering of texts. This is not always an easy task, although thepublication in recent decades of new critical editions of texts byByzantine philosophers has made it more feasible.1 Older editionsof Byzantine philosophers, some of which have been reprinted,also remain useful, some unexpectedly so.2

b. The study of texts in relation to their sources. Namely, the identificationof sources—distinguishing between instances of mere borrowingand instances of a more critical incorporation of such sources intoByzantine texts—the identification of original elements, of director indirect influences, of tendencies in the use of source materials,etc. Here, the ever-expanding secondary bibliography needs tobe consulted with caution, since some studies contain errors ofinterpretation which may be more or less obvious.3

This paper will, therefore, necessarily consider both the external evi-dence and, as far as possible, the internal evidence regarding our texts.While its nature and methods remain to be justified, this paper willhave served its purpose and satisfied its writer’s aims if it stimulatesan interest among new scholars in conducting research and writingabout this highly productive area of Greek philosophy, one that has

1 Benakis (1991).2 One such is the collection of texts by Nikephoros Blemmydes edited by Dorotheos

Voulismas and published in Leipzig in 1784, where the treatise On Virtue can be found.3 There is, for example, the case of the article by Giocarinis (1964), where Eustratios

seems to be a defender of the Platonic theory of ideas, when in fact the opposite istrue, as is evident from the texts cited. It is also inexcusable for A. Lloyd to speak ofnominalism in Eustratios in the article cited in note 10, when he himself concludes thatEustratios’ method may be defined as a form of conceptualism!

64 linos g. benakis

been somewhat neglected. I am certain that they will find such researchrichly rewarding, whether they engage in ‘technical’ research work or amore broadly conceived examination of the most significant problemsof Byzantine philosophy.

As a starting point, one ‘external’ fact of particular importance toour topic is the large number of manuscripts containing the Nicoma-

chean Ethics which have been preserved from the Byzantine period.There are approximately 120 manuscripts, to which one might add 45manuscripts of the Major Ethics and 25 of the Eudemian Ethics. In order toput these numbers into perspective I cite the corresponding numbers ofmanuscripts of other key works by Aristotle. There are 160 manuscriptsof the Categories from the Byzantine period, 140 of the De interpretatione,120 for the Prior Analytics, 120 for the Physics, 60 for the Metaphysics,60 for the De caelo, and 40 for the Poetics. I have discussed the Politics

elsewhere.4 It is, therefore, essential to consider these numbers whenconsidering the knowledge and interest of the Byzantines in the moral-political ideas of Aristotle.5

Of even greater importance is an examination of the ‘internal’ ele-ments that constitute this interest, so that one might then understandthe relation between our Byzantine authors and the political think-ing of the state philosophers of antiquity. The same point can applyto the Ethics, where the identification of elements of Aristotle’s ‘moral’teaching in the works of Byzantine philosophers might be considered inrelation to the presence of moral problems and issues within both aca-demic teaching and within a Byzantine Lebensphilosophie that was firmlyembedded in Christian dogma.

There are numerous Byzantine commentaries on Aristotle’s Nicoma-

chean Ethics. Among the earliest of these was that of Michael of Ephesus(eleventh-twelfth century), who can be found in the circle of philoso-phers associated with Anna Komnene and who wrote commentarieson book V and on books IX and X of the Nicomachean Ethics.6 A firstedition (by contemporary criteria) of these commentaries appeared in

4 Benakis (1982b) 230–236.5 See the testimony of Adamantius Korais, who, in his Hellenic Library published

Aristotle’s Politics in 1821 as the first volume of the collection. This was followed in 1822by his publication of the Nicomachean Ethics. He wrote the following in his prologue,claiming that Ethics is a part of Politics: “both are one and the same science, of whichEthics can be considered the theoretical part, and Politics the practical.”

6 In EN 5 and In EN 9–10. For Michael, see Browning (1962).

aristotelian ethics in byzantium 65

Venice in 1541.7 We must not overlook the fact that Michael of Eph-esus was an experienced commentator, with extensive commentaries onAristotle’s work: including books V–VIII of the Metaphysics, the Parva

Naturalia, the Sophistici Elenchi, the De partibus and the De motu animal-

ium, which, fortunately, were included in the publishing endeavor ofthe Prussian Academy.8 The commentaries by Michael of Ephesus onPhysics, De caelo and the Rhetoric have not been preserved. For details ofhis knowledge and treatment of the Politics see my article mentionedabove. In addition, the recent secondary literature on Michael is reli-able.

In the same period, Eustratios of Nicaea (c. 1050–c. 1120) composedcommentaries on books I and VI of the Nicomachean Ethics.9 Eustra-tios’s commentaries were also included in the 1541 Venetian edition.Parts of them were also, surprisingly, included in E. Pargiter’s 1745 Lon-don edition entitled Aristotle of Morals to Nichomachus I. For the impor-tance and impact of Eustratios’ commentaries on Aristotle’s work inthe West one should consult a significant series of articles by Mer-cken, Sorabji, Lloyd, Trizio, and Benakis.10 According to Sorabji, theesteemed scholar of the whole tradition of Greek commentaries onAristotle, Eustratios of Nicaea introduced Platonic, Christian and anti-Arabic elements into his texts, whereas Michael of Ephesus can be seento have mainly followed the existing commentaries by Alexander ofAphrodisias and the Neoplatonic school of Alexandria. Also of signif-icance for any assessment of Eustratios is the study by Lloyd, whichargues that Eustratios’ Aristotelian commentaries were the most inter-esting of any of those produced by a Byzantine philosopher, as thesubject of his discussion was not limited to the philosopher’s style ordefinitions, but rather addressed the philosopher’s views and his teach-ings. Indeed, Eustratios appears to have been a competent philoso-pher in the tradition of Michael Psellos and John Italos, whose studenthe was. One finds within his work a combination of Aristotelianismand Neoplatonism. This is evident in his resolution of the problem ofgeneral concepts (the universalia), in which resolution Lloyd also finds

7 Aristotelis Stagiritae Moralia Nichomachia cum Eustratii, Aspasii, Michaelis Ephesii nonullo-rum aliorum Graecorum explanationibus, ed. B.B. Felicianus, Venetiis 1541.

8 In metaph., In GA, In PN and In PA.9 In EN.

10 Mercken (1990); Sorabji (1990) 20–21; Lloyd (1987); Trizio (2006); Benakis (1978–1979).

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that Eustratios has resolved the problem of conceptual realism (concep-tualism) that can be found in the Alexandrian commentators, i.e. thoseof the school of Ammonius and thence of all Byzantine scholars.11

In his study, Lloyd does not treat Eustratios’ work on the Ethics sys-tematically. There is undoubtedly fertile ground for future researchhere. One strand that remains noteworthy is Eustratios’ influence onWestern Christian philosophy. Here, it should be noted that the firstWestern commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, that by Albertus Mag-nus (Cologne 1250–1252), appeared approximately 130 years later thanthat by Eustratios. Eustratios was already known in the West by thattime, first through James of Venice (approx. 1130) and primarilythrough the translation and use of his commentaries, particularly onLogic, by Robert Grosseteste in England. The latter called Eustratios‘Commentator Graecus’ or simply ‘Commentator’ (compared to theplain ‘Philosophus’ reserved for Aristotle). On the subject of Eustratios’influence in the West, we have the reliable studies by H.P.F. Merckenon Robert Grosseteste’s Latin translations of the Greek commentaries.12

Mercken is also the author of a paper, “Ethics as a Science in Albert theGreat and Eustratios of Nicaea,”13 where the key issue, as to whethera scientia moralis rather than a practica moralis was possible in the Mid-dle Ages, is examined on the basis of the first Latin commentary onthe Nicomachean Ethics, that of Albertus Magnus. Albertus only wrote onbooks I and VI. It is in these books that Aristotle deals with issues ofmethod in the Ethics and it is where he discusses the intellectual virtues,of which science or scientia is one. Eustratios, of course, had commentedon these same books and his authority is invoked by Albertus, whorefers to him as Commentator Graecus. Clearly, an area of enquiry thatthen arises from this relationship and that deserves greater attentionwould be an investigation of the extent to which Albertus Magnus’sviews on the scientific understanding of ethics were influenced by thewritings of his Byzantine predecessor.

Another Byzantine commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics is the“Anonymous” commentary on books II to V.14 This text is a com-pilation of mainly Alexandrian commentaries made by a Byzantinescholar, probably of the thirteenth century. There is a further anony-

11 See Benakis (1978–1979).12 Mercken (1973).13 Unfortunately all I know of this article is a short summary.14 In EN 2–5.


mous Byzantine commentary on book VII of the Nicomachean Ethics.15

No reliable research has yet been carried out on either of these com-mentaries.

There are also a number of paraphrases that deserve our attention.In 1889 Heylbut published a Late Byzantine paraphrase of the whole ofthe Nicomachean Ethics.16 This paraphrase is attributed to Heliodoros ofProussa in this Berlin edition. It has also been attributed to AndronikosKallistos (1400–1486) and to Andronikos Rhodios (!) in a first editionthat was published in Cambridge in 1679, and has also been attributedto John Filagrios from Crete (s. Wartelle for cod. Napol. Gr. 335). Themost likely case is that this paraphrase was the work of ConstantinePaleokappas, a 14th century monastic scholar.17 This work, which was auseful teaching tool for the Byzantines, was widely known.

George Pachymeres’ (1242–1310) paraphrase of the Nicomachean Ethics

was written as part of his extensive work, the Philosophia, which soughtto provide “commentaries” on the whole Aristotelian Corpus in 12books and 238 chapters. These had only been published in a Latintranslation: Venetiis 1545, Lugduni 1547, Parisiis 1547, 1555, and Basi-leae 1560. A first critical edition of book ten has now been publishedwithin the series “Corpus Philosophorum Medii Aevi—Commentariain Aristotelem Byzantina” of the Academy of Athens.18 This greatByzantine historian and philosopher’s method was to select significantpassages from Aristotle’s work and then to provide them with explana-tions in simpler, more comprehensible terms, using language and ideasdrawn from the ancient commentators.

Lastly, there is a commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics that is at-tributed to the emperor John Kantakouzenos, or, under his monasticname, Ioasaph (after 1355), which remains unpublished. This work,however, is identical to the commentary by Pseudo-Olympiodoros (aparaphrase of the commentary by the Alexandrian Olympiodoros). Itis believed that Kantakouzenos had probably commissioned a copy ofthis text and that this was later mistakenly attributed to him.19

It is not difficult to locate both brief and lengthy references, explicitor otherwise, to Aristotle, the Ethics, or commentators on the Ethics in

15 In EN 8.16 Heliodoros of Proussa, Paraphrasis.17 This paraphrase is known from Hatch (1879).18 George Pachymeres, Paraphrasis.19 See Nicol (1968).

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other texts by Byzantine philosophers. For example, we can readilyfind references in the recent editions of Michael Psellos’s writings: inchapter seven of the Philosophica Minora I and in chapters twelve andthirty-two of the Philosophica Minora II.20 In paragraphs 66–81 of Psellos’sDe omnifaria doctrina there are numerous references to book 2 of theNicomachean Ethics, as well as to the Pseudo-Aristotelean On Virtue and

Vice and the Ethica Eudemia.21 These instances suggest that Aspasius’scommentaries on Aristotle’s writings on morality are a common sourcefor Psellos as well as other Byzantines.

A further example is offered by the chapter “On moral virtue andother matters,” which is found in the collection Queries and Solutions

written by the eleventh-century philosopher John Italos.22 Here, Italossuggests that the ancient philosophers, primarily Aristotle, have giventhe most exact definition of what might be termed ethical virtue. Italosincludes seven passages from books I, II, V and VI of Aristotle’s Nico-

machean Ethics in his chapter. The presence of Aspasius’s commentarycan also be detected throughout.

The philosopher Nikephoros Blemmydes of Nicaea (1197–1272) alsowrote a “Discourse on Virtue.”23 This, like his better-known works,Epitome on Logic and Epitome on Physics, follows closely upon the structureand language of Aristotle’s own works and thus cleaves to the modelprovided by the Nicomachean Ethics.

The Miscellanea philosophica et historica by Theodore Metochites (1270–1337), is accompanied by a brief table of the names of ancient writers.24

This contains approximately forty references to Aristotle, without, how-ever, always referencing the specific work by Aristotle cited in the text.The Nicomachean Ethics, like the Metaphysics, Politics and Rhetoric, does notappear to have been mentioned by Metochites. A fuller investigation ofthe Miscellanea and his other writings may show that Metochites did, infact, know and use these works.25

Lastly, in this purely descriptive overview, I would like to mention thepre-eminently moral dissertation by George Gemistos Plethon (1360–1452), his “On Virtue”. A new critical edition of this text contains an

20 See my critical review for these two valuable volumes from the Teubneriana,Benakis (1995). Phil min. I 22–28 and Phil min. II 23–30, 109–111.

21 Omni. doc. 43–49.22 QQ 87–95.23 Nikephorou monastou kai presvyterou tou Vlemmidou Epitome logikes 121–140.24 Misc. 838.25 See now the notes in Hult (2002).


enlightening introduction, from which it is clear that Plethon’s mainsources are Plato, Plutarch, Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius, and the pseu-do-Aristotelian On Virtue and Vice.26 Plethon’s method itself shows theinfluence of Aristotle, and the Mystran philosopher’s knowledge of theAristotelian corpus is in any case well-known from his entire bodyof work (for Nicomachean Ethics, see, for example, De differentiis, V,1–2and elsewhere.) Here, however, we can draw a significant distinction:while in Aristotle moral philosophy is “phenomenological”, and for thatreason largely descriptive, morality in Plethon is the object of science inthe strict meaning of the term, and thus is wholly based on the firstprinciples of Metaphysics. Therefore, Plethon’s method can be seen to bePlatonic, for it is to a great extent analytical. But in the case of the lastgreat Byzantine philosopher, too, research will need to address otherimportant aspects of his moral teachings, such as his basic belief in thedual nature of man, in absolute providence, and in the moral-politicalcharacter of free will, and other such areas.

26 Traité des vertus.

NEOPLATONIC SOURCE-MATERIALIN EUSTRATIOS OF NICAEA’S COMMENTARY ON

BOOK VI OF THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS

Michele Trizio*

Eustratios of Nicaea’s acquaintance with arguments and formulas de-pending directly or indirectly upon Neoplatonic sources is not entirelya new issue. For instance, Zervos’s famous 1920 monograph on Psellosbriefly sketches some notes on Eustratios’ Neoplatonic background andexplicitly mentions Proklos as his source while linking this influencedirectly to the Psellian legacy.1 However, it was with Giocarinis’ andSteel’s studies on Eustratios’ defense of the Platonic ideal Good in hiscommentary on book I of the Nicomachean Ethics that the Neoplatonicinfluence on Eustratios became evident.2 In particular, Steel founddirect evidence of a dependence upon Proklos’ commentary on theParmenides, as well as the presence in Michael of Ephesus’ commentaryon book X of the Nicomachean Ethics of Damaskios’ commentary on thePhilebus, probably one of the few traces of the influence of this latterwork in Byzantium.3

Until now scholars have devoted their attention mainly to Eustratios’commentary on book I of the Nicomachean Ethics, whereas the aim of thepresent paper is to investigate the role played by Neoplatonic sourcesin his commentary on book VI of that same work. Here, although thecommentator does not deal directly with the Aristotelian criticism ofthe Platonic theory of knowledge, Eustratios still seems to regard thePlatonic and Neoplatonic tradition as a reliable set of sources for theexegesis of the Aristotelian text.

* I would like to thank Charles Barber and Dave Jenkins for their scrupulous editingof the present paper.

1 Zervos (1973) 225–227.2 Giocarinis (1964). Cf. also Podskalsky (1976) 519; Lloyd (1987) 350; Steel (2002).3 Cf. Steel (2002) 54–57.

72 michele trizio

1. The Objects of Physics, Mathematics and First Philosophy

In a previous article I proved that the influence of the Neoplatonists,in particular Proklos, is evident in both the terminology and the argu-ments developed by Eustratios. This influence seems to be widespreadthroughout the three commentaries written by this Byzantine author.4

Focusing on the problem of the Aristotelian distinction between abso-lute (Gπλ�ς) and conditional necessity ()5 =π� "σεως), I emphasized thatEustratios interprets this distinction within a non-Aristotelian frame-work. Despite the complementarity in Aristotle of the two kinds ofnecessity, he strictly applies the absolute one to what he calls “beingsin the proper sense of the term” (κυρ�ως Hντα), which he describes asthose beings properly so-called which always remain self-identical (τ*&ε' κατ* τ* α;τ* κα' Iσα�τως F��ντα); and the conditional one to “thatwhich is never a proper being” (Hντως �;δ"π�τε Hν), which he associateswith what is subject to coming to be and passing away.5 He also situatesthis particular interpretation of Aristotle’s different kinds of necessitywithin the framework of the Neoplatonic distinction between “causes”(αJτια) and “concomitant causes” (συνα�τια). Only the first can be con-sidered causes properly so-called as they are “the only ones which tran-scend their effects” (μ.να τ�ν α#τιατ�ν )5C�ρηται).6 In both cases, Eustra-tios quotes Proklos literally.7

This preference for Neoplatonic sources is reflected in the peculiarargumentative structure which often seems to characterize Eustratios’commentary on book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics. His comments on thedifferent lemmata are often introduced by an initial “safe” explanationof the Aristotelian text, in which Eustratios seems to simply expandthe lemma with material of his own or taken from the tradition of theLate antique commentators. He then introduces a further interpretativelevel by using a terminology referable to the Neoplatonic tradition,in particular to Proklos, which seems to be more representative ofEustratios’ position.8

4 Trizio (2006).5 In EN 293.10–20.6 In EN 267.18–22.7 Cf. for example Inst. 75: Π ν τ� κυρ�ως αJτι�ν λεγ.μεν�ν )5CLρηται τ�+ &π�τελ"σμα-

τ�ς = In EN 267.19–22 τLς μ?ν γ*ρ γν7σεως &ρ�α' �$ Mρ�ι κα' τ* &5ι7ματα )π� γε τ�ν&ναγκα�ων, τLς δ? =π�ρ5εως τ* π�ιητικ* κα' τ* τελικ�. τα+τα γ*ρ μ.να κυρ�ως ατια, Mτικα' μ.να τ�ν α#τιατ�ν � ��ρηται.

8 For a sample of this structure, cf. Trizio (2006) 41–53.

neoplatonic source-material 73

Eustratios’ account of the objects and status of the three theoreticalsciences can be considered a particular instance of his view on thestatus and functionning of the cognitive process. The occasion forsuch a discussion came from a famous passage of book VI of theNicomachean Ethics, where Aristotle says that a young boy can becomea good mathematician (μα ηματικ.ς), but he cannot become a man ofwisdom (σ��.ς) or a natural philosopher (�υσικ.ς).9 The reason is thatthe principles of wisdom and physics—as well as the knowledge of theparticular facts belonging to the field of practical wisdom—derive fromexperience ()5 )μπειρ�ας), and experience requires time in order to beacquired (πλL �ς γ*ρ �ρ.ν�υ π�ιε, τNν )μπειρ�αν).10

The commentator does not seem to be particularly concerned withthe link established by Aristotle between time, experience and theacquisition of the capacity of dealing with the particulars: he merelyexpands the Aristotelian lemma, which is in the end a similar strat-egy to that found in Eustratios’ commentary on another famous Aris-totelian reference to this topic, in book I of the Nicomachean Ethics.11

Interestingly, however, a variant in Eustratios’ text of the Nicomachean

Ethics appears only in two of the extant manuscripts. Instead of πλL- �ς γ*ρ �ρ.ν�υ π�ιε, τNν )μπειρ�αν Eustratios has πλL �ς γ*ρ π�ι�σει)μπειρ�αν, which allows him to remark on the protreptic value of thisparticular Aristotelian sentence.12 By contrast, he devotes five pages—one of the longest explanations of the whole commentaries on book Iand VI of the Aristotelian work at stake—to the status of the objects ofphysics, mathematics and first philosophy (σ��α). Following Eustratios’exposition, I shall start from his account on mathematical objects anddiscuss the objects of physics and the objects of first philosophy.

1.1. The Objects of Mathematics

According to Eustratios, mathematical objects are known by abstrac-tion ()5 &�αιρ"σεως) from the subjects in which they actually exist()κσπ�ντες α;τ* κα' &�αιρ�+ντες &π� τ�ν =π�κειμ"νων )ν �Oς =�εστ�-

9 Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea VI,9,1142a16–20.10 Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea VI,9,1142a14–15.11 Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea I,1,1095a2–4; Eustratios, In EN 25.4–26.5. In Aristotle,

Ethica Nicomachea II,1,1103a15–16, time and experience are said to be the prerequisitesfor the acquisition of the intellectual virtues.

12 In EN 344.13–15.

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κασι).13 “Abstraction” (&�α�ρεσις) seems to be the technical term, notimmediately identical with “induction” ()παγωγ�), used by Aristotle todescribe the way in which mathematical objects are graspable. It entailsa logical separation or “subtraction” of arithmetical and geometricalobjects from their subjects.14 This description of the status of math-ematical objects seems to be a standard account of the Aristotelianstandpoint grounded in the commentary tradition.15 Numbers, mag-nitudes and figures of magnitudes cannot exist in actuality outside thesubjects in which they exist (�ωρ'ς τ�ν =π�κειμ"νων κατ’ )ν"ργειαν =��-στασ αι μN δυν�μενα). They are, on the contrary, abstracted by thought(κατ’ )π�ν�ιαν) from the subjects in which they actually exist ()κ τ�ν=π�κειμ"νων )ν �Oς =�εστ�κασι).16 Such terminology can be traced backto Alexander of Aphrodisias’ commentary on the Metaphysics where he

13 In EN 344.30–345.10: Fστι δ? τ� λεγ.μεν�ν τ�ι�+τ�ν, Mτι τ* μ?ν μα ηματικ* �αν-ταστικ* κα' διαν�ητ* κα' )ν �αντασ�Pα κα' διαν��Pα F�ει τNν σ�στασιν, )ν μ?ν τCL �αντασ�Pατυπ��μενα, =π� δ? τLς διαν��ας )5ετα�.μενα> τ* δ? τ�ια+τα )5 &�αιρ"σεως λαμ2�ν�-μεν, Qτ�ι )κσπ�ντες α;τ* κα' &�αιρ�+ντες &π� τ�ν =π�κειμ"νων )ν �Oς =�εστ�κασι κα'τυπ�+ντες α;τ* )ν τCL �αντασ�Pα &�λως κα' &σωμ�τως δε��μ"νCη τα+τα &π� τLς α#σ �σε-ως, R &μ"σως Iς α#σ ητ�,ς �6σι κα' )ν =π�κειμ"νDω α;τ�,ς )πι2�λλ�υσα, παραπ"μπει τCL�αντασ�Pα τ�0ς τ�π�υς α;τLς, � δ’ )ν /αυτCL τ��τ�υς δε��μ"νη κα' συντηρ�+σα Eσπερ τιςπ�να5 =π�τ� ησι τCL διαν��Pα α;τ��ς, � δ’ Iς Hμμα τLς ψυ�Lς α;τ�,ς )πι2�λλ�υσα )5ετ��ειπερ' α;τ�ν κα' τ�ν /π�μ"νων α;τ�,ς κα' ε=ρ�σκει τα+τα κα' τ�0ς λ.γ�υς α;τ�ν &π�δ�-δωσι. τ�+τ� δ? γ�νεται )π' τ�ν &ρι μ�ν κα' μεγε �ν, T =π�κε�μενα τα,ς μα ηματικα,ς)πιστ�μαις ε#σ�ν.

14 Aristotle, Physica II,2,193b36–194a1. The natural philospher and the mathemati-cian deal both with lines, figures and shapes. However, the first must deal with both,matter and form, like a craftsman, while the second does not treat these concepts in sofar as they are boundaries of each natural body (�;� CU �υσικ�+ σ7ματ�ς π"ρας Vκαστ�ν),nor does he deal with their accidental determination as they happend to be in each nat-ural body (�;δ? τ* συμ2ε2ηκ.τα εωρε, CU τ�ι��τ�ις �6σι συμ2"2ηκεν). On the contrary,he separates them (�ωρ��ει), i. e., he treats them as separated by thought from move-ment (�ωριστ* γ*ρ τCL ν��σει κιν�σε7ς )στι). Cf. Philippe (1948), the excellent Cleary(1985) & (1995). See also Aristotle, Metaphysica XIII,2,1076a32–37; XIII,3,1077b17–20.Here Aristotle uses the elliptic relative subclause CU τ�ιαδ� to justifiy the possibility fora science, in this specific case, mathematics, of investigating its objects as separated(�ωρ�σας) although they do not exist under the status of separation (μN κε�ωρισμ"ν�ν).

15 On the commentators understanding of Aristotle’s view on mathematical objects,starting from Alexander of Aphrodisias, cf. Mueller (1990).

16 In EN 345.39–346.7: )5 &�αιρ"σεως μ?ν �6ν τ* μα ηματικ* λ"γ�νται, &ρι μ�' Hντακα' μεγ" η Qτ�ι σ��ματα μεγε �ν, Mτι π�σ* μ"ν ε#σι κα' π�ι�, κα' )ν =π�κειμ"ναις�;σ�αις τNν =π.στασιν F��υσι, �ωρ'ς τ�ν =π�κειμ"νων κατ’ )ν"ργειαν =��στασ αι μNδυν�μενα, &�αιρ�+νται δ? κατ’ )π�ν�ιαν )κ τ�ν =π�κειμ"νων )ν �Oς =�εστ�κασι κα' Iς )ν�αντασ�Pα =�εστηκ.τα περ' τLς διαν��ας τNν )5"τασιν δ"��νται παρ* τ�ν /π�μ"νων α;τ�,ς.&�αιρ�+νται δ", Mτι μN Vν τι τD� γ"νει =π�κε�μεν�ν F��υσιν &λλ’ )ν δια�.ρ�ις =π�κειμ"ν�ιςδ�νανται γ�νεσ αι.


explicitly rejects the Platonic views on mathematical objects as inter-mediate entities between the Ideas and the sensible particulars. Accord-ing to Alexander these objects do not exist per se, independently fromthe actual conditions (primarily matter and movement) in which theysubsist (�; γ�ρ )στιν α;τ* κα ’ α=τ* =�εστ�τα) but by thought (&λλ’)πιν��Pα).17

Eustratios provides a more detailed and dynamic account—echoinga passage from Ammonius’s commentary on the Isagoge18—that beginsthe abstractive process in the imprint of sense-perception data on theimaginative faculty ()ν τCL �αντασ�Pα), which has already received themwithout matter and bodily circumstances (&�λως κα' &σωμ�τως). Sense-perception offers those imprints to the imagination, which preservesthem in itself, like on a tablet (π�να5), and submits them to the dianoia.19

Here Eustratios refers to Alexander of Aphrodisias’ image of the blanktablet as an analogy for the material intellect (� =λικ.ς ν�+ς) to describethe imaginative faculty’s state of receptivity towards sense-perceptiondata.20 Notably, Eustratios’ description of imagination as a blank tabletreflects the Aristotelian analogy between sense and sense-perceptiondata, on the one hand, and intellect and object of intellection, on theother.21

Therefore, Eustratios’ discussion of mathematical objects seeminglycorresponds to the standard Peripatetic view.22 Such an interpretationcan be found in contemporaries of Eustratios, like the approximativeaccount of it given by his former master John Italos.23 However, thereare elements in Eustratios’ description of the status and graspability ofmathematical objects which seem to belong to a different tradition. Asit has been said, the general cognitive process sketched by our com-

17 Alexander of Aphrodisias, In Metaph. 52,13–21; In Sens. 12.24–27. Cf. also Flannery(2003). Cf. also Eustratios, Syllogistic Demonstration 159.5–7: Σ��ματα γ*ρ κα' &ρι μ�'Fνυλ�ι /τ"ρ�ις )στ'ν )νυπ.στατα, κα ’ /αυτ* δ? �;� =��σταται.

18 Ammonius, In Porph. 11.31–12.6: A circle or a square, claims Ammonius, does notexist by itself (κα ’ /αυτ�). However, when we perceive a wooden or a copper or a stonecircle we receive the form (εXδ�ς) of the circle in the dianoia, preserving these imprintsapart from matter, in the same manner that wax receives the imprint of a signet ringwithout receiving its matter. The circle, in this specific case, is separable in the sensethat it is separarated by thought (κα � τCL )πιν��Pα �ωρ��εται).

19 In EN 344.32–345.4.20 Alexander of Aphrodisias, De An. 84.25ff.21 Aristotle, De anima III,4,429A16–18.22 Another example is John Philoponos, In de An. 57.28–58.6.23 QQ 63,90.32ff.

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mentator in regard to mathematical objects entails the passage fromsense-perception to the imagination, and from the imagination to thedianoia. But there is one more passage in this process that can hardlybe traced back to Aristotle or to the Aristotelian tradition: Eustratios’description of the dianoia as the “eye of the soul” (� δ’ Iς Hμμα τLςψυ�Lς). As such, the dianoia directly grasps ()πι2�λλ�υσα) mathematicalobjects and their related properties, and attributes to them their corre-spondent definitions (τ�0ς λ.γ�υς α;τ�ν &π�δ�δωσι). Aristotle also usesthe expression “eye of the soul” in book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics,arguing that phronesis as a truth-attaining disposition cannot be acquiredby “that” eye of the soul without moral virtue.24 Eustratios, however, isobviously not referring to this passage. “That” (τ��τDω) eye of the soul isin fact a reference to Plato’s Republic (533c) where dialectic is describedas the only science which aims directly at the first principle, dismissinghypothesis and thus securing its ground. Dialectic lifts the eye of thesoul (τ� τLς ψυ�Lς Hμμα) upwards, which was buried in an outlandishfilth ()ν 2�ρ2.ρDω 2αρ2αρικD�). The handmaids of dialectic are the othersciences discussed earlier in the text by Plato, of which mathematics isincluded (533b–c), and these can be labelled “sciences” as well as gener-ically dianoia.25

Without reservations the Neoplatonists identify dianoia with the Pla-tonic eye of the soul, linking it to the consideration of mathematicalobjects and its purgative function. In the prologue to his commentaryon book I of Euclid’s Elements, Proklos refers to this very passage of theRepublic, claiming that only mathematics can enlighten and awake theeye of the soul, which was blinded and obscured (&π�τυ�λ��μεν�ν κα'κατ�ρυττ.μεν�ν) by other kinds of occupations. In doing so, mathemat-ics has the function of turning the eye of the soul from images (&π� τ�νε#δ7λων) to the true realities ()π' τ* &λη L), bringing it from darkness tointellectual light.26 According to Proklos, Aristotelian abstraction can-not account for the way in which we grasp mathematical objects.27 Onthe contrary, “projectionism”, within a general theory of recollection, isthe right account for the knowability of these objects. Projections occur

24 Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea VI,13,1144a29–30: � δ’ V5ις τD� Hμματι τ��τDω γ�νεται τLςψυ�Lς �;κ Aνευ &ρετLς.

25 Plato, Respublica 533c–d.26 In Euc. 20.17–23. Here Proklos states that the only way to account for mathemati-

cal objects is to rely on the generative projections of forms already existing in the soul(α$ γενν�σεις πρ�2�λα' τ�ν )ν α;τCL πρ�υπαρ�.ντων ε#δ�ν).

27 Cf. In Euc. 12.15–13.13.


due to the logoi which constitute the essence of our soul. Thus, Syri-anus explicitly says that geometrical objects are in the imagination, butthey are located there insofar as they are parasitic (παρυ��σταται) uponthe logoi present in the dianoia, since that which derives from abstractioncannot be considered sufficiently accurate.28

Proklos’ commentary on book I of Euclid’s Elements further associatesthe dianoia and the eye of the soul. Ordinary mathematics, as distin-guished from Pythagorean mathematics,29 is here described as the pathof knowledge (κατ* πα�δευσιν �δ.ν) because it has the same relation toknowledge as education has to virtue. In this respect the function ofmathematics is to prepare the dianoia and the eye of the soul (τ� HμματLς ψυ�Lς) for the turning toward the upper realm.30 Proklos adds thatif the eye of the soul remains closed, we would not be able to attainour proper perfection. This perfection is obtained through what Prok-los calls mathesis, namely the recollection of the logoi eternally present inour soul (� τ�ν &ϊδ�ων )ν ψυ�CL λ.γων &ν�μνησις), mathematics being thescience that brings us to this recollection. It is due to the investigationof mathematical objects, then, that we awaken this innate knowledge,purifying the dianoia and ridding ourselves of ignorance.31

I believe that there is no other way to explain Eustratios’ reference tothe eye of the soul than by linking it to the function of the dianoia withinthe cognitive process according to the Neoplatonists. Indeed, Eustra-tios’ account ignores the deeper Proklean arguments related to thetopic of “projectionism” as the true account of mathematics. For exam-ple, Proklos argues that projections take place in the dianoia, but thedianoia cannot operate because of its weakness regarding the conceptof an unextended form—namely the geometrical logoi in the soul—andso needs to project it into the imagination.32 Thus geometry deals withuniversal concepts but only in terms of their being distributed (κατατε-ταγμ"να) to the imagination, which means that the dianoia must some-how unfold them. The same is true for numbers, where the final pro-jection takes place in opinion, doxa, which is thus elevated in its role and

28 Syrianus, In Metaph. 91.29–34; see also In Metaph. 95.29–36, where Syrianus explic-itly states that sense-perception cannot be considered as a solid basis for the knowledgeof mathematical objects. On Syrianus’ theory of mathematics, see Mueller (2002).

29 On this distinction, see Mueller (1987) in part. 317.30 In Euc. 20,10–17.31 In Euc. 46.13–47.6.32 In Euc. 54.14–55.13; 141.2–19.

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function.33 Nonetheless, these differences remain insufficient to excludea dependence upon Proklos and the Neoplatonic tradition.

Understanding the reason for Eustratios’ twofold account attainsgreater importance when we note that the first reference to abstraction-ism is followed by a nod towards the Neoplatonic theory of mathemat-ics. The reason can be found in a doxography on mathematical objectsthat was elaborated by the same Eustratios, one in which Aristotelianabstractionism and Platonic innatism are described as the two oppo-site positions on the matter at hand. According to the Platonists, saysEustratios, “abstractionism” cannot be considered a reliable accountof mathematical objects because that which is derived by abstraction,i.e. that which is “later born” (=στερ�γεν�ς), is considered to be infe-rior to sense-perception data and physical realities (τ* )5 &�αιρ"σεωςτ�ν α#σ ητ�ν )στι κα' �υσικ�ν �ε�ρ�να). It would be inappropriate forthe soul to derive from the sensible particulars the logoi which alreadyexist in itself ()ν /αυτCL τ�0ς λ.γ�υς =�ισταμ"ν�υς), since these logoi arein the soul before sense-perception data (πρ� τ�ν α#σ ητ�ν εJδη κα' λ.-γ�υς �#κε��υς α;τCL λ�γικ�ς κα' ψυ�ικ�ς )νυπ�ρ��ντας). The pre-existinglogoi are superior and prior by nature (κρε�ττ�υς Hντας κα' ��σει πρ�-τ"ρ�υς) to the material forms (τ�ν )ν�λων), the sense perception-data(α#σ ητ�ν), and the sensible particulars (κα ’ Vκαστα).34

This account, which is devoted to discussing the Platonic view, vastlyexceeds the one devoted to the Aristotelian position, obviously suggest-ing which of the two positions Eustratios prefers. Moreover, the wholeargument seems to combine perfectly abstractionism with the purga-tive function of mathematics according to the Neoplatonists. Since thesoul, continues the commentator, ignores (&γν��+σα) these logoi fromthe beginning, because of the bond with generation (δι* τ�ν δεσμ�ν τLςγεν"σεως), i.e. because of the shock of birth, it needs to rely in someway on sense-perception (τCL α#σ �σει) and on the forms and intelligi-

33 In Euc. 95.21–96.11. On the distinction between the different faculties dealing withgeometrical and arithmetical objects, see Cleary (2002).

34 In EN 320.21–29: ε# γ*ρ κα' 8Αριστ�τ"λης περ' τ* )5 &�αιρ"σεως λ"γει τNν μα η-ματικNν καταγ�νεσ αι, &λλ* τ�+τ� �;κ Qρεσκε τ�,ς Πλατωνικ�ς περ' τ�+τ� δ�5��υσι,δι.τι τ* )5 &�αιρ"σεως τ�ν α#σ ητ�ν )στι κα' �υσικ�ν �ε�ρ�να, Iς )5 α;τ�ν τNν γ"νε-σιν F��ντα κα' =στερ�γεν�ς α;τ�ν =�ιστ�μενα. κα' Aτ�π�ν εXνα� �ασι τNν ψυ��ν, π�λλD�κρε�ττω �6σαν τLς ��σεως )κ τ�ν κα ’ Vκαστα κα' �υσικ�ν F�ειν )ν /αυτCL τ�0ς λ.γ�υς=�ισταμ"ν�υς, &λλ* μN F�ειν πρ� τ�ν α#σ ητ�ν εJδη κα' λ.γ�υς �#κε��υς α;τCL λ�γικ�ς κα'ψυ�ικ�ς )νυπ�ρ��ντας, κρε�ττ�υς Hντας κα' ��σει πρ�τ"ρ�υς τ�ν )ν�λων κα' α#σ ητ�νκα' κα ’ Vκαστα.


ble contents derived by abstraction from matter (τ�,ς &�αιρ�υμ"ν�ις )κτLς @λης εJδεσι κα' λ.γ�ις). It is due to this abstractive cognitive processthat the soul, says Eustratios, is able to re-light the spark of knowledgein itself (τ� τLς γν7σεως �7πυρ�ν). This fire is said to exist in us bothbecause of our specific nature and because it has been put in us by theCreator. However, it needs to be awakened because of its mixture withthe passions. This fire needs to be purified in order to become visibleagain (δε,ται &νακα �ρσεως ε#ς �αν"ρωσιν) as it is covered in ash andobscured under the form of vapor ()ν α# �λCη κεκρυμμ"ν�ν )μπ�ρευμα).It shines forth through this dispersed vapor when it comes into contactwith wood, and therefore it often starts to burn again (ε#ς πυρσ�νπ�λλ�κις &ν�πτεται).35 Such an extended description of the Platonists’viewpoint—too long to be just a doxography—is evidently dependentupon Proklos.36

Even though the starting point in this doxography was the status ofmathematical objects, it is clear that the point here is more generalsince it entails the problem of the value of Aristotelian a-posteriori con-

35 In EN 320.29–36: κZν )5 &ρ�Lς &γν��+σα τ��τ�υς δι* τ�ν δεσμ�ν τLς γεν"σεως�ρLται τCL α#σ �σει κα' τ�,ς &�αιρ�υμ"ν�ις )κ τLς @λης εJδεσι κα' λ.γ�ις, Mπως &να� CL)5 α;τ�ν )ν α;τCL τ� τLς γν7σεως �7πυρ�ν, : )κ τLς �#κε�ας ��σεως κα' τ�+ δημι�υργ�-σαντ�ς =π�ρ��ν α;τCL συγκ"�υται τ�,ς )κ τLς γεν"σεως π� εσι, κα' δε,ται &νακα �ρσεωςε#ς �αν"ρωσιν, Iς )ν α# �λCη κεκρυμμ"ν�ν )μπ�ρευμα, : δN σκεδαννυμ"νης τLς α# �λης)κ�α�νεται κα' δραττ.μεν�ν @λης ε#ς πυρσ�ν π�λλ�κις &ν�πτεται. Eustratios had alreadyexpounded a similar argument in In APo. 257.33–258.14.

36 See for example, In Alc. 7.3–7: κα' γ*ρ �γν��μεν /αυτ�0ς =π� τLς γενεσι�υργ��λ� ης κατε�.μεν�ι κα' =π� τLς ταρα�Lς τ�ν &λ.γων ε#δ�ν τLς �ωLς )κκρ�υ.μεν�ι, κα'�#.με α π�λλ* γιν7σκειν [ν �γν��μεν δι* τ�0ς κατ’ �;σ�αν �μ,ν �νυπ�ρ��ντας λ�γ�υς.In Euc. 46.13–47.6: δεσμ�ται δ? Hντες κα' τ� Hμμα τLς ψυ�Lς μ��ντες �; μ� π�τε τNνπρ�σ�κ�υσαν �μ,ν τελει.τητα σ��ημεν. α@τη τ��νυν )στ'ν � μ� ησις � τ�ν &ϊδ�ων )νψυ�CL λ�γων &ν�μνησις, κα' μα ηματικN δι* τα�την � πρ�ς τ*ς &ναμν�σεις �μ,ν τ*ς)κε�νων συντελ�+σα γν�σις δια�ερ.ντως )π�ν�μ��εται. κα' τ� Fργ�ν Aρα τLς )πιστ�μηςτα�της �π�,�ν δN τ� )στιν )κ τ�+ \ν.ματ�ς δηλ�+ται κινητικ�ν τLς )μ��τ�υ γν7σεως κα')γερτικ�ν τLς ν��σεως κα' κα αρτικ�ν τLς διαν��ας κα' )κ�αντ�ρικ�ν τ�ν κατ’ �;σ�αν�μ,ν =παρ�.ντων ε�δ�ν, λ� ης τε κα' �γν��ας &�αιρετικ.ν, [ν &π� τ�ς γεν σεως Fσ��μεν,κα' &π�λυτικ�ν τ�ν )κ τLς &λ�γ�ας δεσμ�ν, κατ* τ�ν ε�ν Hντως τ�ν τLς )πιστ�μηςτα�της F��ρ�ν, :ς πρ��γει μ?ν ε#ς τ� )μ�αν?ς τ* ν�ερ* δ�ρα, πληρ�, δ? π�ντα τ�ν ε�ωνλ.γων, κινε, δ? τ*ς ψυ�*ς )π' ν�+ν, κα' Eσπερ )κ κ�ρ�υ 2α "�ς &νεγε�ρει, δι* �ητ�σεωςδ? )πιστρ"�ει πρ�ς /αυτ�ς, κα' δι* μαιε�ας τελει�,, κα' δι’ ε=ρ"σεως τ�+ κα αρ�+ ν�+περι�γει πρ�ς τNν μακαρ�αν �ω�ν. In Alc. 188.11–15: Mτι δ? κα' παρ* τ�ν κρειττ.νων)γγ�νετα� τις �μ,ν γν�σις τ�ν πραγμ�των, α$ τ�ν ε�ν α;τ�ψ�αι κα' =�ηγ�σεις $καν�ςδηλ�+σιν, )κ�α�ν�υσαι μ?ν τNν τ�5ιν τ�ν Mλων τα,ς ψυ�α,ς, πρ�κα ηγ��μεναι δ? τLς πρ�ςτ� ν�ητ�ν π�ρε�ας κα' τ�0ς πυρσ�!ς �ν�πτ�υσαι τ�0ς &ναγωγ��ς. See also Theol. Plat.1,7.18; In R. 1,18.22. Eustratios’ reference to later-born concepts as inferior to sense-perception data strongly echoes In Prm. 980.10–13.

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cepts and the functioning of the process of concept formation. Eustra-tios explicitly states that even according to the Platonists one cannotget rid of what is derived from sense-perception data. Eustratios evi-dently follows a Proklean model since, according to Proklos, mathe-matics begins precisely with reminders and reminiscence coming fromwithout (F5ω εν) and ends with the logoi existing within the soul (ε#ςτ�0ς Fνδ�ν λ.γ�υς). Mathematics is awakened (&νεγε�ρεται) by the lowerrealities but it strives for the higher forms.37 Abstraction in itself cannotaccount for the very knowledge of mathematical objects, but it servesthe purpose of activating the recollection process. This Proklean doc-trine constitutes the framework of Eustratios’ account of the knowabil-ity of mathematical objects.

1.2. The Objects of Physics

In two of the passages from this section of the text Eustratios addressesthe status of the objects proper to natural philosophy. These passagesare extremely interesting because they take two different approachesto the topic at hand. In the first one (348.7–22), Eustratios providesthe reader with a mere explanatory account of the objects of physics,namely material forms and sensible particulars (τ* Fνυλα κα' κα ’ Vκα-στα). In this sense, the one who intends to deal with physical realitiescannot investigate them according to the logical method (μN λ�γικ�ς)—as in the case of mathematical abstraction—but according to the themethod proper to physical examination (&λλ* �υσικ�ς). In consider-ing the physical objects one cannot get rid of matter. Eustratios furtherargues that the natural philosopher somehow employs logical meth-ods (τα,ς λ�γικα,ς με .δ�ις). However, it is clear that it is not the samelogical procedure that characterizes mathematics. On the contrary, itconsists in deriving the universal determination (κα .λ�υ) through dis-cernment of the common element among the particular individuals ()π'π�ντων κ�ιν�ς).38 Such an account might disappoint the reader since itsimply proposes by way of explanation that which can be found in Aris-totle himself 39 and avoids mentioning the widely attested terminologicaldistinction between mathematical objects, which are said to arise from

37 In Euc. 18.10–20.38 In EN 348.7–22.39 Aristotle, Physica II,2,193b31ff.


abstraction ()5 &�αιρ"σεως), and natural or physical objects, which aresaid to arise by addition ()κ πρ�σ "σεως) of the determining proper-ties.40

In the second passage (347.10–15), Eustratios reminds us that enmat-tered forms cannot be separated from their subjects and that physicalobjects cannot be defined without their material component. Eustra-tios explains that this is the case in irrational souls and physical objectsin general. Because of this status material forms are neither perfect bythemselves (α;τ�τελL) nor self-established (α; "δραστα) and thereforeneed a subject in order to be settled and established (=π�κειμ"ν�υ τιν�ςπρ�ς τ� /δρασ Lναι δε.μενα), and only from this subject can they beabstracted by thought ()5 )κε�ν�υ &�αιρε �σ�νται κατ’ )π�ν�ιαν).41

Eustratios’ terminology becomes increasingly interesting with the useof the term α; "δραστα, which rarely occurs in late antique philo-sophical literature. For instance, it occurs in Priscianus Lydus’ com-mentary on On the Soul during his discussion of Aristotle’s reference tothe thesis that the soul might be composed of elements. In particular,Priscianus mentions an example of what he assumes to be the mean-ing of Aristotle’s reference to “elements of each kind” (/κ�στ�υ γ"ν�υςστ�ι�ε�α) as an instance of what belongs to substance, namely being self-established (τ� α; "δραστ�ν) and not subsisting in a substratum or sub-ject (μN )ν =π�κειμ"νω).42 If this is the case, one might consider α; "δρα-στ�ν synonymous with α; υπ.στατ�ν. In the end, this is what a famousByzantine expert on Ancient and Late Antique philosophical literature,Michael Psellos, defends in his discussion of one passage from Gregoryof Nazianzos’ Oratio de Filio.43 Discussing Gregory’s counter-argumentto the Arian idea that the generation of the Son involves time, Psel-los makes clear that this use of time, which he defines as the “measureof movement”, here refers to Aristotle and is neither self-established(α; "δραστ�ν) nor self-subsistent (α; υπ.στατ�ν).44 That the term α;- "δραστ�ν was also synonymous with α; υπ.στατ�ν for Eustratios ismade clear by the author when he distinguishes the mental separationthat allows mathematical objects to be grasped from the separation thatdistinguishes “substantial forms” (�;σι7δη εJδη). The latter are said to

40 Cf. Aristotle, De Caelo III,1,299a13–17. Simplikios, In Cael. 567.7–17; John Philo-ponos, In APr. 26.2–3.

41 In EN 347.10–15.42 Priscianus Lydus, In de An. 68.31–32.43 Gregory of Nazianzos, Or. 29, 9.15ff.44 Theol. I 53.101–105.

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be immaterial (Aυλα) and self-subsisting (α; υπ.στατα); they are notliable to mental separation from their subjects (�;δεν�ς =π�κειμ"ν�υε#σ' �ωρι�.μενα κατ’ )π�ν�ιαν), such as is the case with mathematicalobjects, insofar as they are not settled in any subject but are settledin themselves (α;τ* /αυτ�,ς ε#σιν Vδραι). Unsurprisingly, the terms usedby the commentator seem to recall once again certain formulas to befound in Proklos, particularly one passage of the commentary on theParmenides, where enmattered forms (τ* μ?ν εJδη τ* Fνυλα) are said tobe in and of other things since they are settled in particular subjects (Fντισιν =π�κειμ"ν�ις /δρα�.μενα).

