oshana moral autonomy

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Personal Autonom y and Society

Marina A. L. Oshana

Recent work in philosophy has addressed the issue of personal au-tonomy as a phenomenon distinct from free will and moral responsibility. Iwant to add to the discussion. Specifically, I wish to defend the claim thatpersonal autonomy, understood as self-government, is a socio-relationalphenomenon. By this I mean that autonomy is a condition of persons con-stituted, in large part, by the external, social relations people find them-selves in (or the absence of certain social relations).'

I will contrast the social or external account with what I will callinternalist or psychological theories of self-determination. Briefly,

internalist theories take the perspective of the individual whose self-gov-ernment is at issue to determine her autonomy. Such accounts are Cartesianin that they make the autonomy of persons derivative of specific psycho-logical conditions. What goes on in the head of the individual, rather thanwhat goes on in the world around her, decides her standing as self-govem-ing or not.

will begin by offering a set of quite general intuitions about what wemean when we say that an individual is self-governing. I think these intui-tions will be accepted by those, such as the internalist, who propose quitedifferent accounts of autonomy from my own, and I will employ themthroughout this paper.

Next, I will review in greater detail intemalist theories of autonomy.Although internalist accounts enjoy current favor, I think they are inad-equate. For provided that certain psychological conditions are met, an

intemalist would count as autonomous one who is enslaved, or bound andgagged. The externalist, by contrast, will deny autonomy to this personand will claim that to characterize him as such is counterintuitive.

In section three, will offer several case studies intended to documentthe inadequacies of intemalist accounts. I will then propose a set of condi-tions for an external or social account of autonomy suggested by these casestudies. In the fifth and final section, I shall explore the consequences andthe advantages of a socia1 focus. My aim is to show that a socio-relationalconception of autonomy is of greater philosophical value and intuitive ap-peal than are various intemalist accounts.

1 Intuitions about Autonomy

Generally speaking, an autonomous person is one who is self-directed.

JOURNAL of SOCIAL PHILOSOPHYVol. 9 No. 1, Spring 1998 81-102998 Journal o Social Philosophy


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8 Marina A L. Oshana

The autonomous person formulates certain goals ,as relevant to the di rection of her life, and is able to pursue these goals and make them effective naction. Moreover, she formulates these goals according to values, desires,and convictions that have developed in an uncoerced and conscious fash-ion. Such values can be described as he agents o w n even while they reflectthe influence of factors external to her. Additionally, an autonomous per-son is able to meet her goals without depending upon the judgments ofothers as to their validity and importance. Though the autonomous indi-vidual may require the assistance of others in meeting these goals, she de-cides which of them are most important.

Together, the intuitions suggest that an autonomous person is in con-trol of her choices, her actions, and her will? There are many ways to un-derstand the phenomenon of being in control. The idea could be interpretedweakly. Some philosophers contend, for example, that a person can remainin control of his choices, actions, and will even when the person acts under

conditions that could undermine self-government. For example, the per-son who, for reasons of drug addiction, coercion, subordinate rank, or weak-ness of will, could not do otherwise than perform a particular act (ingest adrug, relinquish money to a mugger, execute a military order, or blow adiet) might nevertheless be deemed in control of his actions if he wouldhave done the act anyway independently and of his own free will. Thuscontrol is possible even in the absence of alternate possibilities, and in theface of factors that are suffiaent to determine ones actions? It is this sort ofcontrol that the internalists tend to highlight.

I believe that personal autonomy calls for a more stringent interpreta-tion of being in control. As the case studies that follow illustrate, a personmight independently arrive at preferences that mirror those she holds un-der conditions where control is absent. It may even be fortunate that thiscoincidence occurs. But the fact that there is this coincidence will not de-cide in favor of autonomy. When we say that a person is self-governingbecause she is in control of her actions and choices, we are saying morethan that the persons actions coincide with preferences or values that areher own. We are saying that the person has the power to determine howshe shall live. Being autonomous is not simply a matter of having valuesthat are authentic, but of directing ones life according to such values. Andthis calls for control over ones external circumstances.

One familiar way to understand these intui,tions is through the ideathat autonomy is the good which paternalism fails to respect. The autono-

mous individual may heed the advice, even the directives, of others, andher choices and actions may be inspired by a source other than herself. Butno one must decide or act for the individual, and the opinions of othersmust not be the wellspring from which the individual judges her choicesand actions to be valid and legitimate.

The self-governing person must face minimal interference in her ac-tions and choices. Interferences can be of a psychological or a physical na-ture, and they can originate from within the individual as easily as they can


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participation in that process. Christman identifies autonomy as the actualpsychological condition of self-government defined as the ability to be self-governing.11 He contends that this condition is forthcoming when anindividuals psychology remains, throughout its history, free from factors

that illegitimately influence the individual. Illegitimate influences are thosethat compromise an individuals ability to evaluate the manner in whichthe desires that motivate her are formed.

A fourfold test precludes illegitimacy and thereby determines autonomy:factors external to the individual cannot be the sole causes of the individualspreferences; the process by which a person comes to have desires, and thefactors that influence the development of desires, must be transparent tothe person; if, at any moment, the person wishes to revise her desires oncethe manner in which they transpire is evident to her, she must be able to doso; and the person must be rational, i.e., her desires must emerge from aconsistent set of beliefs.12

htemalist theories deserve praise. Characteristics of a persons psy-chology, including dispositional qualities and traits of temperament, arecertainly relevant to that persons preparedness for self-go~enunent.~~ naddition, the internalist approach offers a way of dealing with the worrythat self-determination calls for self-creation or complete control over oneslife. Whether or not causal determinism is true, this seems a difficult condi-tion to meet. We are, after all, interdependent in many ways, and are subjectto a variety of external influences, and it is not obvious that all of theseundermine autonomy.

The hierarchical analysis of Dworkin circumvents this putative require-ment by noting that autonomy is guaranteed as long as nothing occurs tocompromise the structural ntegrity of the agents psychology. Autonomydoes not require that a persons desires or values have developed underconditions over which she has complete control. In fad, that a person hasbeen subject to coercion, manipulation, deception, or run-of-the-mill social-ization is unimportant; what is important is the effect such factors can haveupon her capacity to identify with her operative desires and in a procedur-ally independent manner,

Similarly, Christman argues that autonomy cannot be a matter of beingunaffected by any of the multitude of external influences that make self-creation impossible. Rather, what distinguishes the autonomous from thenonautonomous agent is that whatever factors do affect the psychology ofthe former neither constrain her reflective capacities nor compromise herability to approve or disapprove of the manner in which her motivationswere formed.

But the intemalists approach to personal autonomy is not without itsproblems. Two consequences are especially noteworthy.

