mio journal 7th edition

52
Marime Interdicon Operaons journal journal N N A A T T O O M M A A R R I I T T I I M M E E I I N N T T E E R R D D I I C C T T I I O O N N O O P P E E R R A A T T I I O O N N A A L L T T R R A A I I N N I I N N G G C C E E N N T T R R E E n mio tc Issue 7 Issue 7 July 2013 July 2013 ISSN:2241-438X ISSN:2241-438X JcTD c3PO AN EXAMPLE OF SMART DEFENSE AT THE SERVIcE OF THE bOARDERS

Upload: nikolaos-ariatzis

Post on 09-Mar-2016

244 views

Category:

Documents


3 download

DESCRIPTION

A Maritime security related journal. Official publication of the NATO Maritime Interdiction Operational Training Centre.

TRANSCRIPT

Page 1: Mio journal 7th edition

Mari�me Interdic�on Opera�ons journaljournal

NN AATT OO

MM AARR IITT IIMM EE

II NNTT EE

RR DDII CCTT IIOO NN

OO PPEE RR

AA TTII OONN AA

LLTT RR

AA IINN IINN GG

CC EENN TT

RR EE

nmiotcIssue 7Issue 7

July 2013July 2013ISSN:2241-438XISSN:2241-438X

jjccttdd cc33ppooAAnn eexxAAmmppllee ooff SSmmAArrtt ddeeffeennSSee

AAtt tthhee SSeerrvviiccee ooff tthhee bbooAArrddeerrSS

Page 2: Mio journal 7th edition

nnmmiioottcc mmiioo jjooUUrrnnAAllppUUbblliiSShheerrnmiotc Souda bay, cretezip 73200, Greecetelephone:2821085716

ddiirreeccttoorr commodore i. pavlopoulos Grc n commandant nmiotc

eexxeeccUUttiivvee ddiirreeccttoorrcdr G. tedeschini itA ndireor of training Support

jjooUUrrnnAAll mmAAnnAAGGeerrcdr. K. Sampanis Grc n

eeddiittoorrlt cdr n.Ariatzis Grc n

wweebb eeddiittoorrcpo K. boutsifakou Grc n

AAddmmiinniiSSttrrAAttiioonn AAnnddddiiSSttrriibbUUttiioonnenS K. papanastasis Grc n

eeddiittoorriiAAll bbooAArrdddr. Alex bordetskydr marios efthymiopoulosdr joship Kasumdr p. michalasdr S. desautelprofessor i. Koukosprofessor G. tsialtasprofessor n. nikitakosprofessor f. papoulias

ccoollUUmmnniiSSttSSlt G. Georgiev bGr n

ccoonnttrriibbUUttoorrSSmr eric follstadmr martin wooleydr ronald Kesselmr david wikoffAdmiral(ret) p.chinofotisdrSiousouras petrosKyriakidis Kleanthisphddr marios efthymiopouloscdr harvey l.Scottmr ingo Klaus wamsermr pierre St. hilaire

2 Issue 7, July 2013

ccoonntteennttSS

44 ccoommmmAAnnddAAnntt’’SS eeddiittoorriiAAllby commodore ioannis pavlopoulos Grc n

1111 vviipp vviiSSiittSS GGAAlleerryy

1144 cc33ppoo:: AAnn eexxAAmmppllee ooff SSmmAArrtt ddeeffeennSSee AAtt tthheeSSeerrvviiccee ooff tthhee bbooAArrddeerrSS

by cdr G.A.tedeschini itA(n), nmiotc training Support director

1166 jjccttdd cc33ppoo mmiilliittAArryy UUttiilliittyy AASSSSeeSSSSmmeenntt

by mr eric follstad, US centcom Science and technology

2200 AAddvvAAnncceedd SSiittUUAAttiioonnAAll AAwwAArreenneeSSSS ttrrAAiinniinnGG by mr martin wooley, orbiS operations llc, nAto Act c-ied ipt

2233 nnoonn--lleetthhAAll ccAAppAAbbiilliittiieeSS iinn mmAArriittiimmeeSSeeccUUrriittyy

by dr ronald Kessel, cmre

2288 bbiioommeettrriiccSS iinn nnAAttoo mmiiooby mr david wikoff, US eUcom biometric s lno

3311 eeffffeeccttiivvee ccooooppeerrAAttiioonn:: tthhee bbeeddrrooccKK ooffAAnnyy SSeeccUUrriittyy AArrcchhiitteeccttUUrree

by Admiral (ret) p.chinofotis Grc n,

3355 iilllleeGGAAll iimmmmiiGGrrAAttiioonn:: oovveerrAAllll AASSSSeeSSSSmmeenntt,,mmAArriittiimmee cchhAAlllleennGGee AAnndd ppoolliiccyy rreeccoommmmeennddAA--ttiioonnSS

by by dr. Siousiouras petros & Kyriakidis Kleanthis, phd

3399 SSppeecciiAAlliizzAAttiioonn AAnndd pprreeppAArreeddnneeSSSSiinn ccooUUnntteerriinnGG eemmeerrGGiinnGG tthhrreeAAttSS AAtt SSeeAA

by dr marios efthymiopoulos, Strategy international ceo

4411 SSoommAAllii ppiirrAAccyy:: ffoolllloowwiinnGG tthhee ppAAppeerr ttrrAAiill

by mr pierre St. hilaire, head of interpol maritime piracy task force

4466 tthhee 22001133 nnmmiioottcc AAnnnnUUAAll ccoonnffeerreennccee:: ffUUttUUrree SSeeccUUrriittyy AAtt SSeeAA.. mmiioo rroolleeSS..

by commander (ret) harvey l. Scott USn

4488 tthhee ““vvoollGGAA”” ccAASSee:: cciivviilliiAAnn--mmiilliittAArryy ccooooppeerrAAttiioonn iinn mmAArriittiimmee iinntteerrddiiccttiioonn ooppeerrAA--ttiioonnSS

by mr ingo Klaus wamser

Page 3: Mio journal 7th edition

Issue 7, July 2013 3

e nnmmiioottcc mmiioo jjoouurrnnaall is a professional publication of nAto maritime interdiction op-erational training center, aiming to serve as a forum for the presentation and stimulation of innovativethinking on nAto maritime interdiction related issues such as doctrine, concepts, force structure, em-ployment and readiness.

e views and opinions expressed or implied in the nnmmiioottcc mmiioo jjoouurrnnaall are those of theauthors and should not be construed as carrying the official sanction of nAto.e nnmmiioottcc mmiioo jjoouurrnnaall is open to receive and publish articles at [email protected]. we reserve the right to make editorial changes.

All articles within this issue not bearing a copyright notice (©©), may be reproduced in whole orin part without further permission. Articles bearing a copyright notice (©©) may be reproduced for anynAto purpose but without permission. if an article is being reproduced, the nnmmiioottcc mmiioo jjoouurrnnaallrequests a courtesy line. to obtain permission for the reproduction of material bearing a copyright notice(©©) for other than nAto purposes, please contact the author of the material rather than the nnmmiioottccmmiioo jjoouurrnnaall..

Page 4: Mio journal 7th edition

ppiirrAAccyy AAnndd tthhee hhoorrnn ooff AAffrriiccAA

piracy, or “robbery on the high seas”, has alwaysexisted since people, commercial goods and commoditieshave traveled through the oceans, and ever since thebeginning of “State-sponsored” navies, the suppressionof piracy has been one of their major concern andresponsibility.

e ancient Greeks, romans, and chinese had thecommon complaint and concern, and thus created navalforces to bght pirates.

As early as 74 b.c., when julius caesar was capturedby pirates during his journey to rodos, the brst thing hedid after paying the ransom and being released was to btout a squadron of ships to sail against those pirates andto take his revenge.

e word “piracy” is derived from the ancient latinword “pirata” (sea robber) and even earlier from theGreek term “peirates” (those who attack ships). piracy,

though, has evolved over time, as maritime commercialtrade expanded.

e frightening increase in piracy off the coast ofSomalia since the beginning of the present centurydemonstrates how fast this kind of threat can evolve andhow severe the difficulties in understanding andsubduing it can be.

e collapse of the Siad barre regime, in 1991,resulted in the creation of a period of instability inSomalia. between 1991 and 1995 the considerablemaritime traffic transiting through the important lanesof passage off the horn of Africa was effectivelymonitored by the naval task force associated with theUnited nations peacekeeping operations in Somalia(UnoSom i and ii). ese routes were historicallyused for all shipping movements towards the Gulf ofAden and the red Sea, and in most cases ships passedquite close to the Somali coast to achieve a moreeconomical passage.

nnmmiioottcc’’ss mmiiSSSSiioonnttoo ccoonndduucctt tthhee ccoommbbiinneedd ttrraaiinniinngg nneecceessssaarryy ffoorr nnAAttoo ffoorrcceess ttoo bbeetttteerr eexxeeccuuttee ssuurrffaaccee,, ssuubb--ssuurrffaaccee,, aaeerriiaall ssuurrvveeiillllaannccee,, aanndd ssppeecciiaall ooppeerraattiioonnss aaccttiivviittiieess iinn ssuuppppoorrtt ooff mmaarriittiimmee iinntteerrddiiccttiioonn ooppeerraattiioonnss..nnmmiioottcc ccoommmmaannddaanntt’’ss vviissiioonneennhhaannccee mmaarriittiimmee SSeeccuurriittyy tthhrroouugghh mmiioo ttrraaiinniinngg aanndd rreemmaaiinn AAlllliiaannccee’’ss ccrreeddiibbllee mmiioo eexxppeerrtt..

4 Issue 7,July 2013

NMIOTC Journal>>>Commandant’s Editorial

commAndAnt’S editoriAl

by commodore ioannis pavlopoulos Grc n

Page 5: Mio journal 7th edition

when the United nations forces left, in 1995,Somalia had no effective government and was not able tomaintain a continuous monitoring of the waters off itscoasts, hence it fell into a period of “clan warfare”.

e chaotic situation ashore and the damage incictedto the economy and the infrastructure of the countryhad a very important effect on the seas.

for generations, offshore bshing represented the onlyregular and signibcant livelihood for many coastalvillages, communities and families. ese bshermendepended entirely on the rich bshing off the Somali coastand they operated from small dhows, boats or woodencanoes, or more recently from modern small motorizedbberglass skiffs. ey used traditional techniques, mainlyusing nets to gather their catch and then off-loading thetake for sale upon returning to shore.

in 1995 the Somali region found itself exposed touncontrolled foreign exploitation, as large commercialbshing vessels started crossing and working off the coastof Somalia, very often also within the country’s territorialwaters, interfering with traditional domestic bshing areasalong the shoreline.

e presence of these large-scale bshing vesselssignibcantly impacted the activities of the boatsconstituting the local bshing ceet, and placed the coastalsubsistence and the local economy based on traditionalbshing practices in danger. e piracy problem in thearea emerged from this context.

many former bshermen became pirates, and armedthemselves with weapons which were easily available dueto the bghting among the Somali clans in their strugglefor power.

e Somali waters, with a coastline of more than2.000 miles, soon became one of the world’s mostdangerous areas for piracy.

when clashes between local bshermen andcommercial bshing vessels began, no central governmentexisted to set the whole problem in a national context,with legal agreements and power to effectively enforcelegality.

no clan or presumptive central authority intervenedto prevent an uncontrolled escalation, and the initiallylegitimate effort to limit the foreign exploitation ofSomali resources turned into the modern piracy“business”.

As their illicit activities proved to be lucrative, piratesprogressively increased the range of their activities, andwhen they made their leap to the high seas, they started

looking for much larger commercial vessels as victims.

e skiffs employed were the same small bberglassmotorized boats that are extremely common along thecoastline, and with which all bshermen – among whompirates were recruited – were very familiar.

ey naturally still used the traditional tools availableto Somali bshermen, but with some tactical rebnement.

by 2004 the pirates began to use multiple skiffs intheir work. A larger skiff provided room for theprovisions of food and water needed to sustain the piratecrew for up to two weeks and at a range of two hundrednautical miles, just as a bshing party would do. it couldalso provide the means and space for storing andrepairing bshing nets, mirroring the more traditionaloccupation and habits of the local crews.

in this way, while looking for their targets, thesebshermen-turned-pirates appeared no different from themajority of the local maritime presence, and a patrolvessel or a potential prey could hardly notice thedifference at distance between a pirate and a legitimatebsherman.

in response to the increased threat of piracy off theSomali coast, on the 2nd of june 2008 the Un Securitycouncil adopted resolution 1816, observing thatSomalia “lacks the capacity to interdict pirates or patroland secure its territorial waters”. is resolutionauthorized, for an initial period of six months thenextended, foreign naval vessels to enter Somali territorialwaters and to use “all necessary means” to repress acts ofpiracy and armed robbery at sea, consistent with existingand relevant provisions of international law.

e resolution, and the consequent internationaleffort against piracy, resulted in a progressive reductionof the presence of pirates and in the decrease of thenumber of successful attacks to commercial maritimefreight, but it did not address the underlying factors thatgenerated the phenomenon. in looking for a solution, itis necessary to recall the history of the problem: theSomali situation emerged from the inability of localbshermen to preserve their resources and livelihood.us, the long-term solution to this problem should gobeyond traditional coalitions, formal alliances and thedefeat of individual targets, as the phenomenon of piracycannot be defeated at sea.

naval vessels patrolling the Gulf of Aden, the Somalibasin and the indian ocean, while being effective inensuring the protection of merchant vessels transitingthe area of high piracy risk, address the symptoms butnot the cause. And history suggests that in naval

Issue 7, July2013 5

NMIOTC Journal Commandant’s Editorial <<<

Page 6: Mio journal 7th edition

6 Issue 7, July 2013

NMIOTC Journal>>> Commandant’s Editorial

operations as well as in international or regional disputes,prosperity and rule of law cannot be injected “surgically”,but it is rather necessary to create the social, cultural andeconomic conditions for an enduring safe and secureenvironment.

it is of high importance to remember at this point,what the Secretary General of imo, mr. Koji Seikimizu,said once more in march 2013 regarding the currentcounter piracy situation:

“we must be thankful for the efforts of theinternational naval forces and their robust operationsand to the shipping industry for the increasing adherenceto bmp and for embracing a culture of heightenedsecurity. but it is too early to claim victory and whilstthe navies and bmp continue to suppress the piratesuccesses at sea, we must increase our efforts to addressthe roots of the problem in Somalia, and create bettermaritime security capacity in the region.”

is basically means that, we have partially fulblledour mission but the threat is still there. needless tomention that “armed robbery at sea” is still considered ahigh threat for the international shipping community inthe western part of Africa, where the phenomenon is ina different format and exceedingly more berce actionsare taking place.

in the end, the solution to piracy is as local as the lostlivelihood of a former bsherman recruited as a pirate ina camp along the Somali coast, and as global as thecommon interest of the international community andof all littoral countries to see their merchant vessels sailthe oceans safely to ensure a courishing commerce.

if we can see the coexistence of these two aspects ofthe problem and act accordingly, the region will be ableto bnd once again both the necessary rule of law and aneffective way to grant its own sustainment.

in this scenario, as professional sailors serving in thenAto maritime interdiction operational trainingcenter, we are strongly committed and aware of our role,being proud to effectively contribute to the internationaleffort against piracy by delivering valuable dedicatedtraining to nAto and non-nAto units designated toparticipate to the counter-piracy operations in the Gulfof Aden and the Somali basin, such as the nAto-ledoperation “ocean Shield” and the eU-led operation“Atlanta”, and additionally contributing to the regionalcapacity building efforts of imo, by providing specibctraining to military and law enforcement personnel ofthe djibouti code of conduct countries.