Therefore, the description of the objects of physics must be under-stood in terms of the distinction between that which is liable onlyto mental separation, that which exists as separate from matter, andthat which can neither exist nor be defined without matter. Moreover,Eustratios clearly compares the status of enmattered forms with the sta-tus of those forms that exist in themselves as separate. The latter areself-subsistent and perfect, and therefeore do not exist in somethingelse. These forms are the objects of sophia.45

1.3. The Objects of First Philosophy

As argued above, according to Aristotle, young people can be goodmathematicians, but they cannot be natural philosophers or men ofwisdom, since the principles of mathematical knowledge are by abstrac-tion, while the principles of natural philosophy and sophia are by experi-ence, which requires time for their acquisition. Yet, if it is clear in whatsense the principle of physics are experiential, then there remains theproblem of explaining how the principles of sophia are also derived fromexperience. In fact, the objects of sophia, which Eustratios calls sophia

par excellance (κατ’ )5α�ρετ�ν σ��α), are described as divine, immate-rial and above sense-perception.46 Thus, to explain in what sense sophia

45 In EN 346.35–38: τ* δ? �;σι7δη εJδη �;� �@τως F��υσιν, &λλ’ Aυλα Hντα κα'α; υπ.στατα �;σ�αι ε#σ'ν Aυλ�ι κα' �;δεν�ς =π�κειμ"ν�υ ε#σ' �ωρι�.μενα κατ’ )π�ν�ιαν,Mτι μηδ? Fν τινι =π�κειμ"νDω /δρ��νται &λλ’ α;τ* /αυτ�,ς ε#σιν Vδραι. = In Prm. 1136.7–11: Ε# γ*ρ ) ελ�σεις εωρLσαι π σαν τNν τ�ν Hντων τ�5ιν, Hψει τ* μ?ν εJδη τ* Fνυλα )νAλλ�ις Hντα μ.ν�ν κα' Aλλων Hντα κα' "ν τισιν #π�κειμ ν�ις $δρα%�μενα. See also hisΛ�γ�ς δε�τερ�ς περ� τ�� γ��υ Πνε�ματ�ς 81.11–14: τα+τ� μ�ι ν.ει, Mτι τε Iς τ* τ"λειατ�ν ε#δ�ν, T τ�ν δε��μ"νων �; δ"εται πρ�ς =π.στασιν, &λλ’ α&'υπ�στατα μ"ν )στι κα(α&τ�τελ�, )ν /αυτ�,ς δ’ /δρ��ει )κε,να κα' τLς �#κε�ας πληρ�, &γα .τητ�ς.

46 In EN 348.23–24.


can be said to derive from experience, he elaborates on the meaningof the word “experience”. “Experience” should not be understood inthe usual and common sense way, i.e., a non-rational practice, but as aform of direct and intuitive knowledge concerning substantial matters.47

I would like to point out that the term πραγματει7δης, “laborious” or“concerning substantial matters,” which is here used to describe thisknowledge, occurs in Proklos’ commentary on the Parmenides, where itrefers to the “laborious game” of producing hypothesis and arguments.Every external argument, says Proklos, is a kind of game, as stated byPlato himself (Parm., 137b), expecially when compared to the unitaryintellection of Being. This game is also “laborious” because it relates tothe contemplation of beings.48 Proklos supports Eustratios’ explanationof the term πραγματει7δης in terms of a direct and intuitive knowledge(κατ’ )πι2�λ�ν) since the latter expression refers to the direct apprehen-sion of the Forms, as I will show later. Both these expressions makeit clear that, according to Eustratios, the kind of experience proper tosophia is a form of contemplation of separate realities.

In the case of sophia, as in the case of physics, the first principlesof the related kind of knowledge are represented by that which isfirst known to us (τ* πρ�ς �μ ς) and not by what is prior in nature(τ* ��σει =π�ρ��ντα πρ.τερ�ν).49 As is well known, this very samedistinction is to be found in the incipit of the Physics (I,1,184a17–25),where Aristotle elaborates on the the nature of the principles of thescience of Nature, saying that the path of the investigation in thisfield leads from what is more recognizable and clear to us ()κ τ�νγνωριμωτ"ρων �μ,ν � �δ�ς κα' σα�εστ"ρων) to what is clearer andmore recognizable in itself or in its own nature ()π' τ* σα�"στερατCL ��σει κα' γνωριμ7τερα). What is first (τ� πρ�τ�ν) cognizable to usare the particulars, while elements and principles are known to usafter (@στερ�ν) an analysis of the concrete data.50 Aristotle elaboratesa similar argument in the Posterior Analytics (I,1,71b33–72a5) where the

47 In EN 347.37–348.5: τα+τα μ?ν εJρηται πρ�ς γν�σιν τ�+ τCL μ?ν μα ηματικCL )πιστ�μCη)5 &�αιρ"σεως εXναι τ* =π�κε�μενα, τCL δ? �υσικCL κα' πρ7τCη �ιλ�σ��Pα, ] κα' κατ’)5α�ρετ�ν σ��α καλε,ται, �;��. π�ς δ’ )5 )μπειρ�ας α$ &ρ�α' τCL σ��Pα κα' τCL �υσικCL, Fτιμα ε,ν λε�πεται. �Xμαι δN � )μπειρ�α )ντα+ α �; κατ* τ� σ�νη ες σημαιν.μεν�ν εJληπται,%να τNν Aλ�γ�ν σημα�νCη τρι2�ν, &λλ’ &ντ' τLς πραγματει7δ�υς κα' κατ’ )πι2�λNν γν7σεως.

48 In Prm. 1036.9–12; 1051.38–1052.3. Here Proklos claims that the method followedby Parmenides is not an empty logical exercise but a “laborious game”, which concernsthe nature of things.

49 In EN 348.24–26.50 Aristotle, Physica I,1,184a17–25.

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premises, the true statements of a demonstration, are said to be causes,better known and prior (αJτι� τε κα' γνωριμ7τερα δε, εXναι κα' πρ.τερα).He therefore distinguishes between two senses in which something canbe said to be prior and better known: that which is prior in nature andthat which is prior or better known to us, i.e. that which is nearer toour sense-perception (τ* )γγ�τερ�ν τLς α#σ �σεως) vis-à-vis that which isfurther (τ* π�ρρ7τερ�ν) from it, namely the most universal concepts (τ*κα .λ�υ μ�λιστα).51

The same distinction occurs in the tradition of the Late Antiquecommentators and is used to describe the different statuses of the threetheoretical sciences, namely physics, mathematics, and metaphysics.Such a scheme can be found in Ammonius’ commentary on the Isa-

goge, where theology is said to come first, insofar as divine things arecausative principles of everything (&ρ�α' γ*ρ π�ντων τ* ε,α). Physics,on the contrary, is what is first in relation to us (πρ�ς �μ ς πρ�τ�ν) sincewe would be unable to grasp the intelligible substance without its rela-tion to sense-perception. That which is first in relation to us is in truththe last (Fσ�ατ�ν): the enmattered is the last substance ()σ��τη γ*ρ �;σ�α� Fνυλ�ς). Mathematics is intermediate, becuase its essential characteris to be intermediate.52 He himself speaks in dynamic terms regardingthe necessity of moving from the realm of physics, i.e., from what doesnot exist outside of matter, to the realm of the divine things, namelythat which is fully separate. This movement cannot take place withoutthe mediation of mathematics, which serves as a kind of bridge betweenphysical and metaphysical investigation.53

51 Aristotle, An. Post. I,1,71b33–72a5. See also Themistios, In APo. 6,14–18.52 Ammonius, In Porph. 10.13–19; cf. also the general argument to be found in In

Porph. 52.9–11: Eστε τ* τCL ��σει πρ.τερα τCL γν7σει �μ�ν @στερα γ�ν�νται κα' τ* τCL��σει @στερα �μ�ν τCL γν7σει πρ.τερα> σα�"στερ�ν �6ν τ� πρ�τ�ν, &σα�"στερ�ν δ? τ�δε�τερ�ν. Cf. on Ammonius and the so-called “Alexandrian school”, cf. Kremer (1961)and (1961–1962). See also Asclepius, In Metaph. 1.13. On this commentary, and on theNeoplatonic involvements of Ammonius’ position, see Verrycken (1990) in part. 204–210.

53 Ammonius, In Porph. 12.8–13.7. Ammonius quotes Plotinus’ famous invitation tostudy mathematics (Enn. 1,3,3) because it allows an acquaintance with the incorporealrealm. This very same exortation is found in Asclepius, In Metaph. 151.4–6; Simplikios,In Ph. 14.4–6; Olympiodoros, Proll. 9.37–10.2; David, In Porph. 59.17–19. But an accountof the different types of priority can also be found in Proklos, In Euc. 12.26–13.26;13.27–14.11; 14.17–20; In Prm. 980.17–21. It seems that in these passages Proklos refersto Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics (I,1,71b33–72a5), remarking that the natural priority ofthe premises within scientific demonstration has to be undertsood as the priority of thea-priori reasons within our soul.


Although Eustratios’ reference to the different types of prioritystrongly echoes the tradition of Late Antique commentatary, Eustra-tios refers again to Proklos when he provides the reader with examplesof priority according to nature. This kind of priority can be found inthe class of divine things ()ν τ�,ς ε�,ς): that which produces (τ� παρ�-γ�ν), remarks Eustratios, is prior to that which is produced (τ�+ παρα-γ�μ"ν�υ); that which perfects (τ� τελεσι�υργ.ν) is prior to that whichis perfected (τ�+ τελεσι�υργ�υμ"ν�υ); that which protects (τ� �ρ�υρητι-κ.ν) is prior to that which is protected (τ�+ �ρ�υρ�υμ"ν�υ); that whichpurifies (τ� κα αρτικ.ν) is prior to that which is purified (τ�+ κα αι-ρ�υμ"ν�υ); that which illuminates (τ� �ωτιστικ.ν) is prior to that whichis illuminated (τ�+ �ωτι��μ"ν�υ); and, in general, that which is tran-scendent (τ� =περ"��ν) is prior to that which is transcended (τ�+ =περ-ε��μ"ν�υ).54 These examples are adopted terms often used by Prok-los to describe the general terms of the process of causation, namelythe transcendence of that which causes in respect to that which iscaused, or to describe specific powers and operations performed bythe different ranks of gods.55 Furthermore, they can also be found in

54 In EN 348.26–29.55 (1) τ� παρ�γ�ν—τ�+ παραγ�μ"ν�υ = Inst. 7.27–28: π�ντCη Aρα τ) παρ�γ�ν κρε,ττ�ν

τLς τ�� παραγ�μ ν�υ ��σεως. Inst. 28.12–14: )πε' γ*ρ κρε,ττ�ν )5 &ν�γκης )στ' τ�� παρα-γ�μ ν�υ τ) παρ�γ�ν, τ* α;τ* μ?ν Gπλ�ς κα' Jσα κατ* δ�ναμιν �;κ Aν π�τε εJη &λλ�λ�ις.Inst. 65.15–19: R γ*ρ )ν τ*� παρ�γ�ντι τ) παραγ�μεν�ν �ρ ται, Iς )ν α#τ�Pα πρ�ϋπ�ρ��ν,δι.τι π ν τ� αJτι�ν )ν /αυτD� τ� α#τιατ�ν πρ�ε�λη�ε, πρ7τως _ν Mπερ )κε,ν� δευτ"ρως>R )ν τD� παραγ�μ"νDω τ) παρ�γ�ν (κα' γ*ρ τ�+τ�, μετ"��ν τ�� παρ�γ�ντ�ς, )ν /αυτD�δε�κνυσι δευτ"ρως : τ) παρ�γ�ν =π�ρ�ει πρ7τως). In Prm. 739.1–2: )πε' γ*ρ �;κ <ν δυνα-τ�ν �;δ? εμιτ�ν τ*� παρ�γ�ντι τα;τ�ν εXναι τ) παραγ�μεν�ν. Theol. Plat. I,19,88.23–24:&ν�γκη γ*ρ εXναι τ�� παρ�γ�ντ�ς τ) παραγ�μεν�ν καταδε"στερ�ν. Cf. also Damaskios,Pr. I,239.22–23: Τα+τα μ?ν �6ν )στι τ* πε�σαντα τ�0ς παλαι�0ς +ιλ�σ�+�υς &π� τ�ν κατ’α#τ�αν πρ�ϋπαρ�.ντων τ, παραγ�μενα π�ντα παρ�γειν. (2) τ� τελεσι�υργ.ν = In Alc.82.18–21: μει�.νως δ? Fτι λεκτ"�ν Mτι τ�ν δαιμ.νων �$ μ?ν κα αρτικNν Fλα��ν δ�ναμινκα' A�ραντ�ν, �$ δ? γεννητικ�ν, �$ δ? τελεσι�υργ�ν, �$ δ? δημι�υργικ�ν, κα' Mλως κατ* τ*ς#δι.τητας διCLρηνται τ�ν ε�ν κα' τ*ς δυν�μεις =�’ Tς )τ�� ησαν. (each intra-mundaneGod rules over one order of demons according to its characteristics and powers); In R.1,136.23–26: τ�ι�+τ�ι γ*ρ �$ τ�ν κρειττ.νων Fρωτες, )πιστρεπτικ�' τ�ν καταδεεστ"ρων ε#ςτ* πρ�τα κα' &π�πληρωτικ�' τ�ν )ν α=τ�,ς &γα �ν κα' τελεσι�υργ�( τ�ν =�ειμ"νων. (Onthe Gods bringing to perfection and reversion the lower realities); In Ti. 1,87.25–26: δι*γ*ρ δυ�δ�ς � μ�ν*ς πρ.εισιν )π' τNν τελεσι�υργ)ν τ�ν Mλων πρ.ν�ιαν. (it is through thedyad that the monad communicates its perfecting providence to the whole). Theol Plat.4,52.15; 4,58.11–12; 4,75.14–17; 4,77.17–19 (on the preserving/συνεκτικ�� and perfect-ing/τελεσι�υργ�� Gods); 4,108.5–8 (the third order of intelligible and intelligent Godsaccording to the Parmenides and the perfective/τελεσι�υργ.ν character of its activity).(3) τ� �ρ�υρητικ.ν—τ�+ �ρ�υρ�υμ"ν�υ: In Ti. 1,154.1–2; 1,156.5–6; 3,312.15–16; Inst.154.1–3, In Alc. 30.9–12 (on the protective Gods and their powers); In Ti. 2,106.15–

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Proklos’ description of the status of the transcendent Forms and theirpowers.56

Eustratios states that if we begin with that which is prior in nature,then accounting for or defining that which is secondary will remainimpossible. Therefore, we must start from what is first for us, namelythe last terms of the causation process: sense-perception data and indi-viduals. From here we can return to that which is prior in nature byway of our admiration of their variety and constitutions. In this way,we are supposed to trace back, by means of rational and intellec-tual contemplation, through the immediately proximate cause until wearrive, by way of the intermediate realms, at the First Cause.57 In this

16; 2,107.16–17; 2,292,10ff. (on the protective activity of the World-Soul); Theol. Plat.1,78.19–21 (quoting the Chaldean Oracles on the celebrations of the paternal, protec-tive/�ρ�υρητικ�, governing, and healing powers); Theol. Plat. 1,123.7–10: τ�ν δ? =�ι-σταμ"νων &π� τ�ν διττ�ν &ρ��ν 〈τ�ν〉 πρ�ϋπαρ��υσ�ν τLς &π�γενν�σεως, τ* μ?ν πρ�ςτNν πατρικNν &��μ�ι�+ται κα' Fστι π�ιητικ* 〈κα'〉 +ρ�υρητικ, κα' συνεκτικ* τ* τ�ια+ταγ"νη τ�ν ε�ν . . . (on the class of gods resembling the paternal principle); 4,53.22–26(the first triad of intelligible and intelligent gods has three properties: revealing, gath-ering, and protecting/�ρ�υρητικ�); 5,122.13–15 (the properties of the second triads ofimmaculate Gods depend upon the protective/�ρ�υρητικ� cause); Inst. 151.23–25: Π νμ?ν τ� τLς κα αρ.τητ�ς αJτι�ν )ν τ�� +ρ�υρητικ�� περι"�εται τ�5ει, �;κ Fμπαλιν δ? π ν τ)+ρ�υρητικ)ν τD� κα αρτικD� γ"νει τα;τ.ν. (On the relation between the protective andthe purificatory); Inst. 154.4–6: ε# γ*ρ . +ρ�υρ, τ� τLς /κ�στ�υ τ�5εως μ"τρ�ν &τρ"πτωςδιασ7�ει κα' συν"�ει π�ντα τ, +ρ�υρ�/μενα )ν τCL �#κε�Pα τελει.τητι. Theol. Plat. 6,67.5–6:π ν γ*ρ τ) +ρ�υρ��ν παντα�. εν σπε�δει περιλαμ2�νειν τ) +ρ�υρ�/μεν�ν (The divineprotection protects all the objects in their proper perfection). (4) τ� κα αρτικ.ν: In Ti.1,38.9–10: Mλως δ? κα' περ' α;τ*ς τ*ς ψυ��ς ε#σι κα' &ναγωγ�' δυν�μεις κα' κα αρτικα�(There are anagogic and purgative Potencies that take care of the souls) In R. 1,122.5–7 (on the different ranges of demons responsible for the care of the souls that stillrequires correction and purification: there are the vengeant, the corrective, the purga-tive/κα αρτικα�, and the one encharged to judge); Theol Plat. 1,86.23–24 (on Δ�κη as thedivinity purgative of the wickedness of the souls). (5) �ωτιστικ.ν—�ωτι�—�ωτι��μ"ν�υ:Iamblichos, Myst. 1,9.10–22: 3Ωσπερ �6ν τ� ��ς περι"�ει τ* �ωτι�.μενα, �=τωσ' κα' τ�ν ε�ν � δ�ναμις τ* μεταλαμ2�ν�ντα α;τLς F5ω εν περιε�λη�εν. (Light and that whichreceives light as metaphors for the causal power of the Gods); In R. 1,289.21–24: τ�νδ? α6 ε#κ.νων δηλ�+ν δυναμ"νων κα' &γ�λματα κα' �Dωγρα��ματα κα' π ν Mτι τ�ι�+τ�ν,α;τ�ς δι�ρι�.μεν�ς, τ�νας εXναι 2��λεται τ*ς ε#κ.νας, κα' Iς τ*ς &π� τ�ν +ωτι%�ντων&π�τελ�υμ"νας )ν +ωτι%�μ ν�ις . . . Finally, Inst. 145.3ff. for a passage in which thesedivine activities are all mentioned together, in regard to the influence of the divineorders on the inferior kinds.

56 E.g. In Prm. 911.37–40 (The Forms are not mere patterns but also productive,perfective/τελεσι�υργικ� and protective or conservative/�ρ�υρητικ� of sensible partic-ulars).

57 In EN 348.30–37: &λλ’ �μ,ν �;κ Fστιν ε; 0ς )5 &ρ�Lς κατειλη�"ναι τ* πρ.τερ�ν,κ&κ τLς πρ�ς )κε,να )πι2�λLς τ�0ς περ' τ�ν δευτ"ρων λ.γ�υς &π�διδ.ναι, &λλ* δLλαπρ7τως �μ,ν τ* )σ��τως )κε, εν &π�τελ��μενα. τα+τα δ? τ* )ν σ7μασι εωρ��μενα, B


way Eustratios justifies the Aristotelian claim that sophia, like physics,requires experience. In other words, to grasp what is prior by naturewe must start from what is prior to us, and it is this anagogical processthat allows the contemplation of the separate substances and the FirstCause.

Everything in this description is taken from Proklos. The term )πι-2�λ� used by the author to describe the mode of knowledge whichallows us to grasp that which is prior by nature is found in Proklosin regard to the knowledge of the intelligibles.58 The very same expres-sion “that which is secondary” to describe that which comes after whatis prior in nature might also be traced back to a Neoplatonic context.For example, it is used by Proklos within the general description ofthe hierarchic nature of the causative process.59 The amazed admira-tion for sensible particulars mentioned by Eustratios, which is meant toarouse in us the knowledge for the higher realities, can also be foundin Proklos. As a matter of fact, Eustratios speaks about our “beingastonished” ()κπληττ.μεν�ι) by the characteristics of sense-perceptiondata. Precisely this term occurs in Proklos for his description of theeffects of beauty on souls during their conversion to the Good.60 Thus,according to Eustratios, our astonishment at the features and charac-teristics of sense-perception data leads us to a kind of anagogic ascen-sion in the order of causes that always requires a tracing back to thenext proximate cause. The words used in this argument are takenfrom a passage of Proklos’ commentary on the Parmenides (879.17–19)where Proklos describes the ascent to reason-principles in nature as theupwards procession from the element that is common to individuals

)στιν α#σ ητ* κα' κα ’ Vκαστα, �Oς )πι2�λλ�ντες κα' τNν τ��των π�ικιλ�αν κα' σ�στασινκα' συν��Nν κα' διε5αγωγNν )κπληττ.μεν�ι &ε' πρ�ς τ� πρ�σε�?ς δι* τLς λ�γικLς κα'ν�ερ ς εωρ�ας &νατρ"��μεν αJτι�ν, Fστ’ Zν δι* τ�ν μ"σων διακ.σμων ε#ς τNν πρ7την κα'μ�αν &ρ�Nν καταντ�σωμεν.

58 See on this topic Ierodiakonou (2005b) 81.59 See for instance Inst. 36.30–32. In Eustratios this expression might also be under-

stood to refer to what Eustratios had already written in his commentary on book I ofthe Nicomachean Ethics, where he mentions the followers of Parmenides and Plato on thenature of the ideas (περ' δ? τ�ν #δε�ν Gπλ�ς), which can be intelligent and intelligible(τ�ν τε ν�ερ�ν κα' ν�ητ�ν) as well as primary and secondary (τ�ν πρ7των κα' δευτ"-ρων) In EN 49.7–9. Needless to say, Eustratios’ reference to the the dyptic intelligent-intelligible is another reference to Proklos although our commentator does not dealwith this topic in all its complexity.

60 This is clear in Theol. Plat. 3,64.6–12; In Alc. 328.6–10.

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and to their proximate cause.61 Moreover, this anagogic ascension, addsEustratios, proceeds through intermediate realms (δι* τ�ν μ"σων διακ.-σμων), which are identified by the term δι�κ�σμ�ς or διακ.σμησις, animportant technical expression found in Proklos for the description ofdifferent realms, planes of beings or world-orders.62

In another passage, Eustratios claims that sophia is the absoluteknowledge of beings, namely of substances. Its object is not a partic-ular qualified or accidental being (�; συμ2ε2ηκ�ς M τι Hν )στ�ν) but thesubstance or Being in an absolute sense (&λλ’ �;σ�αν R Gπλ�ς Hν).63 Thisargument can be found in the Aristotelian identification of the objectof metaphysics with being qua being. In fact, says Aristotle in book IVof the Metaphysics, none of the other sciences treat being generally qua

being (κα .λ�υ περ' τ�+ Hντ�ς CU Hν), but just some portion or part of it(τ� συμ2ε2ηκ.ς), like, for instance, the mathematical sciences.64 Needlessto say, Eustratios’ reference to the concept of substance (�;σ�α) can alsobe traced back to the Metaphysics, book VII, where Aristotle explicitlylinks the problem of being with the problem of substance. His formu-lation is akin to Eustratios’ argument where he states that that whichis primary, i.e., not in a qualified or particular manner, but absolutely,will be substance (Eστε τ� πρ7τως _ν κα' �; τ' _ν &λλ’ _ν Gπλ�ς � �;σ�αZν εJη).65 Moreover, the idea that metaphysics deals with τ� Gπλ�ς Hνcan be found in many relevant passages of the late antique tradition.66

61 In Prm. 879.17–19: &π� γ*ρ τ�ν )ν τ�,ς κα "καστα κ�ιν�ν )π' τ) πρ�σε�0ς ατι�να;τ�ν �νατρ ��μεν, : δ� )στι π�ντως εXδ�ς �υσικ.ν.

62 Esutratius speaks about “intermediate realms” (δι* τ�ν μ"σων διακ.σμων) throughwhich we proceed upwards towards the One and First Cause. This exact expressionalso occurs in Proklos in order to describe the declining procession to the last terms ofthe causation process. See for instance In Alc. 112.1–5, where beauty and greatness aresaid to come from above, from the most primary principles all the way to the visibleworld through all the intermediate realms (δι* π�ντων τ�ν μ"σων διακ.σμων). See alsothe account of the different διακ.σμ�ι in Theol. Plat. 3,20.9ff. Needless to say, δι�κ�σμ�ςis an important term for the Neoplatonists in general. Syrianus, for example, mentionsfive main διακ.σμ�ι: divine, intellective, psychic, natural, and sensible. They are all saidto be filled by the Dyad with the numbers proper to them; cf. Syrianus, In Metaph.112.35–113.3. Ammonius uses the term δι�κ�σμ�ς to describe the three primitive ordersor realms of the natural substances, which he identifies with the divine, the intellectiveand the psychic one; cf. Ammonius, In Int. 24.22–29.

63 In EN 320.7–10: � δ? σ��α Gπλ�ς περ' τNν τ�ν Hντων γν�σιν καταγιν�μ"νη, Qτ�ιτ�ν �;σι�ν, �c τι _ν γιν7σκει &λλ’ Gπλ�ς Hν, Qγ�υν �; συμ2ε2ηκ�ς M τι Hν )στιν &λλ’�;σ�αν R Gπλ�ς Hν [)στιν].

64 Aristotle, Metaphysica IV,1,1003a21–26.65 Aristotle, Metaphysica VII,1,1028a29–20.66 Cf. e.g. Asclepius, In Metaph. 226,6ff.


What is more interesting is that Eustratios finishes this argument bystating that the best part of sophia is the one that deals with the moreprinciple beings (&ρ�ικ7τερα). Sophia is in this respect theology.67 In stat-ing this Eustratios follows the Neoplatonic interpretation of Aristotle’sFirst Philosophy,68 which is also found in other Byzantine authors closerto Eustratios, like Michael Psellos and in Eustratios’ teacher John Ita-los.69

Metaphysics deals with higher realities, that which is immaterialand divine, and not liable to mental separation (like the mathematicalobjects), but existing as such as separated,70 which Eustratios, followingProklos, defines as the “causes in the proper sense of the word,” thosebeings which exist by absolute necessity.71 In this respect, says Eustra-tios, First Philsophy/theology also provides the particular sciences withtheir indemonstrable principles since it relates directly to the causativeprinciples of every being, and is, therefore, the supreme science. Onlyin this way, according to Eustratios, can the man of wisdom, the sophos,clarify and strengthen the principles of each science by referring themto their true and supreme causes or principles.72

Eustratios proposes a description of the statuses of the three theo-retical sciences following the tradition of the commentators through aconsideration of their different types and degrees of separation fromtheir object. He often uses terms taken from Proklos’ work in order todescribe the anagogic ascent from the level of perishable realities to thelevel of true beings. The starting point for this upwards procession is thesensible knowledge that awakens in us the desire to strive towards theseparate forms. Eustratios’ account of the nature and status of humanintellect is linked to this idea.

67 In EN 320.13–19.68 Cf. e.g. Syrianus, In Metaph. 80.16–18; Ammonius, In Int. 27.32–33; Asclepius,

In Metaph. 1.7–8; 1.17–18; 4.1–3; 134,10–12; Elias, In Porph. 20.21–22; Simplikios, InPh. 364.15–16; John Philoponos, In APo. 331.10–11. Nevertheless, that the subject ofAristotle’s Metaphysics was a theological one had been already argued by Alexanderof Aphrodisias; cf. Alexander of Aphrodisias, In Metaph. 171.5–11. For a detailed studyon Alexander’s view, cf. Genequand (1979); Kremer (1961) 5–77; 105–129; 142–172; 209–216; Verbeke (1981); O’Meara (1986); Steel (2005).

69 Psellos, Orat. min. 37.210–211; Phil. Min. II 69.15–16; Italos, QQ 26.16–17.70 In EN 346.36–39.71 Cf. Trizio (2006) 47–53; 53, 60.72 In EN 322.12–19; 323.22–23. It might be useful to compare the whole set of

arguments provided by Eustratios with two similar passages taken from Asclepius’commentary on the Metaphysics, e. g., 3.21–4.3 and 361.28–33.

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2. The Doctrine of the Intellect

In his commentary on EN,6,1141a3–8, where Aristotle identifies theintellect with the only truth-attaining disposition that can grasp the firstprinciples, Eustratios provides a twofold classification of the differenttypes of intellect. On the one hand, there is an intellect by essence (κατ’�;σ�αν) that posseses all the intelligibles in itself (π�ντα F�ων )ν /αυτD� τ*γνωστ�) and grasps them by means of direct and immediate apprehen-sion (Gπλα,ς )πι2�λα,ς κα' & ρ.�ις καταλαμ2�νων). On the other, thereis an intellect by disposition or habit (κα ’ V5ιν), which is identified with“our” human intellect. This intellect initially possesses common notions(τ*ς κ�ιν*ς )νν��ας) as the result of its proper operations and intelligi-ble contents, which are echoes of the Intellect that exists in an absoluteand pure way (ν��ματα &πη��ματ� τινα )ν /αυτD� τ�+ Gπλ�ς =π�ρ��ντ�ςν�+). Eustratios says that the human intellect does not share the perfectintellection that characterizes the intellect by essence. It can recoverfrom this gap once it becomes free from the confusion caused by thepassions. But even after gaining a purer form of knowledge, the humanintellect cannot perform intellection in the same way as the intellectκατ’ �;σ�αν. In fact, human intellection is still neither simultaneousnor eternal (�;κ & ρ.�ν �;δ’ )ν α#�νι) as is the Intellect described byEustratios as existing in an absolute and pure manner, whose presencein us is witnessed by the intelligibles possessed as echoes. On the con-trary, human intellect is only allowed a temporal form of knowledge,only grasping the intelligibles singularly (κα ’ dν κα' )ν �ρ.νDω) whilepassing from one to the other (μετα2α�νων &�’ /τ"ρ�υ ε#ς Vτερ�ν).73

Specialists in late antique philosophy will readily recognize this pas-sage as a puzzle pieced together from Proklos’ arguments. For example,the distinction between intellect κατ’ �;σ�αν and intellect κα ’ V5ιν is tobe found in Proklos’ commentary on Plato’s Timaeus, where the authordistinguishes between three types of intellect. The first one is the divineintellect, the demiurgic one; the second is the one participated (� μετε-

73 In EN 317.19–28: � μ?ν γ*ρ κατ’ �;σ�αν ν�+ς π�ντα F�ων )ν /αυτD� τ* γνωστ*κα' Gπλα,ς )πι2�λα,ς κα' & ρ.�ις καταλαμ2�νων α;τ* �;δ"π�τε )5�σταται &π’ α;τ�ν, �δ? )ν �μ,ν ν�+ς κα ’ V5ιν F�ων τ� εXναι, μ.νας F�ει )5 &ρ�Lς τ*ς κ�ιν*ς )νν��ας �#κε,α)νεργ�ματα κα' ν��ματα &πη��ματ� τινα )ν /αυτD� τ�+ Gπλ�ς =π�ρ��ντ�ς ν�+, Mταν δ?τLς τ�ν πα �ν &παλλαγCL συγ��σεως κα' τ�ν συνηρτημ"νων =περαρ CL δυν�μεων κα' τ�τ"λει�ν α;τ�+ =π�λ�ψεται /αυτ�+ μ.ν�υ γεν.μεν�ς, τ.τε κα' /κ�στDω τ�ν ν�ητ�ν Gπλ�ς)πι2�λλειν δ�ναται, �;κ & ρ.�ν �;δ’ )ν α#�νι Iς � κυρ�ως ν�+ς καταλαμ2�νων α;τ*&λλ* κα ’ dν κα' )ν �ρ.νDω κα' μετα2α�νων &�’ /τ"ρ�υ ε#ς Vτερ�ν, Iς πρ�ε�ρηται.


�.μεν�ς) by the Soul, which is substantial and by itself perfect; the thirdone is the intellect by disposition (� κα ’ V5ιν), by means of which theSoul is intelligent.74 Proklos seemingly refers this last distinction to theWorld-Soul, and Eustratios extends the term to include the particularsouls, on the grounds that that which is valid for the World-Soul shouldalso be valid for the particular ones.

Proklos also seems to be the source of Eustratios’ argument regardingthe different manners in which the intellect κατ’ �;σ�αν and the intel-lect κα ’ V5ιν possess the intelligibles. The first one contains all formsin itself in a unitary manner and never abandons them (�;δ"π�τε )5�-σταται &π’ α;τ�ν).75 The latter contains all forms as well, although ina secondary and discursive manner.76 Thus, Eustratios contends that atthe beginning we possess only common notions (κ�ινα' Fνν�ιαι) as thesoul’s proper (discursive) operations. In doing so, he follows the Neo-platonists in describing the type of knowledge that is coordinated withdiscursive reason as proceeding from common notions or axioms fromwhich the soul produces arguments or demonstrations.77 However, even

74 In Ti. II,313.1–4. The same distinction is found in In Alc. 65.19–66.6, wherethe author compares the above mentioned types of intellect with three types of love,describing the third kind of love, which exists by irradiation in the souls as analoguousto the intellect by disposition (κα ’ V5ιν). See also the argument elaborated by Proklos inIn Ti. I,406.14–25, where one can find a discussion on the nature of the principle thatmakes the soul intelligent, i.e., whether the intellect is substantial and situated abovethe soul, or whether it is a disposition or state of it.

75 In EN 317.21: �;δ"π�τε )5�σταται &π’ α;τ�ν. = In Alc. 187,8–11: �cτε γ*ρ τ*κρε�ττ�να γ"νη τLς �μετ"ρας ψυ�Lς δι* μα �σεως R ε=ρ"σεως τυγ��νει τLς /αυτ�ντελει.τητ�ς> &ε' γ*ρ σ�νεστι τ�,ς /αυτ�ν γνωστ�,ς κα' �&δ π�τε �+�σταται α&τ�ν �;δ?)νδεL γ�γνεται τLς �#κε�ας γν7σεως. Here Proklos states that the classes superior to oursoul do not attain perfection through a learning process since they are always united totheir objects of knowledge and never leave them (�;δ"π�τε &��σταται α;τ�ν).

76 Inst. 194.30: Π σα ψυ�N π�ντα F�ει τ* εJδη, T � ν�+ς πρ7τως F�ει.77 On this Neoplatonic theory, cf. O’Meara (1986) 12–13. That the knowledge of

the intelligibles is somehow not properly coordinated (συστ�ι��ς) with the discursivereason is clearly stated in an argument expounded by Proklos in In Prm. 949.11–19. Cf. Steel (1997) 293–309, 295–297. The term “common notions” (κ�ινα' Fνν�ιαι)to describe the starting points of discursive reasoning and the principles of scientificdemonstrations might be traced to Syrianus, In Met. 18.9–10; 21,31–34; Proklos, In Euc.240.11–14; Ammonius, In Int. 7.16–22; Asclepius, In Metaph. 158.11–13; John Philoponos,In APr. 2.24–27. For a survey on the Neoplatonic usage of the expression “commonnotions” it might be useful to refer to Proklos, Theol. Plat. v. 1, p. 155, n. 4. In regardto the more techinical meaning of the expression “common notions,” it is interestingto note that, beginning probably with Alexander of Aphrodisias, common notions aresometimes identified tout-court with the axioms upon which the sciences are based. Cf.e.g. Alexander of Aphrodisias, In Top. 18.19–21. This is also what Eustratios does in InEN 319.8–9 and in In APo. 45.27–33.

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this discursive activity of the soul is grounded on contents which thesoul somehow already possesses in itself. Eustratios defines these con-tents as the “echoes in us of an absolutely existing Intellect” (&πη��ματ�τινα )ν /αυτD� τ�+ Gπλ�ς =π�ρ��ντ�ς ν�+). The term &πη��ματα used byEustratios to describe the innate knowledge in the particular soul, isanother sign of the Proklean influence on this and other argumentselaborated by Eustratios.78

The commentator refers to the possibility that the human intellectmight be freed from the passions, adding that it is this that enables itto transcend the potencies related to these passions (τ�ν συνηρτημ"νωνδυναμ"νων).79 This argument reflects a passage from Proklos’ commen-tary on the Alcibiades where the author describes the different vesturesthat the soul assumes in its descent into the body and which obstructthe contemplation of beings. The soul has to control and regulate, saysProklos, the secondary and tertiary potencies related or attached toit (τ*ς δευτ"ρας κα' τρ�τας δυν�μεις τ*ς συνηρτημ"νας α;τCL).80 Thesepotencies are basically lower powers that the soul brings forth fromitself when it is embodied and guarantee the functionning of the bod-ily vital functions. Following the Neoplatonists, Eustratios calls theselower potencies “acts” ()ντ"λε�ειαι), or “lives” (�ωα�), which cannot beseparated from bodies.81 These lives are necessary insofar as it is notpossible for the soul to be attached directly to physis and bodies82 sincea soul is an incorporeal essence and, as such, never comes in contactwith a body. In entering the body the soul never loses its essential unityin this ensouling process of the body.83

This whole argument strongly echoes a formula found in Proklos’commentary on the Timaeus. Here Proklos rejects the opinion of those,

78 Cf. e.g. In Alc. 99.13–19; Theol. Plat. 1,125.3–8; Inst. 129.26–28. Other occurrencesof the term &πη��ματα are listed in Ierodiakonou (2005b) 81, n. 30. The terms &π��ημαand &πη��ματα occur as well in Ps.-Dionysios; cf. e.g. De divinis nominibus 147.12; 191.5;201.12. However, none of the passages of Ps.-Dionysios in which these terms occur canbe linked to Eustratios’ argument since they only refer generically to the lower degreesof perfection found in the last terms of the causation process and not to concepts foundin the human soul.

79 In EN 317.24–25.80 In Alc. 224.1–9, in part. 8–9.81 In EN 317.33; see also 276.37–38. For Neoplatonic occurrences of the term �ωα� to

describe the lower lives or potencies of the enbodied soul, see Proklos, In Prm. 818.33–35; Priscianus Lydus, In de An. 219.32–34; 242.4; 246.37.

82 In EN 217.30–33.83 For this Neoplatonic doctrine, see Steel (1978).


probably referring to Aristotle, who believe that the soul is just a seriesof acts, potencies or lives inseparable from the body. Furthermore,according to Proklos, the embodied soul organizes the vital functionsof the body through potencies or lives such that simply declaring thatthe soul is only the animating principle of the body would be wrong.Eustratios echoes Proklos’ doxographical account as he speaks aboutother lives which are responsible for the bond between the soul andthe body, “which some call acts”. He simply takes this expressionfrom Proklos without regard to the fact that in Proklos the wholeargument has been rejected.84 This passage, as do many others fromthe commentary on book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics, seems to showthat for Eustratios Proklos is not only a source, but source-material, i.e.,a kind of terminological repertoire, which he freely employs in orderto construct his own arguments. A highly educated Byzantine readerwould probably have immediately noticed that the whole of Eustratios’scommentary on book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics is constructed inthis way. It is an amazing piece of philosophical rhetoric, in which theauthor deepens the interpretation of the Aristotelian text by a carefulline by line reconstruction of the source material offered by Proklos’works. Eustratios seems to regard the original context and doctrinalframework of Proklos’ arguments and formulas as secondary since heuses Proklos’ vocabulary mainly as a means to construct coherent andconsistent arguments, which pay more attention to form and style thanto content.

Returning to Eustratios’ view on the status of the human intellect,the condition according to which the soul acts discursively is not adefinitive one. In fact, these lower potencies or lives can be somehowtranscended so that the soul regains its essential purity. However, evenwhen this happens, claims Eustratios, the soul cannot grasp the intel-ligibles in the same way as the ν�+ς κατ’ �;σ�αν. The operational gapbetween the human and the separate Intellect remains, as the intellec-tual and non-discursive operation of the soul is neither simultaneous

84 In EN 317.32–35: Iς κα' μετ* τNν λ�γικNν ψυ�Nν �;� � ��σις ε; 0ς κα' τ* σ7ματα&λλ* �ωα� τινες Vτεραι, Tς )ντελε�ε�ας �ασ'ν εXναι, &�ωρ�στ�υς �cσας σωμ�των κα'�#κε�ως α;τ�ν )πιγιν�μ"νας τα,ς κρ�σεσι κα' τ��των διαλυ�μ"νων συναπι��σας. = InTi. 2, 286, 23–26: Fτι τNν διαπλ�κNν τ�ια�την &νε5.με α λ"γειν, �%αν τιν?ς λ"γ�υσιν, Iςμεριστα,ς δυν�μεσι κα' �ντελε�ε�αις κα' %ωα1ς ��ωρ�στ�ις τLς ψυ�Lς τD� σ7ματι παρ��σης;μηδαμ�ς. Proklos’ doxographical account introduced by the formula τιν?ς λ"γ�υσιν isclearly reflected in Eustratios’ use of the form �ασιν.

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nor eternal (�;κ & ρ.�ν �;δ’ )ν α#�νι). The soul can grasp the intel-ligibles by means of direct apprehension—the above mentioned )π�2�-λαι—that are singular and distinct acts of intellection, in the sense thatone follows the other. In this way the intelligibles can be grasped oneby one (κα ’ dν) and in time ()ν �ρ.νDω) insofar as time is that which isinvolved in the process of passing from one intelligible content to theother (μετα2α�νων &�’ /τ"ρ�υ ε#ς Vτερ�ν).

This latter argument can be safely traced back to Proklos.85 If theNous and the divine souls which attend upon the gods act and thinkwith no interruption, then the particular souls, which exist within arealm of becoming and division, act and think in a discontinuous way.86

In the first entities, intellection is co-extensive with their essence; inthe second, intellection is other than their essence.87 This separationbetween essence and activity characterizes the particular souls. Theyremain eternal in their essence, but they act within a temporal dimen-sion.88 The terms and the formulas employed by Proklos are clearlyreflected in Eustratios’ own arguments.89 In fact, he explains that thesoul qua soul (Iς μ?ν ψυ��) acts by unfolding (&νειλιγμ"νως) the intelligi-ble contents within the realm of discursive reasoning, i.e., by means ofsyllogisms, passing from the order of the premises to the order of theconclusions (μετα2α�ν�υσα ε#ς συμπερ�σματα )κ πρ�τ�σεων).90 However,the soul, when participating in the Intellect (Iς δ? μετ"��υσα ν�+), actsby means of direct apprehensions, insofar as it already possesses in itselfthe principles and the definitions (τ*ς &ρ�*ς κα' τ�0ς Mρ�υς) as echoesof the Nous (Iς ν�+ &πη��ματα), and it recollects the projections of theinnate reasons of the soul in the dianoia. When it becomes intelligent,i.e., capable of intellectual operation, it acquires an intellection that isfinally coordinated to the nature of the intelligible and no longer simplydiscursive even though it is not simultaneous and immediate like theknowledge proper to what Eustratios calls Intellect “by existence” (κα ’

85 On this theory see O’Meara (2000).86 Cf. Steel (1997) 307.87 See In Prm. 895.32–40. Further examples of this argument in the Neoplatonic

tradition can be found in Steel (1978) 132–141.88 For this principle see Inst. 191.89 See e.g. In Prm. 1165.30–35; In Ti. 1, 245.6–7; 1,246.1–9. Here Proklos claims that

our knowledge does not grasp all at once (�; π�ντα δ? Bμα) but passes from one contentto the other (&λλ* μετα2α�νων &π’ Aλλων )π’ Aλλα). Not only the content, but also theterms used by Proklos are the same as those used by Eustratios, as is clear from the useof the form μετα2α�νων to describe the passing from one intelligible to the other.

90 A quotation from John Philoponos, In de An. 2.2–3.


@παρ5ιν).91 Intriguingly, this distinction between the soul qua soul andthe soul as participating in the intellect, Iς μ?ν ψυ�� and Iς δ? μετ"-��υσα ν�+, seems to be drawn directly from an argument in Proklos’commentary on the Timaeus. Here Proklos mentions two ways in whichthe logos knows the eternal Being: the first one is Iς μ?ν λ.γ�ς, that isdiscursively; the second one is Iς δ? ν��ν, namely intellectually, whichtakes place by means of the direct apprehensions introduced above.92

Proklos argues that, although true intellection and knowledge are abovethe soul, they can be participated (μετ"�εσ αι) by the same soul whenthe logos acts intellectually (Mταν � λ.γ�ς )νεργCL ν�ερ�ς).93

Eustratios seems to follow Proklos in admitting that our knowledgefunctions μετα2ατικ�ς in two senses. First, discursive reasoning forcesus to move from the order of premises to that of conclusions. Second,because the soul cannot, in a purely intellectual operation, grasp theintelligibles simultaneously, it needs to move from one content to theother.94 More interestingly, Eustratios concludes that the condition bymeans of which the soul becomes intelligent is not a natural one (��σις)but a dispositional one (V5ις).95 He clarifies that this dispositional statuscomes upon the soul from outside (Iς F5ω εν )πεισι�+σα )π�κτητ�ς)as something acquired ()π�κτητ�ς).96 The term )π�κτητ�ς, “acquired,”used by Eustratios to describe the dispositional and habitual nature ofhuman intellect, can often be found in Proklos as a description of a

91 In EN 303.19–16: � γ*ρ ψυ�N Iς μ?ν ψυ�N &νειλιγμ"νως )νεργε,, συλλ�γι��μ"νη κα'μετα2α�ν�υσα ε#ς συμπερ�σματα )κ πρ�τ�σεων, Iς δ? μετ"��υσα ν�+ Gπλ�ς )πι2�λλει,F��υσα μ?ν κα' τ*ς &ρ�*ς κα' τ�0ς Mρ�υς Iς ν�+ &πη��ματα, γιν�μ"νη δ? κα' τ��των )π"-κεινα, Mταν ν�ερ* γ"νηται, τ�,ς ν�ητ�,ς ν�ητ�ς )πι2�λλ�υσα, ε# κα' μN & ρ.ως κα' �μ�+Iς � κα ’ @παρ5ιν, &λλ* κα ’ dν περιε��μ"νη τ* π�ντα κα' ν��+σα κα ’ Vκαστ�ν, δι� κα'� τ�ια�τη κατ�στασις �; ��σις &λλ* V5ις τLς ψυ�Lς \ν�μ��εται, Iς F5ω εν )πεισι�+σακα' γιν�μ"νη )π�κτητ�ς. The soul is all forms in an unfolded manner (&νειλιγμ"νως) =In Euc. 16.10–16; In Prm. 987.37–39. When the soul becomes intelligent it grasps theintelligibles by means of direct apprehensions (Gπλ�ς )πι2�λλει/τ�,ς ν�ητ�,ς ν�ητ�ς )πι-2�λλ�υσα) = In Prm. 704.28–34; In Alc. 246.15–18; In Ti. 2,313.13–15. Even after thesoul’s self reversion, it will grasp the intelligibles in a different manner than the Intel-lect. The soul cannot grasp the intelligibles all at once and simultaneously (μN & ρ.ωςκα' �μ�+) = In Prm. 1165.24–25: �2τε γ*ρ Mλην α;τNν (scil. the soul) 3μ�� τ�,ς τ�+ ν�+παρ�γειν ν��μασιν> �& γ*ρ �'ρ�ως α;τ* π"�υκεν �ρP ν.

92 In Ti. 1,246.5–7.93 In Ti. 1,245.28–31.94 Cf. e.g. Theol. Plat. 4,43.20–22; In Ti. 1,219.1–3; 2,219.4–5.95 This idea can be traced back to the tradition of the Neoplatonic commentators.

Cf. Tempelis (1997) 317–320.96 In EN 303.25–26.

