nuke info tokyo - 原子力資料情報室（cnic） kotobuki bldg., 1-58-15 higashi-nakano,...

ThecriticalityaccidentatTokai last falldemonstratedtheinherentrisksofnuclearenergy, and forced Japan to review itsnuclearpowerpolicies. Shortlybefore,andsoonafter,thisworst-everaccidentinJapan'snuclearhistoryonSep.30,1999,MOX fuelmanufacturedatBritishNuclearFuelsplc(BNFL)andBelgonuclairearrivedin Japan. Itwas later revealed thatdataforthequalitycontroloftheBNFLfuelhadbeenfalsified. TheshipscarryingMOXfuelleftEuropeinmid-Julyanddelivered32assembliestoTokyoElectric'sFukushima Iplant (BWR)on theeasternsideof JapanonSep.27,1999,andeightassemblies toTakahama

Plant (PWR)onOct.1, thedayafter theJCOaccident. Data fabricationbyBNFLwasrevealedonSep.19,aftertheshiphadlefttheBritishport,byanarticleintheUKnewspaper,The Independent,whichwasbasedon inside information. KansaiElec-tricannouncedthat ithadpostponedtheloadingofMOX fuel intoTakahama3on

NUKE INFO TOKYOCitizens’ Nuclear Information Center

URL: http://www.jca.apc.org/cnic/ e-mail : [email protected] Kotobuki Bldg., 1-58-15, Higashi-nakano, Nakano-ku, Tokyo 164-0003, JAPAN

March/April2000

No. 76

CONTENTSNIIreportonMOXdatafabrication 1-2Plansfornuclearplantcanceled 3Aginganddecommisioningofreactors4-7STA'sdoseevaluationofJCOaccident 8LatestonRokkashofacilities 9Who'sWho:KazumasaAizawa 10NewsWatch 11-12

(Left) Protest against MOX utilization. (Right) X-ray photo of rejected BNFL fuel rods (source: Kansai Electric)

MOX Data Fabrication:Lack of Regulatory Ability Exposed

November1,andTakahama4onDecem-ber20.TheuseofMOXfuelmanufacturedbyBNFLwascanceled,andMOXfuelcur-rentlyunderprocessatFrenchcompanyCOGEMAisplannedtobeloaded. TheUKNuclearInstallationsInspectorate(NII),which investigatedthedata falsifica-tion,releasedareportontheirfindingsonFeb.18,2000.Thereportstatesthat"oneexampleoffalsificationhasbeenfounddatingbackto1996,"andthat"asystematicmanagementfailureallowedvariousindividualstofalsifyqualityassurancerecords."-thusmakingitamplyclearthatpoormanagementatBNFLwasoneofthereasonswhythedatafalsifica-tionwasallowedtocontinueforsolong.Fur-thermore,JohnTaylor,therecentlyresignedchiefexecutiveofBNFLwhovisitedKansaiElectric,reportedthat"twofuelrodswererejectedbecauseasmallconcreteblockandascrewwerefoundtobemixedinwiththepel-lets."Theseproblemstouchonrudimentaryissues,demonstratingthatthereisinadequatecontrolofstagesofthemanufacturingprocessprecedingdataspecification.ItseemsthattheproductionofMOXfuelisadubiousbusinessfromthebottomup. Buttheproblemsareevenmoreseriousthanthis;thefuelwithfalsifieddatahadpassedtheinspectionoftheMinistryofInternationalTradeandIndustry(MITI)whichistheregu-latorybodyfornuclearfuelinJapan.Kan-

saiElectricwitnessedtheinspectionduringmanufacturing,andthefuelpassedanexternalinspectionbyMITIuponarrivinginJapan.Theagencywasalsopreparedtopassthefuelforinspectionpriortoitsbeingloadedintothereactor.KansaiElectriconlycancelleditsapplicationforapprovaltoburnthisparticularMOXfuelafterthenewsreportsintheUKandanalysisofthefueldatabyJapaneseNGOsforcedthecompanytoadmitthatdatafabrica-tionhadtakenplace. ThesecircumstancesshowthatnuclearfuelregulationinJapanisvirtuallynon-existent.MITI'sinspectionsandregulationsaredonealmostentirelyonpaper;thereisnoadequatesystemfordetectingsuchanomaliesasscrewsmixedinwithpellets,noristhereasystemfordeterminingwhetherdatahasbeentamperedwith.Throughoutthisseriesofscandals,MITIand theNuclearSafetyCommissionhavemaintainedthatthereare"noproblems"withthefuel.Theyhaverefusedtoadmit,orevendiscussthepossibility,thattheprovisionsforinspectionandregulationareinsufficient. ThedatafabricationscandalhascastlightonafundamentalproblemforJapan'snuclearpowerprogram:nooneindividualandnosin-gleinstitutioncandetermine-letaloneguaran-tee-thesafetyofnuclearenergy.byMasakoSawai[WehavemadetheNIIreportavailableonourweb-site.]