CCoommmmooddoorree IIooaannnniiss PPaavvllooppoouullooss was born in the city ofessaloniki (northern Greece) on April 13th, 1961. Hegraduated the Hellenic Naval Academy and was commissioned asEnsign in June 1983.

His specialties are Officer of Navy Special Forces' andCommunication Officer. He attended the basic training courseof the Underwater Demolition School, the static line and free-falling parachuting course of the Army, unconventional warfarein the U.S. and several NATO SoF courses in Germany.

He served on several types of warships (destroyers, guidedmissile patrol boats, landing crafts) as a Communication andNavigation Officer and as an XO onboard DDG KIMON.

He spent most of his sea carrier onboard amphibious ships.He was assigned as Commanding Officer on the HS RODOS(LST type) from 1995 to 1997 and as Operations Staff Officerin the Landing Fleet Command from 1999 to 2000. FromAugust 2005 to September 2006 he assumed the duties ofCommanding Officer on HS SAMOS.

From 1989 to 1994 he served in the Navy's Special Forces asan operational team leader and staff officer. He accomplishedseveral missions (boarding officer during IRAQ crises in 1990 inthe Red Sea, during UN sanctions imposed on Former Yugoslaviain the Adriatic Sea in the years 1992 and 1994, security teamleader of ex-USSR President Michael Gorbachov and the Chiefsof the US Armed Forces in 1993).

From September 2006 till July 2008 he was assigned asCommandant of the Navy's Special Forces.

In 1993 he served for six months under the United Nations

Gag in northern IRAQ as a UN guard team leader. From 1997 to 1999 he served in the Naval Academy as

Director/Major of the Naval Cadets' battalion. After his graduation from the Naval War College in 2000 he

served as Head of the Current Operations Planning Department(J3) in the Hellenic Navy General Staff (2000 to 2002); NavalAttaché of the Embassy of Greece in Paris/France (2002-2005),Deputy Director in the Naval Staff Officers' Course School(2009-2010) and Director of the Athens Multinational SealiftCoordination Center (2010-2012).

Being promoted at the rank of Commodore the 1st of August2012, he has been assigned as Commandant of the NMIOTCon the 28th of August 2012.

He bears the Gold Cross Phoenix battalion, the PeaceOperations' medal (3 ops), the Military Merit, the SuccessfulCommand medals and the Gold Cross of Honor battalion.

e States of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have also decoratedhim for his participation in the operations for the liberation ofKuwait. He has also been decorated with the Peace Operationsmedal of the United Nations and the expert riGe-shooting awardof the US ARMY.

On June 2006, he was decorated by the French Republicas "Chevalier dans l'Ordre National du Merite" for hisappointment as Naval Attaché of Greece in France.

Commodore Ioannis Pavlopoulos HN speaks English andFrench. He is married, father of two children.

Page 7: Mio journal 7th edition

Issue 7,July 2013 7

NMIOTC Journal NMIOTC Training <<<

Page 8: Mio journal 7th edition

nmiotc’s training is following Act’s trainingguidelines and principles. it is using the three key wordsthat Act has implemented in the training concepts...

eeffffeeccttiivvee eeffifficciieenntt andAAffffoorrddaabblleetraining is eeffffeeccttiivvee by having modular struc-

ture, providing ad-hoc and on request - just in timetraining, executing specibc training analysis for each tar-get audience, conducting adjustable training levels on acase by case basis, conducting tailored and customizedtraining iaw operational needs and bnally by deliveringa mission rehearsal training.

it is eeffifficciieenntt as it follows nAto standards, it isbeing enriched with subject matter experts / specializedtrainers/ experienced lecturers, by implementing day andnight training scenarios and bnally by having strong co-operations with other institutions/Agencies and the Ac-ademia.

it is aaffffoorrddaabbllee primarily because it is at very lowcost, students pay only for incremental costs like simu-nition and helicopter usage and bnally becausenmiotc has the ability of deploying its Specializedmio mobile training teams (mtt) to customer’spremises at very low cost.

8 Issue 7,July 2013

NMIOTC Journal>>> NMIOTC Training

Page 9: Mio journal 7th edition

Issue 7,July 2013 9

NMIOTC Journal NMIOTC Training <<<

Page 10: Mio journal 7th edition

10 Issue 7, July 2013

nmiotc’s instructors (in blue) teaching counterpiracy techniques to a mio boarding team. training isbeing executed with nmiotc’s rhibs in Souda bay

conducting realistic and mission reahearsalscenarios.

recently nmiotc’s training support team installedsmoke, noise and background noise generators inside

training ship “hS Aris” in order to make trainingmore realistic and effective for the students creating a

real war gaming zone environment.

rreeaall ppiirraattee wwhhaalleerr aanndd sskkiiffffare used for practical small vessel investigation training.

nmiotc extensively apply the model ofrreeaalliissttiicc mmiissssiioonn rreehheeaarrssaall

before deployment.

pictures from the monitors of the cctv system onboard nmiotc’s training ship “hS Aris”, where

students actions are being recorded and played backafter training in post evaluation training briefs. ese

pictures show the material collected from 31microcameras in hidden places inside the training

ship.

NMIOTC Journal>>> NMIOTC Training

Page 11: Mio journal 7th edition

Issue 7,July 2013 11

NMIOTC Journal Photo Galery <<<

vviipp vviiSSiittSS GGAAlleerryyvviipp vviiSSiittSS GGAAlleerryy

visit of the Act chief of Staff, vice Admiral tony johnstone-burt obe Gbr (n)8 April 2013

visit of the dcom mArcom vice Admiral christian canova frA (n)

31 may 2013

visit of the chief of romanian national defence General Staff lieutenant General Stefan danila rom (Af)

13 june 2013

visit of the commander in chief of the hellenic fleetvice Admiral panagiotis litsas hn

11 April 2013

visit of the nAto SnmG2 commander rear Admiral eugenio diaz del rio eSp (n))

12 june 2013

Page 12: Mio journal 7th edition

vviipp vviiSSiittSSvviipp vviiSSiittSS

visit of thenAto SnmG1 commanderrear Admiral (l.h.) Georg w. von maltzan Ger (n)

27 may 2013

visit of the US cApStone class 13-2 SwA of national defense University

19 february 2013

visit of the German defence Attaché in Greececolonel norbert dreshke Ger (A)

28 may 2013

12 Issue 7, July 2013

NMIOTC Journal>>> Photo Galery

visit of nAto forAcS Steering committee 15 may 2013

visit of operation AtAlAntA force commander commodore jorge manuel novo palma por (n)

27 march 2013

visit of thevice chief of hndGS vice Admiral Alexandros eodosiou Grc (n)

19 April 2013

Page 13: Mio journal 7th edition

vviipp vviiSSiittSSvviipp vviiSSiittSS

courtesy viisit of the SSn SAphir commanding officer4 february 2013

visit of the head of the counter piracy project implementationUnit (piU) of imo,mr philip holihead

5 july 2013

Issue 7, July 2013 13

NMIOTC Journal Photo Galery <<<

visit ofthe haifa naval base commander rear Admiral eli Sharvit (iSn) )

08 march 2013

visit of the british defence Attaché in Greececolonel Anthony morphet Gbr

08 April 2013

visit of the American hellenic institute 16th may 2013

courtesy viisit of the fS de pUi dU lome commandingofficer

3 july 2013

Page 14: Mio journal 7th edition

14 Issue 7, July 2013

NMIOTC Journal>>>

piracy is one of the most ancient threats to sea linesof communication and the brst crime in the history forwhich the international jurisdiction was established.

ere are examples of pirates even in the classicperiod, ancient Greeks, romans and etruscans but it islater in the 17th century when the principle ofconsidering the attack of a merchant to anothermerchant in the high sea as an international crime wascommonly and authoritatively stated. pirates of the seaswere considered enemies of the humanity and anynation had the jurisdiction to intervene with the use offorce in order to defeat them. is principle is nowcustomary law and it is regulated by the internationalconvention of the law of the Sea of montego bay 1982.during the last ten years maritime piracy has tripled inintensity and affects wider and wider areas, so theattention of the international community of nations hasbeen attracted again, especially in the horn of Africa(hoA) which has become the biggest concern and casestudy for maritime Security.

in hoA multiple maritime operations are in forceand multiple naval formations, belonging to differentorganizations, are operating in the same maritime

areawith similar counter piracy / counter terrorismmissions:

• cmf (combined maritime force under thelead of US central commad )

• ooS (operation ocean Shield under the leadof nAto maritime command )

• operation Atalanta (under the lead of europeanUnion maritime Schipping centre horn of Africa )

• russian republic counter piracy maritimemission;

• chinese republic counter piracy maritimemission;

An average of 40 naval units is deployed in the highseas in front of hoA.

Since the 17th century civilization and humanrights have gone a long way forward and there is theneed to grant a fair trial to pirates, evidence collection,biometrics and information sharing have a crucial role.A brilliant study on the maritime piracy in the horn ofAfrica was run in 2010 by nAto joint lessons learntcentre, of monsanto portugal. jAllc analysts spread

NMIOTC Journal>>>Capability Development

jjccttdd cc33ppooAAnn eexxAAmmppllee ooff SSmmAArrtt ddeeffeennSSee AAtt tthhee SSeerrvviiccee ooff tthhee bbooAArrddeerrSS

bbyy ccddrr GGiioovvaannnnii AAnnttoonniioo tteeddeesscchhiinnii iittAA((nn))

Page 15: Mio journal 7th edition

Issue 7,July 2013 15

NMIOTC Journal

around the globe, from the maritime headquarters innorthern europe and eastern America to operationalcenters in bahrain and eastern Africa and moreovervisiting naval Units and collecting a single astonishingresult.

in the age of global communication, crime evidencesand biometrics are very difficult to share. ey are notshared with sufficient efficiency and the whole success ofthe mission is affected by this issue. e reason lays thedifferent status and the different security policies whichare in force in the many organizations involved.

e challenge to address this issue was engaged by thejoint capability technology demonstration (jctd), asmall agile team of experts in technology based tampaflorida within the military framework of US centralcommand.

e out of the box idea is based on the principle thatboarding teams collect raw information and rawinformation, before it is not processed and correlated is,by debnition, unclassibed.

jctd has created a information collection andsharing system in which the sailors of the boarding teamsare the main users both as data input and data extraction.A pretty neat situation, which allow instant data sharing,at the lowest thinkable level and among multinationalboarding teams, as qualibed users, law enforcementpeople of the area of operations. Snapshots of singleevents in time and space are shared globally. nojudgments but simple facts, positions and veribedidentities.

Since they presented their idea during nmiotcannual conference 2011, we immediately recognized thegreat value in it and offered our support as subject matterexperts in maritime interdiction operations, which is themain toolset with which is addressed counter piracy in

hoA. After the developing phase nmiotccontributed to the operational evaluation and themilitary utility assessment of the system.

nmiotc consider c3po a great leap forward in theeffectiveness of maritime security multinationaloperations. it is particularly impressive that all this isachieved at very low cost. no expensive equipment isnecessary to be part of the network. A cloud database, aweb based software, which is reachable by a standard webbrowser (e.g. chrome or explorer) by the boardingteams at sea, with nothing more than a simple personalcomputer and internet. identity veribcation loops areembedded in the system and warnings on specibcpersons show up with the colors of a traffic light next tothe names of the crew members of the merchant vessel.

in the concept of making c3po operationalnmiotc stands ready to provide practical training onthe use of c3po to all nAto and partners boardingteams.

A more detailed article is published at page16 of thisissue.

Scenario Walkthrough

NMIOTC Journal Capability Development <<<

commander G.A.tedeschini itA(n), is thenmiotc director of training Support. email yourcomments to [email protected]

On board Training Ship ARIS

Page 16: Mio journal 7th edition

16 Issue 7, July 2013

NMIOTC Journal>>>

““eemmppllooyy yyoouurr ttiimmee iinn iimmpprroovviinngg yyoouurrsseellff bbyyootthheerr mmeenn’’ss wwrriittiinnggss,, ssoo tthhaatt yyoouu sshhaallll ggaaiinn eeaassiillyywwhhaatt ootthheerrss hhaavvee llaabboorreedd hhaarrdd ffoorr..””

