mmm·MILITARY MEN-AT-ARMS SERIES 312

THE ALGERIAN WAR1954-62

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MARTIN WINDROW MIKE CHAPPELL

FIISt~ .... GrNI Brlwn ... 1~7 by os-....• divWon ofRMd Ilool<t L.Ir.-it.cl. Mu;1Ie1n _. 81 FlAlwn Rotd. Londor'l SW3 &AS_..-AI rights --...d.~ ffom "'V ,.. dNling l« lIle PI"I'OM of printe study.

..-dI. o;ritIasm ... ....-w. at permitted undIr !lie~ 0Kigrts arodPeIWltI Act. 1018. f'O) pwt oIl/'IiI Pldc:tbOl'l meyl)e~~ .. e'"'-tl tyt........ _ .. enylorrn ... by MY ....... elec:tronic.tIIclncII.~ "*""""-". opIlCM. phoIlIC1IlP)'II'4l• ..cording ...__•_ lIle prior -...~ 01 _ 0llP'IriIlht _. Enqo.ntt IIhcdcI

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~ Reed Elook1 Moch*o House. 81 Fullam Road.London SW3 6R8

Author's Note

Consistent typography is hardly possible In a text scattered withlerms in bolh French and Atable, many of the latter lfan!lliteraled lromFrench sources. Generally I have only Italicised Arabic words at theirfirst appean!Ince and. for emphasIs and clarity. a lew French technicaland slang terms. I have not usually itat/clsed French unit tilles, elc.•and have ltletelore used English capIt.llsaliorl, •.g. Reglmenl derwai/let.lt$~ rather than lhe more correc1 regiment der:inJiIlecJrs a/gftriens.

Equally. I have not drawn fine distinctic:Jrn; between the Algerian FlN(front de llb6ratlon Niltiot\ale. the overaD poIiticat organisation) andthe AlN (ArTnee de LiberaIOCWl NationaIe, the miltary sttuet...e); gen­eraJly I h8Ye used the laner when refermg 10 IM"I III'Tn8d operationsexcept lor urban 1em:Jrism.

Acknowledgements

, em exlftlrTlely gratelul for all _tara recerved dl.ri'Ig the p-epa­rabon of ItlI$ book WId beforehand, particIbrly !rom WiI Fowler, whowas lIS generol& lI$ aIw8ys; from .-.rt-I..uc DefatNe. and Jim--Publisher's Note

RNdln mey lind. /IIIIIlfIlI1O ttudy INI .....~"""'_~-..-MM300 FrancII f'otwvl LIQIiorI_ '945

EiIe 6 FrancII f'otwvll.alriM~

Artist's Note

Readers may care 10 note that the origN~~ \Il'tloctl thecolour plates ~ this book were prepared _~ far crrva:a sale.

'" reproduction copyright 'Nhal$OeYer IS ret..c t¥ VIe P..disher. '"enquiries should be IIddrusecl 10;

14 Downlands, Watmer, Deal, Kent CTI.t 7XA

The pobIishln regret that they CWI .... re:;) no co e$pondenceupon this maner.

n.. ""ling Imqe of the FrenchArm'lln the Al~rt.n W.r '1....s,

paratroopers ~rade In red berets

.nd ".mHI l~rfI·. with slungMA,T.~ sub·machlne ~uns, This ls

the 1.. BPC phot09raphed at

Port FouR In Dec.mber 1~Se,

THE ALGERIAN WAR1954-1962

THE BACKGROUND

T IS Il\IU), aftcr -10 rears. 10 COI1\'C\' the public impact of Fr.\ncc·s \',lrto maintain hel' colonial grip on Algeria: rei in the late 1950s this ugh'

connict dominated Europe's media 10 almost the same cxtelH aswould Vietnam ten rcars latcr.

It broughl Fr;lIlcc to the n::rgc of lllilil:U)' coup dilfflt. il destrored theFounh Republic. and decisi\'c1r transforllled the French con~lillltion. Itdcslro>cd thousands of careers: hiltcrlr di\'ided the French miliuu,r <lndpolitical classes for a gel1cl".Hion: and sell! hundreds of tholl.)ands ofEUl'opc;1I1 sell IeI' families into aft(On ruinous exile,

Its exact cost in lh'es is unknown. Some 25.000 Frcnch lroops died inaClion. b\ accident or of disease: some 3.600 European ci\'ilians werekilled or disappeared. and a similar number of lo\'al ~luslilll lroop~ werekilled. The Algeri:m guerrilla:. lo~t perhaps 155.000 killed outright. andm:u1\' more died of,,'ounds: ~luslim ch"ilian dealhs from all CHl~S e,tsihcxceeded 50.000 e\'en before lhe \'engeful posl<ea.scfire bloodbath.which killed annhing up 10 twice as mal\\'. The mllCh~1I0lCd totalestilml1e of a million Algerian dead is now di.scolilHed. but the lnle COStwas cenainh at leasl half lhal - a sufficielllh' monstrous figure.

Coll\'cntionalh prcscnlcd asju~1 another successful mid-20th centun'colonial rebellion foughl on lhe ~Iaoist model. this war 1,-aS in fael

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:>haped b~ its specific time and its particular antagonists; and it offers anillieresting example of thc military defeat of a re\ olutiOllal;' mO\'cmcnl.which ne\'ertheless gained its ultimate objecti\'e 1)\' political means. In atexi of lhis lenglh lhere is ob\;ousl~ space for onh the mOSt generalsununan of the mi1itar~ aspects, and none .n all fOl' the \'CI;' complexpolitical background: interested readers are recommended to AlistairHome's classic :\ SilT'fI~ Ilnr ojProu (see bibliograph} on p, 38),

The Algeria of the 1 950s

8\' the carl\' 1950s Algeria had el~o\'ed for nearly a centul')' the officialstatus of 'Fnmct: o\'erse:ls' - a cOnStillHional fiction 10 which mallYFrenchmen clung passionatcl\', oSlensibly justificd by the parliamelltal')'rcpl'escnwtion in Paris of her lhree depanmems (frolll west to east,Or-1O, Algiers and ConSlallline, popularly called the Ol'anais, Algeroisand ConstaIHinois). Ho\,evCI', only a tin)' millorit~ of Ihe ;\Iuslim popu­lation held French citizenship rights or significant propert)'- Since theinitial French landings in 1830 on a coastline under lhe nominal:tllthorit}' of the deca)'ing Ouoman Empire. a V:ISt. 11llcxploiled, andmore or less chaotic tribal hilHcrland had been ttansformcd inlOFrance's largest colonr; a source of cheap agricultural produce, and acapli\'c market for Frcnch manufacturers.

The ~llIslill1 population had exploded to some ciglll million .•It atime when France had a \\'cak eCOIlOI1l~ and nlll<l\\'a)' infl:uiOIl. $om(' 75per cel1l or :\Imlims ,,'ere illiterale: they suffered chronic unem-

\.TERRITORIES

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., IOD '5O_M ~ '50 __

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E.,ty ALN I/Olunt..... PO" with

Mause, riftes and an automatic

plstol: in No...mbefo tiS4 it Isbeli....ed that the AlH had nomore ~n 350 .....pon•• ofwhich many we,. sholguns.

LEFT Sketch map 0' inhabitednOl1ham Algerl.; the admlnlll­

trl.h,. boundarle. wllre more orI,.. theoretical whan projectedliown into the ~h.,... Most of

lhl. ".st country .. empty d••art;

Ib most southerty point - In 3degrees E, 111 d.-g....s N _ lifl

~. ',200 mile. south 01Algi........ la... actions took placa8n:xlnd ttte oa.es on Ih' desertroutes, •.g. Tlmlmoun, appro•.230 mU•• further south than Aln

SI'"" Nota that only mainmountain ma..ll. are Identified _

apart from Ihe MltldJa and othernarrow coaatal plains vlrtuiJlIy

the whole area 01 the map is

mountainous.

plopncllI. poor heahh. andTeal hungel". The greatmajority of those who didha\"e \I'ork were peasantfarmers or urban labourersscraping a subsislence inmore or less :lbjeci poYenr,

All1wugh olltrighl-bandilry' was far fromunknown ill remote areas,few :\Illslims were inyolvedin polilically motivatedsubversion. Rur"l \;llagersaccepted the atllhorit\' oftraditional communityelders, whose obedienceto the often distantFrench administration wasrc\,'arded by pell)' pri\'­ileges. The older gener­

.nion ,,'cre often genuinely lo\'al to France. the rOldj (chieftains) andrural constables \"caring their World War medals \,'ith pride: acu\islS con­lemplUollsl~' dismissed this class as the &1Ii Oui-Qlli. the '\es-\ti Tribe'.The urban 1>001' were more resti\'e: trade unions prO\ided some focus ofdiscontClH, although the Comlllunist Party was ne\'er su·ong. HO\l't....·cr.pressure for :\luslim rights - either internal self-government. inde­pendence. or even complelc intcgration with France - had long beenbuilding up among Ihe small but significant academic aile! professionalclass which had benefited from French education.

