online supplement to: constrained by the bank and the...

online supplement to:Constrained by the Bank and the Ballot

Courtenay R. Conrad & Jacqueline H.R. DeMeritt

Table 1: Estimated Interactive Impacts on Repression using OLS

(r.s.e.) (r.s.e.)

Fuel Rents .018 (.009)

Oil Exporter .153

(.047)Democracy -.008 -.009

(.004) (.002)UER*Democracy -.001 -.004

(.001) (.005)GDP -.0000 -.0000

(1.77e6) (1.53e6)Population 9.10e8 1.15e7

(5.71e8) (7.34e8)Dissent .023 .132

(.010) (.010)War .458 .449

(.055) (.042)PTSt1 .699 .704

(.025) (.018)

N 1598 2443R2 .8046 .5582

*** p 0.01; ** p 0.05; * p 0.1, (two-tailed). Dependentvariable: PTS. Models estimated via OLS regression. Robustses (clustered by country) in parentheses.

1

Table 2: List of Countries in Estimation Sample

Afghanistan Dominican Rep. Kyrgyz Rep. Rep. of KoreaAlbania DR of Congo Laos RussiaAlgeria Ecuador Latvia RwandaAngola Egypt Lesotho Saudi ArabiaArgentina El Salvador Liberia SenegalArmenia Eq. Guinea Libya Sierra LeoneAustralia Eritrea Lithuania SingaporeAustria Estonia Macedonia Slovak RepublicAzerbaijan Ethiopia Madagascar SomaliaBahrain Fiji Malawi South AfricaBangladesh Finland Malaysia SpainBelarus France Mali Sri LankaBelgium Gabon Mauritania SudanBenin Gambia Mauritius SwazilandBhutan Georgia Mexico SwedenBolivia Ghana Mongolia SwitzerlandBosnia Herz. Greece Morocco SyriaBotswana Guatemala Mozambique TajikistanBrazil Guinea Namibia TanzaniaBulgaria Guinea-Bissau Nepal ThailandBurkina Faso Guyana Netherlands TogoBurundi Haiti New Zealand Trinidad & Tob.Cambodia Honduras Nicaragua TunisiaCameroon Hungary Niger TurkeyCanada India Nigeria TurkmenistanCentral. Af. Rep. Indonesia Norway UAEChad Iran Oman UgandaChile Iraq Pakistan UkraineChina Ireland Panama United KingdomColombia Israel Papua New Guinea UruguayCosta Rica Italy Paraguay UzbekistanCote dIvoire Jamaica Philippines VenezuelaCroatia Japan Poland VietnamCuba Jordan Portugal YemenCyprus Kazakhstan Qatar ZambiaCzech Republic Kenya Rep. of Congo ZimbabweDenmark KuwaitNote: Bolded in Model 1 only. Italicized in Model 2 only.

2

Table 3: Estimated Interactive Impacts on Repression using CIRI Physint Measure

(r.s.e.) (r.s.e.)


Oil Exporter .458

(.193)Democracy -.025 -.043

(.015) (.008)UER*Democracy -.003 .000

(.003) (.024)GDP -.0001 -.0000

(7.60e6) (6.68e6)Population 7.94e7 8.76e7

(2.55e7) (2.49e7)Dissent .087 .137

(.047) (.045)War .923 .873

(.140) (.125)CIRIt1 1.026 .965

(.052) (.039)

N 1601 2291Pseudo R2 .3251 .2957LPL -2321.2405 -3447.8475

*** p 0.01; ** p 0.05; * p 0.1, (two-tailed). Depen-dent variable: CIRI Physint Measure. Models estimated viaordered logit. Robust ses (clustered by country) in parenthe-ses.

3

Table 4: Estimated Interactive Impacts on Repression using CIRI Physint Measure andOLS

(r.s.e.) (r.s.e.)