2 March/April 2000 No.76 Nuke Info Tokyo

SUBSCRIPTIONNuke Info Tokyo is a bi-monthly newsletter that aims to provide foreign friends with up-to-date information on the Japanese nuclear industry as well as on the movements against it. Please write to us for a subscription (subscription rates: Regular subscriber - $30 or ¥3,000/year; sup-porting subscriber $50 or ¥5,000/year). The subscription fee should be remitted from a post office to our post office account No. 00160-0-185799, HANGENPATU-NEWS. We would also appreciate receiving information and newsletters from groups abroad in exchange for this news-letter. (When sending the subscription fee from overseas, please send it by international postal money order.)Citizens' Nuclear Information Center3F Kotobuki Bldg., 1-58-15 Higashi-nakano, Nakano-ku, Tokyo 164-0003 JAPAN Tel: 81-3-5330-9520; Fax: 81-3-5330-9530Translators: Rick Davis, Gaia Hoerner, Taeko Miwa, Kumiko Tanaka, Junko Yamaka Proof-readers: Antony Boys, Antony Moore Scientific Advisor: Jinzaburo Takagi Editor: Gaia Hoerner

OnFebruary22,KitagawaMasayasu,theGovernorofMiePrefecture,announcedinthecourseofapolicyspeechtotheprefecturalassemblythatplansfortheAshihamanuclearpowerplantshouldbecancelled.ThepresidentoftheChubuElectricPowerCo.,HirojiOta,respondedonthesamedaythattheutilityintendedtoabandontheplan.Thismarkedtheendofaplanthathadplaguedlocalcitizensfor37longyears. ChubuElectric firstannounced itsplantobuildanuclearplant in1963.Thesitestraddled the border betweenNantoTownandKiseiTown inMiePrefecture,andwhile the townassemblyofNantodecided in1964 tooppose theplan, theKiseiassemblyvotedtoencourageit. In1993,Nanto's townassembly reaf-f i rmed its opposit ion. In 1996, over810,000ofMie'scitizens--welloverhalfoftheelectorate -- signedpetitionsoppos-ingtheplan,whichtheysubmittedtothegovernor. In1997, thegovernmentaskedChubuElectric,NantoTown,andKiseiTownto

observe a cooling-off perioduntil theendof1999. All threepartiesconsented,andhalted their respectiveactivities foroppositionandpromotion. Meanwhile,Mieprefecture consultedwithexpertsandmade inspection tours of nuclearpower facilities,andafter thecooling-offperiodconcluded, thegovernormadehisannouncement. Thereisnodoubtthatmanyprefecturalcitizenswelcometheplan'scancellation.Itmusthavebeengoodnewseven toChubuElectricbecause,with the level-ingoff inelectricpowerdemand,andthestrugglefortheelectricpowerindustrytoholditsownunderderegulation,buildinganuclearplantwassimplynotanoptionfor theutility if itwanted topreserve itsowncorporatewell-being. It isnowevident that Japan'splans fornuclearpowerdevelopmentareoveram-bitious. Surelynow is the time tocancelallsuchconstructionplansandtakeabigsteptowardphasingoutnuclearpower.byNishioBaku

Nuke Info Tokyo March/April 2000 No.76 3

Plans For Nuclear Power Plant at Ashihama Dropped

Plansweretobuildanuclearpowerplantatthissite.Thankstothegovernorandallofthoseinvolved,theareaisnolongeratrisk.