Although the strains had becollle more mixed in the to\,'ns, an age­old suspicion persisled between the highland Berbers of the Aures andf\.,bylia and the 10\,'land Arabs. The Berbers were the poorer and more\\dI'like of the twO comlllunities: but Algerians in general ha\'c been char­acterised b\' their O\\TI writers as tough. stoic. proud. stubOOrn. .secreti\'e.\iolemh qual'l·clsome. and unforgi\'ing - 'a people of light·angles.\';Ihollt cllryes·.

The)' \\'cre also gi"cn to cxu'eme phrsical cruelty, Tonure \\.IS COIl1­monplace: the knife - 10 CUI throats, and 10 inOiCI appalling mutilationsas a \,,,,rnil1g to others - \'':IS the weapon of choke (throat-eutung is asso­ciated wilh sheel>-killing. and is thus a deliberately insulting death).Throughout the war many more ~luslill1'i died at the hands of theirfellow AJgerians than of the French.

The great majority of producth'e land. commerce and indusu}. and\,irtualh' all political and administrau\'c power lay with lhe long-estab­lishl'd 1.2 million-su'ong European .settler community (known as colons01' pied.s 110m). mainly of Spanish. hali;m, Corsican and AIs.,uan stock.Apan from a small liberal intelligentsia the COIOIIS were politically andracially cOl1scn·ali\·e. their auitudes 10 the ~ltlSli1lls I<ll1ging from patcr·nalislll to callous bigotry, Although lhere I,'ere man}' co!onsand :\luslilllS\,'hose shared lo\'e for their oflen stunningl\" beautiful counu}' broughtthem together in friendship. the t\';n walls of religion and racial injusticewould alw'l\1i uhimaleh' separate them. 5

6

A French patrolln Kabylla; the

northern slopes of the matn

mountatn chains Offered

guerrillas thick cover, wtth cedar,

scrub oak and corit forest, anddenle undergrowth to shelter

them from French llirertltt,(Courtesy Jim Worden)

Over the years various half-hearted attemprs "'ere madc by Paris toreform Algerian local government in fal'our of ~Iuslim ,.dvancement:grudging enough, these gestures were consistentl)' undermined br therolrms. The wbites tended to be as \'olatile, headslrong, violent <lnd unfor­giving as the ~Iuslims. They regarded France with the schizophrenicmixwre of enthusiasm and resentment t~vical ofall sculcr corn mun ities.Ther were righlly conscious that it was Lher who had built Algeria ­draining the marshes, irrigating the wildel'llcss, and bringing the fertilenorth, which el~ored much the same climate and scenCll' as southernEurope, under widespread culth'ation, The~' ,,'cre fiercelr determincd tocling to what ther had: and they saw beu'I)'\1 in :lll)' hint of compromisefrom Paris.

r<lctional hostilities and conspiracies di\'ided each of the three mainpanics to the war - French, cololls and ~Iuslims; bill it was probablr Ihed)"sfunctional relationship bet"'een Paris and the CQwnswhich destroyedan}' chance of a witH ion shon of total victory and lotal defeat. France'sconstitutional arl'angemellls under the Foul'lh Republic also made for arapid succession of chrollicall)' wcak and unstable gO\'crnments, unableeither to reach a settled dew of the Algerian dilemlll., or to prosecutepolicr - anr poliC)' - eOeCli\'elr and consistl'n tl)',

From 1958 a fou1'lh pan}' elllered the equation, and came todominate ie Gener~l Charles de Gaulle_ The man who g;we France backhcrsclf~respcct in I94Q--l5 had retired from public life in 1946, disgustedb)' pany politics; he retained a unique moral amhorit)', and during themost squalid episodes of the Fourth Republic man)' Frenchmen'sthoughts turned IOwaI'd that huge, eloquent silence at Colombc)'-Ies­Deux.Eglises. When sumllloned back to office in 1958 he understood

that military success could nOt presct;,e the statusquo. Publiclr enigmatic while hc consolidated hisgrip on power, hc \\'orkcd to crcatC the conditionsfor some kind of negotiated peace which wouldpresen'c the future of the cololls, as well asessential French i1llcrcsts, in a semi-independentAlgeria. He would be defeated by a combinationof mloll intransigence; the FLN's dctcnninatiollnOt to be manoeuvred awar from their goal ofcomplete independence; and the absence of allrcredible, moderale intcnnediaries on either sideafter rears of lllutual Tllurder. During the \1~Lr

extremists on both sides had targeted their moreopen-minded fcllol\' countrymen, punishing:111)' sign of compromise with s:l\<lge atrocitiesand reprisals which gave Ihe spiral of hatred.,nother tll'ist.

FI<lnce's humiliation in 1940 had robbed herin i\luslim eres of much of her bamka - thespiritual force er~ored by the strong and SlIC­

cessful: and all VE Day in May 1945 celebrationllIrned to hOlTor around the Algerian (Qwn ofSCti/". An ami-French Muslim demonsLration galOul of hand: panicky shots were fired; mobs r.:m:Imok, spreading out 10 butcher mOTr than a

hundred European ci,ilians: and o,oer the weeks which follo,\'ed FrenchtrOOpS and European Iynch·mobs killed at least 6,000 ~luslims more orless at random - the U1..e figures can nt:\'er be known" The 5Ctif mas­s..l.cres were a5(onishingh' liltle discussed in France. wherc Algerianunrcst was complaccll!h dismissed as apolitical bandi!r~... French publicanemion was soon focused on Indochina, the arena for the first greatpost-war challenge 10 France's colonial authorit,", Among (he :'\Iuslims,hO\\'t:\'er, setif was a !liming point, discrediling moderate ,'oices andaClipg as a recnLiting scrgeant for olllrigh( re,"ollllion.

Large numbers of ~luslim (roops sen'cd with the FrenchExpcditional1' Corps in Indochina between 1946 and 1954: allhoughgenerall}' brave and lora!. some were inel'i1ablr allracted br lhe VietMinh"s allli-coionial propaganda, E\"emually the French Army '.-asdefeated once again, and this time b" her o\,'n colonial subjecLS: the railof Dien Bien Phu in ~Iar 1954 broughl her to the negotiating table toagl'ee a rapid retreat from South-East Asia,

During the earl" J950s there had been gro,\;ng unrest in France'sother n\'O :\"onh African territories, ~Iorocco and Tunisia were notoutright colonies, but prOlectorates OWl' ,,'hich French righLS werelimited b~' international agreement, and their clamour for inde­pendence had to be addressed, In 1952-56 French forces ,\'en' deplo}"edall sccurit}" operations in bmh COlllllricS, being dra,,"n from Algeria in1952-5-l and lhercafla from unitS returning from Indochina, Francealso had a m,~or COllllllitmClH to hcl' sector of thc Iron CUl'lilin across

·f''''-,,,

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L8ndscape with inf.trtry: th.wllcMfnes. of the ••mm

Con.ls"t1nois, wheN FNnc:hl"t.rvllflt!on unitt: spent muc:h oftheIr w., '"omadl$lng'.lCOurt••y Jim Worde")

7

•

Suspe.c:t being lIearc:hed by men

of the !hi Zouaves, winter1954-55; at this early date they

wear fully badged M1946 woolbattledren.