Oil Exporter .277

(.131)Democracy -.017 -.027

(.008) (.005)UER*Democracy -.001 .007

(.002) (.013)GDP -.0000 -.0000

(4.20e6) (3.14e6)Population 4.92e7 5.78e7

(9.76e8) (1.02e7)Dissent .063 .092

(.024) (.025)War .608 .680

(.095) (.089)CIRIt1 .695 .676

(.026) (.020)

N 1601 2291R2 .7739 .7304

*** p 0.01; ** p 0.05; * p 0.1, (two-tailed). Dependentvariable: CIRI Physint Measure. Models estimated via OLS.Robust ses (clustered by country) in parentheses.

4

Table 5: Estimated Interactive Impacts on Repression using AI-based PTS

(r.s.e.) (r.s.e.)


Oil Exporter .507

(.200)Democracy -.013 -.033

(.016) (.009)UER*Democracy -.007 -.009

(.003) (.021)GDP -.0001 -.0001

(8.15e6) (7.71e6)Population 2.56e7 2.33e7

(2.49e7) (3.71e7)Dissent .083 .125

(.042) (.041)War 1.127 1.067

(.167) (.144)PTSt1 2.461 2.276

(.130) (.041)

N 1598 2443Pseudo R2 .4657 .4211LPL -1294.3934 -2135.6549

*** p 0.01; ** p 0.05; * p 0.1, (two-tailed). Dependentvariable: AI-based PTS. Models estimated via ordered logit.Robust ses (clustered by country) in parentheses.

5

Alternative Conceptualizations of Democracy

In our article, we argue that repression covaries negatively with democracy because moredemocracy means more ballot-related constraints. In this context, democracy is a continuousconcept and its additive relationship with repression is linear: as democracy increases, abuseshould decrease. Differently, some scholars argue that anocracies (i.e., states that are neitherfully democratic nor fully autocratic) may be more likely to engage in repression than eitherfully consolidated democracies or autocracies (e.g., Ellingsen and Gleditsch 1997, Fein 1995,Opp 1994, Regan and Henderson 2002, Vreeland 2008). Thus, there is more murder in themiddle (MMM) because anocracies lack both the possibility of peaceful collective action thatcharacterizes democracy and the coercive apparatus inherent in autocracy. Democracies donot repress (or repress at lower rates than their less democratic counterparts) because thecosts of human rights violations under that institutional context are so large. Autocracieshave such a monopoly on coercion that few citizens speak out against the state; becausecitizens fear the states reaction to dissent, repression is unnecessary.

What does this mean for our argument? Our theory engages democracy as a formof constraint; more democracy makes repression increasingly costly. Differently, the MMMthesis suggests that mid-range democracies are the ones that repress, both because theymay need to and because they are not constrained by population dependence at the ballotbox. In this case, the relationship between democracy and human rights abuse is drivenby two factors: constraints (i.e., costs, which we argue impact repression in the same way)and the need to engage domestic threats (i.e., benefits, which we consider independent ofcosts). Since the theoretical underpinnings of MMM differ from the motivation for our ownexpectations about regime type, the MMM specification strikes us as a poor way to captureour key concept democracy. Nonetheless, we wonder whether incorporating this differentconceptualization of regime type will affect our main results. In this online supplement, wespecify a non-linear relationship between regime type and repression; the squared polity scalescore is statistically significant in both models, and all other results remain as reported.

Another possibility is that ballot constraints are a binary influence on abuse: Perhapsstrong democracies are constrained by the ballot, while other states are not. Using a dichoto-mous indicator of democracy, or splitting our sample across democracies and autocracies,would grant leverage on whether UER increases repression in autocracies but not democra-cies, and on whether democracybut not autocracyreduces repression as UER increases.In this article, however, we develop expectations about modifying relationships rather thandirectional differences. Thus we are interested in whether (and how) changes in democracymodify the relationship between UER and repression, and in whether (and how) changes inUER modify the relationship between democracy and repression. As a robustness check, inour online supplement we look at three different binary conceptualizations of democracy: aminimalist, binary measure of political regime type from the Democracy-Dictatorship (DD)data first described by Alvarez et al. (1996) and Przeworski, Alvarez and Cheibub (2000)and extended by Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010) as well as dichotomization of thePolity IV measure at both 6 and 7. In each case, as shown below, our results are robust tothe respecification of democracy.