~~ SSooccrraatteess 447700––339999 bbcc

we have all heard—and presumably used—variousclichés and noble parables regarding individual andcollective pursuits that are believed to ensure theachievement of stated goals. Sayings such as “hard workpays off,” “Keep your nose to the grindstone,” “no pain,no gain,” and “if at brst you don’t succeed….try, tryagain” are all meant to inspire and elicit a belief that ifone will just work harder and put in additional time,success can be assured. Supposedly, failure to achievestated goals can then be defended since it was not due toa lack of effort. ere is no argument that time andeffort play a distinct role in the achievement of goals;however, it can also be argued that in order for work tobe applied in the manner and form necessary for theachieving of goals, the proper tool for the job must be anintegral component of performing the task at hand.

e need for improved tools and processes governingboarding operations pertaining to maritime interdictionoperations (mio) recently brought assessment activitiesto the nmiotc. e combined end-to-endexpanded maritime interdiction operationsperformance optimization (c3po) joint capabilitytechnology demonstration (jctd) military Utility

Assessment (mUA) conducted from 2 to 11 April 2013at nmiotc was an effort to equip mio forces with theright tools for the job and to perform more effectiveoperations.

in the most simplistic terms, mio is used tofacilitatauthorized maritime security operations (mSo)in upport of each country’s national interests or pursuantto an internationally recognized mandate. today,thousands of mio operations have been and continue tobe conducted by a variety of naval forces, host nationand/or regional law enforcement agencies, and otherrecognized and authorized agencies assigned mSomissions. expanded mio (emio) has been developedby the U.S. department of defense (dod) to deter,degrade, and prevent attacks against the U.S. and itsallies, and involves interception of targeted personnel ormaterial that poses an imminent threat.

over the years, naval forces and law enforcementagencies have conducted tens of thousands of boardings.Unfortunately, most of the data created from pastboardings is not available to support today’s global miomission planning and operations. As you read thisarticle, decisions to board suspect vessels are being madeby ships’ commanding officers or mio commanderswith little to no background or historical boardinginformation regarding the vessel about to be boarded.currently, this hail or hail-and-board decision is fraughtwith unnecessary risk and uncertainty that could bereduced [eliminated] simply by having access topreviously documented reports regarding past activitiesof the ship and crew under interrogation. is inabilityof the mio commander, commanding officer, and/or

NMIOTC Journal>>> Capability Development

jjccttdd cc33ppoo mmiilliittAArryy UUttiilliittyy AASSSSeeSSSSmmeenntt

by mr eric follstad, US centcom Science and technology

C3PO Opera%onal View

Page 17: Mio journal 7th edition

Issue 7, July 2013 17

NMIOTC Journal

boarding officer to leverage historical boarding data,regardless of source, to make the best operationallyinformed decision, is summarized by the operationalproblem statements below:

• U.S. and coalition boarding teams are unable toshare actionable maritime interdiction information in atimely manner, resulting in missed interdictionopportunities, unnecessary boarding events, and thepotential failure to detain persons of interest orconbscate suspected contraband.

• boarding teams lack a common repository toconsolidate and share mio data. once boarding data iscollected, it usually remains in theater or in combinedsystems, which inhibits efficient analysis and processingby US and coalition partners.

ccAAppAAbbiilliittyy ddeevveellooppmmeenntt

in developing the necessary toolsets to address theoperational problem, thresholds were debned, and it wasdetermined that the capability demonstrated must beable to perform the following tasks:

• Share past boarding data between participatingnavies

o Simple web-based architecture utilizingcommercial browsers

o Globally accessible content utilizing basicinternet access

• Support pre-mission planning

o Access historical boarding reports and imagerywith the click of a mouse

• provide near-real-time biometric veribcation

o faster response from the identity managementdatabases

• consolidate and share boarding data

o create boarding reports, upload images, andexport to after action reviews

o Support end-users and decision-makers

based on over 18 months’ worth of consultation,development, iterative testing, exercising, andexperimentation with US, nAto, and other nationalrepresentatives, the c3po enterprise boardingoperations Support System (ceboSS) softwarepackage was created. hosted on servers located in theUS (and accessible worldwide), ceboSS provides theemio toolsets that previously were not available forforces executing mio operations. with theimplementation of ceboSS, shipboard capabilities foremio planning now include the following:

• Unclassibed web-based user interface accessibleanywhere

• Searchable database of historical boardinginformation

• Automated data exchange with biometricidentity management databases

• boarding report templates

• information sharing among partners andorganizations

even with the 18-month c3po collaborativedevelopment effort leading to the creation of theceboSS capability, there remained key questions thatwere unanswered pertaining to the overall conceptbehind the c3po project: is the ceboSS capabilityoperationally relevant in supporting current and future

CEBOSS Training

NMIOTC Journal Capability Development <<<

On Board Traning Ship ARIS

Page 18: Mio journal 7th edition

18 Issue 7, July 2013

NMIOTC Journal>>>

mS0, and does it have the military utility thatcommanding and boarding officers desire to have? esequestions were unanswered until now.

ddeetteerrmmiinniinnGG tthhee mmiilliittAArryy UUttiilliittyy

hort of actual combat operations, an acceptable andwidely used method to evaluate a new capability orcapability under development is to utilize current andqualibed operators (users) on actual systems with asupporting concept of operations (conopS) andcorresponding tactics, techniques, and procedures (ttp)in an operationally realistic setting with lifelike scenarios.is was the premise for assessing the military utility ofceboSS.

leveraging the intellectual capital of the nmiotcstaff, US naval forces central command(nAvcent), and the US coast Guard as well asnAto subject matter experts from Germany and thehellenic navy, eight scenarios based on actual boardingswere created along with more than 700 appropriateprops, artifacts, identibcation documentation, andrelated paraphernalia that are typically collected anddocumented during boarding operations. rough theuse of role players and surrogate agents, vessel hailingevents and compliant boarding operations were plannedand executed utilizing the nmiotc headquarters andthe training ship AriS.

even though current mio conopS and ttps havebeen standardized and agreed upon by US and nAtoorganizations, there was a desire to evaluate potentialdifferences between US and nAto use of ceboSS asit pertained to mission planning, execution, and post-event reporting. Since ceboSS was envisioned to beused and accessed worldwide by an untold number ofpotential users, there needed to be considerationregarding how [potentially] other countries and users

would view and use the ceboSS functionality and userinterfaces. to evaluate these differences, the assessmentutilized two teams: a US-only manned team and anAto team. e US team was comprised of visit,board, Search, and Seizure (vbSS) members andanalysts from USnAvcent/US coast Guard, and thenAto team was comprised of members fromnmiotc. of note during the course of the assessment,several software changes were recommended in an effortto better support differences in nAto and US planningmethodologies. us, the decision to utilize both nAtoand US boarding teams proved to be a valuableassessment approach.

e basic script for the execution of the assessmentwas to initiate planning utilizing many of the inherentsearch features maintained within the ceboSSsoftware. role players utilized photo teams to initiatevisual identibcation of suspect vessels. based onfeedback from these teams, visual characteristics of thevessel allowed shipboard boarding teams the ability tosearch the ceboSS system against a variety of vesselcriteria such as vessel name, color, and distinguishingfeatures. if a match and positive identibcation werefound, critical past boarding information wasimmediately available to assist with mission planning.based on reviewing and analyzing past boarding data andcontrasted with the current operational situation, adecision to hail the vessel was then made. e boardingofficer could then utilize ceboSS to prepare the actualhail scripts, develop a set of questions for the vessel’screw, and—based on responses from the suspect crew—verify information provided by the crew against pastboarding data.

in support of pre-boarding preparations, boardingteams extracted historical boarding information fromceboSS to support mission planning. data availableassisted in determining suspect crew composition, vessel

NMIOTC Journal>>> Capability Development

Evidence Collec%on

Biometric Collec%on

Page 19: Mio journal 7th edition

Issue 7, July 2013 19

NMIOTC Journal

cargo, past destinations, and potential tripwires for useduring crew interviews as well as a myriad of other datafor use during boarding or questioning.

during the actual boarding event, boarding teamshad the ability to maintain an ongoing narrative withthe ship to conduct ceboSS inquiries and dataexchange as needed to answer/verify/dispute issues thatarose during engagement with the crew underinterrogation. is served to empower the boardingteam by affording them the ability to corroborateinformation from past boardings while the boardingteam was still on the boarded ship. not only didceboSS provide near-real-time access to historicalboarding data to better affect pre-boarding planningactivities, ceboSS provided live connectivity tobiometric identity management databases. is criticaloperational attribute allowed boarding teams—via ahandheld biometric device—to capture, upload,transmit, and quickly receive biometric responsesregarding personnel encountered during boardingoperations. it also allowed boarding teams the ability toanticipate and verify crewmembers who may be onboarda suspect vessel based on data entered into ceboSSfrom previous boardings. is is a critical capability thataddresses past issues seen with releasing vessels withpersons of interest onboard, due to lack of identityveribcation during actual boarding events.

Another critical issue identibed by mio personnelduring the development of the c3po jctd involvedthe generation of reports. report generation followinga boarding can be laborious, time consuming, mentallyexhausting, and a distraction from primary duties. toremedy this situation ceboSS employs an automaticreport generation template that streamlines andautomates the after-action report (AAr) in accordancewith current US and nAto standards. ese templatescan be easily updated and refreshed to account for new

standards and reporting requirements. Users enjoyed theability to populate the ceboSS database as theboarding was being executed, bnish the data entryshortly after returning to the ship, export the data intopre-debned report templates, and publish their boardingreport for worldwide access and review with just the clickof a mouse. e capability that ceboSS provided to“work smarter, not harder” was heralded as a resoundingsuccess by boarding officers.

wwAArrffiiGGhhtteerrSS’’ ppeerrSSppeeccttiivveeSS AAnndd wwAAyyAAhheeAAdd

during the course of assessment planning, dailyscenario mission planning, debriebngs, and the post-mUA hotwash, there were universal agreements that thiscapability is needed. comments from commandingofficers, boarding officers, vbSS teams, trainers, andnmiotc supporting staff have been positive withaffirmation that the ceboSS system addresses keyelements of the operational need. Given ceboSS’s brstintroduction to the user community during the mUA,there were several recommendations to improve ttpsand some suggestions for technology interfaceimprovements regarding large data ble transferinefficiencies. e biometrics veribcation process andcorresponding ttps were highly praised and fullysupport recently approved nAto biometrics policies.of note was the desire on the part of nmiotc toimmediately start training on the system for operationalemployment. A bnal report of military utility will beco-signed by the US central command and the USeuropean command and released in August 2013.

Boarding Report

NMIOTC Journal Capability Development <<<

The JCTD C3PO Military U%lity Assessment Joint Tean on board Training Sip ARIS

for additional information regarding the c3pojctd and future activities, contact mr. mikel Awad atUS central command, phone: (813) 529-8113e-mail: [email protected]

Page 20: Mio journal 7th edition

20 Issue 7, July 2013

NMIOTC Journal>>>

e nAto Allied command transformation (Act)hQ in norfolk, together with the nmiotc, hasrecognized that naval boarding teams are critical enablersin supporting Attack the network (Atn) operations. inaddition to collecting traditional boarding data,boarding teams have the potential to collect vitalforensic, biometric, material and technical data that canbe exploited to support countering threat networks. Asstated in Atp 71, evidence gathering is a critical part ofmaritime interdiction operations (mio). whether insupport of an approved nAto operation or during day-to-day operations in support of national tasking,boarding teams are exposed to valuable information andintelligence that can be used to support maritime targetdevelopment for a specibc operation and/or support abroader counter threat network effort by disseminatingessential information used to attack threat networks.

for a number of years the US military has been usingAdvanced Situational Awareness training (ASAt®) toenable early detection of potential threats by use ofhuman behaviour pattern recognition and Analysis(hbpr&A). A second course aimed at tackling theserious threat from “green on blue” attacks has developedand is named insider reat Situational Awareness

training (it SAt �). is latter course is currentlybeing run in Afghanistan for coalition forces.

maritime ASAt®

incuenced by the successes of ASAt®, the nAtomaritime interdiction operational training centre(nmiotc) hosted a “pilot” maritime ASAt (m-ASAt)from 8 to 12 july this year. e aim of this m-ASAt

NMIOTC Journal>>>Training Issues

AAddvvAAnncceedd SSiittUUAAttiioonnAAll AAwwAArreenneeSSSS ttrrAAiinniinnGG((AASSAAtt)) ®®pprreeddiiccttiivvee aanndd pprrooaaccttiivvee SSeennssee ttoo ccoommbbaatt tthhrreeaattss aaccrroossss tthhee ccoonn--tteemmppoorraarryy ooppeerraattiinngg eennvviirroonnmmeenntt

bbyy mmrr mmaarrttiinn wwoooolllleeyy,, oorrbbiiss ooppeerraattiioonnss llllcc

The ASAT methodology

Page 21: Mio journal 7th edition

Issue 7, July 2013 21

NMIOTC Journal <<<

course was to produce students who are motivated, agile,and adaptive, and who can use advanced critical thinkingskills to apply ASAt® principles to situations in order toenhance and assist boarding operations, non-combatantevacuation operations, and mission planning. followingthis pilot course, nAto is expecting to develop a projectplan that will require a two year period to develop aprogramme that delivers trained m-ASAt personnel forthe nmiotc and nAto. e advantages that suchtraining will provide nAto maritime personnel are asfollows:

a. improved operational environment awarenessand understanding.

b. increased survivability when deployed bothinside and outside of the perimeter wire, whenperforming non-combatant evacuation operations,and whilst conducting boarding operations

c. improved understanding and application ofhbpr&A skills.

d. improved tactical reporting.

e. more accurate network analysis to facilitatereporting and targeting.

ASAt®

is unique training has been successfullyimplemented in both iraq and Afghanistan. it is ascientibcally validated and battle tested training programthat allows individuals to cognitively make sense ofhighly complex environments. ASAt® is an experientialbased, predictive, tactical problem solving system thatimproves with each environmental exposure. Allpeople, events, and vehicles give off certain signals whenthey are measured against context, relevance, and thesocietal baseline. ese ‘signals’ are read as ‘anomalies.’establishing a baseline, detecting and then acting on

such anomalies is the essence of ASAt®. e course alsoprovides detailed instruction on the methods tounderstand and interpret human behavior and theninterpret the signals that are given by humans either asindividuals or as part of a group.

ASAt® imparts individuals with enhanced cognitivetools for the detection of potential threats in anysituation or context, thereby providing the skills andability to detect, observe, and engage criminals,terrorists, insurgents, fugitives, their networks, andprevent evolving threats.

Such skills provide personnel with predictive,proactive sense making and problem solving capabilities,thereby enabling action to be taken prior to incidentsoccurring.