Genmlll)'. where the bcSI-equipped units of her conscript army faced theSoviet threat. Since the 19·105 the French arnl\' in :\lgeria had also beencommitled 10 providing training. replacement. and If<lJlsil facilities forIndochina. where large numbers of professional troops (as opposed to

conscripted short-term national sen:iccmen) remained \n~ll into 1955.Although there were more than 60,000 troops in Algeria when the

first ShOlS of the war were tired 011 the night of I :'\o\'cmber 1954. pOlcn­liall}' elTective manpo\,"cr I"as dws limited to some 17.000. of whomtwo-thirds I,'cre ~ll1s1im Tirailleurs and Spahis: immediately aV<lilablecombat troops numbered some 3.500. Prior warnings of fonhcomingtrouble had been ignored by the gener~tllr incn milit:lI)' authorities.

SUMMARY OF MAIN EVENTS

November 1954-1956

1954: Nov: The first co-ordinated AL~ aHacks on public insm.llaliolls.military and police posts in Aures and Kab)'lia to capwrc m'ms havevariable succeS$. Call for gencml rising largely dismissed by French. whorespond to 'banditry' b>' Ill.ti0r punitive !;1,'eep5. Nov.:Jan; some success,but survival of guerrillas gi\'es them prestige in Muslim eyes, and indis­criminate repression (including some air and aniller)' bombardment ofvillages, In;tSS l'ound-ups and ill·treatment) increases FLN supporl.1955: Feb: Governor-General Soustelle begins liber:'ll reforms and a\\'dfare pro~,'yamlJle, which is cOllntered from the spring b)' rapidlyspreading ALN terrorism against ~luslim 'collaborators', Europeanfarms, and rUt':t] schools - i.e. the cololl cconOlll}'. and an}' focus ofl\'luslim/Europcan co-operation - througholll Const:lnl,inois. At:'>!assembles SO-man companies to ambush troops, April-May: FLN gainThird World recognition al Bandung Conference. To hit cololl'lgriculmre. all Muslims are ordered EO give up smoking and akohol, 011

pain of Illutilation anddeath, The French institutea polic)' of 'collectiveresponsibility' against thepopulalion. ",-jth pre­dictable results. June:ALN regional commanderZighoUl declares unlimitedterror campaign againstEuropean and Muslimci\·i!ians. laler backed brFLN ideological chiefRamdane Abane. Aug.:Grist)' ALN ma.ss.1.cre of 120civilians at PhilipPe'\;lleoutrages public opiDion:arm)' and colon reprisals killseveral thousand Mn:slim ,Setback for refOl'lDistsseeking to remO"'C' rootcauscs of unresc ry;MNjn

qcle of atrocity. reprisal. and consequent increased FL"1 support. Parisannounces recall of 60,000 reSCryiSls. Armed clashes. and AL:-\ grip onthe populalion. bOlh increase country-wide.1956: Jan.Feb: Soustelle recalled. Colo" riots force Premier ~Iollet torescind unpopular appoitllmellt of Gen. C;urotlx - Algiel~ mob di...CO\'erl> iu power O\'er P;lris. March: Morocco and Tunis achie\'eindependence. French garrisons leave all blll small endwc ill Tuni:)ia.

AL'\' thereaftcr acquire lr.I.ining c;unps and logislic bases in bolllcOlltllrics. planning to use these o\'cr-border bases to suppon (",'emualescalalion to mobile phase of re\'olutionan' war by building cO!l\'entionalmanoeu\'re units, Howe\"er. continuing ~Ioroccanand Tunisian \1.llncra­bility \,is-a-\;s Fr.mce limits permitled AL~ acti\;ties throughout \I-ar.May: 20 conscripts of ge RIC killed by AJi f\.hodja·s AL:\' unil ne:lrIlalcstro - first m;yor conscript ca~uallies: public outr'age encOUl-agesFrench hard line. 30 Sep,: FL:\' urban bombing campaign 'lg<linslcivilian largets opens in Algiers: European casualties. and Iplch·mobreprisals. II'ili mounl during \1'iIllCI', 22 Ocl: FLN cXlcrnal leadersincluding Bell Bella hUacked from ~loroccal1 airlim'r, imprisoned byFrench. Angcl' in ~Iorocco and Tunisia leads 10 increased help for FL:'\':rClIlo\'al of cxternal leaders helps unify illlernal leadersh ip. No\': Anglo­French landings in SIle7 Canal Zonc. Egypt. President :\'asserSllbscqUClllly increases aid to FL'\'. who St!:p up drive fDr illlcrnatiDnalrecognition. profiting from Frcnch unpopularit\': Sucz climb-downincreases French Army's contempt for political .tlllhorilies.

1957-Summer 19581957:Jan-Mar & May-5ept.: Gen. ).Iassu·s lOe DP gi\"cn free hand :lg-dinsturb<m FL\' bombers and assassins in '8attJc of Algien:'.

Paras control casbah 1>\' massive ID checks and enforced 'pymmid'StnlCtUl'C of answeldbilif\' by household. building. street and block rep..resentatin:s, ).Iasked infonners help screen ).Iuslims picked up in masssweeps: suspects interrogated under tortul'c: many deaths in capti\;I}:including FL\' leader L1.hbi Ben ~rhidi" FL~ networks in cit\' steadilydeslroyed: Olhers penetldted by French illlclligcnce, ;mel nccing SUI'­

"h'ors will compromise ntral Wilap.s. AL:\" morale:lnd recruiting slump.

Spring: Army effectiveness ;md moraleimprove: Sections Adminlstrali\"cs Specialisecs(SAS) 'heans & minds' programme sho\l's results.ALN defections increase. Gcn. Beaufrc. com­manding ZEe. simuhancollsh' applies populalionrcsettlement. PS\'-ops. ruthless hunting Ollt ofFL'\'politico-administrath'e infraslnlcture. 'free fire'operations against AL-..: bands: AL:\" forced ontOdefensi\'e. May: ~Iassacre of 300 \'iJlagers al~Ielollza. "ab\lia. 1>\ \\j};I\';\ 3 leOlder "\mirOllchehands French propag-dnda coup.Jul),: Si Cherif of\\'i1a\-a 6 defcclS 10 French \I;lh 330 men, Sept.:AJgiers FL'\' chicf\acefSaadi Gtplllred: urban ter­rorism \inualh hailed. French complele 'MoriceLine' of Tuni:)ian frontier defences. These seal offilHernal .-\1.:\ from external forces and supplies:

AlH training wfttI L.w1s LMG;bef_ t957 .au1om1ltk ••.aponSw .... in v.ry Short "'P9!y. Att.r

Suez, Nauer pl"O'tkted .bout 500

Bren LMG••nd 5,000 Britishri1tes.. Moat other w••pon. hadto be pu~tynd '01" ....h on the

Intem.tlo<lal m.artlet; ttl. Frenc:h.ecrel servic:•• w.ged • I.ttl.1undergrovnd w.ar 10 dlIC:ourag.'h. ALN's ..om"..~l.al suppt~....

9

'0

Letlon motorised lnl,ntry ponwith prisoner-. ,net re<:o...re<tweepons: mostly M'lIn. KgarflIes, \Irith prstol" e MAT49 'nclen MP40.

-l60km of 5.0Q0-\'oh electrified fence. bad>ed wire. minefields. \\"ith radarsur\'eillance and conSlam ground and air patrols. guarded b~ 12.900men. Similar defences soon compleu~d on 720km of :\Ioroccan frontier.\\;I.h 9.500 men.

Dec: Gen. $alan appoimed Cin-e. FL'\ '.'\.L:\" leadership crisis:liquidalion of brilliant political chief Rmndane Abane.1958: Jan.July: 'Battle of the frontiers'; delennined AL~ ,mcmpl.'i 10

bring ill arms and troops from Tunisia lead 10 fiercCSl banles ofw:ar wilhFrench Ullil.'i in cleared strip extending one dar's march inside frol1lier,paniculad)' in 'Duck's Beak' seclor ne;:lr Guclma,

Jan: Amir'Ollche launches destructi\'e purge of Wila)'a 3, Feb: Cross-­border' pm\'ocatiolls PI'OrtlIH French bombing of Sakici. Tunisia:intern;:lIional prOtCS15 aid FL:\I's diplomatic cailipaign: but ALN monthl),c.;:\SlIahies on frontiers lotal 3,.400 dead, 529 captured, and inside Kabylia(27 Jan·20 Feb), another 2.151 and 333. Total French casualties forIllolllh: 360 dead, 700 wounded. March: Al.:-J mOlllhly casualties onfrontiers 3.132 dead. 715 captured. April: Frdllce without go\'ernmelll

for 37 da~'S from 15th: crisisof :lmhoril)' in Algeria..>\L" monthly ca5uahies onfromiers 3.728 dead. 756caplUred. 28 April-3 May:Largest cngagemen15 ofw,lr ncar Souk·Ahras.