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state or condition that does not belong to something essentially or sub-stantially (Hντως) but only in a participatory or dispositional manner.97

A similar consideration can be made for the notion of κα ’ @παρ5ιν,which Eustratios associates with that Intellect that he also defines asκατ’ �;σ�αν, κυρ�ως or κ�ρι�ς ν�+ς, referring to the Supreme Intellect.98

In fact, the concept of κα ’ @παρ5ιν is to be found in Proklos withina threefold distinction of the modes in which characters exist, namelyin their causes (κατ’ α#τ�αν), substantially or existentially (κα ’ @παρ5ιν),and by participation (κατ* μ" ε5ιν).99 Sometimes, however, Proklos sim-ply refers to the opposition κα ’ @παρ5ιν–κατ* μ" ε5ιν independentlyfrom the general description of the triadic structure of reality in orderto draw a more general distinction between the substantial inherenceof a character or property as opposed to possession through mere par-ticipation in the same character.100 Eustratios seems to refer precisely tothis latter opposition when he compares the Intellect κα ’ @παρ5ιν, i.e.,the Intellect which is essentially such, with the intellect by dispositionor habit (κα ’ V5ιν), which is said to be adventitious and participated.Eustratios confirms this himself by making it clear that κα ’ V5ιν, “bydisposition”, means κατ* μ" ε5ιν, “by participation”.101

Elsewhere, Eustratios elaborates a similar argument when he refersagain to the idea that the soul, even after transcending the discursivedimension of its knowledge, cannot grasp the intelligibles in the sameway as that found in what Eustratios defines as “the supreme Intel-lect” (� κ�ρι�ς ν�+ς). The intelligent soul can only grasp them one by

97 In R. 1,28.17–20. In this passage Proklos says that every god is essentially orsubstantially (Hντως) good insofar as he is constituted in his substance (�;σιωμ"ν�ς)according to the good and does not possess it as something acquired ()π�κτητ�ν) oras a disposition (Iς V5ιν). In fact, continues Proklos, that which is good in this latter wayis neither essentially nor truly good (τD� Hντι) but has only participated in the good (τ�+&γα �+ μετ"σ�εν). See also In Ti. 1,352.19–22. If knowledge among the gods belongs tothem essentially and substantially (κατ’ �;σ�αν), and if their intellection is not acquired()π�κτητ�ς), then they will know what they know in a way coordinated to their essence.However, it is also true that in the Inst. Proklos clearly states that since the substance ofevery god is supra-substantial goodness, he has goodness neither as a disposition (κα ’V5ιν) nor substantially or essentially (κατ’ �;σ�αν) but in a supra-substantial manner. Cf.Inst. 119.16–19.

98 In EN 314.16; 317.27.99 Inst. 65; 140.17–18. On this topic, cf. Steel (1994). Cf. also Giocarinis (1964) 176,

n. 39.100 Cf. e.g. In Alc. 104.7–8. Here the gods are said to be self-sufficient κα ’ @παρ5ιν,

whereas the other things are self-sufficient only κατ* μ" ε5ιν.101 In EN 303.16–17.


one, “dancing around the Intellect” (τ�ν ν�+ν περι��ρε��υσα).102 Thislatter expression is found in a similar context in Eustratios’ commen-tary on book I of the Nicomachean Ethics, where it is clear that it isa quotation from Proklos’ commentary on the Parmenides.103 By refer-ring to it, Eustratios stresses that the soul’s capacity for operating inan intellectual manner is not an essential condition (�;σιωδ�ς) but issomething acquired (κτητ.ν), a disposition or a habit supervening (IςV5ιν )πιγιν.μεν�ν) to the soul. According to Eustratios it is because ofthis status, i.e., acquired from outside (κτ7μεν�ν F5ω εν) but also poten-tially losable (&π�2αλλ.μεν�ν), that the Philosopher mentions the intel-lect among the other truth-attaining dispositions, namely Art, ScientificKnowledge, Practical Wisdom and Wisdom.104

Despite attributing this description of the dispositional and habitualstate of the intellect to Aristotle himself, Eustratios seems to refer onceagain to Neoplatonic source-material. The term κτητ.ς means the sameas )π�κτητ�ς, and it characterizes the participatory nature of the intel-lectual activity that belongs to the particular souls, as opposed to theessential (�;σιωδ�ς/κατ’ �;σ�αν) possession of the same character. It isremarkable, then, that the two expressions, Iς V5ιν )πιγιν.μεν�ν andIς F5ω εν )πεισι�+σα, which are found in the two different passageshere under discussion,105 appear almost verbatim in Proklos in the samepassage from his commentary on the Parmenides, where Proklos distin-guishes between two types of multiplicity among beings, one essential,and the other that which “supervenes from outside and is adventitious”(F5ω εν )πιγιν.μεν�ν κα' )πεισ�δι�δες).106

It might be objected that in one passage of Alexander of Aphro-disias’s De anima one can find the notion of ν�+ς κα ’ V5ιν described

102 In EN 314.8–18: ε# γ*ρ κα' ν�ερ*ν λ"γει τNν ψυ�Nν κα' ν�+ν =π�ρ�ειν �ησ'ν )να;τCL, &λλ’ �;κ �;σιωδ�ς =π�ρ�ειν )ν α;τCL τ�ν ν�+ν τ� εται, &λλ� γε κτητ�ν κα' IςV5ιν )πιγιν.μεν�ν, κα * κα' πρ.τερ�ν εJρηται. δι* τ�+τ� κα' τα,ς &λη ευτικα,ς V5εσινα;τ�ν συνηρ� μησεν, �ρ�ν α;τ�ν κα' κτ7μεν�ν F5ω εν κα' &π�2αλλ.μεν�ν. κα αρ* γ*ργεν�μ"νη κα' )λευ "ρα τ�ν πα �ν � ψυ��, )λλ�μπεται μ?ν τCL πρ�ς ν�+ν γειτνι�σει,δ"�εται δ? )κε, εν τ� ν�ερ�ς )νεργε,ν, κα' �@τω τNν τ�ν Hντων πρ�σλαμ2�νει κατ�ληψινGπλα,ς )πι2�λα,ς )�απτ�μ"νη α;τ�ν, �;κ & ρ.�ν Iς � κ�ρι�ς ν�+ς �;δ? π�ντων �μ�+,&λλ* κα ’ dν Vκαστ�ν α;τ�ν τ�ν ν�+ν περι��ρε��υσα κα' )5 /τ"ρων τ�ν =π’ α;τ�+ν��υμ"νων ε#ς Vτερ�ν μετα2α�ν�υσα.

103 In EN 47.4–11, where the author quotes In Prm. 807.29–808.11. See also Giocarinis(1964) 191, n. 86, and Steel (2002) 52–53.

104 Cf. Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea VI,3,1139b15–17.105 Respectively in In EN 314.10 and in 303.26.106 In Prm. 1187.41–1188.3. Cf. Psellos, Theol. I 4.28–29.

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in terms recalling the one used by Eustratios. Alexander distinguishesbetween an intellect that he calls “natural” or “material,” which is com-mon to all men who are not physically incapacitated, and an acquiredone ()π�κτητ�ς) that comes to be only afterwards (@στερ�ν )γγιν.μεν�ς),which Alexander calls “form” and “disposition” or “habit” (V5ις), i.e.,the perfection of the natural and material intellect.107 In this passage theterm )π�κτητ�ς and the expression @στερ�ν )γγιν.μεν�ς, similar to theforms Iς V5ιν )πιγιν.μεν�ν and Iς F5ω εν )πεισι�+σα used by Eustra-tios, characterize Alexander’s notion of ν�+ς κα ’ V5ιν. Nevertheless,Alexander’s dispositional intellect seems to refer to the habit or disposi-tion that happens to be in those who go through a process of practiceand learning, namely the possession of the intelligibles without actuallythinking them. On the contrary, as previously seen, in Eustratios theexpression κα ’ V5ιν has to be understood within the general metaphys-ical scheme, borrowed from Proklos, which is characterized by the dis-tinction between that which exists and acts by its own essence and thatwhich exists and acts by participation of something else. Indeed, theterm V5ις thus interpreted entails the possession of an unactivated sci-ence, which is why, as we will see, Eustratios will follow Proklos in stat-ing that we need to reactivate this knowledge. This Neoplatonic frame-work is even clearer when Eustratios remarks that the soul is able toact intellectually only in so far “as it participates in a principle superiorto it” (τ�+ =π?ρ α;τNν τεταγμ"ν�υ μετ"��υσαν), adding a verbatim quo-tation from Proklos’ Platonic Theology demanding that this participationrequires “the proximity to the Intellect” (τCL πρ�ς τ�ν ν�+ν γειτνι�σει).108

This doctrine of the different types of intellect is, according toEustratios, part of a more general account of the whole causation pro-cess. Eustratios explains the soul’s proximity to the Intellect by referringto the necessary unity and uniformity of the processions of beings fromthe First Cause (τ�ν Hντων α$ πρ.�δ�ι )κ τLς πρ7της α#τ�ας κα ’ ε$ρμ�νγ�ν�ιντ�) in such a way that each term of the causal chain is strictly

107 Alexander of Aphrodisias, De An. 81.26–82.1. Cf. also Themistios, In de An. 95.30–31; 98.21–24; 100.2–3; John Philoponos, In de An. 490.27. On this topic, see Davidson(1992) 10–12; De Libera (1990) 254–255. However, in Aristotle, De anima, 3,5,430a14–15the term V5ις is referred directly to the active intellect.

108 In EN 317.28–30: δε, γ*ρ τNν ψυ�Nν τCL πρ�ς τ�ν ν�+ν γειτνι�σει F�ειν τι ν�ερ�ντ�+ =π?ρ α;τNν τεταγμ"ν�υ μετ"��υσαν. = Theol. Plat. 1,66.20–23: ψυ�N δ? α;τ�κ�νητ�ς�6σα τLς κατ* ν�+ν μετ"�ει �ωLς κα' κατ* �ρ.ν�ν )νεργ�+σα τ� τLς )νεργε�ας Aπαυστ�νκα' τNν Aγρυπν�ν �ωNν )κ τ�ς πρ)ς τ)ν ν��ν F�ει γειτνι�σεως. The expression τ�+ =π?ρα;τNν τεταγμ"ν�υ μετ"��υσαν is freely borrowed from In Ti. 3,269.15–20, where Proklosdiscusses the way in which the Indivisible is present in the particular souls.


related to the one immediately superior to it by the possession of anelement of similitude between the two terms (&ε' τ�+ =�ειμ"ν�υ συν-απτ�μ"ν�υ τD� πρ� α;τ�+ κα� τινα πρ�ς )κε,ν� κεκτημ"ν�υ �μ��ωσιν).109

The attentive reader can easily recognize a rough version of Proklos’more complex and detailed description of the causation process foundin the Elements of Theology.110 In fact, compared with Proklos, Eustratiossimply proposes a rough metahysical scheme characterized by the solepresence of a Separate, Supreme Intellect, a dispositional or habitualintellect, i.e. the intelligent soul, and the bodies to which the soul isattached through its lower potencies or lives. However, despite Eustra-tios’ simplified account of the process of causation, Proklos is clearly theshadow behind most of the arguments expounded by the commentator.This is not only true for Eustratios’ theory of the intellect but also forthe commentator’s description of the process of concept formation.

3. Intellection and Recollection

As previously shown, Eustratios alludes to intellection’s anagogical pro-cess, which starts from the last terms of the causation process, i.e.,that which is first according to us, and gradually arrives at the FirstCause.111 Sense-perception data play an essential role in our strivingfor the knowledge of higher realities. By producing in us astonishmentand admiration for the exterior features of things, they can be con-sidered the starting point for the whole process of intellection insofar asthey stimulate and awaken the knowledge already present in our soul.112

When understood in light of Eustratios’ account of the graspability ofmathematical objects, abstraction from sense-perception becomes nec-essary to reactivate the innate knowledge of our soul, a knowledgeof which the soul itself is no longer aware, thanks to the shock ofbirth.113

Being of a participatory disposition, the human intellect bears initself the traces of its cause. It possesses that which is possessed by theNous, the separate Intellect, only in a secondary manner. As Eustratios

109 In EN 317.30–32.110 Cf. e.g. Inst. 11.8; 21.15–18; 29.3–4; 132.29–30; Theol. Plat. 5,103.5–6.111 Cf. n. 57, 61, and 62.112 Cf. n. 35.113 Ibid.

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says, there are echoes in us of an absolutely existing Intellect.114 Theactivity of the soul, however, confers common notions, as these notionsare gathered together through induction from sensory data.115 In thisrespect, it has been argued that Eustratios’ position becomes inconsis-tent since he admits that we possess both the existence of a full knowl-edge of universals when we are already born and a full knowledge ofthe existence of universals that are abstracted from the common char-acters of individuals.116 While agreeing that one can find this twofoldaccount for intellection in Eustratios, I reject the charge of inconsis-tency because Eustratios reconciles both abstraction from the individ-ual particulars and innatism in one and the same theory of intellection.

Evidence for my position can be found in Eustratios’ similar butmore detailed explanation of how we pass from sense-perception anddiscursive reasoning to the pure knowledge of the intelligibles. Inter-estingly, this account has many more Christian elements than the onepreviously seen as it relates the temporary loss of the purely intellectualcapacity to the loss, as it seems from the text, of our original Adamiccondition.117 Human being, claims Eustratios, was created in a stateof perfection, without lacking any of the dispositions that could havebrought him to perfection. If he would have mantained this condition,he would be a man of wisdom (σ��.ς), and he would not only be ableto act dianoetically or discursively (διαν�ητικ�ς) but also intellectually,according to his rank in the hierarchy of beings (κατ* τ� &ν�λ�γ�ν τLς�υσικLς α;τD� τ�5εως).118

This description of the Adamic condition is again strongly influencedby Proklean terminology. The term διαν�ητικ�ς, in fact, is to be foundin Proklos as opposed to the knowledge which Eustratios defines as “bydirect apprehensions”, characteristic of the intellectual operation prop-erly so-called.119 However, as has been said before, the framework of

114 Cf. n. 73.115 Ibid.116 Cf. Ierodiakonou (2005b) 82.117 In EN 297.16–298.6. This account apparently shows similarity with Basil of Cae-

sarea, Homiliae in Psalmos 48.21 (col. 449–452); Gregory of Nyssa, De opificio hominis 136–144. Also compare Eustratios’ passage with the Neoplatonic one, inspired by Proklos,quoted in n. 35. Finally, this passage is quoted verbatim by the 14th century philoso-pher and theologian Nicephoros Gregoras; cf. Nikephoros Gregoras, Solutiones quaes-tiones, I,493.178–494.191.

118 This latter expression seems to be borrowed from John of Damascus, ContraManicheos, 81.7–8.

119 Cf. e.g. In Ti. 2,61.16–17; Cf. also n. 128.


this argument remains a Christian one. Had man, claims the commen-tator, not transgressed the rank and the law which he received fromthe Creator, he would have remained in his state of perfection. Sincehe preferred to strive for the lower realities and to enjoy life accordingto the senses, he fell from the condition of perfection to the realm ofcoming to be and passing away.

In this argument it is difficult to distinguish pagan from Christiansources. Eustratios refers to the Platonic, but also Christian image, ofman’s intellectual eye (τ� ν�ερ�ν Hμμα) as closed and completely veiled(συμμ"μυστα� τε κα' συγκεκ�λυπται) because of the loss of the state ofperfection.120 He then clearly refers to typically Christian terminologywhen he claims that the eye of the soul was made turbid by the “thickerand mortal flesh” (τLς πα�υτ"ρας σαρκ�ς κα' νητLς), which echoes apassage from Gregory of Nazianzos in which the author describes, likeEustratios, the loss of the Adamic condition.121

Despite these Christian elements, Eustratios’ aim seems to be nei-ther moral nor eschatological but mainly epistemological. As a matterof fact, the main consequence of the fall and the loss of man’s perfectand original condition is that human knowledge now depends on sense-perception. However, he remarks once more that sense-perceptionplays the relevant role of awakening us from the sleep induced bythe generation process.122 The terminology changes once again whenEustratios provides a basic account for the process of induction: fromparticular individuals we inductively ()παγωγικ�ς) form or assembletogether common notions (τ*ς κ�ιν*ς )νν��ας), which are able to pro-duce scientific conclusions.123 The common notions are immediate inso-

120 For the expression τ� ν�ερ�ν Hμμα see Synesios, Epistulae 154.86; Syrianos, InMetaph. 25.6; Proklos, In Prm. 1128.32; Ps.-Dionysios, De caelesti ierarchia 50.13–14; Max-imus the Confessor, Quaestiones ad Thalassium, 59.112; John of Damascus, Dialectica 1.27;Photios, De spiritus sancti mystagogia 77AB; Epistulae et Amphilochia, 284.278; Psellos, Omni.doc. 95.7.

121 Gregory of Nazianzos, Or. 45 633A; This passage by Gregory is quoted literally inIn EN 276.16. For other related passages, see Bianchi (2005) 30, n. 46.

122 In EN 297.32–33: &�υπνι��σης δ? κα' α;τ�ν Eσπερ τCL γεν"σει καταδαρ �ν�ντα.This expression is freely borrowed from Plato’s Phaedo, where the process of generationis said to be in one case falling asleep, and in the other waking up: Plato, Phaedo, 71d:κα' τ*ς γεν σεις α;τ�,ν τNν μ?ν καταδαρ'�νειν εXναι, τNν δ’ &νεγε�ρεσ αι.

123 In EN 297.33–38. Cf. also n. 99, where the common notions are said to be theproduct (�#κε,α )νεργ�ματα) of the (inductive) activity of our intellect, different fromthose concepts which on the contrary are echoes in our intellect of an absolutelyexisting Intellect (ν��ματα &πη��ματ� τινα )ν /αυτD� τ�+ Gπλ�ς =π�ρ��ντ�ς ν�+). Forsimilar formulas related to the formation of universals by induction from individual

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far as the intellect forms them with sense-perception data, which inthemsleves are immediate because they are in direct contact with oursensitive faculties. In this case, the terminology of the whole argumentcan easily be found in the tradition of the late antique commentators.124

But it seems that this account is insufficient for Eustratios since headds that the constitution of the universal from individuals is only apreliminary step towards a further level in the process of concept for-mation. After induction man rids himself of the “veil of ignorance” andagain becomes capable of striving for those realities that are superiorand nobler than he and, ultimatively, for his Creator.125 The expres-sion “veil of ignorance” refers to the veil that Moses had to wear,126

and to which St. Paul refers in his second letter to the Corinthi-ans.127 However, it is interesting to notice that the expression “veil ofignorance” does not explicitly occur in either the Old or New Testa-ment. Rather it seems to be borrowed from Origen’s interpretation ofMoses’ veil in his Contra Celsum and can also be found in Theodore ofStoudios.128

In conclusion, induction, i.e., the constitution of the axioms of thesciences from individual particulars, is a consequence of the loss ofman’s intellectual perfection and the subsequent fall into the realmof coming to be and passing away.129 Clearly, then, Eustratios’ posi-tion cannot be regarded as inconsistent, if, following the commentator,induction is understood to be a necessary step that leads to a higher

particulars, see In APo. 89.5–6: � γ*ρ )παγωγN τ* =π� τ� �ητ��μεν�ν κα .λ�υ λα2�+σακα ’ Vκαστα, �@τως τ� κα .λ�υ συν�στησιν.; 268.30–31: )παγωγικ�ς γ�ρ, �ησ�, κα' �αJσ ησις )μπ�ιε, τ� κα .λ�υ, )κ τ�ν κα ’ Vκαστα τ� κα .λ�υ συν�στασ αι π�ι�+σα.Elsewhere (In APo. 22.24–28), Eustratios seems somehow to regard the common notionsas innate concepts in our soul, or more probably as the dianoetical projections of theseinnate concepts.

124 I refer in particular to Eustratios’ use of the verb συν�στημι to account for the con-stitution of universals from the manifold of particulars. See e.g. Alexander of Aphro-disias, In Top. 537.7–8; John Philoponos, In APo. 438.2–3; In Ph. 12.20–21. See also Prok-los’ aporematic argument in In Euc. 13.27–14.4. Cf. In EN 297.36–37: )5 [ν &μ"σων �;-σ�ν Mτι κα' )5 &μ"σων &��ρμ�ν α;τ*ς � ν�+ς συναγ��ε . . . = John Philoponos, In APo.439.19–20: &λλ’ &π� α#σ �σεως, Iς δ"δεικται, )νδ�δ�νται �μ,ν �+�ρμα( � 4ν τ� κα .λ�υσυν�γ�μεν κα' )πιγιν7σκ�μεν. Similar arguments are also found in In EN 399.29–31.

125 In EN 297.38–40.126 Ex. 34.29–35.127 IICor. 3.13–15.128 Origen, Cels. VI,50.5–7; Theodore of Stoudios, Sermones Catecheseos Magnae,

30,84.36.129 In EN 298.4–6.


form of knowledge and awakens in us a knowledge that appears at thebeginning to be only a confused echo of what is possessed in a con-centrated and unified manner by the Supreme Intellect. Furthermore,this position can be easily traced back to Proklos and to the positiverole that, according to this author, later-born concepts play as the pointof departure for the process of recollection.130 That this might be thecase is confirmed by the occurrence in Eustratios of the root &νεγε�ρ-to describe the awakening in us of an innate form of intellection.131 Asa matter of fact, this expression frequently occurs in Proklos preciselyin regard to the awakening function of a later-born concept, and moregenerally in regard to the teaching-learning process and the process ofanamnesis.132

All the evidence suggests that Eustratios follows Proklos in depict-ing the process of concept formation as starting from sense perceptionand from the concepts that the soul derives by induction from the indi-viduals. Nonetheless, later-born concepts cannot fully account for theattainment of the true knowledge, but they are helpful in reactivatingthe inner knowledge of the soul and in enabling the same soul to acttowards the intelligibles in a purely intellectual way and not in a merelydiscursive way. What is less clear is whether or not Eustratios treatsthe separate intelligible forms as if they exist outside of and prior tothe Intellect. When he discusses Aristotle’s reference to the objects ofscience as being eternal and unperishable he describes them as self-subsisting realities with a certain causative power, but when he elabo-rates on the characters of the separate and supreme Intellect he simplydescribes them as unitarily contained in it. The two solutions are notcontradictory since Eustratios’ main source, Proklos, ranked the Intel-lect as the third member of a triad of which the first member is Being,which is described, in terms that Eustratios knew well, as the true being(τ� Hντως Hν) and the intelligible, not in the sense of the content of theIntellect, but as the transcendent cause of that content.133 Apparently,Eustratios is not interested in the further elaboration of this topic.134

130 Cf. Steel (1997) 301.131 In APo. 265.22–23; 22.24–28.132 Cf. e.g. Theol. Plat. 5,87.22–88.4.133 See Inst. 161.21–27.134 An echo of this problem is found in Giocarinis (1964) 200–203. The author

resolutely concludes that according to Eustratios Ideas do not subsist outside of thedivine mind although he recognizes that according to Eustratios’ main source, namelyProklos, the intelligible being exists outside of the Knowing Hypostasis. However, if this

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As shown by Ierodiakonou, Eustratios does not want to elaboratefurther on the status of Aristotle’s practical wisdom,135 although hiscomments on specific passages of the Aristotelian text regarding ethicalproblems are sometimes illuminating for this topic. Those passages inwhich Aristotle distinguishes science from art and practical wisdom bymeans of their different types of objects attracted Eustratios’ attention.Aristotle’s definitions of the object of science as being that which is eter-nal, non-generated and not subject to corruption, as well as Aristotle’sreference to the intellect as that which apprehends the first principles,136

provide Eustratios with the possibility of presenting a Neoplatonic the-ory of intellect and intellection inspired by Proklos.

That this is the case is confirmed by Eustratios’ interpretation ofAristotle’s observation that, when contingent realities are out of therange of our consideration (Mταν F5ω τ�+ εωρε,ν), we do not knowwhether they exist or not.137 Eustratios claims that the term εωρε,ν canbe understood in two ways. First, the term can be interpreted in thesense of perceiving (&ντ' τ�+ �ρ ν) so that contingent realities are com-parable to that which is in potency (τ* δυν�μει Hντα). One can havesensory knowledge only when these objects are present in actuality;otherwise, it is not clear whether or not these objects exist.138 This inter-pretation seems to be rooted in one passage of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, inwhich the Philosopher asserts that there is no definition of individualsas they are apprehended by intelligence or sense-perception, althoughwhen they are out of the sphere of actuality (&πελ .ντες δ? )κ τLς )ντε-λε�ε�ας) it is unclear as to whether they exist or not (�; δLλ�ν π.τερ�νε#σ'ν R �;κ ε#σ�ν).139

However, Eustratios prefers another interpretation of Aristotle’s pas-sage, as he devotes most of his comments to the idea that by εωρε,νthe Philosopher meant “to have intellection” (&ντ' τ�+ ν�ε,ν) or “toinquire” ()5ετ��ειν) into something. In this sense, the focus is no longeron the definitional unknowability of individuals, but on the notion of

seems to be the case in Eustratios’ commentary on book I of the Nicomachean Ethics,in his commentary on book VI of the same work the situation appears a bit morecomplicated.

135 Cf. Ierodiakonou (2004) in part. 237–238.136 Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea VI,6,1141a3–7.137 Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea VI,3,1139b19–23.138 In EN 292.22–27.139 Aristotle, Metaphysica VII,10,1136a3–7. Cf. also Gauthier & Jolif (1970) 453, where

Gauthier refers to Ethica Nicomachea VII,5,1146b31–35 and Metaphysica VII,15,1040a2–5.


universality as such. Eustratios resolutely remarks that necessary reali-ties, the objects of science, are independent from one’s thinking activ-ity.140 Plato and the Neoplatonic tradition seem to be the direct sourcesof this interpretation of Aristotle Mταν F5ω τ�+ εωρε,ν. The objects ofscience, claims Eustratios, exist by absolute necessity; they are eternaland non-generated and therefore above time.141 They are true beings(κυρ�ως Hντα), whereas contingent realities are never truly beings (Hντως�;δ"π�τε Hντα) for they do not possess the ontological status that Pla-to’s Timaeus ascribes to true beings, i.e., to remain always self-identicaland unchanged (τ* &ε' κατ* τ* α;τ* κα' Iσα�τως F��ντα).142 Eustra-tios is most probably referring to Timaeus (27d5–28a4) where one canfind the distinction between what is intelligible by means of ratio-nal thought (τ� μ?ν δN ν��σει μετ* λ.γ�υ περιληπτ.ν), which remainsunchanged, and that which can only be an object of opinion, namelya non-rational activity. The object of opinion, says Plato, is subject tobecoming and perishing, and “it is never truly a being” (Hντως δ? �;δ"-π�τε Hν).

The terminology used by Eustratios, however, suggests that he readPlato while aware of the interpretation and formulas that he found inProklos’ work. Eustratios quotes a passage from Proklos’ commentaryon the Parmenides in which the author seems to refer to the same passagefrom Plato’s Timaeus discussed above (27d5–28a4): the explanation of asensible particular is neither stable nor fixed but merely conjectural,while the knowledge of intelligibles is stable and irrefutable. This isbecause the intelligibles are “true beings” (κυρ�ως Hντα).143 The expres-sion is the same as the one employed by Eustratios, who adds thatby “true beings” he means “that which remains always self-identical”(τ* &ε' κατ* τ* α;τ* κα' Iσα�τως F��ντα).144 It is clear then that whatEustratios defines as that which exists by absolute necessity, what Aris-totle himself had defined in the lemma as the object of science (τ� )πι-στητ.ν), is none other than the separate intelligible forms.

Eustratios attributes a certain causative power to these realities.These forms, above generation and time, are the medium through

140 In EN 292.28–33.141 On this point see Trizio (2006) 53–61.142 In EN 293.15–19.143 In Prm. 994.26–32.144 For the expression τ* &ε' κατ* τ* α;τ* κα' Iσα�τως F��ντα see first Plato, Phaed.

80b2; Resp. 484b4. But also Proklos, In R. 1,72.5; In Alc. 21.13; In Prm. 906.22–23. Cf.also Trizio (2006) 58–59.

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which creation and providence proceed into the realm of coming tobe and passing away, reaching as far as the last terms of the causa-tion process.145 That which is subject to generation and corruption isdescribed by Eustratios, in Platonic terms, as a shadow that must referto its archetype.146 Without the causative activity performed by the trueseparate beings, that which is subject to coming to be and passing awaywould remain uncaused and self-produced, which according to Eustra-tios is impossible.147 The intelligibles are described as purely good (ε#-λικριν�ς &γα �), graspable only by the intellect (νD� μ.νDω ληπτ�) whenfree from the disturbance of the passions (νD� τLς τ�ν πα �ν &παλλατ-τ�μ"νDω \�λ�σεως) because the intellect receives the illumination of theFirst Light (τD� πρ7τDω καταλαμπ�μ"νDω �ωτ�), whereas contingent reali-ties can be grasped only by sense-perception and imagination (α#σ �σεικα' �αντασ�Pα ληπτ�).148

Once again, a puzzle of quotations from Neoplatonic sources andsprinkled with sporadic Christian elements emerges.149 More impor-tantly, Eustratios clearly states that the intelligibles are separate forms

145 In EN 294.14–16.146 In EN 294.16–19. For the term σκια�, “shadows”, see Plato, Resp. 510a1; 515a7.147 In EN 293.38: &να�τια κα' α;τ.ματα. = Inst. 97. The entire argument that Eustra-

tios advances in order to prove the existence of transcendent causes seems to dependon this proposition.

148 In EN 294.19–25: Fστιν Aρα τ* ν�ητ* κα' ε#λικριν�ς &γα * κα' τ��των &ρ�"τυπακα' νD� μ.νDω ληπτ* =π�ρ��ντα, κα' &π� τ�+ τρ.π�υ δ? τLς γν7σεως α;τLς Fστι λα2ε,ντNν )κε�νων \ντ.τητα κα' Mσ�ν =περ"�ει τ�ν τCLδε, εJ γε τα+τα μ?ν α#σ �σει κα' �αντασ�Pαληπτ�, )κε,να δ? διαν��Pα κα' μ�λιστα νD� τLς τ�ν πα �ν &παλλαττ�μ"νDω \�λ�σεως κα' )νκα αρD� $σταμ"νDω κα' τD� πρ7τDω καταλαμπ�μ"νDω �ωτ' κα' τ�,ς &κιν�τ�ις )κε�ν�ις &τρεμ�ς)πι2�λλ�ντι.

149 For the expression ε#λικριν�ς &γα � cf e.g. In Alc. 108,13. For the expression νD� μ.-νDω ληπτ� referred to the intelligibles, see Alcinous, Didaskalikos 10,4.1, but also Clementof Alexandria, Strom. 8,8,23,6.5–6; Gregory of Nazianzos, Or. 38 321B; Hermias Alexan-drinus, In Phdr. 41.10; John Philoponos, In Nic. arith. introd. 18.6. See also In EN 278.15–18, where the author claims that those who become mad for fame (δ�5�μανε,ς), thosewho enjoy themselves (�δυπα ε,ς), and those who pursue pleasures (�ιλ�δ�ν�ι) all striveonly for sense-perception data, being incapable of reverting (μN )πιστρε�.μεν�ι) uponthat which is graspable by the intellect (τ�ν δ? νD� ληπτ�ν). For the expression α#σ �σεικα' �αντασ�Pα ληπτ� see e.g. Themistios, In APr. 95.27–28; Proklos, In Prm. 892.10–11;John Philoponos, In APr. 271.15–16. For the expression τLς τ�ν πα �ν &παλλαττ�μ"-νDω \�λ�σεως see John Philoponos, In APr. 276.26: )πιτε�νει γ*ρ μ λλ�ν τNν δυσ�"ρειανκα' τ*ς �κ τ�ν πα'�ν 5�λ6σεις. The expression τD� πρ7τDω καταλαμπ�μ"νDω �ωτ�, whichechoes In EN. 106.22–23, seems to occur under similar forms in many patristic authors,as well as in many pagan Neoplatonists. However, it might be useful to refer in particu-lar to Psellos, Phil. min. I 36.350–353.


with generative and noetic power, being the archetype of the perishablerealities and the cause of our knowledge. The commentator avoidsany reference to the status of these intelligbles as divine thoughts, ashe did in his commentary on book I of the Nicomachean Ethics.150 Onthe contrary, he simply stresses that they exist as such, independentlyfrom one’s investigation or thinking activity, that is to say, that theiruniversality does not depend on thought. They are prior to our intellectalthough, as has been said before, it is not clear whether or not they arealso prior to the absolutely existing Intellect.

Eustratios’s argument seems to be a more or less direct refutationof a well-known passage from Alexander of Aphrodisias’ De anima, inwhich the author seems to state that universals are thought-dependententities.151 Universals are intellect when they are thought (κα' τ.τε )στ'ν�+ς Mταν ν�Lται), but when they are not thought Alexander seems tostate they no longer exist (ε# δ? μN ν��,τ�, �;δ? Fστιν Fτι), that is tosay, that outside the thinking activity they vanish (Eστε �ωρισ "ντα τ�+ν��+ντ�ς α;τ* ν�+ � ε�ρεται). It might be possibile that by claimingthat the intelligible forms, the true beings, exist independently fromone’s thinking activity and investigation, Eustratios is really criticizingthis passage of Alexander’s De anima. What is certain is that he rejectsthe idea that universals are thought-dependent entities. The commen-tator definitely allows the existence of later-born concepts, i.e., con-cepts resulting by induction from sense-perception data. But they areonly a means of bringing the soul from its birth-induced state of igno-rance to true knowledge, the one related to the self-subsisting separateforms, which, as already discussed, Eustratios describes in Prokleanterms. Therefore, this passage deserves to be mentioned alongside allthe arguments elaborated in Late Antiquity, expecially by the Neopla-tonists, against a thought-dependent theory of universals and in favorof their priority to our intellection.152

Eustratios’ position cannot be labelled as either “nominalistic,” i.e.,the view according to which universals are just names independentfrom things but dependent on thoughts, or “conceptualistic,” i.e., theview that universals exist through thought. These two views, respec-

150 In EN 40.22–24; 41.26–27.151 Alexander of Aphrodisias, De An. 90.2–11. However, scholars still debate this

and other related passages by Alexander. Cf. e.g. Tweedale (1984); De Libera (1999);Sharples (2005).

152 On this subject, cf. Sorabji (2001); O’Meara (2001).

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tively held by Joannou153 and Lloyd,154 strictly reflect the context ofthe passages investigated by these two scholars. This context is mainlytheological and involves the application to a greater or lesser extentof late antique logical theories. But I am not sure that one can con-sider a position developed in some of Eustratios’ theological writingsto be fully representative of the author’s position on the topic at hand.On the contrary, in reconstructing Eustratios’ view of universals onemust carefully distinguish between his general account and its concreteapplication to specific problems, e. g., as the proper way to define theco-existence of two natures in one and the same hypostasis. Moreover,the standard Neoplatonic account of the threefold status of universalsthat is found in Eustratios must be read in comparison with the Neo-platonist’s dynamic account of the nature and functioning of the pro-cess of concept formation. Admittedly, as stated by Benakis,155 Eustra-tios accepts, like the Neoplatonists, the existence of all three types ofuniversals: separate forms before the many; in the particular individu-als; and, as concepts derived by induction from sense-perception data.However, one should not forget that the admission of this threefold sta-tus for universals also entails a recognition of a qualitative differencebetween these three types of universals.

As I have tried to show in this paper, Eustratios follows Proklos andin general the Neoplatonic tradition in believing that concepts derivedfrom induction and enmattered forms do not have the same valueas the separate intelligible forms: only separate intelligible forms aregranted the status of true beings. Furthermore, the Neoplatonists donot confine themselves to the recognition of only three different typesof universals. They also admit the existence of creative logoi in the mindof God, as Eustratios himself does in his commentary on book I ofthe Nicomachean Ethics, and of logoi ousiodeis in our soul, namely innatecontents which the soul has to recall gradually and which Eustratioscalls “echoes in us of the absolutely existing Intellect”.156

153 Cf. Joannou (1954a) and (1954b).154 Cf. Lloyd (1987) 346.155 Cf. Benakis (1978–1979) and (1982a).156 A brief account of the different universals known to the Neoplatonist can be found

in Sorabji (2004) 133–146.


4. Conclusions

Far from being inconsistent, Eustratios’ position is simply Proklean inadmitting that later-born concepts, derived by induction from sense-perception data, only play the role of awakening our innate knowledge,bringing the human soul to the direct apprehension of the separateforms. By reading Eustratios’ commentary on book VI of the Nico-

machean Ethics, one realizes how difficult it is to locate Eustratios withinthe traditional scheme that is used to define Byzantine literature of theXI and XIIth centuries. To label him as a Christian, as a Neoplatonist,or as a Christian Neoplatonist does not fully account for the very com-plex character of this Byzantine commentator. In the present paper Ihave tried to avoid these kinds of characterizations and to have insteadfocused upon Eustratios’ methodology and his textual approach, in par-ticular, his peculiar way of constructing his arguments from his mainlyNeoplatonic sources.

Eustratios’ acquaintance with Neoplatonism should be understoodin light of the author’s erudition and personal interest in Neoplatonicliterature. The arguments expounded by the commentator seem to becarefully constructed even if at first glance they appear to be drawnpiecemeal from Proklos’ own arguments and formulae. Just as themodern reader may notice the erudition of this author, he may alsoremark that this commentary was surely written for highly educatedreaders. Eustratios suggests this himself when he rhetorically concludesone of the many Neoplatonic explanations of the nature and functionof the process of concept formation by writing that “one could probablyconsider us redundant for having extended this explanation too far,and so deviating from our initial purpose. But, taking our cue fromthe words of Aristotle, we prolonged this argument so that it might beuseful to the �ιλ�λ.γ�ι”, i.e., to those who are fond of learning andliterature.157

157 In EN 294.25–28.

EUSTRATIOS OF NICAEA’S‘DEFINITION OF BEING’ REVISITED

David Jenkins

In 1954 Pericles Joannou published two short articles in Byzantinische

Zeitschrift on Eustratios of Nicaea, our commentator of books I and VIof the Nicomachean Ethics.1 In the first of these articles, Joannou editedand commented briefly on an extended scholion attributed to Eustra-tios, in which he interprets a particularly enigmatic passage from Johnof Damascus’ second oration on the dormition of the Virgin Mary.Joannou argued that the scholion, which he titled the “Definition ofBeing,” showed Eustratios to be Byzantium’s first nominalist, a conclu-sion he supported with his second article, a similar edition and com-mentary on the semeioma from the synodical proceedings against Eustra-tios in 1117. In 1990 the four manuscripts which contain the “Definitionof Being” were reedited and a new reading was published by KlausAlpers, who put forward arguments that better established its attribu-tion and date.2 However, Alpers did not address the philosophical con-tent of the scholion itself but hoped to leave competent scholars a betterphilological foundation upon which to do so.

The frequent citation of Joannou in subsequent overviews of Eustra-tios’ life and works suggests that his conclusion regarding Eustratios’nominalism has gained at least a tacit acceptance.3 In his entry onEustratios in the Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium Alexander Kazhdanclaimed that “Eustratios developed the concept of the universalia aspure ‘names,’ whereas he regarded only the individual as existing.”4 Onthe other hand, A.C. Lloyd made a qualified use of these documentsas evidence of Eustratios’ commitment to the “Aristolelian logic of uni-versals” since he considered Joannou’s interpretation of the “Definitionof Being” to be questionable.5 Linos Benakis had deeper reservations

1 Joannou (1954a); (1954b).2 Alpers (1990).3 Mercken (1973) 6*; Hunger (1978) 34.4 Kazhdan (1991).5 Lloyd (1987) 346. Lloyd acknowledged that the work was difficult and based

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and claimed that Joannou’s evidence for Eustratios’ nominalism was“based on a superficial reading.”6 Therefore, given the naturally prob-lematic definition of nominalism and in light of the questions regardingits application to Eustratios, it might be worth revisiting the philosophi-cal content of this so-called “Definition of Being.”

Although Joannou refers to Eustratios’ scholion as his “Defintion ofBeing,” our two best manuscripts identify the passage itself as “the mostuniversal definition of Plato’s philosophy.”7 The meaning of this passagehas baffled commentators and translators for centuries since it appearsfar too abstract for its place within the oration’s narrative.8 AlthoughJoannou argues against the possibility that the passage is an interpola-tion, this suggestion is not implausible since 1) the section of the orationthat immediately follows the passage deals with the “beyond being”nature of God’s attributes, which, as we will see, is the critical conceptfound within the passage itself, and 2) the oration is already well-knownfor an obvious interpolation, the so-called Historia Euthymiaca.9 Never-theless, the passage is certainly philosophically ambiguous enough toallow an interpretation that is consistent with the thought of John ofDamascus, to whom Eustratios clearly attributes the passage and to itsplace within his second oration on the Virgin’s dormition.

his argument primarily on another frequently cited instance of Eustratios’ allegednominalism, his polemic against the mononphysitism of Tigranes.

6 Benakis (1978–1979) 333, note 46.7 3fρ�ς κα �λικ7τατ�ς �ιλ�σ��ας Πλ�των�ς. Alpers (1990) 155.8 See Second dormition 524, n. on lines 34–37. Kotter notes the following: 1) that

Jacobus de Billius did not even include the passage in his 1577 edition; 2) that MichelLequien, who translated the work in 1712, found these lines extremely obscure andincongruent with what was said immediately above and decided to include in the placeof his own translation that of Aloysius Lipomanus (1558), hoping that he had had abetter text to work with: There is no heavenly order that was not unanimously present, nor wasanyone found who, simply because they lived in heaven and were incomparable to lower beings, refusedto descend and perform all the services that I have mentioned (qui eo qoud in supernis versabatur,nullique inferiorum comparandus esset, descendere, et omnia quae dixi munera obirerecusavit; PG 96.731); and 3) Pierre Voulet’s 1961 translation: No being made an exception.No one, even among the most elevated of those who are incomparable to any other, refused to lower oneselfand to discharge all these services (Aucun être ne faisait exception. Aucun, même parmi lesplus élevés de ceux qui ne sont comparables à nul autre, ne refusa de s’abasisser et des’acquitter de tous ces services; Sources chrétiennes 80, p. 141).

9 Second dormition 7.1 (p. 524): 8Εντα+ α λ.γ�ι ε.πνευστ�ι κα' ε.� εγκτ�ι. 8Εντα+ �τινες @μν�ι ε�τερπε,ς κα' )5.δι�ι. gΥμνLσαι γ*ρ )�ρLν κα' )π' τ��τDω τ�+ ε�+ τNν=περ�πειρ�ν &γα .τητα κα' τ� =περμ"γε ες μ"γε �ς κα' τNν &πειρ�δ�ναμ�ν δ�ναμιν κα'τNν παντ�ς @ψ�υς κα' μεγ" �υς )π"κεινα πρ�ς �μ ς α;τ�+ μετρι.τητα, τ�ν =π"ρπλ�υτ�νπλ�+τ�ν τLς &καταλ�πτ�υ �ρηστ.τητ�ς, τNν Aπληστ�ν τLς &γ�πης A2υσσ�ν. For theHistoria Euthymiaca, see Second dormition 504–505.

eustratios of nicaea’s ‘definition of being’ revisited 113

Alpers is undoubtedly correct in claiming that the title of the passageis a later emendation, but I would qualify Lloyd’s suggestion that itsidentification as “the most universal definition of Plato’s philosophy” iserroneous since, taken on its face, the passage is not at all inconsistentwith Neoplatonism, which might be the reason Eustratios was drawnto its interpretation (and why a later scribe attributed it to Plato).10

Eustratios was the student of John Italos, Michael Psellos’ successoras the Consul of Philosophers. Italos focused primarily on Aristotle’slogic, but like Psellos his metaphysical orientation owes much to theNeoplatonism of Proklos.11 We would assume then that Eustratios waswell versed in the “Platonism” of his teachers, and in fact, in hiscommentary on Book 1 of the Nicomachean Ethics, he begins his defenseof Plato against Aristotle’s critique of a single good by characterizingPlato’s philosophy in the following way:12

For Plato said that the one and the unspeakable and the good is the causeof all beings, and he placed the One beyond all beings, saying that it isthe cause of all and therefore not one of the all, but beyond being andnot existing, though not in the sense of lacking being but lying beyond allbeing.

Michael Psellos described Plato’s philosophy in very similar terms inone of his theological lectures:13

[Plato] said that the first good was one and before all and from all, bothbecause it is not a being and because it is itself the cause and life of allbeings.

In both instances, the One is described first as beyond being andtherefore not a being in the proper sense, and second as the causeof all beings and therefore in all beings. It is to these two points

10 Alpers (1990) 154. Lloyd (1987) 346.11 We should keep in mind that when Italos and Psellos refer to Plato, they are more

often than not referring to what we have come to identify as Neoplatonism.12 In EN 43.11–14: � μ?ν γ*ρ Πλ�των τ� dν κα' τAρρητ�ν κα' τ&γα �ν τNν κ�ινNν

α#τ�αν τ�ν Hντων π�ντων εXπε, κα' =π?ρ τ* Hντα π�ντα τ� dν Fτα5εν, αJτι�ν μ?ν π�ντων)κε,ν� λ"γων, �;δ?ν δ? τ�ν π�ντων δι* τ�+τ� κα' =π?ρ _ν κα' μN Hν, �;� Iς τ�+ Hντ�ςλειπ.μεν�ν, &λλ’ Iς Hντ�ς παντ�ς =περκε�μεν�ν>

13 Theol. I 4.90–92: )κε,ν�ς γ*ρ dν λ"γων τ� πρ�τ�ν &γα �ν κα' πρ� π�ντων Fλεγενdν κα' )κ π�ντων, τ� μ?ν Mτι μηδ?ν τ�ν Hντων, τ� δ? Mτι π�ντων α;τ�ς &ρ�N κα' �ω�>Psellos’ characterization of Plato’s philosophy served as the basis of his own: “Let usthen consider the creator of all to exist as the first and transcendent mind, or rather asGod and the good and the one, being both all things and no thing, both beyond beingsand in beings.” Theol. I 90.26–28.

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precisely that our passage is the immediate corollary, whose translationI now hazard, assuming, as did Eustratios, that its meaning is abstractlyphilosophical:14

There is no being, which is not by nature a particular being or whichis an individual as one. Because no being is beyond-being, and no beingdescends apart from and to everything, creating and not allowing itself tobe acted upon.

Whereas the One is both transcendent and the cause of all, particularbeing exists in being and is caused. Only the One “descends apart fromand to everything, creating and not allowing itself to be acted upon”;particular being is fated to its own particular relatedness within exis-tence. This is the fundamental point that Eustratios elaborates through-out the scholion. However, he makes one critical qualification: he doesnot equate God with the Neoplatonic One. For Eustratios, God too isa particular being. He begins his commentary on the passage in thisway:15

Nothing whatsoever is called a being that does not exist, and there isnothing whatsoever that is not a being by nature or does not exist. Forhow does something exist if it is not a being? For example, God is abeing, as is fire, air, water and earth, all of these things exist by natureand are said to be; and not only these things, but all beings in so far asthey are.

From there, Eustratios proceeds to clarify the existence of a particularbeing, which is characterized in each of his arguments by a relatednessthat undermines its identity as “one”, whether this relation is to otherparticular beings or to its own substantial predicates. For instance, heunderstands the phrase “[no] individual is as one” to clarify the pointthat each particular being is not “as one.” This would include theparticular being of the divine Logos, who, although he is one person,

14 Second dormition 6.34 (p. 524): iΕστι γ*ρ τ�ν Hντων �;δ"ν, : μN τ�+τ� π"�υκεν, R τ�μ.ν�ν Iς Vν> Mτι μηδ?ν τ�ν Hντων τ� =περε,ναι, κα' πρ�ς �;δ?ν παρατι "μεν�ν κ�τεισι,κα' κατι.ν γε πρ�ς Bπαντα, κα' π�ι�+ν, κα' μN τ� δρ σ αι δε�.μεν�ν. Joannou translatedthe first part of the passage as: Nothing can exist without being a particular thing, with theexception of the Unique considered from the point of view of the One (Nichts kann existieren ohneein Einzelnes zu sein, mit Ausnahme des Monos unter dem Gesichtspunkt des Henbetrachtet). Joannou (1954a) 360, n. 1.