First, intemalist theories in effect assimilate autonomy with respect toones preferences or values with the autonomy of persons, as if what can bepredicated of the former can be predicated of persons as well. This assimi-lation signals the need for an alternate account of self-government. The prob-


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Personal Autonomy and Society 85

lem is not merely that internalists lack an adequate account of the conditionof personal autonomy in terms of things other than preferences. Rather,they contend that the autonomy of persons is a matter of the condition of apersons psychology, and they seek no other account. Nor is it true that theintemalist is attempting to explain something other than the autonomy ofpersons, such as psychological freedom simpliciter. What is distinctive aboutthe internalist is his attempt to explain the autonomy of persons in terms ofones autonomy with respect to ones psychological states.

But, as the case studies will show, there is no natural transition from aconception of autonomy that focuses on psychological states, or capacities,to an account of the autonomy of persons. Although a persons status asself-governing is in part dependent on her psychology, personal au-tonomy and autonomy vis a vis ones psychological states differ in kind;since the subjects vary, the conditions for each may vary as well. In anyevent, what I am interested in is not autonomy with respect to ones

preferences or history and the conditions that make that possible butrather the autonomy of persons, persons who have certain preferences,and who pursue certain options.

Second, according to internalist theories, people with the same psychol-ogy are, ips0 facto, equally autonomous (or nonautonomous). A moreexternalist theory such as I will offer denies that personal autonomy is acondition that supervenes on psychological or dispositional states alone.On the external analysis, it is possible for two individuals to satisfy all thepsychological and historical conditions we have been discussing, but todiffer with respect to their status as autonomous beings-and this differ-ence is to be explained in terms of some variance in their social circum-stances. (The study of Harriet, in the following section, illustrates this point.)In addition to whatever subjective psychological characteristics are requiredfor autonomy there are objective social criteria according to which we judgesomeone as autonomous, and these external criteria are independent of theindividuals internal state.

I have called the externalist account I favor socio-relational by way ofcontrasting it with an internalist account. By this do not mean to implythat intemalist accounts lack a relational component, and that they are flawedfor this reason. My complaint about intemalist accounts of autonomy is notthat they fail to include among the components of a persons psychologycertain relational or interactive qualities or abilities. Rather, my complaintis that such accounts are exclusively subjective. The agents psychological

condi ion-specifically, the structural and historical character of her judg-ments and preferences-is alone important for her autonomy.The psychological emphasis of internalist theories reflects the convic-

tion that preserving the autonomy of persons consists in preserving wh atis metaphorically described as the inner citadel. The metaphor asksus to assume the existence of some essential (presumably psychological)element of the individual, independent of the world and inviolable, invirtue of which autonomy is safeguarded. This element is often referred


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to as the true self or real self.14I do not thi nk the imagery of an inner citadel advances our understand-

ing of personal autonomy. In the first place, the existence of such an ele-ment is questionable and requires considerable defense; at the very least,

we need some explanation of what ths true self is. (Perhaps it is something akin to Kants Wille?) In the second place, our intuitions make itunlikely that it will be a condition that attaches to a person as to an entityseparated from the world, as the metaphor implies. Moreover, if I am cor-rect that autonomy is determined by how a person interacts with others,the metaphor of the inner citadel will not accurately capture the conditionof the self-determined agent.

2 Case Studies

The following four case studies establish that persons who are

nonautonomous in certain situations fail to be autonomous because theylack characteristics that only a socia l theory of self-determination can ac-commodate. Each is intended to highlight the extemalists intuition thatautonomy is incompatible with constraint-even where constraint is self-chosen and reflects a free, rational choice. The first three cases depict per-sons who satisfy the various intemalist criteria for autonomy but who nev-ertheless fail to meet the general intuitions for self-government. To sim-plify, I consider a hybrid intemalist theory according to which the criteriaare second-order identification with the operative desire, integration ofmotivational and valuational systems, and historically proper preferenceformation. The fourth case depicts persons who lack autonomy but whonevertheless have authority over this lack.

Case 1: Voltintay laveryConsider the situation of the contented slave. Let us suppose, first, that

the decision to become a slave was autonomous, in that it met the condi-tions for psychological autonomy proffered by the internalists. This indi-vidual has willingly relinquished his rights, and has chosen to be a slaveunder conditions free of whatever factors might impair the autonomy ofhis decision. Second, assume that a life of slavery is consistent with thispersons values and that it satisfies his notion of well-being. What role, ifany do these facts play in determining the autonomy of the slave? Is hisautonomy guaranteed by the fact that he possesses an integrated and co-

herent psychology, and that he has arrived at this preference in a procedur-ally independent manner? Does the fact that he expresses happiness orapproval over his situation transform what seems o be a state that violatesautonomy into one of nonviolation?

It is certainly possible for a persons conception of well-being to fail toinclude an interest in a~tonorny.~ or example, deeply religious personsmay believe that their interests are best served by following, without ques-tion, the edicts of their leaders. Such persons will not value or seek self-


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determination. Furthermore, persons who do value and wish for self-de-termination, but who have given up hope of achieving that state, may for-mulate conceptions of welfare and pursue ventures that perpetuate theircondition. For example, such ndividuals might believe it in their best inter-

ests to remain in dysfunctional domestic situations rather than risk the frus-trations and challenges that accompany life on ones own.16 Not everyone,then, will include the autonomous life among those goals integral to theirwell-being, nor is autonomy guaranteed by an individuals success in achiev-ing what he believes to be in his best interest.

The question of immediate interest is whether the individual who seeksa situation of enslavement-who knowingly, willingly, and freely choosesa life of bondage-where this choice fulfills his version of well-being, isautonomous as a result. I claim that this person is not. The slave does con-sent to the state of affairs in which he finds himself, but what he consents tois a loss of freedom. And although the slave may be unhampered in hispursuit of his conception of the good life, what he has in mind for thatlife, and what he in fact obtains, is a life that satisfies few, if any, of theintuitions described above, and so is a life of nonautonomy.*

For whether or not the slave has freely chosen bondage, and whether ornot, once he is a slave, he expresses pleasure or displeasure with his status,having become a slave he has no authority over those aspects of his socialsituation that influence his will and the direction of his life.Ig Being a slavemeans that how he shall live is, no longer up to him. The slave is denied thepossibility of seeing himself as n ndependent participant in the willing,planning, and controlling aspect of the projects he works on. Instead, he isharnessed to somebody elses ...enterprise as though he were merely a natu-ral force, like a beast of burden or like water-power.20

The slave may never actually experience treatment of the sort that pro-vides plain evidence of a failure of self-determination. But why should suchevidence be required? The slave might always comply with his mastersorders, and as a reward for his obedience he might never suffer punish-ment (assuming, of course, that his master is reasonable). Nevertheless, ser-vility, degradation, the expectation of punishment, and dependence on thegood will of his master are very real, actual properties of his condition,whether or not punitive treatment is ever realized. k i n g a slave means thathe could be punished or mistreated at his masters whim. Thus he fact thathe is not autonomous is a fact about the actual situation, the truth of whichrests upon the truth of certain counterfactual claims.