6

Table 6: Estimated Interactive Impacts on Repression usingBinary Polity IV Measure of Democracy

(Democracy: Dem-Aut 6)

(r.s.e.) (r.s.e.)


Oil Exporter .651

(.143)Democracy -.248 -.526

(.237) (.134)UER*Democracy -.108 -.458

(.055) (.351)GDP -.0001 -.0001

(9.85e6) (8.87e6)Population 1.24e7 2.29e7

(2.30e7) (2.48e7)Dissent .088 .112

(.036) (.032)War 1.431 1.343

(.193) (.149)PTSt1 2.553 2.483

(.131) (.099)

N 1610 2475Pseudo R2 .5098 .4794LPL -1190.7896 -1939.6182

*** p 0.01; ** p 0.05; * p 0.1, (two-tailed). Dependentvariable: PTS. Models estimated via ordered logit. Robustses (clustered by country) in parentheses.

7

Table 7: Estimated Interactive Impacts on Repression usingBinary Polity IV Measure of Democracy

(Democracy: Dem-Aut 7)

(r.s.e.) (r.s.e.)


Oil Exporter .680

(.141)Democracy -.239 -.517

(.257) (.158)UER*Democracy -.114 -.456

(.058) (.357)GDP -.0001 -.0001

(9.94e6) (9.06e6)Population 1.24e7 2.64e7

(2.27e7) (2.46e7)Dissent .087 .108

(.035) (.031)War 1.424 1.350

(.196) (.147)PTSt1 2.550 2.487

(.131) (.099)

N 1610 2475Pseudo R2 .5099 .4790LPL -1190.5412 -1941.8475


8

Table 8: Estimated Interactive Impacts on Repression using Minimalist Measure ofDemocracy

(r.s.e.) (r.s.e.)


Oil Exporter .706

(.150)Democracy -.198 -.396

(.247) (.125)UER*Democracy -.134 -.567

(.057) (.351)GDP -.0001 -.0001

(9.92e6) (9.04e6)Population 9.03e8 1.95e7

(2.26e7) (2.73e7)Dissent .086 .106

(.034) (.032)War 1.434 1.358

(.194) (.144)PTSt1 2.536 2.499

(.034) (.100)

N 1602 2475Pseudo R2 .5098 .4782LPL -1185.6844 -1944.1711


9

Table 9: Estimated Interactive Impacts on Repression including Squared Democracy Term(MMM)

(r.s.e.) (r.s.e.)


Oil Exporter .808

(.200)Democracy .140 .151

(.055) (.036)Democracy2 -.008 -.009

(.003) (.002)UER*Democracy -.010 -.034

(.004) (.022)GDP -.0001 -.0001

(9.26e6) (7.30e6)Population 2.27e7 4.03e7

(2.00e7) (2.04e7)Dissent .090 .111

(.038) (.034)War 1.551 1.390

(.203) (.156)PTSt1 2.482 2.425

(.130) (.099)

N 1598 2443Pseudo R2 .5154 .4847LPL -1162.3292 -1887.9704


10

ReferencesAlvarez, Mike, Jose Antonio Cheibub, Fernando Limongi and Adam Przeworski. 1996. Clas-

sifying Political Regimes. Studies in Comparative International Development 31(2):336.

Cheibub, Jose Antonio, Jennifer Gandhi and James Raymond Vreeland. 2010. Democracyand Dictatorship Revisited. Public Choice 143:67101.

Ellingsen, Tanja and Nils Petter Gleditsch. 1997. Democracy and Armed Conflict in theThird World. In Causes of Conflict in Third World Countries, ed. Ketil Volden and DanSmith. Oslo: North-South Coalition and International Peace Research Institute pp. 6981.