15 Joannou (1954a) 366.1–4: �;κ Fστιν _ν λεγ.μεν�ν, : μN =π�ρ�ει, κα' �;κ Fστι τι, :μN Hν, π"�υκεν Qγ�υν =π�ρ�ει> π�ς γ*ρ =π�ρ�ει, ε# μN Hν )στιν; Iς )κ παραδε�γματ�ς>_ν =π�ρ�ει ε.ς, _ν τj� π+ρ, _ν τ� &�ρ, _ν τ� @δωρ, _ν � γL, τα+τα Hντα πε��κασι κα'λ"γ�νται>


is not “as one” since he is both God and man. Even God Himself isnot “as one” since the divine is known to be of three persons. Further,fire, air, water and earth are also not “as one” since there are clearlydifferent kinds of each.16 The clause “because no being is beyond-being” is understood to mean that a particular being (Hν) is not beyondor prior to its being in general (εXναι). Again, this distinction appliesto God Himself, whose particularity as God does not precede Hisbeing in general or vice versa.17 Eustratios then extends his assertionof particular being to the clause “no being descends apart from andto everything, creating and not allowing itself to be acted upon”: thereis no being, including God, that exists in isolation from other beingsor is “unparticipated” by some other. Everything descends, creatingand being created. God too exists among angels and human beingsand is “placed next” (παρατ� εται) to all creation, found complete ineverything. He even makes us gods by adoption, thereby allowing us tobecome what He is Himself by nature. Fire, air, water and earth arelikewise intertwined, both creating and being created by one another.18

Finally, the scholion ends with Eustratios applying all four of thesepoints to Mary. First, she is a particular being. Second, she is not “as

16 Joannou (1954a) 366.7–18: � γ*ρ Θε�+ λ.γ�ς μετ* τ�+ πρ�σλ�μματ�ς �;� Iς dν)στι, ε# κα' εOς )στιν. Aλλ� γ*ρ ε�ς κα' Aλλ� Aν ρωπ�ς. &λλ’ �;δ’ � ε�ς κα ’ /αυτ�ν εOςγιν7σκεται. Aλλ�ς γ*ρ � πατNρ κα' Aλλ�ς � υ$�ς κα' Aλλ�ς � παρ�κλητ�ς . . . &λλ’ �;δε τ�π+ρ, Qτ�ι τ� ��ς, Iς dν )στι. &στ"ρες γ*ρ κα' � πυρ�αν�ς � )ν τCL ΑJτνCη κα' τ� παρ’ =μ,νπ+ρ . . . &λλ’ �;δ’ � &Nρ Iς εOς κα �ρ ται κα' Fστι. πνε, γ*ρ π�ικ�λως )ν τ? 2�ρρP κα'ν.τDω κα' τ�,ς λ�ιπ�,ς . . . �;δε τ� @δωρ Iς dν )στι. τ� γ*ρ στερ"ωμα κα' � κρ�σταλλ�ς κα'�ιlν κα' τ� τLς αλ�ττης . . . �;δε � γL Iς dν )στι. γL γ*ρ � τ? &�7δης κα' γL � αλ7δηςκα' γL � καλλιεργ�υμ"νη . . .

17 Joannou (1954a) 367.1–5: π�ς γ*ρ πρ� τ�+ εOναι Fσται τι τ�ν Hντων; Vκαστ�ν, MτεHν )στι, τ.τε κα' τ� εOναι κ"κτηται. � γ*ρ ε.ς, mν &ε�, κα' τ� εOναι κ"κτηται &nδι�ν,κα' �; πρ�τερε�ει τD� εD� τ� _ν τ�+ εOναι, �cτε τ� εOναι τ�+ Hντ�ς. &λλ’ �;δ? Vκαστ�ντ�ν Hντων πρ�τερε�ει τ�+ /αυτ�+ εOναι, R τ� εOναι τ�+ /αυτ�+ Hντ�ς. Asserting thatGod is a being is not inconsistent with the thought of John of Damascus. While Johnacknowledged that the substance of divinity is beyond substance he also claimed thatsubstance comprehends God. In his Institutio Elementaris, he clarifies this point by saying,“substance is the highest genus, which supernaturally (=περ�υσ�ως) comprehends theuncreated divinity as it intellectually (γνωστικ�ς) and comprehensively (περι��ικ�ς)encompasses all of creation” (Institutio Elementaris 7.25).

18 Joannou (1954a) 367.9–16: τ�υτ"στιν �;κ Fστι τ�ν Hντων �;δ"ν, Do μN συνυπ�ρ�εια;τD� τι τ�ν Hντων. κα' �;κ Fστι τι, : μN κ�τεισι, Qτ�ι συγκατ"ρ�εται κα' παρα "ει Bπαντα.κα' �;κ Fστι τ�ν Hντων, : π�ιε, κα' α;τ� μN π�ιε,ται, Qγ�υν : μN μετ"�εται α;τ., =π’ Aλλ�υτιν.ς. � γ*ρ Θε.ς, ε# κα' =π?ρ τ� π ν )στι, &λλ* συνυπ�ρ�ει κα' &γγ"λ�ις κα' &ν ρ7π�ις,κα' π�σCη τCL κτ�σει παρατ� εται, Qγ�υν ε=ρ�σκεται )ν π σι τ"λει�ς. κα' π�ιε, )μ? ε.ν, τ�ν)κ στ�ι�ε�ων συγκε�μεν�ν, π�ιε,ται δ? =π’ )μ�+, Qγ�υν ε�+μαι )γl "σει. κ�τεισι γ�ρ,Qγ�υν κεκ"νωται )π' μικρ.ν, με�νας : Uν.

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one” since she is both a virgin and a mother. Third, these attributesexist in general when they come to exist in Mary’s particularity and arein no way beyond being. And finally, Mary is both celebrated by theangels and saints and illuminates them in turn with her brilliance, inthis way affected by others just as she affects them.19 So, in each case,we see that Eustratios characterizes a particular being by its relation tosomething else. Whether in relation to other beings as causes or effects,or to substantial predicates or universals, a particular being is never anisolated and pure unity.

Joannou concludes his own analysis of the scholion by saying thathere “we see how the doctrine of universals first penetrated theologyin Byzantium before it was taught by Abelard several decades later inthe West.”20 He argues that in the case of Eustratios this penetrationwas of a decidedly nominalistic bent, which can be distilled to threepoints: 1) the restriction of existence to particular being reduces theontological status of the universal to a mere concept; 2) essence andexistence are indistinguishable, i.e, a particular being’s participation inbeing in general is simultaneous and coextensive, and 3) the identity ofa particular being’s essence and existence, i.e., its definition by meansof its substantial predicates or universals, determines its particularityand distinguishes it from other particular beings, an identity in whichGod too participates.21 If we collapse points 2 and 3, we are left withtwo fundamental issues: the ontological status of the universal and theidentity of “essence and existence.” Let us proceed then to the first ofthese.

While his emphasis on particular being might appear to suggest thatEustratios was, in the words of A.C. Lloyd, like Aristotle, “turning the

19 Joannou (1954a) 368.2–9: _ν γ*ρ )στι κα' α@τη κα' =π� τ� _ν &ν�γεται κα' �;� Iςdν � μ.νη γιν7σκεται, Fστι γ*ρ κα' παρ "ν�ς κα' μ�τηρ. και τα+τ’ �@τως Hντα �;� =π?ρ τ�εOναι ε#σ�, &λλ’ Mτε τα+τα, Qγ�υν γ"ννησις κα' παρ εν�α, =π� τ� _ν γεγ.νασι, τ.τε κα' τ�εOναι κ"κτηνται κα' �;� =π?ρ τ� εOναι ε#σ�ν . . . κα' )π��ησε μ?ν α;τ�, Mτε κατ"λαμψε τα,ςμαρμαρυγα,ς /αυτLς τ�0ς συνελ .ντας, δ"δεκται δ? κα' τ� δρ σ αι, Mτε κατελ�μ� η =π�τ�+ πνε�ματ�ς, κα' : π"π�ν ε πεπ��ηκεν.

20 Joannou (1954a) 365.21 Joannou (1954a) 360: Das Allgemeine ist nur als Begriff gegeben . . . (p. 362)

Essenz und Existenz sind nicht unterscheidbar . . . (p. 363) Der Identität Essenz-Existenz zufolge ist das einzig wirklich existerende Einzelding (τ�+τ�, τι), ein in dereigenen Gesetzlichkeit autonomes Wesen, d. h. nicht nur von den anderen Dingen,sondern auch, wenn man den schöpferischen, göttlichen Akt des Anfangs der Welt (&π’&ρ�Lς) voraussetzt, sogar von Gott in seinem Dasein unabhängig: es ist wahrhaftig einEinzelding (μ.ν�ν).


relative positions of the intelligible and sensible worlds upside down,”he does not specifically address the problem of universals in the “Def-inition of Being.”22 For that we must turn to his Aristotelian commen-taries on the Nicomachean Ethics and Posterior Analytics. We should beginby noting at least two important aspects of the relationship betweenthese commentaries and the “Definition of Being.” First, it is more thanlikely that many years separate the commentaries from our scholion.Klaus Alpers has ably argued that the scholion dates from 1082 to 1086,after Eustratios’ diaconate and before his promotion to metropolitan,or during the period in which he would have been, as the manuscriptsidentify him, a presbyter. It is also more than likely that his com-mentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics and Posterior Analytics date from aperiod after his anathema in 1117.23 Further, the scholion was written inresponse to an inquiry by a certain Tzetziros and is remarkably untech-nical in its language, reminding us of the many short pedagogical lec-tures written by Psellos, whereas the commentaries make full use ofboth Aristotelian and Neoplatonic terminology.24

Lloyd has observed that the “three-fold division of what may looselybe called the universal is the most fundamental for the interplay be-tween Aristotelian and Neoplatonic logic.”25 Eustratios deals explicitlywith this traditional division several times in his commentaries, mostfamously on Book I of the Nicomachean Ethics, where he introduces thewholes before, from and in the parts (πρ� τ�ν μερ�ν, )κ τ�ν μερ�ν, )ντ�,ς μ"ρεσι).26 Kimon Giocarinis has argued that Eustratios used thesedistinctions to defend the Platonic doctrine of Ideas, whereas LinosBenakis has specifically identified our author as an heir to the “concep-tual realism” of the Alexandrian Neoplatonists, who both maintainedthe substantial primacy of a transcendent universal (πρ� τ�ν π�λλ�ν)and accepted Aristotle’s argument that the conceptual or abstracteduniversal ()π' τ�,ς π�λλ�,ς) is subsequent to the substance of a particular

22 Lloyd (1955–1956) 67.23 Browning (1962) 6; Alpers (1990) 151.24 It is tempting to identify the Tzetziros of our scholion with the Tziros who was

present with Eustratios at the condemnation of their teacher John Italos in 1082.Eustratios was then a proximos, or teacher, at the School of Saint Theodore of Spho-rakion, and perhaps this Tziros, a student of lesser philosophical ability, sought clarifi-cation from Eustratios a few years later after reading this passage in John of Damascus.For examples of Psellos’ lectures, see: Psellos Phil min. I 3, 6, 13, 36, 48; Phil min. II 74,93, 95, 160; Theol. I 53, 107.

25 Lloyd (1955) 61.26 In EN 40–41.

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being’s inseparable form ()ν τ�,ς π�λλ�,ς).27 There can be no questionthat in his Aristotelian commentaries Eustratios maintains the primacyof a transcendent universal. He addresses Aristotle with an exasperatedvocative four times in the context of defending this universal in his com-mentary on Book I of the Ethics.28 In each instance, Eustratios cannotunderstand Aristotle’s implication, in essence, that an image is prior toits paradigm, that a universal whether innate or abstracted from sensi-ble particulars is somehow prior to its causative transcendent form.

However, regarding the universals from and in the parts, his positionis perhaps less Alexandrian than Benakis claims. In a recent article,Katerina Ierodiakonou has stressed that for Eustratios “the main dis-tinction which matters is the distinction between the universals whichare paradigms of perceptual individuals and exist in God’s mind, andthe universals which are later-born than the perceptual individuals andsubsist in them.”29 In other words, Eustratios operates with two uni-versals, one before the parts (πρ� τ�ν μερ�ν) and one after the parts ()κτ�ν μερ�ν or )π' τ�,ς π�λλ�,ς). I think Ierodiakonou is correct here,but the identification of this whole after the parts might be better clar-ified. Whereas Ierodiakonou questions whether Eustratios recognized awhole )ν τ�,ς μ"ρεσι I would argue that Eustratios understood the uni-versal after the parts ()π' τ�,ς π�λλ�,ς) to be one of three different statesof the universal )ν τ�,ς μ"ρεσι (the apparent conflation of these twowholes led Lloyd to wonder if Eustratios wasn’t just “plain confused”).30

In other words, the two wholes with which Eustatios is concerned arein fact the πρ� τ�ν μερ�ν and the )ν τ�,ς μ"ρεσι. In both his mostdeveloped discussions of this issue (In EN 40–41 and In APo. 194–195),Eustratios does acknowledge the whole )κ τ�ν μερ�ν, but he under-stands it to be a collection (A ρ�ισμα, σ�ν ετα) of “extensional objects”(whether of similar or dissimilar parts), and not a conceptual “genus oflogic,” to borrow the terminology of Sten Ebbesen, who has noted howPorphyry also finessed this distinction.31 What Eustratios restricts to the

27 Giocarinis (1964). Benakes (1978–1979) 330–333. Developed by Ammonius and hissuccessors though explicit in Proklos as well, see Ammonius, In Porph. 42; Proklos, Inst.67.

28 In EN 49.25, 50.30, 53.25, 56.2.29 Ierodiakonou (2005b).30 Lloyd (1987) 345.31 In APo 195.34: )κ τ�ν μερ�ν δ? τ* σ�ν ετα κα' ε#ς π�λλ* μερι�.μενα, εJ ’ �μ�ι�μερL

Iς λ� �ς ε#ς λ� �υς Mλ�ν _ν πρ�ς μ"ρη ε#ς T κα' διαιρετ.ς )στιν, [ν Vκαστ�ν τ. τε Hν�μακα' τ�ν λ.γ�ν τ�+ Mλ�υ )πιδ"�εται, εJτ’ &ν�μ�ι�μερL Iς Aν ρωπ�ς ε#ς �ε,ρας π.δας


universal )ν τ�,ς μ"ρεσι is precisely the three genera of logic that Iero-diakonou identifies when she clarifies Eustratios’ understanding of γ"νηand εJδη (In APo. 194.26), namely, as wholes subsequently abstracted after

the parts ()π' τ�,ς π�λλ�,ς; )5 &�αιρ"σεως); as seen commonly in the partsat the moment of perception (τ� )ν α;τ�,ς κ�ιν�ς εωρ��μεν�ν); andas wholly existing in each particular ()ν τ�,ς κα ’ Vκαστα). These generaof logic are therefore all in the parts, but differentiated as existing, per-ceived or abstracted.32 What Ierodiakonou correctly identifies as criticalis the fact that Eustratios assigns definite existence only to the wholeexisting in each particular (Iρισμ"νως =π�ρ�ει), while he grants partialexistence to the whole seen in the parts (=��σταται, &λλ’ �; κα ’ /αυ-τ.) and no existence at all to the whole abstracted from the parts (�;κ=��σταται).33 These ontological distinctions lead her to conclude that forEustratios “apart from God’s thoughts, only individuals exists” and that“such a position clearly differentiates him both from the nominalismwhich Joannou has ascribed to him and from the conceptual or mod-erate realism which Benakis has talked about in connection with theNeoplatonic tradition.”34 In other words, on the one hand, his denial ofthe abstracted whole’s existence disqualifies him as a conceptual realist,and on the other, his granting of existence to the whole existing in eachparticular and of partial existence (subsistence) to the whole commonly

seen in particulars distances him from a nominalism that sees every uni-versal as a mere concept. I would say that this is a fair characterizationof the position on universals that Eustratios developed in his later com-mentaries and does qualify the nominalism Joannou claims to see in thescholion. Nevertheless, even if we argue that Eustratios was or becameless nominalistic than Joannou would have believed, his later position

κε�αλ�ν> �;δ?ν γ*ρ τ�ν μερ�ν τ�+ &ν ρ7π�υ Mμ�ι�ν τD� MλDω, Iς μ�τε τ�cν�μα μ�τετ�ν λ.γ�ν τ�+ Mλ�υ δε�.μεν�ν> In EN 40.37: τ� δ? )κ π�ντων A ρ�ισμα Mλ�ν )στ'ν Iς )κμερ�ν τ�ν κατ* μ"ρ�ς τ��των μ�ν�δων συντε ειμ"ν�ν. Ebbesen (1990b) 156.

32 Sten Ebbesen has lucidly explained the inevitable conflation of these apparent“modes.” He identifies the abstraction with the “unranked” universal (for the sake of hisexample, /common dog/), the common element of each particular with the “ranked”universal (/this particular dog/) and the particular instance with the particular itself(/Snuffy/) and goes on to say, “If you cannot quite make up your mind on the question,and I think Porphyry could not, /this particular dog/ has a strange intermeidary statusbetween /Snuffy/ and /common dog/. In a sense it is identical with the former, ina sense with the latter and in a sense, maybe, it is a compound of the two.” Ebbesen(1990b) 153.

33 In EN 281.25; In EN 346.3; Refutation 165.34 Ierodiakonou (2005b) 77.

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on universals does differ from the conceptual realism of the Alexan-drian Neoplatonists for precisely nominalistic reasons: we can at leastsay that Eustratios was always more nominalistic than the Alexandriansin this regard.

Let us turn now to Joannou’s second characterization of the “Defi-nition of Being”: the identity of what he calls “essence and existence.”Although Joannou acknowledges that Eustratios admitted a conceptualdistinction between essence and existence, or between being in gen-eral and particular being, he rightly points out that Eustratios deniedany temporal precedence or material distinction to essence.35 Particu-lar being was simultaneous and inseparable from its being in general.If we assume, as I think we can, that Eustratios thought in more orless Neoplatonic terms, we might consider looking at this issue fromwithin a simplified representation of Neoplatonism which will allowus to correlate this “identity” with our discussion of universals.36 Forthis purpose I will borrow the first six propositions of Proklos’ Ele-

ments of Theology, which describe and relate the most comprehensiveelements of his thought: the One, unity, the unified and the not-one(matter). These elements can be understood as the possible combina-tions of two distinctions, namely, an unparticipated and participatedunity and a non-participating and participating plurality where theunparticipated generates the participated and unity is prior to plural-ity.37 This generation is conceptualized as a procession that meets itsown return in the shared participation of unity and “unified” plural-ity. If we assume for the sake of representation that the relationshipbetween the unparticipated and the participated is horizontal and thatbetween unity and plurality is vertical, we might expect the followingscheme:38

35 Freilich gibt Eustratios den Begriffsunterschied zwischen Sein und Dasein, Essenzund Existenz zu, aber er spricht jeder Wesenheit das “Frühersein” im Sinne eines DunsScotus und noch meher jegliche wirkliche “physische” Unterscheidung ab . . . Joannou(1954a) 362.

36 See Trizio (2006) and Steel (2002) for the Eustratios’ Neoplatonism.37 We should be clear that there is no “non-participating” plurality per se in Prok-

los. Nevertheless, as was generally accepted, he clearly understood matter to be theconstituent of particulars that did not share in form (Aμ�ιρ�ς, Inst. Prop. 72, p. 68).Damascius a generation later described matter precisely as “non-participating” (τ� μNμετ"��ν τ�ν ε#δ�ν � @λη )στ'ν, In Prm. 281.13–14).

38 Proklos cannot sustain the clarity of this logic throughout his deductive systemsince he is forced to expand the single vertical relationship that I have represented


The One UnityUnparticipated unity Participated unity(procession →)

Unified Not One (matter)Participating plurality Non-participating plurality

(← return)

Proklos later correlates these elements with a triad of what we mightcall existence, which states that every existent exists in three senses,in its cause, (κατ’ α#τ�αν), in its own substantial existence (κα ’ @παρ-5ιν), and in its participation as an effect (κατ* μ" ε5ιν). These threetypes of existence are then identified with our three different wholes:the whole “before the parts” (unparticipated unity) exists κατ’ α#τ�αν asthe pre-existing cause of all parts; the whole “from the parts” (partici-pated unity) exists κα ’ @παρ5ιν as the parts taken together as an exist-ing whole; the whole “in the part” (the participating plurality) existsκατ* μ" ε5ιν in its particular participation of an existing whole from theparts.39 Proklos is aware of but does not clarify the ambiguity inherentin the whole from the parts we have discussed above; while he acknowl-edges that parts taken together as wholes are of two kinds, either wholeswhose parts are themselves wholes or wholes whose parts are not (e.g.,“man” taken as a whole of whole “men” as opposed to “man” taken asa whole composed of a head, feet and hands), he does not address howthis whole can also be thought of as either a collection of extensionalobjects or as a logical collection, be it a species or genus.40 In any event,we would add these relations to our Proclean scheme in the followingway:

between unity and the unified to a series of vertical relationships that accommodatethe descending continuity of the Neoplatonic hypostases, i.e., to the Henads, Being,Mind, Soul and Matter, since each hypostasis possesses its own unparticipated unity.Only when this series of hypostases is telescoped back into a single vertical relation arethe four elements related with logical consistency, a tendency which, I would argue,is characteristic of the Byzantine appropriation of Proklos that begins with Psellos.For Psellos, Unity is identified with Nous and the Unified with Soul; for Italos andEustratios, these associations become more logically conceived as genus/species andimmanent form respectively. See Jenkins (2006) 134–142.

39 Inst. 65, 67 (pp. 62–65).40 Inst. 67.11–14 (p. 64).

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The One UnityUnparticipated unity Participated unityκατ’ α#τ�αν κα ’ @παρ5ινWhole before the part Whole from the parts

Unified Not One (matter)Participating plurality non-participating pluralityκατ* μ" ε5ινWhole in the parts

These correlations are the basis of the conceptual realism of the Alex-andrian Neoplatonists, with the important clarification that for them,following Aristotle, the whole from the parts, understood now specif-ically as a logical abstraction, is subsequent to the substance of thewhole in the parts, whereas for Proklos the whole in the parts remainsclearly and logically subordinate to the whole from the parts (prop. 68:Every whole-in-the-part is a part of a whole-of-parts).

As we have seen in his Aristotelian commentaries, Eustratios hasmoved beyond the Alexandrians in removing substance entirely fromthe abstracted whole from the parts and by clearly identifying thiswhole as a kind of whole in the parts, while confining the whole from theparts ()κ τ�ν μερ�ν) to a collective whole of extensional objects, separatefrom the genera of logic.41 Further, Eustratios understands perceptionto be the simultaneous awareness of the common element shared byparticulars and the individual instance of that element in each partic-ular. Perception falls on both indiscriminately (συγκε�υμ"νως), and it isonly later (=στερ�γεν�) that abstraction allows their separation.42 Thewhole commonly seen in the parts is then in some sense both the wholeof abstraction and the whole of particular existence since, on the onehand, it is subsequently comprehended as an abstraction and on theother, it exists in each particular prior to perception (this simultane-

41 Ebbesen (1990b) 156.42 In APo. 266.17–28: �; γ*ρ Zν ε# μN � αJσ ησις )γν7ρι�εν Mλως τ�ν Aν ρωπ�ν,

pδ�νατ� Zν � ψυ�N δι* τLς κατ’ α;τNν γν7σεως ε#ς τNν &ν ρ7π�υ #"ναι κατ�ληψιν κα'γν�σιν, κα' τ� κα .λ�υ & ρ��ειν )ν /αυτCL. ν+ν δ? τ�+τ� γ�νεται α;τCL> α#σ �νεται Aρα.κα' � αJσ ησις τρ.π�ν τιν* τ�+ κ�ιν�+, ε# κα' μN Iς κ�ιν�+, &λλ’ Iς κα ’ Vκαστα. Rμ λλ�ν Zν εJπ�ις Iς κ�ιν�+ R Iς κα ’ Vκαστα α#σ �νεσ αι τ�+ κα ’ Vκαστα. ε# γ*ρδιακρ,ναι � αJσ ησις &π’ &λλ�λων pδ�νατ� κα ’ /αυτNν τ* κα ’ Vκαστα, Iς κα ’ VκασταZν α;τ�ν α#σ �νεσ αι Fδ�5ε> ν+ν δ’ &διακρ�τως )πι2�λλει α;τ�,ς κα' συγκε�υμ"νωςγιν7σκει α;τ�. σημε,�ν δ’ Mτι κα' τ* παιδ�α π�ντας πρ�σαγ�ρε�ει πατ"ρας τ�0ς Aνδραςκα' μητ"ρας τ*ς γυνα,κας, Iς κατ’ αJσ ησιν )νεργ�+ντα μ.ν�ν κα' μ�πω διακριτικNν V5ιντ�ν /κ�στ�υ #διωμ�των F��ντα.


ous identification is reflected in the “hybrid” existence attributed to thiswhole).43 We could then map Eustratios’ understanding of universalsonto our diagram in the following way:

The One UnityUnparticipated unity Participated unityκατ’ α#τ�αν κα ’ @παρ5ινWhole before the parts Whole in the parts

(abstraction/perception)

Unified Not One (matter)Participating plurality non-participating pluralityκατ* μ" ε5ινWhole in the parts(perception/existence)

We see then that Eustratios has confined the genera of logic, his threestates of the whole in the parts, to the relationship between unityand the unified, or between the Neoplatonic existences κα ’ @παρ5ινand κατ* μ" ε5ιν. The whole from the parts falls away since it is insome sense pre-logical as a collection of extensional objects,44 and thewhole before the parts remains supra-logical as paradigm, an elementof Neoplatonic metaphysics with no apparent role within the operationsof Aristotelian logic.45

Nevertheless, the whole-before-the-parts is still very much alive inthe thought of Eustratios of Nicaea. Joannou is undoubtedly correct inattributing his insistence on the identity of “essence and existence” to

43 Sten Ebbesen has lucidly explained the inevitable conflation of these apparentstates. He identifies the abstraction with the “unranked” universal (for the sake of hisexample, /common dog/), the common element of each particular with the “ranked”universal (/this particular dog/) and the particular instance with the particular itself(/Snuffy/) and goes on to say, “If you cannot quite make up your mind on the question,and I think Porphyry could not, /this particular dog/ has a strange intermediary statusbetween /Snuffy/ and /common dog/. In a sense it is identical with the former, ina sense with the latter and in a sense, maybe, it is a compound of the two.” Ebbesen(1990b) 153.

44 “At the very beginning of the Isagoge he [Porphyry] examines the meaning ofgenos. The first use of the word, he says, was to designate the origin of each man’s birth,and next it came to designate the set (plêthos) or collection (athroisma) of people sharinga common origin of birth. It is not in any of these sense, he continues, that we use theword when we speak of the genos to which the species are subordinate, but probablythe logical use was established in imitation (kath’ homoiotêta) of prior usage . . .” Ebbesen(1990b) 155.

45 See Lloyd (1990) 73.

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an affirmation of creation ex nihilo and a refutation of any pre-existingforms that the Creator was obligated to follow in the manner of Plato’sDemiurge. When God created a particular existent, He also created itsessence as a divine thought. As Ierodiakonou has argued, for Eustratiosonly these thoughts and individuals truly exist, the former the simulta-neous paradigms of the latter. So in terms of our diagram, we wouldlocate “essence” with the whole before the parts and “existence” withthe substance (�;σ�α) of the particular, or the whole in the parts whichexists in each particular (Aristotle’s “immanent form”). However, as wehave seen, the common element existing in each particular is not so eas-ily disentangled from its perception and subsequent abstraction in thehuman soul. In other words, the insistence on the identity of “essenceand existence,” while perhaps intended as a refutation of Plato’s Demi-urge, results in affirming the existence of a particular’s common ele-ments, however subtly that existence is later defined in relation to itsparadigms in the mind of God. The images of these paradigms are thecommon elements of particulars, which undoubtedly exist, but they arealso perceived and abstracted, and the distinction between paradigmand abstraction begins to blur in the apparent and operative logic ofsimple predication: no being is “as one” because no being is beyondthe predication implied by “part” and “whole.” This is what Lloyd hascalled the nominalism of Porphyry, whose pedogogical appropriationof Aristotle gave one the impression that “at the cost of making thelogic purely formal, any significant name, simple or composite, couldfall under its rules.”46 That every particular existence has an “essence”is then no more than saying every part has a whole or every partic-ular has a universal or every subject has a predicate, and vice versa.In the “Definition of Being” Eustratios provides examples that are nomore than this, a subject possessing multiple predicates and a predi-cate encompassing multiple subjects: while the Logos can be thoughtof as a particular one, he is not “as one” since he is both God andman. So too is Mary a particular individual, but she is also a virginand a mother; conversely, God and even the elements of fire, water, airand earth, can be thought of as one, but each is not “as one” sinceGod encompasses the three divine persons, Father, Son and Holy Spiritjust as the elements encompass their particular kinds. The simplicityof this logic also lies behind his polemic against the monophysitism of

46 Lloyd (1957) 156.


Tigranes (ca. 1114). In order to rationalize Christ’s two natures, Eustra-tios urges theologians to consider applying the distinction that Greekphilosophers make between a particular and a universal to the distinc-tion between a person and a nature: a person is particular, a natureuniversal. Since a particular can possess several substantial predicates,so too can the Logos possess two natures. Although he again prefers toidentify the particular with primary existence and the universal withsubsequent abstraction, he sees no reason to fret over the fact thatsometimes the Greeks claim that the particular is subordinate to theuniversal and its participant and at other times that the universal iseither subsequent to the particular or nothing at all: whenever theseclaims are useful, they can be used; whenever they are not, they shouldbe ignored.47

It is therefore difficult to assess the implications of Eustratios’ under-standing of universals given, on the one hand, that he denies theabstracted whole of its existence, and on the other, that he affirms thewhole before the parts and its operation within logical predication asthe paradigm of an image which apparently stretches from existenceto abstraction. What we can say is that in at least the “Definitionof Being” and his polemical works, where Eustratios hopes to ratio-nalize the two natures of the Logos and three persons of the Trin-ity, these positions seem to converge almost exclusively on particularbeing understood as the logical relationship between a particular andits defining universals (between the participating unified and the par-ticipated unity of our scheme). In fact this convergence is so strongthat it defines what I consider the most significant feature of Eustra-tios’ thought: the identification of God Himself with particular being.Though perhaps understandable in the context of a Porphyrian nomi-nalism that extends formal logic to every name, this identification is stillstriking and seemingly at odds with the long and orthodox traditionof Ps.-Dionysios, who understood God to be beyond all being, partic-ular or otherwise.48 Not that Eustratios denies this; in fact, even in the“Definition of Being” he specifically acknowledges that God is beyond

47 Refutation 162–166. His representation of this alleged Greek position is not entirelyAristotelian since the Neoplatonic universal “before the parts” and existence κατ’ α#τ�ανare both specifically acknowledged as elements of that same argument.

48 As Gerhard Podskalsky has pointed out, Eustratios did not hesitate to use theapophatic character of Pseudo-Dionysius’ thought when it suited his polemical inten-tions, but this appropriation seems disingenuous at best given “seine im übrigen fastpositivistischen Einstellung zur Theologie.” Podskalsky (1977) 117.

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everything (=π?ρ τ� π ν). However, his admission here is clearly con-cessive and occurs in a passage where Eustratios not only asserts thatGod exists among men and angels but also that “He creates me a godcomposed from [the] elements and is created by me (κα' π�ιε, )μ? ε.ν,τ�ν )κ στ�ι�ε�ων συγκε�μεν�ν, π�ιε,ται δ? =π’ )μ�+).” Joannou’s read-ing immediately clarifies this remarkably heretical statement to mean,in language reminiscent of John Italos, “that is to say, I am made agod by adoption (Qγ�υν ε�+μαι )γl "σει).”49 Not surprisingly, our fourmanuscripts differ significantly here, and Alpers rejects Joannou’s read-ing, dropping altogether “He is created by me” (a phrase which in bothits instances was crossed out by later hands) in preference for: κα' π�ι-ε, μ?ν )μ? ε.ν, τ�ν )κ τ�ν στ�ι�ε��ν συγκε�μεν�ν, Qγ�υν ε�+μαι )γ7,κα' : )στιν )κε,ν�ς ��σει, γ�ν�μαι )γ7 "σει. This reading better clar-ifies the distinction between divinized by adoption ( "σει) and divineby nature (��σει), but Alpers makes no attempt to explain or fails torecognize that the particle μ"ν would more than likely require its cor-relative δ", which is of course supplied by π�ιε,ται δ? =π’ )μ�υ. OnlyVaticanus Graecus 711 preserves the passage as a μ"ν δ" construction:κα' π�ιε, μ?ν )μ? ε.ν, τ�ν )κ στ�ι�ε��ν συγκε�μεν�ν, π�ιε,ται δ? =π’ )μ�υ,Qγ�υν γ�νεται Aν ρωπ�ς δι’ )μ? πλNν Gμαρτ�ας, κα' : )στιν )κε,ν�ς ��ση,γ�ν�μαι )γ7 "σει ( . . . that is to say, He became a man without sinon account of me and what He is by nature I become by adoption).Though this reading is perhaps theologically acceptable the languageremains provocative. Nevertheless, the notion is understandable if wepush for the particularity of God within the metaphysics of Neoplaton-ism. If God as the One descends the chain of being in His procession,He is also met by us in the ascent of our return, a notion MichaelPsellos himself had suggested.50 In the “Definition of Being” Eustratiosmakes it clear that God not only descends to and is found complete ineverything, but like all particular being He is also acted upon in returnand participated by something else, in His case, as Eustratios suggests,by our sinfulness which required the incarnation of the Logos. How-ever, the opposite movements of procession and return, both logicallynecessary as binding the cause and effect of particular being, imply inthe case of God that the movement that begins in His transcendence isconditioned by or related to the movement that returns from matter, oras our alleged emendation suggests, that God is also created by us.

49 QQ 81.21.50 Theol. I 64.


This is not the only time we see Eustratios experimenting with thisparticular implication of Neoplatonic theology. In his commentary onBook VI of the Nicomachean Ethics, he justifies the partition of the soulby comparing it to the “composition” (σ�ν εσις) of divinity, which,although one in itself, is participated (κατ* μετ��ν) by others thatare different κα ’ =π�ρ5ιν, so that the whole is made up of bothdivinity and the divinized ( ε��μεν�ν).51 Morever, like Italos beforehim, Eustratios was specifically condemned in 1117 for applying theidea of the return to the Logos, in his case, for claiming that thehumanity of Christ worships his divinity “as a servant,” δ�υλικ�ς, andthat his humanity was perfected only upon its return to the divine.Jesus was, in theory, like any man, but he is the Logos because thereturn of his humanity to the divine was perfectly accomplished.52 Tohis accusers, the economy of this theosis was too logically conceived, andEustratios was finally charged with reducing the nature of Christ toan Aristotelian syllogism.53 In spite of this, in his later commentary onthe Nicomachean Ethics, Eustratios would continue to claim that a being’sperfection depends on its appropriate return to the transcendent causeof everything.54

So even if we claim that Eustratios tended to restrict the possibilitiesof philosophy to the logic of predication, he was still operating fromwithin the thought world of Neoplatonism.55 It is well worth notingin this context that forty years after his condemnation, Nicholas ofMethone wrote a refutation of Proklos’ Elements of Theology, which allowsus to compare his views on the specific chapters that interest us here,namely, those that address the three-part division of existence and therelationships of wholes to parts.56 In both instances, Nicholas makes

51 In EN 287.28–37.52 Niketas of Herakleia was among his accusers, specifically citing Eustratios’ specu-

lation concerning the theosis of Christ’s humanity. See Apologia 304.17–25.53 As Kapriev points out, the charge of “Aristoteliansim” simply means the use of

syllogistic thinking, which was condemned since it implies a formal structure withinwhich the divine is comprehended. Kapriev (2005) 214.

54 In EN 288.18–22: gΕκ�στ�υ τ�ν Hντων R γιν�μ"νων � μ?ν �;σ�α κατ* τNν )κ τ�+π�ιητικ�+ α#τ��υ εωρε,ται πρ.�δ�ν, � δ? τελει.της κατ* τNν πρ�ς )κε,ν� )πιστρ��Nν τLςπρ�ς )κε,ν� &ντιπ�ι�υμ"ν�υ )�"σεως κ&κε,ν� κατ* μ"τρ�ν μιμε,σ αι σπ�υδ��ντ�ς, %ν’ Iς)κε,ν� τ"λει�ν, �@τω κα' α;τ� τ"λει�ν κατ* τNν α;τD� Gρμ.��υσαν τελει.τητα γ�ν�ιτ�.

55 Recent commentators have qualified Joannou’s insistence on nominalism by re-minding us of Eustratios’ Neoplatonism. See Kapriev (2005) 214; Podskalsky (1989)col. 117.

56 Refutation 69–71.

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it his point to reestablish the transcendence of God. He accepts thethree-part division of existence with one important qualification: itdoes not, as Proklos claims, apply to every existent, but only to God.Only God exists κατ* μ" ε5ιν in that He exists in everything; thereciprocal movement of every existent in return to God is rejected.Likewise, in discussing wholes and parts, Nicholas states that there isonly one whole, the transcendent God “before the parts.” The otherwholes are mere relations found in objects and can make no claim toa fundamental structure of reality or a scheme of participation. Therefutation seems aimed directly at Eustratios: God is a transcendentand not a particular being, and the logic which might have suggestedHis particularity is only valid when it affirms His transcendence.

In fact, it could be argued that the identification of particular beingwith God does inevitably compromise His transcendence. John Italosand Michael Psellos, who clearly associated the being of God withthe Neoplatonic One, would have undoubtedly interpreted the finallines of our passage from John of Damascus in a significantly dif-ferent way: the phrase, “Because no being is beyond-being, and nobeing descends apart from and to everything, creating and not allowingitself to be acted upon,” could not possibly refer to the One since theOne is beyond being and descends with its transcendence uncompro-mised. This is the striking departure of Eustratios, who, without deny-ing that God is beyond being, nevertheless understands His descentthrough existence in the same way as that of any other particularbeing.57 Like the Neoplatonic One, God descends perfectly to andencompasses everything, but unlike the Neoplatonic One, He descendsaffected and participated by his creation. This is perhaps another rea-son why Eustratios can acknowledge the paradigm of God’s thought asthe whole before the parts but inevitably only require it as the mostcomprehensive universal that can be predicated of particulars. Everyparticular participates in God κατ* μ" ε5ιν, but its substantial existenceκα ’ =π�ρ5ιν only requires a participated universal. For Eustratios thisseems to be the operative sense of the identity of “essence and existence”:the simultaneity of particular and universal. While the abstracted whole

57 “Eustratius’ argument is of more than historical interest. It implies that themeaning of ‘exists’ is the same in, say ‘centaurs exist’, ‘frozen air exists’, and ‘Godexists’, for the difference between the states of affairs which the sentences describe isto be looked for only in the difference between centaurs, frozen air, and God.” Lloyd(1990) 74–75.


is subsequent, it is the same whole in the parts that exists and is simulta-neously perceived.

So was Eustratios a nominalist? We agree with Ierodiakonou thatJoannou’s claim that Eustratios understood universals to be mere con-cepts (or “pure names” as Kazhdan claims) is an oversimplificationof his position as developed in the Aristotelian commentaries eventhough his rejection of the existence of the abstracted universal isclear (there is no explicit argument about universals in the “Defini-tion of Being”).58 However, as regards Joannou’s second observation,that Eustratios equated “essence and existence,” I think the case isclear: Eustratios does tend to limit the discussion of being to the for-mal logic of predication, both in his engagement with Aristotle and inthe “Definition of Being.” Whether for reasons of philosophical affinityin the first instance or polemical clarity in the second, this reductiontends to eclipse the paradoxical being of both God and matter in sofar as they name, as our simple scheme suggests, the unparticipatedcorrelates of predication’s universal and particular constituents. Eustra-tios’ philosophical predecessors, John Italos and Michael Psellos, wereless willing to ignore the problematic implications of this lack of par-ticipation. Italos still affirmed the existence of universals, granted atleast subsistence to abstraction, and openly pondered the significanceof being both above and below particulars, identifying these types of“non-being” specifically with God and matter.59 Psellos maintained athoroughly Dionysian understanding of God’s being as an apophaticregress of “beyonds” that transcend all comprehension:60

But further, if you want to be theologically precise, God is neither every-thing nor beyond everything, neither a definition nor a comprehensiveterm, neither light, nor life, nor mind, nor being, nor the One, nor even

58 Lloyd has a different explanation for what I am considering nuance: “Byzantineauthors had not sufficiently focused the question what exactly the fundamentum in reamounted to. Consequently it is in a sense anachronistic to expect in each case to assesstheir commitment to nominalism.” Lloyd (1990) 73–74.

59 QQ 19.15–17 (p. 21): �;δ? γ*ρ τ� =π?ρ τ* Hντα μN Hν, Eσπερ �;δ? τ� =π� τα+τα>Aμ�ω γ*ρ τα+τα Hντα, [ν τ� μ?ν Iς κρε,ττ�ν τ�ν Hντων μN Hν, τ� δ? Iς �ε,ρ�ν, κα' τ�μ?ν ε.ς, τ� δ? @λη.

60 Theol. I 56.56: μ λλ�ν δ", ε# 2��λει τNν &κρι2L ε�λ�γ�αν μα ε,ν, �cτε π ν � ε�ς�cτε =π?ρ τ� π ν, �cτε Mρ�ς �cτε περι��, �; ��ς, �; �ω�, �; ν�+ς, �;κ Hν, �;� Vν, &λλ’�;δ’ =π?ρ τ� Vν> τ* γ*ρ τ�ια+τα \ν.ματα �μ"τερ� ε#σι πα �ματα κα' τLς �μετ"ρας ψυ�Lςqδ,νες> )κ,ν� δ? Aρρητ�ν κα' =περ�ρρητ�ν, κα' �; μ.ν�ν M τι )στ'ν �;κ )πιστ�με α, &λλ’�;δ? τNν τ��τ�υ &κρι2�+μεν Aγν�ιαν, κα' γ*ρ κα' τ� Aγνωστ�ν α;τ�+ &κατ�ληπτ�ν. Seealso Phil. Min. I 7.80; Theol. I 26.80.

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beyond the One. These names are the products of our experience andthe pangs of our soul, but God is unspeakable and beyond unspeakableand not only do we not know what He is, we have no idea how to deter-mine our ignorance of Him since even His unknowablility is incompre-hensible.

EUSTRATIOS OF NICAEA ON THESEPARATION OF ART AND THEOLOGY

Charles Barber

Eustratios, Metropolitan of Nicaea was one of the more sophisticatedand engaged writers on the nature of art and painting in Byzan-tium.1 Yet, his work remains little used by art historians and theolo-gians who seek to conceptualize the object that we call “icon.” Rather,the literature on Byzantine aesthetics has tended to privilege the the-ologians of Late Antiquity, of the “iconoclastic” era, and the Palae-ologan period.2 As such, Eustratios remains one of our more under-appreciated thinkers on Byzantine art. Modern editions, translations,and a richer secondary literature will no doubt help change this sit-uation.3 Until these become available, this essay, like the other rareaccounts of Eustratios’s writing on art, must be considered preliminary.Given this condition, my essay will attempt to show how Eustratiosdeveloped a consistent account of the image, one that led him to rejectthe post-iconoclastic elevation of the icon to the status of theology orphilosophy. In order to do this, I will focus on three of Eustratios’s writ-ings. His discussion of art in his Commentary on Nicomachean Ethics 6 andhis two closely linked essays on icons: the Dialogue and the Syllogistic

Demonstration.4 While the three works discussed here reveal the consis-tency of his thought, even though the Ethics might date to ca. 1120 andthe icon essays belong to the early 1090s, they also reveal one notable

1 Draeseke (1896) 319–336; Joannou (1952) 24–34; Joannou (1954a) 358–368; Joan-nou (1954b) 369–378; Joannou (1958) 1–30; Browning (1962) 1–12; Browning (1963) 173;Giocarinis (1964) 159–204; Gouillard (1967) 206–210; Glavinas (1972) 195–198; Mercken(1973) 6*–14*; Lloyd (1987) 341–351; Mercken (1991) 5*–7*; Trizio (2006) 35–63. Thispaper on Eustratios’s thinking on art draws on materials published in Barber (2007)99–130.

2 There is no mention of Eustratios in such standard if aging works as: Mathew(1963), Bychkov (1977), or Ouspensky (1992).

3 Mary Fox and Dave Jenkins have prepared the translations from Eustratios’sSyllogistic Demonstration. This forms part of a collaborative project that is working undermy direction to prepare editions, translations and commentaries on the materialsbequeathed us by Komnenian discussions of the icon.

4 In EN 299–321; Dialogue 127–151 and Syllogistic Demonstration 151–160.

132 charles barber

addition in the later text.5 I will turn to this at the end of the paper,where I will suggest that this addition, an identification of the bestwisdom with theology, presents an attempt by Eustratios to removethe icon from the contentious theological position it had occupied ineleventh-century Byzantium by lessening its status in regard to theol-ogy proper.

The passage from the Ethics commentary that introduces this addi-tion is towards the end of the section that concerns Aristotle’s distinc-tion of art from prudence and the respective values of doing and mak-ing and contains Eustratios’s response to section 1141a9 of Aristotle’stext, which reads:

The term wisdom is employed in the arts to denote those men whoare the most accurate masters of their art, for instance, it is applied toPheidias as a sculptor and to Polykleitos as a statuary. In this use thenwisdom signifies nothing other than artistic excellence.

ΤNν δ? σ��αν )ν τα,ς τ"�ναις τ�,ς &κρι2εστ�τ�ις τ*ς τ"�νας &π�δ�δ�μεν,�X�ν Φειδ�αν λι �υργ�ν σ��ν κα' Π�λ�κλειτ�ν &νδριαντ�π�ι.ν, )ντα+ αμ?ν �6ν �;δ?ν Aλλ� σημα�ν�ντες τNν σ��αν, R Mτι &ρετN τ"�νης )στ�ν>6

In the course of his lengthy commentary on this passage Eustratioselaborates on the nature of the particular wisdom that belongs to thearts. Both Pheidias and Polykleitos are praised for the accuracy of theirimitations in stone of natural things, for example:

Polykleitos is called a wise sculptor, making accurate imitations in thestones according to what is possible as regards the subject.

Π�λ�κλειτ�ς &νδριαντ�π�ι�ς σ��ς qν�μ��ετ�, &κρι2ε,ς κα' α;τ�ς τ*ςμιμ�σεις )ν τ�,ς λ� �ις κατ* τ� )γ�ωρ�+ν τD� =π�κειμ"νDω π�ι��μεν�ς.7

In this phrase we can hear a condition introduced by Eustratios, as henotes that these imitations are determined by that which is: “possibleas regards the subject.” This suggests that the artist is dependent uponwhat the subject discloses of itself. Eustratios then expands upon this:

Since substance is being proper, the things in and around substance arenot beings proper, but each is said to be a kind of being and a kindof being of substance, as the quantity of substance, or the quality ofsubstance or the relation or position, like lying, standing and leaning,or substance being in a place or in time or any of the other nine

5 The date for the commentaries draws on Browning (1962). The date for the iconessays is suggested at Dialogue 129, where the essays are linked to a Synod.

6 In EN 318.27–30.7 In EN 319.19–21.

on the separation of art and theology 133

categories. Each of the arts is likewise, since something is worked fromthe underlying substance in the substance and around the substance.That which is known is that which is worked out and inheres in andaround substance. This is artistic form, which is brought forth by theartist in the material proper to that art. And this is an accident, andtherefore something that is not properly being, so that the excellence andperfection concerning it (i.e. accidence) is a kind of wisdom. But wisdomproper derives from the knowledge of beings, that is, of substances, whichare not a kind of being, but being proper, namely, not accidence, whichis a kind of being, but substance or being proper. Just as we say aboutcoming-to-be, on the one hand, that the coming-to-be of accidence fromnon-being is not coming-to-be proper but a kind of coming-to-be, and onthe other, that the coming-to-be of substance is complete and not a kindof coming-to-be on account of its actually being complete, as Aristotlehas taught us, so too is the knowledge and wisdom of each accidence akind of knowledge and a kind of wisdom. And the wise man concerningthis wisdom is a kind of wise man about something kind of wise, and thewise man concerning substances and the things in themselves that followupon substances is completely wise and wise in the proper sense, andmoreover he is the best of all in wisdom, who concerns himself with themost fundamental aspects of beings and the best wisdom is his science,namely, theology.