That the slave feels content does not indicate that he is self-governing.The slave might feel satisfied because the tasks he performs are less menialthan are those performed by his counterparts, and for this he is grateful. Hemay be content because his master allows him the opportunity to learn toread and write, an envied and valuable skill. But the fact that he is better offthan are most other slaves, and that his attitude is one of appreciation, doesnot mean that he is free. His lack of autonomy is in part signaled by the factthat he looks upon literacy as a gift to be thankful for. By contrast, a free


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88 Marina A . L. Oshana

man, even if he were grateful to be literate, would likely view literacy as askill to which he has a right.

What have intemalists to say about the autonomy of the contentedslave?21 Dworkin remarks that

If we conceive of autonomy as the capacity of individuals to criticallyreflect on and take responsibility for the kind of persons they want to be,then ... here is nothing in the idea of autonomy which precludes a personfrom saying: I want to be the kind of person who acts at the commandsof others. I define myself as a slave and endorse those attitudes and pref-erences. My autonomy consists in being a slave.

If t h i s is coherent, and I think it is, one cannot argue against such slaveryon the grounds of autonomy.

But is this coherent? Dworkin claims that one cannot argue that volun-tary slavery offends autonomy, because its voluntary nature renders it con-sistent with autonomy But Dworkins argument is unsatisfactory for thefollowing reasons. First, it relies too heavily on choice as a sufficient condi-tion for autonomy. But choice does not guarantee autonomy, for the personwho chooses might be compelled to do so, and to do so from within theconfines of a situation that grants her no autonomy; consider Sophieschoice.23 And since a person can freely select a life that denies hi m self-determination, the exercise of choice is no guarantee that the result of thatchoice will be a situation in which the chooser is autonomous.

The person who chooses slavery is of course (at least partially) respon-sible for his resulting lack of autonomy But autonomy is absent as ong ashe remains a slave, for he is subject to coercion and his standing remainsone of compliance, submissiveness, and dependency.

This suggests a further point. It is certainly possible that a person couldautonomously choose nonautonomy; the example of the religious devo-tee of fers a plausible case in point. Some, however, would questionwhether the person who conceives of servitude as a state that will con-tribute to his welfare, and who pursues that state in light of this belief-who opts for the choice that denies him autonomy-really is autono-mous to begin with. For example, Thomas Hill recalls Rousseaus thoughtthat the very idea of consenting to slavery (or, analogously, to torture orimprisonment) is incoherent, since it means that the agent displays aconditioned slavish mentality that renders [such] consent worthless.Hill argues that a persons consent releases others from obligation onlyif it is autonomously given, and consent resulting from underestimationof ones moral status [as a human being entitled to a certain body ofrights] is not autonomously

Although I do not share Hills belief, it merits consideration. For if Hi11is correct, then it is unlikely that truly autonomous desires-desires thatmeet the hybrid conditions of the internalist-will be for states of


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Personal Auton om y and Society 89

nonautonomy. A person who is autonomous, or who at least meets theinternalists criteria for psychological autonomy, will desire situations ofautonomy. Equally, a persons desire for nonautonomy will be sufficient tosignal her lack of autonomy or of an autonomous psychology. In short,

being autonomous (or having an autonomous psychology) will turn onhaving desires of a certain sort. I want to put this concern on hold for themoment, and return to it in considering the next case-study. The point to bemade at this juncture is that, if Hills objection holds, it raises difficulties forDworkins claim that the slaves desire is consistent with autonomy.

Finally, Dworkins analysis suggests that the ability to critically reflectin a procedurally independent fashion is sufficient for the condition of be-ing autonomous. But being able to engage in critical reflection, to take stockof oneself and to shape oneself on the basis of this evaluation, does notguarantee that whatever state of affairs ensues from this activity will be oneof personal autonomy. Since actually being autonomous depends on cir-

cumstances beyond those descriptive of a persons psychology, it may stillbe possible to argue against slavery on the grounds of autonomy.

Case 2: The subservient womanConsider the woman whose role as spouse and as homemaker affords

her less recognition and independence than she deserves and than she mightotherwise have. Let us imagine that this woman, whom I shall call Harriet,prefers to be subservient. I will assume that Harriet is sober and mature,and that we have no reason to suspect any failure on her part to give herpreference for this life-style whatever measure of deliberation t merits. Norhave we reason to believe that she has not evaluated her motivations towhatever extent seems appropriate. Harriets reasons for her actions areconsistent, value-reflective, and historically sound. She possesses adequateinformation about, and has taken a critical and reflective stance with regardto, the events that have shaped her character and her desires, and she hasno wish to alter these events. I will even assume that Harriet finds her lifegratifymg and has no wish to alter it. There is nothing she values or wantsmore than she wants subservience. Thus she has no preferences of a higherorder that are somehow ineffective against her will.

Let us return now to Hills concern about persons who choosenonautonomy. Against Hill, I want to deny that Harriets lack of autonomyrests on the substance of her preferences and desires. A persons prefer-ences-for religious devotion, for slavery, for subservience, for power-

can certainly serve as an indicator of that persons ability to be self-govern-ing, and some desires more than others are hospitable to autonomy. Buthaving a desire for nonautonomy does not entail that the individual whohas the desire is nonautonomous; might desire to experience thenonautonomous condition of hypnosis, while being autonomous n my wish.

Nor must such a desire emerge from conditions hostile to autonomy. Ofcourse, if Harriets desire for subservience was produced by a socially rein-forced belief in her inferior status, then we might be persuaded that her


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choice was not autonomous. Her lack of autonomy could be traced to anunsupportive history? But we have assumed that such a history is not trueof Harriet. In spite of the fact that Harriet's desires may be regrettable, shemeets the intemalist's qualifications for autonomy?

Harriet's lack of autonomy is not due to her lamentable desires. Butneither is her self-determination guaranteed by the fact that she satisfies theintemalist criteria. Harriet has the right psychology. Nonetheless she failsto be autonomous-not because she wants to be subservient, but becauseshe is subservient. Her lack of autonomy is due to her personal relationswith others and to the social institutions of her society.

