The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 12 | Issue 47 | Number 3 | Article ID 4225 | Nov 16, 2014

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MSG Headache, West Papuan Heartache? Indonesia'sMelanesian Foray インドネシアのメラネシア進出　MSG（メラネシア先鋒グループ・グルタミン酸ナトリウム）頭痛、西パプアの苦痛

Camellia Webb-Gannon, Jim Elmslie

Introduction

Asia and the Pacific—these two geographic,political and cultural regions encompass entirelife-worlds, cosmologies and cultures. YetIndonesia’s recent enthusiastic outreach toMelanesia indicates an attempt to bridge boththe constructed and actual distinctionsbetween them. While the label ‘Asia-Pacific’may accurately capture Indonesia’s aspirationalsphere of influence, it is simultaneously onethat many Pacific scholars have resisted,fearing that the cultures and interests of thePacific are threatened by the hyphen1. This fearis justif ied, we contend, as Indonesiaprogressively puts itself forward in Pacificpolitical forums as the official representative of‘its’ Melanesian populations2—a considerablenumber of whom support independence fromthe Indonesian state3.

In this article, we examine why Indonesia isincreasingly representing itself as a Pacific‘nesia’ (Greek for islands), seemingly toneutralise West Papua’s claim to politicalMelanesianhood. Then we analyse the waysIndonesia is insinuating itself into Melanesianpolit ics and its attempts to undercutMelanesian support for West Papuan self-determination. Finally we consider theimplications of Indonesia’s lengthening arminto Melanesian politics for Melanesia’sregional political bloc, the MelanesianSpearhead Group (MSG), and for West Papuanpolitics. International support for West Papuanindependence is critical to the movement’straction, as it was in the cases of East Timor

and South Sudan4. As West Papua refutesIndonesia’s claim that the conflict is an internaldomestic one, and enlists the support of fellowMelanesian nations to help internationalise itsconcerns, Indonesia is forced to respond on theinternational stage too, seeking first to wooWest Papua’s strongest potential allies, theMSG members. We conclude by arguing that ifthe MSG and individual Melanesian states wantto respond to Indonesia by including it in theirpolitical and trade networks, it is theirprerogative to do so. However, they shouldbeware of further stifling already marginalisedMelanesian voices such as those of WestPapuans, this being the principal deleteriouseffect of Indonesia’s recent foray intoMelanesian politics.

Map showing Indonesia in relation toM e l a n e s i a . I m a g e c r e d i t(http://wikitravel.org/en/Oceania)

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Indonesia’s Pacific Pitch

West Papua’s geopolitical liminality in relationto Asia and the Pacific Islands positions it asthe ‘hyphen’ in the pan-regional Asia-Pacificconstruction5. Culturally it is of the Pacific, witha Pacific identity, which, on account of itsgeographic location and colonial history, hashad its interests subordinated to its muchlarger Asian occupier, Indonesia. Over the lastfive years however, West Papuan voices forself-determination have increasingly made theirway into the consciousness of the regional andthe international community6. In response, overthe past two years in particular, Indonesiandiplomacy has vigorously extended itself eastinto Melanesia in an attempt to maintaincontrol over West Papua, its territorial bridgeto the Pacific7. But Indonesia is not only usingWest Papua to attain status as a member of thePacific regional community, it is also seekingPacific status to legitimise its stranglehold onWest Papua8.

Indonesia has had a long relationship with thePacific, and a largely violent one with what isnow West Papua. In Asia in the Pacific Islands,Ron Crocombe describes Indonesia’s historicallinks with the Pacific as being forged through aseries of waves. The first wave produced theancestors of most Pacific Islanders who cameoriginally from Taiwan and travelled viaIndonesia to reach Melanesia9, and later,Polynesia and Micronesia1 0 . However,Crocombe downplays the significance of thesemigration waves to Asia and Pacific Islandsrelations, claiming that these early populationshad very little interaction with Asia after theirexodus 1 1 . West Papuans l iv ing in thewesternmost part of the island of New Guineaand its outlying islands were not so fortunate.From the 15th century, the sultans from theIndonesian islands of Tidore and Ternateconducted violent slave raids into West Papua,plundered exotic goods and extracted tribute12.The second wave of Asians to the PacificIslands, according to Crocombe, stretched from

1800 to 1945 and mainly included workershired to labour in European colonialsettlements. Following this pattern, the Dutchcolonisers of West Papua used Malukanc o l o n i a l s u b j e c t s a s t e a c h e r s a n dadministrators in West Papua, much to theresentment of West Papuans13.

The third wave was the most violent of all forWest Papuans. While the Dutch had preparedan e l i t e g roup o f Wes t Papuans fo rindependence by 1961, the Unitary State of theRepublic of Indonesia insisted that West Papuajoin it. In 1962, against a backdrop of Cold Wargeopolitics, the United States (US) andAustralia backed Indonesia’s claim to WestPapua and negotiated a transfer of the territoryto Indonesia, without consulting the localpopulation. In 1969, the UN cursorily oversawand endorsed the so-called Act of Free Choice,a referendum in which less than one per cent ofthe West Papuan population was required, byforce, to vote for integration with Indonesia onbehalf of the entire territory. Since 1964, WestPapuans have conducted military and peacefulcampaigns for independence, whi ledemographers estimate that between 100,000and 500,000 West Papuans have been killedunder the Indonesian occupation14. Crimesagainst humanity committed by Indonesiansecurity forces, documented extensivelyelsewhere15, have been horrific and frequent,yet ignored. Indeed, serious accusations ofgenocide have been mounted against Indonesiafor its actions and intentions in West Papua16.

Despite its forced incorporation of WestPapuans and several other Melanesianpopulations within its state boundaries,through which it claims a place at theMelanesian political table, Indonesia is not partof Melanesia17. While some anthropologistshighlight the contiguity of Asia and Melanesia,and the blurring of ethnicities and cultures inthe transitional region between New Guineaand Asia18, in terms of chosen identity19,invented tradition2 0 and sociocultural

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practices21, West Papuans have much more incommon with the rest of Melanesia than withAsia22. And while identities are neitherprimordial nor unchanging but are worked outi n r e l a t i o n t o o t h e r n e s s 2 3 , a n d a l lcategorisations of humans are socialconstructs, the living out of constructedidentities is experienced as reality. Regionalidentity may not be as salient to many PacificIslanders as language and place, but it isimportant to those elites whose job it is todefine the nation-state and its place in theinternational system24. Thus, as Selwyn Garu,member of the Vanuatu Council of Chiefsstated in 2009, “Melanesia is not a concept, it’sa reality”25. Such statements “say…something”,according to Stephanie Lawson, “not just aboutthe social construction of reality but about thereality that social constructions come toacquire in the world of politics”26. They also saysomething about why, despite some overlap ofethnicities and cultures in what Indonesiaconsiders to be the far eastern limit of its state,West Papuans are “ontologically attached”27 tothe Melanesian Pacific, as a distinct andseparate region from Indonesia’s Asia.

However, Indonesia has much to lose28 if WestPapua is included politically, in addition to itscurrent cultural affiliations, with the Pacific. Itis not possible for Indonesia to deny WestPapuans’ cultural Melanesian-ness, an identitylabel that has gained wide support among WestPapuans, Papua New Guineans, Ni-Vanuatu,Solomon Islanders and Kanaks in the post-PNGand Vanuatu independence era29. The label‘Melanesia’—‘mel’ (from the Greek ‘melas’,meaning ‘black’) and ‘nesia’ (from ‘nesos’,meaning ‘islands’)—formalised in 1832 byFrench explorer Dumont D’Urville as the nameof the south-west Pacific region in 1832—haslargely shed its racial and racist connotations30.Being generally darker in skin colour and moreegalitarian31 in social organisation than otherlighter-skinned and hierarchically-structuredsocieties in the Pacific encountered by earlycolonial explorers, Melanesia was a pejorative32

and rac ia l l abe l , i n cont ras t to thegeographically labelled Pacific regions ofPolynesia (many islands) and Micronesia (smallislands). Despite the label’s objectionablegenealogy, indigenous intellectuals from the1970s onward have reclaimed Melanesian-nessas an anticolonial33 and panethnic34 identitybased largely on various discourses—theMelanesian Way35, wantokism36 and kastom37,which largely exclude Western, Asian and evenPolynesian values38 on the basis of either theirforeignness and (or) their imperialistconnotations.

In order to deny West Papuan representation atMelanesian and Pacific forums, Indonesia istrying to identify itself as a Pacific (Melanesian)as well as an Asian state. Indonesia haspreviously represented itself as “Father of theNesias”39, referring to the path the Papuan andAustronesian peoples historically followedt h r o u g h I n d o n e s i a t o t h e o t h e r‘nesias’—Melanesia, Polynesia and Micronesia.But being ‘Nesian’, as Kirsten McGavin pointsout, is a Pacific Islander notion. As an identityit is not necessarily ethnically defined, and itcan incorporate many Islander culturalpractices, particularly when groups of‘Islanders’ from different Pacific countriesgather socially in an ‘outside’ country. Thus,the hula might be performed at an Australianwedding uniting a New Zealander and PapuaNew Guinean, even though the hula is aHawaiian dance, precisely because thecelebration is taking place in a panethnicPacific Islander community40. Identifying as‘Nesian’, therefore, is problematic forIndonesia because as a panethnicity, being‘Nesian’ is “based on [a Pacific Islander]cultural background and similarity ofexperiences41.” The experiences of PacificIslander West Papuans at the hands of theIndonesian state have been incomparably moretragic42 than those of most other peoplesgrouped together as Indonesians.