Iς γ*ρ � μ?ν �;σ�α _ν Gπλ�ς, τ* δ? )ν τCL �;σ�Pα κα' περ' τNν �;σ�αν�;� Gπλ�ς Hντα, &λλ� τι _ν Vκαστ�ν τ��των λ"γεται, κα� τι τLς �;σ�ας Hν,�O�ν π�σ.της �;σ�ας R π�ι.της �;σ�ας R σ�"σις R "σις, Iς τ� κε,σ αι κα'%στασ αι κα' &νακεκλ�σ αι, R τ� )ν τ.πDω εXναι τNν �;σ�αν R τ� )ν �ρ.νDωQ Aλλ� τι τ�ν κατηγ�ρι�ν, �@τω κα' τ�ν τε�ν�ν /κ�στη, )πε' τLς �;σ�ας=π�κειμ"νης )ν τCL �;σ�Pα κα' περ' τNν �;σ�αν )ργ��ετα� τι, )κε�ν�υ )στ'γνωστικ�, �! τε )ργ��εται κα' : )ν τCL �;σ�Pα κα' περ' τNν �;σ�αν )ντ� ησι.τ�+τ� δ" )στι τ� κατ* τNν τ"�νην εXδ�ς, : )ν τCL �#κε�Pα @λCη τLς τ"�νης=π� τ�+ τε�ν�τ�υ &π�τελε,ται. τ�+τ� δ" )στι συμ2ε2ηκ.ς, κα' δι* τ�+τ. τι_ν �;� Gπλ�ς, κα' δι* τ�+τ. τις σ��α � κατ’ α;τ� τελει.της κα' &ρετ�,� δ? σ��α Gπλ�ς περ' τNν τ�ν Hντων γν�σιν καταγιν�μ"νη, Qτ�ι τ�ν�;σι�ν, �c τι _ν γιν7σκει &λλ’ Gπλ�ς Hν, Qγ�υν �; συμ2ε2ηκ.ς M τι Hν)στιν αλλ’ �;σ�αν R Gπλ�ς Hν [)στιν.] Iς �6ν )π' τ�ν γεν"σεων τNν μ?ντ�+ συμ2ε2ηκ.τ�ς )κ τ�+ μN εXναι γ"νεσιν �;� Gπλ�ς γ"νεσιν &λλ� τιναγ"νεσιν λ"γ�μεν, τNν δ? τLς �;σ�ας γ"νεσιν Mλως, &λλ’ �c τινα δι* τ� MλωςHντως εXναι γ"νεσιν, Iς κα' α;τ�ς � 8Αριστ�τ"λης �μ,ν παραδ"δωκεν, �@τωκα' τNν γν�σιν κα' τNν σ��αν τ�ν μ?ν συμ2ε2ηκ.των /κ�στ�υ γν�σιν τινακα' σ��αν τιν�, κα' τ�ν κατ’ α;τNν σ��.ν τι σ��ν κα� τινα σ��.ν, τ�νδ? κατ* τ*ς �;σ�ας σ��ν κα' τ* κα ’ α=τ� τα,ς �;σ�αις /π.μενα Mλωςσ��ν κα' Gπλ�ς σ��.ν, π�ντων δ’ ε#σ"τι )ν σ��Pα κρ�τιστ�ν τ�ν περ' τ*&ρ�ικ7τερα τ�ν Hντων καταγιν.μεν�ν κα' σ��αν κρατ�στην τNν )πιστ�μηνα;τ�+, sτις )στ'ν � ε�λ�γ�α.8

8 In EN 319.37–320.19.

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I want to develop two strands from this passage. First, I would liketo show that his accidental account of art is consistent with Eustratios’discussion of art elsewhere. Second, I will, as mentioned earlier, returnto the implications of his separation of the work of art from the practiceof theology.

The points made in the passage above build from the precedingdiscussion of art in the Ethics. So that by the time the reader reachesthis section he or she has seen that Eustratios has elaborated upon butnot really extended the scope of Aristotle’s text. Art is therefore alreadyunderstood to be a rational process of making that proceeds under itsown conditions.9 As it proceeds art moves that which is external tothe substance being worked.10 It brings something into existence andthe cause of this is the artist,11 who is obliged to be accurate as it isthis that puts the material of the image and the form of the subjectin contact with one another (κα' Fστι τις σ��ς Iς )ν τCLδε τCL @λCηκα' τD�δε τD� =π�κειμ"νDω τ�+ &κρι2�+ς )�αψ�μεν�ς).12 Furthermore, art,unlike natural things, is not necessary.13 It is therefore of little surprisethat when we come to the passage quoted above that the wisdomaccredited to art is of a second order. While the artist might be calledwise, with reference to his or her accurate rendering of the accidentsthat adhere to or surround substance, this wisdom is of a different,lesser, order when compared to the wisdom of one who attends tobeing proper. This last, in its best form, is designated the work of thetheologian.

Eustratios’s account of art in his Ethics commentary follows upon theassumptions that underpin his earlier and extended engagement withthe question of art in the two essays on the icons that were written inthe early 1090s. In these, we find a rigorous and philosophical renderingof the prevailing discourse on icons, veneration, and the visible, asbequeathed in the writings of the ninth-century iconophile authorsNikephoros of Constantinople and Theodore of Stoudios. Eustratios’stwo essays were written in response to a theory of iconic depictionproposed by Leo, Metropolitan of Chalcedon in a dispute that ranfrom 1082 until 1094. This theory was developed in the course of

9 In EN 299–300, 307–308.10 In EN 301–302.11 In EN 300–301, 307–308.12 In EN 319.26–28.13 In EN 301.


Leo’s defense of his charge that the Emperor Alexios I Komnenos hadbeen guilty of iconoclasm when he had melted down church silver thatbore sacred images. The core of Leo’s definition was that the formalrelation between the image and its subject, their common likeness,made the icon of Christ worthy of adoration. While Leo resisted theargument made by Basil of Euchaita that the material of an image wastransformed by the impression of divine form into its surface, he didargue that the form seen in the image not only gave the one looking atthe object immediate access to the divine hypostasis of Christ himself,but also made the object as a whole sacred.14

In response Eustratios presented an array of arguments intended todefine more precisely an icon’s proper limits. These arguments weregrounded on two key themes. First, there was a need to draw a clearerdistinction between knowledge of the Logos and knowledge of theincarnate Christ. Second, there was a need to define more clearly thekind of knowledge that an icon could convey.

I would like to begin with a passage from the Syllogistic Demonstration

that Antony Lloyd and others have drawn to our attention.15 Thisreads:

But they [Leo of Chalcedon] then say that we consider it [the icon] wor-thy of adoration not by isolating its material outlines, but by perceivingthe ground of the human per se, which is the divine hypostasis adoredin this portrait. But the essential ground of a particular man is nothingother than humanity itself, which is seen equally in all men, and the onewho adores this would no more adore the assumed existing in God theLogos than the humanity of any other particular man. And the one ador-ing this would seem rightly to be an anthropolater. Since God the Logos,having assumed humanity, divinized nature, it follows that the perfectionof nature exists in the one in number [i.e. the particular]. Therefore theessential ground of all enmattered and natural things is perceived per se,not existing outside of particulars, but having its existence in them: notas a whole from parts, but in the parts existing whole in each of them.16

And the one who adores the bare ground adores a concept more than athing.

Φασ' δ? α6 ις, Iς �; σ��ματα τLς @λης &�αιρ�+ντες τLς λατρε�ας &5ι�+-μεν, &λλ* τ�ν τ�+ &ν ρ7π�υ λ.γ�ν κα ’ /αυτ�ν )πιν��+ντες, Iς ε�ϋπ�-στ�τDω τ��τDω �αρακτLρι λατρε��μεν. 8Αλλ’ � λ.γ�ς � �;σι7δης τ�+ &ν ρ7-π�υ �;δ"ν )στιν Vτερ�ν R � &ν ρωπ.της α;τ�, � )ν π σιν &ν ρ7π�ις )π�σης

14 Stephanou (1946) 190–198; Carr (1995) 579–584; Barber (2007) 131–157.15 Lloyd (1987) 348.16 cf. In APo. 195–196.

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εωρ�υμ"νη, κα' � τα�τCη λατρε�ων �; μ λλ�ν λατρε�ει τD� )ν τD� ΘεD� Λ.-γDω =π�στ�ντι πρ�σλ�μματι, R /κ�στDω τ�ν κατ* μ"ρ�ς &ν ρ7πων. Κα' �τα�τCη λατρε�ων δ.5ειεν Zν δικα�ως &ν ρωπ�λ�τρης> )πε' κα' � Θε�ς Λ.-γ�ς �@τω δι* τ�+ πρ�σλ�μματ�ς τNν ��σιν ) "ωσεν, Iς τLς ��σεως τελε�ας)ν τD� /ν' κατ’ &ρι μ�ν =παρ��σης. iΕπειτα � λ.γ�ς � �;σι7δης )π' π�ν-των τ�ν )ν�λων κα' �υσικ�ν )πιν�ε,ται μ?ν κα ’ /αυτ.ν, �;� =�ισταταιδ? �ωρ'ς τ�ν κα ’ Vκαστα, )ν τ��τ�ις F�ων τNν @παρ5ιν> Iς Mλ�ν �;κ )κμερ�ν, &λλ’ )ν μ"ρεσιν Iς )ν /κ�στDω =π�ρ�ων Mλ�ν α;τ�ν> κα' � τD� λ.γDωλατρε�ων γυμνD�, )πιν��ματι μ λλ�ν λατρε�ει R πρ�γματι.17

Eustratios makes several points here. First the ground (λ.γ�ς) of manis humanity rather than divinity. Second, it follows from this first pointthat man cannot be adored. Third, the incarnation has divinized all ofnature. Fourth, it follows from this that the divine may be perceivedin the post-incarnational particular. Fifth, if one tries to adore theground—in this instance divinity—beyond the particular, one will onlyadore a concept rather than the thing that mediates and presents thatground to us.

It is this last point that leads Eustratios to criticize the distinctionthat Leo has tried to draw, namely that we can perceive Christ throughthe icon but not in it. For Eustratios, Leo has overlooked the icon asa medium whose very material particularity allows Christ to be know-able. Granted this, it is important then to recognize the constraints thatthis medium imposes. Foremost among these is the understanding thatthe description and definition of an icon, as an artifact, is not to be con-fused with the physical account of the implications of the incarnationidentified in this passage.

This leads Eustratios to argue that:

The portrait of the particular is nothing else, that is a portrayal thatboth depicts and impresses the accidents specific to it, the accumulationof which would never be found in any other thing of a similar nature;therefore, depicting it from these [accidents], or sometimes describing itwith words, we are able to portray and distinguish it from others; norwill the universal ever be depicted, so that someone could adore this inimages, but rather only the material outline of the particular and thisaccording to appearance.

vαρακτNρ δ? τ�+ κα ’ Vκαστα �;δ?ν Vτερ�ν, R δια��ρα5ις κα' �O�ν δι�γρα-ψ�ς τε κα' διατ�πωσις τ�ν #δ�ως συμ2ε2ηκ.των α;τD�, [ν τ� Z ρ�ισμα �;κZν )π’ Zλλ�υ τιν�ς τ�ν �μ��υ�ν ε=ρε ε�η π�τ"> δι� κα' )κ τ��των α;τ�νε#κ�ν��ντες, R λ.γDω π�τ? =π�γρ��ντες, διιστ ν τ�ν Zλλων κα' �αρακτη-

17 Syllogistic Demonstration 157.


ρ��ειν δυν�με α> �;δ’ ε#κ�νισ �σεται Zν τ� κα .λ�υ, %να κα' )ν ε#κ.σι τ��-τDω λατρε�ει τις, &λλ’ R μ.ν�ν σ�Lμα κα' wνυλ�ν τ�+ κα ’ Vκαστα κα' α;τ�τ�ν κατ’ )πι��νειαν.18

Here, Eustratios’s insistence that a portrait is only an accumulation ofvisible traces of a particular subject, leads him to reiterate that therecan be no portrait of a universal, such divinity, without the mediationof the particular.

This line of reasoning is also developed in Eustratios’s Dialogue. Here,too, Eustratios begins by arguing against the possibility of seeing thedivine in an icon, by pointing out that painting can pertain to thehuman alone:

It follows then that the human alone is to be depicted . . . just as, clearly,therefore the divine cannot be painted . . . the divine is undifferentiatedand undivided; it follows that it cannot be painted . . . By the sameargument they cannot be depicted together. For if they were to be, thenthe divine would again have dimension and measure, as it is unitedunconfused to the flesh within the one person. It follows therefore thatonly the human can be depicted: either in its own right or in relation tosomething else.

λε�πεται Bρα μ.νην εXναι τNν &ν ρωπ.τητα τ� εικ�νι�.μεν�ν . . . Mτι μ?ν�6ν � ε.της �;κ Vστιν ε#κ�νιστ.ν, δLλ�ν . . . � δ? ε.της &μ"ριστ.ντε κα' &δι�στατ�ν> �;κ Bρα ε#κ�νιστ.ν . . . ΤD� δ? α;τD� λ.γDω �;δ? τ�συναμ�.τερ�ν Vσται ε#κ�νιστ.ν. Ε# γ*ρ Vσται, π�λιν � ε.της διαστατ.ν τεκα' μεριστ.ν> )πειδ� περ κατ* μ�αν =π.στασιν &συγ��τως Qνωται τCL σαρκ�.Λε�πεται �6ν μ.νην ε#κ�νιστNν εXναι τNν &ν ρωπ.τητα. Αcτη δ? ] Gπλ�ς ]κατ� τι.19

This passage hints at the problem of representing Christ that concernsEustratios. Christ’s person consists of two natures, the human and thedivine. One is bounded by time and space, the other is not. Becausethe divine is without these bounds it is, in itself, unrepresentable. Allthat can be depicted in the icon is that which is manifest through thehuman.

Furthermore, that which is seen by these means is not even humanityproper, it is the accidental traces external to the human substance:

Form is the visible or rather that which is seen or manifest, thence theshape is exact in accordance to appearance. For vision is not cast into theabyss, nor does it grasp the essential, but only the colors of this and theircommon sensible outlines, I speak of number, movements and other such

18 Syllogistic Demonstration 157.19 Dialogue 131–132.

138 charles barber

things, which are all accidents. One must also transfer the name on tothe essential form as it is named in accordance with the likenesses of theshape. For these simulate and adorn and beautify the substance.

iΕστι γ*ρ εXδ�ς τ� ε#δ.μεν�ν Qγ�υν 2λεπ.μεν�ν κα' �αιν.μεν�ν, Mπερ )στ'ν� μ�ρ�N /κ�στ�υ κατ* )πι��νειαν. f; γ*ρ ε#ς 2� �ς � Hψις )πι2�λλει,�;δ? τLς �;σ�ας )��πτεται, μ.νων δ? �ρωματων κα ’ /αυτNν κα' τ�νκ�ιν�ν α#σ ητ�ν σ�ημ�των, λ"γω &ρι μ�+, κιν�σεως, κα' εx τι τ�ι�+τ�νVτερ�ν, Bπαντα συμ2ε2ηκ.τα )στι. Μετεν�νεκται δ? τ�cν�μα κα' )π' τ*κατ* �;σ�αν εJδη κα ’ �μ�ι.τητα τLς μ�ρ�Lς \ν�μασ "ντα. 8Επιμ�ρ��ειγ*ρ κα' τα+τα κα' κ�σμε, κα' καλλ�νει τ� =π�κε�μεν�ν.20

Eustratios’s opponent is unwilling to accept such a rigidly formalistunderstanding of the icon and argues that the traces in the work ofart disclose the entirety of their subject:

But since the accidents artistically portrayed according to the shape inChrist disclose him in this divine portrait, we say that [we are able] toworship [him] in this in terms of adoration through what is disclosed bythem.

8Αλλ’ )πε' τ* συμ2ε2ηκ.τα κατ* τNν μ�ρ�Nν τD� vριστD� �αραττ.μενατε�νικ�ς α;τ�ν )κε,ν�ν μην�ει τ�ν ε�ϋπ.στατ�ν �αρακτLρα, )κε�νDω �αμ?νπρ�σκυνε,ν λατρευτικ�ς τD� μηνυ�μ"νDω =π’ α;τ�ν.21

This leads Eustratios to ask:

What then is disclosed in the image, that which is painted or that whichis not painted?

τ� δN μην�εται )ν α;τ�,ς; : γρ��εται, R : �; γρ��εται;22

In answer to his own question he reiterates the importance of the dualaspect of Christ, who has two natures in a single hypostasis. This leadshim to argue that while the icon can only show one of these natures,that is the human,23 the icon can lead us to contemplate the divine,which resides elsewhere. Similarly, we may venerate the icon, but theadoration addressed to the divine cannot be mediated by such anobject.24 Worship by means of an icon must therefore be distinguishedfrom the direct worship—that is adoration—of God.25 Hence:

20 Dialogue 142.21 Dialogue 144.22 Dialogue 144.23 Dialogue 145.24 Dialogue 147.25 Dialogue 149.


For while our worship [understood as adoration] of him is unmediated,the imitation [of him] is mediated.

)κε, μ?ν γ*ρ &μ"σως πρ�σκυν�+μεν α;τD�, )ντα+ α δ? δι* μ"σης μιμ�σε-ως>26

This mediating function for the icon is founded upon its accidentalnature. It cannot offer direct access to the substance of its subject, as itcan only convey the external qualities of that subject. Hence:

Yet the icon takes the outline and the shape of the depicted, not theessence. The outline and shape are simply a quality and the fourth kindof quality. Every quality is simply an accident. No accident should beadored. Equally no outline or shape should be adored. What we aretalking about when we talk about the icon is perfectly obvious: theartistic and the mimetic. The pre-eternal Divine Logos has assumedinto himself at the end of days the additional from the holy virgin andTheotokos, the first fruit of our mixture. The hypostasis of the DivineLogos has required the adoption of our nature, so that the two naturesmight be contemplated in the one hypostasis. So, just as the Son ofGod has maintained his infallible hypostatic particularities, accordingto which the hypostasis is distinguished from the Father and the Spirit.So, too, did the Son of Man possess other particularities by which hediffers from the mother and other men. What are these secondary things,substance or accident? By which I mean, colors, size, perhaps the curveof a nose, or the hair for instance, or the outlines from which he hasemerged: the eyebrows, the eyes, and each part that is manifest on hisexterior, by means of which when we see them on icons we recognizewho each icon is representing.

iΕτι � ε#κlν τ� σ�Lμα κα' τNν μ�ρ�Nν τ�+ ε#κ�νι��μ"ν�υ λαμ2�νει �; τNν�;σιαν> τ� δ? σ�Lμα κα' � μ�ρ�N π�ι.της Gπλ�ς κα' τ"ταρτ�ν γ"ν�ς π�ι.τη-τ�ς> π σα δ? Gπλ�ς π�ι.της συμ2ε2ηκ.ς> �;δ?ν δ? συμ2ε2ηκ�ς λατρευτ.ν>�;δ?ν Aρα σ�Lμα R μ�ρ�N λατρευτ.ν. Π�ντως δ? �;κ Aδηλ�ν περ' π��υσημαιν�μ"ν�υ τLς ε#κ.ν�ς )ν π σι τ��τ�ις � λ.γ�ς �μ,ν> περ' γ*ρ τLς τε�νι-κLς τε κα' κατ* μ�μησιν> Mτι � Θε�ς Λ.γ�ς πρ�αι7νι�ς zν )π’ )σ��τωντ�ν �μερ�ν /αυτ� τ� πρ.σλημμα )κ τLς Gγ�ας Παρ "ν�υ κα' Θε�τ.κ�υ=πεστ�σατ�, τNν &παρ�Nν τ�+ �μετ"ρ�υ �υρ�ματ�ς> κα' =π.στασις α;τ�ς� Θε�ς Λ.γ�ς τL πρ�σλη� ε�ση ��σει �μ,ν )�ρημ�τισεν, Iς )ν μι =π�-στ�σει τ*ς δ�� εωρε,σ αι ��σεις. gΩς μ?ν �;ν υ$�ς τ�+ Θε�+ )τ�ρησεν&δι�πτωτα τ* =π�στατικ* α;τ�+ #δι7ματα, κα ’ T διεκρ�νετ� τ�+ Πατρ�ςκα' τ�+ Πνε�ματ�ς κα ’ =π.στασιν> Iς δ? υ$�ς &ν ρ7π�υ Fσ�εν α; ις#δι7ματα Vτερα, κα ’ T δια�"ρει τLς μητρ�ς κα' τ�ν λ�ιπ�ν &ν ρ7πων.Τα+τα δN τ* δε�τερα τ� )στιν �;σ�α R συμ2ε2ηκ.ς; �$.ν τι λ"γω, τ� �ρ�μα,τ� μ"γε �ς, � γρυπ.της τυ�.ν, � τ�ι�δε τρ��ωσις, � τ�ν παρει�ν τ�ι�δε

26 Dialogue 148.

140 charles barber

σ�ημ�τισις, τ�ν �ειλ"ων, τ�ν \� αλμ�ν, κα' /κ�στ�υ μ�ρ��υ κατ* τNνF5ω εν )πι��νειαν, Bπερ )ν τα,ς ε#κ.σι γρ��ντες, τ�ν�ς )στι γνωρ��μεντNν /κ�στ�υ τ�ν ε#κ�νι��μ"νων ε#κ.να.27

The answer to his last question is, of course, accident. What Eustratiossets forth in these texts is an account of painting that wishes to distin-guish precisely the icon, a man-made object, from its natural subject.This difference is substantial. While Eustratios identifies the availabil-ity of the divine through a post-incarnational divinized nature, he isunwilling to allow this presence to the work of art. It becomes nec-essary, then, for him to distinguish that which is in nature from thatwhich is visible in a painting. A painting remains the trace of the visi-ble, a record of the accidents that describe the particular manifestationof a given subject but that should not be confused with their substance.

These writings on the icons provide early insight into Eustratios’sthought. They show an engagement with the philosophical world ofeleventh-century Byzantine philosophy. This did not go unnoticed by alate, fierce critic of Eustratios’s thought. When, in the summer of 1117,Niketas, Metropolitan of Herakleia, wrote a discourse that demandedthe removal of Eustratios from his episcopal see, he chose to link theSyllogistic Demonstration text to Eustratios’s discourse addressed to theArmenians, which had been written in 1114.28 Read together, Niketasargued that these texts betrayed an incautious application of philosoph-ical technique to a theological problem. The relevant passage reads:

We find that the vow taken by the metropolitan of Nicaea, where hestates that: “I have been suspected of professing a bad doctrine that Ihave never borne in mind, as God knows, and that I do not now bearin mind.” was for the pleasure of those listening, for he has clearly hadthese things in mind many times before. For in his discourse concerningicons he considers that the assumed should not be adored. At the startof this discourse he demonstrates that when one is a creature one cannotbe adored, and so he divides the one Christ into the adored and thenon-adored, the worshipped and the non-worshipped, while at the endof the discourse he introduces a rational distinction for the assumed,and considering on its own terms that which has never existed withoutthe Logos that has assumed it, he excludes this [the assumed] fromthe adoration and worship which is rendered to the heavenly powersthemselves. Having also applied this rational distinction for the assumedin the two discourses for which he is being criticized [the Armeniantexts], he has fallen into the abyss of a contrary doctrine. It follows

27 Dialogue 154–155.28 The Armenian discourse can be found at Refutation 160–198.


therefore that one cannot say that he has repented these errors, ratherone is indeed suspicious regarding his approach.

Mτι ε=ρ�σκ�μεν τNν )5�μ�λ.γησιν ]ν � Νικα�ας )π�ι�σατ�, λ"γων Mτι> 3Υπ�-πτ�ς )γεν.μην )π' δ.5Cη �;κ &γα CL Rν �;δ"π�τε )�ρ.νησα, Iς � Θε�ς �X-δεν, �;δ? ν+ν �ρ�ν�, )π’ )5απ�τCη τ�ν &κ�υ.ντων γεν�μ"νην> �ανερ�ςγ*ρ κα' πρ� π�λλ�+ τ* α;τ* )�ρ.νει. Κα' γ*ρ )ν τD� περ' ε#κ.νων λ.-γDω α;τ�+ τ� πρ.σλημμα �Xδεν &λ�τρευτ�ν, )ν &ρ�CL μ?ν τ�+ λ.γ�υ α#τ�αντ�+ &λ�τρευτ�ν εXναι &π��αιν.μεν�ς τ� εXναι κτιστ.ν, και τ�ν Vνα vριστ�νε#ς λατρευτ�ν κα' &λ�τρευτ�ν, πρ�σκυνητ�ν κα' &πρ�σκ�νητ�ν, Aντικρυςδιαιρ�ν, )ν δ? τD� τ"λει τ�+ λ.γ�υ τCL )πιν��Pα δια�ρεσιν πρ�σ�γων τ�+ πρ�σ-λ�μματ�ς, κα' τ� μηδ"π�τε κα ’ /αυτ� =π�ρ5αν �ωρ'ς τ�+ πρ�σλα2.ντ�ςΛ.γ�υ κα ’ /αυτ� εωρ�ν κα' τLς λατρε�ας κα' πρ�σκυν�σεως, ]ν κα'=π’ α;τ�ν τ�ν �;ραν�ων πρ�σκυνε,ται δυν�μεων, τ�+τ� &π�στερ�ν. Τα�-τCη δ? τCL δι’ )πιν��ας τ�+ πρ�σλ�μματ�ς διαιρ"σει κα' )ν τ�,ς δυσ' λ.γ�ις�Oς &πε2�λετ� �ρησ�μεν�ς, ε#ς τ� τLς &λλ�κ.τ�υ δ.5ης )μπ"πτωκε 2�ρα- ρ�ν. Λ�ιπ�ν �6ν τ�ν &πατ�ντα �;κ Aν τις εJπCη μεταν��+ντα, @π�πτ�ν δ?μ λλ�ν κα' περ' α;τNν τNν πρ�σ"λευσιν.29

Niketas here criticizes Eustratios for applying logical distinctions to the-ological problems. In particular, he objects to Eustratios’s constructionof his argument from the premise that one can separate the adopted(Christ’s human nature) from the Logos that has adopted this nature inthe person of Christ. For Niketas, the distinctions drawn by this mannerof thinking were problematic because they appeared to betray Eustra-tios’s continued adherence to the thought of John Italos, Eustratios’steacher, who in 1082 was condemned for his own application of philo-sophical premises to theological matters. Consequently, we can see thatEustratios is condemned in regard to the question of the icons for fail-ing to live up to the vow he had taken to distance himself from histeacher’s method.

Given that the primary complaint against Eustratios was definedby his Armenian discourse, the additional reference to the Syllogistic

Demonstration might at first glance appear superfluous. I would, however,like to suggest that this reference served a purpose that went beyondsimply establishing a heretical genealogy for the Armenian text. Italso introduced the question of the icon into Niketas’s description ofEustratios’s orthodoxy. This was a significant gesture in eleventh- andtwelfth-century Byzantium, as one’s understanding of icons was animportant means of evaluating the orthodoxy of one’s thinking. This

29 Darrouzès (1966) 302.23–304.3. The reference to the discourse on icons appearsto cite discussions at Syllogistic Demonstration 152 and 159.

142 charles barber

function for the work of art was annually rehearsed in the Feast ofOrthodoxy, which at this period was beginning to expand around thecore question of the image, and is also attested in the trials of Symeonthe New Theologian and John Italos, as well as the professions of faithby Michael Psellos and John Italos. In each instance the icon played asignificant role as a means of defining or testing the orthodoxy of thefigure on trial.30

This function for the icon was a legacy of the iconoclastic era,whose theologians—primarily Theodore of Stoudios and Nikephorosof Constantinople—had established the centrality of the icon for thedefinition of orthodoxy, thus implicitly elevating the icon to the levelof theology. This status was confirmed by the seventh canon of theConstantinopolitan council of 869–870, which had declared:

Setting up holy and venerable icons and teaching the similar disciplinesof divine and human wisdom are very beneficial. It is not good if this isdone by those who are not worthy. For this reason no one is to paint theholy churches who has been anathematized by what has been decreed,nor to teach in a similar place, until they have turned back from theirdeceit. Therefore, if anyone after our declaration were to allow these inwhatever manner to paint holy icons in the church or to teach, if he isa cleric he will endanger his rank, if he is a layman he will be banishedand deprived of the divine mysteries.

Τ� τ*ς Gγ�ας κα' σεπτ*ς ε#κ.νας &ναστηλ�+ν κα' τ�0ς πλησ��ν διδ�σκειντ* μα �ματα τLς ε�ας τε κα' &ν ρωπ�νης σ��ας, λ�αν \νησι�.ρ�ν> �;καλ�ν δ? τ�+τ� μN παρ* τ�ν &5�ων γ�νεσ αι> τ��τ�υ ��ριν μηδαμ�ς ε#κ�-ν�υργε,ν )ν τ�,ς $ερ�,ς να�,ς τ�0ς &να εματισ "ντας εσπ��μεν, μ�τε μNν)ν �$Dωδ�π�τε τ.πDω διδ�σκειν, μ"�ρις Zν )πιστρα��σιν )κ τLς #δ�ας &π�της.ΕJ τις �!ν μετ* τ�+τ�ν �μ�ν τ�ν Mρ�ν πρ�ς �ωγρα�ικNν Gγ�ων ε#κ.νων )ν)κκλησ�Pα R διδασκαλικNν α;τ�0ς �πωσ�+ν παραδ"5�ιτ� πρ 5ιν, ε# μ?ν κλη-ρικ.ς )στιν, ε#ς τ�ν Jδι�ν κινδυνευ"τω 2α μ.ν, ε# δ? λαϊκ.ς, &��ρι�"σ ω,κα' στερε�σ ω τ�ν ε�ων μυστηρ�ων.31

Here, painting, theology and philosophy are placed on the same planeand are subject to the same policing. It is this legacy that Eustratiossought to dismantle when he followed Aristotle in distinguishing wis-dom in the arts from wisdom proper. For, while wisdom proper encom-passed “substances and the things in themselves,” the wisdom of thearts only addressed the accidental qualities of such a thing. This distinc-tion leads Eustratios to distinguish theology, the highest manifestation

30 This thread can be found throughout Barber (2007).31 Conciliorum Oecumenicorum Decreta 148.


of wisdom proper, from what is now a different and secondary wisdom,namely that of the arts. In so doing, it can be suggested that by link-ing and then distinguishing artistic and theological wisdom in his Ethics

commentary, Eustratios was attempting to escape from the problemsthat had arisen throughout the eleventh century and now in his owncareer from the use of the icon as a litmus test of orthodoxy.

THE ANONYMOUSCOMMENTARY ON NICOMACHEAN ETHICS VII:

LANGUAGE, STYLE AND IMPLICATIONS

Elizabeth A. Fisher

The anonymous commentator on NE VII has gained a tripartite rep-utation for incompetence among the scholars of the past two cen-turies who have examined his work. Their verdict is unanimous: heis incompetent in managing the morphology and vocabulary of Greek,incompetent in mustering adequate Greek style to express himself, andincompetent in understanding and explicating philosophical ideas. As aphilologist by training and inclination, I cannot discuss Anonymous asa philosopher, but his capabilities as a writer of Greek and some pecu-liarities of his interests as a commentator seem to be worthy of furtherexamination. My observations on this topic at the Notre Dame work-shop also elicited some very interesting observations from the otherworkshop participants on the similarity of Anonymous’ commentaryto the work of other known Aristotelian commentators as well as onthe possible identity of our elusive subject. Accordingly, I shall treat notonly Anonymous’ language and style but also the implications of thosetopics for contextualizing his commentary.

Whatever his own limitations, Anonymous travels in the company ofrespectable commentators whose treatments of individual books of theNicomachean Ethics were assembled by Eustratios and Michael of Eph-esus at the instigation of Anna Komnene.1 These early twelfth-centuryscholars selected existing commentaries on some books and suppliedtheir own commentaries to Books I and VI (Eustratios) and to Books V,IX and X (Michael).2 Did Michael and Eustratios invite Anonymousand his commentary on Book VII into their select circle, or did hiswork intrude into the collection without their endorsement later in itstextual history? The question is open, since the first evidence of thiscollection as it now survives dates from the mid-13th century, whenRobert Grosseteste, bishop of Lincoln, translated into Latin these com-

1 Browning (1990) 399.2 Mercken (1990) 407–441.

146 elizabeth a. fisher

mentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics.3 The surviving Greek manuscriptsthat contain the Anonymous Commentary on Book Seven all postdateGrosseteste’s translation.4

In the opinion of H.P.F. Mercken, editor of Grosseteste’s translation,Anonymous is so incompetent that Michael and Eustratios could notpossibly have approved his commentary on Book VII for inclusion intheir collection; Anonymous must be an intruder who arrived late.5

Inferior to the other commentators in matters both of style and ofsubstance, Anonymous is now considered an egregious interloper intheir company.

In 1816 F. Schleiermacher distinguished Anonymous from the othercommentators on the Nicomachean Ethics by labeling his work not somuch scholia as exegesis; Schleiermacher then lodged a series of com-plaints against Anonymous:6

1. His understanding of familiar philosophical concepts is flawed(e.g., σ��ιστικ�ς λ.γ�ς ψευδ.μεν�ς Anon. 414.21–28)

2. His remarks are tasteless (“abgeschmakkter”), e.g., regarding thechild-eating monster Lamia (Anon. 427.38–40)

3. His Greek syntax is faulty, for he always (“immer”) uses a neuterplural subject with a plural verb

4. His vocabulary is corrupted by the Latinism κ�ρ2ωνας for Aν ρα-κας (Anon. 428.13 and 29)

Schleiermacher characterized Anonymous’ commentary as “exceedingeverything in its poverty” (“an Dürftigkeit alles übertreffend”) and con-cluded that it is a “shoddy effort” (“Machwerk”). Concerning the iden-tity of Anonymous, Schleiermacher speculated that he was a physician,because he frequently incorporates examples from medicine into hiscommentary.

H.P.F. Mercken not only took up Schleiermacher’s complaintsagainst Anonymous but also further multiplied and interpreted them.After reiterating the poverty of the commentary on Book VII and thecommentator’s inadequacy as a philosopher, lack of good taste and

3 Rose (1871) 65–66.4 Heylbut (1892) lists three manuscripts of the fourteenth century, five of the fif-

teenth, one of the late fifteenth or early sixteenth century, two of the sixteenth century,and one of the seventeenth century; the Aldine Edition dates from 1536. All citations ofAnonymous’ text are to the Heylbut edition.

5 Mercken (1991) *26.6 Schleiermacher (1838) 309–326.

the anonymous commentary on nicomachean ethics vii 147

lapses in elementary aspects of classical Greek such as his combinationof plural verbs with neuter plural subjects and use of the Latin calque

κ�ρ2ωνας, he conceded that sixth-century authors do combine pluralverbs with neuter plural subjects but declared the usage unclassical andforeign to the practice of Michael and Eustratios in their commentarieson the Ethics.7 Mercken added to the list of stylistic lapses committed byAnonymous his use of a present form built on the aorist �αγε,ν and hisrelentless repetition of Qτ�ι in explanations in his commentary. Repeat-ing Schleiermacher’s suggestion that Anonymous was a physician, Mer-cken dated his activity before Grosseteste’s mid-13th century translationof the Ethics commentaries but after the work of Michael and Eustra-tios.8

Leaving aside the issue of his abilities (or lack thereof) as a philoso-pher, let us examine in detail the aspects of Anonymous’ language andstyle that have so offended Schleiermacher and Mercken. First, regard-ing their charge that Anonymous is tasteless in commenting upon thechild-eating monster mentioned by Aristotle, we may compare the orig-inal passage from Aristotle with Anonymous’ comment upon it. WhenAristotle says “I mean monsters, like the female who they say rippedopen pregnant women and ate their children,”9 Anonymous makesAristotle’s general statement about “monsters” more precise by notingthat such behavior characterized the Lamia: “[Eating children] seemedsweet to the Lamia. The Lamia was a woman in the Pontus regionwho, because she had killed her own children, devoured the infants ofother women.”10 Anonymous’ brief remarks on the Lamia are standardin the folktale tradition surrounding her except for his observation thatthe Lamia was native to Pontus. This information is unique to Anony-mous,11 who is apparently attempting to integrate the Lamia with thesavage and cannibalistic tribes περ' τ�ν Π.ντ�ν mentioned immediatelyafter her by Aristotle (1148b22–24) and further specified by Anony-mous as �$ . . . Σκ� αι περ' Π.ντ�ν (428.1). Although his remarks onthe Lamia might suggest that Anonymous displays shoddy scholarship

7 Mercken (1990) 437–438.8 Mercken (1990) 408–409.9 λ"γω δ? τ*ς ηρι7δεις, �O�ν τNν Aν ρωπ�ν ]ν λ"γ�υσι τ*ς κυ��σας &νασ��υσαν

τ* παιδ�α κατεσ �ειν (EN 1148b20–22).10 )δ.κει δ? τCL Λαμ�Pα �δ�. � Λαμ�α γυν� τις <ν περ' τ�ν Π.ντ�ν, sτις δι.τι &π7λετ� τ*

�#κε,α τ"κνα, τ* τ�ν Aλλων γυναικ�ν 2ρ"�η Qσ ιεν (427.38–39).11 The online Thesaurus Linguae Graecae (hereafter, TLG) cites only Anonymous for the

combination of Lamia with Pontus.


or a pedantic disposition, on this topic he is no more “tasteless” thanAristotle himself.

If the remarks of Anonymous are not incongruous with Aristotle’soriginal text in the matter of taste, does his practice regarding neuterplural subjects with plural verbs indicate that his Greek falls short ofthe classical standard? According to Herbert Weir Smyth, no; a sin-gular verb is regular with a neuter plural subject in Attic Greek, butthe plural verb does occur in Homer, Thucydides and Xenophon.12

Moreover, Anonymous does not, as Schleiermacher claimed, “always”(“immer”) employ the less regular usage. A sampling of Anonymous’neuter plural subjects using the TLG isolates this example of the reg-ular and less regular Attic usages in one sentence: τ* ηρ�α δι* τ�+τ��; λ"γεται &κρατL, δι.τι �;κ F��υσι τNν κα .λ�υ =π.ληψιν (422.2–3).13

Similarly, Anonymous uses singular and plural verbs in equal propor-tion with neuter plural subjects within the space of 21 lines on p. 433(lines 3–23). Some passages, on the other hand, demonstrate Anony-mous’ fixation on one usage or the other. Neuter subjects occur withsingular verbs three times within four lines on p. 419 (lines 2–5) andwith plural verbs five times within nine lines on p. 425 (lines 28–36).Anonymous may be following the preference of his source closely inthese latter instances; however, the examples of regular and less regularusage in close proximity suggest to me that Anonymous was indifferentto this matter. In his dialect and to his native speaker’s ear, both usageswere acceptable.

Pace Schleiermacher and Mercken, both Eustratios and Michael ofEphesus demonstrate a similarly casual attitude regarding this point.Checking the incidence of singular and plural verbs with neuter plu-ral subjects in the TLG turns up instances of both usages in Michael’scommentary,14 even in the same sentence on p. 502 lines 19–20: ε#σ' δ?τ* λ�ιπ* π�ντα &π� τ�ν παρ�ιμι�ν δηλ��μενα, T μετ’ \λ�γ�ν {η �σεται.Eustratios also wavers between neuter plural subjects with either sin-gular or plural verbs;15 an example of each appears juxtaposed on p. 9lines 13n–14n: |Ων δ’ ε#σ' τ"λη τιν* παρ* τ*ς πρ�5εις, )ν τ��τ�ις 2ελτ�ωπ"�υκε τ�ν )νεργει�ν τ* Fργα and on p. 21 lines 24–25: )πε' γ*ρ �cτε τ*

12 Smyth (1956) §959.13 See also �;δ’ Mλως F��υσι τ* ηρ�α λ.γ�ν &λλ* π�ντα δι"� αρται, 433.23.14 For example, see the plural verbs at 463.17, 473.19, 495.17, 507.19, and 512.7; a

singular verb occurs at 464.10.15 For example, see the plural verbs at 8.27n, 12.9, 19.20, 49.35, 66.1, and 67.32;

singular verbs at 7.27, 10.28, 13.1.


Hντα �cτε τ* γιν.μενα )5 &ν�γκη ε#σ'ν R γ�νεται π�ντα. Regarding thispoint of grammatical usage, Anonymous’ modern critics prove to bemuch more rigorous that two notable early twelfth-century commenta-tors on Aristotle. Perhaps their lapses are not as frequent as those ofAnonymous, but they are nonetheless evident.

Anna Komnene herself demonstrates twelfth-century stylistic prac-tices consistent with the usage of Anonymous. In a list of Anna’s devi-ations from the rules of classical Greek grammar, Georgina Bucklernotes the frequent occurrence of neuter plural subjects with pluralverbs in Anna’s prose.16 Further, both Anna and Anonymous share apenchant for sometimes choosing Latin words when “native” Greekwords exist. In Anna’s Alexiad we find �.ρ�ν (“forum” replacing &γ�ρ�),π.ρτα (“gate” instead of π�λη), κλε�σ�υρα (“gorge” or “pass” from Latinclausura for ε#σ2�λ�), etc.17 Anna’s choice of Latinisms apparently in con-temporary use over their more dignified and classical Greek synonymsresembles Anonymous’ use of κ�ρ2ωνας instead of Aν ρακας at p. 428line 29 and also in close conjunction with the classical word that he alsoknew (428 lines 12–13: Fτι δ? �δ0 δ�κε, τισι, παρ* ��σιν δ? δ�κε,, τ� )σ �-ειν Aν ρακας. )ν Mσ�ις γ*ρ πλε�ν��ει � μελαγ��λικ�ς �υμ.ς, �δ0 δ�κε,τ� )σ �ειν κ�ρ2ωνας). The root κ�ρ2ων- is not unusual in the vocabu-lary of twelfth-century authors: e.g. κ�ρ2ων�ν (John Phokas), καρ27νι�ν(Typikon of the Pantokrator), nor unprecedented in the tenth century.Constantine Porphyrogennetos uses καρ2.νι�ν in De cerimoniis.18 Theseauthors write to instruct and to inform their readers rather than to daz-zle them with rhetorically sophisticated vocabulary and constructionsimitated from classical Greek. Robert Browning has discussed the lin-guistic register they adopt as coexisting with the formal and artificialstyle affected by “Atticising” authors and quotes Constantine Porphyro-gennetos’ justification for using it: “So that what I write may be clearand easy to distinguish, I have employed a conversational and simplestyle, using the same words, and the appellations long attached to eachobject and uttered in regards to it.”19 Browning terms the stylistic reg-ister they employ “technical Koine,” typified by a toleration of vocab-ulary drawn from contemporary speech, simplified sentence structure,

16 Buckler (1929) 483, n. 7.17 Buckler (1929) 487.18 Lexikon zur byzantinischen Gräzität, s. v.19 Browning (1978) 103–104; translation of Constantine Porphyrogennetos De caeri-

moniis 5.2.4, by Robert Browning.


and a relaxed attitude towards the syntax and morphology of classicalGreek.20 Commentators on law, medicine, rhetoric and literature typ-ically settled into this register as the most appropriate and useful forinstruction and explanation; in the twelfth century, Eustathios of Thes-salonike used both an Atticising style in making rhetorically dazzlingspeeches and technical Koine in explicating Homer. When placed inthis stylistic environment, Anonymous’ indifference to the niceties of averb’s number with neuter plurals, his use of the Latinism κ�ρ2ωνας,his toleration for the unclassical form �αγε, (a present form generatedfrom the aorist of )σ �ω), and his unsophisticated style marked by therepetition of Qτ�ι may be seen as practical in terms of the needs of hiscontemporary audience, even if not acceptable to Schleiermacher andMercken.

Karl Praechter sketches a situation in which a commentator likeAnonymous might present his exegesis of a text that he first read outto students listening to his lecture.21 In the context of a lecture hallor classroom, Anonymous’ use of �αγε, may provide a useful exam-ple of his strategy to engage his audience. Commenting upon Aristo-tle’s views on bodily pleasures, Anonymous observes, “For if someoneis hungry and gobbles and feeds, pleasure then follows for him.”22 Inswitching between the colloquial Koine word �αγε, and the Atticising��ρτ��ει,23 Anonymous accomplishes a juxtaposition of linguistic regis-ters that could be interpreted as a sort of humorous device intended toengage and divert his students; I have tried to replicate this effect bycontrasting the register represented by “gobbles” with the more formalone reflected in “feeds.”

In the context of such a classroom environment, Anonymous’ habitof accumulating explanations with the repetitive and unimaginativeconjunction Qτ�ι does have some purpose. His audience, eager forinstruction and grateful for explication of each concept he introduced,might find repeated illustrations marked by the familiar Qτ�ι welcomeas the modern reader/ philosopher does not. Anonymous’ relianceupon this pedagogical strategem is easy to cite but too frequent todocument in full. Two examples will illustrate Anonymous’ practice.

20 Browning (1978) 107–108; for the twelfth century, see 119–123.21 Praechter (1990) 40–44.22 ε# γ�ρ τις πεινP κα' �αγε, κα' ��ρτ��ει, τ.τε Vπεται α;τD� �δ�ν� (448.16).23 ��γει occurs in Chrysostom, Theophilos, Aesop and Georgios Monachos; ��ρτ�-

�ει occurs in Aelian, Hesiod, Eubolos and the Septuagint.


On page 408 eight instances of Qτ�ι occur within ten lines of text (12–21), and on page 410 eleven instances occur within eighteen lines (17–36). To gauge the effect of this prominent aspect of Anonymous’ styleas a commentator, let us examine Aristotle’s text at the opening of NE

VII (1145a15–20) with Anonymous’ commentary following it:

Μετ* δ? τα+τα λεκτ"�ν, Aλλην π�ιησαμ"ν�υς &ρ��ν, Mτι τ�ν περ' τ* Q η�ευκτ�ν τρ�α )στ'ν εJδη, κακ�α &κρασ�α ηρι.της. τ* δ’ )ναντ�α τ�,ς μ?νδυσ' δLλα> τ� μ?ν γ*ρ &ρετNν τ� δ’ )γκρ�τειαν καλ�+μεν> πρ�ς δ? τNν ηρι.τητα μ�λιστ’ Zν Gρμ.ττ�ι λ"γειν τNν =π?ρ �μ ς &ρετ�ν, �ρωικ�ν τινακα' ε�αν

Anonymous resorts repeatedly to Qτ�ι as he comments upon this pas-sage:

3fτι τ�ν �ευκτ�ν, �τ�ι τ�ν κακι�ν τ�ν περ' τ* Q η �τ�ι τ�ν εωρ�υμ"νων)ν τα,ς p ικα,ς &ρετα,ς, τρ�α ε#σ'ν εJδη κακι�ν. � γ*ρ κακ�α &ντ�κειταιπ�σαις τα,ς p ικα,ς &ρετα,ς. � γ*ρ δειλ�α κα' � ρασ�της κα' � &κ�λασ�α,CU κακ�αι, &ντ�κεινται τα,ς p ικα,ς &ρετα,ς Iς κακ�αι. τ, δ0 �ναντ�α, �τ�ι&π� τ�ν τρι�ν �τ�ι α$ δ’ &ρετα�, α% ε#σιν )ναντ�αι τ�,ς δυσ�, τCL τε κακ�Pακα' τCL &κρασ�Pα, �ανερα� ε#σι. τ� μ?ν γ�ρ, �τ�ι τ� )ναντ��ν τCL κακ�Pα,καλ�+μεν &ρετ�ν (� γ*ρ κακ�α &ντ�κειται τCL p ικCL &ρετCL), τ� δ", �τ�ι τ�)ναντ��ν τCL &κρασ�Pα, καλ�+μεν )γκρ�τειαν. πρ)ς δ0 τ7ν 'ηρι�τητα, �τ�ιτCL δ? ηρι.τητι, μ�λιστα Gρμ.�ει ε#πε,ν &ντι κε,σ αι τNν =π?ρ �μ ς &ρετ�ν,�τ�ι τNν �ρωϊκNν κα' ε�αν. (p. 408. 12–21)

Although Michael and Eustratios occasionally use Anonymous’ belovedconjunction, their commentaries on the NE do not present the densethickets of Qτ�ι typical of Anonymous’ style.24 A desire to be at oncecomprehensive, organized and precise typifies this commentary andalso the derivative eleventh-century rhetorical commentaries of JohnSikeliotes and John Doxopatres.25 As we shall soon see, other commen-tators punctuated their explications with Q or with Qγ�υν as persistentlyas Anonymous resorted to Qτ�ι.