1. Japan'sSituationRegarding theDis-posalofDecommissionedReactors

In the1970s, theconstructionof lightwater reactorswas implemented rapidly,andbytheendof1999,atotalof53plantshadbeenbuilt. Japan's firstcommercialnuclearpowerplantwasTokaiand itwasdecommissionedin1998.Theearlynucle-arplantshavealreadybeenoperating for25-30years,andproblemsareemergingbecauseofequipmentaging. Underthegovernment'spolicy,decom-missionednuclearplantswill allbe leftfive to tenyears (coolingperiod), afterwhichanothereightto10yearswouldberequired fordismantling. Ifweassumea lifetimeof40years,acoolingperiodoffiveyears,anddismantlingperiodofeightyears,thenanincreasingnumberofplantswouldbedecommissioned in themid2010s,and thedismantlingof those reac-torswouldbeconcentrated in the2020sthroughthe2040s(Fig.1). Thegovernment's recentenergyplancalls forbuildinganadditional20 reac-torsby2010with thegoalbeing70GWofnuclearcapacity, andundera longer

termoutlook thereareplans for increas-ingcapacity to100GWby2030 (Fig.2).If Japan is tohave100GW in2030soastocompensatealso for thecapacity lossdue to this reactordecommissioning, thecountrywillberequiredtobuildtwotosix1100MW-classnuclearplantseachyear.However, judgingby thecurrent inabil-ityof Japan'selectricpowerandnuclearpowerindustriestobuildevenoneplantayear,suchagoalisquiteunrealistic.

2.WastesfromDecommissionedReac-tors2.1Theamountofwastesgenerated

TheNuclearPowerWorkingGroupoftheAdvisoryCommitteeonEnergyclaimsthat radioactivewastes fromreactordis-mantlingbelong to the samecategoryaswastesgenerated inconjunctionwithplantoperation (workclothingworn incontrolledareas,etc.). The lowconcen-trationsof radioactivesubstancesmakethem"low-levelradioactivewastes."How-ever, theWorkingGroupactuallyconsid-erseverythingexcepthighly radioactivewastesas low level. Even items like the


Problems Caused by the Decommissioning of

Nuclear Power Plants

interior structuralpartsof reactorsandpressurevesselsareputintothelow-levelcategory. Table I shows theclassificationofwastesbytheWorkingGroup. According to theWorkingGroup, theclearance level is apparently a concen-tration levelof radioactivesubstances indismantlingwastes that requiresnocon-siderationof radiation impactonhumansortheenvironmentevenwhennospecialmeasuresare taken to treat thewastes.As illustrated in thedismantlingwastecategoriescreatedbytheWorkingGroup,the term"clearance level" indicates thatwasteswhose concentration levels arebelow1x106Bq/tare tobedisposedasgeneralwastes,whichwebelieveentailsseriousproblems. Thegovernment's ideais thateven substances thathavebeenartificiallycontaminatedwith radioactiv-itywillbedisposedalongwithordinarywastes if theirconcentrationsarebelowacertain level. But there isno reasonwhy,inaddition to the radiationwe receive ineveryday lifealready,wemustalsosufferexposure to radioactivesubstances thatwillenterour livesdue to theestablish-mentof suchaclearance level,and it isthereforenot right toprescribea levelof thiskind. What ismore, theWorkingGroup's assumption thatweneednotconsider thehumandangersofexposurecausedbydiscardingwastesofaconcen-trationbelowthis level - i.e., in thecat-egoryofgeneralwastes-isveryquestion-

ableindeed. Fig. 3 shows the amount ofwastesgeneratedwhendismantlinga1100MW-classBoilingWaterReactor(BWR).(a)istheamountanticipatedby thegovernment,which totals8,790m3. But ifwe takeallwastesintoconsideration,asshownin(b),theamountgeneratedwillbeabout20timesasmuch,or210,790m3perreactor. Fig. 4 shows the amount ofwastesaccumulatedover theyears. (a)doesnotincludewastesbelowtheclearance level.As this illustrates, the low-levelwastesabove the clearance level alone,willamount toabout2.1x105m3 (about525kt)in2050.However,whenwastesbelowclearance levelareadded,as in (b), theamount comes tomore than6x106m3(over15Mt),whichisfarlargerthanin(a). In the final analysis, dismantling isbound to result in the rapidaccumula-tionofanunimaginablyhugeamountofwaste,anditseemsthattheonlyavailableanswer to thisproblem is toentrust thedisposalof thesemountainsof toxic sub-stancestofuturegenerations.　