Secondly, Indonesia encounters problems with

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its ‘Nesian’-ness in its status as a state, ratherthan a region. Being regions, Melanesia,Polynesia and Micronesia provide a frameworkwithin which their individual states can worktogether relatively amicably through regionaland bilateral relationships. Indonesia, as anation-state, cannot allow the many nations itencompasses to freely associate as sovereignpolitical entities. Thus Indonesia lacks thedemocratic functioning of the three Pacific‘Nesias’ of which it claims parentage (by virtueof the use of i ts land by Melanesia’s ,Polynesia’s and Micronesia’s originalinhabitants while in transit from Taiwan totheir Pacific destinations). Regardless of thesedeficiencies in Indonesia’s claims toMelanesian representativeness, however,realpolitik negotiations saw Indonesia grantedobserver status in 2011 at the MelanesianSpearhead Group (MSG)—Melanesia’ssubregional political and trade bloc. Thistranspired despite the MSG being founded in1986 to strengthen Melanesian solidarity andpromote Melanesian interests, including thedecolonisation of Kanaky43. The MSG includesVanuatu, the Solomon Islands, Fiji and theKanak Socialist Front for National Liberation(FLNKS)44, but has not yet welcomed WestPapua into its fold.

The West Papua National Coalition forLiberation (WPNCL), which represents manyWest Papuan independence groups at theinternational level, has been working tohighlight the dubiousness of Indonesia’s claimto Melanesian representativeness, and forseveral years lobbied the MSG for observerstatus for itself with little effect. This changedat an MSG meeting in New Caledonia in 2013,when the WPNCL prepared yet anotherapplication for observer status. The eveningbefore it was due to be submitted the WPNCLleaders attending a special pre-summitreception were encouraged by the Chair of theFLNKS to apply for full membership45: theapplication form was quickly adjustedaccordingly. Although it is not within the

MSG’s remit to formally intervene in theIndonesia-West Papua conflict, West Papuanshope that if they are admitted to the MSG, thatbloc will have sufficient clout to take their caseforward to the UN Decolonisation Committee.West Papuans found encouragement for thismove in a casual remark by UN SecretaryGeneral Ban Ki Moon at the 2011 PacificIslands Forum in New Zealand46.

The MSG decided during its June 2013 summit,at the insistence of Vanuatu and the SolomonIslands, to endorse West Papua’s right to self-determination, and stated that the atrocities ofthe past five decades in West Papua needed tobe taken up with the Indonesian government.But they held off from a decision on WestPapuan membership, instead acceptingIndonesia’s invitation to host a ForeignMinisterial Mission (FMM) of MSG leaders toJakarta and West Papua, headed up by Fiji, sothat MSG leaders could witness first-handconditions in West Papua47. The WPNCL wouldbe advised, it was decided, of the MSG’sdecision within six months of the FMM visit.Despite the delay of the final decision on fullmembership, West Papua’s reception at thisMSG summit was a small victory in itself: forthe first time West Papuan representativeswere given observer status like Indonesia andEast Timor, and did not have to attend asmembers of a Vanuatu delegation as they hadin the past. And the very act of deliberating onWest Papua’s application and deciding to sendthe FMM to Indonesia appeared to indicate of anew approach to West Papua amongst MSGstates.

Two key factors however, are proving stickingpoints for the WPNCL’s progress at the MSG,one of which the remainder of this articleexamines. The first is the problem of WestPapuan high level representation. While theWPNCL has excellent diplomatic networkswithin the MSG, and is the umbrel laorganisation for some 29 independence groupsin West Papua, there are other influential

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bodies claiming to be the legitimate and mostsuitable representatives of West Papuans at theMSG. Jacob Rumbiak of the Australian basedWest Papua National Authority and the WestPapuan provisional government, the FederalRepublic of West Papua48, put forward a claimfor MSG observer status, on behalf of hisaffiliations, and was present at the Junesummit. According to Vanuatu Lands Ministerand West Papua supporter, Ralph Regenvanu,t h i s c o n t e n t i o n a r o u n d ‘ t r u e ’representativeness is disconcerting to MSGleaders, and it has weakened the WPNCL’sMSG support base49. This is an important issuethat deserves detailed analysis elsewhere. Butthe second problem for the WPNCL, which istaken up here, is Indonesia’s powerfulcountero f fens ive to the MSG’s newreceptiveness towards West Papua50. Accordingto an article in the Solomon Star News,Jakarta’s method is to “convince the [MSG]countries that Indonesia is a gateway to anAsian economic miracle and they can be part ofthe economic prosperity through Indonesia”51.In the next section, we consider the effects ofIndonesia’s response on each MSG membercountry, the MSG overall and West Papua’spolitical future.

Fiji

Indonesia was savvy in determining how to pickoff MSG member support for West Papua. Itchose Fiji, arguably its closest Melanesian ally,as the member through which to extend aninvitation to the MSG to visit West Papua,assuming correctly that Fiji’s Foreign AffairsMinister, Ratu Inoke Kubuabola, would take itupon himself to shore up support amongst theMSG members for an Indonesia-friendlyoutcome52. Having already established closemilitary ties with Indonesia53, Fiji was alsoseeking closer diplomatic ties with that countryafter joining the Non-Aligned Movement in2011. Brij Lal contends that Fiji is keen toassert itself on “the bigger stage” with majorAsian powers but, in doing so at the expense of

West Papua, is jeopardising Melanesianregional peace and security54. However, thetiming of Fiji and Indonesia coming togetherindicates it may have triggered a foreign policycoup for Fiji, namely a visit in early 2014 byAustralia’s Foreign Minister Julie Bishop toFiji’s Prime Minister Voreqe Bainimaramawhich signified a thaw in the seven year freezeon diplomatic relations between the twocountries55. In light of these prior connectionswith Indonesia, Fiji proved reluctant at the2013 MSG summit to sign off on West PapuanMSG membership, instead moving to delay thedecision unti l after the MSG ForeignMinisterial Mission (FMM) visit to West Papuain o rder t o e s tab l i sh the WPNCL ’ srepresentat iveness o f West Papuanindependence groups.

Even a last minute announcement by Indonesiathat it planned to truncate the MSG delegates’visit to West Papua—initially planned to span acouple of days, prompting Vanuatu to pull outof the trip altogether—did not cause Fiji toquestion the mission’s merit. Indeed, the“carefully choreographed” half-day visit toWest Papua was structured so that MSGdelegates did not meet with independenceadvocates or political prisoners in WestPapua56, and therefore could not report to theirconstituencies on local West Papuan concernsor unrest. All of the MSG delegates whoattended the Indonesian FMM visit signed,together with Indonesian officials, a statementcommitting each party to respect each other’s“sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity and[…] non-interference in each other’s internalaffairs”. This marked a sharp departure fromthe commitment to West Papuan self -determination made just seven months earlierat the MSG summit in Noumea. An examinationof the MSG-Indonesian statement reveals alikely motive for the change of heart: itpromises cooperation between the MSGcountries and Indonesia on food security, trade,education, natural disaster response, policingand political and cultural exchange programs57.

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During the June 2014 Fiji-hosted Pacific IslandsDevelopment Forum, then-Indonesian PresidentYudhoyono indicated that Indonesia hadearmarked US$20 million for capacity buildingprograms for Pacific Islands countries58. Theseare areas in, and funds through which,individual MSG countries hope to benefitthrough collaboration with Indonesia.

In an attempt to further secure Fiji’s loyalty,Jakarta has showered Fiji with gifts of moneyand political support that have benefited bothparties. One such example is Indonesia’s May2014 US$30,000 contribution to assist Fiji inhosting the UN regional conference of the UN’sSpecial Decolonization Committee – aconference at which Indonesia was anxious tobury the issue of West Papua59. It has alsodona ted one m i l l i on do l l a r s t o theestablishment of an MSG regional police forcetraining academy, in which Fiji is taking alead60. In early 2014, Vanuatu announced itwould host a special meeting of the MSG todiscuss West Papua after the FMM visit failedto make genuine contact with West Papuans onthe ground61. Realising then that it neededFiji’s support more than ever, Indonesiasubsequently sent an eight member delegationto give public lectures at Fijian universities andto discuss “trade, investment, economicrelat ions and even higher educationprospects”62. Despite West Papuan WPNCLmembers labelling this a conflict of interest,the Fijian High Level Representative at theMSG, Kaliopate Tavola, commended Fiji fortaking the opportunity to seek bilateralagreements with Indonesia during the FMMvisit63.