ASAt is an enduring skill set that is applicable acrossculture or geography and can be applied to any type ofoperation (for example irregular warfare, lawenforcement, maritime board and Search, customs andvillage Stability operations). is training combinesclassroom instruction and practical training scenarios, itis a non-materialistic capability that complements andenhances existing Standing operatingprocedures/tactics, techniques and procedures.

orbis’ hbpr&A courses are being taught to a wideaudience, including:

a. ongoing courses at the US Army maneuvercentre of excellence (mcoe) at fort benning.

b. A wide variety of US Army mobile trainingteam events to include training every Security forceAssistance team headed to Afghanistan.

c. US naval Special warfare Group and navalSpecial warfare command.

d. US and nAto teams deployed in Afghanistan

Interoga%on

NMIOTC Journal Training Issues <<<

Mari%me Interdic%on Opera%ons (MIO)

Page 22: Mio journal 7th edition

22 Issue 6, December 2012

NMIOTC Journal>>>

(insider reat ASAt®).

e. US Special operations command.

f. nAto (A countering ied course and adeveloping maritime course).

numerous compelling accolades exist regarding theeffectiveness of ASAt®. ree examples are as follows:

a. Sergeant from task force paladin: “is was themost valuable training we have received in the sevenmonths we have been deployed to Afghanistan, a real eyeopener”.

b. ASAt® course student (officer). ASAt® trainedpersonnel are also able to be proactive instead of reactive,giving them relative superiority in any situation."

c. commanding officer of a US navy SealSquadron: “ASAt® enables operators to short-circuitthreats before they harm friendly forces or publicperception. e training enables individual shooters toreduce civilian casualties and collateral damage frompreventable brebghts. ASAt® trained operators are alsoable to be proactive instead of reactive, giving themrelative superiority in any situation.”

it SAt �

ASAt® is utilized when conducting operationsoutside of the operating base. it SAt � is utilizedwhen personnel are inside of the base. it SAt � is basedon the fundamentals of ASAt® and therefore the briefdescription of ASAt® (above) applies equally to it SAt�. e purpose, method and end State for it SAt � areas follows:

a. purpose:

i. close the capability gap permitting “green onblue attacks” by arming individual coalition memberswith the hbpr&A skills to identify an insider threatand provide the tools for action within a decisionmaking framework.

ii. provide coalition members the gift of time andspace to identify a developing threat and replace hypervigilance with “informed” awareness.

b. method:

i. deliver practical, skills oriented, Subject matterexpert (Sme) delivered training and education inhbpr&A.

ii. training is scalable and customized to each typeof unit to bt unique challenges and situations.

iii. instruction is interactive and scenario driven.

c. end State:

i. e most exposed elements of the force aretrained in hbpr&A to identify the insider threat andlinked to a decision making framework.

ii. foster a climate of “informed awareness” tomitigate the risk to force at the tactical level for coalitionunits operating in a partnered environment and reducerisk to mission at the operational level by closing thecapability gap.

NMIOTC Journal>>> Training Issues

ffuurrtthheerr iinnffoorrmmaattiioonn rreeggaarrddiinngg AASSAAtt®®.. iitt SSAAtt �� aannddmm--AASSAAtt ccaann bbee oobbttaaiinneedd ffrroomm oorrbbiiss ooppeerraattiioonnss llllcc..ccoommmmeennttss ccaannbbee sseenntt ttoo mmrr mmaarrttiinn wwoooolllleeyy ::mm..wwoooolllleeyy@@oorrbbiissooppss..ccoomm

Page 23: Mio journal 7th edition

NMIOTC Journal

much can be said about the term “non-lethal”. itgenerally refers to military response against a target whenthere no intention of harming associated persons in anylasting way. e term is used in connection with securityoperations outside of combat, for operations such asforce protection, critical infrastructure protection,maritime interdiction operations, counter terrorism,ensuring delivery of humanitarian aid amid concict, andso forth. “non-lethal capabilities” then draws a cleardistinction from the military’s core capabilities fordelivering lethal force during combat.

in non-lethal capabilities the intent is to purposefullyengage a target without delivering any lasting harm,which is fundamental to the nAto debnition of “non-lethal capabilities” [ref xx]. in security operations, as inself-protection generally, one typically has a duty to

warn, to prove hostile intent, and use proportionalforce, where the utility of non-lethal capabilities is clear.non-lethal capabilities reduce the risk of harm topersons who may be innocently unaware of securityoperations, and reduce the risk of post-event litigationagainst security forces. ey bll the response spectrumbetween “shouting and shooting”, as some have said,which ultimately supports larger strategic objectives inmodern concict.

purposeful non-lethal engagement generally takestwo forms: 1) unambiguous warning in a security zonewhere non-cooperation in the target may be interpretedas hostile intent, legitimizing the escalation of forcebrought to bear against, perhaps ultimately lethal force;and 2) incapacitation of a target, to suppress or stop itsadvance, presumably after warnings have been given, asa step in the escalation of force against a non-cooperativetarget. clearly some technical means are required forboth tasks.

technologies have been forthcoming, many of whichhave been examined by the nAto centre for maritimeresearch & experimentation (cmre, la Spezia, italy),especially for use in maritime security, for enforcingsecurity exclusion zones around ships or other maritimeinfrastructure, against the threat of attack by small boatsby underwater intruders, and for stopping small boats.

Among the leading high-readiness technologiesconsidered for countering small-boat threats in ports andharbours are those in the table. ese (and many others)

Capability Development <<<

Opera%ng a patrol boat

nnoonn--lleetthhAAll ccAAppAAbbiilliittiieeSS iinn mmAArriittiimmeeSSeeccUUrriittyybbyy ddrr rroonn KKeesssseell,,nnAAttoo cceennttrree ffoorr mmaarriittiimmee rreesseeaarrcchh aanndd eexxppeerriimmeennttaattiioonn ((ccmmrree))

Issue 7, July 2013 23

Page 24: Mio journal 7th edition

24 Issue 7, July 2013

NMIOTC Journal>>>Capability Development

have been exercised individually at the waterside or onboard ships, under the controlled conditions needed forperformance assessment and the safety of participants.e goal of the exercises is to help transition promisingnew technologies into capabilities, through independenttest and evaluation, the formulation of concepts of useand of corresponding operational requirements. ineffect, cmre provides a test bed where securityproviders and industry can exercise, experiment, anditerate options, engaging in a process of spiraldevelopment between developers, industry, academics,and subject matter experts, military and civilian.

ideally, one would like to see technologies that couldbe used selectively for both warning and incapacitation,perhaps by turning up the effect of warning to createsome degree of incapacitation in a non-cooperativecontact. is broadens the scope of a single technologyin escalation of force scenarios.

both warning and incapacitation are possible to someextent with the optical disruptor cited in the table forinstance, whose brilliance can create both a point ofattraction in the target’s visual beld at very long distances(drawing their attention to security forces for speedyawareness and compliance), and a visual dazzling glarethat makes it difficult to aim a weapon toward the sourceof the optical disruptor. cmre has developed modelsfor predicting the ranges of effectiveness for warning andfor visual suppression by optical disruptors underdifferent daylight conditions.

e long-range acoustic loud hailing device, on theother hand, is found to serve only for warning—fordelivering audible alarms and messages (shorter distancesthan optical disruption), but not for incapacitation. forif it occurs at all, incapacitation would only occur veryclose to the acoustic device itself, where sound levelsexceed the threshold of pain, and where they wouldcertainly induce permanent hearing loss, contrary to thenon-lethal concept of no lasting harm. ough oncedescribed as an acoustic weapon, acoustic devices are

now more accurately described by their manufacturersas warning and communication devices—a role they canbll rather well, though with some qualibcations ofcourse.

e running-gear entanglement technology cited inthe table is an instance of incapacitation rather thanwarning. it acts with stopping force on the mechanics ofthe small boat, without physiological effects or harm onits occupants.

ese technologies illustrate that, when evaluatingany candidate technology for use in non-lethalcapabilities more generally, it is necessary to be clearabout its concept of use, if it is to warn or to incapacitate.e purpose determines the way the technology must beevaluated and transitioned into capability.

Going somewhat further in non-lethal capabilitydevelopment, given a number of technologies for non-lethal capabilities, there emerges an array oftechnology-driven options, each with its own concept ofuse, range of effectiveness, mode of operation,technology demonstration, and so forth. ese might beused together for more complete capability and coverageagainst a range of threats; against small boats, jet skis,and underwater intruders for instance. it is difficult tocreate a picture of overall capability simply by listingtechnologies as in table (xx). And it is more difficult stillto validate the overall capability afforded by a numberof non-lethal technologies used together in practice,through at-sea experimentation, particularly in light ofthe risks that close engagements with fast boats present.

Given the advances being made in serious gamingusing computers, however, it is possible to exercise anynumber of options together in a virtual exercise. indeed,the results of many separate at-sea exercises of candidate

Exercising a running-gear entanglement system

Op%cal disruptor

Page 25: Mio journal 7th edition

Issue 7, July 2013 25

NMIOTC Journal

non-lethal technologies were used by cmre to createcomputer models of each, for use together in real-time,virtual exercises of integrated capability for escalation offorce scenarios in maritime security. cmre’s maritimetactical eatre Simulator was used in the harbourprotection table-top exercise (hpt2e, march 2012,cmre) as part of nAto’s defence Against terrorismprogramme of work.

in hpt2e, 30 military and civilian subject-matterexperts from 9 nAto nations participated in many fast-paced, free-play engagements in a realistic virtual port,playing the role of security providers in security missionssuch as the protection of a military vessel exiting a portor of an lnG off-loading facility during times of highalert of terrorist attack. ey were equipped with virtualpatrol boats, communications, surveillance sensors, anda number of non-lethal response technologies in orderto exercise the non-lethal technologies consolidated intomaritime escalation of force capability, with thetechnologies subject to realistic constraints of awareness,communication, time for action, distance of action, andso forth, much as they were found to be in real-worldexperiments.

many separate vignettes of engagement were played,half with attackers, and half with only benign butpossibly troublesome port traffic. participants playingdefenders had no prior knowledge of the nature or time

of security zone challenges (randomized, blind trials).e play of each vignette was followed by a debriebngsession with selective replay to review the use of the non-lethal capabilities, from initial decision to engage, tosituation resolution.

e exercise taught participants about the kinds ofcandidate technologies that are of high readiness for usein maritime security—about their modes and ranges ofoperation, aiming and maneuvering requirements,expected effectiveness, nominal costs, and so forth. moreimportantly, by exercising the technologies in realisticaction, participants developed a good appreciation forone technology relative to another when used together—about their complementary nature, for use againstdifferent threats, at different ranges, time to effectiveness,with different objectives: warning and incapacitation.over 80 % of attacks were stopped before the attackerreached his or her objectives, and never were benign buttroublesome ship traffic (from teenagers on jet-skis tobelligerent bshing vessels) harmed.

much of the challenge along the transition path ofemerging technologies into non-lethal capabilities formaritime security therefore amounts to matchingperformance to newly-debned operational requirementsfor new technologies, then integrating severaltechnologies together into capability against a numberof threats, and conveying an appreciation for what thatoverall capability can be under realistic time-speed-distance constraints for close engagements. progressdepends on clear concepts for non-lethal capabilitiesfrom the outset.

Capability Development <<<

A long-range acous%c loud hailer and op%cal disruptor

ronald t. Kessel currently leads maritime Securityprojects at the nAto centre for maritime research andexperimentation (formerly nUrc). he has workedclosely with industry and on european commissionprojects conducting research on response technologiesand maritime surveillance. email your comments at: [email protected]

Simula%on

Page 26: Mio journal 7th edition

ccooUUrrSSeeSS,, eexxeerrcciiSSeeSS AAnndd ttrrAAiinniinnGGSSccooUUrrSSeeSS,, eexxeerrcciiSSeeSS AAnndd ttrrAAiinniinnGGSS

training of the hellenic Udt4-8 feb 2013

training of hnlmS de rUyter31 jan - 01 feb 2013

26 Issue 7, July 2013

NMIOTC Journal>>> Photo Galery

norwegian coastal rangers12-24 january 2013

training of rS SeveromorSK 14-18 january 2013

>>> NMIOTC Journal

Page 27: Mio journal 7th edition

ccooUUrrSSeeSS,, eexxeerrcciiSSeeSS AAnndd ttrrAAiinniinnGGSSccooUUrrSSeeSS,, eexxeerrcciiSSeeSS AAnndd ttrrAAiinniinnGGSS

Graduation ceremony for fS coUrbet and esthonian vpd8 february 2013

training of USS nicholAS4 - 7february 2013

training of hnlmS vAn SpejiK23 - 24 may 2013

Issue 7,July 2013 27

NMIOTC Journal Photo Galery <<<

training of itS zeffiro 20-24 may 2013

training of fS GUeprAtte29-30 April 2013

<<<NMIOTC Journal

Page 28: Mio journal 7th edition

maritime interdiction operations (mio) are gettinga boost in effectiveness by using an old science with newtechnology –biometrics.

militAry problem. boarding teams have thechallenge of correctly identifying people onboard vessels.criminals and terrorists alike use many names andidentibcation documents to easily slip through the cracksof the mio process. mio teams unknowinglyencounter the same pirate or smuggler multiple times,but he is recorded under different names and notrecognized.

is gap hinders intelligence and strengthens thecapability of bad actors who exploit such weaknesses toremain anonymous and operate probtably. biometricstechnology dramatically increases the difficulty foradversaries to remain anonymous and it correlatesintelligence about a person’s biometric signature andmany aliases. commonly insurgents in the iraq andAfghanistan wars used numerous false names. in onecase, an insurgent leader had over 90 false names inmultiple databases, but the disparate databases were notsynchronized to paint a true picture of the insurgent.

biometricS defined. So, what is a biometric?everyone already has an idea of what it is, but they maynot recognize it under the term “biometrics.” biometricsis the automated recognition of individuals based on

their behavioral and biological characteristics.biometrics is used for identibcation or veribcation insupport of a variety of operations or activities. e mostcommonly recognized examples of biometric signaturesare bngerprint topography, deoxyribonucleic acid(dnA) structure, iris structure and facial topography.technology is advancing in other biometric signaturesthat have military usefulness, such as gait, hand-writing,typing and voice dynamics.

biometric fUnctionS. biometric capabilitiesare being used for force protection, criminal prosecution,targeting, sourcing, humanitarian, law enforcement andintelligence purposes. biometrics technologies are used

bbiioommeettrriiccSS iinn nnAAttoo mmAArriittiimmee iinntteerrddiiccttiioonn ooppeerrAAttiioonnSSUUSSiinnGG AAnn oolldd SScciieennccee wwiitthh nneeww tteecchhnnoollooGGyy ttoo SSeeccUUrree tthhee SSeeAASS

by mr david wikoff, US eUcom biometrics lno

NMIOTC Journal>>> Training Issues NMIOTC Journal

28 Issue 7, July 2013

Page 29: Mio journal 7th edition

by diverse organizations, government and privateindustry alike. e United nations initiated a refugeebiometric data base; law enforcement has a well knownhistory of using biometrics; Sea world and disneyworld use biometric devices at their entry points; andindia is biometrically enrolling all residents to betteradminister government functions such as voting, healthcare, banking, and welfare.

e most common identibcation process simply usesa facial picture. when a policeman examines thephotograph on a driver’s license he compares it to theowner’s facial characteristics. however, identibcationdocuments can be falsibed and policemen are notgenerally trained as facial recognition experts who canspot the difference when an individual has gainedweight, changed hair style, or shaved a beard. becausephysical changes occur frequently, many police officersaccept similar physical characteristics, even though theymay be uncertain. biometrics capabilities automate thesame identibcation process used by the police officer, butwith phenomenally greater identibcation accuracy.

biometrics can also support training missions. whennAto nations train navies such as Somalia’s, biometrics

can help vet students to ensure nations are not providingtraining to pirates or nefarious actors.

e biometric process (bgure) is easilyimplementable, although the details can be challenging.

e phases are being described in the next paragraphsin summary.

plAnninG: in planning you establish thearchitecture for the rest of the biometrics process.examples include establishing legal authority to collectbiometrics, rules of engagement, architecture, role andresponsibility, technical standards, training andequipment resources, and task organizing the capability.ese steps ensure effective biometrics operations.

collect: collection can include live-scancollection at a check point using a biometrics device (e.g.bgure 2), processing detainees, or other activity. it canalso include forensic processes such as developing latentbngerprints from captured enemy material. And lastly,collection can occur with sharing of biometric holdingssuch as bngerprint databases or criminal cards.

