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African Journal of Political Science and International Relations Vol. 4(3), pp. 096-108, March 2010Available online at http://www.academicjournals.org/ajpsirISSN 1996-0832 2010 Academic Journals

Full Length Research Paper

Chinas foray into Africa: Ideational underpinnings andgeoeconomic interests

Chaldeans Mensah

Grant MacEwan University, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada. E-mail: [email protected].

Accepted 18 February, 2010

Chinas new foreign policy stance in Africa is a marked departure from its previous emphasis on purelyideational principles designed to strengthen its standing as a supporter of the Third World. Theideational affinity with Africa has not changed in Chinas foreign policy discourse, but the newemphasis is on an aggressive pursuit of its geoeconomic and geopolitical interests on the continent,

marked by an acquisitive impulse for Africas natural resources and a concerted effort to offer politicalsupport to its allies in Africa to secure those resources in an uncertain post bipolar internationalsystem. This paper explores the transformation of Chinas African policy, ideationally, from theBandung principles to the Beijing Consensus, while noting the geoeconomic and geopoliticalmotivations behind Chinas engagement with Africa as it cements its position as an emerging globalpower. The paper concludes that despite the presumed coincidence of interests and ideational affinitythat formed the basis of pre-Deng China-Africa relations, Chinas new geoeconomic and geopoliticalengagement represents a major pathway for the continent, but serious steps must be taken to harnessthe relationship to ensure that it fulfills Africas desire to pursue a sustainable development agenda thatmoves it away from overdependence on commodity exports and marginality in the global economy. Aversion of this paper was presented in July 2008 at the Second Global Studies Conference in Ljubljana,Slovenia.

Key words: Beijing consensus, geoeconomics, geopolitics, hard power, natural resources, soft power, South-South Cooperation

INTRODUCTION

Chinas insatiable drive for resources to power itseconomic engine as it emerges as a new globaleconomic powerhouse, has led the country to pursue anaggressive foreign policy engagement on the Africancontinent. This geo-strategic reach into Africa is part of aconcerted Going Global Strategy (Corkin, 2006, p.10). Itis a far cry from the autarchic impulse of Chinas

relationship with the international system during the pre-1978 period under Mao Zedong. The thrust of Chinasnew foreign policy stance in Africa is a marked departurefrom its previous emphasis on building political influenceon the continent, primarily bolstering its credentials as asupporter of the Third World movement. While elementsof the old political posturing to cultivate ties in Africa in itsstruggle against hegemonism (a euphemism for USdominance) remain, as well as diplomatic calculations toshore up relations against any enticements to Africancountries from Taiwan, the fundamental emphasis of thenew approach is to provide China with reliable supply of

energy and other primary commodities. In a sense, theprevious engagement by China on the African continentwas part of a wider geopolitical strategy of developing oideational affinity with the Third World, while buildinginfluence on a continent eager to escape the dangers othe traditional cold war rivalries and the impact of neo-colonialism.

The new phase of assertiveness by China to maintainstrong economic ties in Africa, unlike the previouspreoccupation with building a Third World coalition, isgeoeconomic in scope, fuelled by Chinas desire foresources to power its economic growth and gain energysecurity. China sees the continent, not just as a potentiaally in its bid for greater influence and power, but as asource of natural resources. This growing interest inAfrica as a source of natural resources has generatedconcerns and questions about Africa succumbing to anew form of external control over its resources. Is Chinasnew acquisitive foray into Africa in search of natural

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resources leading to replication of the old patterns offoreign control over Africas resources? Is this fear of acolonial-type control misplaced or is it an opportunity tofoster a new dynamic relationship with a rising powerbased on a new ethos of co-operation and mutualbenefit? China is brilliantly playing off concerns in African

countries about undue interference in their internalaffairs, including concerns about political and economicconditionality attached to lending by the InternationalFinancial Institutions (IFIs) as part of the WashingtonConsensus. Critics of Chinas laxity on human rightsissues have pointed to Chinas use of its seat on theSecurity Council to shield Sudan, one of its African oilsuppliers, from strong international action on the crisis inDarfur. In addition to these general concerns about theSino-African relationship, it must be noted that Chinasquest for raw materials in Africa comes at an important

juncture in its development. It requires these resources topush ahead its unprecedented economic growth, evenwith the impact of the 2009 economic downturn. ForChina, Africa offers a vast opportunity to tap into the oiland gas reserves of the emerging petro-states on thecontinent. Africa is also a ready market and supplier of awide range of natural resources required for Chinaseconomy.

In the past, and even in the current official party policystance toward Africa, China viewed itself in the context ofshared historical experience or common struggle withAfrica against the economic domination of the ThirdWorld by the developed capitalist countries. Yet, aschanging global geopolitical changes such as the end ofthe Cold War and globalization, have dictated, China andAfrica have had to redefine their roles in this changing

world order (Kim, 1994, p.128). The renewed interest byChina in Africa comes at a time of diminishing westerninfluence on the continent. A combination of benignneglect, condescension, official fatigue with Africasdevelopment prospects and failed development modelshas compelled African countries to give another look at along-time friend in the heady days of the Afro-Asianmovement and nonalignment in the 1950s and 60s. Butthe question remains: Is Africa opening itself up to re-insertion into the old division of labour, that is, as asupplier of raw material, at a time that successivecontinental plans are trying to assert diversification awayfrom this path? Using Samuel Kims framework for

assessing Chinas multifaceted global and Third Worldpolicy at the systemic levels (Kim, 1994, pp.120-160),Chinas African relationship will be assessed looking atthe interrelated diplomatic/political, economic/functionaland military/strategic issue-areas. This analysis views therelationship in an historical context, covering (not in ahard-and-fast way) two historical periods: the period atthe height of the anti-colonial struggle to the immediatepost-independence period for African countries and thepost-Maoist period of economic dynamism andliberalization for China, while exploring how Chinas

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current global prominence will shape how the two partiesdevelop their relationship in the years to come. Unlike theprevailing views of the relationship which conceives ofChina as engaged in a long-term developmenpartnership, or as an economic competitor ocolonizer (Alden, 2007), the argument of this paper is

that the relationship is a complex one, built on initiaideational principles of working in concert with the ThirdWorld as part of its global policy, but increasinglymotivated by the geoeconomic imperative of strategicallytapping into resources and markets to support its growingeconomy. As will be discussed later, China uses its sofpower or ideational principles (Five Principles of PeacefuCoexistence, and the Beijing Consensus) to bolster itsstanding in Africa in order to achieve desired outcomesBut as it engages in aggressive pursuit of energysecurity, it has not shied away from employing its hardpower assets strategically. There is an obviousreceptiveness of African states to Chinas blandishmentsand strategic inroads into the African continent, asituation that is derived from a perceived unwillingness oinability of the West to help the continent overcome itsongoing struggle against poverty and severe economicmarginalization. This is exemplified by the G8sunwillingness to follow through on its successivecommitments to ameliorate the continents economicplight. While there is a coincidence of interest betweenAfrica and China on the continents unfavourabledealings with Western actors, ranging from theprescriptions of the Washington Consensus to theLome/Cotonou agreements with the European UnionChinas pursuit of its geoeconomic interests is likely toproduce difficulties for both parties in the diplomatic

economic and strategic areas.