Fein, Helen. 1995. More Murder in the Middle: Life Integrity Violations and Democracy inthe World, 1987. Human Rights Quarterly 17:170191.

Opp, Karl-Dieter. 1994. Repression and Revolutionary Action: East Germany in 1989.Rationality and Society 6:101138.

Przeworski, Adam, Michael Alvarez and Jos Antonio Cheibub. 2000. Democracy and De-velopment: Political Insititutions and Well-Being in the World, 19501990. Cambridge,UK and New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Regan, Patrick M. and Errol A. Henderson. 2002. Democracy, Threats, and Political Re-pression in Developing Countries: Are Democracies Internally Less Violent? Third WorldQuarterly 23(1):119136.

Vreeland, James Raymond. 2008. The Effect of Political Regime on Civil War: UnpackingAnocracy. Journal of Conflict Resolution 52(3):401425.

11

Figure1:

Mod

eratingIm

pact

ofRegim

eTyp

eon

theRelationshipBetweenIncreasing

UnearnedRevenues(FuelR

ents)

andRepression:

FullResults

0.1.2.3.4Pr(PTS=1)

-8-6

-4-2

02

46

810

ln(F

uel R

ents

)

Auto

crac

yD

emoc

racy

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02

46

810

ln(F

uel R

ents

)

Auto

crac

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emoc

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-8-6

-4-2

02

46

810

ln(F

uel R

ents

)

Auto

crac

yD

emoc

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0.005.01.015.02Pr(PTS=4)

-8-6

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02

46

810

ln(F

uel R

ents

)

Auto

crac

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emoc

racy

0.0002.0004.0006.0008.001Pr(PTS=5)

-8-6

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02

46

810

ln(F

uel R

ents

)

Auto

crac

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emoc

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sourc

e:Tab

le2,

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e.Valuesarepred

ictedprob

abilities

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ingin

each

PTScatego

ryas

revenu

esfrom

oila

ndna

tural

gasincrease

forfullau

tocracies(solid

line;

Polity=

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andfullde

mocracies

(dashe

dlin

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10).

Rep

ortedprob

abilities

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lesat

medians.

12

Figure2:

Mod

eratingIm

pact

ofRegim

eTyp

eon


UnearnedRevenues(O

ilExp

orts)

andRepression:

FullResults

0

0.05

0.1

0.15

0.2

0.25

Autocracy

Dem

ocracy

Pr(PTS=1)

Not Oil Expo

rter

Oil Expo

rter

0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

Autocracy

Dem

ocracy

Pr(PTS=2)

Not Oil Expo

rter

Oil Expo

rter

0

0.05

0.1

0.15

0.2

0.25

0.3

0.35

0.4

0.45

0.5

Autocracy

Dem

ocracy

Pr(PTS=3)

Not Oil Expo

rter

Oil Expo

rter

0

0.005

0.01

0.015

0.02

0.025

0.03

0.035

Autocracy

Dem

ocracy

Pr(PTS=4)

Not Oil Expo

rter

Oil Expo

rter

0

0.0002

0.0004

0.0006

0.0008

0.001

0.0012

0.0014

0.0016

0.0018

0.002

Autocracy

Dem

ocracy

Pr(PTS=5)

Not Oil Expo

rter

Oil Expo

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sourc

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le2,

columntw

o.Valuesarepred

ictedprob

abilities

ofbe

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each

PTScatego

ryforstates

that

doan

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expo

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Rep

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med

ians.