Store And mAtch: collected biometric recordsare checked against one or more local or centralizedbiometrics databases. e biometrics systemarchitecture, as well as sharing caveats and arrangementsdetermine how dissemination and matching isconducted. biometric matches are compiled into amatch record displayed to the collector, or sent from acentralized database to inform the collectingorganization and operator at the point of encounter, andmay also trigger an analytical process. e sharing isdone differently based on sharing agreements that applyin different situations.

AnAlyze: biometric enabled intelligence (bei) isintelligence information associated to a biometric

NMIOTC Journal Training Issues <<<NMIOTC Journal

Issue 7, July 2013 29

The Biometrics Process

The SEEK II Biometric Device

Page 30: Mio journal 7th edition

NMIOTC Journal>>> Training Issues

signature or collection. bei answers the “So what?” orsignibcance of a biometric collection. bei associatedwith a biometric record can reveal a person’s aliases, linkpersons of interest to a network, and reveal previoustactics, technique, and procedures. bei can also indicatethreat levels and potential intelligence value.

Action: bei products and results are used by

leaders to make decisions at the tactical, operational, andstrategic levels. one product of bei analysis is thebiometrics enabled watchlist (bewl), a collection ofbiometrics records of persons of interest, for example,

wanted by law enforcement, denied access to militarybenebts such as training or money, or denied access tobases or sensitive areas. if a person on a bewl changestheir identity, they will still match to the bewl on thedevice or database and be biometrically identibable whenthey enter biometric screening. A bewl can consist ofdifferent categories of interest, and is customizable tosupport operations.

A custom bewl is particularly helpful during mioevents because it can identify persons of interest at thepoint of encounter, or if training a foreign navy, studentscan be vetted for previous nefarious activities.

SUmmAry: e power of biometrics will continueto expand across a spectrum of nAto operations.biometrics has garnered major success in the land warsof iraq and Afghanistan by identifying unknown insiderthreats, bomb makers, bomb emplacers, and high valuetargets. biometrics serve as a force multiplier for nationsby being able to track transient threats around the worldand at the borders of Ally nations. reats at sea are alsotransient and as nAto begins to apply biometrics inmio, nAto will continue to increase stability andsecurity worldwide.

NMIOTC Journal

30 Issue 7, July 2013

The NMIOTC Mari%me Biomer%cs Train the Trainers course

mr david wikoff currently has been employed at theUS european command as an lno from ArmytrAdoc capabilities manager for biometrics andforensics.email your comments to: [email protected]

Page 31: Mio journal 7th edition

e future security in an unpredictable world dependupon dynamic changes in the world’s geopoliticalsituation, the evolving nature of threats, constrainedresources, severe weather climate events andrevolutionary technological development together withits rapid spread.

e ‘’Strategic concept for the defence and Securityof e members of the north Atlantic treatyorganization’’ and the Alliance maritime Strategydelineate ‘’the modern security environment whichcontains a broad and evolving set of challenges to thesecurity of nAto’s territory and populations’’.

e Alliance has the framework and a robuststructure to meet the requirements of the Strategicconcept and Alliance maritime Strategy (AmS) as well,in order to secure its strategic interests at any strategicdistances. furthermore, the Alliance been sensible of thegeostrategic reality and of the great importance for aneffective and efficient cooperation with its internationalpartners, emphasizes in the Strategic concept, itscommitment to prevent crises, manage concicts andstabilize post-concict situations, including by workingmore closely with our international partners, mostimportantly the United nations and the europeanUnion’’.

e evolution of challenges, experience gained by theAlliance’s involved players, detailed analyses, studies andconference’s conclusions may offer a fresh ground and afood for thought on issues regarding security.

e 2013 nmiotc’s thematic focusing on ‘’futureSecurity at Sea’’ , provides an in depth looking into an

environment which can often be used as a hiding placefor a lot of illegal actors and their consequent threats,both above and below the surface. e consequentinsecurity factors, are not in isolation from the landenvironment thus reducing the barriers of security andits basic parameters. in this context, certain threats tosecurity could arise like:

- proliferation of nuclear weapons and weapons ofmass destruction and effect ,

- international terrorism in its various forms,

- supranational organized crime ( interrelated or notwith terrorism ),

- cyber-warfare, asymmetric use of technology,

- illegal human trafficking and immigration,

- economic criminality and escalating incidents ofpiracy with or without entailing crew’s hostagesituations,

- natural or manmade disasters, distraction ordisruption of any critical infrastructure or/and energyresource, epidemic diseases,

- illegal trafficking of weapons and narcotics,

All these threats and their derivatives-components canbe posed from any direction: mainland, coastland, ttwand littoral waters, islands, sea platforms, high seas andfrom any strategic distance.

As you may recall, in response to Strategic concept,the Alliance maritime Strategy(AmS) set out ‘’emaritime security environment’’ and ‘’e maritimecontribution to Alliance security’’ which describes Alliedmaritime ops and activities as vital contributors toAlliance security. in particular, as it is debned in para 7of the AmS, such contributions may include:

-deterrence and collective defence;

-crisis management;

-cooperative security;

-maritime security;

in the section of maritime security is clearly debnedthat:

a. the maintenance of ability of nAto’s maritime

eeffffeeccttiivvee ccooooppeerrAAttiioonn:: tthhee bbeeddrrooccKK ooff AAnnyy SSeeccUUrriittyy AArrcchhiitteeccttUUrree

by Admiral(ret) p.chinofotis, chod emeritus, former deputy Greek minister of interior

NMIOTC Journal Strategic Issues<<<NMIOTC Journal

Issue 7, July 2013 31

Page 32: Mio journal 7th edition

forces to undertake the full range of maritimeinterdiction missions is a prerequisite, including insupport of law enforcement and in preventing thetransport and deployment of wmd

b. the Alliance’s maritime forces are prepared, inaccordance with decisions taken at the lisbon Summit,to contribute to energy security including protection ofcritical energy infrastructure and sea lines ofcommunication(Sloc’s).

‘’e maritime dimension of a comprehensiveapproach’’ (part iv of the AmS) directs for an effectivecooperation through enhancement and extension to itsimplementation actions. e imposed enhancement andextension in cooperation is not restrictive in themaritime domain only. e nature of challenges,portrays a complex of interdependencies among themaritime and land security environment and theirrelevant actors, which usually turns up its complication.

e comprehensive Approach Action plan and itsUpdated list of tasks, as well as the relevant supportingdocuments debnes the key areas of work in order tofulbll the requirements for improving effectivecooperation, mutual understanding and trust amonginternal and relevant external actors and organizationsas well. e key areas of work encompasses planningand conduct of operations, lessons learned-training-education and exercises, enhancing cooperation withexternal actors, public messaging.

A multi-dimension approach to the ‘’broad horizon’’of security challenges asks for a well-based securityarchitecture, capable not only to cure but to prevent.Security and defense are two separable but not separatedbelds. often, security and defense overlap one anotherand could produce a vague and confused situation as foractions to be taken and ambiguities to be resolved.effective cooperation among security and defensedisciplines is imperative to face a joint perspective andmuch faster cycles of decision making. e

accomplishment requires to turn the capabilities of onebeld into an advantage for the other, thus fosteringoperational synergy and achieving effective and practicalcooperation. to this end, key components comprise:

-a well-calibrated ‘’cow of information’’ and network-centric capability

-pinpointing and accessing expert information,

-elimination of malfunctioning,

-inter-state cooperation,

-interoperability, inter-service and interagencycooperation to the maximum extent possible.

-security missions connectivity by means of a cross-jurisdictional ability to assess risk and utilize networkenablers

-agile and usable forces ( in terms of eligibility,readiness, deployability, cexibility, maneuverability inthe area of operations, endurance and sustainability forprotracted operations)

e fact that the Alliance calls for a non-stopimproving security architecture is evident, as it happenswith the need for adjustment to the rapidly developingnew challenges in order to be proactive and in advanceof any unpredictable or developing threat.predominant trigger for being aware of any new securitychallenge and/or any emerging security situation is ‘’thecow of information’’ and its process through theintelligence cycle steps. in particular, regarding thementioned certain threats (from proliferation up toillegal trafficking) the following six points would supportthe Alliance efforts by fostering the cooperation withexternal actors in the beld of security informationgathering and distribution:

a . to modulate an extended information grid, inorder to provide an enlarged network-centricenvironment specibcally tailored for speed ininformation cows and enabling the sharing ofinformation at the appropriate level of the externalactors,

b. a joint information fusion capability,including the Armed forces intelligence centre’s ‘’whitepicture’’, would offer, through a single hub, a robustability to plan add direct information requirements,collect, process, produce and disseminate actionableinformation. So, a consolidated and coordinated ‘’threatassessment’’ would be provided to decision makers,

c. to establish liaison offices for interpoland eUropol, in a manner as in the Un and eU, onthe ground that nAto has a substantial cooperation

32 Issue 7, July 2013

NMIOTC Journal>>> Strategic Issues NMIOTC Journal

Page 33: Mio journal 7th edition

with the Un, strategic partnership with the eU andfriendly and cooperative relations with all countries ofthe euro-Atlantic partnership council and partnershipfor peace, the mediterranean dialogue and the istanbulinitiative. e round-the-clock support and a wide rangeof operational assistance by the interpol to membercountries, as well as the operational and strategicagreements and cooperation of eUropol withorganizations and non-eU states should be consideredfor further exploitation,

d. to enrich the nAto civil-military fusioncentre (cfc) in norfolk,vA with personnel andinformation from interpol and eUropol,upgrading the classibcation status of cfc accordingly,

e. in particular evolutions following specibcemerging security situations, the restrictive principle of’’need to know’’ to be modibed to a ‘’duty-to-share’’ one,depending on the emerging situation, possibleconsequences and effects as well as the promptnessrequired for response.

f. based upon the previous points, a proper andusable information Sharing Strategy would support thesecurity architecture to face the certain threatsmentioned above (from international terrorism up toillegal trafficking).

e relevance between the aforementioned ‘’sixpoints’’ with security operations focused on certainthreats is obvious.

e revolution in information and communicationsmakes top-down control and reports through theestablished channels more efficient and faster. in somerespects this development enables much greaterawareness in the operating environment, picturecompilation, connectivity to a common informationnetwork and a timely and trusted operating picture withall the actors involved at different levels of securityarchitecture. during a maritime interdiction operationa series of activities inherent to the security architecture

pillars takes place: domain awareness, recognition ofpotential violators, approach for identibcation,interrogation and stopping of suspect vessels, compliantor non-compliant boarding, inspection and collection ofevidence and bnally unblock, diversion or seizure whenthe situation dictates so.

maritime Security operations must be able to tacklethe certain threats mentioned above (from internationalterrorism up to illegal trafficking) and support nationsand law enforcement organizations in dealing withthose threats. information sharing and improved synergyare the key components of the operations.

roughout the world’s history the maintenance ofsecurity at sea has its own uppermost signibcance due tothe interdependent network of commercial, bnancialand political relationships.

An effective cooperation among all security partnersis the bedrock for a well based security architecturewhich serves to establish a common informationenvironment, facilitates collaboration in shaping mutualunderstandings of the operating domain and permitsintegrated planning, coordination and conduct ofactions in order to achieve desired results and the properend-state. So we can evaluate and put on scale needsbeforehand in order to meet a ‘’fast detect > to engagecycle’’, what the full range of responses is and who todepend on.

it is imperative to outgeneral any adversaries. to thisend, we must continue to forge the cooperation amongall security echelons with the optimum use of regionalagencies and enabling capabilities. ensuring cohesionand effectiveness we avail of the present in order to meetthe future.

Issue 7, July 2013 33

NMIOTC Journal Strategic Issues <<<NMIOTC Journal

chinofotis panagiotis, Admiral (ret) hellenic navy, isa former chief of defense, former deputy minister ofinterior and State deputy-member of parliament(mp)..email your comments to: [email protected].