Does Anonymous’ commentary reveal that he was a physician aswell as a pedagogue? Citing his frequent references to medical matters,Schleiermacher and Mercken believed that he was. Among such refer-ences is his hapax legomenon λι ,τιν, which he identifies as νε�ρ,τιν (kidneydisease): τ�,ς F��υσι λι ,τιν ν.σ�ν R νε�ρ,τιν (423.25). Here Anonymous

24 Eustratios uses pairs of Qτ�ι at p. 18.40–41, p. 101.22–23, p. 119.5–6, p. 119.16–17 and p. 352.27–28; he uses Qτ�ι alone at p. 366. 29. Michael uses pairs of Qτ�ι atp. 480.19–20, 571.2–3, 583.35, and 614.35–615.1.

25 Browning (1975) 9.


demonstrates the same enthusiasm for medical synonyms that we haveseen in the case of his Latinized reference to κ�ρ2ωνας (428.12–13) usedin conjunction with &ν ρ�κας, the classical word occurring in Aris-totle’s text: \ν��ων τρ75εις, Fτι δ’ &ν ρ�κων κα' γLς (1148b28). Anony-mous’ reference to charcoal eating rewards examination in the fullercontext of his remarks, where he explains the phenomenon accord-ing to the theory of humors, central to post-Galenic medical think-ing.26 Paraphrasing Aristotle, Anonymous states, “It is seemingly plea-surable to some, although contrary to nature, to eat charcoal. For inpersons with an excess of melancholic humor, it is seemingly pleasur-able to eat charcoal. In others, however, for whom the acidic humorpredominates, it is seemingly pleasurable to eat earth or clay. Fromsome symptom, then, either of the melancholic or acidic humor, this(condition) results.”27 The theory of humors is by no means obscuremedical knowledge restricted to practicing physicians; it survives stillin such expressions as “bilious temperament” and “sanguine disposi-tion.” Robert Todd observes that medical references are in fact com-mon in the medieval commentaries to Aristotle and that John Philo-ponus, the sixth-century commentator on Aristotle’s De anima, left us“the best extant example of Greek philosophical commentary employ-ing medical ideas” but was neither a physician nor a philosopher byprofession but rather a grammatikos.28 Since the commentators generallyrelied heavily upon the works of their predecessors,29 a philosopher ofAnonymous’ modest attainments should not be described as a physiciansimply on the basis of his desire to display general medical knowledgein his commentary.

Whatever his status vis-à-vis the medical profession and his deficien-cies as a philosopher and stylist, Anonymous is at times a resource-ful and colorful source of unusual and memorable literary tidbits. Hisrather eccentric remarks regarding the child-devouring Lamia at page427 lines 38–39 have already been noted. Aristotle’s introductory re-marks on the “bestial man” (1145a30) prompt Anonymous to remark,“Such a one was Echetos” (�O�ν <ν � iΕ�ετ�ς 409.32), reminding his

26 Sarton (1952) 338–339.27 Fτι δ? �δ0 δ�κε, τισι, παρ* ��σιν δ? δ�κε,, τ� )σ �ειν Aν ρακας. )ν Mσ�ις γ*ρ

πλε�ν��ει � μελαγ��λικ�ς �υμ.ς, �δ0 δ�κε, τ� )σ �ειν κ�ρ2ωνας. Aλλ�ις δ? �δ0 δ�κε,τ� )σ �ειν γLν, Qτ�ι πηλ.ν, Mσ�ις \57δης �υμ�ς Fγκειται. &π. τιν�ς �6ν συμπτ7ματ�ς Rμελαγ��λικ�+ �υμ�+ R \57δ�υς τ�+τ� α;τ�,ς )πιγ�νεται. (428.11–16).

28 Todd (1984) 103–105.29 Todd (1995).


audience of Homer’s cruel tyrant, notorious mutilator of men (Odyssey

18.85–87, 116; 21.308). When Aristotle cites Niobe and Satyros as exam-ples of excessive devotion between parents and children (1148a35–1148b2), Anonymous supplies the full stories justifying Aristotle’s allu-sion (426.16–29), not only fulfilling the role expected of a commentatorbut also exceeding it; to the well-known narrative of Niobe’s insult toLeto, mother of Apollo and Artemis, he adds information particular toHomer, namely that Niobe had six sons and six daughters (Iliad 24.602–604). By adding Homeric allusions to Echetos and to Niobe’s children,Anonymous reveals his own literary interests and his conviction that areference to Homer is always useful to engage and to inform an audi-ence. He could be sure that his audience would recognize and appreci-ate allusions to Homer, for he observes that the Iliad provided the basisfor education in his time. Responding to Aristotle’s comment that stu-dents at an elementary level of instruction parrot words without under-standing their real meaning, (�$ πρ�τ�ν μα .ντες συνε�ρ�υσι μ?ν τ�0ςλ.γ�υς, Jσασι δ’ �cπω> 1147a22), Anonymous specifically cites the firstfew words of the Iliad: “Similarly, contemporary children who are firstbeginning to learn also parrot and say, ‘Sing, Muse, the wrath’ althoughthey do not know nor understand what they are saying” (�μ��ως δ? κα'�$ πα,δες �$ ν+ν πρ�τ�ν &ρ5�μεν�ι μαν �νειν συνε�ρ�υσι μ?ν κα' λ"γ�υσι“μLνιν Aειδε ε�”, �cπω δ? Jσασι κα' ν��+σι τ� λ"γ�υσι 420.27–29). Here,Anonymous sounds like a grammatikos all too familiar with the frustra-tions of teaching students who grasp only superficially the texts theirteacher knows intimately and values profoundly.

Perhaps it is too generous to attribute details of the commentary todeep-seated humanistic convictions on the part of Anonymous, sincehe is persistently eager to supply literary context for mundane aspectsof Aristotle’s text. To illustrate the affection of an unrestrained per-son (&κρατ�ς, cf. 434.19) for debilitating luxuries mentioned by Aristotleas inducing “softness” (� μαλακ.ς) at 1150a9–14, Anonymous specifiesPramnian wine (λυπε,ται � μαλακ.ς, �O�ν ε# )πι υμε, �Xν�ν Πρ�μνι�νπιε,ν 434.30 and 32),30 apparently anticipating Aristotle’s characteriza-tion two pages later of the unrestrained person (� &κρατ�ς) as one whogets drunk quickly and easily (� &κρατ�ς )στι τ�,ς τα�0 με υσκ�μ"ν�ιςκα' =π’ \λ�γ�υ �Jν�υ κα' )λ�ττ�ν�ς R Iς �$ π�λλ�� 1151a5–6). AlthoughAnonymous may be an incompetent philosopher, at least he has read

30 Perhaps an allusion to Homer; cf. Iliad 11 line 639 and Odyssey 10 line 235.


and remembered Aristotle’s text. He also appreciates wines other thanPramnian. When the master mentions in general terms “restorativepleasures” (�α�ρ�υσιν &ναπληρ�υμ"νης τε τLς ��σεως 1153a2–8), Anony-mous cites wine drinking among such pleasures and specifies Chianwine (τD� πιε,ν �Xν�ν vι7την 449.9–10).

Anonymous may at times be suspected of simply indulging his pen-chant for making Aristotle’s text more elaborate and more precise indetail. When Aristotle cites lines from the sixth-century bce elegiac poetDemodocus remarking upon the foolish Milesians (1151a8–10), Anony-mous not only follows tradition in identifying Demodocus as a Mile-sian but also adds the detail that he was born on the island of Leros(� Δημ.δ�κ�ς Μιλ�σι�ς Λ"ρι�ς <ν τ� γ"ν�ς 439.15–16). Anonymous andDiogenes Laertius (I. 84) are the only extant sources for this last tidbitof information.31

In this highly selective discussion of Anonymous’ literary interests,I have reserved to the end a particularly tantalizing instance eitherof his scholarly industry and resourcefulness or of his willingness topresent pseudo facts without any basis in sources. Aristotle refers toan unnamed monster who offered up for sacrifice and then devouredhis own mother (Eσπερ � τNν μητ"ρα κα ιερε�σας κα' �αγ7ν 1148b26);Anonymous confidently identifies this depraved person as Xerxes, kingof the Persians (� }"ρ5ης � τ�ν Περσ�ν 2ασιλε0ς μανε'ς F�αγε τNν /αυ-τ�+ μητ"ρα κρε�υργ�σας 428.10–11). I can find no other source for thisastonishing revelation, although a second anonymous commentator onthe Nicomachean Ethics repeats it in the fourteenth century, apparently onthe authority of Anonymous or perhaps relying upon an unidentifiedsource they both share.32

At this point it may be helpful to summarize a philologist’s sketch ofAnonymous based on characteristics of his commentary.

1. His Greek vocabulary and syntax are neither inappropriate norwithout precedent for a Middle Byzantine writer using the “tech-nical Koine” register of the language.

2. His writing style reflects the needs of students in a lecture environ-ment.

3. His citations of medical information in his commentary indicatethat he is conversant with the tradition of Aristotelian commen-

31 Cf. Greek Elegiac Poetry from the Seventh to the Fifth Centuries bc, 404–407.32 Anecdota Graeca e codd. manuscriptis Bibliotecae Regiae Parisiensis, v. I, 423.


tators but not that he is necessarily a physician by profession; hemay have been a grammatikos.

4. He is well informed about literature and enthusiastic about incor-porating into his commentary allusions to literary sources andidentifications of persons and places drawn from literature.

Might it be possible to identify Anonymous, or at least to situate hisactivities in a particular time and place? Scholars have made someintriguing attempts to do so. In the 1973 Introduction to the first vol-ume of his Grosseteste edition, Mercken tentatively suggested that itwas Anonymous himself who compiled the NE commentaries ratherlate (i.e., shortly before Grosseteste translated them) and who com-pleted the set by supplying a commentary for Book VII where it waslacking.33 In 1990, however, Mercken dropped this suggestion entirelyfrom the revised Introduction printed by Sorabji.34 In the 1991 Intro-duction to the third volume of his edition, Mercken specifically repu-diated his earlier suggestion and remarked further that the incompe-tence of Anonymous disqualified him from any possible associationwith Michael of Ephesus or the circle of Anna Komnene. “Was it per-haps,” he wondered, “not in Byzantium that the last gap in the com-pilation was filled?” (italics mine).35 Mercken’s rhetorical question issomewhat ambiguous, at least to my ear. It is generally assumed thatthe set of commentaries on NE originated in Constantinople; therefore,I take Mercken’s question to imply a different place of origin. SinceRobert Grosseteste, working in Italy, assembled a group of Greek schol-ars to assist him in his Aristotelian studies,36 we might speculate thatAnonymous belonged to this circle. Lacking any supporting evidence,however, a speculation it must remain.

An animated discussion at the Notre Dame Workshop centered onthe possible identity of Anonymous and produced some interestingcandidates. Peter Frankopan observed that Stephanos Skylitzes claimsto have written a commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics that is nowlost. Stephanos mentions this commentary incidentally in his scholia onAristotle’s Rhetoric, noting the succession pattern of Georgian and Celtickings and advising, “Concerning such governmental practices, consult

33 Mercken (1973) *28.34 Mercken (1990) 437–438.35 Mercken (1991) *26–27.36 Mercken (1973) *34–37.


my scholia on the Ethics” (περ' δ? τ�ν τ�ι��των π�λιτει�ν &ν�γνω ι τ* )ντ�,ς 8Η ικ�,ς μ�υ σ�.λια, 277.27–28).37 Could Stephanos Skylitzes be theanonymous commentator on Book VII? In several respects, the littlethat is known of his career and writings fits the profile of Anonymous.

Like Anonymous, Stephanos adopted the “technical Koine” appro-priate for a commentary or collection of scholia. Although he exhibitsno inhibitions in using neuter plural subjects with plural verbs, asin 8Ιστ"�ν κα' )π' τιν�ν πCN μ?ν τ* σημε,α πρ�ηγ�+νται [ν ε#σι σημε,α(266.20),38 he also follows on occasion the classicizing usage combininga singular verb with such subjects (e.g., κατα�ατικ�ς γ*ρ συν�γεται &ε'τ* δι* σημε�ων &π�δεικν�μενα. 266.11–12). Stephanos admits into hisvocabulary words of Latin origin like 8Απριλλ��ς (Aprilis, 272.19), #�υδικι-�λι�ς (iudicialis, 296.32) and κλεισ�+ρα (clausura), which Stephanos labelsa word of the popular dialect (�O�ν τ*ς #διωτικ�ς παρ* π�λλ�,ς λεγ�μ"-νας κλεισ��ρας 269.2–3).39 He also resorts to the tedious repetition of Qin a passage like 267.13–19, where this alternative to Anonymous’ Qτ�ιoccurs twelve times in seven lines:

π�τ? δ? �; λ"γ�νται {ητ�ρικ* &λλ* συμ2�υλευτικ* δικανικ* )πιδει-κτικ* περ' ε#ρ�νης περ' π�λ"μ�υ περ' π.ρων περ' �υλακLς �7ρας ν�μικ�, ε# περ' π�λιτει�ν εXεν κα' ν.μων. ε# �6ν τ* τρ�α τLς {ητ�ρικLς εJδημετιlν κα' συμ2�υλευ.μεν�ς κα' δικανευ.μεν�ς κα' πανηγυρ��ων &π�τ�+ μ λλ�ν )ν τ�,ς τρισ'ν )πι�ειρ�σεις τ�+ Uττ�ν τ�+ δυνατ�+, {ητ�ρικ*τα+τα ε#π? τ* πρ�2λ�ματα>

Careful examination of Stephanos Skylitzes’ commentary on Aristotle’sRhetoric has enabled scholars to date its composition to 1122–1123, whenStephanos was a mere twenty-six years old, and to locate its authorin Constantinople; since his lost commentary on the NE predates hiswork on the Rhetoric, the earlier commentary was a notably precociouseffort.40 Stephanos enjoyed a truly meteoric rise as a scholar, appointedhyperedros, then proedros at the St. Paul school directly upon completinghis own education there and revealing in his commentary great enthu-siasm for the logical writings of Aristotle and a remarkable breadth ofliterary knowledge.41 O. Schissel, for example, cites Stephanos’ refer-

37 Rabe (1896). All citations of Stephanos’ text are to this edition.38 E.g., 264.18–19, 271.16 and 272.11.39 Buckler (1929) 487, notes that κλε�σ�υρα (“important mountain pass with a fortress

and garrison”) occurs four times.40 I have derived my summary of Stephen’s career from Wolska-Conus (1976) 599–

603.41 Wolska-Conus (1976) 605–606.


ence to the Souda Lexicon (285.18) and to an unidentified lexicon toHomer (306.8–9), as well as his affection for obscure mythological datasuch as the details he provides on the career of Meleager (276.25 and295.22, drawn from Apollodoros’ Bibliotheka).42 Nevertheless, he was nota particularly talented or original philosopher. Wolska-Conus remarksthat “the composition, language and inspiration of his scholia breathemediocrity.”43 He moved, however, in an elevated social circle. Namedmetropolitan of Trebizond at the age of thirty, Stephanos soon returnedto Constantinople mortally ill and died; his student Theodore Prodro-mos delivered a monody for his teacher and friend.

Chronologically and socially, the career of Stephanos Skylitzes fitsthe circle of scholars who provided Anna Komnene with a commen-tary on the NE, and in some respects he resembles our mysterious andunidentified Anonymous commentator on NE Book VII. Like Anony-mous, he writes in a technical Koine style with an eye to the needsof students and with a pronounced taste for literature and mythol-ogy; he is familiar with the works of Aristotle, but he is not an out-standing philosopher. That said, some of Stephanos’ characteristics asa commentator are at odds with those of Anonymous. When stringingtogether a series of alternatives, his preferred conjunction is not Qτ�ιbut Q; unlike Anonymous, he includes in his commentary a significantnumber of references to Scripture. The social and intellectual proximityto the circle of Michael of Ephesus and Eustratios that Stephanos evi-dently enjoyed might militate against identifying him with Anonymous.In the view of Mercken, Anonymous’ commentary on Book VII is soegregious in its incompetence that Michael and Eustratios could notpossibly have selected it for inclusion in their collection.44 In the currentstate of our knowledge, we cannot identify the Anonymous commen-tary on NE VII with Stephanos Skylitzes’ lost scholia.

During the discussion of Anonymous and his commentary at theNotre Dame Workshop, Sten Ebbesen proposed an additional directionfor inquiry regarding his identity. Ebbesen observed that Leo Magenti-nos, bishop of Mytilene, supplied a popular commentary on Aristotle’sSophistici Elenchi that was frequently used by later medieval commenta-tors despite its rather mediocre content and inelegant style. Althoughlittle is known of Leo Magentinos’ career, Ebbesen dates his activity to

42 Schissel (1929) col. 2366.43 Wolska-Conus (1976) 602.44 Mercken (1991) *26.


the late twelfth or early thirteenth century.45 Just as Anonymous reliesheavily upon Qτ�ι in his scholia on NE VII, so Leo resorts with annoy-ing frequency to its equivalent Qγ�υν in commenting upon the SE. Anexample comes readily to hand in Leo’s scholion on 174b23, whereQγ�υν occurs five times within six lines of text:

δε, λ�ιπ�ν κα' τ�0ς )ρωτ�ντας �ρ σ αι τ��τDω, �γ�υν τD� διαιρε,ν τ� πρ�-κε�μεν�ν, εJτε )ν�στανται �$ &π�κριν.μεν�ι Iς μN )λεγ� "ντες, εJγε Iδ' μ"ν,�γ�υν )π’ Aλλ�υ σημαιν�μ"ν�υ συμ2α�νει τ�δ�, �γ�υν τ� )λεγ� Lναι κα'&πατη Lναι α;τ��ς, Iδ' δ", �γ�υν )π’ Aλλ�υ σημαιν�μ"ν�υ, μ�, �γ�υν �;συμ2α�νει τ� &πατη Lναι κα' )λεγ� Lναι (Scholion 284 lines 12–17).46

Not surprisingly, Leo Magentinos adopts the “technical Koine” registerin his scholia, generally pairing a neuter plural subject with a pluralverb as in his note on 164a22, )5 [ν π�ντα τ* σ��σματα γ�ν�νται, τ� τεπαρ* τNν λ"5ιν κα' τ* )κτ�ς τLς λ"5εως. τ�να δ? τα+τ� ε#σι μετ* μικρ�νμ� Cης (Scholion 2, lines 6–7, Ebbesen (1981) v. 2, p. 284). His practiceis not consistent, however. In his remarks on 168b31, he uses neuterplural subjects with a plural, then a singular verb in close succession:)πε' &5�ωμ� )στιν Iς τ! τD� α;τD� κα' /ν' "π�ρ#�ντα κα' &λλ�λ�ις ε$σ�τα;τ�, �Jεται � σ��ιστNς )πε' τD� τιν' μ"λιτι =π�ρ�ει κα' τ� μ"λιτι εXναικα' τ� 5αν D�, %σται Aρα τα&τ! τ� μ"λι κα' τ� 5αν �ν κα' πρ�ς Aλληλα&ντιστρ"��ντα. �;κ &λη ?ς δ? Iς τ* τD� α;τD� =π�ρ��ντα κα' &λλ�λ�ιςε#σ' τα;τ�> (Scholion 124, lines 19–25, Ebbesen (1981) v. 2, p. 289).

Any detailed analysis of Leo’s Greek style and personal interests asrevealed by his scholia is complicated by the derivative nature of hiswork. “He was no philosopher of distinction,” Ebbesen remarks, “Hequarried the works of earlier commentators and he did not alwaysunderstand them.”47 It is difficult, therefore, to characterize Leo as acommentator or to compare him in specific terms to Anonymous or toStephanos Skylitzes. I cannot, for example, find any instance of Latinvocabulary in Leo’s scholia; that may be because Leo adhered closely tosources that did not use Latinate words. Literary and cultural referencesin Leo’s commentary represent his interests inasmuch as he chose toinclude rather than avoid them, but such references are rare.

Perhaps we see Leo briefly assume the role of cultural impresarioas he elucidates Aristotle’s text at 167a7. Aristotle states, “ . . . Owingto the similarity of the language, ‘to be something’ appears to differ

45 Ebbesen (1981) v. 1, 303.46 Ebbesen (1981) v. 2, 292. All citations of Leo’s text are to this edition.47 Ebbesen (1981) v. 1, 303.


only a little from ‘to be,’ and ‘not to be something’ from ‘not to be.’In like manner when something is predicated in a certain respect andabsolutely . . .” (i. e., “anyplace and without qualification”)48 (�α�νεταιδ? δι* τ� π�ρεγγυς τLς λ"5εως κα' μικρ�ν δια�"ρειν τ� εXνα� τι τ�+ εXναι,κα' τ� μN εXνα� τι τ�+ μN εXναι. �μ��ως δ? κα' τ� παρ* τ� πCN κα' τ�Gπλ�ς> 167a5–7). Leo Magentinos expands vividly upon this passage:“Thus, if it seems good among the Triballoi to sacrifice their elders,by this very fact and without qualification and in every place is thisconsidered good. Once there was this example of such; all the peoplein the Golden Age were good according to Hesiod,49 but according tohim no person in the Iron Age was good” (τ�υτ"στιν ε# )ν Τρι2αλλ�,ςδ�κε, &γα �ν τ� τ�0ς γ"ρ�ντας �ειν, Qδη κα' Gπλ�ς κα' ε#ς π�ντατ.π�ν &γα �ν τ�+τ� ν�μ��εται. τ�+ δ? π�τ? παρ�δειγμα τ�+τ�> π�ντες�$ )ν τD� �ρυσD� γ"νει Aν ρωπ�ι κατ* τ�ν gΗσ��δ�ν &γα �' <σαν> �;δε'ς δ?Aν ρωπ�ς )ν τD� σιδηρD� γ"νει κατ’ α;τ�ν &γα �ς <ν. Scholion 71, lines 7–12, Ebbesen (1981) v. 2, p. 287). According to the TLG, Leo shares thisparticular combination of arresting examples only with an anonymousscholion, where the similarity is striking: “Both all people are just andno person (is), but not at the same time nor always, but the one sort inthe Golden Age, the other in the Iron (Age). And in some places (it isconsidered) good to sacrifice fathers. For (it is so) among the Triballoi,but without qualification, (it is) not (good)” (κα' π�ντες Aν ρωπ�ι δ�και�ικα' �;δε�ς, �;� Bμα δ? �;δ’ &ε�, &λλ’ �$ μ?ν )π' τ�+ �ρυσ�+ γ"ν�υς, �$ δ?)π' τ�+ σιδηρ�+. κα� π�υ τ� τ�0ς γ�νε,ς �ειν καλ.ν> )ν Τρι2αλλ�,ς γ�ρ,Gπλ�ς δ’ �;. Anonymi in Aristotelis Sophisticos Elenchos paraphrasis, Scholion24, lines 13–15). Did the anonymous scholiast rely upon Leo for thiscombination of examples—or vice versa? Alternatively, did the twocommentators rely upon the same hitherto unidentified source?

Michael of Ephesus (= ps.-Alexander-2)50 also mentions the Goldenand Iron Ages from Hesiod’s myth in his scholion to this passage ofthe SE, but without citing Hesiod by name: “But also (there is) theone who says that every person in the Golden Age was good and noperson in the Iron (Age was) good, then concludes that every man andno man was good” (&λλ* κα' � λ"γων π�ντα Aν ρωπ�ν )π' τ�+ �ρυσ�+γ"ν�υς &γα �ν εXναι κα' �;δ"να Aν ρωπ�ν )π' τ�+ σιδηρ�+ &γα .ν,

48 Forster transl. (1955) 27; explication mine.49 Cf. Op. 106–201.50 Ebbesen identifies ps.-Alexander-2 as the first edition of Michael’s commentary

on the SE; cf. Ebbesen (1981) v. 1, 268.


εXτα συναγαγlν π�ντα Aν ρωπ�ν κα' μηδ"να Aν ρωπ�ν &γα �ν εXναι,lines 30–34, Ebbesen [1981] v. 1, p. 268). Ebbesen identifies Michaelof Ephesus as a source favored by Leo Magentinos;51 Leo may haveadopted his reference to the myth of the Five Ages of Man fromMichael’s commentary, adding Hesiod’s name in the process.

The reference to Triballoi is unusual applied to the SE; I can findno instance in the TLG earlier than Leo’s. Leo’s wording resemblesAristotle’s discussion of Triballoi in the Topics (115b21–25); “In the sameway, also, it is honourable in some places to sacrifice one’s father, forexample amongst the Triballi, but without qualification it is not hon-ourable. (Or is a relativity to persons rather than places indicated here?For it makes no difference where they may be; for, wherever they are,it will be honourable in their eyes because they are Triballi.)”52 (τ�να;τ�ν δ? τρ.π�ν κα' π�0 μ?ν καλ�ν τ�ν πατ"ρα �ειν, �O�ν )ν Τρι2αλ-λ�,ς, Gπλ�ς δ’ �; καλ.ν. R τ�+τ� μ?ν �; π�0 σημα�νει &λλ* τισ�ν> �;-δ?ν γ*ρ δια�"ρει Mπ�υ Zν oσιν> παντα��+ γ*ρ α;τ�,ς Fσται καλ.ν, �6σιΤρι2αλλ�,ς). Since Leo composed commentaries upon all Aristotle’slogical works,53 he may have supplied the reference to the Triballoiindependently, based on his recollection of the passage from the Top-

ics.Does Leo Magentinos’ scholion on SE 167a7 help to redeem his

reputation as a commentator on Aristotle? Can we conclude that he,like Stephanos Skylitzes and the anonymous commentator on NE VII,demonstrates enthusiasm for specifying literary details and displayssome independent knowledge of Aristotle’s writings? The possibilityis open. However, certainty eludes us because the medieval commen-taries on Aristotle’s works are still imperfectly and incompletely known.Wolska-Conus noted thirty years ago that the task of preparing man-uscript inventories of the myriad medieval Aristotle commentaries hadonly just begun.54 Among them may lie Leo’s source for his scholion onSE 167a7, quietly awaiting publication and recognition.

Our investigation of the anonymous commentator on NE VII leadsus to the same impasse. In the present state of scholarship, we can-not identify Anonymous nor even specify the period of his activity. Hiscommentary shares features both with the work of the twelfth-century

51 Ebbesen (1981) v. 1, 306.52 Forster transl. 379.53 Ebbesen (1981) v. 1, 302.54 Wolska-Conus (1976) 604.


commentators in the circle surrounding Anna Komnene, and also withthe scholia of the late twelfth- or early thirteenth-century commentatorLeo Magentinos. Although he may be a mediocre philosopher, Anony-mous remains a master of evasion.55

55 I am grateful to my colleague Professor Denis Sullivan (University of Maryland)for helpful suggestions, valuable citations, and unfailing encouragement as I preparedthis paper; I also wish to thank Börje Bydén for his careful reading and helpfulsuggestions on portions of the argument advanced here.

MICHAEL OF EPHESUS ON THE EMPIRICAL MAN,THE SCIENTIST AND THE EDUCATED MAN

(IN ETHICA NICOMACHEA XAND IN DE PARTIBUS ANIMALIUM I)*

George Arabatzis

I

Michael of Ephesus, when commenting on the last book of Aristotle’sNicomachean Ethics, gives lengthy consideration to the empirical manand to a lesser extent the degree how this figure relates to the worldof education/culture. In my paper, I will not discuss the Aristoteliantext, but will concentrate on the structure and the possible coherenceof Michael’s ideas. To facilitate this reading, I will present a seriesof translations I have made of passages from Michael’s commentary.These will not give the total of Michael’s thinking on this book, butshould offer the reader a good understanding of Michael’s analysis. Thereferences in my text are to the CAG edition of Michael’s commentaries,although the punctuation of the translated passages is often mine.

In his commentary, Michael underlines the traditional Aristotelianposition regarding the importance of experience for the sciences andthe arts, noting that they combine logos and action:

. . .experience contributes greatly to the medical and other arts, whoseobjective is not pure knowledge, but whose work consists of logos andaction. . . (617.12–14)

In a previous passage, Michael says that the problem of experience isrelated to the question of the distinction between the general and theparticular and states that the domain of particular things possesses acertain autonomy in relation to the world of generalities. Among the‘knowers’ of particular things from experience, he not only mentionsdoctors, but also fathers:

* A part of this paper is developing arguments from my book on Michael ofEphesus; see Arabatzis (2006).

164 george arabatzis

he who knows the general will care for the particular; but the one whodoes not know the general, there is nothing preventing him from caringthrough experience about a particular thing and about what is good andwhat is bad for him. Among those who are good for people are thedoctors who know from experience what can save them [their health]and consequently, the father who knows by experience what sports aregood for his son so that he may train him better than a coach.

(614.18–24)

The whole question is finally linked to the condition of the empiri-cal man as knower: the empirical man is distinguished from the lay-man, who can possibly judge what is good and bad, but who lacksthe ‘knowledge proper to the empirical man,’ meaning a dexterityin accomplishing the practicalities of every particular thing in gen-eral:

empirical men [are prudent men and knowers] not only in music but ineverything in general; I call ‘empirical men’ those scientists and artistswho occupy themselves in everything. In everything the empirical manjudges works appropriately, namely by which means and how we accom-plish them. The doctor knows what is health and by which means andhow it is accomplished. The doctor knows what is health and by whichdrugs and which diet it comes along and how to use them; but not thelayman. In the same manner, the painter knows which icon is the bestand where somebody makes an error and in which part [of the image]and it is impossible for inexperienced and unskillful men to conceive andrealize such a work; but it is dear to them [the laymen] to know if thework has been well done or not. Accordingly, those who are not politi-cians cannot legislate but possibly they can judge if the laws are good.

(618.2–12)

The last remark introduces us to the question of the role of laws asmodels of knowledge for the empirical man. This point follows uponMichael’s identification of a contradiction inherent in the nature of law.At first, Michael points to the weakness of law as a generality that maybe surpassed by the reality of action:

law for general issues and actions for particular issues are what is best;as for medicine, we should not always follow the generalities, but thereare things for which general laws are erroneous and say otherwise; so thedoctor does otherwise according to each case; it follows then that neithershould the law command the whole reality. (612.20–25)

In another passage, Michael points to the strength of law which is itspower to compel; this power is not due to violence but to the prudenceand the intelligence of the eldest, that follows upon long experience,and to the legitimacy granted them by the people who are convinced

michael of ephesus on the empirical man 165

that laws are indeed products of prudence and intelligence and thatthey also produce prudence and intelligence:

It is habitual for Aristotle to name intelligence that which is superior byart or prudence or experience or prediction or discovery of the goodand the useful. We need intelligence to become good. But the fatherlyintelligence, meaning someone’s father, possibly will choose the good,unless he is vulgar and of the populace, and will convince healthy mendirected toward the good to act for the good; but for vulgar characters,he [the father] is feeble and set aside and does not have what it is needed,meaning the violence of law; because the natural [fatherly] filter blocksthe violence toward the son. So, what can one say about the father? Oneman cannot wholly command all the sons of a state unless he is a king ora tyrant. These latter can accomplish this task because they have plentyof power. But, for the reason that not all states are under the commandof one king or tyrant, we need laws. Every law has the power to compelbecause it is a discourse that derives from prudence and intelligenceand posits prudence and intelligence. And prudence and intelligenceconcerning actions come after long experience. And he [Aristotle] saidwhen he spoke about prudence that we should accept the sayings of theexperienced and the eldest as Principles. Because they possess an ‘eye’gained from experience; he called the prudence through which they cansee that which will be useful ‘eye.’ So, people obey laws believing that thelegislators made the laws because they were able to perceive in advancethrough their ‘eye’ the good and the useful. (608.27–609.10)

The two passages above go beyond the stated contradiction in the law:that is, that the law as a mixture of logos and action is simultaneouslycomplete and incomplete. As logos it can account for great experienceand can also produce good actions. At the same time, it is incompletebecause it cannot account for the totality of reality. Yet, the law canovercome a gap in reality: the father who is sufficient for the supervisionof one son is insufficient for the supervision of all sons, while a king or atyrant cannot stand as ‘fathers’ for the whole of society. Later, Michaeldoes not forget to raise the question as to whether laws can effectivelymake many people good. The problem is there related to the legislator,who is conceived as an educator. Like the teachers of arts and sciences,the legislator who can make one man good can also do the same formany:

The distinction between laws that are fair and evil is the work of thelegislator, just as it is the work of the doctor to distinguish what is goodfrom what is bad for the health . . . it is to be considered, they say,whether the law that can make somebody good can make many like himand whether that which is useful for many is also useful for one. This isone and the same question. He who is right and without error does the


same regarding the other arts and sciences and the artists and scientists.As it happens there, where the one capable of teaching and making hima doctor or a musician can make many like him and, respectively, he whocan make many can make one, the same happens with the law: who canmake one great can make many likewise and vice versa. (611.24–31)

Still, in a previous passage, Michael declares that many are estrangedfrom the virtue of the educated man. While the educated man ischaracterized by aidos (shame, self-respect, sense of honor), the manyonly obey the good because of fear and the threat of legal punishment:

the educated are accustomed to stay away from the evil and to listen tothe words of those who profess the good and run toward them; but as forthe many, it is impossible to turn them toward the good. . . because themany, if they ever show themselves unfaithful to evil and respond to thegood, they don’t act out of aidos but because of fear or the threat of legalpunishment. (606.1–6)

Aidos is a difficult word to translate and even more difficult to under-stand in the context of the Byzantine society of the eleventh-twelfthcenturies. It is, however, very probable that it had an affinity with theconcept of timiôteron in science that we are going to examine below.

II

In order to understand the relation between the empirical man and theeducated man we must turn now to other texts by Michael of Ephesus.Thus, in his scholia and glossae In Politica, he states that:

we call the craftsman an empirical man and the architectural man alogical man. We call craftsmen those who are actually identified asthe subordinate assistants, architectural men those who are now nameddoctors and chief doctors. The proemium of the first book of the dePartibus Animalium correctly identifies the educated man in every artand science, and I myself also discuss this in my commentary on thebook.1 (306.28–34)

Let us now follow this reference to the following assertions in Michael’scommentary in de Partibus Animalium I:

1 This is for the present time the only non CAG edition of a Michael of Ephesus’text; see In Pol.


in terms of geometry, the educated man is not the man who is accus-tomed to geometrical theorems (such a man is called the chief [kyrios]scientist), but is he who possesses the geometrical principles and knowssome theorems and is able, on the basis of these, to judge whether hisinterlocutor is a geometer according to geometrical principles and if heconverses as a geometer ought. The man who has [the knowledge] ofgeometrical, mathematical, astronomical, physical principles and simply[haplôs] of every art and science ( . . . ) such a man should be identified asbeing completely educated, as one who is educated about everything andpossesses the principles of everything, and who is thought to be capableof judging everything, and is one in number; such a man is not many butone ( . . . ). It is obvious from the above that the scientist is an educatedman but that not every educated man is a scientist; even if he ever the-orizes (theorei) about it [the truth of a scientific assertion], the educatedman does not determine (skopei) in advance the truth or not of the object(that is the work of the scientist), but his work is to theorize whether theobject is geometrical and is shown according to geometrical principles.

(1.3–2.10)

The original Aristotelian text that Michael comments upon states that:

Every study and investigation, the humblest and the noblest (timiôteran)alike, seems to admit of two kinds of proficiency; one of which may beproperly called educated knowledge of the subject, while the other is akind of acquaintance with it. For an educated man should be able toform a fair judgment as to the goodness or badness of an exposition. Tobe educated is in fact to be able to do this; and the man of general edu-cation we take to be such. It will, however, of course, be understood thatwe only ascribe universal education to one who in his own individualperson is thus able to judge nearly all branches of knowledge, and not toone who has a like ability merely in some special subject. For it is possiblefor a man to have this competence in some one branch of knowledge.

(639a1–12, transl. W. Ogle, p. 994)

We see that Michael’s commentary points firstly to the fact that theeducated man is ‘one in number’, a this, and more precisely ‘one notmany’. Another interesting statement concerns ‘the scientist being aneducated man but not every educated man being a scientist.’ Michael’sdefinitions ought to be of interest to modern scholars, in that his com-mentaries refer to notions like numerical identity and numerical differ-ence concerning the educated man and the scientist, to the asymmet-rical relation between them, or rather, to the referential opacity thatcovers the two terms as well as to their ontological status.2 It seems that,

2 For a summary of the relevant research see Gil (2005).


according to Michael, Aristotle makes a classification of the educatedmen and the scientists before he proceeds with his other classificationsof the animals.

This is a view that is generally neglected in modern analysis of theabove passage of the Parts of Animals. Characteristically, Kullmann insistson the many possibilities of interpretation that this text offers.3 Balmemakes a threefold distinction between the specialist who knows the dataof his particular science, the educated man that, whether a specialist ornot, can distinguish if an explanation is based on the proper Principles,and the man who can do that for one science and not for another.4

For Terence Irwin, the Aristotelian educated man is the man capable ofdistinguishing between sciences, that is to state the difference betweenmathematical and philological sciences; it is the educated man, he says,and not the scientist, to whom Aristotle addresses the greater part of hiswork.5 For J.-M. Le Blond the near identification of the educated manwith the dialectician clearly shows Aristotle’s withdrawal from his scien-tific rigor for the benefit of his dialectics. The reason for this withdrawalwas that, having returned from Asia Minor to Athens, he addresses anAthenian public that held dialectics in the highest esteem. The praiseof the educated man shows also, according to Le-Blond, that generaleducation needs some deep knowledge of science and cannot be exclu-sively formal.6 For Düring, who does not refer extensively to the passageexamined here, there is not the slightest withdrawal in the Introduc-tion to Parts of Animals towards dialectics but the continuation of theAristotelian interest for speculative philosophy.7 It is Pierre Aubenquewho has examined the above passage more thoroughly; he rejects LeBlond’s view that Aristotle’s thesis is conditioned by the fact that he wasaddressing the Athenian public and instead insists on the critical epis-temological function of the educated man. The turn towards generalculture is an anti-Platonic step taken by Aristotle under sophistic influ-ence. Science cuts off humans from the totality of their existence andthe scientist, as a specialist, is alienated from other humans and evenfrom himself. As long as dialectics is not a science it can be re-evaluatedby Aristotle with the intent of humanizing science. The reason for the

3 Kullman (1974) 6–7.4 Balme (1972) 70–71.5 Irwin (1988) 27–29.6 Le Blond (1945) 52–54, 130.7 Düring (1943) 34ff.


need of this dialectics of general culture is that the foundations of sci-ence itself escape scientific reasoning. Aubenque, therefore, in declaringthat Aristotle, although a scientist himself, refused to consider science asan absolute value, interprets the Aristotelian text in light of some verymodern anxieties about the role of science in society.8

III

Before we continue with Michael’s analysis of the relations betweenthe empirical man, the scientist and the educated man we have toacknowledge and answer two questions: What is modern scholarship’sopinion regarding both Michael’s commentaries In EN and his wideractivity as a commentator? And, are the different positions proposed inthe different commentaries logically consequent? I will deal briefly withthese questions.

The latest theory about the scholiastic activity of Michael of Eph-esus is that he, together with Eustratios of Nicaea (c. 1050–1120), wrotecommentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics for the sake of the Byzantineprincess Anna Komnene;9 Michael produced scholia on the books V,IX, X and Eustratios on books I and VI. Ancient scholia were usedfor most of the rest of the books. Friedrich Schleiermacher held thesescholia in very high esteem, especially the ones by Eustratios.10 Accord-ing to Mercken, it is probably the Christian Platonism of Eustratiosthat attracted Schleiermacher’s interest, while Michael is said to be themore Aristotelian of the two commentators.11 Anna Komnene, in herfamous historical book the Alexiad has only good things to say aboutEustratios but does not mention Michael at all.12 The modern editorof the Nicomachean Ethics R.A. Gauthier has a remarkably lower opinionof these commentaries than Schleiermacher.13 More recently, Michael’sactivities as a commentator have attracted the attention of scholarslike Nussbaum, Preus and Konstan (see Bibliography). The fact thatMichael was the first to have commented on the biological works of

8 Aubenque (1960) 144–149.9 Browning (1990).

10 Schleiermacher (1838) 309–326.11 Mercken (1990) 416, 418, 434–436.12 Alex. 14.8.13 Gauthier & Jolif (1970) 100–105, 121.


Aristotle and on his Politics after many centuries is most intriguing forthe modern historian of philosophy.

The question is whether and to what extent we can claim thatMichael of Ephesus’ views on the relations between education andscience in the commentary In PA are coherent with those expressed inhis commentary In EN. According to Browning, this latter commentaryis dated after 1118, the year of Anna Komnene’s forced retirement tothe Monastery of Kecharitomeni.14 At one point in Michael’s commentaryIn Parva Naturalia (149.8–16), the author refers to his commentary In

PA in a list of his other commentaries that includes In Parva and In de

Motu Animalium. He also announces a commentary In Metaphysics V–XIII—a much debated question in modern scholarship as we will seebelow—and says that what remains for him to do is a commentary In

de Coloribus. We find no mention here of his work In EN.Michael’s life is also very difficult to date. At the beginning of the

twentieth century Praechter, on the evidence of some anonymous scho-lia written before 1040 that contained passages by Michael, defendedthe position that Michael was not, as it had been believed until then,a pupil of Michael Psellos, but his contemporary. Ebbesen showed thatboth the anonymous scholia and the passages attributed to Michaelwere based on more ancient commentaries, so there was no need fora co-dependency of the two. This point supports Browning’s thesis thatMichael belonged to the circle of Anna Komnene’s scholiasts. In hiscommentary In Politica, Michael gives some information about himself,as Ernest Barker has already noted.15 Here, Michael manifests a criticalattitude towards the government of his times. If we were to follow theearlier date for his life and work, Michael would have been referring tothe reign of Alexios I Komnenos, but if we accept the newer hypothe-sis, then it can be suggested that he was thinking of Emperor John IIKomnenos, Anna’s brother and, arguably, the usurper of her throne.Another passage that is critical of the Byzantine Emperor also indicatesthat John Komnenos and not Alexios Komnenos was the subject ofthe comment. Within the same scholia and glossae, Michael remarksthat the Turks desired the maintenance of a status quo with the Byzan-

14 Anna Komnene, first-born child of the Emperor Alexios I Komnenos, had theambition to rule the state together with her husband Nikephoros Bryennios after herfather’s death. It was her younger brother John who took over the command probablywith the collaboration of the dying Emperor and later forced Anna to monastic life.

15 Barker (1957) 140.


tines, even though they were superior in number. According to Barker,who, following Praechter on this point, dated Michael in the eleventhcentury, Michael is referring to the year 1096 when Byzantines andTurks had a common enemy to face, namely the Crusaders. Follow-ing the more recent dating of his life and works, I think that Michaelis, in fact, referring to the period after 1130 when the Emperor Johnchose not to attack the Sultanate of Ikonion, an ally of the Byzantinesat the time, but to march against the emirate of Melitene in Syria.16

Consequently, on the basis of this last comment, the scholia In Politica

must have been written after 1130 a date that should be considered asthe terminus post quem for the work. A commentary on the Politics musthave been of prime interest for Anna Komnene given her politicallyambitious personality. We can then assume that the views that Michaelheld In PA were still representative of his views even after 1130. Thissame year must be considered to be the terminus ante quem for this lat-ter commentary. It is obvious from the above that both the scholia In

EN and In Politica belong to the later phase of Michael’s comment-ing activity and that the author still maintained the positions expressedIn PA.

IV

It is now time to examine Michael’s approach to the problem of therelations between the empirical man, the scientist and the educatedman. At first, we may summarize his definition of the empirical manfollowing his commentary In EN in the following terms

(1) The empirical man is the man of particular experiences in general

Furthermore, any scientist/artist 1,2,3 . . . n is an empirical man, in thathe is interested in every particular thing, so that

(2) scientist / artist 1 is an empirical manscientist / artist 2 is an empirical manscientist / artist 3 is an empirical man. . .. . .scientist / artist n is an empirical man

16 Ostrogorsky (1997) 45.


Of course, (2) presupposes that

(3) every empirical man is not a scientist

In his scholia In Politics, Michael distinguishes between the empiricalman and the logical man with the difference being between the artsand the sciences.17 However, in his commentary In EN the differencebecomes weaker as it is shown by the example of the doctor as ascientist who cares for particularities and not only for general laws ifhe wants to be effective in his science.

As for the educated man, Michael states that

(4) the educated man can identify the different sciences and knowsome of their conclusions

Now, if we turn to the position of the educated man, in relation to thescientist, we see that according to Michael

(5) every scientist is an educated man

but

(6) every educated man is not a scientist

It is clear that for Michael, and according to (5) and (6), unlike themodern scholars I have mentioned earlier, the perception of the edu-cated man does not mean any kind of withdrawal from the scientificambitions of Aristotle. The scientist of particular sciences continues tobe the peak of learning and not some educated man/dialectician thatwould reign platonically over the sciences as ‘one over many’. In that,Michael stays close to the Aristotelian idea of the autonomy of sciences.

If we phrase (5) in terms similar to (2) we should have

(7) scientist 1 is an educated manscientist 2 is an educated manscientist 3 is an educated man. . .. . .scientist n is an educated man

17 We should keep in mind that for Aristotle this difference is not always valid; seeNE 2,5,1106b5–15; Met. 981a12–b9; however, see the subsequent passage Met. 981b25–982a3 where he returns to the distinction between the sciences and arts stated in NE6,3,1139b14–36.


What is then the status of the educated man? If we suppose that‘some educated man is a scientist’, we would have

(8) some educated man is a scientist 1

But in no case we can come up with

(9) some educated man being a scientist 1 is a scientist 2

because that would mean

(10) scientist 1 is a scientist 2

and would allow

(11) scientist 1 is a scientist 3

. . .scientist 1 is a scientist n

This is absurd and would mean the end of the distinctiveness of the dif-ferent particular sciences, a position very much unlike the Aristotelianproject; it would also be the end of the ‘chief scientist’ according toMichael. So (9), (10) and (11) are false.

Thus, the educated man is seen by Michael as a kind of limit permit-ting the distinction between the different particular sciences. Further-more, the educated man being ‘one in number’, i.e. a this, cannot beinfinite and so stands as a limit equally for the infinite multiplication ofthe sciences; thus in the series of sciences 1,2,3 . . . n, the n cannot standfor infinity.

The final question about education concerns the relation betweenthe empirical man and the educated man and has to do with thepossibility that the scientist/artist 1,2,3 . . . n is the third term permittingus to say that ‘the educated man is an empirical man’ or ‘an empiricalman is an educated man’. The second inference would be absurdaccording to (3), but the first could have some degree of truth, meaningthat in some aspects the educated man is an empirical man and moreprecisely she/he is empirical in regard to the perception of empiricaldata. The question is whether we could have a repetition of (5) and (6),when the two terms are now the educated man and the empirical manand are expressed in the following way

(12) every educated man is an empirical man(13) every empirical man is not an educated man


Would the difference be that the educated man refers to sciencesand the empirical man to sciences/arts? That cannot be true, not onlybecause the status of sciences and arts is often identical in Aristotle, asI mentioned above, but because Michael does not state the differencein his commentary In PA I, a passage that he himself considers author-itative on the subject. We have seen earlier that on the moral level theeducated man is entirely alien to the empirical man. I will try to showthat this also comprises the epistemological level and thus that (12) isfalse.