However, not all Fijians are happy with theapproach their Prime Minister and ForeignMinister are taking on West Papua. Forexample, popular Fijian musicians havecollaborated to write and perform the song ‘Letthe Morning Star Rise’, which refers to WestPapua’s national flag, and lyrically ralliesMelanesian support for West Papuan freedom64.

At a national government level, too, there isdiscontent about the handling of West Papua: aspokesperson for Fijian opposition party theUnited Front for a Democratic Fiji has accusedIndonesia of meddling in Fijian internal affairsby offering support for Fijian Prime MinisterCommodore Bainimarama in anticipation of hisre-election that occurred in September 2014,and buying off support for West Papuan self-determination65.

New Guinea island divided between Papua NewGuinea and West Papua (or the Indonesianprovinces of Papua and Papua Barat). Imagec r e d i t(https://www.flickr.com/photos/akrockefeller/8341481016/)

Papua New Guinea (PNG)

PNG, the host of the inaugural MSG summit in1986, and the largest country in Melanesia, isperhaps the most politically influential as wellas populous member of the group. With regardto support for West Papuan independence, it isalso the most reserved. PNG shares a borderwith Indonesia (West Papua) and its army isoutnumbered 322 to one by Indonesia’s66,factors which explain PNG’s reticence tochallenge Indonesia on its neighbour’s plight.The 1986 Treaty of Mutual Respect, Friendshipand Cooperation between PNG and Indonesia, abilateral non-aggression pact, governs border

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relations. PNG Prime Minister Peter O’Neill hasbeen conscientious in condoning Indonesia’s“sovereignty” in West Papua, probably in thehope of reducing the border skirmishes andincursions by Indonesian troops into PNG thatoccur several times a year, in spite of the 1986treaty. There are also many economic anddevelopment opportunities for PNG to exploitthrough collaboration with Indonesia; in 2013PNG agreed to work with Indonesia on jointborder gas exploration, highway constructionand hydropower projects67. And perhaps PNG ismindful of its own secessionist issue inBougainville, seeing any success for WestPapua as a query against its own handling ofthe Bougainville conflict.

At the 2013 MSG summit PNG’s previous primeminister and one of the founders of the MSG,Michael Somare, addressed those gathered:“There is strong and growing support amongthe MSG peoples for West Papua’s membershipto MSG and West Papua’s aspirations to self-determination. … For me personally, I believethat MSG should actively make representationsto Indonesia to address human rights abuses inWest Papua”68—because West Papua is “asignificant Melanesian community”69. However,PNG’s current prime minister, Peter O’Neill,did not even attend the summit. Instead, hewas leading a delegation of PNG leaders toIndonesia for discussion of border controls,trade and investment. While there, O’Neillreiterated to the Indonesian press that PNG iscommitted to supporting West Papua as a partof Indonesia70.

PNG’s Foreign Minister, Rimbink Pato, visitedIndonesia and West Papua for the FMM,together with the Foreign Ministers of Fiji andthe Solomon Islands and a representative of theFLNKS. When quizzed by media on humanrights violations in West Papua he responded,“I have not seen the evidence. As I’ve said, wehave a clear mandate and we have conductedan investigation … our mission has beencompleted”71. And while in Jayapura, West

Papua, Pato reaffirmed that the MSG members“support Papua to remain under Indonesiansovereignty”72. On December 1, 2013, PowesParkop, the governor of the National CapitalDistrict and a long-term supporter of WestPapua, arranged for the Morning Star flag to beraised, as is West Papuan tradition on thatdate, at City Hall in Port Moresby for the firsttime. Prime Minister O’Neill asked Parkop tocancel the flag-raising but the governor ignoredthe request, accusing O’Neill of being leantupon by Indonesia. Two foreign invitees to theevent, Jennifer Robinson, a prominent humanrights lawyer, and Benny Wenda, a WestPapuan political refugee in exile, werethreatened by police with arrest warrants fortaking part in political activity on a visitor’svisa73. Nevertheless, civil society and local andopposition politicians in PNG support WestPapuan independence. The Melanesian UnitedFront launched a campaign and petition tosupport the WPNCL at the MSG74, and theleader of the opposition in PNG, BeldenNamah, recently stated: “Papua New Guineahas a moral obligation to raise the plight ofWest Papuans and their struggle forindependence with the Indonesians and beforeinternational bodies and forums”75.

Solomon Islands

Jason MacLeod contends that “of all theMelanesian countries, the Solomons have thelowest level of awareness of the Indonesiangovernment’s occupation of West Papua” andthat “they are the site of substantial Indonesianand Malaysian logging interests”76. Indonesiaand the Solomon Islands also collaborate onissues of energy, f ishing, media anddevelopment77. Nevertheless, prior to leavingfor the June 2013 summit, the Solomon IslandsPrime Minister Gordon Darcy Lilo publiclyadmitted his concern for West Papuans’ humanrights, stating his belief in the importance ofthe issue being ra ised at the MSG 7 8 .Furthermore, at a meeting with a delegationfrom the WPNCL in early 2013, he stated that

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“the West Papuan case is an incompletedecolonisation issue; it has been going on fortoo long; it must be resolved now”79.

Even at the June 2013 summit meeting, theSolomons delegation, together with Vanuatuand the FLNKS, supported the WPNCL’s MSGmembership application. During the summit,Lilo expressed hope that the MSG could“provide a platform for dialogue between WestPapua and Indonesia … to allow for responsibleand managed progress towards sel f -determination”80. A trip to Indonesia by Liloshortly after the summit, however, marked aturning point in the Solomons’ endorsement ofWest Papuan aims. The trip was allegedly paidfor by Indonesia, and Lilo described it as a“breakthrough moment” from which “benefitswill come over time”81. According to newsreports, Indonesia’s then-president Yudhoyonoused the opportunity to convince Lilo thatprosperous development was transpiring inWest Papua, and to emphasise the benefits tothe Solomon Islands of ongoing trade withIndonesia8 2. Given the proximity of theinvitation to the 2013 MSG summit and thatLilo was the first Solomon Islands primeminister ever to visit Indonesia, it seemsapparent that the trip was an Indonesianattempt to sway Lilo from his pro-West Papuaposition.

There was civil society backlash, however,against the Solomon Islands government’sabout face on the issue. Solomon Star Newsheadlines described Lilo as having been “lured”by Indonesia into changing his position on WestPapua, signifying media distrust of Indonesianmotives83. And Redley Raramo, president ofForum Solomon Islands International, allegedthat Lilo should be “blasted” for underminingthe West Papuan agenda at the MSG summit84.

New Caledonia's Front de LibérationNationale Kanak et Socialiste (FLNKS)

New Caledonia is a French territory but the

FLNKS (Kanak and Socialist NationalLiberation Front) has enjoyed MSG supportfrom the beginning, and New Caledonia islisted as a non-self-governing territory with theUN’s Decolonization Committee. Thus theFLNKS has a fine line to walk on West Papua.Caroline Machoro-Regnier, Chair of the MSGForeign Ministers group, declared FLNKSsupport for West Papua at the 2013 summit,and revealed that the West Papua issue wasraised at this particular summit at the FLNKS’behest: “We asked the representatives of WestPapua to come to New Caledonia to explain thesituation to us. We cannot just leave the issueaside, with all the exactions, the violation ofhuman rights that West Papua is suffering”85.However, in adding that the issue was“sensitive”, with the potential to cause a riftbetween MSG members and between the MSGgroup and Indonesia, she hinted that FLNKSloyalty to West Papua might waver, dependingon the extent of the threat to MSG solidarity86.

Yet it was the MSG chairperson and FLNKSspokesperson, Victor Tutugoro, who called for aspecial MSG meeting to discuss West Papuajust days after the FMM team returned fromIndonesia because the stated aim of the visit, tomeet with indigenous West Papuan humanr i g h t s g r o u p s t o d e t e r m i n e t h erepresentativeness of the WPNCL, had failed.However, the Kanak delegate who completedthe FMM visit, Yvon Faua, was pessimisticabout the WPNCL’s prospects, stating thatthere were other groups claiming to representWest Papuans and that subsequently “thereport FLNKS has to make to the leaders isthat it is not possible to accept the application.I think the [WPNCL] has to join all the othersbecause as we know there are also otherorganisations”87. The FLNKS’ post-FMMreticence to support West Papua’s bid mightreflect influence from other MSG delegates,influence from Jakarta or genuine confusion asto the WPNCL’s representativeness, given thatthe FMM delegates were not able to meet withWest Papuan independence leaders in-country.

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Or, as the FLNKS enter the final phase of theNoumea Accord during which they decidewhether a referendum on independence will beheld in 2018, it might just be that the FLNKSleaders are fearful of losing MSG support fortheir cause as the West Papua issue promisesto be an ongoing and possibly explosive one forthe organisation.

Rally for West Papuan independence in PortVila, Vanuatu, March 5 2010. Image credit:Asia-pacific-action.org. Original image location(https://www.greenleft.org.au/node/44585)

Vanuatu

The Vanuatu Government has long been asupporter of the West Papuans and their desirefor independence. This is more than asentiment held by the political elite but is feltstrongly throughout the society, more than inother Melanesian countries. Even at the time ofVanuatu’s independence, in 1980, West Papuawas a significant fixture on the politicallandscape. Vanuatu’s first prime minister,Father Walter Lini, said that the country wouldnever be truly free while other parts ofMelanesia, especially West Papua, remainedoccupied by foreign powers.