At [easl eiglu companiestOtalling .. 1.300 men ofALN' 2c & 4e Faileks (bat­talions) attempt LO forceMorice Line north andsouth of Sollk-Ahras 10

reinforce \\ila)'as 2 and 3:some 800 succeed incrossing (mosLl)' b)' diggingunder obstacles), Of these,436 killed, 100 c:lptuJ'ed infirst l,,"O da)'S, anOlher 93killed later, b)' 9c, 14e &[Be Rep, leI' & 2e REP andmOlO!'ised infant!')'; onl)'appmximatel)' !GO escapeinto Lhe intcdor: around412 indiddual weaponsand 46 machine-guns.one mOrtar and fourbazookas are captured.French casuahies over sixda), ace 38 k;I",", and 35wounded (man)' in 3eCie./ge Rep),

13 May: A Europeanmob seizes Algiel'S publicbuildings, and demands the

return to po\,'cr of Gcn. de Gaulle (French1>oIitico-military faClions have been conspiring toS<'l.mc end). June: De Gaulle becomes FrenchPremier; \isits Algeria 10 great acclaim, and makes,'eassuring but ambiguous speech. 26 Jlme: L,stm~~or fl'Olllier baIlIe ncar Tebessa; SQO.su'ong .-\L'\Jforce reU'c:us after losing 46 dead. 64 captured.these figures indicating Joss of AL:\' morale, JuI,~French estimate 10lal AL'\J casualties Jan.:July al23,53<1 dead and capllll'ed, AL\'/FL\' rift in faceof defeats and purges; AL\' abandon hope of rein­forcing internal forces in significant strength,

September 1958-Deeember 1959

Sept: FL~ fonn pro\isional gO\'emment in exile(CPR"'). securing increased Arab League andCommunist aid. De Gaulle's conSlilutiollalreforms massh'e1~t supported in referendum;hopes rise of compromise peace. Oct: De Gaulleoffers 'Peace of the Bra\'e' - an amnesty for sur­rendering insurgents. safe-conduci for fL'\J tonegoliate cease-fire: sufficient response to \"01'1"}'

bolh FL,t leaders and (olo,,/ann~' hard-liners.Judicial excc\llions halted. release of delaineesbegun (c.13,OOO :'\'ov. 58-Julr 59), Dec: De Gaulle becomes Presidem ofFrance. Gen. ~laurice Clmlle replaces Salan as Cin-e in Algeria.1959: Feb-April: Oper:llions against Wilaya :; in the Or:mais lauJlch'ChaUe Plan' offensive,

Beginning in this relath'e1v easier region, all a\-ailable sector andinten;entiOIl troops are commiued. area by area. to the elimination ofALN and infl-astructure, SeClor and motorised troops concentrate indeep cordons: (OllllllmllloJ dl' dU/.SJe track AL~ units inside cordon untilfixed br air and air-inserted obser\'ers: para and Legion imer\'elllionunits and taClkal air suppon COllcenu-ale, remaining in contact \Llllilenemy is destrored: local FLN administration is rooted out: rescn'e unitsonl)' move on when sector troops c;lpable of dominating area perma­nentl}'. Apr-June: Operation 'Courroie' againsl \\"ilara 4 in the Algerois.caslern Ouarscnis.July: OpeJ'ation 'Elincelles' in lhe Hodna l\lollntalnsto isol:lIe \\tlara 3. July-Oct,: Opcl"'il.lion '.Iumclles· against Wila)':.\ S inKab)'lia. Sepl.-No\',: Operation 'Pierres Pn:ciell~S' ill ZNC, ZEe. l\1;uorlosses :lnd damage to ALN strength, suppOrt nCI"'ork, commandStnlClUre, and montlc; intcrnal AL:'\' ordered to disperse imo section­sized uniL\ onl)': mililary acti\it)' henceforward largel)' reduced 10lo\,'-risk sabotage and terrorism.

16 SepL: Dc Gaulle publiclY recognises prospect of Algerian 'self­determination', hoping military sialematc \,'ill persuade FL~ 10negotiate, Seeming French 1>oIiticai weakness. the)' remain aloof - but!.he offer fllrthel' angers roio1/ am1\" conser...ati,·es.

1960 - April 19611960: 24-29 Jan, 'Barricades Week', Europeans revolt in AJgiers, fire onpolice; paras brought in, bUI refuse to confront roioll$. De Gaulle defuses

LevlOn p..... ktentl1led by th.g....n beret. which they .Iw.ys.wore In prefenlnce to ttle81g...rd cap of tM RePs .ndRPe., cro••• w.t.rcourseloueel) dul1"11 II .u",me'.~ Intyplc.1 Aur•• tll""Jn. V.t....n.tend to remember the h••t. cold,grinding phy.lc.1 ...h.u.tlon .ndI.ck 01 ,Ieep .. vividly at IMlrcJath.. wIth ttle ALN, (CourtesyJim Worden)

11

L1.Col. Je.nplerre leads hi.

par.. of the 1er REP through

AlgIe... elty, 1957. Tl'lls

admlnlon that the Gendarmerie

and tn. eMI aulhoritlea hadeompletely Ioat eontrol, end thet

only <s. facto martiella. offer.cl

8 solution••8•• Illming-poinl In

the F..-m;h ,ppf1)lleh to tn.rebellion.

crisis \,;th broadcast speech. but ob\;ous French dislillil~ ellcoUl,lges thefL:\' to playa wailing game. Boumediennc. nc,,' AL">: chief-of-staff.orders imernal forces 10 marl.. lime ,dIile he build:. up external anmas c\"Clllual bargaining counler: impro\'es relations ,,;th Communislbloc, thus increasing pressure 011 France ",. prospect of dirt~cl Russian or

hillt'SC inten·cntion.April: Opcr.Hiol1 TridellI' in Aurc5 completes Challe Plan. June: De

Gaulle publicly imiles negolialioll. but secret FL">: French peact' 1..... lks at:'>Iclun fail. Terrorism continucs, p<'rticularh'lal'gcting :'>Iu!>lilll~ :1Il.r.lctcdb" De Gaulle's offers: AL," infrastnlClllre is quietly rebuilt. French dcc­(oralC'S war-weariness, and foreign crilicism, both increase, No\'.: DeGaullc speech refers for first lime to possible future 'Algerian Algeria':EUl'opean hard-line 'Uhr.IS' plan coup. 20 Dec,: Vi': recoglli~ Algerianright to self-determination.1961 :Jan: First ass.'lSsinations bv 0 ..\5 (Secret Army Orbr:uti~:t1iol1) - CO/Oil

'ultfas' and ,II'Ill}' deserters - in namc of preser\'ing '/I/gm..fm,ufll~: 20­26 April: COlip d'~l<Jl in Algiers - 'Generals' Putsch' - Icd b\ rCliredgenerals Salan, Challe, Zeller, and Jotth:md with some P:\I";\ units, inn:1Il1e of pl'eser...ing French Algeria: fears of airborne attack on Paris.Coup fails whcn De Gaulle broadcas!.'> appcal fOf lo)'ah\ 10 con:.cripts:implic:llCd para units arc disbanded: Challc Slll'renders, man\' officersarrestcd: others, led Iw Salan, go underground to continue fuule butlethal OAS terrorism in Algcria and France.

May 1961-July 1962

Mar: :'>Iajor 0.-\5 bombings bt.-gin in Algiers. fL'I/French peact talksopen at [,ian, De Gaullc orders am\\' (0 cease offensive opernuons.