Let us assume the social relations Harriet is party to, given her role ashomemaker, afford her less financial flexibility, less confidence and emo-tional security and fewer opportunities for intellectual and creative devel-opment than she could have were these relations otherwise.u Absent, too,from Harriet's life are economic and political institutions that might em-

power homemakers.Harriet's life is similar o that standardly ascribed to an average womanin a fundamentalist Islamic society. She has few options for action and littleauthority over her social situation. Although Harriet is master of her will,although she lives in a manner consonant with her preferences, the choicesshe makes are guided almost entirely by the judgments and recommenda-tions of others. Taken together, these facts imply that Harriet is not autono-mous. But an internalist theory would characterize her as autonomous,despite her subservient situation.

We might strengthen this case by assuming that Harriet's regard forothers not only exceeds any regard she pays herself, but supersedes or sup-plants that regard. We could assume Harriet does not th nk of herself asanything other than an other-regarding caregiver, and that she fails to per-ceive herself as someone whose activities, needs, preferences, and interestshave value independently of the value they have for others. We could de-scribe Harriet as someone who systematically disregards her own counsel,and fails to act in a self-managed way.

We need not do this, however, since Harriet's lack of autonomy is notowing to a deficient measure of self-regard, nor to the failure of others toaccord her consideration. Self-respect and respectful treatment from othersmay make it more likely that a person will be autonomous, but neither areconstitutive of self-governmerkB Certainly how a person regards herselfcolors the choices she makes, the activities she pursues, and the desires she

has. And when a person's feelings of inadequacy cause her chronically tomake choices which call for submission to humiliation or maltreab~ent, ~~choices which will be attended by an acceptance of maltreatment from oth-ers, autonomy is impossible.

Similarly, self-respect is needed to inspire others to reciprocate with asimilar attitude of respect toward oneself. The person who, for example,constantly reneges on, or is inconsistent about, the personal values he es-tablishes for himself exhibits no commitment to these and so cannot expect


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that others will take his expression of these values seriously. As a result,others might regard this individual as less than capable of self-governmentjust because he appears incapable of upholding a system of values. None-theless, that a person respects himself or fails to do so will not decide hisstatus as self-governing.

The inadequacy of intemalist accounts can be illustrated by contrastingthe case of Harriet with that of a homemaker who is self-governing. BothHarriet and her counterpart, whom I shall call Wilma, share the propertiestouted by the internalist. Both possess structurally coherent psychologies,and each offers reasons for her actions that are consistent, value-reflec-tive, and historically sound. But suppose that the personal relations inwhich Wilma finds herself, and the social institutions that affect her life,afford her control over her choices. She directs her life from within arange of possibilities that promise economic independence and the op-

portunity for personal growth. Moreover, although Wilma may viewherself as an other-regarding caregiver, she is treated by others as onewhose needs and wants deserve to be respected, and this desert is rein-forced by her social situation. While both women desire to be of serviceto others, only Harriet finds herself subservient. Wilma can be describedas autonomous while Harriet cannot.

Case #3: The conscientious objectorConsider the conscientious objector (CO) who chooses prison rather

than denounce his pacifistic principles. Let us suppose that the CO identi-fies with his choice, and it is the choice most consistent with his values. Hemight even be said to have brought imprisonment upon himself. But sinceincarceration denies the CO control over his daily life, and renders himdependent on the judgment and will of others for the satisfaction of hisobjectives and for the direction of his life, the CO must be judged

nonautonomous. The intemalist, however, will claim that the CO notmerely decides in an autonomous fashion, but that he remains autonomousinsofar as the psychological and historical criteria are met. The CO maymarshal the respect of others; he might be admired, perhaps even by hiscaptors, for his emotional fortitude or for his fidelity to his principles. (Theslave might be similarly admired.) But respect of this sort will not make theincarcerated individual autonomous.

The following analogy may help illurninate the extemalist's assessment

of the slave, the housewife, and the CO. Consider a state occupied andcontrolled by a foreign power. The state might not object to this occupation.Indeed, its Congress might vote after the occupation to welcome the for-eign power, and might develop a rational plan of action for the occupation.And the citizens might never experience hardship or adversity in this situ-ation. n intemalist account would call this state autonomous because it ismaster of its will; the state has fashioned goals for itself of which it ap-proves, the political situation external to its goveming body notwithstand-ing. But an extemalist will claim that it makes more sense to deny that this


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state is self-governing because it is subject to the dictates of a foreign power.Not being subject to the dictates of others is part of what it means to be self-governing. This is as true of a state as it is of a slave.

Case 4: ThemonkIt is possible to relinquish ones autonomous condition without losing

authority over that condition. A monk, for example, who opts o live underthe dictates of a religious order, thereby foregoing his autonomy may none-theless preserve the power to reinstate his autonomy. Suppose that everyyear it is up to the monk to decide whether to remain in the order and tocontinue conducting his life in a manner that denies him a fuller range offreedom. Then, even if the religious order has power over i m sufficient tocompel hi m to behave in a certain way, the monk can annul this powerannually, in much the same way that individuals have the legal authority todissolve the terms of certain contracts.30 Unlike the slave, the monk has

consented to a condition that guarantees him ultimate authority over him-self on a yearly basis, and he is sovereign in ths regard.

Nonetheless, his monastic superiors preserve authority in the interim,for his life is ruled by them on a daily basis. Thus he fact that the monk canannul his status as nonautonomous does not mean he is self-governing. Butin light of the social relations he is party to, the monk can become self-governing merely by revoking his decision to be subservient. The slave is ina different social position, a position which, unlike that of the monk, makesit impossible for him to annul his status.3l

I should caution that what decides a persons autonomy s not the inter-val of time for which a person behaves (or fails to behave) in a self-man-aged way. As I noted earlier, the presence or absence of local or occurrentcontrol does not grant or rob a person of a life of self-government.J2 Just asone who occasionally tells a lie can be an honest person, and one who isoccasionally despondent can be a happy person, so, too, can a person beautonomous even though her life might include moments of nonautonomy.For example, the person might be suffering from a severe bout of flu.

Equally, the monk (or the slave) fails to be self-governing though on occa-sion he might be in control of some aspect of his life. What I am interested inis a global sense of autonomy-the idea of living a self-governed life, theidea of autonomy as a global condition of persons rather than a transientcharacteristic.=

Let me summarize some of the ideas posed by the case studies. Au-tonomy requires more than upholding a persons values and conception ofwell-being. It requires more than the ability to formulate and execute a planfor life. It requires more than the ability to judge favorably of ones history.A n individual does not enjoy autonomy because he is admired by othersany more than he lacks autonomy merely because he depends on others.Rather, autonomy is determined by what dependency and admiration en-tail for persons in their daily lives. A self-governing person must be able toevaluate his reasons for action, and in a socially and psychologically unfet-


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tered way. Moreover, the choices he makes and the goals he sets as relevantto the direction of his life must emanate from a variety of acceptable alter-natives, and the individual must be able to pursue these choices withoutundue social or psychological cost.