STRENGTHENING CHINAS DIPLOMATIC ANDPOLITICAL TIES IN POST-COLONIAL AFRICA: FROMBANDUNGS PANCHILA TO THE BEIJINGCONSENSUS

While Chinas recent economic focus on Africa foresources has generated interest and concerns about itsstrategic calculations, it should be noted that Chinasinterest in Africa is not new. Indeed, Chinese commerciaactivity on Africas east coast has been traced to theTang Dynasty (AD 618-907) (Davies et al., 2007)

Following the establishment of the Peoples Republic oChina in 1949, China made a concerted effort to work topromote Third World solidarity and, in the African contextoffer support to the anti-colonial movements on thecontinent. The emphasis was heavy on the building ofideational solidarity and inter-subjective understandingswith African and other Third World countries. This wasleverage that China could use in its dealings with the twosuperpowers. From the Chinese perspective, asenunciated by Mao, Africa and the Third World countrieswere a component of the theory of the three worlds

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098 Afri. J. Pol. Sci. Int. Relat.

comprising the two superpowers in one category and theother industrial capitalist countries in another category,with the Third World as the third category. ChinasForeign Minister Zhou Enlai attended the Afro-Asianmeeting of 1955 in Bandung, which formed the basis forthe establishment of the Non-aligned movement. At

Bandung, Chinas preoccupation, as Mike Mason pointsout was on the building of solidarity on the basis ofanticolonialism, geographical location and the struggleagainst underdevelopment... (Mason, 1997, p.31). Thisemphasis on anti-colonialism won the Chinese politicalplaudits on the African continent, as this was at the heightof the anti-colonial struggle on the continent. Chinaprovided support for liberation movements in Africa,including in Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe (Sutter,2008, p.368). It is interesting that even in the post-colonial era contemporary Chinese leaders are quick toremind Africans of their shared colonial experience andstruggle against foreign aggression. As well, the theme ofThird World solidarity became a solid basis fordeveloping China-African relations during the cold warperiod. China became a natural ally for African countrieseager to escape the strictures of the power bloc systemof the cold war conflict. The attractiveness of China toAfrican leaders in the immediate post-Bandung periodwas the Chinese government focus on strong politicalprinciples that African leaders found compelling in theirbid to establish a strong presence on the internationalscene. In the package of political principles wasemphasis on shared understandings on anti-hegemony,South-South solidarity and the pressing need to reducethe vulnerability of African and other Third Worldcountries in the international system.

The legacy of Bandung, which formulated a sense ofcommon embrace of political principles for the ThirdWorld movement, has guided Chinas subsequent Africanpolicy. Emphasis on shared political ideals became astrategic approach for China to broaden its influence inAfrica. Using the language of the Bandung Conferenceand the Non-aligned movement, Beijing stressed that itsAfrican policy was motivated by the desire to expand onthe spirit of Bandung by emphasizing key principles ofthe Third World movement: mutual respect for eachothers territorial integrity and sovereignty; mutual non-aggression; mutual non-interference in each othersaffairs; equality and mutual benefit; peaceful coexistence.

The five ideational principles (Panchila) are the formativebasis of China-African relations, and have been aconstant in Beijings diplomatic practice on the continent.The principles are also captured in what is known byChina as the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence:

1. Each country should have the right to choose its ownpolitical, economic and social system in line with its ownresources.2. All nations of the world and especially the big powers,should strictly abide by the principle of not interfering in

other nations affairs.3. All nations should respect and treat others equallycherish mutually beneficial cooperation, exist in harmonyand seek common ground while resolving differences.4. International conflicts should be fairly resolved throughpeaceful means, not through the use or threat of force.

5. Each country, no matter how big or small, strong orweak, should have the equal right to participate inconsultations to settle world affairs. (Kornberg and Faust2005, p.211)

The ideational legacy of Bandung has formed the normsaround which China has forged its ties with Africa, albeitthe imperatives of economic interchange have oftenundermined adherence to the principles and norms. Interms of specific application to Africa, China emphasizesits respect for African countries independent approach todevelopment (Chinas African Policy, 2006), and ongoingefforts towards continental unity and collective self-reliance. Borrowing from the cooperative ethos affordedby Bandung, Chinas Africa policy seeks to work towardspolicy coordination in multilateral institutions, as well asthe sharing of mutual ideas in the areas of sustainabledevelopment and governance. While China is oftenmentioned for its lack of non-interference andconditionality in its dealing with Africa, compared to stricconditions imposed by Western actors on Africancountries for assistance, it should not be forgotten thatChina-African relations has always operated within thecontext of one unavoidable conditionality: Chinasinsistence that African countries adhere to the principle othe one China policy. In other words, Beijing would notcountenance any effort by African states to have officia

relations and contacts with Taiwan, which it views as arogue or renegade province. Nevertheless, while Chinasfocus on the principle of non-interference has attractedAfrican leaders, it has limits when it comes to notfollowing the one of China policy. From Chinasperspective, African countries can have differinginterpretations of governance and human rights, but foAfrican countries to gain the benefits of engagement withChina, they have to support Chinas great cause oreunification (China African Policy, 2006, p.4)Enhancing its African linkages bolsters Beijings positionin this competition with Taiwans dollar diplomacy in anongoing cross-strait scramble for Africa. (Liu, 2001).