12

'The Battl. of Algie,..', liS7,paf1ltroopef1l supervise a ma$$.mst lin the c:.sbilh _ ....h....many tens 01 thoudilnds ofMuslim. inhabited. kllom"t...­squ.... mail" of int"n::onnec:tinihouses, c:ourty.rds, .t.irways,all"YlI and rooftop•. Initial" ..."nlni aided by localInlorm",.. ....Ill IUiint pOSllbl"FLN 'Upportll"'; rigorousintelTOgatlon. routinely InvolvingtOl1u.. by "Iectrodel, ....111Identity ,ulpeetS, and h"lpflU in IntaUlg"nc:. offic:",..''o'1l.nigf1lms' of te!'TOrist c"lIsand hideouts. Targeted raids ....iIIfolio...., ....,n1"9 furth"r prison",..lor lntenotatlon, bomb eac:h"s,and doc:um"nts.

FLN do not rcciproc.uc.Slepping up op<.-ralionssharply: wilh loss of in i­liath'e French casuahicsincrease greatl}' O\'er thefoUO\\'ing "car, July: FirstE,'ian peace talks fail.8 Sept: \Iost ,"iolcllt ofmam' OAS atlcmpLS on DeGaulle's life.1962: Feb: \Ior(' thom 550deaths in ,,,,rious QASoutrages finalh destro}' an\'significal\l Fi'cnch publicsupport for colon cause.7-19 March: Second E"ianpeace talks: ccase-fireagreemcnt signed bct\\'ccnFrench and FL~. 20 April:Salan capllll'ed. June:OAS/FL~ IfUCt:. 3 July:France recognises Algerianindependence,

Ben Bella becomes firslpresidelll of independentAlgeria, French arnn­\\;lhdraKs except for Icm­pora.... enda'es al Regg:mcin Sahara and \Iers-d-J.i.i:bir

pon, June-Jul)': Enforced exodus or r.I,-I.50.000 European (olmu,ghen choice between 'the suitcase and the coffin'. Only aoout 15,000100"llulIkis are resettled in Fr.mce: alxmdoned, 1>\' the French between50,000 and 100,000 \Iuslim men. women and children are butcheredIhcrcaflCr by Ihe FL'\, often wilh grotcS(llIe cruelty.

THE ARMY OF NATIONAL LIBERATION

Command StructureThe "III for genei,,1 insurr~C1iOIl in ~o\'elllber 195,1 was isslled in thenallle of the ~ational Liberation From (FL~), a mo\'emem which hade\'olved from an 'alphabet ltOUp' of predoll!> nationalist raClions. TheeXIC:'I11<1lleadership \\';lS iniliall\' based in Cairo under Ahmcd Ben Bella.and later in Tunis. Imcmal regional leaders were l..ahbi lkn ~1'I-lidi

(Ora.n), Rabah Bital (Algiers). Belkacem N-im (Kab,lia), \IourddDidouchc (north Constantine) and \llIstafa Ben Boulaid t-\ure~). orlhe original nine mosl senior leader' onh Ni.m hould slill be alhe andat large after \Iarch 1957,

The FL'\ \\'as di,ided into amonomous politico-militarY commands,Hi/nyu. each \\'holl~ responsible for regional acth·itie:.: indoctrinating.mobilising. and fa.xing the civil population, b,' persuasion or terror:and rccnliting, training. arming, and commanding the AL'\. This 13

,.

YKef ~adl. ttMo resourcefulyou"1l ...de. of 1.400~ In the

Algiers enbloh.CO~ by the1et' REP on 24 September 1i57., hi, netw<lt1l w.s """II)'

am.shed. h. d.mended .nd

rec:.wed POW .tatu. from theFrenc:h. The co-produeer ofPont.co....o.. c"hie (.ndrem........DIy _n.h.nded) lieS

film L. 8.ftaglJ. di Alg.ri. Inwhleh he .eted hlm..tt, 1M

.u....l"ed the post·lndepend.ne.eh.os to beeom•••ueeessfulbu.ln•••m.n.

decentraliscd command. and widely diffel'ing local conditions.explain the 111lco-ordinaled nature of openuions for much of the

war. The hean of the rebellion was always the remote highlandsof the Aurcs and Kab\ \ia. whose mountains. canyons, hidden,-alleys. caves and cliff ,mages offered limitless hidc-ouL'i. andwhose A.L," leaders were inheritors of a tradition of blood·feud and bandim' not unlike that of the :\'onh-Wesl Frontierof India. Although he looked. in a suit. like a flabby small­town functionary. Belkacem Krim had in faci laken to lhehills "ith a 5ten gun as early as 19-1i; Ben Boulaid \I-as ahighly-decor.lled "eleran of the Italian campaign; and Omar

Ouamrane's milil<ln' background "~.lS so respecled thai e,"en asan AL," colonel he was al\',l\s known as 'Scrgeant' Ou,unranc.

The \\Ila~-as. and some prominent commanders and seniorofficers. were as follow~ (almost allll.sed aliaselo):

Wilay3 1 (Aures): :\llI5lafa Ben Boulaid. :\Iahmoud Cherir. Hadjukhdar, :\Iohamllled ,·\moun.

Wilara 2 (N.Conslantinois): :\Iourad Didouche. Youssef Zighotlt.ukhd"r Ben Tobbal. Ali K.,fi.WiJap. 3 (Kab)iia; and sometimes e.mbraced command of Algiers city):Belkacem Knm. Omar Oll:lnll-ane. :\Iohammedi S.,id. Col. Amirollche.:\Iohand Ou HHadj.Wilap.4 (Algerois): Rabah Bilat. Omar Ouamrallc. 5i Sadek. 5i Lakhdar.Ali Khodja. 5i ,..\zzedine. 5i :\I'hamed. Si Salah.Wila)'a 5 (Oranais): t..,hbi Ben :\I'Hidi. Alxlelhafid Boussouf. HouariBoumedienne. Col. Lotfi.Wila)'a 6 (Sahara and en~irons):T,lieb EI-Djoglmli, 5i Haoue ,

The characler and fOrlunes of the Wila\'"as \-aried dr:unatica1lv at dif­ferent times. as did the qualit), of leadership. Somc cOlllluanders wercoUL'ilanding: others \,'crc lillie more than feuding bandit chiefs, E"enwithin the Arab and Berber COllllllullilies locill tribal differences andmutual suspicion persisted. A marked nalional characteristic was aninstincli,'C suspicion of the cult of the indh·idllal. These factors. logether\,'itl1 the sheer difficuhy of command liaison. hampered operationaleffectivcness. ~Iercilcss w,ll'farc bctween mrious ~Iuslim groups waspursued simultaneously \\'ith the \,'301' "gainst the French, panicular1~'

betweell the FLN ,lnd the rh-al i\INA 1I,llion;llisl movcmCnt (a tendencyoft.en exploited \\'ith grt:al success b)' French inlelligence a encies),

The 'gencnll stan" (Co-ordinating and Execut.ivc Committee. CCE ­which flcd Algiers for Tunis in spring 19:'7) tightencd up the commandSU'uClurc in carly 1958. creating Western and Eastern staffs (COMs) in:\Iorocco (for' Wilayas 4, 5 and 6) alld Tunisia (for \\'ilaps I. 2 and 3)rcspccti\·e1)'. In January 1960 existing rcalities were recognised by theconfirmation of Col. HOllari Boumedicnnc - I,'hose powerba.se ,,-as thearmy-in-waiting in Tunisia - as chicf-of-staff of the whole ALN.

Organisation and EqUipment

The Soummam Conference of August 1956 esmblisllt:d AL\J lacticalorganisation: ranks from prh-ate (djQlUldl) to colonel (sagfl mom); theII·man seCtion (fOOl/d)). liD-man companr (I((IliOO). and 350-manballalion (fo;/~Jr). In praclice the shortage of arms. and FrenchSUlycillance. ncarlr alw'1Ys limited units inside Algeria to katiba size.

..'

- '.