How this sentiment became established inVanuatu is unclear. Certainly amongst thegeneral population there is a belief that theisland of New Guinea is the ‘mother country’.

This is true; humans arrived some 3,000 yearsago, migrating down the spine of the NewGuinea archipelago and onto the fertile chain ofislands that today comprise Vanuatu. So thereis a sense of kinship and common heritagewhich is deeply felt.

Moreover Vanuatu has also always been a placeof refuge for West Papuan dissidents andindependence activists. In the 1970s thefamous West Papuan rock band, the BlackBrothers, sought asylum in Vanuatu and livedthere for many years. Their music, heavilyimbued with a longing for independence andpolitically charged with themes of injustice andresistance against oppression, seeped into theconsciousness of the newly independentnation88. Vanuatu continues to act as a refugefor West Papuan activists: Andy Ayamiseba ofthe Black Brothers has been a long termresident under successive administrations, aswas John Otto Ondawame, Vice-Chairman ofthe WPNCL, until his passing in September2014.

The ongoing presence of high profile WestPapuan activists in Vanuatu has helped ensurethat the West Papuan issue has been aired inthe local media much more than in otherMelanesian countries. The issue of West Papuais strongly embedded within the nationalpsyche and on the domestic political agenda.The Vanuatu traditional Council of Chiefs,which at times of political crisis has proved tobe Vanuatu’s supreme repository of politicalpower, is also vocal in its support for WestPapua, and the issue has percolated downthrough society from the elite to the villagelevel.

Indonesia has been aware of this supportwithin the Vanuatu body politic for many years,but has only recently sought to counter it. Themost obvious example of this was in thecourting of one of Vanuatu’s previous primeministers, Sato Kilman, with lavish trips toJakarta and talks of a closer relationship

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between the two countries. Kilman was forcedto resign on March 21, 2013 ahead of a vote ofno confidence largely due to his dealings withthe Indonesians89. He had been instrumental inIndonesian obtaining observer status in theMSG, and Ni-Vanuatu voters believed that hewas too close to Jakarta, whose influence onVanuatu’s internal politics was feared90.

Kilman’s successor as prime minister, MoanaCarcasses Kalosil, immediately distancedhimself from the Indonesian push for closer tiesand instead embraced the attempts to have anofficial West Papuan presence in the MSG. Heasked the WPNCL to formally apply forobserver status and facilitated the lobbyingefforts of Ayamiseba and Ondawame with thegovernments of PNG, the Solomon Islands andFiji. Initially these efforts seemed to makeconsiderable headway but, as discussed above,were stymied at the MSG Noumea meeting inJune by the deferral of the decision pending theMSG FMM to West Papua.

Meanwhile Kalosil continued pushing the WestPapuan cause even after its support in the MSGfaltered. At the United Nations on the 28th ofSeptember, 2013 he opined, “How can we thenignore hundreds of thousands of West Papuanswho have been bruta l l y beaten andmurdered?”91. Kalosil went even further onMarch 4th, 2014 in a speech to the UN HumanRights Committee in Geneva, when hespecifically referred to the horrific torture andmurder of individual West Papuans which hadbeen filmed by soldiers, and called for theCommittee to establish a country mandatewhich should “include investigation of allegedhuman rights violations in West Papua andprovide recommendations on a peacefulpolitical solution in West Papua”92.

Indonesia responded forcefully to Kalosil’sspeech and the accusation of human rightsabuses. It is worth looking at this response insome detail as it clearly states the Indonesiangovernment’s view on West Papua. It is also

demonstrated the importance of the FMM’s tripto West Papua as a piece of diplomatic windowdressing. Using the right of reply, Indonesia’sAmbassador to the United Nations rejectedKalosil’s claims:

His statement represents anunfortunate and sadly lack ofunderstanding of basic facts onhistorical role of the UN and theprincipled position of internationalcommunity at large as well as thecurrent state of Indonesia,including the actual developmentin the provinces of Papua and WestPapua, Indonesia93.

The Indonesian Ambassador then went on toclaim that the “issue of West Papua” wasmanipulated within Vanuatu’s domestic politicsfor electoral advantage by certain individuals.Quoting former Prime Minister Sato Kilman(who, as noted, lost office due to his closeconnection with Jakarta) as saying: “InVanuatu, the West Papua issue has beenpoliticised and used by different politicalparties and movements not for the interests ofthe people in West Papua but more so forelections and political campaign propaganda”.The Ambassador then alluded to the farcicalFMM mission discussed above, which spentless than a day in West Papua, as underminingKalosil’s comments:

Furthermore, the statement of Mr.Kalosil is simply in contradictionwith the visit of a high-leveldelegation of the MelanesianSpearhead Group (MSG) membersrepresen t ing Me lanes ianCommunity to Indonesia from 11 to1 6 J a n u a r y 2 0 1 4 i n w h i c hMinisterial Level Delegation of Fiji,Papua New Guinea, SolomonIslands and representative of the

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Front de Liberation NationaleKanak et Socialiste (FLNKS) ofNew Caledonia as well as MSGHigh Representative conducted insitu visit to Papua province andobtained firsthand information94.

Finally the Ambassador referred to one of theagreements signed by Kilman as PrimeMinister, as being somehow breached byKalosil’s statement:

Worse, his statement is also incontradiction to the will of theVanuatu government itself towardsits relation with Indonesia asreflected in the 2011 BilateralDeve lopment Cooperat ionAgreement that provides a legalframework for the two countries torespect each other’s sovereignty,unity, and territorial integrity andprinciples of non-interference ineach other’s internal affairs95.

This open diplomatic confrontation wasevidence that Indonesia’s diplomatic offensiveover West Papua was well underway. Despitethe heartfelt support for the West Papuanstruggle within the Vanuatu government andthe country as a whole, this sentiment is muchweaker in the other Melanesian countries.Their support for the cause has waned as theirfinancial and strategic relationship withIndonesia has blossomed, and it is hard toseparate these two developments. The financialand strategic support from Indonesia can beclearly linked to the withdrawal of support bythe MSG states for West Papua. The clearestexample of this has been Fiji.

Bainimarama and Yudhoyono. Image credit(http://foto.okezone.com/view/2011/04/06/1/2143/sby-menerima-pm-fiji-voreqe-bainimarama)

Indonesia-Fiji Diplomatic Entente

Fiji had been one of the MSG countries activelypromoting the membership of West Papua, orat least its ‘observer status’, which Indonesiaalso enjoys. The late WPNCL leader, John OttoOndawame, had an enthusiastic response fromFiji Prime Minister, Bainimarama, when hevisited Suva for talks with the Fi j iangovernment over the proposed MSGmembership in March 2013. However thesetalks did not ultimately result in Fijian supportfor the Papuans’ MSG bid.

Fiji had been suspended from the PacificIslands Forum (PIF) in 2009 under pressure

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from Australia and New Zealand followingBainimarama’s coup in 2006. This was anattempt, along with other sanctions, todiplomatically isolate Fiji and the Bainimaramaregime until free and fair elections were heldfor a new government. Bainimarama respondedby forming a rival organization to the PIF, thePacific Islands Development Forum (PIDF),which had its inaugural meeting in Suva inearly August 2013, to which Australia and NewZealand were not invited96.

Wh i le reg iona l concerns about theBainimarama regime are legitimate, Fiji alsohas well-founded grievances against Australiaand New Zealand. Pacific countries often feltthat the PIF was dominated by the ‘big two’whose economic, military and diplomatic powerdwarfed the many small nations of the Pacific.Serious concerns among Pacific nations, suchas restrictive visa policies, the threat of climatechange and rising sea levels, and the offshoreprocessing of asylum seekers, were brushedaside by Austral ia . While Austral iandevelopment aid is substantial to all the PIFcountries, many policies pushed by Australia,such as the registration of traditional land as aprecursor for its commodification and possiblesale (leaving Pacific Islanders landless), arestrongly resisted by many Islanders, and alsodeeply resented as external interference inpurely domestic issues.

While the PIDF may have had a degree oflegitimacy amongst some Pacific nations it wasthe role played by Yudhoyono at the PIDFforum in June 2014 which transformed thenascent organisation into one which threatensthe established architecture of internationalrelations in the South Pacific.

Even before the PIDF meeting Indonesia wasmaneuvering to suppress the West Papua issue.The Vanuatu’s Daily Post newspaper sawIndonesia’s US$30,000 contribution to Fiji tohelp fund hosting the United Nation’s regionalmeeting of the Special Decolonization

Committee as blatant manipulation: “Jakarta’scheque book d ip lomacy re f lec ts i t sdetermination to silence any murmurs ofregional support or discussions within the MSGon the issue of re-enlisting West Papua back onthe decolonisation list”97. It seems to have beenmoney well spent for Indonesia as there wasscant mention of West Papua in the officialforums, despite local moves by some churchgroups to have the issue aired.