At the geopolitical level, China saw Africa in theimmediate post-colonial period as a continent that offeredit the geographical reach in developing its claim as theglobal champion of the Third World. China portrayeditself, especially in the pre-Deng Xiaoping period, asengaged in a protracted struggle against hegemonismand sought to develop stronger political ties with newlyindependent countries, African countries to enhance itsglobal reach and influence. Chinas Africa policy touchedon enhancing ties between Africa and Asia (Afro-Asianrelations), as well as China seeing itself as the worlds

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largest country reaching out to a continent with thelargest number of developing countries. The politicalobjectives of Chinas outreach was presented as South-South cooperation (this is also called EconomicCooperation among Developing Countries, and as beena major focus of the Third World movement), and an

exercise of countries trying to build trust and developingmutual ties after sharing a colonial experience thatresonated on the African continent. Chinas also soughtto get diplomatic support from African countries, giventheir numbers in the UN General Assembly, on issues ofinterest to the country as it developed global aspirationsdifferent from those of the US and the former USSR.Samuel Kim described Chinas use of the UN for itsglobal aspirations clearly as follows: At the global level,the UN General Assembly affords an indispensable forumfor the projection of Chinas symbolic identification withthe Third World. The UNs recognition of the PeoplesRepublic in late 1971 as the sole legitimate governmentof China allowed Beijing access to the chief global arenafor the politics of collective legitimation anddelegitimation (Kim, 1994, p.135). A major globalconcern that China shared with African states, within theUN and other global forums, is the need for reform of theinternational economic and political order. China countedon the support of African states as it managed itsrelationship with the US and the USSR, seeking ameasure of equidistance to maintain its global aspirationsas a unique growing power cultivating a strategicpartnership with developing countries.

African countries were equally assuaged by Chinasemphasis in its foreign policy on the principles ofsovereignty and opposition to hegemony and promotion

of self-reliance as well as a call for new internationaleconomic order (Muekalia, 2004, p. 2004). Indeed Chinawas a strong supporter of the demands of the ThirdWorld for a New International Economic Order, a supportthat was couched in terms of a broader pursuit ofcollective self reliance or South-South cooperation (Kim,1994, p.151). For its part, China has supported Africasefforts to increase its representation in the SecurityCouncil as part of UN Reform (Ministry of Foreign Affairs,Beijing Action Plan, 2007). In Chinas global strategiccalculation, Africa represented an untapped well ofdiplomatic support for its global aspirations. With Maosdeath in 1976, there was a marked decline in Chinas

support for the anti-colonial movement in Africa, asattention shifted to internal economic reform. But asChina embarked on its economic reform program underthe leadership of Deng Xiaoping and beyond, theeconomic imperative of the relationship reachedimportant heights. It is certainly not the case that the pre-Deng China-African relationship was devoid of mutualeconomic interchange. China famous involvement in theconstruction of the Tanzania-Zambia railway (then knownas Tan-Zam, but now called TAZARA) in the 1970s is anexample of the use of foreign economic aid to buttress its

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diplomatic efforts on the continent. The Deng and postDeng African engagement by China sought to build onthe ideational connection with Africa but move therelationship to a new level dictated by Chinas growingneed for natural resources, and also the need to deployits massive currency reserves in foreign markets. There

was a shift, as Samuel Kim describes it in the context oChina and the Third World, of the relationship from aid toexchange (Kim, 1994, p.152) or what Wenran Jiang callsa relationship restructured from anti-colonial brothers-in-arms to economic and trade partners, based on markeprinciples (Jiang, 2006, p.6). It is clear that the view oAfrica, as a market and source of raw material, was parof Chinas global aspirations, albeit downplayedstrategically by its leaders. As Chris Alden points out, therecommitment by Deng to transforming Chinas economywas coupled with an admonition on the best approach toforeign policy: Observe calmly, secure our position, hideour capabilities and bide our time. Be good at maintaininga low profile, never claim leadership. (Alden, 2007, p.11)

Beijing consensus versus the Washingtonconsensus

If Chinas Africa relationship has been informed by theideational principles from the Bandung Conferenceespecially at the height of the anti-colonial struggle, thenew engagement with Africa for its economic resources isrelevant when viewed through the lens of the so-calledBeijing Consensus (BC), which is in sharp contrast to theWashington Consensus (WC), with its emphasis onpolitical and economic conditionality for lending by

international financial institutions. The term WC isattributed to John Williamson, whereas the BC was firsused by academic Joshua Cooper Ramo. Eric Chu TeoCheow traces the WC from the neo-liberal revolution thaemerged around the world with the Reagan and Thatcheschools of thought and power. He contrasts the WCsend-of-history arrogance with BCs focus ondevelopmental economics, social and economic changes(Cheow, 2006, pp. 1-3). The WC was viewed skepticallyby African leaders, who saw it as a neo-liberastraightjacket that ignored the legitimate concerns abouAfrican sovereignty and genuine economic requirementsIn addition, the WC failed to take into account the oft-

stated African desire to extricate itself from the clutchesof neo-colonial influences and eradicate the impact opoverty on the continent. Viewing the BC in opposition tothe WC puts Chinas African presence as a geopoliticachallenge to the US and Europe or an instance of US-China ideological rivalry (Cheow, 2006; Lammers, 2007)Unlike the WCs paternalist overtones and interference ineconomic and political decision-making on the continentthe BC is viewed as providing a more equitable paradigmof development (Ramo, 2004). It is important to stressthat ideational principles and diplomatic approaches have

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been useful for promoting Chinas soft power in Africa.Drew Thompson notes Chinas use of soft power nicelywhen he writes African leaders embrace of the BeijingConsensus reflects perhaps what is most attractive aboutBeijings soft power: a long-standing history of friendlyties, provision of appreciated, no-strings-attached

financial and technical aid to both elites and the mostneedy, and growing commerce between the worldslargest developing nation and the continent with the mostdeveloping nations (Thompson, 2005, p.1). Chinasattractiveness (soft power) to African leaders is alsofounded on the BCs principles potential to reshape andoffer an alternative approach to development. Lammers(2007, p.3) notes that BC may have implications forAfricas development paradigm, that is, offer a pathwayfor Africa to see China as a model to pursue its owndevelopment path out of neo-colonial linkages.Interestingly, China is offering its model of SpecialEconomic Zones to Africa, which was part of its domesticreform program. Martyn Davies reports examples of suchzones in a number of strategic areas: metals hub(Zambias copper belt region); trading hub (amanufacturing zone to house 40 Chinese businesses inMauritius for market access to COMESA); Trans-shipment hub (Dar es Salaam in Tanzania as a port tocommodities mined in the Copperbelt); Nigeria (aproposed SEZ for manufacturing and assemblyoperations for Chinese firms) (Davies, 2007, pp.4-6). Theidea of creating high-growth economic hubs is part of theBCs model of innovation-led growth (Ramo, 2004, p.20).An example of this innovative thrust is Chinas use of thelinguistic connection between Macao SpecialAdministrative Region and Lusophone African states to

foster opportunities for using Macao as a model or bridgeto promote China-Lusophone Africa cooperation (Peng,2008, pp.4-7). It is not entirely clear that Africascontinental plan, the New Partnership for AfricanDevelopment (NEPAD), is necessarily consistent withwhat China offers for Africa. Some of the themes raisedin NEPAD, including good governance, reducingcorruption and strengthening of democracy, are not onthe top of the list of Chinas priorities, albeit China hasformally endorsed the NEPAD. Moreover, strong supportfor the ideational principle of non-interference negatesagainst Chinas concern for those themes.