V

It is important to investigate the way in which Michael faces the worldof empirical facts or in other terms the material world. In his com-mentary In PA I, writing about the famous passage that constitutes (forJaeger) Aristotle’s praise of empirical research,18 Michael states:

if someone thinks the theory of the parts of which animals consist tobe ignoble (atimon), for not producing pleasure to our senses, he mustthink the same of himself; for, what pleasure can the menses of womenor the foetal membranes that cover the baby when it comes out ofhis mother’s belly, or the flesh, the nerves and such-like of which manconsists produce? It is significant that we cannot see without muchdiscomfort that of which the human species consists; we call ‘discomfort’the sorrow that is produced in the senses or, as we might say, disgust.

(23.3–9)

The question of material bodies and their painful or pleasurable per-ception must be related, I think, to the following passage from thecommentary In EN, where Michael uses the term “somatoeidis = bod-ily material, corporeal”.

sight, for this species, is a perception without materiality, as Aristotle hasshown in the second book of De anima. . . , being without the materialfrom which they derive. Hearing and smell are more corporeal (somatoei-deis) and they perceive the sensed objects more passively together withtheir material. (569.8–14)

We find only one occurrence of somatoeidis in the Aristotelian corpus, inthe Problems, XXIV, 936b35, where we read:

18 PA 5,644b22–645b3; see Jaeger (1934) 337.


but substances which have body in them, like thick soups and silver,since, owing to their weight, they contain much corporeal matter (soma-toeides) and other resistance, because they are subjected to violent forceas the heat tries to make its way out, form bubbles wherever the heatprevails. (transl. E.S. Forster)

In Michael’s passage, in contrast to Aristotle, we perceive a change ofperspective from objects to senses, from the knowable to the knowingsubject. This departure from Aristotle is combined in Michael withsome allegiance to a Platonism that is manifest in the following textfrom In EN :

He (sc. Aristotle) says, that once the omissions and that which must besupplied from elsewhere are brought together, in accordance with theassumptions of the Epicurean and later Stoic philosophers concerninghappiness, one can attribute a share of happiness even to non-rationalanimals, while according to myself and Plato and others who along withus would place happiness in the intellective life, it is impossible for non-rational animals to be happy in that way. . . 19 (598.19ff.)

The animals in the above passage must be considered to be bodieswithout reason but not somatoeide because this last term refers explicitlyonly to human beings. It is a term we find, in the way that Michael usesit, in Plato’s Phaedo where it is said about the soul that:

Because each pleasure or pain nails it as with a nail to the body andrivets it on and makes it corporeal (somatoeide), so that it fancies the thingsare true which the body says are true. (83d)

And, at another point, Plato speaks of the soul contaminated by thebody:

so that it thought nothing was true except the corporeal (somatoeides),which one can touch and see and drink and eat and employ in thepleasures of love, and if it is accustomed to hate and fear and avoid thatwhich is shadowy and invisible to the eyes but is intelligible and tangibleto philosophy (81b).

(transl. Harold North Fowler, 1960, Loeb Classical Library)

Furthermore, Michael in relating the distasteful vision of the parts ofthe human body with science, he refers to the timiôteron of science; it is arelation that reminds us of the discussion in Plato’s Parmenides about theexistence or not of the ideas of the humblest, ignoble things =atimotaton

(Parmenides, 130c ff.). In response to this problem, Michael seems to

19 Quoted in Praechter (1990) 40, translated by Victor Caston.


answer in the most unequivocal way: the timiôteron of things dependson the degree of the timiôteron of human perception.

The question of pain and pleasure in relation to somatoeidis introducesus to the way that Michael relates them to perception and to sciencein his commentary In PA of the famous Aristotelian encomium of thescientific work quoted above. It is obvious that the empirical world isat the same time the world of facts and the world of the morally goodand evil. The second point is evident in the way Michael promotes thehigher (intellectual) pleasures against the lower—somatoeideis?—ones:

Every mind is searching its proper good and intuits it or dreams aboutit and submits to the animal and oppressive pleasures, which are notproperly pleasures because of their evil lessons and the necessary andconsequent ignorance of real pleasures. Because the judging mind isovertaken by darkness regarding the nonesuch, real pleasures . . .

(In EN 9–10 538.12ff.)

Michael’s ‘intellectualism’ seems to draw not only from Plato but alsofrom Proclus as it is shown in the next passage, where the Proclianinfluences were noted by Carlos Steel20 and are indicated here in italics:

. . . escaping from the appetites of every kind and the consecutive sensations thatdeceive the intellect and introducing fantasies as introducing forming and dividingprinciples and something like an unsolvable multiplicity, rejecting the opinions asmultiple and in themselves and for the other things, and mixed to the senses and theimagination (because every opinion acts together with irrational sensationand imagination), returning to science and intellect, and after that to the life ofintellect and the simple intuition, and on the process receiving the illuminationfrom the divine and filling inside with the immaculate light. What is thegood by which the divine rewards those who engage themselves in theintellect that is relative to it? (In EN 9–10 603.16–30)

We can see in the above that alongside the Proclian references areexpressions that remind us of a Christian orthodox vocabulary, suchas that of the Greek fathers of the Church, for example: “filling insidewith the immaculate light”. Michael’s attitude is that of a Christianor of a man that has been raised in a Christian cultural environmentor in a culture with a monotheistic ground. This is also evident inanother passage from his In de Motu Animalium, where Michael relatesthe timiôteron to the prior. We read:

Saying [Aristotle] that the first mover always moves, he adds, ‘for theeternally noble and the primarily and truly good, and not just occasion-

20 See Steel (2002) 55–56.


ally good’, like our goods (for these are not always goods), ‘is too divineand precious to have anything prior to it’, i.e., that it is so divine thatnothing is prior in worth to it; for such a thing is more precious [tim-iôteron] than anything. (114.11–15, transl. Preus)

How, then, is the question of the timiôteron to be linked to Michael’sAristotelism in a more precise manner than by simply positing somevague Platonic or Neoplatonic influence? A critical reading of a remarkby Nussbaum allows us to do this.21 Nussbaum thinks that Michael’sexpression: “if there were, among beings and having reality, some pow-ers greater than the powers of heaven and earth, they would movetomorrow or some time” (In MA 110.14–16, transl. Preus) is a realcontribution to the comprehension of Aristotle’s expression: “if thereare superior motions, these will be dissolved by one another” (Move-

ment of Animals 699b25–26, transl. A.S.L. Farquharson). She thinks thatthe Byzantine scholiast’s hypothesis about a moving principle is cor-rect, in that, if it could exercise a force greater than the forces of earthand heaven, it would do so and thence destroy the world. Neverthe-less, Nussbaum believes that Michael’s interpretation of “one another”as interaction of forces and bodies (“for the words by one another areequivalent to the earth by the force greater than its power, and theheaven by the force greater than its power”, op. cit., 110.16–17, transl.Preus) is erroneous. For Aristotle, according to Nussbaum, states thatthe moving principle that has a force capable of moving and eventuallydestroying the world must also be a body—a sixth body different fromthe five physical ones; the reason being that Aristotle continues by say-ing that the force of the aforesaid body cannot be infinite because therecannot be an infinite body: “for they cannot be infinite because noteven body can be infinite” (op. cit., 699b27–28). In that way, Michael’sinterpretation, Nussbaum says, is half right—as long as it points to onemoving principle for Aristotle’s passage—and half erroneous—for notattributing to this moving principle the quality of being a body. How-ever, for a Christian or a man brought up in a Christian environmentas Michael was, his interpretation is placed midway between Aristotleand his cultural setting. Furthermore, Michael includes physics amongthe theoretical sciences and not, as certain commentators have tried todefend, following a confusing statement in Parts of Animals, distinct fromthe theoretical sciences.22 Yet, I don’t think that Michael would wholly

21 Nussbaum (1978) 317–318. For a different view, see Preus (1981) 75.22 Balme (1972) 76ff. and Düring (1980) 213–221 for an opposite view.


subscribe to a speculative worldview where first philosophy plays therole of theology. He would rather leave this role to Christian theol-ogy. Thus Michael inherits the Neoplatonic intellectualism but not theNeoplatonic metaphysics. This disposition allows him to value the exte-rior world, even its discomforting sides, as part of the creation—in analmost ‘eucharistic’ manner—and at the same time to conceive what Iwill describe below as a scientific intentionality towards the world.

VI

In view of the above, the problem of the relations between the educatedman and the empirical man becomes less crucial than the questionconcerning the relations between scientists and empirical men. Howcan (2) and (7) be true at the same time? Neither the distinction betweenthe sciences and the arts nor the criterion of practicality can be decisivehere. I think that what we need is to see the scientist in a more complexway and the qua device can be of great utility. For Michael the scientistof the particular sciences, the ‘chief scientist (kyriôs),’ as he calls him, is

(14) a scientist qua doctor . . . qua geometer . . . qua naturalist, etc.

(14) is equivalent to the series: scientist1, scientist2, scientist3 . . . scientistn.It is only this scientist of (14) that can be appropriately called aneducated man. Only a scientist of the particular sciences is an educatedman; in virtue of the fact that both the scientist and the educatedman may be called thises. We should note the conceptual affiliationbetween the haplôs of the “simply educated” and the “kyriôs” of the“chief scientist” from the commentary In PA, a similarity to whichBonitz has already pointed in the Aristotelian corpus. So (7) must beformulated in the following manner

(15) every scientist qua doctor . . . qua geometer . . . qua naturalist, etc. isan educated man

There is also a scientist as a generic name that does not need a defi-nition in terms of particular sciences; we can put this second scientistbetween quotation marks and call him a ‘scientist’. It is this second ‘sci-entist’ that must be called an empirical man since both the ‘scientist’and the empirical man are rather generic names than thises. Thus (2) isfalse and must be replaced by the following

(16) a ‘scientist’ is an empirical man


We can see here how Michael’s intellectualism, although inspired byPlatonism, finds itself in Aristotelism (the combination of the two tradi-tions is a constant mark of Byzantine philosophy, before its final phaseanyway). The ‘scientist’ and the empirical man are generic names dueto the fact that they are dealing with the material world that is itselfindefinite, informal, vague. By the same token, we can understand whatis the proper content of the educated man. The educated man marksthe difference from the natural, material world and shows that intelli-gence is the proper ‘nature’ of man. Thus, we can say

(17) the educated man delimits the different sciences, restricts the num-ber of sciences and demarcates the intellectual man from nature

VII

It is clear by now that Michael’s analysis of Aristotle’s introduction inthe Parts of Animals I is different from most of the analyses of mod-ern scholars. Michael conceives of neither a humane critique of sci-ence, as Aubenque does; nor of a retreat in the face of dialectics, asdoes Le Blond; significantly, he does not focus on the educated man, asIrwin does; his approach is also distinguished from the question of Aris-totelianism as speculative philosophy, that Düring emphasizes. I thinkthat while most of the above scholars perceive the relation between theeducated man and the scientist only in terms of Michael’s first artic-ulation concerning “principles/theorems”, this Byzantine thinker goesbeyond this (which for a medieval commentator such as him proba-bly follows upon the difference of proprieties found in Porphyry’s com-mentary In Categories) and advances the articulation of ‘Skopein/Theorein’.The first articulation, although implied in Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, ismore clearly stated in Proclus’ Commentary in Euclid’s First Book of Ele-

ments. We may here perceive another filiation between Neoplatonic phi-losophy and the Michael’s work as a commentator. The second artic-ulation, like the first, is not a clear-cut distinction, and so differs fromProclus, who would like to attribute different functions to different levelsof the intellect. For Michael, the two terms characterize both the edu-cated man and the scientist, as the whole question is, I think, part of atheory or proto-theory of scientific intentionality suggested by the termsskopein and theorein. The first is the more immediate and proto-reflexiveintentionality, the one that probably causes the pain and the pleasure in


perception. The second intentionality produces the theorems, or other-wise the objects of theoretical activity—these objects are linguisticallyformulated as ‘terms / horoi’ but that does not mean that the objectsof the first intentionality are pre-linguistic; the activity of theorein can becalled ‘theorization of the objects’. In that way, the distinction betweenskopein and theorein can be described as a distinction between intentional-ity of the content and intentionality of the object, a classical distinctionin the theories of intentionality after Brentano.23 The existence of sucha theory or proto-theory of intentionality is to be found in Michael’scommentaries. To the relevant passages quoted above, we must add thefollowing that Stan Ebbesen has drawn our attention to as the sole orig-inal contribution by Michael in his commentary in Sophistici Elenchi:24

The phrase ‘the science is not in the species’ is equivalent to ‘the scienceis not said by the species although it is in the species’. Such as themedicine is a species of science (what is meant by the ‘suppose it to bethe medical science, as it is in general’) is clear that it [the science] is inthe medicine; yet, although it is in the medicine, it is not said by it; for, hewho says medicine does not say science; the reason for that is induced byhim [Aristotle] by saying ‘the science is of the knowable’, meaning thatscience is said potentially of the knowable but the medicine is not said ofan object; neither grammary is said grammary of an object nor any ofthe other particular sciences, as we have learnt from the Categories; so,if somebody saying science means science of an object but he who saysmedicine does not mean of an object, it is clear that the species is notsaid together with the genre. Better, the assertion ‘the science is not inthe species’ is equivalent to ‘the science is not appearing in the species’.It is habitual for him [Aristotle] to use such interpretations as one whosays science does not say medicine although this last is under the science;likewise, one who says double does not say half. (183.8–24)

Michael’s text refers to Sophistical Refutations, 181b25ff. where, in relationto the ‘science of an object,’ the caution against repeating the samethings many times is discussed:

With regard to those which draw one into repeating the same thing anumber of times, it is clear that one must not grant that predicationsof relative terms have any meaning in abstraction by themselves, e.g.double apart from double of half, merely on the ground that it figures init. For ten figures in ten minus one and do in not do, and generally theaffirmation in the negation; but for all that, if someone says that this isnot white, he does not say that it is white. Double, perhaps, has not even

23 Simons (2001).24 Ebbesen (1981) 270.


any meaning at all, any more than half; and even if it has a meaning,yet it has not the same meaning as in the combination. Nor is knowledgethe same thing in a specific branch of it (suppose it, e.g., to be medicalscience) as it is in general; for in general it is science of the knowable(transl. W.A. Pickard-Cambridge; translation modified: science instead ofknowledge for the Greek word: ‘episteme’).

Concerning Michael’s remark that “it is habitual for him [Aristotle] touse such interpretations”, Ebbesen states that Michael means that Aris-totle “has the habit of turning his sentences upside down.”25 I think thatMichael is saying something more here, meaning the caution aboutwhat in the Sophistical Refutations is called “repeating the same thingmany times”. By drawing attention to the “principle of not repeatingthe same thing many times” Michael refers to a passage of his commen-tary In PA (10.10–30) and so relates this to the critique of the Platonicdichotomy. I have located a very similar passage in the commentary In

Metaph. Z (521.19–36)

As the animals are divided in animals endowed with feet and footlessones, the feet-endowed animals must be distinguished by their properdifferentiae and not say something like, from the feet-endowed animalsothers have feathers and others not, if we are to divide appropriately;because these are not differentiae of the feet-endowed animals. But wemust distinguish them qua feet-endowed and say that other are cloven-footed and other not cloven-footed; this is the differentia of the foot; thecloven-footness is a kind of footness like the logical animal is a kind ofanimal. But some people who are incapable and have not the power todefine the differentiae of every kind, they do that, I mean they divideby improper differentiae. But the feet-endowed animals, even if they aresomething else also, should be divided by their proper differentiae untilwe arrive to undivided ones that would be impossible to distinguish byanother differentia. And then, there would be as many kinds of feetas the last differentiae of the feet-endowed animals that can not befurther divided. Because if, as he has often said, the genus after thelast differentia is the species, it is evident that the feet-endowed animalshappen to be as many as the subsequent differentiae; and if so, it isobvious that the last differentia is the substance and the definition ofthe thing and we should include in the definition only this one and thegenus if we are not to say many times the same thing and babble.

(521.19–36)

In the parallel text from the commentary In PA, after a similar argu-ment, Michael concludes:

25 Ibid.


. . . If then the last differentia is the main [kyria] one in distinguishing thespecies, then the rest are said in vain; the last differentia is implying theprevious differentiae. If someone says that this is not the main differentiabut the rest also and that we have to utter them as well then he arrives torepeat many times the same thing; that’s what he said in the book Z ofthe Metaphysics. (10.10–30)

If there was a general agreement that the commentaries In Metaph.E–N are written by Michael, then this passage would be of greatinterest for the present study. As it now stands, the disagreement of thescholars about the paternity of the commentary In Metaph. E–N endsup unfavorably disposed towards Michael: for he is either the author ofthese commentaries but not a great scholiast or he is making an untruestatement when he says that he is the author.26 As for the passages In

Metaph. Z and In PA I that I have introduced as being very similar toone another, if we follow Sten Ebbesen’s account of Michael’s workingmethod (described as a hasty picking from every kind of source), thenthis similarity does not allow us to identify conclusively the authorshipof the commentaries In Metaph. E–N.

In relation to the “rule of not repeating the same thing many times”could we refer here to a nominalistic intuition (opposed to an essential-ist’s stand that is often connected with Aristotle’s Biology) in additionto the intellectualism that I have ascribed to Michael? I think that weought to avoid such hasty categorizations when speaking of a Byzantinecommentator; his ‘intellectualism’ or ‘nominalism’ does not follow thewell-known Western Medieval philosophical concepts. For the purposesof this study, it would be better to speak of a principle of economy inexpression that is possibly situated in the field of the notorious Byzan-tine affection for rhetoric. The originality of Michael’s position is ratherto be found in his theory of the intentionalities related to culture andthe sciences.

It is a fact that the theories of intentionality are also well rooted inthe philosophical tradition of the Western Christianity (intentio), espe-cially after Augustine; the presence of the concept in Greek philosophyis a much debated question while the presence of Augustinian thoughtin Byzantium is rather late and in any case, at least for the period thatgoes from the Photian schism to the conquest of Constantinople by the

26 See In PN 149.14–15; in fact, Michael speaks of the books Z to N. See Luna (2001)and Taran (2005); see also Arabatzis (2006) 162–170.


Crusaders, never too great.27 As to whether there was or was not atheory of intentionality in classical philosophy that might have inspiredMichael remains an open question. Victor Caston is in favor of sucha theory in classical thought.28 For him, we must include among theGreek terms that suggest intentionality the ones related to purpose,like the verb skopein, especially in connection with books, letters anddiscourses.29 I would like here to add, commentaries, as I believe thedistinction between skopos and theoria refers to the technique of com-mentary itself. In fact, commentaries are divided according to the pur-pose/skopos of the redaction and to a general discussion/theoria of itstopics.30 If Michael’s paternity of the commentaries In Metaph. 5–13 canbe accepted, then the hypothesis of a proto-theory of scientific inten-tionality in him is strengthened by the fact that the commentary In

Metaph. 10 states precisely the manner in which philosophy is character-ized by the activities of skopein and theorein:

[Aristotle] teaches that the philosopher is determining (skopein) and theo-rizing (theorian) being and that it is the proprium of a science to theorizebeing qua being, just as the mathematician, when abstracting from hisdiscourse the harshness, weight, softness and heat and all that pertains tothe sensible nature of bodies, that is the contrarieties of the senses, leavesonly the continuum of size, lines, levels, solids. (645.6–10)

However, Caston doubts as to whether theoria serves as a metaphor forvision and, consequently, as a paradigm, such as Michael’s, concerningwhether the viewing of parts of the human body could suggest somekind of intentionality. Others defend the position that vision has a spe-cial meaning in Aristotle as being the most immaterial of the sensesand for having an epistemological significance as the paradigm for thetheoretical life.31 In Nic. Eth. X, theoria is presented as ‘the pleasantest ofexcellent activities’ (1177a23–24, transl. W.D. Ross revised by J.O. Urm-son). This leads to the following question: since for Aristotle every activ-ity is characterized by its own pleasure on the basis of which there can-not be deduced any hierarchy of pleasures, how then can theoria be saidto be the pleasantest activity? This happens in much the same way asvision is conceived as superior to other senses:

27 See Lössl (2000).28 See Caston (2001) 23–48.29 Caston (1993) 219.30 See Praechter (1990) 45ff.31 See Gonzalez (1991).


sight is superior to touch in purity, and hearing and smell to taste; thepleasures, therefore, are similarily superior, and those of thought superiorto these, and within each of the two kinds some are superior to others.

(1176a1–3, transl. W.D. Ross revised by J.O. Urmson)

Michael’s commentary In EN 9–10 569.8–14, as well as the metaphorof the ‘eye’ of prudence from In EN 9–10 609.6–10, respond to thispassage. These and other passages discussed above speak in favor of atheory or proto-theory of scientific intentionality in Michael. To these,might be added the use of terms such as ‘emphainesthai = appearing’from In SE 183.8–24, that does not point to perception alone, but alsoto intellectual perception or, as I have said, to scientific intentionality. Ifwe notice that Michael defined the educated man as ‘The man who has

[the knowledge] of Geometrical, Mathematical, Astronomical, Physical Principles

and simply [haplôs] of every art and science’ and if every scientist is aneducated man (and if the philosopher purposes and theorizes like ascientist does, as the passage In Metaph. 10 claims—if it is by Michael’shand), then it seems possible that Michael has distinguished himselffrom the long tradition, following Philoponus and John of Damascus,that had promoted the First Philosophy as an ‘art of arts and science ofsciences’.

We can conclude by stating that according to Michael the relationsbetween the scientist, the empirical man and the educated man arethe following: (a) science is prior (timiôtera) in regard to intellect; (b)following upon (a) Michael opposes the idea of the educated man asan hyper-scientist such as Plato’s dialectician; (c) the educated man isdifferent from the empirical man as thisness is different from genericnames; (d) the above statements are part of a more general classifica-tion of science, culture and experience. In fact, by commenting on therelations between the three, Michael not only underlines the classifica-tory power of the scientist, but also uses the scientist and the educatedman as model objects of classification. We therefore have every right tospeak here of a philosophy of sciences.32

32 The question left open is that of empirical data. We have seen in his commentaryIn EN and In PA that Michael refuses to enlist in speculative philosophy and alsopermits the infiltration of ‘purified’ empirical objects into his theory of science. Yet,the full presuppositions and implications of his positions remain to be clarified.

SOME OBSERVATIONS ON MICHAEL OF EPHESUS’COMMENTS ON NICOMACHEAN ETHICS X

Katerina Ierodiakonou

A study of the Byzantine twelfth-century composite commentary on theNicomachean Ethics cannot pass over Michael of Ephesus’ contributionto it. For it is not only that Michael is undoubtedly the writer of thecomments on books V, IX and X,1 it has also been plausibly suggestedthat it was he who compiled this commentary, bringing together thecomments of Aspasius, Eustratios and two anonymous commentators.2

He thus produced an invaluable tool for a better understanding ofAristotle’s ethical theories, a tool which proved to be of great helpnot only to the Byzantines, but also to the students of Aristotle inthe medieval West, who extensively used its Latin translation made byRobert Grosseteste in the thirteenth century.

Nevertheless, we know next to nothing about Michael’s life, and littleattention has been given so far to the content of his comments on theNicomachean Ethics. At least we now can say with confidence, thanks toBrowning’s and Ebbesen’s research, that he lived not in the eleventhcentury, as Praechter had argued, but in the twelfth century, and more-over that he most probably, together with Eustratios, belonged to AnnaKomnena’s circle of intellectuals.3 It still remains unsettled, however,whether Michael wrote his commentaries only while he was workingunder Anna, or whether he worked on Aristotle also before and afterthis period.4 On the other hand, we seem to be well informed aboutthe remarkable breadth of his writings as an Aristotelian commenta-tor. He not only wrote commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics, but alsoon Metaphysics V–VIII and on the Sophistical Refutations, both wronglyattributed to Alexander, on the Generation of Animals, wrongly attributedto Philoponos, on the Parva naturalia, on the Parts of Animals, on the Move-

1 In EN 5, In EN 9–10.2 Ebbesen (1990) 451, n. 23; Mercken (1990) 437.3 Praechter (1931); Browning (1990) 399–400; Ebbesen (1981) 268–285; Mercken

(1990) 430–432.4 Preus (1981a) 10, n. 22; Mercken (1990) 437.

186 katerina ierodiakonou

ment of Animals, on the Progression of Animals, all edited in the CAG series;5

furthermore, he wrote comments on the pseudo-Aristotelian treatise De

coloribus, which are still unedited,6 on the Politics, which have only partlysurvived,7 and finally, on the Prior and Posterior Analytics, on the Topics, onthe Physics, on the De caelo and on the Rhetoric, which are unfortunatelylost.8

But Michael’s surviving commentaries have not been studied in greatdetail. It is only due to Ebbesen’s work that we know something aboutMichael’s logical comments on Aristotle’s Sophistical Refutations, and weowe it to Preus’ and Arabatzis’ efforts that we know something aboutMichael’s comments on Aristotle’s zoological writings.9 Now, concern-ing the comments on the Nicomachean Ethics, there is no systematic studyof them. Mercken has discussed them in general terms, and he hasraised the general issue of whether Michael should be regarded as aPlatonist or as an Aristotelian. On his view, Michael’s task as a com-mentator was to clarify Aristotle’s doctrines without taking sides; that isto say, without being a militant Aristotelian, but also without trying toforce Aristotle into a Platonic, or for that matter, a Christian mould.10

Since there is no detailed study of any of Michael’s comments onthe Nicomachean Ethics, I want to focus here on these comments, and inparticular on the comments on book X of the Nicomachean Ethics. To bemore precise, I want to discuss three issues which arise from Michael’scomments:

1. The use of medical examples2. The distinction between two kinds of eudaimonia

3. The issue whether non-rational animals can achieve eudaimonia

I choose these three issues because I think that they themselves arephilosophically interesting, though I am not sure that what Michael hasto say about them is original. The fact that we have no other ancient

5 In metaph.; In SE; In GA; In PN ; In PA.6 A graduate student in the University of Hamburg, V. Papari, is now preparing

under the supervision of Prof. D. Harlfinger an edition of these comments as part ofher doctorate thesis. The Latin translation of these comments, together with a Germantranslation, can be found in Col. 103–129.

7 Pol. xvii–xxi and 293–327 (translated in Barker 1957).8 Praechter (1990) 51–52. Conley (1990) 38 suggests that the anonymous Rhetoric

commentary in In Rh. is Michael’s.9 Ebbesen (1981); Preus (1981a) and (1981b); Arabatzis (2006).

10 Mercken (1990) 434–436.

michael of ephesus’ comments on ne x 187

or Byzantine commentary on book X of the Nicomachean Ethics makes itvery difficult to judge whether Michael here just copies and rephrasesold material, as Ebbesen and Preus have claimed in the case of hislogical and zoological comments,11 or whether he has something new tosay. There is no doubt that if one wants to make an overall judgementabout Michael’s originality, or give a general characterisation of him asan Aristotelian commentator, one would need to work through all of hiscommentaries in a systematic way; but this is beyond the scope of mypaper.

1. The Use of Medical Examples

Even a hasty reader of Michael’s ethical comments cannot fail to noticehis frequent references to medicine. Aristotle, of course, does the samein many places throughout the Nicomachean Ethics, but in Michael’scomments the occurrences of medical examples are certainly morenumerous and more striking; for they are more detailed and seem torequire a certain amount of in depth medical knowledge (cf. 618.25–619.4). It really is peculiar that this fact has not until now been usedas further evidence to support the claim that perhaps Michael was amedical doctor.12

In the majority of cases Michael uses medical examples in his com-ments on Nicomachean Ethics X in order to clarify something in Aris-totle’s ethical theory. For instance, in order to clarify the view thatpleasure is something which we desire for itself and not for the sakeof something else, Michael uses the example of medical treatment asan illustration of the distinction he has in mind; obviously, drugs orbloodletting are not desired for themselves but only because they canrestore a patient’s health (534.29–34).13 Again, in order to clarify theview that ethical virtues should be regarded as the final end of anagent’s actions, Michael puts forward as an analogous case the exam-ple of health, which undoubtedly constitutes the final end of a doctor’s

11 Ebbesen (1981) 284; Preus (1981b).12 Praechter (1906) 863–864; Mercken (1990) 432–433.13 τ�ι�+τ�ν δ? � �δ�ν�. �;δε'ς γ*ρ )ρωτP τ�ν �δ.μεν�ν, δι* τ� sδεται, Eσπερ τ�ν

λ�υ.μεν�ν R �λ"2α τεμε,ν � ��ρμακ�ν πιε,ν 2�υλ.μεν�ν, δι* τ� τ��των Vκαστ�ν α$ρε,ται.τ�+τ�ν γ*ρ εJ τις Fρ�ιτ�, δι* τ� )π' τNν �αρμακ�π�σ�αν %εται, τ��’ Zν εJπ�ι %να =για�νCη,)κε,ν� δ? εJ τις Fρ�ιτ� δι* τ� τNν �δ�νNν δι7κει, εJπ�ιεν Zν δι’ α;τNν κα' �; δι’ Aλλ� τι.


actions (594.29–34).14 And there are many other similar cases in whichmedicine is used as an example which Michael seems to consider assimpler and easier to understand.15 But there are also at least two con-texts in which Michael’s use of medical examples is particularly inter-esting and enlightening.

The first case I want to focus on concerns Michael’s comments onAristotle’s sentence right at the beginning of book X of the Nicomachean

Ethics. Aristotle verbatim says ‘After these matters we ought perhaps nextto discuss pleasure’ (1172a19),16 and Michael undertakes to explain whyAristotle here uses the adverb ‘perhaps’ (isos). In doing so, he tries tomake sense of the reason why Aristotle includes in his ethical treatisean account of pleasure, and thus raises the issue of the relation betweenpleasure and eudaimonia.

According to Michael’s comment (530.2–12),17 if Aristotle hadthought that pleasure actually is a part of eudaimonia, he would havesaid that it is necessary in this context to talk about pleasure. For justlike in the case of a horse it is necessary to talk about the non-rational,since it is part of a horse to be non-rational, similarly in the case ofpleasure, if pleasure is a part of eudaimonia, it would be necessary to talkabout pleasure in an ethical treatise on eudaimonia. If, however, plea-sure is not a part of eudaimonia, but only its symptom, as it were, andshadow, it would not be obligatory to talk about pleasure in this con-text, though of course we would still have the option to do so. Now,from the two examples used here, that of the symptom and that of theshadow, Michael in the rest of the passage chooses to further elaborate

14 Iς γ*ρ #ατρ�+ τελικ�ν αJτι�ν κα' τ� �! Vνεκα π�ντα π�ιε, κα' πρ�ττει, Mσα π�ιε, κα'πρ�ττει, =γ�εια, κα' �#κ�δ.μ�υ &ρ�N τελικN � �#κ�α κα' στρατηγ�+ ν�κη, σ7�ρ�ν.ς τε �τ�ν πα �ν συμμετρ�α, �@τω κα' τLς �ρ�ν�σεως, Iς δ"δεικται Mτε περ' τα�της Fλεγεν, �$κατ* τ*ς p ικ*ς &ρετ*ς \ρ �' σκ�π�' τ"λη ε#σ' κα' αJτια τ�ν πραττ�μ"νων )κε�νων Vνεκα.

15 E.g. 531.24–27; 542.28–31; 543.2–3; 16–18; 19–22; 544.10–15; 547.14–17; 557.24–41; 562.22–26; 564.10–13; 573.11–13; 19–21; 585.17–24; 585.35–586.2; 611.28–31; 614.35–615.2; 615.10–14; 615.35–616.2.

16 Μετ* δ? τα+τα περ' �δ�νLς Jσως Vπεται διελ ε,ν.17 Τ� σως R δι* �ιλ.σ��ν εXπεν ε;λ�2ειαν R )νδεικν�μεν�ς, Mτι ε# μ"ν )στιν � �δ�νN

μ"ρ�ς τLς &ρετLς, Iς κα' τ�+ %ππ�υ τ� Aλ�γ�ν, �;κ Jσως &λλ’ &ν�γκη περ' �δ�νLς ε#πε,ν.&ναγκα,�ν γ*ρ ε#δ"ναι τ* μ"ρη )5 [ν τ� Mλ�ν τ�,ς 2�υλ�μ"ν�ις μα ε,ν καλ�ς τ� Mλ�ν, Mτιπ�τ" )στιν. ε# δ’ �;κ Fστι μ"ρ�ς &λλ’ �O�ν σ�μπτωμ� τι κα' σκι* τα,ς καλλ�σταις )νεργε�αις)πισυμ2α�ν�υσα, Jσως δε, λ"γειν περ' α;τLς. δι* τ� Jσως; δι.τι δυνατ.ν )στι κα' δ��α τ�ν)πισυμ2αιν.ντων μαν �νειν τ* πρ�γματα, �Oς Vπεται τ* τ�ι�δε συμπτ7ματα. δυνατ�ν γ�ρ)στι γν�ναι τριτα��υ ��σιν κα' Aνευ τ�ν /π�μ"νων α;τD� συμπτωμ�των, ��λεμεσ�ας κα'$δρ�τ�ς κα' τ�ν Aλλων, κα' ε;δαιμ�ν�ας �;σ�αν δ��α τ�+ γιν7σκειν τ� )στιν �δ�ν�, ε# μNμ"ρ�ς α;τLς )στιν, &λλ� τι τ�ν συμ2αιν.ντων α;τCL.


on the medical example of the symptom (symptoma), and this as follows:he claims that it is not necessary to discuss pleasure when talking abouteudaimonia, because just as it is possible to understand the nature oftertian fever without knowing its symptoms, namely sweat and vomit-ing of bile, it similarly is possible to understand the nature of eudaimo-

nia without knowing much about pleasure; for pleasure supervenes on(episymbainousa) eudaimonia, just like symptoms supervene on what theyare symptoms of.

The relation between pleasure and eudaimonia is a central issue inAristotle’s ethics, since it is important for him to demarcate his ethicaltheory from those of his predecessors or contemporaries; they eitheridentified pleasure with the ultimate good, and thus its possession witheudaimonia, or they claimed that pleasure is not at all a good, and thusnot desirable in itself, or, finally, that eudaimonia involves some pleasureas a good. Aristotle’s account of pleasure as an activity (energeia), ratherthan a movement (kinesis), of the soul marks his innovation in under-standing pleasure as an activity which completes or perfects (teleioun)virtuous human action without actually being its final aim (telos). It iswell-known that many different interpretations have been suggested bymodern scholars in connection with Aristotle’s notion of pleasure andits relation to eudaimonia. More specifically, many different interpreta-tions have been offered to explain the alleged inconsistency betweenAristotle’s account of pleasure in book VII and that in book X; forthough in book VII Aristotle talks of pleasure as an activity of the soul,in book X pleasure seems at times to be taken as what completes orperfects an activity, and thus appears as an end in itself.

I do not intend to get involved in this debate. Still, I want to drawattention to the way Michael understands Aristotle’s notion of pleasureand to what he consequently has to say about the relation betweenpleasure and eudaimonia in his comments. For what seems novel inMichael’s understanding of Aristotle’s notion of pleasure is his anal-ogy of pleasure as a symptom of eudaimonia, an analogy which wefind nowhere in Aristotle’s text. Furthermore, Michael explains whatit means for pleasure to be a symptom of eudaimonia, namely that plea-sure supervenes on it; and it is interesting to note here that, insteadof Aristotle’s verb ‘epigenesthai’ (1104b4; 1174b33), Michael twice uses theverb ‘episymbainesthai’ (530.7; 8),18 a verb which we find repeatedly in

18 Cf. also ‘symbainesthai’ in 530.12.


Galen’s medical treatises.19 Finally, Michael also explains what it meansfor something to supervene on something else, by putting forward anepistemological criterion; for, according to him, something superveneson something else, if the knowledge of what supervenes is not a nec-essary prerequisite for the understanding of the nature of the thing onwhich it supervenes (530.7–12).

I do not know whether the medical example of a symptom in con-nection with the view that pleasure supervenes on eudaimonia as itssymptom for the first time was introduced into the discussion by Mi-chael in the twelfth century, or whether he simply followed an ear-lier interpretation of Aristotle’s text in a commentary which has beenlost. But leaving aside the issue of originality, I think that Michael’s useof this medical analogy is indeed helpful in understanding Aristotle’snotion of pleasure and its relation to eudaimonia; for it indicates that therelation between pleasure and eudaimonia is certainly not an accidentalone, but pleasure is inseparable from eudaimonia without being a part ofit. The analogy which Aristotle himself uses, namely that of pleasure ‘asan end which supervenes as the bloom of youth on those in the flowerof their age’ (1174b),20 has proved to be more cryptic and much moredifficult to decipher.

The second case I want to discuss concerns Michael’s references tomedicine as a paradigmatic discipline. That is to say, in his attemptto determine the position of ethics and politics among the sciences,Michael, as Aristotle before him, uses the example of medicine inorder to establish its epistemic status and then compare it with that ofethics and politics. But though the example of medicine as a scientificdiscipline proved useful to Aristotle himself in the Nicomachean Ethics,Michael’s account of medicine as a science is more systematic andinteresting in its details, especially in its exposition of those particularcharacteristics of medicine responsible for its scientific character.

Michael claims that medicine is a science. In his commentary ofbook V of the Nicomachean Ethics he draws the distinction betweensciences and rational abilities (3.6–16).21 According to him, rhetoric

19 E.g. XV 528.2K; XVIIA 164.2K; XVIIIA 89.18K; 396.8K.20 Iς )πιγιν.μεν.ν τι τ"λ�ς, �O�ν τ�,ς &κμα��ις � Eρα.21 &λλ* δι* τ� #ατρ�ν λ"γ�μεν τ�ν δυν�μεν�ν κα' τ* =γιειν* κα' τ* ν�σ7δη πρ�ττειν,

�μ��ως δ? κα' διαλεκτικ�ν κα' {�τ�ρα τ�ν δυν�μεν�ν )�’ /κ�τερα )πι�ειρε,ν; R Mτι κα'α$ )πιστLμαι κα' α$ δυν�μεις α$ α;τα� ε#σι τ�ν )ναντ�ων> �; γ*ρ F��υσι τ� εXναι )ν τD�τ� Vτερ�ν τ�ν &ντικειμ"νων δ�νασ αι κα' 2��λεσ αι δεικν�ναι, Eσπερ � δικαι�σ�νη )ντD� 2��λεσ αι κα' δ�νασ αι μ.να τ* δ�καια, &λλ’ Fστιν α;τα,ς s τε παρασκευN κα' �


and dialectic are rational abilities, because they attempt to do one orthe other of two contraries (ta antikeimena epicheirein), whereas medicineand music are sciences, because, though they require knowledge ofboth contraries (ginoskein ta antikeimena), they aim at only one of them.A similar distinction between sciences and rational abilities also isfound in Michael’s commentary of book X of the Nicomachean Ethics,though medicine is not explicitly mentioned there (616.3–6).22 Hence,medicine on Michael’s view is a science, because, though it presupposesknowledge of both contraries, namely how to cure and how to harmpatients, medicine aims only at restoring patients’ health.

To establish medicine among the sciences, and consequently alsoethics and politics, Michael seems to closely follow the tradition of theother ancient and Byzantine commentators on the Nicomachean Ethics.This subject I have already discussed in another paper.23 What I wantto focus on now is what Michael has to say about those particularcharacteristics of medicine that give it the status of a science, andespecially about the type of knowledge medicine requires. Michaeloften points out in his comments on book X of the Nicomachean Ethics

that medicine, just like the theoretical sciences, involves knowledge ofthe universal. He says, for instance, that medicine is knowledge not ofParmenides, but of all old men in general, and not of Socrates, but of allmen with Socrates’ temperament. Sometimes, though, Michael adds, itis more important for treating a patient to know from experience theparticular case than to know the general rules of medicine (614.15–27).24

Thus, according to him, it is perfectly justifiable that doctors often do

2��λησις κα' τ� εXναι πρ�ς τ* &ντικε�μενα )πι�ειρε,ν. τ�+τ� δ? λ"γω )π' τLς {ητ�ρικLς κα'διαλεκτικLς> )π' δ? τLς #ατρικLς �;� �@τως, &λλ’ Fστιν α;τCL τ� εXναι )ν τD� γιν7σκειν τ*&ντικε�μενα. δυν�μεις δ? λ"γει τNν διαλεκτικNν κα' {ητ�ρικ�ν, )πιστ�μας δ? μ�υσικNν κα'#ατρικ�ν> κα' γ*ρ α!ται τ�ν &ντικειμ"νων ε#σ' γνωστικα�.

22 π�λιτικ'ς κα� τ(ν λ�ιπ(ν )πιστημ(ν κα� δυν�μεων; δυν�μεις )κ�λ�υν �$ παλαι�'τ*ς )πι�ειρ��σας τ"�νας ε#ς τ&ναντ�α, �O�ν {ητ�ρικNν διαλεκτικ�ν, )πιστ�μας δ? τ*ς μNτ�ια�τας, �O�ν &ρι μητικNν γεωμετρ�αν �υσικ�ν.

23 Ierodiakonou (2005a).24 Mτι δ? α$ )πιστLμαι τ* κ�ιν* διδ�σκ�υσιν, Jσμεν Bπαντες �$ τα�τας μετι.ντες. � γ*ρ

#ατρικN �; διδ�σκει τ� συμ�"ρει Σωκρ�τει, &λλ* τ� π�σCη κρ�σει �π��α � Σωκρ�τ�υς, �O�νπ�σCη ερμCL κα' 5ηρP , κα' τ� παντ' γ"ρ�ντι, &λλ’ �; τ� Παρμεν�δCη. � μ?ν �6ν τ� κα .λ�υε#δlς )πιμελη ε�η Zν κα' τ�+ κα ’ Vνα. &λλ* κα' Vνα τιν* τ�+ κα .λ�υ &γν��+ντα �;δ?νκωλ�ει )πιμελη Lνα� τιν�ς /ν�ς )κ πε�ρας ε#δ7ς, τ�να τε τ* q�ελ�+ντα α;τ�ν κα' τ�να τ*2λ�πτ�ντα. κα' ε#σ� τινες μ λλ�ν q�ελ�+ντες α=τ�0ς τ�ν #ατρ�ν )κ πε�ρας γιν7σκ�ντεςτ* σ7��ντα α=τ��ς, Eστε κα' � πατNρ � γιν7σκων )κ πε�ρας τ�ν υ$�ν π�,α τ�ν γυμνασ�ωνq�ελ�+σι, μ λλ�ν Zν γυμν�σειε τ�+ γυμναστ�+. δι��σει δ? � τ�ι�+τ�ς τ�+ τ� κα .λ�υε#δ.τ�ς, Mτι � τ� κα .λ�υ ε#δlς π�λλ�0ς Zν #�σαιτ� κα' π�λλ�0ς Zν &μ"μπτως γυμν�σειεν,


not follow the general rule; for example, although in general those whohave fever should not eat, doctors realise that sometimes not eatingis not beneficial to certain patients (cf. 612.22–33). And again this issomething doctors learn from experience. Hence, medicine does notonly involve knowledge of the universal but presupposes a great dealof experience, which means that medicine as a discipline should beclosely connected with its practical exercise.25 Michael explicitly saysthat doctors do not only have knowledge of the universal, but mostimportantly they cure patients; this after all is the reason why it iscrucial not only to know what the medical textbooks say, but also howto combine this with practical experience in treating patients (618.25–619.4).26

Michael’s insistence on the importance of combining reason andexperience in medicine is not novel; on the contrary, it is very muchin the spirit of Aristotle as well as of Galen. For Galen, too, suggestsin many places of his voluminous writings that we should, on the onehand, learn as much as possible from experience and develop a body ofempirical knowledge that is quite uncontaminated by any theory, and,on the other hand, develop a general theory, and then check the resultsof this theory against our body of empirical knowledge. He thus tries tofind a position from which one can see that there is an important placein medicine for the approach of the Empiricist doctors, just as thereis a need for the general theories which the Rationalist doctors adhereto, that the two do not exclude but rather complement each other, andthat they depend on each other in an accomplished doctor. Indeed,it may be Galen’s influence which accounts in good part for the fact

�!τ�ς δ? )κε,ν�ν μ.ν�ν :ν )κ πε�ρας �Xδεν, Mτι πρ�ς τ�ν τ�ι��των q�ελε,ται, 2λ�πτεταιδ? παρ* τ�ν τ�ι��των.