4 The Conditions for Personal Autonomy

The preceding scenarios indicate the need for the following conditionsfor autonomy In conjunction with one another they are sufficient to consti-tute autonomy. I recognize that persons can be more or less autonomous,and that not everyone need be autonomous to the same degree in order tocount as autonomous. But these conditions must be satisfied, each to somesignificant degree, if a person is to be autonomous. Thus, here is a thresh-old for autonomy. The scope of this paper does not allow a satisfactorydiscussion of the threshold. However, it should be apparent that I view the

satisfaction of the intemalists conditions required for autonomy vis a vispreferences to fall short of the threshold required for the autonomy of agents.

Condition #I: Critical reflectionFirst, autonomy requires that persons be able to engage in the psycho-

logical activity of critical reflection assumed by the intemalist. On my view,a person engages in critical reflection when she assumes the stance of athird party in appraising her motivations and actions, and the environmentin which these develop. The individual assesses these as she would themotives, actions, and environment of another comparably developed hu-man being. If, on the basis of this evaluation, the individual accepts her

motivations as her own-if she identifies with them-then they are au-thentic. If she does not identify with them, then they may require correctionor revision.34

Condition 2 r oced ti ral independenceIn order to be autonomous, an agent must not in fact be influenced or

restricted by others in autonomy-constraining ways. That an individualhappens to reach, via critical reflection, certain conclusions about the infl u-ences which affect her is not sufficient to determine whether she is autono-mow. For a person can decide, mistakenly, that she has not been affected inways that jeopardize autonomy, even where she has in fact been so affected.

Hence the need for a condition of procedural independence (PI). ForDworkin, PI is satisfied when a persons critical faculties have not beeninfluenced in ways that undermine the authenticity of the motivations thatare appraised by those faculties. Dworkin takes PI to guarantee the integ-rity of a persons critical faculties, but he wants to remain neutral with re-spect to the kinds of situations and influences (external or internal) that areconducive to such integrity.

However, I dont believe an account of PI can be neutral in this fashion.For if a person is to appraise her desires under conditions of PI, the environ-


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ment must be free of whatever variety of factors destroy the psychologicalintegrity of the person, and disable the person in her relations with others.For example, the environment must be noncoerave and nonmanipulative.In general, PI incorporates certain (rather open-ended) standards of histori-cal and social-relational legitimacy into the criteria for personal autonomy.I take these standards to characterize substantively the manner in whichthe autonomous individual relates to others in the world.

Condition 3: Access to a range of relevant optionsThe self-governing individual must have access to an adequate assort-

ment of options. It is not enough that a person acknowledges the state ofaffairs in which she finds herself as one she would consent to even if shewere lacking any other options, for the fact that a person finds her choiceacceptable does not mean that an acceptable range of choices was hers. Anassortment is not adequate f a person can only choose nonautonomy. Thus

the option to choose nonsubservience must be available to the agent. Nor isan assortment adequate if the agent's choices are alldictated by duress (eco-nomic, emotional, etc.) or by bodily needs. The social climate must be sen-sitive to the fact that humans are not brute creatures; they are individualswhose physical and emotional well-being depends on the ability to engagethe body and the mind variously and creatively. Moreover, these optionsmust be real -they must be options that a person can, in fact, hope toachieve, and they must be relevant to the development of her life.%

Condition 4: Social-relational propertiesIn order to be autonomous, a person who is in a society must find her-

self within a set of relations with others that enable her to pursue her goalsin a context of social and psychological security. By this I mean that a person'ssocial background, where this includes social institutions, must be such thatthe following are true:

a. The individual can defend herself against (or be granted defenseagainst) psychological or physical assault when it is necessary to do so.

b. The individual can defend herself against (or be granted defenseagainst) attempts to deprive her of her civil and economic rights, whereand when such attempts arise.

c. The individual need not take responsibility for another's needs, ex-pectations, and failings unless doing so is agreed upon or is reasonablyexpected of the individual in light of a particular f ~ n ~ t i ~ n ? ~

d. The individual can have, and can pursue, values, interests, needs,and goals different from those who have influence and authority over her,without interference or risk of reprisal sufficient to deter her in this pursuit.

Although only the fourth condition of personal autonomy is explicitlylabeled social-relational, conditions 1 3 can also be characterized as ap-pealing to external circumstances and relations beyond the psychology ofthe agent as essential to self-government. All contribute to a conception ofSelf-government hat is distinct from an account of psychological freedom.%


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The claim of the extemalist is that a sensible characterization of autonomyrequires a certain environment external to the agent whose self-govern-ment is at issue. Together, the four conditions should be sufficient to guar-antee that an individual is autonomous-that she is an independent par-ticipant in situations that pertain o the diredion of her life and to the projectsshe selects as important to her life, that she is not captive to social impedi-ments, or to psychological and physical disabilities, of the sort that preventher from forrriulating and realizing her goals, and that she is able to sustainherself without relying on the judgment and will of others.

Notice that satisfaction of these conditions does not guarantee that aperson will be autonomous at some point of time or with respect to someparticular function. I might meet these conditions and so be an autono-mous agent, but at the moment be too distraught by some crisis to functionin a self-directed way. The role of these conditions-in particular the lattertwo-is not to account for the means to securing control over ones imme-

diate situation but to illustrate what is absent in the lives of individuals likethe slave, the subservient housewife, the prisoner, and the monk. As I havenoted, personal autonomy is a stable property of an autonomous personrather than a transient characteristic.

5 Why Social Autonomy?

Part 1 The consequences ofan external analysisThe externalist account that I advocate has the following consequences.

First, the emphasis moves from the autonomy of preferences or values tothe autonomy of persons. Though a persons psychological status affects

that persons ability to be self-governing, actually being autonomous is atleast partly a function of social relationships, and states of affairs, that ob-tain independently of these psychological properties.

Second, personal autonomy cannot be determined solely by referenceto a persons history, or to the history of his psychological states, even givena historical account that is sensitive to the persons socio-relational back-ground. In general, intemalists who offer a historical account fail to discussthe conditions under which a suitable psychology must develop in termsthat are clearly sensitive to the agents socio-relational environment. Forexample, the reflection-constraining factors and illegitimate nfluenceswhich Christman employs to test the autonomy of persons offer no morethan veiled references to the social relations that affect the agents psycho-

logical capacities,J9It is likely, however, that the internalist has in mind certain social fac-

tors and influences when he speaks of appropriate and inappropriate influ-ences. But even if he does, the only facts the internalist addresses are factsabout a persons psychological history-facts pertaining to the develop-ment of the agents capacity to reflect upon, revise, and identify with herpsychological states. I claim, however, that to the extent an agents historyis important for her autonomy, much more than her psychological history


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is at stake. For example, what ishistorically relevant to the monks autonomyis that his monastic order permits hi m to leave when he sees fit. What ishistorically relevant to Harriets lack of autonomy is a pattern of social prac-tices that have made her subject, rather than sovereign, of her life.