2.2 The Economics of Decommissioning Reac-tors


Thecostofdismantlingisconsideredtobeabout40billionyenperplant.However,aninterimreportbytheAdvisoryCommitteeonEnergyestimatesthatinadditiontothis,about17.8billionyen(foran1100MW-classBWR)willbeneededtocovertheprocessing,inspec-tion,transport,anddisposalofdismantlingwastes. According to JapanNuclearFuelLtd.'sannualfinancialstatement,salesdataforitsundergroundwastedisposaloperationindicatethat,11.8billionyenwerespentfor19,520drums(each200litersor0.5t),whichcomestoabout600,000yenperdrum.Ifweusethisasastandard,then,usingtheresultsinFig.4(a)andassumingthathighbetagamma,concretepit,andVLLWarealldisposedindrums,thatcomestoabout44,000drumswhenwastesbelowclearancelevelarenotincluded.Thedisposalof8,790m3(about22,000t)wouldthereforecostabout26.4billionyen.Thus,aconsiderationofdisposalcostsaloneshowsthat,simplyfortheamountofwastestobeburied,the17.8billionyenestimateoftheaforementionedinterimreportisabouthalfoftheactualcost,makingthegovernment'sfigureagrossunderestimate.Ifweincludethewastesbelowclearancelevel,thatcostisabout633billionyen.Inotherwords,ifalldismantlingwastesareburiedaccordingtopresentlawwithoutresortingtotheclearancelevel,dis-posalcostswillbeinflatedbyabout20times.Thesedisposalcostsareabouttwicethecon-structioncostsof1100MW-classplantsoftherespectivereactortypes. Thesemassiveexpensesmustbetherealreasonwhythegovernmentandelectricutili-tieswanttodisposewastesofdecommissionedreactorsusingthedangerousandrecklessnotionofclearancelevel.Dependingonhowthisproblemismanaged,itcoulddisrupttheentireeconomicfoundationofthenuclearpowerindustry,andthusundermineitsverybasisforexistence.Fromtheseestimations,beginningin2010wewillforcefuturegenera-tionstopaycolossalsumsofmoney,notto

generateelectricity,butjusttodecommissionnuclearreactorsandattendtotheirwastes.

3. Aging of Nuclear Plants 3.1 Problems of Plant Aging

Ordinarily,thelifetimeofanuclearpowerplant isassumedtobeabout30-40years.However,thegovernmentisconsideringlifeextensionbecauseoftheexpenseandtheenor-mousamountsofwasteproducedbydecom-missioning. The Japan'sAtomicEnergyCommis-sionandNuclearSafetyCommissionhavechannels for consideringhow toman-age reactordecommissioning,and thereismuch technicaldiscussiononmattersincludingmethods fordismantlingandremoval. However, there isnodiscussionatallon thecreationof standardswithregard to thevitalmatterofwhatkindofindicators areusedandwhatextentofsafetymargin isexpectedwhendecidingon reactordecommissioning. Thismakesitpossiblethathenceforthreactordecom-missioningwillbepostponedowing topoliticaljudgmentsbytheelectricutilities,and thataged,dangerousnuclearplantswithnoeconomicmeritwillbekept inoperation,necessitatingapaperingoveroftheirproblems. Stoppingthiswilldefi-nitelyrequirethevigilanceofthecitizens.The indicationsof thedangersposedbyaging reactorsareeasy to see; someofthemaredescribedbelow. To s tudy the ag ing p rob lem weassumedthefollowingtwotypesofnucle-arpowerplants.(1)Nos.1,2,3:Threerepresentativeplantsthatbeganoperatingearlyandhavebeenin service foracomparatively long time(No.1 : Fukushima I-1,No.2 :Mihama1,No.3 :Tsuruga1).Theyearsofoperationare28,29,29respectively(asof1999).(2)Nos.4,5:Tworepresentativeplantsnotlong inoperation (No.4 :Sendai1,No.5 :


Onagawa1).Theyearsofoperationare15each.