.. -. ...,.. -,..- '

Katibas were numbered. beginning \,'jth that oflhe \fila)'a (e.g. Kaliba 533 was it unit ofWilap 5).By ~Ia)' 1956 Si L'tkhdar and Ali Khodja ofWilaya4 had already fonned the firsl Zonal Commando(CdoAI). About 100 strong in five 20-manplaloons. Ihese commandos \,'cre a response tothe A.L~· patch\' strength and equipmcllI. (on­ccmr<uing the beSt available men and \,'c;:II)QIl$ fOl'

speciallraining and missions.The llllC\-en now of arms ah,.ws dicL.,ted

strength and level of acti';t}: Desperatel~' mcagrein 1955. this improved sharpl}' during 1956.French na\OI.I and espionage successes sometimesinterrupted supplies, but it was the \;rmal scalingof the Tunisian and Moroccan fromiers in 1958which lefl lhe Wilayas in critical straits from thatSUITlIller until ~Iar 1961. Brief nOtes 011 specificAL\'! Kcaponl")' will be found in the Plates com­mcntarics :md c:lptions. Gencl-dllr speaking. after1956 1ll0~1 regular' field lmilS \\'cre adequalelyarmed with World War II tifles, S~ICs, UIGs andgrcnades: there \\OI.S a shonage of he:w)' machinegUllS and mOl1ars: specialist weapons such asbazookas \\'ere ah,OI.~"S desperately 1.lre: and apanfrom occasional harassing fire from mortars,aniller\' and :\A:\ inside Tunisia, the French facednothing hea\;er, R..,dios and mcdical resourceswere alwa~"S in hort supply, ,,;th the ine\'itableconsequences for command and co-ordination,morale and numbers.

An apparenU, d.Mned B<trberdoulH' 'n t"e hills, one ofhundred. who•• inhabitantswere forcibly remoyed. By mld­

HIS8 lOme 485,000 clyman. had

bee" re••ttlad, Ind 100,000more had "ad Into Tunisl' and

Morocco. I" the Ihort term thllpolley robbed the ALN 01 food,

ahalte. and local guld••, andc:... tad frea-flre I.on•• up to 30

mil•• wid. Inalda the lronti......

Strength and Morale

A detailed breakdo\\11 of AL:'Ii strength at any particular timc is difficult,since both sides manipulated for propaganda purposes the dislinctionbetween full-time armed fighters (molldjahiddille) , part-time guen'iIIas(lIIoI/.55ebili1/e) and au.xiliades, and bet\fCCn fighters activc inside Algeriaand the 'Army of the Frontiers' \,':titing in Tunisia and 1Ilorocco. Thecore force in November 19504 \\'as perhaps 500 arlllcd men and 1,200auxiliaries. Initial losses in \\'intel' 195-4--55 may havc reduccd acti,'efightCI"S to as fcw as 350: but rescntment al heavy-handcd Frenchrepression, and the l'lpid spread of the FL'ts grip O\'er the populationfrom 1955 hugely inCl'eascd recruitment.

Recmits \\'ho could not be armed at once se"'ed initiall\' as auxil­iaries on intelligence, courier, and logistic dlllies, After theeSL'Iblishmem of the cXlemal camps they were taken o,·er the frontiersas soon as possible for training and equipmel1l in Tunisia or ~Iorocco.

In late 195; il is claimed that :t monthh a"erage of 1.000 armed men,,'cre passing back into Algeria. The sealing of the frOllliers in 1958 pre­,cmcd OUlwards as wdl as inwards mo\cmem, and noticeabl\' reducedthe qualit\, of the imcmal forces.

\ 'adollS quoled totals suggeSI that bet\,'een earh' 1956 and earl\' 1958the ilHernal strength \\"as bet\,'ecn 15,000 and 20.000 'regula.'.)', plus al 15

'.

.. '~.:.. .

..

_.

"

leaSl lhe ~;II11e llumber of p;lrHime guerrillas: andthat b\ J,\lluan' 1958 anOlher 15.000 \I'ere under:lfln!> in Tunisia and :\ lorocco. B} j;\lIuan 1959 theregulars in .Algeria had been reduced 10 some8.000. bUI the Arn1\' of the Frontiers had rebuiltitSelf to 15.000 ,Ifter the losses of spring 1958. InFebnlan 1960. 8.000 regulars are still claimed in.-\Igeria despite the cost of the Chal1e olTensi\·cs.bUl onl\' 10.000 tOlal in Tunisia and :\Iorocco.Bet\I'cen December 1960 and Augusl 1961illlernal sU'ength loCcm~ not 10 hal'c gro\'11. but theAlml'ofthe Frontiers 1,<l.S built up 10 somc 25.000.B\ :\Iarch 1962 Boumedicnne had increaS(..d this10 c.35.000 and was rccehing So\iel bloc weaponsincluding a little armour and anillerr

Since the Baltic of lhe Fl'OlHiers. Januar-y:Julv1958. was claimed 10 ha\'e CO~I the AL'1 c.23.500dead. and Challe'~ 1959 opera lions a similarnumber. then if these lotals are L...·cn approxi­match correct the\ suggest lhal rccruitmentamong eXlernal refugees more than kept "I' withcasualties. but thaI Ihe replacements could not bemO\'ed illlo Algeria in any numbers after 1939.

AL:" discipline. marr\'ing revolutionar~

harshness I,'itll Islamic puriL1nism, was exu'cmclv <;elere. Condilions inlhe field \I'ere harsh: shelter. food and medical sllpplic~ \I'ere nidi­mental"'; and despite IOdII viclories the odds were hc.nilv ag'"dinst theAL:" in most engagemellls with french imcn'elllion uni~ from 1957.~Ior::lle I"IS namrallr \'olatHe: in 1956 dcfcctiOllS to the French \,'ereminimal. but after the fromicr 1>.1.ulcs of 1958 lhe) wcre running at 300a month. and some units reponcdl~' refu"Cd ordcrs 10 "uempt 10 cross.It was a tribute to their toughness anc! 1ll0lh'3lion thaI e\en \1 hCll dis­persed and forced back 01110 the defcnsi\'e the h;ml core of fighlcrscndured ulllil lhe lide lUrned once more: and as soon as lhe Frenchceased offcl1sin~ operations ill :\1 ..>, 1961 the ALN demonstraledremarkable pOI,'ers of recovery.

Nevcnheless. recruilment b), kidnapping was common, and therc~el1tmcn[ lhis caused accounted for mall)' of lhe ~tead}' trickle ofdescniolls back to the French. Before 1959 lhe djOlillOUl/ were I,'ell awareof their likely fate if captured. If [heir ~llrrcllder \\'as C\'en accepled.france r'cfused 10 treal what \I'ere termed 'outlal"s' as prisoners of \1'011'.

,lIld man}' werc guillolined. Howe\'cl', lhe 'Peace of Ihe BI<I\'e' olTer ofOctober' 1958 lempled many to change sides to thc 'lffrk;sand colnm(lIIdosdf'dwS$I'. the proponion of surrendered 10 killed incr'Cllscd from 27% in19581042% in 1959.

\\llOlc AL:" commands could lurn rOllcn - 01' could be acth'ch pe.....suaded 10 rot. by the 2e Bureau and the 'diny tricks' unit lie Bataillonde Choc. Wila\<I. 3 \\'3S deeply penetrated by Frcnch inlclligence in 1957.and its leader Amirouche ruined his command in 1958-39 b\ hisobsessh'e witchhulll for trailors. tonuring and killing lhousands.

In earh' 1957 Wilaya .1'5 militan: chief Si Lakhdar led probabh themost impressh'e ofall AL'\' commands. and its political chiefSi ~I'harncd

.. .' ......,

. .:~\~.

'-

A paratl'OO9"r dlrft;w _n oldBerber wom_n durinll th_

reloutlon of v1Uqe.. from"._r Bat".. Condition, In~resettl_ment c_mp, lI_ri.clbetw..n th_ llrim _net thetole..ble; but _n thole lon::.cloft thel, _nee"..1I_nd d..plyrelented b_Inll uprooted, _ndIn th_ long t_nn the policy

Incre...cl FLN ,upport.lCourte,y Jim Wordenl

16

n.e .w.mpy CoHo penln....I. onthe north-e••t co••t wa••

notorious AlN retuee: the..leglotl pair...re lorced 10 wade

durl"'i ••weep thro...gh thickcover. (Co...rt••y Jim Word.n)

\\';.1$ implanting a strong and dcmocratic ct:ll struCtlll'C in thc Algcrois, Int:arly 1958 ther astlltch' ncu\l';.IIi~d a French inldligcllce attClllpt toestablish a loe;l[ ~Iuslilll coulllcr-gucrrilia fOl'ce. 'lei b~ $Ullll1l('!" 19j9­infected bv Wi lap 3 - this command was tcaring it~lr apan in blood\'purges: ;lI1d in June 1960 ill> leader Si &llah ~('cretl~ flcw to Paris tonegotiate peace with Dc Gaulle. (~othillg GlIllt: of this. and Si Salah \\<lS

cseemed by Ihe FL'\.) This episode \\~.t" call~d pMth b\ a rift betwet:1lthe bdeaguen:d Wilaya commanders and the external pro\'isionalgo\'emmelll: relations bct\\'cen the internal and cstl'rnal lcader..hip\fere alw;I\'S din-iClllt. and sometimes murderous.