The depth of Indonesian engagement with Fijibecame apparent at the PIDF held on June17-19, 2014. Yudhoyono was the chief guestand keynote speaker at the event, whichfocused on climate change and sustainabledevelopment. It was the first visit to Fiji by aserving Indonesian president and the length ofthe stay – three days – shows just howimportant the Indonesians judged the event.Espousing the benefits of a closer relationshipbetween Indonesia and the Pacific Islandstates, Yudhoyono made firm commitments toincrease aid and engagement. Amongst otherthings he promised US$20 million over fiveyears to address the challenges of climatechange and disasters; talked of plans to tripletrade to a billion dollars in coming years, andoutlined how Indonesia could act as a bridgefor the Pacific and Indian Ocean states98.Yudhoyono suggested Indonesia would becomethe conduit by which the Pacific Island states(especially Fiji) could interact with the dynamicAsian region and the wider world.

The PIDF meeting also seemed to acknowledgethe ‘terms of trade’ of the Indonesian-MSGstates relationship: on the one hand therewould be silence by the Pacific leaders on WestPapua, and on the other hand (as ex-Editor ofthe Fiji Times, Netani Riki, put it) Indonesia“would not rock the boat on questionablegovernance, transparency and human rightsissues”99. This Faustian pact should have hadalarm bells ringing in Canberra; there arealready voices of concern being raised in thePacific. Reverend Francois Pihaatae, General

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Secretary of the Pacific Council of Churches,commented, “Where our self-determinationinterests are concerned, whether it be in theareas of governance, development and security,or our firm support for West Papuan freedom,we cannot allow the state visit to cloud ourprudence and better judgment”100.

This is the core of the conundrum. It is nosecret that the Melanesian countries haveserious problems with poor governance andwidespread corruption. There are human rightsabuses outside of West Papua, with Fiji itselfbeing virtually a military dictatorship. The MSGcountries need more transparency, not lesssince it is one of the few effective remedies forreining in corrupt ion, a long with anindependent judiciary. In PNG billions ofdollars of foreign aid and a recently resurgenteconomy have not translated into improvedliving standards and better public services forthe majority of people. In many areas, such asthe Sepik River region, basic services havegone steadily backwards since independence.The chief explanation for this is poorgovernance and corruption.

Bainimarama was ecstatic over the success ofthe PIDF meeting and Yudhoyono’s visit. Hecalled it “one of the greatest things that hasever happened to Fiji”101. Yudhoyono must havebeen highly pleased with the visit too: therehad been no mention (at least publicly) of WestPapua, and the substitution of Indonesia in the‘big brothers’ role traditionally played byAustralia, New Zealand and the US was beingopenly discussed. For Bainimarama there wasan added bonus: it was agreed Indonesia wouldco-lead the multi-national group of observersthat monitored Fiji’s September 2014 generalelection. As it turned out, Bainimaramaretained the premiership102.

Bainimarama’s diplomatic maneuverings alsocontinued within the MSG, of which Fiji hadChairmanship during 2012-2013 leading up tothe Noumea summit. As mentioned, the MSG

had been originally formed to support theFLNKS in New Caledonia and their desire forindependence from France. However the MSGdiminished in importance after the MatignonAccord was signed in 1988, which allowed for areferendum on New Caledonia’s future afterten years. During this period the NewCaledonians agreed not to raise the issue ofindependence. Bainimarama reinvigorated theMSG by bringing the issue of West Papuanmembership into the mix before doing an aboutturn and getting closer to Jakarta.

The Decision

As discussed, the prospective membership ofthe WPNCL in the MSG was deferred in June2013 pending the FMM fact-finding trip toIndonesia in January 2014. The MSG’s decisionwas formally announced at the MSG meeting inPort Moresby on June 26, 2014. As a result ofIndonesia’s successful intervention intoMelanesian regional politics, the application bythe WPNCL was rejected. The officialcommunique announced that:

8. The Leaders:

( i ) Noted and accepted thecontents of the MinisterialMission’s Report;

(ii) Agreed to invite all groups toform an inclusive and unitedumbrella group in consultationwi th Indones ia to work onsubmitting a fresh application;

(iii) Welcomed and noted theprogress on greater autonomy inP a p u a a n d t h e r e c e n tannouncement by the President ofIndonesia to withdraw the militaryfrom West Papua;

(iv) Endorsed that the MSG andIndonesia take a more proactive

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approach in addressing the issue ofW e s t P a p u a a n d P a p u a b yundertaking the initiative toconduct greater awareness on thesituation in Papua and West PapuaProvinces with respective to theSpecial Autonomy Arrangementsand how this has contributedpositively to the Governance of theProvinces by the local population;

(v ) Endorsed that the MSGcontinue to hold dialogue withIndonesia on the issue of WestPapua and Papua and encourageand support the establishment ofbilateral cooperation arrangementswith Indonesia with specific focuso n s o c i a l a n d e c o n o m i cdevelopment and empowermentfor the people of Papua and WestPapua Provinces;

(vi) Endorsed that MSG Membersand Indonesia consider holdingregular Meetings at Ministerialand Officials level to discuss (iv)and (v);

(v i i ) Endorsed that MSG inconsultation with Indonesia worktogether in addressing thedevelopment needs of the Papuaand West Papua Provinces;

( v i i i ) E n d o r s e d t h a t M S Gencourage the strengthening andparticipation of Melanesians inIndonesia in MSG Activities andProgrammes; and

(ix) Endorsed that the MSGcontinue to support and encouraget h e l e v e l o f M e l a n e s i a ninvo lvement in execut ive ,management and controllingpositions in private enterprisessuch as the Bank of Papua and at

political levels103.

This represents a substantial victory forIndonesian diplomacy in thwarting WPNCLattempts to join the MSG. The decisions takenby the MSG, in effect, give the Indonesiangovernment a veto over MSG policy on WestPapua. Apparently West Papuan membershipwill only be reconsidered if the competingPapuan independence groups: the WPNCL andthe Federal Republic of West Papua (FRWP),the influential activist movement the KomiteNasional Papua Barat (KNPB) and the pro-Indonesian West Papuans, as wel l asMelanesians from other parts of Indonesia,collectively put in an application, with theapproval of the Indonesian government. Giventhe deep antagonisms among these variousgroups and the individuals who lead them, aunited appl icat ion wil l be a di f f icultundertaking, although in a seminar at theUniversity of Sydney on June 30, 2014 WestPapuan ‘dialogue’ diplomat Octo Mote spoke ofthe recently articulated willingness of WPNCLleaders, leaders of the FRWP within WestPapua, and those of the KNPB to work togetherin this regard. The longstanding opposition ofJakarta to the inclusion of West Papua in theMSG will also obviously be a barrier, although,according to Mote, West Papuans can appeal tothe MSG that the FLNKS did not need France’sapproval to join the MSG so why should WestPapua need Indonesia’s?

On the other hand, optimists have expressedthe view that this potential unity grouping maybe able to create a forum in which seriousnegotiations could take place between thevarious segments of West Papuan society andthe Indonesian government104. While this mayappear unlikely, the diplomatic power playsbetween the Pacific nations and Indonesia arefar from over. Vanuatu, which has alwayssupported the WPNCL and boycotted the FMM,continues to advocate on West Papuas’ behalf.Recently installed Vanuatu Prime Minister, Joe

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Natuman, has raised the prospect of referringthe case of West Papua to the InternationalCourt of Justice, declaring: “We considerseeking an opinion on the legal process held bythe UN when it handed over West Papua toIndonesia”1 0 5 . The announcement of aReconciliation Conference to be held in PortVila in August 2014 between the various WestPapuan groups, who are still hopeful of jointlygaining a place at the MSG table, shows thatthis process is far from over106. Indeed there issomething intrinsically Pacific about how thenegotiations are unfolding in the face of theseemingly insurmountable communique issuedby the MSG excerpted above.

Of course there are other major players in thePacific region, particularly the US with its ownhegemony over the Micronesian countries andsovereign status over the Hawaiian Islands,although the US does not play a significant rolein MSG diplomacy. China is also engaged in theregion, with multiple interests in PNG from theownership and management of mines such asRamu Nickel to a voracious appetite for rawmaterials, including timber. As in many otherregions, China is also purchasing bothagricultural and residential real estate,especially in countries amenable to foreigninvestment such as Vanuatu. Yet these playershave been much more cautious in straying intothe domestic politics of individual countries.They do not have the over-riding motivationthat Indonesia has to thwart the activities ofWest Papuan independence activists.

Conclusion

In the current state of Melanesian regionalpolitics, it appears that the cultural andhistorical affiliations of West Papuans withother Melanesians are threatened by regionalrealpolitik. The MSG’s decision regarding WestPapua’s status has a diplomatic veneer but aduplicitous core—without directly rejecting anyfuture West Papuan bid for membership theMSG has placed seemingly insurmountable

obstacles in the way. Jakarta can be satisfiedthat its policy of engagement with the MSG hasso far yielded the hoped for results. However,West Papuan independence activists continueto maneuver for official status in the MSG,buoyed by the considerable sympathy andsupport that many organisations andindividuals have for their cause.