3.2 Decrease of Capacity Factor and Age-Induced Troubles

Fig.5 illustrateshowthecapacity fac-torchangeswiththepassageofyears.Wetook theaveragecapacity factor foragedplants (Nos. 1, 2, 3), and smoothed thecurveusingthree-yearaverages.Theplots(blackdots) showtheactualvalues fromtheaboveprocess, thebroken linecurveshowing the trend. As thegraphclearlyshows, theagednuclearplants reachedtheirutilization factorpeaks15-20yearsafterbeginningoperation,afterwhichthefactordeclined.Duringthefirstfewyearsthe factor isunder50%,whichmayhavemuch todowith theaccident sufferedbyMihama1. in itsearlyyears, inwhichradioactivityleakedfromitssteamgenera-tor tubes,causinga shutdown. Althoughour resultsweredependentalsoon theconditionsat theplantschosen for thisstudy, suchsmoothing revealeda trendthatwouldhavebeenhard todiscernbyexaminingonly theutilization factordataforeachindividualplant.Theresultsshowthattheseagedplantsareovertaxingtheirequipment. Theas- yetunagedplants(Nos.4,5)havecapacity factorsofabout78%,whichisperhapsduetotheirhighertechnological levels. However, compari-sonwith theseunagedplants shows thatthe capacity factorsof theagedplantswillnot improvedespitemajor repairorimprovementefforts toprolong their life-

times. Fig.6 shows thenumberofproblemsforeachnuclearplants. Thenumberofincidents for each reactorwasdividedby its years inoperation todeterminetheaverageannualnumberof incidents.Troubles includeautomaticandmanualshutdownsduringoperation,damage tosteamgeneratorsduringshutdowns,etc.These results includenotonly incidentsrelated toaging,butall reportedprob-lems.Nevertheless,theydemonstratethatagednuclearplantsclearlyhaveamuchlargernumberofproblems. Furthermore,this result shows thatwhileagednuclearplants average 1.76 incidents a year,newerplantsaverage0.53ayear,whichisadifferenceofover three toone. Thisposesaserioussafetyproblemfornuclearpower.

4. Conclusion

Thenotionofa "clearance level" looksverymuch likeaploybywhich thegov-ernmenthopestounderestimateboththeamountofwastecreatedby thedisman-tlingofnuclearpowerplantsandthecostofthedismantlingprocessitself. As thisstudymakesclear,even ifwe layaside themanyotherproblemscausedby thenuclearpower industry, theenor-moussafety,environmentalandeconomicproblems involved in thedismantlingofagingplantsare sufficient in themselvestojustifythebeliefthatthenuclearenergysystemisanythingbut"sustainable."byTadahiroKatsuta


OnJan.31,2000,theScienceandTech-nologyAgency (STA) released theexpo-sure levelsof the local residentsand theworkerswho carriedout various tasks,suchas theextractionofcoolantwater,duringefforts to contain the criticalityaccidentatTokai-mura, IbarakiPrefectureinSeptember lastyear. These levelsaredrastically lower than thepreviousdoselevelevaluations.STAexplainsthatinthecaseofresidents,lowerdoselevelsaretheresultofconsidering theshieldingeffectsofbuildings,and for theworkers,a resultofrevisingsensitivityofthepocketdosim-etersandneutronRemcounters. Accordingtothereport,therewere119residentswhowereexposedtomorethan1mSv,theannualdoselimitforthepublic,andthehighestexposurerateisestimatedaslowas21mSv.Asforexposedworkers,theworkerwhowasmeasured tohavereceived120mSvduring theextractionofcoolantwater isestimated in the latestreport tohavebeenexposed to less than50mSv. However, this is justoneevalua-tion resultwhich itself containsmarginsoferror,andcouldeasilybeseveral timeslargeror smallerdependingonmethodsofevaluation. OnFeb.16,CNIC,actingwiththe"Criti-calityAccidentVictims'Group," submit-tedaproposaltotheSTAandtheNuclearRegulatoryCommission regarding thedetailsoftheexposuredoseevaluationforthisaccidentandthewaystheseagencieshavebeentreatingthelocalresidents. Theproposalcontained the following

fourdemands;1)Thewithdrawalof,andan apology for propagandizing to thepublic the falseargument thatdoses lessthan200mSvor50msvaresafe, therebyimplying that there isa threshold levelofsafety. 2)Ascientific reevaluationof thelatestdoselevelestimates. 3)Arepeatofthedoseevaluation for the JCOaccidenton thebasisof the1990 recommenda-tionsof the InternationalCommissiononRadiologicalProtection. 4)Exposedresidentsmust be guaranteed healthexaminations inaccordancewith thosefornuclear-workers, includingbloodtests,andthattheyshouldbeissuedwithhealthmanagementcards.byChihiroKamisawa