But a deeper difficulty confronts any historical account of autonomy.This is that history is important for autonomy only to the extent that it re-sults in a certain state of affairs in the present. The fact that a persons his-tory offers an optimal breeding ground for autonomy, ands o is a historyhappily free of autonomy-constraining factors, is relevant for personal au-tonomy only if that history yields the kind of social relations and psycho-logical stability that are suitable for self-government. A persons historymay contribute to an ability to live a self-determined life, but does not con-stitute autonomy.

A third consequence of a social account is that the autonomous indi-vidual is regarded in a less atomistic light than might be expected from an

intemalist theory of self-determination. Kants account of autonomy, forexample, is atomistic in that the locus of autonomy s the will of the rationalindividual. What occurs external to this person in the larger social and phe-nomenal environment is of no consequence.40 By contrast, my view of au-tonomy is, in a manner of speaking, heteronomous, since I make au-tonomy a characteristic that attaches to persons in light of their socio-rela-tional standing.

The fact that autonomy is a phenomenon that is best understoodrelationally does not mean that a person can only be autonomous in aninterpersonal context. People can, of course, oversee their choices and di-rect their lives when distant from others; a Robinson Crusoe, for example,

who has never interacted with others could be described as autonomous.But Crusoes autonomy would still be a matter of his not being enslaved,and the like. We call people autonomous (or refuse to do so) in part byexamining their external circumstances.

Part 2. Theftinctionofa socialfocusThe social relations in which a person finds himself contribute both

causally and materially to the condition of autonomy. The intemalist would,I believe, concede that appropriate social relations contribute causally toautonomy. For, assuming that an individual does not suffer from whateverpsychological infirmities might make autonomy difficult even in the mosthospitable of social situations, a person in appropriate social circumstancesis more likely to experience psychotogical autonomy. The principal psy-chological characteristics of self-determination-an ability to engage in ra-tional, reflexive self-evaluation, and identification with ones motives-flour-ish when a person interacts with others in unimpeded ways.

But since the intemalist views psychological freedom as sufficient forself-government, he is likely to see no other role than a causal one for socialrelations to play. Appropriate social conditions provide the backgroundagainst which persons can implement whatever psychological abilities pre-


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pare them for autonomy but the intemalist will contend that a person neednot be in these social situations in order to meet the requisite psychologicalconditions and, thereby be autonomous.

Our case studies, however, illustrate that satisfylng the psychological

conditions simply will not be sufficient for self-government. We can speakof a persons desires as autonomous, or of a person as autonomous over herdesires, even where the person is not autonomous (just as we can speak ofa persons desires as satisfied even where the person is not). We refuse tocount the slave et al. as self-governing because his external environmentrenders hi m incapable of functioning in a self-governing way.

Not being subject to the dictates of others, or not being severely con-strained, or not having an adequate range of options might only be causallynecessary for meeting the internalists conditions-for being what one mightcall a rational planner. But they are constitutively necessary for beingautonomous. Thus n addition to whatever role social conditions play in

bringing about a climate more conducive to self-government, anunconstraining social situation is partly constitutive of, or contributes ma-terially to, self-government.

Part 3. Theadvantages of social fociisfor airtonomyThe intemalist might raise the following objection. He might object that

two separate notions of autonomy are a t issue, and accuse me of havingequivocated between them. For while the intemalist defines autonomy interms of psychological conditions by way of the criteria supplied in sec-tion two), he might say I am developing a different notion of autonomy.Perhaps he would concede that an extemalist analysis plays a useful role incertain contexts, but he will contend that the intemalists conception of au-tonomy is legitimate in its own right. It is not incoherent or improper toanalyze autonomy in a Cartesian fashion.

In support of his complaint, the intemalist may deny he shares my in-tuitions about self-government. Believing that personal autonomy consistsin the integrity of the inner citadel, the internalist might contend that theperson who is subjugated and controlled, either because of natural or artifi-cial factors, may nevertheless be autonomous vis a vis a properly struc-tured or welldeveloped set of preferences, or vis a vis the possession ofsome intrinsic disposition for autonomy. As a result, the intemalist will findhis own criteria for autonomy quite adequate: autonomy is a condition thatsupervenes on psychological states, and the presence or absence of socio-

relational conditions, if relevant at all, is useful only as a way of explainingwhat is required for the exercise of autonomy, understood as the realizationof these psychological states.

Perhaps there are different notions of self-government at play here. ButI doubt it. I think the intemalist would accept the intuitions about self-gov-ernment offered earlier, and that his objective, like that of the externalist, isto provide an account of autonomy that will capture these intuit ions. thinkthese intuitions are sound, and that they show that what needs to be ana-


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lyzed is a condition that is more plausibly called self-government than isany purely psychological state.

Moreover, to the extent the case studies show autonomy to be lackingin the lives of certain agents, we can say that autonomy requires control

over one's external situation, a viable range of options for choice, and theabsence of severe constraint. While the internalist disregards (or at best,sidesteps) these consequences, the externalist confronts them. Thus thephilosophical work a socio-relational theory of self-determination can dogives it a theoretical advantage over a more psychologistic approach.

Three benefits, in particular, attend such an approach. One advantageis that such an account recognizes our status as social creatures. Isaiah Ber-lin, commenting on the desire persons have for social recognition and fra-ternity, says that my independent self is not something which I can detachfrom my relationship with others, or from those attributes of myself whichconsist in their attitude towards me.''41 And Joel Feinberg notes that to be

a human being is to be part of a community, ...o take one's place in an al-ready functioning group. We come to awareness of ourselves as part of nongoing social process ...defined by reciprocal bonds of obligation, c o m o ntraditions, and in st itut i~ns . ~~

One might object that an account of autonomy such as I offer makesautonomy possible only within a rather limited range of social circumstances.As a result, my account might be deemed too restrictive to be of great use.Whatever the case, I believe the conception of autonomy I describe is themost plausible. Notice, too, that autonomy may be highly valued even incultures that allow only a privileged few to be autonomous.

The second benefit is that, while an intemalist account might be ad-equate to answer certain questions pertinent to our status as responsibleagents, a social conception of autonomy is of greater service when address-ing questions about our status as moral agents generally understood. Thisis because morality, like autonomy, is a phenomenon of social applicationand importance. Morally laden events, such as violations of personalautonomy, protection against such violations, and punishments for viola-tions, depend on a person's social standing relative to others. And it seemcorrect that being morally autonomous, or autonomous with regard to re-viewing and adopting a system of moral norms, requires that a person firstbe self-goveming in the sense I have explained.