THE FRENCH ARMY IN ALGERIA

B\ eark 1955 the gatTiSOIl had increased 10 some 74.000: reinforcementsIhal spting brought the total to about 105.000 in Juh. About 60.000rescr\isl.S \\'ere recalled from 'iumnu'r 1955, bringing the g'".tI1ison 10

approxim;ueh 200.000 b\' earl~ 1956: timing that \'ear some 150.000re~f\;sl.S ,,'ere recalled. and militan sendce fOl' con-eripl.S \\"":IS increasedto 27 months. The strength of (.-100,000 reached b\ till' end of 1956would be maintained until 1962.

The esselltial characteristic of the gaITi~n was il'i di\·i:.ioll into t\\odistinct entities. The 'scctor' or static troops. almost emireh con.'>Cripl.l>and re~ryiSl:>. \\'ere dispcr'Cd O\'er thi" illllnell~ eoullln ill all allempi10 prm'ide local securil\": while the (;('1)(:1';.11 Kesene of airborne andmotoriscd 'imen'emion' unias. also I:u-geh eon~l"ipted blll \\'ith allarmature of ,'olullIeers and long.-;enicl' profc'isionals. acted as: Illobilefil"c·brig<lde~.

DivisionalOrganisation

Algeria. France's I Qth~lilil;II'\' Region. wasdi\'id~d into three CorpscOlllmands - the Corpscl'Armi'e d'Oran, d·Algel".de Const;,ntinc: and theS;lharan region. \\'hich had,,1"':\\'5 been under militarygU\enWll'1l1. Each Corpsarea was dh'ided intoopcrational 1.0I1e1>. Foradministrati\'c and &rarrisonpurpo:.es cach lOllt: \\',11> lhefief of one or more Iighl('\'oltigcur') Oi\ision~ eachof (.8,600 men. Tho..edcplO\'ed in mid·1956 \\'('re:C d'A d'Oran: 12e, 13e &:2ge 01. ~ DB (annolll'ed)C d'A d'Alger: ge. 20e &:2ie 01 17

ABOVE T."ks. .l.teh •• ttlls M24CMtf.. of • Sp.hi .-gim.nl.we.. useful .s mobrl. firesupport In ttl. cOfdons of.II-.rms operations••nd pl.yedth.lr pert In 'plo"'9h1ng' thecl.ared zone_ .Iong the frontierb....'V... bllt we... ImpraCllc.llnthe moun"ln, where theIntervention units spent much oftheir w.r. lCourt..y .11m Worden)

C d'A de Constantine: 2eDI;-'Iot, l-le So: 1ge OJ.25(> 01.-\1',Reserve: 7e 01;-'10(' 10e OP.Later the -It:- 01;-'101. lie &:21 ... DI would be depJow:d:and the 25c ,\i:roportceIlould become a filIII)al<\chute Division.

For example: in eark1937 the Corps d'Arnu~e

d'Oran comprised theZone :\onl Or.umis (Z:\O)with elements of the-Ie Dh ision d'lnfalHerie;-'!otorisee - nine inr.'1ntn'b.'1llaliollS, one armouredGwalll regiment. one;Irtillcn group: ZoneCenlre Oranais (ZCO).

\"ith the 1St- &: 2ge Oi\;~ions d'lnf;ulterie - 15 infalltn. 2 .umoured,three arlillen' units: Zone Ouest Oranais (ZOO). 5e Di\;~ion Blindee &:12e Oi\;sion d'infallterie - 26 inf:mtn. three 'Innoured, (\'0 artitle'1units: and Zone Sud Oranais (ZSO). \,;th the fCSt of the -Ie 01:\1 - fourinfanu'\', three artillcn units, Each lone also had \,tt;OllS teml>Ol<\'1in'egular units. local'" l<\ised.

111e PWl>ortion of Clrccl' soldiers in the c:ulrcs of the...e formations\'AS usualh' onh' about ISC(, although in 1956 some 25% of the 2ge OJ':­cadre and 5% of its troop.; \..ere professionals.

18

ABOVE ALN flghle, w.ari"Sl us

M1943 field j~u~k.l; hIs US web

equipment Include. suspenders

and two rine ammunttton bell.,

ICOlJ"esy Wilt Fowlerj

LEFT Probably pholO$...phed In

Tunl.la at aboul the tim. 0' the

Batlle 0' lhe Frontiers, 1957·58,these cle.n, well·equtpped ALN

djOlJOOIld .... still 'nned with oldt886 Lebel rin.., though note

the cent...l soldl,r with ,

Gennan MP40, end e lettshoulder patch _ p....um,bly

,n NCO.

The Sector Troops

The disadnuH'lgc ofilic sharp distillctiuu bell,censector and intcrn>mion units was lhal lhe lormer\,'ere stan'cd of all the human and m'lIerialresources enjovcd br the latter. sufferingpanicularh from ,I shonage ofexpericncedjuniol'officers OInd ~COs, The rapid expansion of19:;5-:;6 strained France's ,lbilit\ 10 train, equipand oRlcer these trool)S. ~Iall\ re~n'isls reponedfor duty only undcr protest: and discipline,morale and efficicllC\' were nOI aided b\' lhedeplo\1nent ofpool'l\' prepared units ofall l\ve~­

cav:lln, anillen. 1"\'1"11 logistics ooualions - in Iheinfantn role.

The great majOlit\ wcre commitled to Ill(>polio' of 'qllfulrillflj?' - 'squaring', referring tomap squares - which tied do\\"n huge nllmbers ofmen in onl~ patchilv successful attempl.S toprOleCl Europe:1Il fal1n~. ~Iuslim \illages, roads.l-aih'<I\'s. p\'lons, pipelines. and ('\'cr\ other kind oftargel from :llIad.. or sabotagc, S\stem.uieqllfldriJlflj?bcgan in the northern Constal1linois inJune 19:;:; and beeline uni\l~rSOlI fromJuh 1936.

Sening OUI their two drear\ \ear~ in indiddualcomp.mil'!> and platoon!> in oflcn loneh andlillerl\' comfonless po~IS scallcred acro,,~ the \WJ.:>tinlerior, 1110:>1 sector troops had no chance tobuild proper IInit cohesion or opel<llional skill~.

DUI'ing long period~ of numbing routine Iheir(mh contact "ith Ihe outside \\'ol'ld might be the momhh' resllpph<COI1\'O). or mailbags dropped frOIll a pa:>:>ing aircrafl. Public pn:occu­pat ion with the triumphs of II'S Iml'llJ 1\<lS bad for morale: lhe scctortroops knew th:1I ther were o;;.econd-class soldil.'r" but mO:>1 I,'ere deniedthe opporlunity to become anything d~e, Their only Slimulm toeRlcienc)' \I'as feal' of the IUI'king enelllY,

To young Frenchmen SCI do\\'n in 1his often beautiful but alien \\'orld,thc ~Illslims' wrelched po\'cn\' I\'as depressing: their loo-frequclll casualill-trealmelll by the authOrllies \\';l~ shaming: and lhe cxelllpl:ll)'atrocities illflictl'd on them bv lhe FL:'\' "'l're horrifying. While few anu}'postS stood in any serious danger of actual assault. the conscripts 1\'OILIdheal' frequent rt:'pons of ambushed COI1\'O\:> and patrob. Illlllibted raSII'altie', and even occasional French prisoners dmgged ofT 10 Cod knew\\'hat f:ue. Ci\'(~n their recoguilion of lhcir own limitation'. Ihl'S(' ~tories

did nOt improve confidence or initiatin~ \\'hen ill-equipped comcript.swere led out on p::lU·ols or night ambushes in activc an:as (one I"crtds ­admittedl\' extreme - aCCOUlll.', of platoons SCIl! Out \lith one round perriflc, Ihree rounds per S~IC. and one mag:lzinc fOl'the DIG),

Agaimt this g('ller..11 backgrollnd there \\el'c. of COlII',e, impressi\'eexceptions. ~Ot all conscripts were b,;mishcd to the 'biNI and the dylJt'l'(lht:' doen and the mountain). Those po:>led in areas such as lhenonhern Omnais. \lith il.', large rolo" population. led a beHer life: ocea-~ional 'lcce,,~ to beache:>, cafe, and ,utllanned girls did \\'ondel"S for 19

20

.