Ramo suggests that BC is more than ideas about

economics, but also encompasses geopolitical issuessuch as global balance of power. Among the other keyprinciples of BC are: the necessity of innovation; theimportance of sustainability and equality as firstconsiderations in development; and strong emphasis onself-determination to exercise leverage againsthegemonic powers (Ramo, 2004, p.12). The BC as abasis for Chinas Peaceful Rise and its influence in Africais similar to the Bandung principles in one importantrespect: both ideational sources of Chinas relationshipwith the developing world focused on giving small states

an option to engage in the international system awayfrom the control and tutelage of the hegemonic statesUnlike the WC emphasis on the prescriptions of Western-led international institutions, BC rejects the notion ofhierarchy of nations that is embodied in the IFIs. Foopponents of the neo-liberalism underlying the WC, there

is a natural attraction to an alternative view ofdevelopment. This is in part due to dissatisfaction with aseries of Western initiatives aimed at Africa: the USAfrican Growth and Opportunity Act, the EconomicPartnership Agreements under the Cotonou Agreementand failure of the G8 to follow through on theidevelopment assistance promises to Africa.

Bandung emphasized relationship among developingcountries based on mutual benefit in a world dominatedby the cold war and super-power rivalry, while the BCoffers developing countries options for recoiling from thestrictures of the WC towards an equitable relationshipwith a traditional friend of the Third World. The questionthat has to be posed is the extent to which ChinasAfrican presence is furthering the principles of theBandung-BC, or whether China is simply exploiting Africaor taking advantage of the ideational affinity in support ofits long-term strategic interests. There are commonalitiesand shared self-understandings between China andAfrica about their place in the international system, butthe significant concern is whether, at a pragmatic level ofeconomic interchange, China goes beyond its ownstrategic needs to help Africa move away from itsmarginal status in the global economy towards a path ofsustainable economic development.

CHINAS ECONOMIC ENGAGEMENT IN AFRICA IDEATIONAL AFFINITY AND GEOECONOMICINTERESTS

During the struggle against colonialism and theimmediate period of the age of African independence inthe 1960s and 1970s, China sought to back up itsideological support of African states with a measure ofeconomic aid, focused on the building of pertineninfrastructure for the newly independence states. It isestimated that China provided more than 900infrastructure projects to African states, including therailway between Tanzania and Zambia (TAZARARailway) as the centrepiece of such demonstration

projects (Ministry of Foreign Affairs China pursues2006). The goal was largely ideological over pragmaticpursuit of self-interest. Nevertheless, even with projectssuch as TAZARA and the Benguela Railway, which linksZambia and the Democratic Republic of Congo to thewest coast of Africa, there is emphasis on buildinghorizontal linkages between African countries, comparedwith the limited connections between African railwaysystems during the colonial era. Mooney (2005, p.1points out that Chinas economic largesse in Africa waspart of the cold war struggle for the hearts and minds of

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Third World citizens. China used its aid projects inAfrica to convey the diplomatic message that it was onthe side of the oppressed, and sought to strengthenalliances against the US and the USSR. Above all,spending on lavish infrastructure and prestige projects onthe continent was meant to convey Chinas interest in the

continent, both as a partner in combating the negativeinfluences of the cold war rivalry and underminingTaiwans quest for diplomatic recognition (Lyman, 2005,p.4). In addition to lavish infrastructure, China focused onstrengthening its credentials as a supporter of South-South economic interchange. This took the form of small-scale technical cooperation, including provision oftechnical experts, training for African workers, culturalagreements and provision of scholarships for Africanstudents to study in Chinese universities. As Lammers(2007, p.2) points out, 15,000 Africans had graduatedfrom Chinese institutions by 2004. In the other direction,there is a growing Chinese community in Africa,estimated to be over 750,000 (Mohan, 2008, pp.6-8;Eisenman and Kurlantzick, 2006, pp.219-224; Corkin,2008, pp.4-5).

Development assistance (for instance, grants and lowconcessional loans) is a continuing aspect of Chinaseconomic engagement in Africa. It is estimated thatChinas EXIM bank had financed over 300 projects inAfrica by mid-2007, with strong emphasis oninfrastructure projects (Davies et al., 2008, p.3).Infrastructure projects are crucial to Chinas overall goalof getting access to Africas natural resources to powerits economic engine. This linkage of infrastructuredevelopment to the acquisition of energy and othernatural resources has been called coalition investment

strategy (Naidu and Davies, 2006, pp.69-83). Chinese aidto Africa won wide acceptance because, apart from itsstrict conditionality on the lack of dealings of therecipients with Taiwan, it was free of the typical toughconditions attached to aid from Western institutions andactors. South-South cooperation is certainly notexpressed as a one-way China-to-Africa flow of aid andbenefits. Indeed, as was demonstrated during the May12, 2008 earthquake in China, African countries werequick to offer moral and material support. For instance,Mauritius contributed $300,000 to aid Chinas quakevictims, while Morocco provided $1 million in aid support(Peoples Daily, 2008; Agence Maghreb Arabe Presse,

2008). Furthermore, unlike its previous emphasis onorganizations such as the non-aligned movement tofoster its relationship with Africa and other developingcountries, China has formed its own consultativemechanism to foster dialogue and cooperation withAfrica, the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, whichwas established in 2000. At a geo-economic level, Chinaeconomic activity in Africa is also aimed at getting astrategic advantage over its big regional economiccompetitors (Japan and India), who have shown stronginterest in cultivating ties with Africa. For instance, at the

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2008 meeting of the first Japan-Africa summit inYokohama, the then Prime Minister of Japan YasuoFukuda promised $4billion in soft loans over the fiveyears to assist with the improvement of Africaninfrastructure. Similarly, India announced in May, 2008$500 million in grant for African development, and

$5billion in credit to Africa, and 131 projects worth over$10 billion.As noted earlier, there was a noticeable retreat in the

late 1970s and early 1980s in Sino-African relations, asChina focused more on its internal transformationHowever, this was short-lived as the imperatives omaintaining a counterbalance to the US and serving as aleader of the Third World coalition ensured a revival orelations with Africa. Moreover, China needed diplomaticsupport from Africa in the face of condemnationparticularly from Western countries, in the wake of theTiananmen Square incident in 1989. As Taylor (2007p.11) points out post-Tiananmen Square Chinaremembered that Africa was a very useful supportconstituency if and when Beijing was in dispute with otheglobal actors In the 1990s and the beginning of thenew millennium, as Chinas incorporation into the globaeconomic intensified, along with its spectacular economicperformance vis--vis the major economic powers, Africabecame an enticing arena for resources and markets fothis new economic power. Chinas government seems tohave made the strategic calculation of expanding itsforeign direct investment into Africa to rely on its vastresource wealth. From a geo-economic perspective, theAfrican continent presented opportunities for Chinasextractive industries to meet the countrys resourceneeds. China has limited resources of oil and gas

accounting for only 2.3 and 0.9 per cent respectively(Nolan, 2004, p.246).