The third advantage is that a socio-relational account can easily explainhow persons might be self-goveming even while manifesting external or

communal social virtues that might appear to reduce autonomy. Thesemight include allegiance to others, obedience to bodies of authority, and acommitment to notions of correctness and objectivity in the moral, epistemic,and other standards that govern conduct and reasoning. Though anintemalist account may explain how autonomy is possible in these circum-stances, a social theory explains this in a natural way. Because being au-tonomous means, in typical cases, that a person is in a certain kind of socialnetwork, moral and other.socia1 virtues are a natural accompaniment of


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autonomy and can easily be components in the lives of autonomous per-

In conclusion, I believe that a more promising approach to personalautunomy than ntemalist theories supply emerges when autonomy is castin a socio-relational or external perspedive. An externalist account is con-cerned with many of the problems and issues that preoccupy internalistapproaches. But I depart from intemalist theories in my conviction that theprimary constituents of self-government are social in nature.

sons.

Earlier versions ofthis paper have been presented t the University ofCalif0mia,Davis, Temple University,and California State University, Sun Bernardino. Thanksare due to David Copp, John Martin Fischer, Ishtiyaque Haji, TonyRoy ichardWollheim, and various refereesfor their comments.

Notes

Others who analyze autonomy in a similarly social light are Lawrence Haworth in Au-tonomy: An Essay in Philosophical Psychology and Ethics, 1986 (New Haven: YaleUniversity Press), and Diana Meyers, in Self, Society, and Personal Choice, 1989 (NewYork Columbia University Press).

The truth of this claim need not entail the denial of physical or psychological determin-ism. An adult may have no more metaphysical control over the world than does a child,but it makes sense to say that an adult is in control of her actions, and has certain rightsof sovereignty, where a child is not, and does not. While being in control of ones choicessuggests that a person is able to alter her present way of life, if she so chooses, thisability need not entail the denial of determinism a s long a s one can be determined insuch a way as to make this ability possible.

Harry Frankfurt argues for the weak view in Coercion and Moral Responsibility, 1973,in Ted Honderich, ed., Essays on Freedom of Action, 63-86 (London: Routledge KeganPaul), and in his Three Concepts of Free Action, 2, 1975, Proceedings of the Aristote-lian Society, Supp. Vol. 40,113-25.

Along these lines, Irving Thalberg discusses prudent behavior under situations of coer-cion in Hierarchical Analyses of Unfree Action, 1978, Canadian Journal of Philoso-phy, Vol. 8, No. 2

Dworkin, Acting Freely, 1970, Nous, Vol. 9: 367-83.Dworkin, The Concept of Autonomy, in Science and Ethics, ed. Rudolph Haller (Rodopi

Press, 1981). Reprinted in The Inner Citadel, ed. John Christman (New York OxfordUniversity Press, 1989).Al1 eferences are to this text. Dworkin develops his view inTheTheory and Practice of Autonomy (New York Cambridge University Press, 1988). Frank-furt, too, employs the hierarchical theory, but does so in an effort to discover the kind offreedom relevant for moral responsibility. Frankfurts view may be that these varietiesof freedom-viz., acting freely, choosing freely, and willing freely-are adequate forautonomy. (See his Identification and Wholeheartedness, in The Importance of WhatWe Care About [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 19881, pp.170-71.) And

Dworkins employment of the hierarchical apparatus to generate a theory of autonomyalso suggests that similar use of this tool could have been made by Frankfurt. ButFrankfurts claim is that the variety of freedom required for responsibility need notinclude the ability to do otherwise, and in this respect his account differs fmm my ac-count, and Dworkins account, of personal autonomy.

Dworkin, 1989, p.61. Dworkins account of autonomy and his employment of the condi-tion of procedural independence are ihtemalist, in the sense have defined. Althoughprocedural independence requires that the environment external to the agent be free offactors that impair the agents ability to critically appraise her lower-order reasons for


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acting, Dworkin's concern is only with the effect such external phenomena have uponthe psychology of the agent. Nothing about the external environment or its relation tothe individual matters in itself. It does not matter, for example, whether the individualhas been coerced or manipulated. What matters is that the individual has not beenaffected in a way that undermines her critical and reflective hd ties .Thus, as Dworkin

understands it, procedural independence only requires that a person's psychologicalabilities not be undermined. His account of autonomy remains ntemalist, the condi-tion of procedural independence notwithstanding.

Dworkin, 1988, p. 15.Dworkin, 1988, pp. 20 and 108. Lawrence Haworth raises problems with the capacity

lo Watson, Free Agency, Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 72, No. 8,1975.l1 Christman, 1989, pp. 5-6. Also see his Autonomy: A Defense of the Split-Level Self,

1987, Southern Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 25, No. 3,281-93, and Autonomy and Per-sonal History, 1991, Canadian Joumal of Philosophy, Vol. 20, No. 1,l-24.

l As with Dworkin's condition of procedural independence, Christman's devetopmentalor historical criteria for individual self-government may seem external in character.But I take Christman's theories to be internalist since he views the psychological stand-ing of the individual as decisive for personal autonomy.

l 3 In addition to the structural and historical criteria that internalists provide, disposi-tional considerations also figure importantly for autonomy. It matters, for example,whether the individual is docile and easily swayed by others, or is strong-mindedand confident.

Both Charles Taylor and Gerald Dworkin employ the ideas of true and real selves;various challenges to these notions have been raised by Isaiah Berlin, Marilyn Fried-man, and Susan Wolf.

l5 Joseph Raz discusses uch cases at pp. 3W91, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: ClarendonPress, 1986).

h Both of these persons differ from the individual who believes that a life of service toothers is the most fulfilling. This individual may value other-regarding behavior morehighly than he does behavior founded on self-interest, but may still value his autonomyand view it as compatible with service to others.

I A sIsaiah Berlin notes, consenting to a loss of liberty does not negate or reverse that loss:If I consent to be oppressed, or acquiesce in my condition with detachment or irony,

am I the less oppressed? If I sell myself into slavery, am I the less a slave? If I commitsuicide, am I the less dead because I have taken my own life freely? Berlin, TwoConcepts of Liberty, in Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969),

n The slave could be self-governing with respect to any activities or relations in his life overwhich he retained control-in his status as spouse, or sibling, or parent, for example.But being autonomous in certain activities or with respect to certain roles-being ',lo-cally au to no mou sd oe s not make the slave an autonomous person, or one who livesa globally autonomous life. I also grant that autonomy can be had in degrees, to theextent that the conditions for autonomy are met. section four, bdow, addresses thispoint.

