相楽洋Hiroshi SAGARA

東京工業大学Tokyo Institute of Technology, Japan

Nuclear data and its preparedness for nuclear non-proliferation and

security

2018 Symposium on Nuclear Data

2

Contents

Title Title

• Introduction: Needs of nuclear data from nuclear non-proliferation technology

• Non-destructive assay• Nuclear disarmament and technical

challenge• Next generation fuel cycle with proliferation

resistance

3

Introduction

Title Title

• Nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security is the one of the most crucial measures demanded in the present world.

• For prevention, detection and responses of malicious acts, variety of technologies are utilized such as radiation measurements or material barriers,

• The needs and required accuracy of nuclear data in nuclear non-proliferation and security are much different from these in the nuclear reactor physics

• The present research focuses on the current status of nuclear data and its preparedness for nuclear non-proliferation and security, and to prioritize the needs for nuclear data measurements especially in these fields.

4

Diversity of threats to nuclear utilization

4

IAEA INCIDENT AND TRAFFICKING DATABASE (ITDB) Fact Sheet 2016

HEUHEU theft incident at Moldova

www.nti.org

4 GRAMS

5

Terminology of 3Ss, Safety, Security and Safeguards/non-proliferation

RI: Radio Isotope, RDD: Radiological Dispersal Device, RED: Radiological Exposure Device

Security Safeguards/NonproliferationSafetyNon-state Actor State ActorNuclear System

・Theft・Diversion

・Sabotage・RI Theft・RDD/RED

・Diversion・Miss-use

・System failure・Natural Disaster

Use of Nuclear Explosive DeviceRadioactive Mat. Release to Environment

Events/Threats:

Consequence:

・Breakout・Use of Nucl. Weapon/Experiments

・non-fulfillment of International conventions

・

・Human Factor

Challenges to the human society

6Copyright2018 H. Sagara

Quantitative regulation in SafeguardsSignificant Quantity & Timeliness Goal

Except for 238Pu>80%

IAEA Safeguards glossary 2001 edition

7

Quantitative regulation in Physical ProtectionIAEA INFCIRC225 Rev.5

Copyright2018 H. Sagara 7

8

Quantitative regulation in Physical ProtectionU.S. Department of Energy

Copyright2018 H. Sagara 8

DOE M 470.4-6

9

Quantitative regulation in Nuclear Security Border control

Copyright2018 H. Sagara 9

Detection of unauthorized nuclear material Detail analysis would be performed in the framework of nuclear forensics

10

Nuclear data needs for Non-destructive assay (NDA)

11

Objectives

Focusing the nuclear data important in nuclear non-proliferation and security, ① NDA Techniques surveillance② Nuclear reaction and data surveillance and analysis③ Prioritizing the requirement of nuclear data measurement, Finally propose the list of nuclear data important in nuclear non-proliferation and security

NDA technique NDA1 NDA2 NDA3Required accuracy 5% 5% 5%Important nuclear data and current uncertainty

σn,f,i(E) 10% σn,g,i(E) 7% σp,n,i(E) 5%

Measurement priority

◎ 〇 △

JSPS Kakenhi Grant Number JP17K07005 Sagara, Katabuchi

12

NDA Technologies

Title Title

INL/CON-09-16307

13

NDA Unirradiated fuel

For unirradiated fuel, there are already many NDAs options

14

NDA: Irradiated fuel

JNMM, Vol. XL, 2012

• DOE Next Generation Safeguards Initiative

• NDA needs for nuclear material accounting when the continuity of knowledge is disconnected.

• Target accuracy of Pu measurement less than 5%

• R&Ds are on going all over the world.

15

Title Title

JNMM, Vol. XL, 2012

Light techniques

Accurate techniques

NDA Techniques

JAEA-REVIEW2015-027

NDA: Irradiated fuel

16

NDA –Passive γ・n-

Title Title

Fig. 2F2 PIE Benchmard[1](C:Cal、E:Exp)

• 137Cs＜~3%• 242,244Cm,

134Cs,154Eu,144Ce,106Ru/Rh,125Sb

< ~10% • C.Y. MOX

1 H. Sagara et al., J. Nucl. Sci Technol, vol. 51, no. 1, p. 1-23 (2014)., 2 S. Shiba, H. Sagara, INMMJ ann. Mtg. 2018.

Fig. Passive gamma Passive Gamma Emission Tomography[2]

𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗𝑘𝑘+1 =𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗𝑘𝑘

∑𝑖𝑖 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 + 𝛽𝛽𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗𝑘𝑘 − 𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗

�𝑖𝑖

𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗∑𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘

Median Root Prior-Expectation Maximization（MRP-EM）

pj：ｊ番目の検出器における投影値

fjk：反復回数kにおけるj番目の

画素値Cij： iからjの検出確率Mj：注目画素jとその周囲の画

素から求められた中央値β： 調整係数

• Needs for next generation safeguards equipment

17

NDA active Photo-nuclear

17

NDA with photo-fission

Difficulty to measure heavily shielded nuclear material by passive

methods

High energy photon may penetrate shields→ Applicable for nuclear material detection?

photon

18

NDA active photo nuclear

232Th(γ,n)238U(γ,n)

235U(γ,fission)

233U(γ,n)

233U(γ,fission)232Th(γ,2n)

232Th(γ,fission)

233U(γ,2n)

235U(γ,n)

238U(γ,fission)

235U(γ,2n)

238U(γ,2n)

Fig. Photonuclear cross sections 図 235Uのガンマ-核分裂断面積と実験値

Kimura, Sagara, Chiba, JNST(2016)Kimura, Sagara, Chiba, Proc. ND2016 (2016)

• Principle validation of γ-fission for U enrichment

• For accuracy <5%, uncertainty of σ(γ,fis) <3%

19

NDA active photo nuclear, Bremsstrahlung spectrum

C. Kim, H. Sagara, INMMJ ann. Mtg 2018

1.E-09

1.E-07

1.E-05

1.E-03

0.1 1 10

FLU

X [1

/CM

2/SO

URC

E]

ENERGY [MEV]

FLUX DISTRIBUTION WITH 6MEV SOURCE

(PHITS)photon electron

y = -0.0002x2 + 0.0026x + 9.44587.5

8

8.5

9

9.5

10

10.5

11

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100Ratio

of r

eact

ion

rate

11-

6 M

eV

Enrichment (%)

Photofission Rate of Reaction Ratio 11-6MeV

1.E-08

1.E-07

1.E-06

1.E-05

1.E-04

1.E-03

0.1 1 10

FLU

X [1

/CM

2/SO

URC

E]

11MEVphoton electron

• Preliminary calculation showed the correlation between enrichment and fission reaction rate ratio

• For next step, experiments are planned.

20

Nuclear Data needs for NDA

o Nuclear data needs for NDA in nuclear non-proliferation is ongoing

Focusing the nuclear data important in nuclear non-proliferation and security, ① NDA Techniques surveillance② Nuclear reaction and data surveillance and analysis③ Prioritizing the requirement of nuclear data measurement, Finally propose the list of nuclear data important in nuclear non-proliferation and security

You cooperation is very welcomed both Non-proliferation and Nuclear Data community !

21

Nuclear disarmament and technical challenge

References

International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification：IPNDV, https://www.ipndv.org/

Kimura, Tomikawa, 2018 AESJ annual mtg.

22

Recent nuclear disarmament topic：IPNDV

Title Title

• IPNDV(International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament

Verification) is an ongoing initiative that includes more than 25 countries with and without nuclear weapons

• the U.S. DOS announced that the U.S. government would lead the IPNDV in 2014, in cooperation with the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI)

• Goal: to identify critical gaps and technical challenges associated with monitoring and verifying nuclear disarmament.

• Phase I report is now open, https://www.ipndv.org/

23

Flow of nuclear weapon disarmament and disposition, IPNDV Phase-1 scenario

Title Title

23

24

Flow of nuclear weapon disarmament

Title Title

2424

Declaration correctness verification

施設全体、解体前後における管理の連続性(Chain of Custody: CoC)

25

Example: Verification elements and techniques

Temporary Store

Temporary Store

Site Storage Dismantlement Building

STEP- ６～７ STEP- ８ STEP- ９～10

NDA Check Point Dismantlement Station

NM(BEFORE)

NDA

HE NM

NDA

Temporary NDA Check Point

Gate Gate

（ENTER) （EXIT)

Holding Area （AFTER)

＜Datalink＞

HE

Inspector's Room Control Room

Site Storage Dismantlement BuildingTemporary Storage

Temporary Storage

Dismantlement Station

NDA check point(After)

NDA check point(Before)

Temporary Holding Area

Inspector’s Room Control Room

検認：核物質の存在パッシブガンマ/中性子

アクティブガンマ/中性子

検認：核物質の存在・同位体組成

パッシブガンマ/中性子アクティブガンマ/中性子

検認：爆薬の存在、核物質の不在

アクティブガンマ

NDASurveillance camera

Review station

機微情報保護遠隔監視技術

検認：爆薬の存在アクティブガンマ

Verification SNMPassive g/nActive g/n

Verification HEActive g

Verification SNM, Isotopic ratioPassive g/nActive g/n

Verification HEActive g

Information SecurityRemote monitoring

26

Verification technical Challenges

• Biggest challengeso Detection and verification of heavily sealed

chemical explosiveso Verification of heavily sealed HEU enrichment

and the fissile quantity more than certain levelo Active methods, especially active neutrons,

should be avoided by safety (political?) reasonso Difficulty to measure radio-rays from sealed

containerso Limited measurement space and capacity

Any idea?