JCO Criticality Accident: STA Lowers Evaluation

Levels of Exposure Dose

JCOplant.ThesiteofthecriticalityaccidentonSep.30,1999. (photobyKenjiHiguchi)

STA's Estimation on Exposure Dose

Missingpartsatreprocessingplant WorkonconstructionoftheRokkashoRepro-cessingPlantisproceedingona24-hoursched-ule,withthreecontinuousshifts,inanefforttohavetheplantrunningby2005.Workhasbeenhindered,however,bythediscoveryofanumberofmissingorfaultyparts.Thefaultycompo-nentswerefoundinliquidwastestoragevessels,whichweremanufacturedbyHitachi.Thecom-panyimportedreprocessingtechnologyfromtheFrenchcompanyCOGEMA,butithadneglectedtotranscribesomepartsofCOGEMA'soriginalmachinerystructureplan. LiquidWasteStorageVesselNo.1wasnotequippedwithan"airlift"(about10cmlong)whichisnecessarytoextractsamplesofliquidwaste.Outofsixteencoolingcoilsofeachofthetwohigh-levelconcentratedLiquidWasteTemporaryStorageVessels,onlytwelvewereequippedwith20cmlonganti-seismicsupports. Hitachihad informedJapanNuclearFuelLimited(JNFL)ofthemissingpartsonFeb.17,2000.However,JNFLdidnotmakethisinfor-mationpublicuntilFeb.25.Theinformationwassimplyconcealeduntilthehigh-levelwastehadarrived.ThegovernorofAomori,MorihisaKimura,wasfuriousthatthecompanyhadnotonlywithheldthisinformationbutwasnotabletodetectfaultsintheconstructionuntilrecently.Thecompanyhaddeceivedlocalresidentsandthelocalgovernment.ItisdisgracefulthatJNFLhasresortedtodeceptioninanefforttoobviatethereasonableconcernsoflocalresidentsandgovernmentofficials.ThefailuretomakeanaccuratecopyoftheCOGEMAblue-print,asdescribedabove,isalsoacauseofgraveconcern,sincetheRokkashoplantreliessolelyonimport-edtechnology.Thesafetyoftheplantisnowinseriousdoubt.Fifth shipmentofhigh-levelwastearrivesatRokkasho

Onehundredand fourcanistersofvitri-fiedhigh-levelwastearrivedatRokkashoearly in themorningofFebruary23,2000.The transport ship Pacific Swan sailedthroughthePanamaCanal,whichhasbeenusedtwice in thepast,andtheconcernsoftheCaribbeanpeopleover the transporta-tionaremounting. Representing thevoiceof theCaribbeanpeople,Titode Jesus flewfromPuertoRicotojoinJapanesecitizensintheirprotestsagainst thearrivalof theshipatMutsu-OgasawaraportinRokkasho. Thehigh-levelwasteshipped this timeincludes liquidwaste originating fromFrenchgas-cooledreactorsandfastbreederreactors. TheFederationofElectricPowerCompanies,whichoversees reprocessingcontracts,haspubliclyannounced that fur-ther shipmentsof radioactivewastewillbereturned to Japan,and that200canisterswillbetransportedwitheachshipment.

UraniumEnrichmentFacility JNFLannouncedonFeb.28,2000 thatoneof themanufacturing linesat theUra-niumEnrichmentFacilitywillbeshutdown.This facility is runningwith1100SWU,andhas five lines. Oneof the cascade linescalled RE-1Ahas experienced continualproblems,andalreadyover4000centrifugeunitshaveshutdown. RE-1Awas the firstone tobeoperated,andhasbeen runningsince1992. According to theofficials, thetotalnumberofcentrifugeunitsatthefacil-itycannotbemadepublicdue toconcernsoverproliferationofnuclearmaterials. Inanycase, the facilityhasnotbeenable toprepareuraniumwhichmeetsthespecifiedconcentration. RE-1Awillbeshutdown inApril,2000.byMasakoSawai