Along this line, Alfred Mele notes that one who autonomously chooses a particular statemight fail to be autonomous with respect to remaining in that state; an appropriatelyautonomous history of choice might not be adequate for the continued or occurrentcondition of autonomy. See his History and Personal Autonomy Canadian Journal ofPhilosophy 23 (June 1993), 271-80.

Jeremy Waldron, The Right to Private Property (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), p. 302.Though Waldron is speaking of what ought to characterize human involvement inprojects of self-assertion upon nature, he takes autonomy to involve self-assertion.

Christman (1987) denies autonomy to the slave on the grounds that the slave does sufferfrom an unsuitable psychological history. I pursue my disagreement with Christman in

Autonomy Naturalized, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol. XIX (1994), 7694.Dworkin, Paternalism: Some Second Thoughts, p.111, in Rolf Sartorius, ed., Paternal-

condition in Dworkin on Autonomy, Ethics 102 (Oct., 1991), 129-39.

p.164.


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ism, 1983 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press), pp.105-11.William Stymn, Sophieis Choice, 1979.

Thomas Hill, Servility and Self-Respect, n Autonomy and Self-Respect, (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1991), p.15.

25As iana Meyers notes, to give credence to such desires as those befitting an autonomous

person would be to succumb to the undesirable state of affairs from which they origi-nate. ee her Self, Society, and Personal Choice for related discussion.

2h Thus disagree with those who argue that Harriet fails to be autonomous because she hasdesires that she would not really want were she in full possession of her faculties, andwho take the absence of such desires as evidence of an absence of critically reflectiveactivity or of a healthy psychology. (Susan Wolf and Marilyn Friedman offer argumentsab ng these lines. ee Wolf, Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility, in Schwman,1987. Friedmans view is found in her Autonomy and the Split-Level Self, 1986, South-ern Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 24 No. 1.) In my view, rationality and the activity ofcritically evaluating ones motives may lead a person to a variety of preferences-someodious, others admirable-with no promise other than that these preferences are formedin a clear-headed fashion.

27 For example, suppose that Harriets relationship with her spouse, though congenial, isthat of an unequal partner. She makes none of the important financial decisions, she

does not decide when or where they shall vacation, or where they shall live, and so on.Nor, for that matter, do they guarantee that a person will become autonomous. The per-son who respects himself may be better equipped than others to rise above adverseconditions, but transcending adverse conditions is not sufficient for autonomy The con-centration camp internee might find that his self-respect remains intact to the extentthat he spiritually triumphs over atrociously inhumane conditions. Yet it seems absurdto claim that this individual is autonomous.

Hill, 1991, p.6. Hill comments that the duty to avoid servility is a duty to take a certainstance towards others, and hence would be inappropriate if isolated (ibid., p. 17). Thissuggests that self-respect, the converse of servility, is essentially a relational phenom-enon, and so cannot merely be a matter of a persons attitude toward herself.

3o Dissolving the contract may, of course, carry a penalty sufficiently burdensome to makeautonomy difficult, if not impossible. And of course, what the contract requires of theindividual will be important for assessments of autonomy.

Similarly, consider Ulysses request that his crew physically restrain him when theirjour-ney brings them in proximity to the Sirenssongs. While he is bound and restrained, his

autonomy is curtailed, for then he lacks control of his fate (and also, of course, com-mand of the ship and crew). But Ulysses circumstance differs from that of the consent-ing slave (and more closely approaches that of the monk) in the following fashion. He isnot relinquishing his right to determine his course of life; none of his considered op-tions for the future are closed to him since his relations with his crew members remainsuch that he will resume control at the agreed upon moment.

32 A t note 19.Explaining the distinction between global and local is problematic, and I will not attempt

to resolve the problem here. Asimilar distinction between theglobal and the local raisesproblems for virtue theory; one must distinguish the local sense of honesty (telling thetruth a t some time) from the disposition, qua trait of character, to tell the truth, i.e., to bean honest person.

%Along hese lines, Waldron (1989, p.305) remarks that autonomy involves the ability tostand back from ones occurrent desires, to determine in some wa y - o n the basis of athought-out conception of the good-which desires and preferences one wants to bemotivated by....With this done, choice, decision, and action are a matter of respondingto values and to desires that have been given this reflective precedence Of course,we cannot subject all of our motives to such evaluation in order to count as autono-mous. Only those choicesand actions significant for the direction of a persons life callfor critical reflection.

Raz (1986, pp.373-78) formulates this condition, but in stronger terms than I think arenecessary. He states that, in order to be autonomous and live autonomously, a person


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must face a range of options that enable him to sustain throughout his life activitieswhich, taken together, exercise all the capacities human beings have an innate drive toexercise, as well as [have the option] to decline to develop any of them.

6 A satisfactory analysis of this condition (in particular, of the notions of an option and ofbeing able to achieve options) is not possible in ths paper. I am relying on the intuitionthat we can speak meaningfully about having options for action, even though we maybe undecided about the truth of determinism and of the Principle of Alternate Possibili-ties. Clearly, a variety of alternatives of every sort is not necessary for autonomy. At thevery least, I am restricted in my choices by the fact that I suffer from certain physical,intellectual, geographic, and financial imitations, as well as by the fact that I share thisplanet with others to whom I must accord certain courtesies. But none of this need limitmy autonomy.

37 A parent, for example, is responsible for fulfilling he needs of his children; an attorney isexpected to serve the needs of her client.

38 I wish to thank Richmond Campbell for his suggestion that I emphasize the externalnature of the first three conditions.

In fact, Christman shuns social criteria for autonomy where such criteria incorporateexternal elements of the sort sufficient to compromise self-government. Christman ar-gues that, in order to capture the idea of self-government that is the motivating con-cept behind autonomy, the rationality of an autonomous agent must be defined interms of a set of subjective criteria internal to the agent. His account is thus doublyinternalist; no external criteria are allowed for rationality, and agent autonomy turns onthe psychological character of the individual. ee Christman (1991), notes 18 and 23,pp.9 and 14, espectively.

* Berlin remarks that, while Kant's free man needs no public recognition for his innerfreedom, the need humans have for recognition within their social sphere is boundup wholly with the relation that [they] have with others ... feel myself to be somebodyor nobody in terms of my position and function in the social whole; this is the most'heteronomous' condition imaginable. ee his 'Two Concepts of Liberty , p.156,note 1

41 Berlin, 1969, p. 156, my emphasis.42 Joel Feinberg, Harm To Self, Vol. 3 of The Moral Limits of Criminal Law (New York:

Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 46-47. See also Raz, 1986, p. 394.

oshana moral autonomy

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