Page 34: Mio journal 7th edition

34 Issue 7, July 2013

NMIOTC Journal

eevveennttSSeevveennttSS

nAto Sea Sparrow international tactics wG3 - 7 june 2013

nmiotc Advisory board 20135 february 2013

jctd c3po military Utility Assessment2 11 April 2013

2013 nmiotc Annual conference18 -20 june 2013

>>>Photo Galery

Advanced Situational Awareness training (ASAt) Seminar26 february 2013

recce visit of the Swedish delegation17 january 2013

Page 35: Mio journal 7th edition

Issue 7, July 2013 35

NMIOTC Journal

human migration has been a perpetual phenomenonfor centuries and the reason has always been the same:pure survival at worst or the hope of a better future atbest. europeans have been immigrants themselves andnot always legally. Americans, who turned out to be verystrict as regards immigration , tend to forget that theyare all immigrants themselves with the exception of the,close to extinction, indigenous population. ere isnothing wrong with migration, as long as the emigrantswant to bnd a new home, share common values andaspirations with the locals and the host nation can affordthem. Greeks, having been refugees after a lost war, oremigrants (both legal and illegal) after a brutal civil warand two world wars, they have always been sympatheticand sensitive to any human being suffering the same fate.nevertheless, something has dramatically changed,mainly due to the economic crisis. in this paper we willtry to illustrate how illegal immigration effects maritimesecurity and can become the most important and hard to

face challenge for any navy and coast Guard;furthermore, how it is perceived as the number oneproblem in both Greece and europe despite its decliningnumbers, and how we can handle the situation, withoutexchanging our democratic values for a more secureenvironment.

have we reached a consensus about who can bedeemed “illegal immigrant”? not in absolute terms.categorically, the persons who cross the borders illegallyor the ones who enter legally into a third country butwith falsibed documents, belong to this group. howabout the ones who are born into irregularity or have notrenewed their visas or temporary residence and workpermits? in most cases, they are considered illegalimmigrants. e ones who should return to theircountries but cannot do so, for practical reasons?probably, not. nevertheless, it is not the purpose of thispaper to examine legalities pertaining to the

iilllleeGGAAll iimmmmiiGGrrAAttiioonn:: oovveerrAAllll AASSSSeeSSSSmmeenntt,, mmAArriittiimmee cchhAAlllleennGGee AAnnddppoolliiccyy rreeccoommmmeennddAAttiioonnSS

by dr. Siousiouras petros & Kyriakidis Kleanthis, phdc

Political Issues <<<

Page 36: Mio journal 7th edition

36 Issue 7, July 2013

NMIOTC Journal

phenomenon; just to clarify that illegal immigration isnot conbned only to unlawful passages, on which ouranalysis focuses.

Another interesting question is where immigrantscome from. i suggest that most people can sense theanswer. “Afghanistan ranks brst in terms of detection ofillegal border-crossing” and has been the case manytimes in recent years, with pakistan being usually thesecond and this year the third. nevertheless, there areoutliers, due to sudden geopolitical events. us, in2011 the country with most illegal immigrants wastunisia and in 2012 the second country was Syria; bothof them did not appear in these statistics the previousyears. As regards tunisian emigrants in 2011, theproximity of their country to malta and italy made, forthe brst and predictably last time, the centralmediterranean route, the one with most illegal bordercrossings in europe. e “Arab Spring” created a waveof illegal immigration and the shortest way to reach eUis by crossing few sea miles.

Starting our analysis with the perception of peril, ina very interesting survey in six european countries alongwith canada and the US, there was an alarming 56% ofthe people surveyed in italy and over 40% in Germany,netherlands and france that consider authorized – notirregular - immigrants responsible for the increase ofcriminal activities . immigrants are targeted for gettingthe jobs of the locals because they do not participate inthe social security system and get paid peanuts; moneyenough to survive but debnitely lower than theminimum wage. is is partly true, because there arejobs that many europeans are simply unwilling to doand are more than happy to have illegal immigrants do

them instead. e locals mainly (not the immigrants)are therefore to blame for the rise of unemploymentthrough labor exploitation. nonetheless, it is anirrefutable fact that illegal immigrants put tremendouspressure on public services and undermine to an extentthe rule of law.

is the perceived threat a clear and present danger?first and foremost, irregular migration, another term forillegal immigration, much more politically correct, is notmerely a maritime challenge right now. but it is going tobe in the near future. Actually, nowadays, 90% of theillegal immigrants use land borders and the single“hotspot” which spectacularly increases the number ofdetected illegal crossings is evros river, the land borderbetween Greece and turkey . Any State can use methodssuch as the creation of artibcial obstacles in land (likethe building of walls, fences or ditches) in order tocontain illegal immigration. nonetheless, this is areactive approach, bound to fail for the followingreasons:

firstly, if a maritime country, like Greece, achieves ahigh rate of restraining illegal immigration by land, theimmigrants will seek other “loopholes” and cross the seaborders, which are debnitely much more vulnerable andmuch less controllable. hence, at least in the long run,the land border surveillance leads to a displacement ofthe phenomenon to the sea and not to its reduction. ischange is for the worse for practical reasons. if theirregular migrants travel in the high seas and their boatssink, either due to bad weather conditions or purposely,they are people in distress. in that case, they have to besaved by navies and coastguards for humanitarianreasons. And if there are people in danger, we will alsoconduct search and rescue operations, which by the wayare very costly. concluding, utter sea surveillance andconstant patrolling is unfeasible and sometimes bringsabout the opposite results rather than the onesanticipated.

Secondly, the problem is universal and not local. iffor instance Greece manages its borders in an excellentand absolutely effective way, illegal immigrants will stillbe able to cood europe through other countries. if ourpolicies focus on reinforcing the surveillance on onespecibc geographic area, the desperate immigrants willbnd another entrance point. Some europeans are happyto see that illegal immigrants are less than 1% of the totaleU population; but for countries like Greece this wasthe percentage back in early eighties; nowadays, the oddscan be horrifying. e legal immigrants are just over 4%of the population (and they were a bit more than 7% 10years ago, which shows that immigrants have beenaffected by the crisis as well).. illegal immigration,

>>> Political Issues

Page 37: Mio journal 7th edition

Issue 7, July 2013 37

according to estimations exceeds 8% of the Greekpopulation, far outnumbering the legal immigrants. eestimations partly stem from the fact that the numberof arrests people attempting to cross the borders in aclandestine way in 2010 was equal to 3% of the totalGreek population. At this point we need to highlightthat the entire european South has sea borders whichcannot be fully monitored. italy and malta suffered acouple of years ago with thousands of libyans andtunisians, who had to leave their country. 63,000 peoplelanded in italy alone in 2011 despite the prime ministerhad proclaimed by decree on february 2011 a “State ofemergency”.

irdly, i just used the phrase “had to leave” theircountry. desperate people function in a “do or die”mode. let us assume that they are arrested, or evendeported, how can we be sure that they would notreturn? it is natural to expect that they would try againto save themselves and try as many times as it takes, untilthey achieve their goal.

fourthly, by combating certain problems, like piracy,we increase illegal immigration as a by-product. let meelaborate on this seemingly strange point, a true paradox.e poor Somali pirate who cannot survive out of piracy,the former drug farmer in Afghanistan, the iraqi refugee,they all have two things in common. ey turn to illegalimmigration in order to survive and they blame thewest for their misery. not only do they become illegalimmigrants, but they are also dangerous.

before moving to the possible long-term solutions ofthe problem we need to see if the situation is getting anybetter. As aforementioned we have fewer incidents ofillegal immigration and “over the last decade theestimated stock of unauthorized migrants in the eU-15has decreased” , but this is due to all the wrong reasons.e brst reason is that the eU and Greece in particularare in the midst of a huge economic crisis and thereforedo not represent the promised land or a “Garden ofeden”. being less attractive due to your problems is not

exactly a big success. e rise of ultra nationalism,combined with xenophobia, islamophobia and attackson immigrants (legal or illegal) in the entire europeancontinent, has created an unsafe environment and manypotential migrants have second thoughts about theirventure. we should not be very proud or happy for thisdevelopment, because the european Union has alwaysbeen considered the beacon of democracy and theincarnation of the protection of human rights; especiallyGreece which has been the cradle of both.

concerning our country, we need to say that Greeceis europe’s most vulnerable point. in 2008 illegal bordercrossing in Greece was just over 50% of the totalcrossings in the eU, this number increased in 2009 andbecame 75% and in 2010 the number reached theincredible 90%.in 2009 three out of four illegalimmigrants entered the eU from Greece. in 2010it gotworse. 90% of all illegal immigrants came throughGreece. At a point there were more than 350 irregularmigrants crossing the evros river per day! ere areseveral reasons for Greece being that exposed. extensiveland borders with turkey but also with Albania, sincethe frontex has identibed as one of the routes forillegal immigrants, the one it calls “Greece-Albaniacircular route”. Additionally there is the western balkanroute and of course the huge eastern mediterraneanroute with migrants crossing the land borders fromturkey. e sea borders are also weak. hundreds ofislands make it easy for traffickers who can choose when,where and how to cross the sea borders. Greece and to alesser extent malta and italy, was also unlucky, becausethe turmoil caused by the Arab Spring created waves ofirregular migration from libya, egypt and lately Syria.from all these countries, the nearest and easiest point ofentry to the eU is Greece.

without being political, turkey needs also to do morein order to contain the illegal immigrants. According toa eUropol report “its geographical position, the

Political Issues <<<

Page 38: Mio journal 7th edition

38 Issue 7, July 2013

NMIOTC Journal

presence of historical smuggling routes and thecomparative ease with which entry visas may be obtainedhave transformed turkey into the main nexus point forillegal immigrants on their way to europe” . e eUparliamentary Assembly has recognized that “turkeyshould honour its agreement with Greece for the returnof migrants who have entered Greece without authorityfrom turkey” , which means that turkey obviously failsto do so.

what is to be done? well, one initiative which isdebnitely paying off is the establishment and thesuccessful operations of frontex . Solidarity andburden sharing is a sine qva non for the solution of theproblem and the eU understands that, as it increasedfrontex budget from just over 6 million euros in2005 to almost 100 million in less than 5 years. esuccess is not only due to frontex of course. As it isvery well documented in frontex reports, theoperation of the Greek police force, “xenios zeus” and“Shield” (“Aspida”), with the deployment of 1,800 policeofficers to the Greek land border with turkey wasextremely successful both preventively and through lawenforcement. As expected, a byproduct of this success isthe increase of illegal immigration by sea. probably thedesired end-state for frontex is to “eventuallytransform to the initially proposed model of a europeanborder Guard agency”.

moreover, since it is a european problem, bnancialaid should be given to the entire south, to improve theirland surveillance and mostly their maritime situationalawareness, by ameliorating their infrastructure.especially, in Greece, if the evros border is sealed oneway or another, the sea border cannot be fully controlled.turkey should receive some aid in order to play its role,especially nowadays that the Syrian crisis has put on ittremendous pressure. organizations with vested interestin combating illegal immigration or any kind oftrafficking including weapons of mass destruction shouldassist themselves by helping Greece.

e second policy to be applied is combating thetraffickers. ere is no room for misunderstanding;human trafficking is a lucrative business, which caneasily probt-wise, be compared with the smuggling ofdrugs or guns. e penal laws in most countries areextremely harsh for drug dealers but more lenientconcerning human trafficking. erefore, harshpunishment for traffickers, including the conbscation oftheir properties, should be adopted. we also have todebne who we consider traffickers and thus we need toinclude counterfeiters who falsify documents, corruptedmembers of local bureaucracies and not only the crewsof small boats or some truck drivers.

e third policy that should be applied is particularto Greece. e irregular migrants who are detected inGreece are handed a decision to leave the country withina week. i suggest that in the interim, many prepare andexecute an alternative plan and thus stay, instead ofleaving. 48 hours would be more than enough.

one more policy recommendation to be adopted,this time by the eU is to change or abolish dublin iiregulation which relocates irregular migrants from theentire continent to their initial eU countries of entry.us, it puts enormous pressure on the South, which ison the verge of collapse. if this hideous regulationremains in place, it should be amended and the Southshould be reimbursed for every patrolling or search andrescue operation conducts in its effort to combat illegalimmigration. e eU parliamentary Assembly hasadopted a resolution , highlighting both the need torevise and implement “dublin ii” in a fairer way and theneed to maintain “a moratorium on returns to Greece ofasylum seekers” under this unfair regulation. even if thephenomenon is examined with purely humanitarian

criteria, the Greek detention system cannot afford moreimmigrants and therefore their detention is bound toinvolve human-rights violations due to practical reasons.dublin ii turned Greece to a “dumpster of human souls”and every single person who signed it should beashamed.

what is even more important: you cannot defeatirregular migration if you do not bght the root causes ofthe phenomenon. by raising the standards of living ofthird world countries, by assisting the creation of rule oflaw in lawless areas or countries, by providing the localpopulation with an alternative, we can really combat theirregular migration.

>>> Political Issues

Kleanthis Kyriakidis is a naval commander serving as aStaff officer/Advisor to the deputy minister of defense.he holds an mpA from the harvard Kennedy School email your comments to [email protected]

Page 39: Mio journal 7th edition

Issue 7, July 2013 39

NMIOTC Journal

international piracy stands out as of primeimportance to the emerging challenges that will haveeventually to be dealt with by nAto member states.member-states such as Greece hold a high interest and ahigh stake but also a duty to protect their national andmultinational interests. Security training and ‘smartpreparation’ for a ‘smart engagement’ at sea, maypositively affect training and operations for future, navalland and air interoperable alliance components. in orderto constructively counter existing but also futureinternational piracy measures there is a need to constructa joined alliance conceptual strategic plan. it should berobust and to the point. it should be brief. it should bea comprehensive political security framework for alsomaritime training, regulation and counter-joinedoperations and most importantly nAto-nationally ledby one member state (rotating) operations. Greece cando the preparedness level, training and also support level,nominated and headed by the nmiotc. enmiotc stands out as a hub for nAto and non-nAto members Allies and regional or bilateralcontributors. e nmiotc offers, internationalstandards that in practice can only and positively affectjoint international community operations that are yet tocome, if one considers the constant challenges andthreats emerging in the open sea spaces and the changesin the mediterranean region.