13

Figure3:

Mod

eratingIm

pact

ofUnearnedRevenues(FuelR

ents)on


Dem

ocracy

andRepression:

FullResults

0.1.2.3.4Pr(PTS=1)

-10

-8-6

-4-2

02

46

810

Dem

ocra

cy

Min

imum

Fue

l Ren

tsM

axim

um F

uel R

ents

.5.55.6.65.7Pr(PTS=2)

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-8-6

-4-2

02

46

810

Dem

ocra

cy

Min

imum

Fue

l Ren

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axim

um F

uel R

ents

0.1.2.3.4.5Pr(PTS=3)

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-8-6

-4-2

02

46

810

Dem

ocra

cy

Min

imum

Fue

l Ren

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axim

um F

uel R

ents

0.005.01.015.02.025Pr(PTS=4)

-10

-8-6

-4-2

02

46

810

Dem

ocra

cy

Min

imum

Fue

l Ren

tsM

axim

um F

uel R

ents

0.0005.001.0015Pr(PTS=5)

-10

-8-6

-4-2

02

46

810

Dem

ocra

cy

Min

imum

Fue

l Ren

tsM

axim

um F

uel R

ents

sourc

e:Tab

le2,

columnon

e.Valuesarepred

ictedprob

abilities

ofbe

ingin

each

PTScatego

ryas

democracy

increasesforstates

within-sam

pleminim

uman

dmax

imum

rentsfrom

oila

ndna

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as.Rep

ortedprob

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les

atmedians.

14

Figure4:

Mod

eratingIm

pact

ofUnearnedRevenues(O

ilExp

orts)on


Dem

ocracy

andRepression:

FullResults

.05.1.15.2Pr(PTS=1)

-10

-8-6

-4-2

02

46

810

Dem

ocra

cy

Not O

il Exp

orte

rO

il Exp

orte

r

.5.55.6.65.7Pr(PTS=2)

-10

-8-6

-4-2

02

46

810

Dem

ocra

cy

Not O

il Exp

orte

rO

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orte

r.1.2.3.4

Pr(PTS=3)

-10

-8-6

-4-2

02

46

810

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ocra

cy

Not O

il Exp

orte

rO

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r

.005.01.015.02.025Pr(PTS=4)

-10

-8-6

-4-2

02

46

810

Dem

ocra

cy

Not O

il Exp

orte

rO

il Exp

orte

r

0.0005.001.0015Pr(PTS=5)

-10

-8-6

-4-2

02

46

810

Dem

ocra

cy

Not O

il Exp

orte

rO

il Exp

orte

r

sourc

e:Tab

le2,

columnon

e.Valuesarepred

ictedprob

abilities

ofbe

ingin

each

PTScatego

ryas

democracy

increasesforstates

that

doan

ddo

notearn

atleaston

e-thirdof

allexp

ortrevenu

esfrom

fuel.Rep

ortedprob

abilities

arecalculated

withothe

rvariab

les

atmedians.

15

Figure 5: Moderating Impact of Regime Type on the Relationship Between IncreasingUnearned Revenues and Repression: Marginal Effects

-.025

0.0

25.0

5

Mar

gina

l Effe

ct o

f Une

arne

d R

even

ue

-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10

Democracy

Marginal Effect of UER 95% Confidence Interval

UER = ln(fuel and natural gas rents)

-.3-.1

50

.15

.3

Mar

gina

l Effe

ct o

f Une

arne

d Re

venu

e

-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10

Democracy

Marginal Effect of UER 95% Confidence Interval

UER = Oil Exporter?

source: Table 1 of this supplement, columns one (top panel) and two (bottom panel). Values aremarginal effects of UER on repression across the full range of democracy.

16

Figure 6: Moderating Impact of Unearned Revenues on the Relationship BetweenIncreasing Democracy and Repression: Marginal Effects

-.03

-.015

0.0

15.0

3M

argi

nal E

ffect

of D

emoc

racy

0 2 4 6 8 10

ln(Fuel Rents per Capita)

Marginal Effect of Democracy 95% Confidence Interval

-.03

-.015

0.0

15.0

3

Mar

gina

l Effe

ct o

f Dem

ocra

cy

0 1

Oil Exporter

Marginal Effect of Democracy 95% Confidence Interval

source: Table 1 of this supplement, columns one (top panel) and two (bottom panel). Values aremarginal effects of regime type on repression across the full range of UER.

17

online supplement to: constrained by the bank and the...

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