Updates on Nuclear Facilities at Rokkasho Village, Aomori

Tokaimura is located inNorth IbarakiprefecturenearthecenterofJapan.Thissmallvillagewithapopulationofabout34,000 andan areaof 37 square kilo-metreshas livedwithnuclearpower formorethan40years.Fifteennuclearfacili-tiesoccupy13.4%of thevillagearea. Athirdofvillagerswork fornuclear facili-ties.Thevillagehasenjoyedtaxincomesfromnuclear facilities,aswellasmanyfinecivic facilitiesandwell-maintainedroads. Tokaimurahas developed itself as"theVillageofNuclearPower." Itwasataboo tocriticisenuclearpowerenergythere,anditappearedasifwordssuchas"anti-nuclear"or"nuclearphase-out"didnotexistintheTokaivocabulary. However,thefireandexplosionoftheTokaiReprocessingPlantthreeyearsagoand the recent JCOcriticalityaccidenthavecertainlyaffectedvillagers. Thisbecameapparentat theVillageAssem-blyelectionwhichwasheldsoonafterthe JCOaccident - for the first time inavillagehistorydominatedbynuclearpower, an anti-nuclear candidate, 58year-oldKazumasaAizawa,waselectedastheVillagesAssemblymember. Mr. Aizawahadbeen a researcherof themodernhistoryof Japanat theIbaraki PrefectureHistoricalMuseumuntilbecoming theassemblymember.Hehadnot intended to join theelec-tionuntilshortlybeforetheelectionday.However, hewasoutraged that even

aftertheJCOaccident,candidatestotheassemblydidnot talkabout thedanger

ortherightsorwrongsofnuclearpower.Thus,heresignedhis long-heldpositionandstoodfortheelection. Hehasbeeninvolvedwithanti-nucle-armovementfora longtime.Forexam-ple,he is the representativeofplaintiffsoftheTokaiIIPlantCase.Heisamanofgentlebutstrongandenduringwill. Many troublesawaithimas theonlyassemblymemberwhoadvocatesnucle-arphase-out inTokaimura. But I'msurethat inhiseffort tomakeTokaimuraamuchsaferplaceforitspeople,MrAiza-wawill leadTokaimura in thenewcen-tury frombeing "thevillageofnuclearpower" to "avillageofnuclearphase-out."


Anti-Nuke Who's Who

Kazumasa Aizawa A man to free Tokai of its nuclear burdens By Hiroshi Kuroha

Anti-Nuke Ibaraki Action Association

People of Maki-machi Once Again Vote Against Nuclear Plant Inaplebiscitewhichwasheld inMaki-machi,NiigataPrefecture,onAugust4,1996,61%ofthevotersopposedtheplanbyTohokuElectric toconstructanuclearpowerplant in thearea.At themayoralelection inMaki-machi on January 16,2000, thecurrentmayor,TakashiSasagu-chi,whoseplatformincludedtheproposaltohaveTohokuElectric abandon theirconstructionplans,wasreelected.Thedayafterhis re-election, themayorexpressedhis intentions topersonallyvisitTohokuElectricand theMinistryof InternationalTradeand Industry todemand that theplan be canceled. The company hasrefusedtomeetwiththemayor.

Claims of Nuclear Power Costs Mere Propaganda In December last year, for the firsttime in five years, theAgencyofNatu-ralResourcesandEnergypublished thetrial costsofpowergenerationby typesofpowergenerators. According to thereport, nuclearpower costs ¥5.9per 1kWh,LNG-fired thermalpower¥6.4, coal-fired thermalpower¥6.5,petroleum-firedthermal power ¥10.2 andhydropower¥13.6. It is nowonder that thenuclearpoweristhecheapest,forthesefiguresarepropaganda. Over thepast ten years, theAgencystated that thecostofpowergenerationbynuclearpowerwas¥9/kWh.Why,then,wasitreducedto¥5.9/kWh?Theexplana-

tionliesinthechangeoftheassumptionsguiding thecalculation. First, theservicelifewas lengthened: itused tobeset to15years for thermalpowerand16yearsfornuclearpower,but thiswas radicallyextended to40years.Then, thecapacityfactorwasraisedfrom70%to80%.Thesechangesweremademoreadvantageoustonuclearpowerplants,whosecostofconstruction ishighandcostof fuel rela-tively low. Therewasnochange in theconditionsofhydropower: theservice lifewassetto40yearsandthecapacityfactor45%. The reason for these changes is thatwithout themthecostofLNG-fired ther-malpowerwouldbecomecheaper,andtheAgencycouldnot say "nuclearpoweris thecheapest." For reference,accord-ing toa trial calculationpublished fiveyearsago, thecostofpowergenerationbynuclearpowerandLNG-fired thermalpowerwas thesame,at¥9/kWh, thatbycoalandpetroleumwas¥10/kWhandbyhydropower¥13/kWh. In recentcalcula-tionLNG-fired thermalpowerwasmadetobeonly¥0.5/kWhhigher thannuclearpower. Butevennow, ifweadjust thecalcula-tions totallywith thecurrentexchangerateof¥128tothedollar,thecostofLNG-fired thermalpowerbecomescheaper.It seems that theAgencywillonceagainhave tocomeupwithalteredconditionsfor thecalculation toensure thatnuclearpowerseemstobethecheapest. TheAgencydidnot showanydetailedbreakdownwhen theypublished the trialvaluesofpowergenerationcosts.Thosedetailsmentioned includeonly thecost