A possible constructive proposal and joined reactionto the aforementioned issue affecting the emergingchallenge of international piracy and generally of

maritime security, seems as a good timing also for theintroduction as well for the stake holder’s nationalinterests within the Alliance in a policy such as this one.A conceptual framework for maritime nAto securitynationally led by one but joined human capital by all,may possibly bring to the surface some realities in termsof everyday operations and leadership within theAlliance, a new balance form of Alliance within, but alsoseveral new options. it will recect decisions that need tobe made for the future of the alliance’s viability but alsodealings amongst member-states in all levels of everydaypolicy, administration, bnancial regulation and editingapplication both political and military.

today, member-states are asked to be bnancially butalso operationally more brm and effective. ey need todo more, to offer more. to offer with robust terms andfor the long-term: A possible solution as such maybe thepolicy of ‘Specialization and preparedness” on a specibcalliance policy.

for Greece and maritime affairs, the nmiotcstands out as one of the most international places to visitfor training, assurance and quality preparedness forcounter-maritime operations at sea and of shore affairssuch as energy affairs. A true commitment andengagement to a single policy role (lead) per-memberstate. A member state will hold part of a specibc policyleadership (both bnancially and politically) but still ofjoined concern and joined work consultation andeffectiveness. is seems as a viable solution both nAtoand Greece, bnancially and politically. it also re-

SSppeecciiAAlliizzAAttiioonn AAnndd pprreeppAArreeddnneeSSSSiinn ccooUUnntteerriinnGG eemmeerrGGiinnGG tthhrreeAAttSS AAtt SSeeAA

by dr.marios efthymiopoulos, ceo & founder, Strategy international Greece.fr. visiting Scholar, johns hopkins University

Strategic Issues <<<

Page 40: Mio journal 7th edition

40 Issue 7, July 2013

NMIOTC Journal

commits Greece as a member-state of the Alliance andtestibes for the ability to continue leading. it is a viableand credible solution. it is also a solution that will projectnational growth and international posture, investmentand development as new structures, institutions andpeople will have to be engaged indirectly and directly inthe construction sector but also to the policy making,creation and operation. it will enhance cultural exchangeand will effectively engage the tactical effectiveness ofsmart defense as well, since strategically one country willhold the expertise and lead solely to a specibc policyrendering inter-connectiveness and interdependencemore true than ever.

At a time of austerity measures and where proposalswith solutions can be presented, this article testibes asbeing a proposal: countries should take an individualnational lead in solely one overall nAto policy. isshould include joined alliance human capital offer perpolicy case without however rendering each countrybscally attached to each position. Specibc policies thataffect national countries can be more constructive thanasking to join in bnancially to all or major policies notonly with human capital but with funds leading somepolicies underfunded or nationally under-represented offunded due to the global crisis.

As such there is a need of member states to specializeon specibc alliance policies; to overcome nationalobstacles and bnd a truthful end to possible bilateraldisagreements. it avoids any possible future clash ofinterests and avoids also duplication of efforts. Acountry that decides to take the lead in the case ofinternational piracy will take the lead bnancially,politically and militarily to the extent it wants, (training,sharing of intelligence, taking the lead in preparation oftactical operational center, bases and equipment) lendingits bnancial per-annum support in the long-term moreviable to nAto, vibrant and more committed to domore in practice. it will also avoid free-riding. it willallow countries to constructively and positively cut-back

on large expenditures and will re-align foreign policy anddefense policy objectives and maybe the supranationalcause to end possible political and military disputes. itwill also upgrade national policies of nAto, towards atrue transatlantic commitment. it will upgrade nAto’spolicy inter-connection and inter-dependence amongstall members but also associated countries with nAto.countries will have to truly rely on joined commitmentfor a large ‘umbrella’ affecting all.

e effectiveness of a security policy framework incounter-piracy and more in counter-maritime affairs andpreparedness led by solely one state and followed by all,only by providing human capital will diminish over-expenditure. it will take into consideration alloperational and administrative lessons learned fromnAto’s past and current operations but also centers andbases. it will eventually create the opportunity for arenewed co-operation in the framework of the newsupranational strategic concept. it will enhance thedecisions that are drawn on smart defense from thechicago Summit. chicago requested and nAto doesstill request for a ‘smart bnancial, training andoperational engagement’ as stakes are high andchallenges emerging, even in the region of Southeasteurope and the middle east. A possible analysis willshow that stakes are high for those states that do holdthe largest interest in a specibc policy that they are mostinterested at. yet, maritime security and counteringinternational piracy is no less than a truly important andinternational policy that affects all and that neverthelessis able to reassure commitment of naval powers andmember-states both individually and collectively.

e sole decision that needs to be made is who willbear the lead. yet, as well, who will bear the political cost.And i wish to clearly state from my personal experiencesthat the nmiotc can bear such effective and fullyengaged cost. As the initial creation cost is already spentby the Greek Government and the nmiotc yearsaway. e nmiotc now holds an internationallyaccredited and international experienced human capital,and is well on its way to increase its posture and abilitiesto train and take the lead on.

>>> Political Issues

dr. efthymiopoulos is a visiting Scholar at the centerfor transatlantic relations, eU center for excellence atSAiS, johns hopkins University in washington dche is also a visiting Senior research Scholar at theGeorge washington University business School, eUcenter for excellence, washington dc.email your comments to:[email protected]

Page 41: Mio journal 7th edition

Since man brst built a boat and blled it with wares,there has been piracy. e fundamentals of piracy haveremained almost entirely unchanged for thousands ofyears. today, as in the past, piracy involves the capture,often violently, of a merchant ship for pecuniary gain.one development in modern times has been that thecutlass has been replaced with the AK-47, and rocket-propelled grenades (rpGs), the jolly roger no longercies and the bnancial stakes are much, much higher.however, piracy has also evolved in one more importantway - rather than stealing whatever goods happen to beon-board, modern pirates often demand millions ofdollars in ransom. piracy has thus become an exceedinglylucrative crime, proving an alluring vocation in a regionwhere young men have few other prospects to escapepoverty and destitution.

piracy is said to represent the brst truly internationalcrime. however, while all nations agree that piracy is auniversal crime, their domestic laws can differ on how aparticular crime is debned, whether or not courtjurisdiction can be established, and what the eventualpunishment for piracy must be, including how it mustbe delivered. which country takes the lead inprosecuting pirates, is highly dependent on the facts of

an individual case. relevant factors, for example, mayinclude the cag country of the captured vessel, thenationalities of the ship crew or those kidnapped, thenationality of the pirates, and the location of the shipwhen it was attacked and, or, hijacked. politicalconsiderations may also play an important role indeciding whether or not, and where, to prosecute a givencase of piracy. while hundreds of pirates have beenprosecuted by regional states and from around the world,the pool of recruits for the organizers of piracy attacksremains constant – there is, in fact, an indication that itis growing. rough an unbroken line of resolutions onthe situation in Somalia – from United nations Securitycouncil resolutions 1950 to 2020 – the Un Securitycouncil (UnSc) has recognized the need to focus onnot only the pirates captured at sea but also the networksthat bnance and orchestrate these attacks, and todismantle them.

iinnccrreeAASSeedd AAnndd SSUUSSttAAiinneedd ffooccUUSS oonnhhiiGGhh vvAAllUUee ttAArrGGeettSS

one of interpol’s core missions is to assist theglobal law enforcement community in collecting,coordinating, and disseminating, actionable information

SSoommaallii ppiirraaccyy:: ffoolllloowwiinngg tthhee ppaappeerr ttrraaiillbbyy mmrr ppiieerrrree SStt.. hhiillaaiirree,,hheeaadd ooff iinntteerrppooll mmaarriittiimmee ppiirraaccyy ttaasskk ffoorrccee

Issue 7, July 41

NMIOTC Journal Law Enforcement Issues <<<

Page 42: Mio journal 7th edition

and intelligence, supporting and enhancing domesticand international enforcement, and tackling maritimepiracy and its illicit funds, in collaboration with otherkey partners. interpol’s maritime piracy task force(mptf), created in january 2010, coordinatesinterpol’s international response to the maritimepiracy threat in all its facets. it specibcally considers thebnancial aspects of the piracy criminal enterprise, with aspecial focus on high value targets (hvts) such aspirate leaders, organizers, negotiators, and investors.interpol has long recognized that, given the lowrisks and high rewards of piracy, simply arresting andprosecuting individual pirates captured at sea will notmeaningfully lower the incidence of pirate attacks.

in the words of interpol Secretary Generalronald noble, “to strike at the heart of maritime piracy,we must investigate, understand, and use to ouradvantage the bnancial component behind each of theseattacks. we must follow the money as part of a globalresponse involving law enforcement against maritimepiracy” (interpol press release 19 january 2010).e global law enforcement community faces a numberof challenges in trying to identify the organizational andbnancial structure of pirate networks and to prosecutethese hvts.2 without a concerted effort to improveinformation-sharing between all the actors involved itwill be extremely difficult to bring to justice those whoorchestrate and organize these pirate attacks.

iinnffoorrmmAAttiioonn--SShhAArriinnGG AAnndd tthheeiinntteerrppooll mmAArriittiimmee ppiirrAAccyy GGlloobbAAllddAAttAAbbAASSee

one of the biggest obstacles in defeating piracynetworks is the lack of information-sharing between keyactors that collect or are in the possession of relevant dataon piracy networks. e process of investigation, arrest,and prosecution of persons associated with maritimepiracy is initiated in a maritime environment. however,its roots and the pursuit of closure are land-based andrequire the cooperation of military, law enforcementauthorities, and the private sectormaritime shippingcommunity, including owners, operators and insurancecompanies. ere is a large volume of information onpiracy networks that is fragmented and in the possessionof actors that have little past experience of workingtogether closely. for example, information on piracyattacks and those responsible may be in the possession ofthe military; complementary information on the sameattacks may be in the possession of the cag state, the shipowner, local law enforcement, crew members andhostages, and the private actors conducting the ransomnegotiations. e ultimate goal is to collect andcentralize this information for use by the law

enforcement community.

either bilaterally or through working Group 5 of thecontact Group on piracy off the coast of Somalia,under the stewardship of the government of italy,interpol actively works with all of these partners –the private sector, military, and law enforcement – tocollect and share information about pirates and pirateattacks. All of these actors have a shared resolve to defeatthe piracy networks.3 because of the international natureof piracy networks, even well trained local lawenforcement will only be able to glean a partial pictureof the network behind a lone pirate attack. it is only bysharing the results of investigations with theinternational community that a more complete picturewill begin to emerge. drawing on two of its corefunctions, interpol is uniquely positioned tofacilitate that kind of international collaboration. byfacilitating secure global communication and offering itsanalytical expertise through operational data services,interpol aids the international law enforcementcommunity to identify links between different piracyincidents. Stimulating information-sharing andcollecting data becomes meaningless unless the data canbe analyzed and contextualized. interpol’s maritimepiracy task force (mptf) provides this assistancechiecy via its Global maritime piracy database. on 29july 2011, interpol washington, in collaborationwith interpol General Secretariat (ipSG) mptfdeveloped and implemented a customized databasewhich contained information on Somali piracy in orderto assist law enforcement authorities around the worldby sharing information to facilitate piracy investigations,and increase piracy-related prosecutions.

interpol further assists select member states inproactively exploiting evidence in their custody to helpidentify the organizers and leaders of the pirate networks.in 2011, interpol launched project evexi(evidence exploitation initiative) – a strategic initiativeco-funded by france and norway – to assist select statesexploit maritime piracy evidence in their custody

42 Issue 7, July 2013

>>>Law Enforcement Issues NMIOTC Journal

Page 43: Mio journal 7th edition

and establish procedures for maritime piracyintelligence-gathering and forensic evidence collection.by establishing these procedures in all of the regionalcountries currently involved in investigating piracy, theproject will provide regional investigators with aninterpol-supported methodology and information-sharing mechanism. rough ensuring that informationassets are optimally exploited for intelligence, andevidence dispersed across jurisdictions is more able to beunibed for the purposes of prosecution, local policeforces will be able to better target individuals involvedin the organization, bnancing, and implementation f actsof piracy.

ddeevveellooppiinnGG rreeGGiioonnAAll ccAAppAAcciittyy ttooccoonnddUUcctt ccoommpplleexx ttrrAAnnSSnnAAttiioonnAAlliinnvveeSSttiiGGAAttiioonnSS,, iinnccllUUddiinnGG ffiinnAAnncciiAAlliinnvveeSSttiiGGAAttiioonnSS

interpol plays a central role in capacity-buildingefforts, including through improving and providinginfrastructure and exchanging data. interpol’scounter-piracy strategy is organized around a single,unifying principle: to build, balance, and integrate thetools of regional structures to combat maritime piracyby strengthening existing assets of investigation andprosecution, reinforcing investigative skills, and buildinginternational cooperation. A european Union-funded,36-month capacity building project aimed at developingthe forensic and investigative capacity of seven easternAfrican countries will provide essential equipmentand/or training to law enforcement in those respectivecountries. in addition to building the forensics capacityof select member states involved in prosecuting maritimepiracy (notably the Seychelles, Kenya, tanzania andmauritius), interpol’s projects and initiatives with“front-line states” in eastern Africa seek to furtherdevelop the capacities for criminal investigation units inthose countries conducting the type of pro-active,transnational investigations required to successfullyprosecute those who illicitly bnance, plan, organize, orunlawfully probt from pirate attacks off the coast ofSomalia.

more specibcally, UnScr 1976 calls for the“implementation of anti-money-laundering laws,” and“the establishment of financial investigation Units” astools against the international criminal networksinvolved in piracy. regional states, as well as other states,could be vulnerable to efforts by piracy networks tolaunder the proceeds of maritime piracy. Assisting statesin the effective implementation of the financial Actiontask force (fAtf) 40 recommendations remains a highpriority in addition to creating fiUs, and developingtrained bnancial investigators that are experienced in

bnancial investigatory matters involving both domesticlaws and international conventions and standards.

“countries should make it a policy priority to ensurethat there are an adequate number of properly trainedbnancial investigators. ese bnancial investigatorsshould be adequately trained, and experienced inbnancial investigatory matters involving both domesticlaws and international conventions and standards.countries should create institutional conditions thatprovide the appropriate environment to carry outbnancial investigations and to facilitate cooperation byproviding the proper legal authority for any involvedagencies.”

interpol, along with other partners such as theUnited nations office on drugs and crime (Unodc)and the world bank, should continue their collaborativeefforts to develop fiUs in front-line states and to train“bnancial investigators” to identify and arrest “those whoillicitly bnance, plan, organize, or unlawfully probt frompirate attacks off the coast of Somalia.” is objective iseminently reasonable and possible given that an fiU inthe Seychelles which has set the gold standard forbnancial investigations could serve as a model for othercountries.

ccoonnccllUUSSiioonn

e costs of maritime piracy are enormous. Seafarersare being held hostage in horribc conditions, many ofwhom have been tortured, abused, and sometimesmurdered. it is, brst and foremost, a humanitarian issuethat must be addressed with urgency. Action must betaken that attacks all of the components of the intricatelyorchestrated international crime of maritime piracy.interpol has established ienforcement bodiesalongside private sector stakeholders in coordinatedefforts to facilitate the identibcation and traceability ofsuspects associated with maritime piracy, as well as intheir prosecution, and will continue to build on suchinitiatives.