27

Next generation fuel cycle with proliferation resistance

28

Security & Proliferation Resistance by deign of Nuclear Fuel

(240)(242)(Fuel Production) (Fuel Protection)

19

0.6

0.8

1.0

1.2

1.4

1.6

0 20 40 60 80 100Burnup (GWd/t)

K-in

f

0%Np

7gHM/shere, 10%EU

2%Np

5%Np

Pebble bed HTGR– Ref. GENES4/ANP2003, 1106– 220MWth – 100MWe– Inlet 500- Outlet900 oC

Fuel sphere

Example for HTGR

1mm

Coated fuel particle (CFP)

Fuel kernel with Np-237

6cm

Adjustment on packing fraction of CFP leads spectrum optimization

21

Fig. Kinf vs Burnup

0102030405060708090

100

0 1 2 3 4 5Np-237 ratio in initial fuel (%HM)

Isot

opic

com

posi

tion

(%).

Pu-239

Pu-240

Pu-241

Pu-242

Pu-238

Fig. Pu vector at EOC vsNp Doping

PWR

Inner Core(IC) 288 Outer Core(OC) 274Radial Blanket(RB) 96SS Shield 102ZrH Shield 108Control Rod(CR) 40Control Rod(CR) 17

Z

R cm

IC

OC

RB

IC OC RBS

hie

ld(ZrH

)S

hie

ld(SS)

Coolant(Na)

Cladding(ODS ferritic Steel)Fuel pellets(U-Pu MOX)

100cmCore

20cmAxial-Blanket

20cmAxial-Blanket

Fuel pellets((U-MA)Ox)

Gas plenum

Gas plenum

Moderator(ZrH1.65)

Fuel pellets((U-MA)Ox)

Moderator(ZrH1.65)

Axial Blanket Fuel

269 329194

289

309

Fast Spectrum Reactor Blanket

Gas cooled reactor

Molten Salt Reactorthe Fluoride salt cooled high temperature reactor

Protected Plutonium Production (P3)-Experimental study by irradiation tests@ATR, Idaho, U.S.A.-

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

Pu

Isoto

pic

Vecto

r (E

xperim

ent)

(wt%

)

Pu Isotopic Vector (Calculation) (wt%)

Pu238

Pu239

Pu240

Pu241

Pu242

Fig. Comparison between experiments and calculations in Pu isotopic vector

NU-Np samplesGood agreement between experimentsand calculations

Koyama et al., JNST, 2008.

Fig.UNIS-B

Fig. Cross-Section of Joyo

0mm (Core)

Am241+350mm(Ax-Ref )

Fig.SMIR

Am241Am243(Rd-Ref)

MK-II FuelInner ReflOuter ReflControl RodNSUNIS-BUNIS-CSMIRMARICO

Am loadedassembly30

Protected Plutonium Production (P3)-Experimental study by irradiation tests@Joyo, Japan-

Reaction Rate σφ Am241(n,g)

Good agreement between experiments and calculations in

Pu vector

0

20

40

60

80

100

0 20 40 60 80 100

Pu Is

otop

ic C

ompo

sito

n (C

AL) [

at%

]

Pu Isotopic Compostion (Exp) [at %]

Pu238Pu239Pu242

Pu

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

1.0E-02 1.0E+00 1.0E+02 1.0E+04 1.0E+06

242g

Am

Isom

eric

Rat

io in

tota

l 241

Am

cap

ture

Neutron Energy [eV]

CurrentKoyama et. al, 2008Dovbenko, 1971JENDL/AC-2008JENDL3.3ENDF/B-VII

Experimental data supports

the latest cross-section libraries

of Am242g isomer ratio

Sagara et al., Mater. Sci. Eng.. vol. 9. no. 1. 012006. May, 2010.

31

Nuclear Data needs for proliferation resistance

o TRUs (n,g), (n,f) are important to control the Pu isotopic vector

o Simulation results of Pu isotopic vectors were well validated by experiments in thermal and fast reactors

o Challenge would be the verification or accounting TRU composition in the fuel material

o Other data such as TRU multiplicity, spontaneous fission, decay heat is also important

32

Summary

Title Title

• The needs and required accuracy of nuclear data in nuclear non-proliferation and security are much different from these in the nuclear reactor physics

• Research on the surveillance of nuclear data and its preparedness for nuclear non-proliferation and security has started to prioritize the needs for nuclear data measurements especially in these fields.

• This would open the new field to connect non-proliferation and nuclear data

Contact: sagara@lane.iir.titech.ac.jp