NEWS WATCH

of reprocessing (¥0.63/kWh),and thecostof treatmentanddisposalof radioactivewastes (¥0.25/kWh). If youworkback-wards and calculate the cost of repro-cessingper1 tHMof spent fuel fromthereported reprocessing cost, youget afigureoflessthan¥300million. SincetheactualcostofRokkashoreprocessingplantis believed tobe¥300-500million, theestimate for spent fuel isclearly too low.The treatmentanddisposalof radioactivewasteisaninordinatelyexpensiveprocess,and for this reasonalonetherecanbenoquestion thatnuclearpowercostsmorethantheAgency'sreporthassuggested. Althoughitisnotincludedintherecenttrialcalculation,asmuchas¥400-500billionhasbeenappropriatedeveryyearfromthenationalbudgetfornuclearpowerdevelopment.Forthermalpowerdevelopmentthebudgetappro-priationis¥20-25billion.Thefactthatnuclearpowerrequiresalong-distancetransmission,alsoaddssignificantlytothecostofthisformofpower.

JGC Corp. S ign Agreement on Business Collaboration with Korean Firm JGCCorp.announcedonFebruary15thatthecompanyhadsignedabusinessagreementwithKOPEC,asubsidiaryofKoreaElectric.Underthisagreement,JGCwillallowKOPECtomakeuseofitsengineeringknow-howinallfieldsofradioactivewastemanagement.OnlylastyearKorealifteditsbanonimportsofnuclearequipmentandtechnologiesfromJapan.Thisagreementwillbethefirstfull-scaletechnicalcooperationbetweenthetwocountries. Intheimmediatefuture,themajortaskwillbetheconstructionoflow-levelradioac-tivewastesolidificationfacilitiesinnuclearplants inKorea. KOPEC isparticipating intheprojecttoconstructalight-waterreactorin

NorthKorea,andJGCislookingforanoppor-tunitytojointheproject.Italsoaimsatbusi-nessexpansionintheAsianmarket,includingChina,incooperationwithKOPEC.

Nuclear Power Industry Plagued by Y2K Glitches

Contrarytosomepeople'sconcerns,thearrivalofthenewcenturybroughtnomajordisruptionstonuclearpowerfacilitiesinJapan.However,therewereanumberofsmallY2Kproblems,andwecannotbeentirelysurethattherewillbenofurthersuchproblemsinthefuture. Someof thedifficultieswhichoccurredwerecausedbycomputersreadingtheyear"99"as "2099"or "00"as "1900." Inmanycases,theinterruptionofdataprocessingmeantthatthemalfunctionwasquicklyrecognized,allowingpropermeasurestobetakentoavoidmoreseriousdifficulties.AtFukushimaII-1,however,therewasabiggerproblem.Forawhile,thepositionofthecontrolrodswasunknown,apparentlybecauseoperatorswereunawarethatabuilt-inclockwassetatGreen-wichMeanTime.

Fire at Nuclear Plant in Miyagi Extinguishes Itself

A fire broke out on February 24, 2000, in a control building next to Tohoku Electric's Ona-gawa 1 plant (BWR) in Miyagi Prefecture. The fire died out by itself, there were no radiation leak, and no one was injured. However, it took the company 15-25 minutes to inform local governments of the accident. Local residents are now greatly alarmed by the existing safety measures in case of accidents. Following the criticality accident at JCO, residents have become extremely sensitive to nuclear-related accidents, and efforts are being made across the nation to become more informed on nuclear issues.


nuke info tokyo - 原子力資料情報室（cnic） kotobuki bldg., 1-58-15 higashi-nakano,...

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