25 Cf. V 8.15–28; 63.2–20; 64.3–14; IX 513.19–22; 617.10–14; 618.4–7.26 Iς κα' )π' τLς #ατρικLς, �ησ�ν, �ρ�μεν. �; γ*ρ � συναγαγlν τ* #ατρικ* 2ι2λ�α κα'

&νεγνωκlς α;τ* δ�ναται τ* #ατρικ* πρ�ττειν> κα�τ�ι λ"γ�υσιν, Mτι Mδε μ?ν ν�σε,, π ς �ν�σ�ν R �μ�ι�μερ?ς ν.σημα ν�σε, R \ργανικ.ν, &λλ* τ.δε μ?ν �O�ν \ργανικ�ν �; ν�σε,δι* τ�δε κα' τ�δε, �μ�ι�μερ?ς Aρα, κα' τ�+τ� R τ.δε R τ.δε R τ.δε, &λλ* μNν �; τ.δε�;δ? τ.δε Mδε ν�σε, δι* τ�δε κα' τ�δε> τ.δε Aρα> &λλ* μNν τ.δε εραπε�εται, ε# τ��ι, κα'δι* κεν7σεως τLς &π� �λε2�ν κα' δι* κα �ρσεως κα' $δρ7των> κα' τα+τα διελ .ντες κα'τ�ν τρ.π�ν τLς εραπε�ας ε#π.ντες &γν��+σι τ� π�ιητ"�ν, εJτε �λ"2α δε, τεμε,ν R $δρ�τακινLσαι R γαστ"ρα λαπ�5αι. � δ? Bμα τD� λ.γDω κα' τNν πε,ραν F�ων ε; 0ς πρ�ττει, ε#δlςτ� δε, πρ 5αι ν+ν κα' τ� μ�. κα' Fστιν � ε#ρημ"νη τ�ν ν�σημ�των δια�ρεσις κα' τ�ν #αμ�τωντ�,ς μ?ν )μπειρικ�,ς κα' τ�,ς λ�γικ�,ς Bμα q�"λιμ�ς, τ�,ς δ? μ.να τ* 2ι2λ�α &νεγνωκ.σιν�;δαμ�ς. Iς �6ν )π' τLς #ατρικLς �@τω κα' )π' τ�ν ν.μων κα' π�λιτει�ν F��ι Zν IςσυναγωγCL τ�ν τ�ι��των>


that, after his time, doctors as well as those who discuss the theory andpractise of medicine, like Michael does, seem to have lost their interestin the ancient dispute between the ancient medical schools, namely theEmpiricists, the Rationalists and the Methodists.27

But Michael does not agree with Galen only in his understandingof medicine as a science which depends both on theory and on practi-cal experience. He also gives an explanation similar to that of Galen’sas to why in the case of medicine it is not enough to have knowl-edge of the universal (540.3–38).28 For Michael points out that there issomething indefinite in the practice of medicine, namely that medicinewhen it comes to restoring the health of particular patients accepts ofdegrees. This does not mean, according to Michael, that health itselfaccepts of degrees, or in other words that medical knowledge is any-thing but universal. However, as soon as we consider, not health in

27 Frede (1985).28 Κα' �!τ�ς � συλλ�γισμ�ς )ν δευτ"ρDω σ��ματι περα�νεται �=τωσ�> � �δ�νN &.ριστ.ς

)στι, π ν &γα �ν Iρισμ"ν�ν )στ�ν, � �δ�νN Aρα �;κ Fστιν &γα .ν. )ν�σταται δ? κ&ντ��τDω πρ�ς τNν λ"γ�υσαν πρ.τασιν, Mτι � �δ�νN &.ριστ.ν τι πρ γμ� )στι κα� �ησιν> ε#μ?ν )κ τ�+ sδεσ αι &�ρ�στ�υ Hντ�ς (�$ μ?ν γ*ρ sδ�νται μ λλ�ν, �$ δ? Uττ�ν, κα' �$ μ?νμ.γις )π' �δ�νNν �ρμ�σιν, �$ δ? τ��ι�ν) ε# μ?ν )κ τ�+ sδεσ αι &�ρ�στ�υ Hντ�ς κα' τNν�δ�νNν &.ριστ.ν τι λ"γ�υσι, περι�αν�ς ψε�δ�νται. τ�+τ� γ*ρ )π��σ�υσι κα' κατ* τ�ν&ρετ�ν &γα �ν �;σ�ν κα' κατ* τLς =γιε�ας κα' κατ* τ�ν )πιστημ�ν> κα' γ*ρ κα' )π'τ��των �ρ ται τ� &.ριστ�ν> �$ μ?ν γ*ρ μ λλ�ν =για�ν�υσι κα' μ λλ.ν ε#σι γραμματικ�'κα' μ λλ�ν σ7�ρ�νες κα' μ λλ�ν &νδρε,�ι κα' μ λλ�ν μετ"��υσι τ�ν &ρετ�ν κα' V5εωνκα' )πιστημ�ν, �$ δ? Uττ�ν. Eστε κατ* τ�+τ�ν τ�ν λ.γ�ν Fσ�νται κα' τ�ν &ρετ�ν κα' �=γ�εια κα' τ�ν )πιστημ�ν /κ�στη τε μ λλ�ν κα' Uττ�ν F��υσα δι* τ� τ�0ς μ?ν μ λλ�νμετ"�ειν κα' μ λλ�ν )νεργε,ν κατ’ α;τ�ς, τ�0ς δ? Uττ�ν> κα' Fσ�νται κατ* τ�+τ� κα' α!ται&.ριστ�ι κα' �α+λαι. ε# δ? �; κατ* τ�+ sδεσ αι τ� &.ριστ�ν κατηγ�ρ�+σιν, &λλ* κατ’α;τLς τLς �δ�νLς, κα' �@τω δι�δηλ�ν τ� ψε+δ�ς. Eσπερ κα' τ� εXδ�ς τLς =γιε�ας κα' τ�τ� <ν εXναι =γ�εια Vν τι κα' τα;τ.ν )στιν Iρισμ"ν�ν κα' &νεπ�δεκτ�ν τ�+ μ λλ�ν κα' Uττ�ν.τ� γ*ρ =γ�εια κα' τ� τ� <ν εXναι =γιε�ας &νεπ�τατ�ν κα' &ν�νετ.ν )στιν. Vκαστ�ν γ*ρ τ�+ ’Mπερ )στ'ν �cτε )π�τασιν �cτε Aνεσιν )πιδ"�εται, �O�ν � &νδρε�α � σω�ρ�σ�νη κα' /κ�στητ�ν )πιστημ�ν, τ�,ς δ? κατ’ α;τ*ς λεγ�μ"ν�ις τ� μ λλ�ν κα' Uττ�ν )ν�ρ ται, �@τω κα'τ� εXδ�ς τLς �δ�νLς κα' τ� τ� <ν εXναι �δ�νLς &νεπ�τατ�ν κα' &ν�νετ.ν )στιν, Eστε κα'Iρισμ"ν�ν, Eστε κα' &γα .ν. λ"γει δ? �μιγε1ς μ?ν �δ�ν*ς α;τ� κα ’ α=τ� �ωρ�ς τιν�ς=π�κειμ"ν�υ τ� εXδ�ς τLς �δ�νLς ν��μεν�ν κα' Gπλ�ς π ν Aλλ� εXδ�ς, �O�ν λευκ.τητα,μελαν�αν, =γ�ειαν> μεμιγμ"νας δ? τ*ς με ’ =π�κειμ"ν�υ ν��υμ"νας, �O�ν τ*ς )ν )μ�' κα'σ�' κα' τ�,ς Aλλ�ις )ν��σας. α$ μ?ν �6ν μεμιγμ"ναι, α� )ν )μ�' κα' σ�' )ν )πιτ�σει κα'&ν"σει %στανται κα' &ναπεπλησμ"ναι ε#σ' τLς &�ριστ�ας, α;τ* δ? τ* εJδη, �O�ν � =γ�ειακα' � �δ�νN κα' τ* Aλλα, Eσπερ εJρηται, &ν�νετα κα' &νεπ�τατα κα "στηκεν. Mτι δ? π�λ0τ� &.ριστ�ν κα' σ�εδ�ν &περ�ληπτ�ν τ� )ν /κ�στ�ις τLς =γιε�ας δηλ�+σιν α$ κρ�σεις. ε#γ*ρ � τ�ι�δε κρ σις τ�ν )ν �μ,ν στ�ι�ε�ων )στ'ν � =γ�εια, α$ δ? κρ�σεις κα' τ� )ν α;τα,ςμ λλ�ν κα' Uττ�ν &.ριστ�ν, δLλ�ν Iς κα' α$ /π.μεναι τα�ταις =γ�ειαι &.ριστ�� ε#σι. κα' τ�λ"γω τ*ς τ�ν π�ντων, Mπ�υ κα' τ�+ α;τ�+ κα' /ν�ς �O�ν Σωκρ�τ�υς κα ’ Eραν Iς ε#πε,ν)πιτε�νεται κα' &ν�εται;


general, but the health of a particular person, we should consider dif-ferent degrees of health. And this is what Galen claims, when he distin-guishes between the general nature of a disease and the treatment of aparticular patient; the former should be diagnosed through a scientificand certain method, whereas the latter can only follow a conjectural orstochastic procedure. According to Galen, this distinction results fromthe unpredictable and unique features of the individual’s temperament,whereas the theorems of medicine are universal and certain.29

2. The Distinction between Two Kinds of Eudaimonia

Let me now turn to the second issue, namely Michael’s distinctionbetween two kinds of eudaimonia. There are indeed many passages inhis commentary on book X of the Nicomachean Ethics in which Michaeldistinguishes between what he calls theoretical eudaimonia and politicalor practical eudaimonia (529.9–11 et passim), a distinction which we findnowhere in Aristotle’s text, at least not in these terms. But is it a dis-tinction which Aristotle himself implicitly adheres to, or does Michaelinterpret Aristotle’s text in a way which clearly is not Aristotelian?

But we should begin with another relevant distinction also drawn byMichael, namely the distinction between two kinds of virtues, the eth-ical or political or practical virtues and the theoretical virtues (571.31–572.12).30 At first one could think that this distinction corresponds exact-ly to Aristotle’s distinction of ethical (ethikai) and intellectual (dianoetikai)virtues at the end of book I of the Nicomachean Ethics. But the termi-nology used here, i.e. the characterisation of virtues as political and

29 Ierodiakonou (1995).30 περ' &ρετ�ν μ"ν, Mτι � μ?ν πρακτικN κα' π�λιτικN λεγ�μ"νη ε;δαιμ�ν�α τ"λ�ς )στ'

τ�ν πρακτικ�ν κα' p ικ�ν &ρετ�ν, � δ? εωρητικN ε;δαιμ�ν�α τ"λ�ς )στ' πασ�ν τ�νπρακτικ�ν κα' εωρητικ�ν &ρετ�ν. διττ�ν γ*ρ τ�ν Aν ρωπ�ν �!τ�ς � �ιλ.σ��ς δ�5�-�ων, τ�ν μ?ν )κ ψυ�Lς κα' σ7ματ�ς, τ�ν δ? ν�+ν (\ν�μ��ει δ? ν�+ν τNν λ�γικNν �ω�ν, Qτ�ια;τ� τ� λ�γικ�ν τLς ψυ�Lς μ"ρ�ς, :ν δN ν�+ν κα' Hντως κα' πρ7τως κα' μ�λιστα Aν ρω-π�ν τ� εται), διττNν κα' τNν ε;δαιμ�ν�αν ε=ρ�σκει, τNν μ?ν ν�ερ*ν κα' τελε�αν, ]ν καλε, εωρητικ�ν, τNν δ? μετ* τ�ν )κτ�ς =�ισταμ"νην. )κτ�ς δ? λ"γ�υσι τ�ν τε τ�+ σ7ματ�ς =γ�-ειαν, τNν τLς @λης ��ρηγ�αν, τNν ε;γ"νειαν κα' τNν ε;τεκν�αν. κα' ε#κ.τως τ�+τ� λ"γει κα'σ�μ�ων�ν /αυτD�. τD� γ*ρ τ�ν Aν ρωπ�ν )κ ψυ�Lς κα' σ7ματ�ς &��ρ��ντι &ν�γκη κα'τNν τ�+ σ7ματ�ς V5ιν ε#ς τNν τLς &ν ρωπ�νης 〈ε;δαιμ�ν�ας〉 συμπλ�ρωσιν παραλαμ2�νειν.�; γ*ρ δ�π�υ ατ"ρ�υ τ�ν τ�+ Mλ�υ μ�ρ�ων κακ�ς F��ντ�ς εcδαιμ�ν Fσται π�τ? τ� Mλ�ν.δι.τι μ?ν �6ν τ"λ�ς )στ' τ� διττ�ν τ�+τ� τLς ε;δαιμ�ν�ας τ�ν &ρετ�ν, δι* τ�+τ� τ* περ'τ�ν &ρετ�ν διLλ εν &μ��τ"ρων, τ�ν τε πρακτικ�ν κα' τ�ν λ�γικ�ν.


theoretical, reminds us more of the distinction between political andtheoretical virtues which we find, for instance, in Plotinus and then inPorphyry; though they both add to these yet another category, that ofthe purificatory virtues which help us to be free of bodily passions.31

And moreover, when Michael explicitly says that the Peripatetics donot further distinguish between political and ethical virtues, whereasthe Platonists do (578.12–25),32 what most probably he is aware of isIamblichus’ and later Platonists’ distinction between political and ethi-cal virtues.33 According to Michael, then, the person who has the polit-ical virtues achieves political eudaimonia, whereas the person who hasboth the political and the theoretical virtues achieves theoretical eudai-

monia. Hence, political eudaimonia is an imperfect kind of eudaimonia,whereas theoretical eudaimonia is the only perfect eudaimonia the virtuousperson can have.34 But is there only a terminological similarity betweenMichael’s and the Platonists’ view? Or does Michael present us withan interpretation of Aristotle’s text which is influenced to a significantdegree by Platonic views?

There is no doubt that Michael’s theoretical eudaimonia is the eudai-

monia which Aristotle discusses in book X of the Nicomachean Ethics andwhich can be achieved through contemplation (theoria). On the otherhand, political eudaimonia seems to be the kind of eudaimonia which canbe achieved both by the acquisition of external goods and by the exer-cise of the ethical virtues, i.e. what Aristotle might appear to discussin the early books of the Nicomachean Ethics. But should political eudai-

monia be regarded as a kind of eudaimonia in Aristotle’s sense? For Aris-

31 Plotinus, Enneads 1.2.1.15–16 et passim; Porphyry, Sent. 32.32 Τ� κρ�τιστ�ν σημα�νει τ� &κρ.τατ�ν> λ"γει δ? κρατ�στην κα' &κρ�τ�την )ν"ργειαν

κα' ε;δαιμ�ν�αν τNν ν�ερ*ν �ω�ν. δε�5ας δ�, Mτι � ε;δαιμ�ν�α ψυ�Lς )στιν )ν"ργεια κατ’&ρετ�ν, )πειδN � &ρετN διττ�, s τε πρακτικ�, ]ν κα' p ικNν κα' π�λιτικNν �$ )κ τ�+Περιπ�τ�υ καλ�+σιν (�$ γ*ρ Πλατωνικ�' /τ"ρας εXναι λ"γ�υσι τ*ς π�λιτικ*ς τ�ν p ικ�ν)>)πε' �6ν διττN κατ’ α;τ�0ς � &ρετ�, � μ?ν p ικ�, � δ? εωρητικ�, κα' δι* τ�+τ� κα'� ε;δαιμ�ν�α διττ�, )ν μ?ν τD� πρ7τDω 2ι2λ�Dω εXπε περ' π�λιτικLς ε;δαιμ�ν�ας, κα ’ ]ν� π�λιτικ�ς ε;δα�μων κ�σμε, τ* �ε�ρω τD� λ.γDω, )ν τ��τDω δ? λ"γει περ' τLς εωρητικLςε;δαιμ�ν�ας κα' τ�+ κατ’ α;τNν ε;δα�μ�ν�ς, Mς )στιν � πρ7τως κα' Hντως Aν ρωπ�ς κα'� &λη ιν�ς Aν ρωπ�ς, � )ν �μ,ν δηλ�ν.τι ν�+ς κα' )πιγιν.μεν�ς � τ�ι�+τ�ς ε;δα�μων τD�π�λιτικD� ε;δα�μ�νι. &δ�νατ�ν γ�ρ )στιν Fν τινι γεν"σ αι ν�ερ*ν �ωNν μN μετρ�σαντι τ*π� η δι* τ�ν p ικ�ν &ρετ�ν κα' κατ* τNν π�λιτικNν ε;δαιμ�ν�αν ��σαντι.

33 On the different kinds of virtues, cf. Dillon (1990); Wildberg (2002); O’Meara(2003) 40–49.

34 For the Neoplatonic background of the notion of political eudaimonia, cf. O’Meara(2003), 90. For further discussion of the notion of political eudaimonia in Michael ofEphesos and in Eustratios of Nicaea, cf. O’Meara (2004) 113 and (2008) 48–49.


totle does not suggest that, if one acquires external goods and exer-cises the ethical virtues, then one can be said to have reached eudai-

monia. There is, of course, in contemporary Aristotelian scholarship adisputed question about whether eudaimonia can be reached only bycontemplation or whether ethical virtues and external goods are alsorequired; this is the famous issue of the so-called inclusive or the dom-inant conception of the end in Aristotle, and hence of his notion ofeudaimonia. But Michael’s distinction between political and theoreticaleudaimonia seems to try to circumvent this issue. For Michael does nottalk of one kind of eudaimonia, but of two kinds; one can achieve politi-cal eudaimonia just by acquiring external goods and exercising ethical orpolitical virtues, while someone who exercises both political and theo-retical virtues achieves theoretical eudaimonia. And theoretical eudaimonia

is obviously considered as the highest form of eudaimonia (kyrios, kratiste,teleia eudaimonia),35 since it presupposes practical eudaimonia; for it is notpossible, according to Michael, to devote one’s life to contemplation, ifone does not first manage to master the bodily passions and to live anethically virtuous life.

Does the difference between Aristotle’s theory and Michael’s inter-pretation merely lie in the fact that Michael attributes to the person ofethical or political virtues a kind of eudaimonia, even if this is not theperfect kind? There is a further distinction drawn by Michael in thiscontext which is very illuminating, especially in revealing the motiva-tion behind the distinction between political and theoretical eudaimonia

(580.3–18).36 On Michael’s view a human being should be thought of intwo ways: firstly, the human being as the composite of body and soul,and secondly, the human being as reason or intellect (nous); indeed, this

35 E.g. 558.7; 578.9; 580.4; 9; 600.31.36 gf λ"γων λ.γ�ς τNν τ�+ ει�τ�τ�υ τ�ν )ν �μ,ν κατ* τNν �#κε�αν &ρετNν )ν"ργειαν

τελε�αν ε;δαιμ�ν�αν, &τελεστ"ραν δ? τNν π�λιτικNν σ�μ�ων.ς )στι κα' τ�,ς πρ.τερ�ν )ντD� πρ7τDω 2ι2λ�Dω {η ε,σι κα' τCL &λη ε�Pα. )πε' γ*ρ διττ�ν &��ρ��μεν τ�ν Aν ρωπ�ν κα'τ�ν Hντως κα' μ�λιστα κα' πρ7τως Aν ρωπ�ν τ�ν ν�+ν �μ�ν εXνα� �αμεν, δε�τερ�ν δ?τ�ν )κ ψυ�Lς κα' σ7ματ�ς, &λη "ς )στι κα' σ�μ�ων�ν τCL &λη ε�Pα τ� λ"γειν τNν )ν"ργειαντ�+ Hντως κα' πρ7τως &ν ρ7π�υ κρατ�στην κα' τελε�αν κα' σεμν�τ"ραν τLς π�λιτικLςε;δαιμ�ν�ας, κα' τ�σ��τDω 2ελτ��να κα' τιμιωτ"ραν, MσDω τ* =π�κε�μενα περ' T )νεργε,τ�ν =π�κειμ"νων τCL π�λιτικCL κρε�ττω κα "στηκε. τLς μ?ν γ*ρ π�λιτικLς )στι τ� κ.σμ�ν)π�γειν τ�,ς δευτ"ρ�ις κα' τ�5ιν κα' Mρ�ν τι "ναι (κα' εJρηται π�λλ* περ' τ��των )ν τD�πρ7τDω 2ι2λ�Dω), τα�της δ? &ν�τασις πρ�ς τ* κρε�ττω κα' Vνωσις κα' γν�σις τLς τ�ν ε�ων�;σι�ν κ�ινων�ας κα' δια��ρ ς, Mτε κα' )ν"ργεια λ"γεται ν�+ς � τα+τα εωρε,ν �@τωςδυν�μεν�ς. Fστι μ?ν γ*ρ κα' πρ� τ�+ )νεργε,ν δ�νασ αι ε;δαιμ.νως κατ* τNν ν�ερ*ντα�την κα' Fν ε�ν �ωNν �;σ�α &σ7ματ�ς �ωρ��εσ αι δυναμ"νη τ�+ �D7�υ τ��τ�υ, �! τNν)πιτρ�πε�αν Fλα�ε.


latter notion of the human being is, according to him, the true humanbeing (alethes, alethinos, ontos, malista, protos anthropos).37 Moreover, politi-cal or ethical virtues characterise the human being as the composite ofbody and soul, whereas theoretical virtues characterise the true humanbeing. But this is not a distinction we find in Aristotle’s Nicomachean

Ethics. Of course, in book X Aristotle does talk about the compositenature of human beings to which the ethical virtues belong, whereasthe exercise of the virtue of reason is contemplation and we should tryso far as we can to achieve this. But this does not mean that Aristo-tle would accept Michael’s distinction between the human being as thecomposite of body and soul and the true human being. Rather, the ter-minology used here of the true human being is again Platonising, andthe distinction itself between the composite human being and the truehuman being can be found, for instance, in Plotinus’ Enneads.38

In addition, the similarity to Platonic views extends further to theway Michael describes the condition of theoretical eudaimonia. For hedefines theoretical eudaimonia not only as the knowledge of the divine,39

something we would expect from a reading of Aristotle’s Ethics orMetaphysics, but as the knowledge of and connection with (epafe) thedivine.40 In this context, moreover, Michael talks of the attempt toseparate oneself from the animal which resides in us and unite ourselves(enosis) with the divine,41 by being drawn to it (anatasis)42 and acceptingits illumination (ellampsis).43 We are clearly reminded here not onlyof Plotinus’ terminology, but also of Platonic doctrines.44 It could beargued, however, that Aristotle also claims that we as rational beingsmust try, so far as we can, to, in contemplation, share in the life ofthe divine. But in this case, too, Aristotle thinks of the human beingwho, being the composite of body and soul, tries to exercise theoreticalwisdom as far as humanly possible, rather than of the true human being

37 529.5–6; 576.25–32; 578.21; 579.15–16; 580.6–8; 585.8; 11; 588.35–36; 589.34;591.15–22; 592.22.

38 E.g. Enneads 1.1.7.20; 1.1.10.7; cf. 1.1.8.10; 4.7.14.10–13; 6.7.6.9–13.39 580.14–15; 581.12; 586.10; 18–19; 589.20.40 586.10; 589.20; 596.11.41 579.4; 580.14; 591.3.42 529.15; 580.14.43 586.17; 591.4; 603.31; 33.44 epafe: 1.2.6.13; 6.7.36.4; 6.9.7.25; ellampsis: 1.1.10.11; 1.1.11.2; 1.1.11.14; 1.12.25. Cf.

Proclus, In Alc. 3.103–104; 2.235–236; In Parm. 5.273; In Tim. 21; 75; 76; 79; 121; De prov.et fato 21–22; 24.


who separates itself from its bodily existence in order to be illuminatedby and connected with the divine.

Hence, I do not think that Michael simply uses philosophical lan-guage ‘coloured by Neoplatonism’, as Mercken suggests; rather, itseems to me that Michael does try ‘to force Aristotle into a Platonicmould’, or, in other words, he does attempt ‘to make Aristotle fit intoa Neoplatonic strait jacket.’45 But to stress the Platonic influence onMichael’s notion of eudaimonia to the exclusion of other sources alsowould be misleading. For the way he talks in particular of theoreti-cal eudaimonia indicates that his reading of Aristotle’s text is not closeto Aristotle’s spirit, but is rather an interpretation influenced by dif-ferent traditions; Neoplatonism is certainly one, but Christianity is alsopresent. For instance, Michael claims that, apart from being perfect, themost pleasant, continuous, chosen for itself and self-sufficient, a featureof theoretical eudaimonia is that in this state there is no need for regretand repentance (metameleia / metanoia).46 Aristotle does not characterisethe life of contemplation in these terms, nor do the Platonists stresssuch a characteristic of eudaimonia;47 on the other hand, both the notionof regret and that of repentance are very much part of the Christianoutlook.

Finally, there is an interesting passage in Michael’s comments ofbook X on the issue of the true human being, in which it becomesclear that Michael is conscious of the fact that what he presents isan interpretation of Aristotle’s text which is not at all unchallenged(576.25–32).48 For Michael here claims that the allegedly Aristoteliandistinction between the true human being and the human being asthe composite of body and soul implies that the true human beingis separated from the body, and thus continues to live after death.According to Michael, therefore, those who interpret Aristotle as notbelieving in the immortality of the soul are fundamentally wrong. Butwe can recognise here Michael’s attempt to reconcile his Christian

45 Mercken (1990) 434–435.46 566.34–35; 575.7–8; 582.35–39; 582.36; 589.24.47 Cf. Plotinus, Enneads 2.1.4.30; 2.9.6.2–3.48 κα' �ρP ς, Mπως τ�ν Hντως κα' μ�λιστα Aν ρωπ�ν )ν λ�γικCL �ωCL τ� εται κα' διττ�ν

α;τ�ν δι* τ��των &π��α�νεται, Vνα μ?ν τ�ν )κ ψυ�Lς κα' σ7ματ�ς, D[ κα' τ� ε6 �Lν κα'ε;δαιμ�νε,ν )ν τD� κατ* τ*ς &ρετ*ς �Lν εXπεν εXναι )ν τ�,ς Μεγ�λ�ις 8Η ικ�,ς, Iς κα' )ντD� πρ7τDω τ�νδε 2ι2λ�Dω, Aλλ�ν δ? τ�ν πρ7τως κα' Hντως Aν ρωπ�ν, τ�ν )ν �μ,ν ν�+ν=π?ρ �! πρ�ϊlν )ρε,. �ωρισ ε'ς δ? τ�+ σ7ματ.ς )στιν α;τ� τ�+ ’ Mπερ )στ�. κα' δLλ�ν)κ τ��των Iς �$ λ"γ�ντες τ�ν 8Αριστ�τ"λην νητNν δ�5��ειν τNν ψυ�Nν �;δ"ν τι λ"γ�υσιν.&λλ* περ' μ?ν τ��των )ν Aλλ�ις.


beliefs with Aristotle’s doctrines, though this might have been facilitatedby an already Platonising interpretation of Aristotle.

3. The Issue as to Whether Non-Rational

Animals Can Achieve Eudaimonia

It is time now to turn to the last issue I want to discuss briefly, namelyMichael’s comment about Aristotle’s claim that non-rational animalscannot achieve eudaimonia (598.18–599.38). Michael says that, since theperfect kind of eudaimonia is theoretical eudaimonia, and one can achievetheoretical eudaimonia only by exercising both political and theoreticalvirtues, and theoretical virtues crucially involve the excellence of rea-son, non-rational animals cannot achieve theoretical eudaimonia. This is,according to Michael, Aristotle’s view, but he crucially adds that it isalso his own view, Plato’s view and the view of all those who identifyeudaimonia with intellectual life (598.18–25).49

Mercken mentions this text as an example of a passage in whichMichael summons Plato in support of Aristotle’s views. He claimsthat such passages serve to clarify Aristotle’s text, without necessarilyproving Michael’s interest in defending or attacking Plato’s doctrines.50

Indeed there is no doubt that Michael here summons Plato in supportof Aristotle’s view, since Plato, too, would agree that non-rational ani-mals cannot attain eudaimonia. I think, though, that the way Michaelrefers to Plato is not as neutral as Mercken presents it. For it seemsthat Michael summons Plato in support of Aristotle’s views, becauseMichael considers him as an important authority, whose views haveparticular weight for him.

And a final short remark about the content of Michael’s comment.Although it seems that Plato and Aristotle are in agreement that non-rational animals cannot achieve eudaimonia, according to Michael theEpicureans and the later Stoics claim that this is possible. For in thecase of the Epicureans, Michael says, eudaimonia is identified with eupa-

49 Τ�ια�την )ν"ργειαν τNν εωρ�αν λ"γει, Qτ�ι τNν ν�ερ*ν �ωNν κα' γν�σιν τ�ν &ρ�στωνκα' ε�ων. λ"γει δ? Iς συλλε5αμ"ν�υς τ* παραλελειμμ"να κα' [ν πρ�συπακ��ειν F5ω εν�ρ�, Mτι κατ* μ?ν τ*ς τ�ν Aλλων �ιλ�σ.�ων 8Επικ�υρε�ων τε κα' τ�ν @στερ�ν Στωικ�νπερ' ε;δαιμ�ν�ας =π�λ�ψεις δ�νατα� τις ε;δαιμ�ν�αν μεταδιδ.ναι κα' τ�,ς &λ.γ�ις �D7�ις,κατ’ )μ? δ? κα' Πλ�τωνα κα' τ�0ς Aλλ�υς Mσ�ι τNν ε;δαιμ�ν�αν )ν ν�ερP �ωCL $στ�μεν,&δ�νατ�ν κατ* τα�την ε;δαιμ�νε,ν τ* Aλ�γα τ�ν �D7ων, )στερημ"να ν�+ κα' �ωLς λ�γικLς.

50 Mercken (1990) 435, n. 86.


theia; but non-rational animals can achieve eupatheia, therefore non-rational animals can achieve eudaimonia. In the case of the later Stoics,eudaimonia is identified with well-being, well-being is identified with liv-ing in accordance with nature, non-rational animals live in accordancewith nature, and therefore non-rational animals can achieve eudaimonia

(598.25–34).51

It is, I think, very interesting that Michael here refers at all tothe Epicureans and the later Stoics, though there is a question as towhat exactly he has in mind when he talks about the later Stoics.And it is striking that he tries to present their theories in a syllogisticform, though there is no evidence that the Stoics, or for that matterthe Epicureans, argued about this topic and in this particular way.Moreover, Michael’s presentation of the Stoic position is really unfair.The Stoics would never claim that non-rational animals can achieveeudaimonia, for what is important in their understanding of what itmeans for human beings to live in accordance with nature is thathuman beings can live in accordance with their rational nature, andthus can have a grasp of what they should or should not do in orderto achieve eudaimonia. But Michael’s criticism of the Epicurean and theStoic position is not at all original; for he clearly follows Plotinus, whoseviews on this subject he reworks or even almost quotes.52

In conclusion, I discussed three different issues which arise from Mi-chael of Ephesus’ comments on book X of the Nicomachean Ethics. It hasbecome clear by now that in the relevant passages Michael seems tohave been influenced by the views of Plato, Galen, Plotinus and theNeoplatonists; he even refers to the Hellenistic philosophers, thoughonly to argue against them. That is to say, Michael’s comments seem todo much more than simply present and elucidate Aristotle’s views.

Zervos has pointed out the Platonic influences on Michael, Praechterhas contrasted Michael of Ephesus, the Aristotelian, with Michael Psel-

51 Mτι δ? δυνατ�ν κατ* τ�0ς 8Επικ��ρ�υ τρ��μ�υς κα' τ�0ς Στωικ�0ς μετ"�ειν ε;δαι-μ�ν�ας κα' τ* Aλ�γα �D�α, δι* τ��των Aν τις παραστ�σειεν> ε# τ� ε;πα ε,ν ε6 �Lν )στι κατ’8Επ�κ�υρ�ν, τ� δ? ε6 �Lν τα;τ.ν )στι κατ’ 8Επ�κ�υρ�ν κα' τ�0ς Στωικ�0ς τD� ε;δαιμ�νε,ν,τ� ε;πα ε,ν Aρα ε;δαιμ�νε,ν )στιν> =π�ρ�ει δ? τ�,ς &λ.γ�ις �D7�ις τ� ε;πα ε,ν, Eστεκα' τ� ε;δαιμ�νε,ν. π�λιν, ε# τ� κατ* ��σιν δι�γειν κατ* τ�0ς Στωικ�0ς ε6 �Lν )στι,τ� δ? ε6 �Lν κα' κατ’ α;τ�0ς κα' κατ’ 8Επ�κ�υρ�ν ε;δαιμ�νε,ν )στι, τ� κατ* ��σιν Aραδι�γειν ε;δαιμ�νε,ν )στιν> &λλ* μNν =π�ρ�ει τ�,ς &λ.γ�ις �D7�ις τ� κατ* ��σιν δι�γειν &π�γεν"σεως μ"�ρι τLς &κμLς> ε;δαιμ�νε,ν Fστι Aρα τ* Aλ�γα �D�α.

52 Enneads 1.4.1–2. I would like to thank Dominic O’Meara for pointing out to methe source of Michael’s comments here.


los, the Platonist, Preus has claimed that Michael tries to stay as close aspossible to the spirit of Aristotle, Mercken has suggested that Michael’sAristotelianism is never a militant one.53 It seems that modern scholarshave moved from regarding Michael as a Platonist to regarding himas an Aristotelian, even if not a militant one. To stress once again thePlatonic roots of Michael’s comments, as I have done, does not meanthat I want to return to the view that he is a Platonist. On the contrary,what I have tried to show by working my way through these passagesof his commentary is that perhaps it is rather difficult to put a specificlabel to Michael. For Michael is a commentator of Aristotle, and thismeans that he thinks that Aristotle’s work is significant, and thus inexplaining it wants to stay close to his spirit. But this does not meanthat he agrees with Aristotle in everything. At the same time, Michaeloften follows Plato, Plotinus and the Neoplatonists, or other ancientthinkers, like for instance Galen. Besides, it may have been importantfor him, as a Christian commentator of ancient philosophical texts notto adhere uncritically to an Aristotelian, Platonic or other ancient view-point. Hence, it is, I think, essential in the future not only to closelyread all of Michael’s commentaries, before we attempt to assess hisoverall contribution in Byzantine thought, but to carefully reflect on therole of a commentator in twelfth-century Byzantium, as he no doubt is.

53 Zervos (1920) 222–223; Praechter (1931); Preus (1981b) 22; Mercken (1990) 434.

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INDEX

Abelard, Peter, 116Abraham, 41Agamemnon, 24Ailios Aristeides, 17Ailios Dionysios, 11Albertus Magnus, 66Alexander of Aphrodisias, 65, 74–75,

97–98, 107, 185Alexios I Komnenos, 24–25, 27, 40,

45–46, 49, 51, 53, 57–60, 135, 170Alpers, K., 111, 113, 117, 126Ammonius, 75Andronikos, son of the emperor

John II, 23Andronikos Kallistos, 67Andronikos Rhodios, 67Antioch, 51Apollo, 153Apollodoros, 157Arabatzis, G., 186Arethas of Caesarea, 10Aristophanes, 6, 11, 19–20, 29, 31Aristotle, 1, 14, 17, 20–21, 29–30,

36–38, 40–41, 45–50, 52–59, 61,64–69, 72–74, 76, 81–82, 88–90,93, 97, 103–105, 109, 113, 116–118, 122, 124, 129, 132, 134, 142,147–154, 156–158, 160, 163, 165,168–170, 172, 174–175, 177, 179,181, 183, 185–190, 192, 194–199,201

Artemis, 153Aspasius, 68, 185Athena, 40Athens, 14, 16, 22, 168Aubenque, P., 168–169, 172Augustine, 182

Bacon, Francis, 18Balme, D.M., 168Bardanes, George, 14Barker, E., 170–171

Basil of Caesarea, 8, 39Basil of Euchaita, 135Baynes, N., 43Bellerophontes, 10, 30Benakis, L., 65, 108, 111, 117–119Berroia, 26–27Bertha-Eirene, 23, 27, 29Blachernai, 51Blachernites, Theodore, 61Bogomils, 61Brentano, F., 180Brown, P., 43Browning, R., 149, 170, 185Bryennios, Nikephoros, 57Buckler, G., 149Budelmann, F., 30Bury, J.B., 43Bywater edition, 73

Caston, V., 183Constantine IX Monomachos, 28Constantine Paleokappas, 67Constantine VII Porphyrogennetos,

6, 37, 149Constantinople, 35, 38, 46, 51, 156–

157Coulon, V., 6Crete, 67Crusaders, 3, 8, 51, 60, 171, 183Cyclopes, 38

Damaskios, 71Dareios, 15Demodocus, 154Demosthenes, 17–18Digenes Akrites, 22Diktys of Crete, 24, 26Diogenes Laertius, 154Dionysios Periegetes, 30, 32, 34Dionysios Thrax, 14–15Doxopatres, John, 151Düring, I., 168, 179

224 index

Ebbesen, S., 118, 157–158, 160, 170,180–182, 185–187

Echetos, 152–153Eirene, 23, 25, 29Epictetus, 69Estienne, H., 12, 15–17Euclid, 47–48, 58, 76–77Euripides, 56Eustathios of Thessalonike, 11, 14–

15, 17, 20, 22, 29–37, 150Eustratios of Nicaea, 14, 20–21,

30, 37–40, 45–46, 48–54, 56–57, 59, 61, 65–66, 71–73, 75–83,85, 87–109, 111–114, 116–120,122–129, 131–132, 134, 136–138,140–143, 145–148, 151, 157, 169,185

Farquharson, A., 177Forster, E.S., 175Fowler, H.N., 175Frankopan, P., 155

Galen, 56, 190, 192–194, 200–201Gauthier, R., 169Gibbon, E., 18Giocarinis, K., 71, 117Greece, 3Gregory of Nazianzos, 14, 17–18, 39,

81, 101Grosseteste, Robert, 41, 66, 145–147,

155, 185

Hades, 54Hagia Sophia, 49Heliodoros of Proussa, 67Herakles, 24, 33, 59Hermogenes, 13, 16–17, 20, 40Hesiod, 19–20, 29–31, 33, 159–160Hesychios of Miletos, 18Heylbut, G., 67Homer, 7, 10–11, 15, 19–25, 27–28,

31–32, 35–36, 38, 59, 148, 150,153, 157

Iamblichos, 195Idomeneus, 24

Ierodiakonou, K., 104, 118–119, 124,129

Ikonion, 171Ioasaph, 67Irwin, T., 168, 179Isaac I Komnenos, 24–26, 29Isaac, son of Abraham, 41

Jacob, 41Jaeger, W., 174James of Venice, 66Jeffreys, E., 23Jeffreys, M., 23Jesus Christ, 33, 60, 135–139Jesus, son of Nun, 41Joannou, P., 108, 111–112, 116, 119–

120, 123, 126, 129Job, 41John Chrysostom, 56, 60John Filagrios, 67John Galenus, 20, 30, 33, 37John I Doukas, 34John II Komnenos, 22–23, 46, 170–

171John Italos, 21, 25, 51–52, 54–56, 61,

65, 68, 75, 89, 113, 126–129, 141–142

John of Damascus, 111–112, 128,184

John Sikeliotes, 151John Solomon, 55John Taronites, 57–58John VI Kantakouzenos, 67Jones, A.H.M., 18Julian, 7

Kadmos, 10Kazhdan, A., 111, 129Kerkyra, 14Knossos, 24Kointos, 26Komnene, Anna, 11, 21, 23–25, 37,

40, 46–62, 64, 145, 149, 155, 157,161, 169–171, 185

Komnenoi, 17Konstan, D., 169Kullmann, W., 168

index 225

Lamia, 147, 152Lattimore, R., 28Le Blond, J.M., 168, 179Leo Magentinos, 157–161Leo of Chalcedon, 40, 50, 52, 54,

134–136Leo the Philosopher, 10Leros, 154Leto, 153Libanios, 18Linear B, 10, 24Lloyd, A.C., 65–66, 108, 111, 113,

116–118, 124, 135Loeb Classical Library, 4Lykophron, 20, 29–31

Magdalino, P., 54Magnanimous Man, 58Manasses, Constantine, 23, 61Manuel I Komnenos, 23, 27, 46, 53,

57Marcus Aurelius, 69Maria Skleraina, 28Mauropous, John, 60Meleager, 157Melitene, 171Mercken, H.P.F., 65–66, 146–148,

150–151, 155, 157, 169, 186, 198–199, 201

Metochites, Theodore, 68Michael Choniates, 14, 22, 33Michael of Ephesus, 20, 30, 37–

39, 47–50, 64–65, 71, 145–148,151, 155, 157, 159–160, 163–201

Michael, later Patriarch of Con-stantinople, 54

Momigliano, A., 43Mommsen,T., 43Moses, 41, 102Muses, 7

Neilos of Calabria, 52, 54Nero, 24Nicholas of Methone, 25, 127Nikander, 29Nikephoros Blemmydes, 68

Nikephoros I, patriarch of Con-stantinople, 134, 142

Niketas Choniates, 47Niketas of Herakleia, 13–14, 40, 51,

140–141Niobe, 153Nussbaum, M., 169, 177

Odysseus, 24, 59Olympiodoros, 67Olympos, 14Oppian, 29Oxford Classical Texts, 4

Pachymeres, George, 67Palamedes, 10Pardos, Gregory, 13, 15–17, 20,

40Pargiter, E., 65Parmenides, 191Patriarch John IX Agapetos, 53Patroklos, 24Paul, 102Pausanias, 11Pegasos, 30Peleus, 15Perikles, 40Pfeiffer, R., 1, 16Pheidias, 132Philoponos, John, 15, 152, 184–185Phokas, John, 149Photios, 11, 17Pickard-Cambridge, W., 181Pindar, 20, 30–31, 33Plato, 18, 20–21, 47–48, 55, 57–60,

69, 76, 83, 90, 105, 112–113, 124,175–176, 184, 199–201

Plethon, George Gemistos, 68–69Plotinus, 33, 195, 197, 200–201Plutarch, 60, 69Polybios, 6Polykleitos, 132Pontus, 147Porphyry, 118, 124, 179, 195Praechter, K., 150, 170–171, 185, 200Preus, A., 169, 177, 186–187, 201Prisianus Lydus, 81

226 index

Prodromos, Theodore, 14, 21, 24,46–48, 53, 61, 157

Proklos, 25–26, 31, 71–72, 76–80,82–83, 85–88, 90–100, 103–105,108–109, 113, 120–122, 127–128,176, 179

Ps. Dionysios the Areopagite, 125Psellos, Michael, 13, 17–18, 20–21,

25–26, 28, 58, 65, 68, 71, 81, 89,113, 117, 126, 128–129, 142, 170,200

Pseudo–Aristotle, 68–69, 186Pseudo–Olympiodoros, 67Ptolemy, 47–48, 58

Quintus of Smyrna, 26

Ross, W.D., 183–184

Satyros, 153Saul, 15Schissel, O., 156Schleiermacher, F., 146–148, 150–

151, 169Shepard, J., 60Simplikios, 6Smyth, H.W., 148Socrates, 33, 191Solon, 41Sorabji, R., 65, 155Spivey, N., 8Steel, C., 71, 176Stephanos Skylitzes, 30, 155–158,

160Stephanos, Metropolitan of Trebi-

zond, 48Stephen of Byzantion, 13Symeon the New Theologian, 142Synesios of Cyrene, 15Syrianus, 77

Teubner, 4Themistios, 5Theodore of Smyrna, 54Theodore of Stoudios, 102, 134,

142Thucydides, 7, 148Tigranes, 125Titans, 33Todd, R., 152Tornikios, George, 25, 37, 47–48, 50,

56–58, 62Trebizond, 157Triballoi, 159–160Triklinios, Demetrios, 19Trizio, M., 65Trojan War, 7, 24, 26Troy, 24Tryphon, 15Tzetzes, John, 10–11, 14, 16, 20, 23–

24, 26–32, 38, 53Tzetziros, 117

Urmson,J.O., 183–184

Venice, 65Virgin Mary, 115–116, 124, 139

Walz, C., 13, 16Wilson, N.G., 2Wolska-Conus, W., 157, 160

Xenophon, 148Xerxes, 154Xiphilinos, John, 60

Zervos, C., 71, 200Zeus, 7, 15, 27, 33, 39Zonaras, John, 11, 47

STUDIEN UND TEXTEZUR GEISTESGESCHICHTE

DES MITTELALTERS

61. Kapriev, G. …ipsa vita et veritas. Der “ontologische Gottesbeweis” und die IdeenweltAnselms von Canterbury. 1998. ISBN 90 04 11097 6

62. Hentschel, F. (Hrsg.). Musik – und die Geschichte der Philosophie und Naturwissenschaften imMittelalter. Fragen zur Wechselwirkung von ‘musica’ und ‘philosophia’ im Mittelalter.1998. ISBN 90 04 11093 3

63. Evans, G.R. Getting it wrong. The Medieval Epistemology of Error. 1998.ISBN 90 04 11240 5

64. Enders, M. Wahrheit und Notwendigkeit. Die Theorie der Wahrheit bei Anselm vonCanter bury im Gesamtzusammenhang seines Denkens und unter besonderer Berück -sichtigung seiner Antiken Quellen (Aristoteles, Cicero, Augustinus, Boethius). 1999.ISBN 90 04 11264 2

65. Park, S.C. Die Rezeption der mittelalterlichen Sprachphilosophie in der Theologie des Thomas vonAquin. Mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Analogie. 1999. ISBN 90 04 11272 3

66. Tellkamp, J.A. Sinne, Gegenstände und Sensibilia. Zur Wahrnehmungslehre des Thomasvon Aquin. 1999. ISBN 90 04 11410 6

67. Davenport, A.A. Measure of a Different Greatness. The Intensive Infinite, 1250-1650.1999. ISBN 90 04 11481 5

68. Kaldellis, A. The Argument of Psellos’ Chronographia. 1999. ISBN 90 04 11494 769. Reynolds, P.L. Food and the Body. Some Peculiar Questions in High Medieval Theology.

1999. ISBN 90 04 11532 370. Lagerlund, H. Modal Syllogistics in the Middle Ages. 2000. ISBN 90 04 11626 571. Köhler, T.W. Grundlagen des philosophisch-anthropologischen Diskurses im dreizehnten Jahr -

hundert. Die Erkenntnisbemühung um den Menschen im zeitgenössischen Verständ nis.2000. ISBN 90 04 11623 0

72. Trifogli, C. Oxford Physics in the Thirteenth Century (ca. 1250-1270). Motion, Infinity, Placeand Time. 2000. ISBN 90 04 11657 5

73. Koyama, C. (Ed.) Nature in Medieval Thought. Some Approaches East and West. 2000.ISBN 90 04 11966 3

74. Spruyt, J. (Ed.) Matthew of Orléans: Sophistaria sive Summa communium distinctionumcirca sophismata accidentium. Edited with an introduction, notes and indices. 2001.ISBN 90 04 11897 7

75. Porro, P. (Ed.) The Medieval Concept of Time. The Scholastic Debate and its Reception inEarly Modern Philosophy. 2001. ISBN 90 04 12207 9

76. Perler, D. (Ed.) Ancient and Medieval Theories of Intentionality. 2001.ISBN 90 04 12295 8

77. Pini, G. Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus. An Interpretation of Aristotle’s Categories inthe Late Thirteenth Century. 2002. ISBN 90 04 12329 6

78. Senger, H. Ludus Sapientiae. Studien zum Werk und zur Wirkungsgeschichte des Niko -laus von Kues. 2002. ISBN 90 04 12081 5

79. Fitzgerald, M.J. Albert of Saxony’s Twenty-five Disputed Questions on Logic. A Critical Edi-tion of his Quaestiones circa Logicam. 2002. ISBN 90 04 125132

80. Darge, R. Suárez’ Transzendentale Seinsauslegung und die Metaphysiktradition. 2004. ISBN 90 04 13708 4

81. Gelber, H.G. It Could Have Been Otherwise. Contingency and Necessity in DominicanTheology at Oxford, 1300-1350. 2004. ISBN 90 04 13907 9

82. Bos, E.P. Logica modernorum in Prague about 1400. The Sophistria disputation ‘Quoniamquatuor’ (MS Cracow, Jagiellonian Library 686, ff. 1ra-79rb), With a Partial Reconstruc-tion of Thomas of Cleve’s Logica. Edition with an Introduction and Appendices. 2004.ISBN 90 04 14009 3

83. Gottschall, D. Konrad von Megenbergs Buch von den natürlichen Dingen. Ein Dokumentdeutschsprachiger Albertus Magnus-Rezeption im 14. Jahrhundert. 2004. ISBN 90 04 14015 8

84. Perler, D. and Rudolph, U. (Eds.). Logik und Theologie. Das Organon im arabischen und imlateinischen Mittelalter. 2005. ISBN 90 04 11118 2

85. Bezner, F. Vela Veritatis. Hermeneutik, Wissen und Sprache in der Intellectual History des12. Jahrhunderts. 2005. ISBN 90 04 14424 2

86. De Rijk, L.M. Giraldus Odonis O.F.M.: Opera Philosophica. Vol. II: De Intentionibus. Criti-cal edition with a study on the medieval intentionality debate up to ca. 1350. 2005.ISBN 90 04 11117 4

87. Nissing, H.-G. Sprache als Akt bei Thomas von Aquin. 2006. ISBN 90 04 14645 888. Guerizoli, R. Die Verinnerlichung des Göttlichen. Eine Studie über den Gottesgeburtszyklus

und die Armutspredigt Meister Eckharts. 2006. ISBN-13: 978-90-04-15000-3, ISBN-10: 90-04-15000-5

89. Germann, N. De temporum ratione. Quadrivium und Gotteserkenntnis am Beispiel Abbosvon Fleury und Hermanns von Reichenau. 2006. ISBN-13: 978-90-04-15395-0, ISBN-10: 90-04-15395-0

90. Boschung, P. From a Topical Point of View. Dialectic in Anselm of Canterbury’s De Gram-matico. 2006. ISBN-13: 978-90-04-15431-5, ISBN-10: 90-04-15431-0

91. Pickavé, M. Heinrich von Gent über Metaphysik als erste Wissenschaft. Studien zu einemMetaphysikentwurf aus dem letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts. 2006. ISBN-13: 978-90-04-15574-9, ISBN-10: 90-04-15574-0

92. Thom, P. Logic and Ontology in the Syllogistic of Robert Kilwardby. 2007.ISBN 978 90 04 15795 8.

93. Goris, W. Absolute Beginners. Der mittelalterliche Beitrag zu einem Ausgang vom Unbe-dingten. 2007. ISBN 978 90 04 16215 0

94. Köhler, T.W. Homo animal nobilissimum. Konturen des spezifisch Menschlichen in dernaturphilosophischen Aristoteleskommentierung des dreizehnten Jahrhunderts. Teil-band 1. 2007. ISBN 978 90 04 16289 1

95. Bonner, A. Art and Logic of Ramon Llull. A User’s Guide. 2007.ISBN 978 90 04 16325 6

96. Folger-Fonfara, S. Das ‘Super’-Transzendentale und die Spaltung der Metaphysik. Der Entwurfdes Franziskus von Marchia. 2008. ISBN 978 90 04 16384 3

97. Roling, B. Locutio angelica. Die Diskussion der Engelsprache als Antizipation einer Sprechakttheorie in Mittelalter und Früher Neuzeit. 2008. ISBN 978 90 04 16553 3

98. Kirchhoff, R. Die Syncategoremata des Wilhelm von Sherwood. Kommentierung und his-torische Einordnung. 2008. ISBN 978 90 04 16633 2

99. Courtenay, W.J. Ockham and Ockhamism. Studies in the Dissemination and Impact of HisThought. 2008. ISBN 978 90 04 16830 5

100. Gaus, C. etiam realis scientia. Petrus Aureolis konzeptualistische Transzendentalienlehrevor dem Hintergrund seiner Kritik am Formalitätenrealismus. 2008. ISBN 978 90 04 16972 2

101. Barber, C. and D. Jenkins (Eds.). Medieval Greek Commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics.2009. ISBN 978 90 04 17393 4

102. Brown, S.F., T. Dewender and T. Kobusch (Eds.). Philosophical Debates at Paris in the EarlyFourteenth Century. 2009. ISBN 978 90 04 17566 2