Fiji’s PIDF may cement West Papua’s hyphenstatus between Asian Indonesia and the non-Anglo Pacific, sacrificing Melanesian solidaritywith West Papua for assumed economicbenefits and closer political ties with Indonesia.But ignoring Indonesia’s undemocratic actionsin West Papua is unlikely to yield a morepeaceful and democratic region. Thus, whileMelanesia’s regional elites may have taken thelead in fostering the region’s cultural identityduring decolonisation, Melanesia’s burgeoningcivil society now has a significant role to play inpressuring their governments to promote theWest Papuan cause. The MSG has reached aturning point and must decide whether itvalues West Papuan human rights over thepotential economic benefits of increasingpolitical engagement with Indonesia.

Camellia Webb-Gannon is a Research Fellow atthe Justice Research Group at the University ofWestern Sydney and is the Coordinator of theWest Papua Project at the University of Sydney.Camellia received her PhD in Peace andConflict Studies from the University of Sydneyin 2012 with a thesis examining the dynamicsof unity and conflict within West Papua'sindependence movement. Her recent researchconsiders the impact of digital technologies onhuman rights advocacy as well as localinterpretations of Melanesian indigenousrights, Melanesian self-determinationmovements, and concepts and mechanisms ofjustice in the Pacif ic region. c.webb-g a n n o n @ u w s . e d u . a u(https://apjjf.org/mailto:c.webb-gannon@uws.edu.au); @camwebbgannon

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Jim Elmslie is a Visiting Scholar and co-convener of the West Papua Project, the Centrefor Peace and Conflict Studies at the Universityof Sydney. His PhD entitled Irian Jaya Underthe Gun: Indonesian Economic Developmentversus West Papuan Nationalism, waspublished by the University of Hawaii Press.Jim has been closely involved with the SepikRiver region of PNG since 1983 as a politicaleconomist, tribal art dealer, film consultant andcultural advisor. jelmslie@ozemail.com.au(https://apjjf.org/mailto:jelmslie@ozemail.com.au)

Recommended citation: Camellia Webb-Gannonand Jim Elmslie, "MSG Headache, West PapuanHeartache? Indonesia's Melanesian Foray", TheAsia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 12, Issue 47, No. 3,November 24, 2014.

Notes

1 Margaret Jolly notes that Pacific scholars suchas Epeli Hau’ofa prefer the term ‘Oceania’ forthe region that encompasses the Pacific andparts of Asia. Although originally a coloniallabel, ‘Oceania’ has been endogenised andclaimed by Pacific Islanders in contrast to theterm ‘Asia-Pacific’ which derives fromforeigners’ ‘policy speak’ (see also Arif Dirlik,1992. ‘The Asia Pacific Idea: Reality andRepresentation in the Invention of a RegionalStructure’, Journal of World History 3:1, pp.55-79) and carries hegemonic connotations(Margaret Jolly, 2008. ‘The South in SouthernTheory: Antipodean Reflections on the Pacific’(http://www.australianhumanitiesreview.org/archive/Issue-March-2008/jolly.html), AustralianHumanities Review 44).

2 Indonesian senior government advisor DewiFortuna Anwar has justified this approach,claiming, “there are more Melanesians living inIndonesia, not just in Papua, than in the Pacific.We have people of Melanesian origin living inMaluku and in Ambon and in the NTT provinceo f I ndones i a ” (Rad io New Zea landInternational, Jakarta Defends Its Policy

A p p r o a c h i n P a p u a R e g i o n(http://www.radionz.co.nz/international/programmes/datelinepacific/audio/2564537/jakarta-defends-its-policy-approach-in-papua-region),August 5, 2013).

3 An independence movement has beenunderway in the Maluku Islands since 1950 andin West Papua since 1964.

4 Michael Smith and Maureen Dee, 2003.Peacekeeping in East Timor: The Path toIndependence, International Peace AcademyOccasional Paper Series, Boulder; MatthewLeRiche and Matthew Arnold, 2012. SouthSudan: From Revolution to Independence,Columbia University Press, New York City.

5 Chris Ballard, 1999. ‘Blanks in the Writing:Possible Histories for West New Guinea’,Journal of Pacific History 34:2, pp. 148-155.

6 There have been media, political, academicand activist initiatives such as InternationalLawyers for West Papua, InternationalParliamentarians for West Papua, several ABCnational network stories on West Papua in 2012and 2013, a US Congress hearing on CrimesAgainst Humanity: When Will Indonesia’sMilitary Be Held Accountable for Deliberateand Systematic Abuses in West Papua in 2010,and the Biak Massacre Citizens Tribunal heldby the West Papua Project at the University ofSydney in 2013, to name a few examples.

7 See for example Winston Tarere’s article ofMay 2, 2014: ‘Indonesia Exercises Cheque-Book Diplomacy Ahead of UN DecolonizationC o n f e r e n c e ’(http://www.dailypost.vu/content/indonesia-exercises-cheque-book-diplomacy-ahead-un-decolonization-conference), Daily Post.

8 See Ron Crocombe, 2007. Asia in the PacificIslands: Replacing the West, IPS Publications,Suva, pp. 301-302. While the Pacific region isthe localised arena in which Indonesia andWest Papua are engaged in their current power

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struggle, the UN has been the longest standingdiplomatic battleground for attempts toestablish ultimate sovereignty over WestPapua. Supporters of West Papuans’ right toself-determination, including Senegal andseveral other African countries, registered theiropposition to Indonesia’s takeover of WestPapua at the UN as long ago as 1969 after asham referendum over the territory’ssovereignty was overseen by the UN, and asrecently as March 2014 when Vanuatu’s formerPrime Minister Moana Carcasses Kalosil usedthe Human Rights Council to lambast Indonesiaover its human rights violations in West Papua.

9 Papuans settled in the highlands of NewGuinea between 40,000 and 50,000 years ago.

1 0 Austronesians came to the Paci f icapproximately 4000 years ago.

11 Crocombe, 2007, p. 3.

12 Clive Moore, 2003. New Guinea: CrossingBoundaries and History, University of HawaiiPress, Honolulu, pg. 62.

13 See for example Pieter Drooglever, 2005. AnAct of Free Choice: Decolonization and theRight to Self-Determination in West Papua, OneWorld, Oxford, p. 65.

14 The figures range, depending on whetherdeaths resulting from direct violence only arecounted, or those following on from starvationand other forms of systemic violence are takeninto account.

15 See Crocombe 2007, pp. 281-298; CarmelBudiardjo and Soei Liong Liem, 1988. WestPapua: The Obliteration of a People, Tapol,London; testimonies on the Biak MassacreT r i b u n a l w e b s i t e(http://www.biak-tribunal.org/); and ElizabethBrundige, Winter King, Priyneha Vahali,Stephen Vladeck and Xiang Yuan, IndonesianHuman Rights Abuses in West Papua:Application of the Law of Genocide to the

History of Indonesian Rule, Allard K.Lowenstein International Human Rights Clinic,Yale Law School, 2004.

16 Jim Elmslie and Camellia Webb-Gannon,2013. ‘A Slow Motion Genocide: IndonesianR u l e i n W e s t P a p u a ’(http://griffithlawjournal.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/glj_elmslie_webb-gannon.pdf),Griffith Journal of Law and Human Dignity 2:1.

17 Jakarta, Indonesia’s capital, is separated fromJayapura, West Papua’s largest city, by 3785kilometres, from PNG’s capital, Port Moresby,by 4,449 kilometres, from Vanuatu’s capital,Port Vila, by 6,777 kilometres, from SolomonIslands capital, Honiara, by 5,852 kilometres,from New Caledonia’s capital, Noumea, by6,621 kilometres, and from Fijji’s capital, Suva,by 7,847 kilometres.

18 See for example Danilyn Rutherford, 2003.Raiding the Land of the Foreigners: The Limitsof a Nation on an Indonesian Frontier,Princeton University Press, Princeton; andRichard Chauvel, Constructing PapuanNationalism: History, Ethnicity and Adaptation,Policy Series 14, East West Center Washington,Washington D. C., pp. 41-47. John Conroy, onthe other hand, writes that the contiguitybetween the Melanesian and Asian regionscontributes to making the “contrasts betweenthem more piquant” (2013. ‘The InformalEconomy in Monsoon Asia and Melanesia: WestNew Guinea and the Malay World’, CrawfordSchool Working Paper, The Australian NationalUniversity, Canberra, pg. 6).

1 9 See David Webster, 2001-2. ‘AlreadySovereign As A People: A Foundational Momentin West Papuan Nationalism’, Pacific Affairs,74:4, pp. 507-528.

20 See Roger Keesing and Robert Tokinson(eds), 1992. ‘Reinventing Traditional Culture:The Politics of Culture in Island Melanesia’,Special Issue, Mankind 13:4; one example ofinvented national tradition in West Papua is the

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Yospan dance, made up of dance steps fromBiak and an area near Jayapura—seeRutherford, 2003, pp. 99-105.