Issue 7, July 43

Law Enforcement Issues <<<NMIOTC Journal

mr pierre St. hilaire is the head of the interpolmaritime piracy task force. email your comments to [email protected]

Page 44: Mio journal 7th edition

44Issue 7, July 2013

NMIOTC Journal>>> Photo Galery

ccooUUrrSSeeSS,, eexxeerrcciiSSeeSS AAnndd ttrrAAiinniinnGGSSccooUUrrSSeeSS,, eexxeerrcciiSSeeSS AAnndd ttrrAAiinniinnGGSS

training of the hellenic Sof25 february - 1 march 2013

resident course 700026 - 29 march 2013

training of the US coast Guard mSSt25 february - 1 march 2013

training of 26th US marine expeditionary Unit 26 - 29 march 2013

maritime biometrics train the trainers course28 - 29 march 2013

training of hmS dragon1- 3 April 2013

Page 45: Mio journal 7th edition

Issue 7, July 2013 45

NMIOTC Journal

ccooUUrrSSeeSS,, eexxeerrcciiSSeeSS AAnndd ttrrAAiinniinnGGSSccooUUrrSSeeSS,, eexxeerrcciiSSeeSS AAnndd ttrrAAiinniinnGGSS

training of hmS Kent8 - 10 April 2013 Resident Course 1000

15 - 19 April 2013

resident course 2000- 300015 - 26 April 2013

training of USS mAhAn17 April 2013

training of fS GUeprAtte29 - 30 April 2013

training of itS zeffiro 20 - 24 may 2013

Photo Galery <<<

Page 46: Mio journal 7th edition

46 Issue 7, July 2013

NMIOTC Journal

Since the attacks of 11 September 2001, the threatposed by international terrorism has gained a newdimension. incidents such as the USS cole and limburgattacks have demonstrated that terrorists are interested inand capable of using the maritime domain to achievetheir objectives. preventing terrorists from attacking at orfrom the sea and from crossing maritime borders hasthus become a major preoccupation for european andnorth American governments. particular attention hasbeen given to addressing the vulnerability to terroristattacks of sea-based critical energy infrastructure and ofmaritime cows of energy resources. `

operation Active endeavour (oAe) was initiated inoctober 2001 in response to the terrorist attacks againstthe United States of America on September 1, 2001.e mission of oAe is to conduct maritime operationsto help deter, defend, disrupt and protect againstterrorism in the area of operations. Since its inceptionoAe has proved to be effective in deterring terrorism inthe mediterranean. while the terrorist threat to militarynaval assets and commercial shipping in themediterranean is assessed as low the potential for aterrorist attack cannot be ruled out. oAe supports theAlliance maritime Strategy in the areas of defence againstterrorism, maritime Situational Awareness and maritimeinterdiction operations. oAe also contributes tomaritime security capacity building through theparticipation of non-nAto nations.

in consideration of the broad spectrum of potential

terrorist activities the risk to the interests of nAtoallies and nAto creditability are high in the event thatwe fail to detect and disrupt a planned terrorist attack.in this regard it is anticipated that enhanced network-based operational capabilities will be developed in theareas of future sensor networks and requirements forsurveillance assets and enhanced interdependenciespertaining to maritime Situational Awareness capabilitydevelopment. it is anticipated that these advances wouldbe linked with the development of a robust and effectivesensor and non-sensor information network.

e 2013 nmiotc Annual conference providednew opportunities for discussion and path forwardproposals in dealing with future maritime securitythreats and linkages with maritime interdictionoperations, investigated interdependencies andincuences under the auspices of operation Activeendeavor (oAe). based on the results of the nmiotcAnnual conference, specibc follow-up actions and areasof enhanced engagement will be identibed, which wouldbe expected to lead to implementation of new domainsin consideration of future training and engagement vianmiotc.

e conference was focused but not limited to thefollowing pillars:

border Security

• identity operations (biometrics)

• human trafficking

tthhee 22001133 nnmmiioottcc AAnnnnUUAAll ccoonnffeerreennccee:: ffUUttUUrree SSeeccUUrriittyy AAtt SSeeAA.. mmiioo rroolleeSS..

bbyy ccoommmmaannddeerr hhaarrvveeyy ll.. SSccootttt,, UU..SS.. nnaavvyy ((rreettiirreedd))

>>>NMIOTC Events

Page 47: Mio journal 7th edition

Issue 7, July 2013 47

NMIOTC Journal

• identity operations (biometrics)

• human trafficking

• illegal immigration

• trafficking illicit Goods

b. energy Security

• critical infrastructure protection

• maritime piracy (hoA & west Africa)

• operational costs – energy consideration

c. mio in Strategic chokepoints

• wmd counter proliferation

• maritime terrorism / piracy

d. civil military cooperation

• civil military cooperation in organized crime(Un, eU, interpol, etc.)

• intelligence/information sharing (nAto, eUimo, Unodc, etc.)

• information sharing with non-nAto entities

while the two previous nmiotc Annualconferences focused on issues related to piracy this year'sconference focussed on the more broad based issuesrelated to overall maritime regional security threats asapplicable to the current structure of oAe andopportunities for the future evolution of oAeengagement activities.

e purpose of the expansion of the points ofdiscussion for this year's conference was designed to dealwith evolving regional security threats and exploreopportunities for cooperative engagement between abroad based cross section of organizations, both civilianand military, currently engaged in developing programsand activities addressing these threats.

e structure of the conference aimed to encouragepresentations and follow-up discussions regarding theissues noted above with dialogues by national andregional military and non military organizations andagencies with the goal of developing a viable pathforward to address these threats via cooperativeengagement.

A potential path forward would be the establishmentof a working group of "focal points" within theindividual national entities, organizations and agenciesfor follow-up planning and discussion with the goal ofthe development of a plan of assessment and cooperativeengagement to enhance addressing these threats.

e participation of organizations and agencies thatare involved with regional border security engagementactivities was a critical element for the success inexploring opportunities for cooperative regional securityengagement.

it is anticipated that the outcome of this conferencewill lead to opportunities for enhancing maritimeSituational Awareness in response to threats of maritimeterrorist activities in the mediterranean. rough thedevelopment of enhanced dialogue and cooperativeengagement via nations neighbouring the mediterraneanand international entities a common understanding ofthe maritime situation would be enhanced leading togreater effectiveness in the planning and conduct ofoperations.

we envision that this year’s nmiotc Annualconference will provide a stepping stone in providingthe tools and a greater understanding to supportactivities and engagement that will reduce the potentialterrorist threats to nAto and national maritime assetsin the mediterranean.

nmiotc is in the process of planning the nextconference, to be held in june 2014, building on thework accomplished this year as well as feedback fromprevious events. initial discussions among the nmiotcconference organizing committee and thedistinguished guests during the conference have alreadyprovided a foundation for nmiotc 2014 Annualconference which we hope to see being developed intoa high-level forum that can engage a wide audience ofmaritime stakeholders in working towards viablesolutions to current nAto maritime security issues.nmiotc along with its external advisory team iswilling to offer to nAto all of its expertise anddynamism as a think tank that can assist Alliance’s effortstoward future security at sea.

NMIOTC Events <<<

commander harvey Scott, USn (retired)is a graduateof the University of hawaii with a technical backgroundin health physics and began his civilian career with thenuclear engineering department at pearl harbor navalShipyard. email to:[email protected]

Page 48: Mio journal 7th edition

48Issue 7, July 2013

NMIOTC Journal

talking about maritime interdiction operationsnowadays, it is normally focused on piracy, drugtrafficking and non-proliferation of weapons of massdestruction. nevertheless the most traditional way tomake use of the sea and one of the most critical issuesduring the three Un conferences on the law of the Seais bsheries. regarding the challenge of the nutrition of agrowing global population the preservation of livingmarine resources and the importance of bsheriesmanagement are on the rise, illegal, unreported andunregulated (iUU) bshing being the worst menace to allefforts in this direction.

e heard island and mcdonald islands are anAustralian external territory and volcanic group of barrenAntarctic islands, about two-thirds of the way frommadagascar to Antarctica.ey are locatedapproximately 4,099 km southwest of perth, and 4,200km southeast of South Africa. e islands are currentlyuninhabited. Since 1997 the region is a registered worldheritage site for natural criteria.

iUU bshing is one of the main threats to the existenceof commercially valuable and vulnerable patagoniantoothbsh in the remote areas of the Southern ocean.Although several regional and internationalorganizations are working to stop the poaching ofpatagonian toothbsh in the region, enforcementproblems make it difficult to stop this illegal practice.ehigh market value is one of the main contributing factors

toiUU bshing of patagonian toothbsh. remotenessof the bshing ground makes surveillance andenforcement very difficult, especially as the Australianfisheries management Authority (AfmA) didn’t operatehigh-endurance patrol vessels at this time. both of thesefactors provide ideal circumstances for iUU bshing.

At the beginning of the year 2002, Australianmaritime patrol aircrafts observed iUU bshing activitiesoff heard island tracking at least two ships involved inthese activities. not willing to further accept iUU bshingin its exclusive economic zone (eez) around heardisland the frigate hmAS canberra with an embarkedAfmA bsheries inspector was deployed together withthe tanker hmAS westralia for heard island arrestingthe “lena” and the “volga” on february 7th and 8th,2002. both were long-line bshing vessels cying the cagof the russian federation. while the masters wererussians the crews were mainly Spanish.

having been pursued unsuccessfully for almost twoweeks earlier by a bsheries patrol vessel running out offuel, the “lena” was now boarded by vertical insertionusing the helicopter of hmAS canberra about 140 nminside the Australian fisheries zone (Afz). on february7th, 2002, the Australian naval officials, whileconducting naval patrol against iUU bshing ofpatagonian toothbsh in the eez of theheard andmcdonald islands in the Southern ocean, also boardedthe “volga”. e bshing license carried by the volga

ee ““vvoollggaa”” ccaassee:: cciivviilliiaann--mmiilliittaarryy ccooooppeerraattiioonn iinn mmaarriittiimmee iinntteerrddiiccttiioonn ooppeerraattiioonnss

bbyy mmrr iinnggoo KKllaauuss wwaammsseerr

>>>CIMIC

Page 49: Mio journal 7th edition

entitled it to commercially bsh in the russian eezand the ‘open sea and coastal zones of foreign countries’..A condition was observance of the rules governing thebshing industry and the conditions of internationalagreements.

Australian military personnel operating from hmAScanberra boarded the “volga” on february 7th, 2002,when the vessel was on the high seas just beyond theAustralian eez and between heard and mcdonaldislands in the Southern ocean. Australia’s case was thatthe volga had been observed bshing illegally in the eezand ced into international waters when it became awareof the Australian navy’s presence.

e master and crew were detained under powers inthe fisheries management Act 1991 and the vessel andcatch were seized. on march 6th the chief mate, thebshing master and the bshing pilot, all of whom wereSpanish nationals, were charged for unlawful bshing inthe Afz, while the rest of the crew was released (andlater repatriated to Spain).

Under the fisheries management Act 1991 the catch(value), vessel, nets and equipment of the “volga” were

all liable to forfeiture by order of a court. e catch,some 131 tons of patagonian toothbsh and 21 tons ofbait, was sold for A$1,932,579.28 and the money washeld in trust by the Australian government waiting for abnal court order. it is normal to sell the catch and bait ofan arrested vessel because they are perishable. e ownerof the “volga”, olbers co ltd, a company incorporatedin russia, instigated proceedings in the federal court ofAustralia seeking to prevent the forfeiture of the vesseland its catch to the Australian government. later on anapplication for prompt release was bled with theinternational tribunal for the law of the Sea athamburg.

while the law suits on the national and internationallevel concerning the arrest of the “volga” are mainlyconcerned with questions of an adequate amount ofbonds the “volga” case as well as the arrest of the “lena”are a very good example of successful civilian-militarycooperation in maritime interdiction operations. due toa lack of high-endurance platforms the AfmA was notable to interfere iUU bshing for a long period in theremote area of heard island on its own. on the otherhand the royal Australian navy was lacking lawenforcement powers to engage in bsheries enforcementactivities. in a combined mission a successfulinterception of the illegal activities has been possible evenover very long distances and under harsh weatherconditions. regarding a worldwide lack of public fundssuch cooperations including military vessels and aircraftstogether with civilian law enforcement personnel can bean answer to demanding missions in remote locationsand over long periods. e enforcement of regulations inthe eez regarding bsheries but also the protection ofoffshore installations including not only oil and gas rigsin the same way as wind farms against terroristic threatsare demanding task exceeding the abilities of civilianauthorities in manpower and equipment of a wastemajority of countries. making use of military vessels cantherefore be a vital contribution to increase on-scenepresence of authorities in the eez deterring illegalactivities of any kind and strengthening the awareness ofarmed forces’ signibcance in public opinion.

Issue 7, July 2013 49

NMIOTC Journal CIMIC <<<

mr ingo Klaus wamser graduated from the University ofpassau, faculty of law. he holds licences as mastermariner and private security profes. in 2011 he got ap-pointed as a lecturer on the law of the sea and marinemining regulations at the montanuniversität leoben inAustria.email your comments at: [email protected]

Page 50: Mio journal 7th edition

ccooUUrrSSeeSS,, eexxeerrcciiSSeeSS AAnndd ttrrAAiinniinnGGSSccooUUrrSSeeSS,, eexxeerrcciiSSeeSS AAnndd ttrrAAiinniinnGGSS

training of US 26th meU recon27 may - 2 june 2013

NMIOTC Journal>>> Photo Galery NMIOTC Journal

training of US coast Guard Ait17 - 21 june 2013

training of imo-dcoc25 june- 5 july 2013

training of nld maritime eod25 june- 5 july 2013

maritime Advanced Situational Awareness training(m-ASAt) pilot training

4 - 12 july 2013

exercise Adrion livex 2013nmiotc mobile training team

4 - 12 july 2013

>>> NMIOTC Journal

50 Issue 7, July 2013

Page 51: Mio journal 7th edition

NMIOTC Journal

Issue 7, July 2013 51

Page 52: Mio journal 7th edition

NATOMaritimeInterdictionOperationalTrainingCentre

Marathi Souda Bay, Crete

Zip 73200Greece

Phone:+302821085716 Email:

[email protected]

www.nmiotc.gr

“NEVER DECLINE THE DANGERS OF WAR”NMIOTC Crest Motto