RESOURCE EXPANSIONISM AS A CENTRALCHINESE GEOECONOMIC INTEREST

Chinas trade relations with Africa have expanded, withthe resource sector playing a prominent role in thisexchange, albeit infrastructure development andrehabilitation remain important components of therelationship. The resource expansionism into Africa wasparticularly pronounced in the area of securing oi

concessions as the country sought new sources to meeits growing petroleum needs, surpassing Japan in 2003to become the worlds second biggest consumer opetroleum products behind the US (BBC Report, 2006)While it is the resource sector, particularly oil-relatedbusiness, that has gained prominence in Chinas dealingwith Africa, it must be emphasised that the country hasalso continued its economic linkages in other areasincluding science and technology, agriculturedevelopment Assistance, debt relief, investment andfinance (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Beijing Plan of Action

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2007, p. 2-8). China imports about 28 percent of its oiland gas supplies from Africa in comparison with 15percent for the US (Alexander Gas and Oil Connections,2006, p.1). The extent of Chinas oil acquisitions shouldnot be exaggerated as Chinese oil companies face stiffcompetition on the continent (Downs, 2007, pp.42-68),

but what is significant is the intensity and speed ofChinas demonstration of interest in the oil producingstates as it begins to fill its new strategic petroleumreserve (Yergin, 2007) p.1). Moreover, Chinas activitiesand general African policy are less constrained andcomplicated by private domestic constituencies, whichmakes it possible for speedier and decisive action (Gillet.al., 2007, p.8).

The scale of what one might call this oil-focusedintrusion by China is one of comprehensive outreach onthe African continent, with the Chinese governmentspearheading a drive to use its diplomatic sway to wincontracts and concessions for its firms. Chinaspromotion of its private firms to do business in Africa isan important facet of its current investment strategy inAfrica (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007, Chinese privatefirms p.1-2). The Chinese multinationals have been akey part of the Going Global Strategy. Chinasexpressed industrial policy is to construct globallypowerful companies capable of competing on the globallevel playing field. As with diplomatic and strategicrelations in the political sphere, the attraction is thatAfrican states in dealing with Chinese firms feelunencumbered by the restrictions normally associatedwith dealings with dominant firms from the West.Furthermore, the firms from China as well as the Chinesegovernment focus on longer-term timeframe than other

actors in terms of strategic considerations (Burke andCorkin, 2006). However, this raises potentialcontradictions between Chinese enterprises interestsand those of their African counterparts (Anshan, 2006).Moreover, China has not felt itself bound by the principlesof the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI),a set of principles that seeks to ensure transparency,accountability and prudent use of natural resource wealthand stewardship of natural resource revenue streams. Asindicated on the EITI website, the EITI process sets aglobal standard for companies to publish what they payand for governments to disclose what they receive(EITISummary, 2008). It remains to be seen whether Chinas

operations will compound some the problems thatnecessitated the establishment of the EITI. Wild andMepham (2006, p.65) have highlighted the importance ofhaving China onboard the EITI, suggesting that Chinacould be encouraged to make public declarations ofsupport to EITI and Chinese companies could be urged(by African and other governments, civil society and theprivate sector) to engage with EITI in the Africancountries in which they operate. In spite of the espousalof the BC and the principles of the Bandung Conference,as well as emphasis in its economic dealings with Africa

on a win-win arrangement, the concern is that Chinahas not shown that its commercial arrangements in the oisector are benefiting the people instead of the regime inpower. It also remains to be seen whether China canfollow through its pledge to abide by the principles otransparency, equity and fairness, and also address

concerns about environmental degradation associatedwith resource development. Mention has been madeabout adverse environmental impact of Chinese-runmining operations, such as copper mines in Zambia andtitanium sands in Mozambique, Kenya, Tanzania andMadagascar (Bond, 2006. p.74). Additionally, Corkin(2006, p.12) suggests that there is a challenge of a lackof institutional regulatory frameworks and governmencapacity to monitor and encourage direct investment interms of local skills development and technologytransfer. She also notes that here is the issue owhether enough is being done to cultivate and harnessthe development of local companies and/or small andmedium enterprises (SMEs). Chinas option foinvestment in the oil business could also be used bysome African states to scuttle efforts to ensure beneficiaefforts to reform the oil sector. For instance, Wild andMepham (2006) and Sutter (2008) mention the case othe Angolan government failure to make significanreform of the oil sector to ensure transparency at therequest of the IFIs, and later accepting a $2billion sofloan from China. There is also concern about Chineselabour practices, such as paying low wages andreserving a disproportionate number of jobs in Chinese-funded projects to Chinese nationals, which in countriessuch as Zambia and Angola has led to anti-Chinesebacklash. This is not a purely African phenomenon, as

African students in China have faced occasional spasmsof protest such as examples in Nanjing in 1988-89, albeitthis is declining as China deepens its involvement inAfrica. However, the Globe and Mail (2008) recently runthis headline: Africans in Beijing harassed as Olympicsapproach. Bond (2006, p.74) reports that thousands oChinese labourers and engineers have been importedinto Ethiopia to build the countrys Takazee Dam.