21 See for example Ronald May on Melanesian‘political style’: 2004. ‘Political Style in ModernMelanesia’ in State and Society in Papua NewGuinea: The First Twenty-Five Years(http://press.anu.edu.au/sspng/mobile_devices/ch03.html), ANU E-Press, Canberra; and CliveMoore on Melanesian wantokism, or thepreferential treatment of those with whom youidentify most according to common language,or in a wider conception, at nation-state orregional levels: 2008. ‘Pacific View: TheMeaning of Politics and Governance in thePacific Islands’, Australian Journal ofInternational Affairs, 62:3, p. 392.

22 Crocombe, 2007, p. 296.

23 Feminist Media Studio, ‘James Clifford On‘ B e c o m i n g ’ I n d i g e n o u s ’(http://vimeo.com/78776772), Vimeo Interview.

24 Margaret Jolly, 2007. ‘Imagining Oceania:Indigenous and Foreign Representations of aSea of Islands’, The Contemporary Pacific 19:2p. 521.

25 Interview with Selwyn Garu, Port Vila,Vanuatu, July 20, 2009

26 Lawson, 2013, p. 22.

27 Ibid, p. 22.

28 Indonesia derives much of its revenue fromthe largely United States-owned gold andcopper mine Freeport McMoRan operating inWest Papua, depends on West Papua forrelieving overpopulation on Indonesian islands,uses West Papua as roaming ground for itsdefense force, and takes national pride in its‘territorial integrity’—West Papua inclusive.

29 Fiji has historically tended to identify with a“Pacific Way” which favours Polynesian cultural

identifiers. Fiji did not join the MelanesianSpearhead Group until 1996, 10 years after theGroup’s formation, when its regionalidentification began to shift (see Lawson, 2013,p. 19).

30 See Epeli Hau’ofa, 2008. We Are the Ocean:S e l e c t e d W o r k s(http://www.australianhumanitiesreview.org/archive/Issue-March-2008/jolly.html), Universityof Hawaii Press, Honolulu; Jean-Marie Tjiabou,1996. Kanaky, Pandanus Books, Canberra;Bernard Narokobi, 1983. The Melanesian Way,University of the South Pacific, Suva; and Jolly,2008.

31 Ronald May, 2004. State and Society inPapua New Guinea: The First Twenty-FiveY e a r s(http://press.anu.edu.au/sspng/mobile_devices/index.html).

32 See Lawson 2013, p. 2 and p. 21.

33 Ibid, p. 14.

34 See Tracy McFarlane, 2010. ‘ExperiencingDifference, Seeking Community: Racial,Panethnic, and National Identities amongFemale Caribbean-Born US College Students’,American Review of Political Economy 8:2, p.101.

35 See Narokobi, 1983.

36 See Lawson, 2013, p. 17.

37 Ibid, p. 15.

38 See Narokobi, 1983, pp. 49-57; and Lawson,2013, p. 12.

39 Crocombe, 2007, p. 301.

40 Kirsten McGavin, 2014. ‘Being ‘Nesian’:Pacific Islander Identity in Australia’, TheContemporary Pacific 26:1, p. 126.

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41 MacFarlane, 2010, p. 101.

42 For example, HIV infection rates in theprovince are 40 times the Indonesian nationalaverage (see S. Rees and D. Silove, 2007.‘Speaking Out About Human Rights and Healthin West Papua’, The Lancet 370(9588) pp.637-639; for another example, indigenous WestPapuans have an infant mortality rate of 18.4per cent, whilst the infant mortality rate amongthe non-indigenous population in West Papua is3.6 per cent—see Stella Peters and WouterBronsgeets, 2012. ‘Extremely High InfantM o r t a l i t y i n W e s t P a p u a R e s u l t o fDiscrimination’ (http://www.sdsp.nl/) PressStatement from 12 November 2012.

43 Public Institute of Pacific Policy, 2008. ‘MSG:Trading on Political Capital and MelanesianS o l i d a r i t y ’(http://www.pacificpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/D02-PiPP.pdf), Briefing Paper 2.

44 The FLNKS is the only member of the MSGthat is not a state, but an indigenous politicalorganization.

45 Radio New Zealand International, June 6,2013. ‘FLNKS Formally Invites West Papua toA t t e n d M S G M e e t i n g ’(http://www.islandsbusiness.com/news/new-caledonia/1415/flnks-formally-invites-west-papua-to-attend-msg-me/), Islands Business.

46 See Jennifer Robinson, March 21, 2012. ‘TheUN’s Chequered Record in West Papua’(http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/03/201232172539145809.html), Al Jazeera.

47 West Papua National Coalition for Liberation,June 2014. ‘MSG Update’, Morning StarNewsletter 6:1.

48 However, as Jason MacLeod notes, when thePresident of the Federal Republic of WestPapua, the incarcerated Forkorus Yaboisembut,heard of the WPNCL’s application, he wrote tothe Director General of the MSG withdrawing

his government’s application and offeredsupport for the WPNCL (see Jason MacLeod,July 1, 2013. ‘A Win For West Papua InM e l a n e s i a ’(http://newmatilda.com/2013/07/01/win-west-papua-melanesia), New Matilda).

49 Australian Association for Pacific Studies,April 24, 2014. ‘Q&A with Ralph Regenvanu,Session on West Papuan Activism. TheUniversity of Sydney. Similar issues plaguedthe East Timorese independence political party,FRETILIN (and various of the other EastTimorese resistance groups), from the 1970s tothe 1990s, due to continued ambushes by theIndonesian military, ideological differences,and personal leadership feuds (Charles Call,12. Why Peace Fai ls : The Causes andPrevention of Civi l War Recurrence,Georgetown University Press, Washington D.C.,pp. 137-138.

5 0 MacLeod writes that Indonesia wassufficiently worried about MSG support forWest Papua that for the first time ever itinvi ted f ive governments to observePapua/West Papua (see Jason MacLeod, July 1,2013. ‘A Win For West Papua In Melanesia’(http://newmatilda.com/2013/07/01/win-west-papua-melanesia), New Matilda).

51 Solomon Star News, August 15, 2013. “LiloL u r e d b y I n d o n e s i a n P r e s i d e n t ”(http://www.solomonstarnews.com/news/national/18505--lilo-lured-by-indonesian-president),Solomon Star News.

5 2 Winston Tarere, February 27, 2014.‘Vurobaravu better placed to deal with WestP a p u a a t t h e M S G ’(http://www.dailypost.vu/content/vurobaravu-better-placed-deal-west-papua-msg), Daily Post.

53 Kiery Manassah, February 2014. ‘The MSGKnows It Has Unfinished Business RegardingW e s t P a p u a ’(http://pacificpolitics.com/2014/02/west-papua-an-unfinished-agenda/), Public Institute of

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Pacific Policy.

54 Johnny Blades, July 23, 2013. ‘One Voice:W e s t P a p u a ’ s D e m a n d f o r G r e a t e rIndependence Has Not Gone Unheard By OtherM e l a n e s i a n S t a t e s ”(http://m.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jul/23/west-papua-pacific-self-determination), TheGuardian.

55 Rowan Callick, February 15, 2014. ‘JulieBishop Move to Bring Fiji in From Cold’(http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/policy/julie-bishop-move-to-bring-fiji-in-from-cold/story-fn59nm2j-1226827773519), TheAustralian.

56 Islands Business, February 2014. ‘MSGC o h e s i o n i n D o u b t ? ’(http://www.islandsbusiness.com/2014/2/we-say/msg-cohesion-in-doubt/) Islands Business.

57 Arto Suryodipuro, January 25, 2014. ‘BuildingRelations with Pacific Island Countries’(http://www.thejarkartapost.com/news/2014/01/25/building-relations-with-pacific-island-countries.html), The Jakarta Post.

58 Ina Parlina, June 20, 2014. ‘RI to Boost Tiesw i t h P a c i f i c I s l a n d C o u n t r i e s ’(http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/06/2 0 / r i - b o o s t - t i e s - w i t h - p a c i f i c - i s l a n d -countries.html), The Jakarta Post.

59 Winston Tarere, May 2, 2014. ‘IndonesiaExercises Cheque-Book Diplomacy Ahead ofU N D e c o l o n i z a t i o n C o n f e r e n c e ’(http://www.dailypost.vu/content/indonesia-exercises-cheque-book-diplomacy-ahead-un-decolonization-conference), Daily Post.

60 Ibid.

61 Tabloid Jubi, March 3, 3014. ‘IndonesiaAccused of Meddl ing in Fi j i Af fa irs ’(http://tabloidjubi.com/en/?p=1425), TabloidJubi.

62 Islands Business, March 4, 2014. ‘Fijian TiesMove, Indonesians with Papuans Fly In’(http://www.islandsbusiness.com/news/fiji/4784/fijian-ties-move-indonesians-with-papuans-fly-in/), Islands Business.

63 Shalveen Chand, February 10, 2014. ‘Fiji’sTavola Defends MSG Meeting in Indonesia,Ambassador Says It Was Opportunity to ‘SeekB i l a t e r a l A g r e e m e n t s ’(http://pidp.eastwestcenter.org/pireport/2014/February/02-10-02.htm), Pacific Islands Reports.