Chinas geoeconomic expansion in the oil sector inAfrica is in direct challenge to US interest in Africa as asource for diversifying its oil imports. It is also designed toaddress Chinas energy security and secure sources foits energy dependency. The expansion of China is bes

captured by mentioning a number of recent deals on thecontinent, especially a flurry of bilateral deals that oftenfollowed state visits by high level Chinese leadersincluding President Hu Jintao. Sudan, which is facingongoing conflict and international opprobrium for itsconduct in Dafur, has found strong support from China todevelop its oil sector. For instance, in 1998, Sudan andChina signed an economic co-operation agreement (BBCReport, 1998), and the China National Petroleum (CNPC)has plans to invest $1billion to increase the Khartoumrefinery capacity, and the construction of a 750-kilometre-

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long pipeline linking the Kordofan oilfields with the coast(BBC Report, 2003). As Western countries haveretreated from Sudan over human rights and terrorismconcerns, China has been the main beneficiary ofexpanded economic engagement with Khartoum in the oilsector. This has created a symbiotic relationship between

the two countries, with Sudan getting protection frominternational criticism through Chinas veto power in theUN Security Council and China gaining leverage over theSudanese government, such as China convincingKhartoum to permit the deployment of UN-Africanpeacekeeping forces in Dafur. Whereas in the era ofBandung, Beijing was content to give broader ideologicalsuccour to newly developing countries as part of its questto promote the development of the Third Worldmovement, the current pursuit of its geoeconomicinterests dictates aggressively protecting individual ThirdWorld governments to secure oil and other resourceseven at the expense of international condemnation for itslack of concern for human rights. It should be noted thatChina still conducts some of its economic outreach withinthe context of the ideational principles of mutual benefit(win-win situation) and South-South cooperation. Forinstance, Beijing has sought to address the problem offoreign exchange shortfalls for African countries byengaging in Countertrade, including the exchange of oilfor loans in Angola, and Gabon giving the China NationalMachinery Equipment Import and Export Company(CEMEC) the sole right to exploit iron deposits in theBelinga region of the country in return for CEMECconstructing a deep-water port as Santa Clara, a railwaytrack from Belinga to the coast, and a hydro-electricpower plant (Corkin, 2007, p.3). Other Chinese forays to

secure resources have found expression in agreementsfor oil development with other African countries, includingthe following: Kenya and China have signed anagreement to allow a Chinese oil producer to search foroil in Kenya (Xinhua, 2006, Deal signed to search...);Chinas top offshore oil and gas producer ChinaNational Offshore Oil Corp Ltd., completed a deal topurchase a stake in Nigerian oil-mining license (Xinhua,2006, New Partnership).. Chinese firms have alsoexpanded their presence in Algeria, including CNPCsoil/natural gas contract with Sonatrach (Algeriasgovernment-owned company), and China Petroleum andChemical Corporation (Sinopec)s deal with Sinotrach to

invest in the Zarzaitine oil field in the Sahara Desert(Hurst, 2006, p.12). China has become a major oilimporter from Congo, and Sinopec is engaged in off-shore exploration. As well, Sinopec is engaged in jointventures in oil exploration in Gabon. In 2006, after talksbetween President Hu and Moroccan King MohammadVI, China and Morocco signed a package of accords toexpand bilateral trade in the fields of science andtechnology, telecommunications, agriculture, oil and gasdevelopment, labour, project engineering and humanresources training, and encourage two-way investment

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(Xinhua, 2006, China and Morocco ink).. Even in war-ravaged Somalia, China has not recoiled from getting anoil exploration deal with the Transitional FederaGovernment in Mudug region of Puntland, a semi-autonomous region of the country (Pham, 2007, p.2)Niger is reported to become an oil producer by 2006 as

China is commited to investing $5 billion to develop thecountrys oil resources, including the building of a 2,000km pipeline and a refinery with a capacity of 20,000barrels a day (BBC Report, 2008, Niger set to become)

In focusing predominantly on natural resourcesespecially its hydrocarbon acquisition targets, China-Africa trade relations would seem to reinforce Africasreliance on natural resources and commodity exports inan increasingly globalized economy.

Despite rhetorical commitment to the principles oBandung and the Beijing Consensus, it is not clear thatthe China-Africa trade relationship has changed Africasstatus in the pre-and post-colonial era as a primarycommodity producer. Besada (2008, p.2) notes thaBeijing has acted and behaved no differently from theway European powers did decades and centuries agoThere is also a lingering concern that over dependenceon oil and other natural resources could lead to what hasbeen called the resource curse. Leftwich (2008, p.223)indicates that this not only undermines democracy byreducing the states need to be accountable to itscitizens, but the resources could also spur conflicbetween groups eager to gain control over the resourcesThe extent to which Chinas oil concessions benefiordinary Africans, particularly in the areas of local andnational employment, integration of mining activities intothe broader economy, and protecting community rights

and relations, is also a cause for concern. If Chinasresource footprint only benefits the elites in Africancountries, and if Beijing ignores such concerns under thepretext of non-interference then it underminesopportunities for long-term development that addressesthe needs of the owners of African resources, the Africanpeople. However, the picture of Afro-Chinese trade is fafrom static, as China explores, bilaterally andmultilaterally opportunities to expand in a broad range osectors. It is also expanding commercial activities in non-Petroleum-producing countries. China offers Africa zerotariff treatment for about 454 types of African productsand overall trade is projected to reach $100 billion by

2010 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007, Sino-AfricanTrade p.1), but African exports to China continue toface tariff escalation (Broadman, 2007, pp.134-135).Even with a wide range of issue-areas in the relationshipit is not certain that China-Africa trade relations wilelevate into an era of diversification of exports from itshistorical dependence on commodities. There is concernabout the revisiting of unequal exchange of the coloniaera, or whether Chinese expansion into Africa would re-establish an era of white elephants and prestigeprojects with little benefit to local people (Bond, 2006

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p.74). China as a low-wage producer has also attractedinvestment that would otherwise go to other developingcountries. Its textile producers have had a detrimentalimpact on local textile industries in Africa, especiallyfollowing the end of the Multifibre Agreement, with theclosures of textile mills in Swaziland, Lesotho, and South

Africa blamed on cheap Chinese imports. The job losseshave exacerbated poverty, particularly among women(Kaplinsky et. al., 2006). South Africa imposed quotas forChinese textiles to protect the domestic garment industryfrom cheap Chinese imports. Broadman (2007, p.113)has noted emerging complementarities between Africaand China along the cotton-textile-apparel value chain;processing of natural resource exports; and increasedintra-industry trade with emerging African industrial hubssuch as South Africa and Nigeria. During a trip to SouthAfrica, in 2006, Premier Wen Jiabao, offered to restricttextile exports to South Africa (Ministry of Foreign Affairs,2006, China willing to restrict). At another level, whileChinas global rise, and its strong demand, has boostedthe prices of commodities to the benefit of Africancommodity exporters, it has also pushed up prices forfood staples and industrial raw materials (Kharas, 2005,pp.54-55).

Chinas military and strategic interests in Africa Shoring up global credentials in a post bipolar world

Chinas geoeconomic interests in Africa are inextricablylinked with its military and strategic analysis of a postbipolar worldview, which requires defending Chinaspositions in international forums such as the UN, and

positioning itself as a global power, while sometimestaking a firm stand against the US. Chinas Africa policycannot be divorced from its overall grand strategy, whichincludes a great power diplomacy focused onestablishing partnerships to increase its attractiveness.Africas strategic importance, in Chinas foreign policycalculations vis--vis other great powers, has grown ascountries deal with the problem of peak oil and seeksources of reliable supply of natural resources. Existingand emerging economic powers, from the US, Japan andIndia, have shown deep interest in Africas resourcewealth. Chinas focus on multipolarity is very muchwelcome in Africa. While BC talks about expediting a

shift from power politics to moral politics, (Ramo, 2004,p.5-6).China has made every effort to use both allelements of its power-hard and soft to secure economicand political advantages in Africa against its globalcompetitors. China has often railed against UShegemonism during the era of global competitiveness ofthe cold war era, albeit, it has been less concerned aboutRussia, whose influence has been declining on the con-tinent in the post-Soviet era. As a resource-rich country,Russia does not have the same acquisitive drive thatChina has in Africa, but it is still interested in exploring

business opportunities and replacing business with theideological space it has vacated in Africa. In AfricaChinas strategic interests for diplomatic support andresource exploitation have often conflicted with those othe US, albeit in some instances they have beencoincident. As Sutter (2008, p.46) points out some of its

strategic interest, use of sea lanes for oil supplies, markeaccess and discouraging export of Islamicfundamentalism, for example, paralleled those of theUnited States. He also notes that at other timescompetition with the United States for markets, oisupplies, and influence led China to work against USpolicies. (Sutter, 2008, p.46).

The overall goal of China is to avoid the dangers ofvulnerability and possible victimization by its rivalsIndeed as China has asserted itself globally in anincreasingly multipolar world, it has lent its diplomaticsupport to anti-western regimes in Africa with challenginghuman rights records, including Zimbabwe and SudanAs noted earlier, this support has meant blunting politicacriticisms or blocking UN action, the case of Dafur is anexample. It has also meant a robust arms tradeexemplified in a negative sense by the publicized case ofa Chinese vessel that was ordered back home afterSouth African dock workers refused to unload weaponsbound for Mugabes government, military exchanges, and

joint military training. The difference between the newChinas military and strategic approach now compared tothe days of the post-colonial period is clear: China hasmoved from working with the developing countries of thenon-aligned movement to avoid the entanglements of thecold war, to a more concerted effort to protect its strategicinterests as a growing global power. The diplomatic

economic and military engagement in Africa also servedto enhance important national priorities of securingenergy and mineral resources, expanding exports, andpushing for eventual China-Taiwan reunification. There iseven an extension of Africas strategic importance in thearea of space development. As Drew Thompson pointsout, China maintains a space tracking station in Namibiaand uses South African ports of call to support space-tracking ships (Thompson, 2005, p.23).

As Chinas geostrategic behaviour in Africa seems toreinforce its support for the tenets of the five principles opeaceful co-existence of the Bandung era, it is lessconstrained by ideational concerns of the outside world

when its resource foothold in African countries is subjecto any form of international challenge. Chinas strategicpush in Africa is geared more to protecting its resourcerich friends and ensuring that natural resources flowunhindered, and also open up markets for Chineseproducts and investments. In a sense, the new China ismore strategic in pursuing its core interests and lessenamoured of the need to be viewed as a responsiblegreat power. Chinas peaceful rise does not mean that itwill pursue policies in Africa that abandons some of itsless-than-peaceful energy sources. For instance, China

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has deployed about 4,000 troops to Southern Sudan toguard an oil pipeline in the region (Brookes and Shin,2006, p.5). Additionally, Beijings strategic behaviour ismounting a serious challenge to the view of Africa as aWestern European backyard from the days ofcolonialism. Military cooperation with African countries is

one way for Beijing to assert its growing influence on thecontinent. As with the situation in Sudan, China has beenthe main backer of the Western-sanctioned regime ofZimbabwe, supplying aircraft and other military hardware.While Mugabe is condemned for widespread humanrights abuses, he has benefited from Chinese militarysupport, and has been praised by China as a man ofgreat achievement, devoted to world peace and a goodfriend of the Chinese people (Brookes and Shin, 2006,p.5). Chinas support for regimes with poor humanrecords undermines NEPAD, and also threatens effortsby civil society to engender peaceful domestic politicalchange. It is clear that Chinas military transfers toAfrican states, as with other transfers elsewhere, aredesigned to fulfil both commercial and strategic reasons.Strategically, they expand Chinese influence in resource-rich countries, and also court support among regimes thatare considered pariah states by the US and the West. ForChina, securing oil supplies from African sources helpsthe country lessen its dependence on Middle Eastern andCentral Eurasian sources. Geopolitically, the MiddleKingdom is diversifying its sources of energy supplies asa strategic choice or advantage over its neighbouringgreat powers, India and Japan. On a purely commercialfront, arms transfers help build Chinas arms industry andgenerate foreign exchange for the Chinese economy.

There is concern in China about US military interest in

Africa, including the establishment of a new AfricaCommand (AFRICOM), and the Combined Joint TaskForce Horn of Africa, ostensibly to combat the terrorthreat. This has given rise to speculation that the duellingmilitary entanglements of China and the US in Africacould trigger the kind of competitiveness that marked theUS-Soviet struggle for allies in Africa during the ColdWar. The struggle, in this instance, is over naturalresources, specifically the growing oil demands of the twomajor powers. AFRICOM is a belated US response toemerging threats and opportunities on the Africancontinent, but the need to counter Chinese growingresource acquisitiveness cannot be underestimated as an

underlying raison dtre for its establishment As Volmanand Tuckey (2008, p.1) point out the creation ofAFRICOM is one element of a broad effort to develop agrand strategy on the part of the US to compete with,and eventually restrain Chinas activities. While themanagement of Chinas rising power is beyond the scopeof this paper (Johnston and Ross, 2002), it should benoted that in Africa the US is particularly wary of losingout on the vast oil supplies in the oil-rich Gulf of Guinearegion, which includes producers such as Nigeria,Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon. For its part, China,

Mensah 105

specifically analysts within the Peoples Liberation Armyis concerned about manifestations of US hegemony, asexpressed in the domination of international trading andfinancial systems; the direct military intervention inregional conflicts; an increased willingness to use militarycoercion in pursuit of political and economic goals; and

the strengthening of old and building of new militaryalliances and defence partnerships (Shambaugh, 2000p.115).