64 Seru Serevi in interview with Bruce Hill,March 3, 2014. ‘Fiji Musician Seru SereviR e l e a s e s W e s t P a p u a S o n g ’(http://www.radioaustralia.net.au/international/radio/program/pacific-beat/fiji-musician-seru-serevi-releases-west-papua-song/1278722),Pacific Beat, ABC Radio Australia.

6 5 T a b l o i d J u b i(http://tabloidjubi.com/en/?p=1425), March 3,2014.

6 6 Winston Tarere, February 27, 2014.‘Vurobaravu Better Placed to Deal with WestP a p u a a t t h e M S G ’(http://www.dailypost.vu/content/vurobaravu-better-placed-deal-west-papua-msg), Daily Post.

67 Johnny Blades, July 23, 2013. ‘One Voice:W e s t P a p u a ’ s D e m a n d f o r G r e a t e rIndependence Has Not Gone Unheard By OtherM e l a n e s i a n S t a t e s ’(http://m.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jul/23/west-papua-pacific-self-determination), TheGuardian.

68 Nic Maclellan, June 22, 2013. ‘Somare SaysMSG Must Serve the Region: West PapuaR o a d m a p A p p r o v e d ’(http://pacific.scoop.co.nz/2013/06/somare-says-msg-must-serve-the-region-west-papua-roadmap-approved/), Pacific Scoop.

69 Makereta Komai, June 20, 2013. ‘Sir MichaelSomare Exhorts MSG To Include West Papua In

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I t s A c t i v i t i e s ’(http://www.pina.com.fj/index.php?p=pacnews&m=read&o=152284964551c28ff06cc8cc9a0e7b), PACNEWS.

70 Islands Business, June 19, 2013. ‘West PapuaP a r t o f I n d o n e s i a : P N G P M ’(http://www.islandsbusiness.com/news/indonesia/1556/west-papua-part-of-indonesia-png-pm/),Islands Business.

71 Ina Parlina and Margareth S. Aritonang,January 17, 2014. ‘Melanesians Respect RI’sS o v e r e i g n t y ’(http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/01/16/melanesians-respect-ri-s-sovereignty.html),The Jakarta Post.

7 2 Bagus Bt Saragih and Margareth S.Aritonang, January 14, 2014. ‘After ObservingPapua, MSG Minis ters to Meet SBY’(http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/01/14/after-observing-papua-msg-ministers-meet-sby.html), The Jakarta Post.

73 PNG Industry News.net, March 10, 2014.‘ I n n o c e n t O c c u p a t i o n ’(http://www.pngindustrynews.net/storyview.asp?storyid=824215590), PNGINndustryNews.net.

74 Catherine Wilson, December 29, 2013. ‘WestP a p u a S e a r c h e s F a r f o r R i g h t s ’(http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/12/west-papua-searches-far-rights/), InterPress Service.

75 Free West Papua.org, April 16, 2014. ‘PNGOpposition Officially Supports a Free WestP a p u a ’(http://freewestpapua.org/2014/04/16/png-opposition-officially-supports-a-free-west-papua/),Free West Papua.org.

76 Jason MacLeod, July 1, 2013. ‘A Win For WestP a p u a I n M e l a n e s i a ’(http://newmatilda.com/2013/07/01/win-west-papua-melanesia), New Matilda.

77 Solomon Star News, August 15, 2013. ‘Lilo

Lured by Indonesian President’, Solomon StarNews (link no longer live).

78 Solomon Star News, June 19, 2013. ‘PM toIntroduce New Concept Paper to MSG’Solomon Star News (link no longer live)

79 West Papua National Coalition for Liberation,June 26, 2013. ‘Statement Regarding the MSGD e c i s i o n o n W e s t P a p u a ’(http://pacific.scoop.co.nz/2013/06/statement-regarding-the-msg-decision-on-west-papua/),Pacific Scoop.

8 0 Blades, July 23, 2013. The Guardian.(http://m.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jul/23/west-papua-pacific-self-determination)

81 Radio New Zealand International, August 29,2013. ‘Solomons Prime Minister Says IndonesiaW i l l M e e t A l l T r i p C o s t s ’(http://www.rnzi.com/pages/news.php?op=read&id=78691), RNZI.

82 Ini Parlina, August 13, 2013. ‘Indonesia,Solomon Islands Leaders Talk About Papua’(http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/08/13/indonesia-solomon-islands-leaders-talk-about-papua.html), The Jakarta Post.

83 Solomon Star News, August 15, 2013. ‘LiloLured by Indonesian President’, Solomon StarNews (link no longer live).

84 Islands Business, June 24, 2013. ‘FSIICondemns Solomon Islands PM’s DeclarationO n W e s t P a p u a ’(http://www.islandsbusiness.com/news/solomon-islands/1589/fsii-condemns-solomon -islands-pms-declaration-on-w/), Islands Business.

85 Nic Maclellan, June 18, 2013. ‘MSG to SendMiss ion to Jakarta and West Papua’(http://www.islandsbusiness.com/news/new-caledonia/1540/msg-to-send-mission-to-jakarta-and-west-papua/), Island Business.

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86 Makereta Komai, June 18, 2014. ‘West PapuaD e c i s i o n D e f e r r e d ’(http://www.pina.com.fj/?p=pacnews&m=read&o=69284240851bf77600b09f2818ddee),PACNEWS.

87 Radio New Zealand International, January 22,2014. ‘Umbrella Papuan Group Suggested ToA p p l y F o r M S G ’(http://pidp.eastwestcenter.org/pireport/2014/January/01-23-03.htm), Pacific Islands Report.

88 Interview with John Otto Ondawame, PortVila, Vanutau, April 12, 2013.

89 Bobakin, March 21, 2013. ‘Vanuatu PMK i l m a n R e s i g n s ’(http://vanuatudaily.wordpress.com/2013/03/21/vanuatu-pm-kilman-resigns/), Vanuatu Daily.

90 Interview with John Otto Ondawame, PortVila, Vanutau, April 12, 2013.

91 UN News Centre, September 28, 2013.‘Vanuatu Urges Inclusive Development, Pledgesto Continue Speaking Out Against Colonialism’(http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=46117#.U886C7yfgUQ), UN News Centre.

92 Pacific Media Centre, March 2, 2014.‘Vanuatu PM Blasts Indonesian Human RightsV i o l a t i o n s i n W e s t P a p u a ’(http://www.pmc.aut.ac.nz/articles/vanuatu-pm-blasts-indonesian-human-rights-violations-west-papua), Pacific Media Centre.

93 Tabloid Jubi, March 6, 2014. ‘IndonesiaStrongly Rejects the Statement of PrimeMinister of Vanuatu’, Tabloid Jubi, link nolonger live.

94 Ibid.

95 Ibid.

96 Australian Network News, August 8, 2013.‘Inaugural Meeting of the Pacific IslandDevelopment Forum Ends with Allegations of

S a b o t a g e ’(https://apjjf.org/admin/site_manage/details/ABC.net.au/news/an-pacific-islands-development-forum-wrap/4873060), Australian NetworkNews.

97 Winston Tarere, May 2, 2014. ‘IndonesiaExercises Cheque-Book Diplomacy Ahead ofU N D e c o l o n i z a t i o n C o n f e r e n c e ’(http://www.dailypost.vu/content/indonesia-exercises-cheque-book-diplomacy-ahead-un-decolonization-conference), Daily Post.

98 Radio New Zealand International, June 19,2014. ‘Indonesia to Strengthen Ties with Fiji’sP I D F ’(http://www.radionz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/247675/indonesia-to-strengthen-ties-with-fiji’s-pidf), Radio New Zealand International.

99 Neatni Rika, June 19, 2014, ‘All Aboard theG r a v y T r a i n a s S B Y V i s i t s F i j i ’(http://www.crikey.com.au/2014/06/19/all-aboard-the-gravy-train-as-sby-visits-fiji), Crikey.com.

100 Tevita Vuibau, June 20, 2014. ‘Plea for WestP a p u a ’(http://www.fijitimes.com/story.aspx?id=271977), The Fiji Times Online.

101 Tevita Vuibau, June 23, 2014. ‘Plea for WestP a p u a ’(http://www.fijitimes.com/story.aspx?id=272286), The Fiji Times Online.

102 Radio New Zealand International, June 19,2014. ‘Indonesia to Co-lead Fiji Observer Force(http://www.radionz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/247659/indonesia-to-co-lead-fiji-observer-force), Radio New Zealand International.

103 Special MSG Leaders’ Summit, 26 June2014. ‘Communique’, National Parliament, PortMoresby, Papua New Guinea.

104 Radio New Zealand International, July 2,2014. ‘Jakarta/West Papua Talks Urged’(http://www.radionz.co.nz/international/pacific-

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news/248848/jakarta-west-papua-talks-urged),Radio New Zealand International.

105 Tabloid Jubi, July 2, 2014. ‘The Governmentof Vanuatu Will Continue Raising the Issue of

West Papua to the UN’, Tabloid Jubi, link nolonger live.

106 Papuans believe MSG will support newapplication, Vanuatu Daily Post, July 8, 2014.