Samuel Kim has noted that Chinas security behaviouhas been fraught with ambiguity and contradiction as iattempts to balance geostrategic and normative concerns(Kim, 1994, p.141). He notes, for instance, that Chinasapproach to UN peacekeeping missions has evolvedthrough four distinct phases: opposition/exclusion (1949-1970); opposition/non-participation (1971-81)support/participation (1982-89); and retreat/participation(1990-present). As Chinas role in Africa has increased inpursuit of natural resources, it has also increased itsparticipation in UN peacekeeping operations in Africaboth to enhance its image as a responsible world powerand to protect its resource-driven interests on thecontinent. The Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudanand Liberia (countries with vast natural resources), areamong the countries with Chinese UN peacekeepingtroops (China Daily, 2007, Peacekeeping a risingrole), albeit China has contributed a total of over 3,000personnel from participation in 12 UN peacekeepingoperations in Africa (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006Chinese Blue Helmets) Chinas African peacekeepingcontribution is consistent with its ideational principles ofpeaceful coexistence, and offering assistance to deal withsecurity threats in Africa. Its 558-member contingent o

the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) has been hailed forcontributing to the post-conflict development effort inLiberia. While helping to resolve a wide range of Africanconflicts, from Western Sahara to the Ivory Coast, Chinais helping to fulfil its commitment to help Africans resolveconflict that hamper development. At the same time, itsoverall geostrategic goals are enhanced in the processby having Chinese personnel on the ground in Africa todeal with any security threats. Aside from UNpeacekeeping, Chinese also have engaged in militarycooperation with African countries to deal with anythreats to the growing Chinese personnel, Peace Corpsmigrants and other humanitarian workers who live in

African states.

Conclusion

China has moved from pre-Deng preoccupation withbuilding relations with Africa as part of a coalition-buildingexercise with the Third World to a more refined strategicpartnership that is derived from long-term acquisition onatural resources for its emerging power in the globaeconomy. The pre-Deng China was heavily focused on

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the use of ideational principles underlying the BandungConference of 1955 and the normative Five Principles ofPeaceful Coexistence to build solidarity with the ThirdWorld. As a champion of the Third World in its struggleagainst colonial influences, hegemonism and Sovietcontrol (during the Sino-Soviet split), China built its

relationship with Africa by delivering prestige projects tocement the relationship. China has expressed itsideational affinity by supporting efforts by Africa and theThird World, to work towards a reformed internationaleconomic order and the promotion of South-Southcooperation. By no means has the ideational componentof China-African relations been extinguished, as the post-Deng relationship with Africa is informed by the existingideational principles as well as the broader BeijingConsensus (BC), which seeks to project a new model ofdevelopment in a global context. While continuity of theideational principles, particularly BC, is evident in theChina-Africa relationship, it should not obscure the factthat China advances its national interests disguised asabstract international principles. The new imperative ofChinas Africa policy may be couched in terms of the priorideational principles, but they are also actuated byChinas geoeconomic interests of ensuring a readysupply of natural resources from Africa (in particular,ensuring energy security). Through a hybrid of soft power(concerted charm offensive, diplomatic engagement, andproclamations of ideational principles) and hard power(military exchanges, arms sales, and military support forenergy-rich regimes), China is seeking to enhance itsbroader global strategic interests as an emergingeconomic power and also ensure that its economiccompetitors do not threaten its interests in Africa. As Gill

et al., 2007, p.8) point out Africa is seen as integral toBeijings strategic ambition to advance a new securityconcept that can ensure Chinas peaceful rise as aglobal power and strengthen relations with keyneighbours and regions. In a post bipolar world, Chinasees a geopolitical benefit of securing vital resources in astrategically important continent to make up for its owndeficiency in resources, while stretching its global reachas an emerging global power. As well, as the Third Worldhas experienced a measure of fragmentation and theemergence of the BRICSAM (Brazil, Russia, India, China,South Africa, ASEAN-4 Indonesia, Malaysia,Philippines and Thailand, and Mexico) poses challenges

for long-established notions of international order(Cooper et.al, 2007, pp.673-689), China sees Africa as astrategic partner to help strengthen its global powercredentials and economic might. The relationship,however, is complex, multidimensional and ambitious andshould not assume to endure in the future based solelyon shared ideational principles, unless those principlesare beneficial for helping ordinary Africans achievematerial benefits that are sustainable.

While Africa and China shared commonality ofideational interests during the anti-colonial struggle and

continue to share broader support for norms of the FivePrinciples, their economic interests may not benecessarily coincident, especially in the area of movingAfrica away from its dependence on commodity exportsAfrican countries, through their continental NEPAD planhave expressed a desire to work towards the path o

sustainable economic development, which includesovercoming the lack of diversification of exports that haslong characterized Africas trade relationship withexternal actors. To be fair, China has engaged Africa ona broad range of economic endeavours, but thepreponderance of efforts is focused on securing naturaresources from the continent. It is not clear that theChinese are responding adequately to concerns aboulabour practices, the displacement or stifling of domesticentrepreneurs by Chinese firms, issues related tocorporate social responsibility (child labourenvironmental sustainability and corruption), andintegration of their resource expansionism into thebroader national or regional economies of Africa. Ocritical concern is the fact that the relationship, both preDeng and post-Deng, remains perched firmly, in the firsinstance, at the level of elites or leaders, asdemonstrated by the summit diplomacy of African andChinese leaders, both multilaterally and bilaterallyJudged by past incidence of mutual misunderstandings(racial incidents both in Africa and China) there is needfor more concerted efforts to establish stronger transnational civil society linkages between the Chinese andAfrican peoples (Campbell, 2008). This process isstarting to take shape as more Chinese migrantcommunities are established in Africa, and Chinacontinues to open doors for the training of African

students in its institutions of higher learning.As China attempts to establish its global reach, it is

imperative for its Africa policy to demonstrate the sameresponsible behaviour that has characterized its peace-keeping operations. There is also the need to temper itstraditional views on sovereignty, and embrace firmlyemerging norms of the responsibility to protect, and nolet its geoeconomic interests for resources trump Africancontinental goals for good governance, human rights andsustainable development. Subjective self-understandingof the past, while a useful reminder of the pastrelationship and perhaps a source for contemporarydiscussions, must give way to a sophisticated engage-

ment with Africa that gives prominence to economicactivities that benefit ordinary Africans, and respects theirhuman security and development. Perhaps the basis forthis new sophisticated and nuanced relationship has tocome from the development of a new African Consensuson its dealings with China, from which a convergencecould be attained with the worldview espoused in theBeijing Consensus. Otherwise Africa will simply be aconvenient actor that helps China in its pursuit of a grandglobal strategy without reaping any sustainable benefifrom the relationship.

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