Wom.n ALN volunt..rs •••ml.....• Lug.r pl.tot; not. the

openwol1l 'ooul.-balk'" ".rrie,..holellng Britllh g..n.e1••• Th.pia". of women In the movementW.lI "ontrov.,..I.t: th.lrtheor.tl".l ' ..volutlon.ryequality' Wal at odel. withe1eeply fell Mu.llm p..Judl"e.,Atthough many .ufferecl anddied for tha "au.e, women"eman"lpatlon qul"kly 101ltImpetull atter the "e••e-tl..,

moti\'ation. Long lrnditions and good leadershipallO\I'ed culti\";uion of higher morale ill some units- e.g. lhe ZOlla\·es. with mall\'local COIDIl recruits.

m(' unils were motorbed \\;th American u'ucksand half-tracks, anti relali\'el) beller equipped formorc pro-aclh"e mobile missions (c.g. the 26e.6Oe. 151e, 152e and 153e RI facing the :\Ioriceune),

Muslim and Mixed UnitsSome 20.000 :\lu~lilll career regulars and anOlhcr20.000 conscripts sern~d in Algeria in TirailleurinfalHn' regimenlS and autonomous baualions(RTA. IHA). and Sp:lhi mechanised ca\'alr\'regiments (RSA); the 'Algerien' suffix 1\,iS discon­tinued in 1958 foUo,\;ng :\Ioroccan and Tunisianindependence. Initialh these units had mixedFrench and :\Iuslim cadres and :\lusJim troops.

A French source add~ these units to peakfigures of (.60.000 hOl*is. 20.000 mogllll:."is and15.000 (omma"dos: :md lists some 9,000 deserLionsfrom the grand tOtal. .-\5 1956 - 1\'e11 before thenumbers of such irregulars reached those le\'els­was the worsl \'eal'. \\;tl1 1,700 defections, il follo\\'Sthat Ihere I\'ere mall\' desertions from the regularunits. Some im'ol\'ed groups of men shooLing

their leaders before taking Iheir II'capons o\'er 10 the AL'\I. Eqllall}~ therewere countless examples of courage and loyal,,' - the more impressi\'egin:n Ihe peril facing 10ralislS' families. Luils still sen'ing in Algeria inmid-1960 were:Oran: 21e RT (Z::,\O): 2e RT. 2e & 14e BT. 2e & 23e RS (ZSO); 2ge RT.ge RS (ZEO),Algiers: IeI' BT (ZNA): IeI' & 4e RT, 5e & lie BT (lSA): 9c BT,3c RS (ZOA),Constantine: 22e RT, 21e RS (ZNC): 7e RT (ZSC): IeI' & 8e RS (ZNEC):3c RT. lie & 14e BT. 6e RS (ZOC).

From 1956 a ne\\' polic}' letl 10 mixing of tile races within lIniLS. B}'1959 Tirailleur unitS \I"oliid approach half :\Iuslim. half (0101/ compo­sition: and IllOSt !\ICIJ'Opolit:\11 anti Colonial unil$ lI'ould also lake in upto 25% !\Iuslim conscripls, reSCtyists and \'olunteers ('Frenchmen ofNorth African slock·. in the official jargon), Wilh some honOIll<l.bleexceptions, lhis political inilialh'c did not work I\'ell militarily. The:\Iuslim leadership class. ea.sily targeted for FL~ J'epris.1.ls, generall)'resisted French effortS to recruit thcm into the officcr corps: and unitcohesion and moralc were \\'eakened by the ine\'itable lensions.

Representative Action, Sector TroopsBefore 1959 local militan' responses to AL'\1 acti\;", Il'ere often poorly co­ordinau~d between sub-seclors, allOl\;ng the enelll)' 10 take refuge \\;threlati\"(~ ease in an 'adjoining map square', Apan from routine securityoperalions. lhe hUIlI for lhe AL'\1 in itS sector was oflen left largely 10 aunil's anached IIoritis - localh' recmited auxiliaries, of whom some

30,000 were already serving by 1959 - under the direction of a fcw\'eteran professionals, From 1959, if the 'Challe Steamroller'\;sitcd their seCtors. garrison units would find themseh'es gal­\-aniscd into an unaccuStomed lell1pO of field opemtions: andthose unil5 deplored ncar the frontiers ah,-a\"S mn morechance of combat dmn those in the centn:: of the COIIlUlY. Asan example of the fonner I,'e may citc thc Icre Section, 7eCompagnie, 2e BaHaillon. 152e Regiment (rInfanterie frolltthe Colmar region of eastern France.

In 1957 the 2e Iln. of the 'fJllill:NItIO':' prOl'ided Ibe dis­persed garrisons for lhe Sedrata SOIlS-S/'C/i'lIr, ZEe. The ballalion's7e Cie was responsible for the La\'est Farm ~olls-fJ/la,.tii',.of Ihe sub­sector: lhree l'illages and alX)ul 8,000 inhabitants ofa regi01I of some170 square kilometres of arid plateau. During 1957 Ihe compall\"sfirsl platoon recorded 20 dashes \,·ith the enem\', mosll\' tri\'ial:II guenillas \,'ere killed, 1\\'0 taken prisoner. and 15 sUSpt:'cu:d local FL\­;Igellls arreMed: four German sub-machine guns and three rifleswere recO\·cred.

Early in Januan' 1958 the \,-arrant officer leading lhis lere Sectionheard that an AL\' party was \,-ailing at Kel>erit village to guide a kalibacrossing from Tunisia. On 7Janua,,' al I 330hrs the platoon - 22 men inone half-track and one G:'IIC truck - approached Kcberit, and ~;l\\' armedlllcn fleeing to take cover in the dry \"uer<Ollrsc of the Qucd Ki:bcrit. Arunning firefiglu follol,'cd: 1,"0 A.L~ ,,·/:.'re killed and an i\IG'12 and a riflerecovered. From the co"cr of lhe gulch Ihe ellell1\'- the ISO-strong unilwhich had crossed from Tunisia the previous night - brought the palrolunder heavy and accurate fire: both \'ehicles \\'ere knocked Olil. Thepia loon took cover around them and relurned fire. The ",U'I"nt officerattemptcd 10 call up reinforcements; radio communications \\;th 7e Cieproved impossible. bm he managed 10 comact a regional I'cla\ stalionand called for air support.

Within minUles tWO 1'-6 Texans aniwd. sUllulloned from theirrominc patrol pallern; spoiling multiple targelS. thCl' called up rein­forcemelllS, By 1500 the plaloon leader had managed to radio demenlSof the 26e Rl al :'Ileslollia. At 1600 his own compan~'npproached. I,'ith alocal SAS officer's group. but ,.-ere pinned down. The lere Section nOI,'had three \\'ounded and were shon ofamlllunitioll. A helicopter bndedto evacuale the casualties. but the ammunition it brought turned out tobe ·7.51T1111 instead of 7.63mm· - the phrase suggeSling that thc pblOonwCI'e armed with .30cal US :'Ill Galdnds instead of 7.5mlll :'IIA536s (seeundel' Plale C2). The AL~ kepi up Ihe pressure; one T-6""$ hit anddri,'en ofT. its pilot \\·ounded.

\\11en darkness fell the enemy withdrew. At 2130 lWO companies ofthe 26e RJ. the Be Cie and lhe recce platoon of the II 152e all finall~

alTi,'ed on the scene. and searched the ground wilh the aid ofspotlightsfrom circling aircraft. The .-\L:\ left 19 dead on the field. and ,,'ere laterreported to ha"e suffered 25 \,'ounded; the materiel reco"ered includedan :'I1G-12, a \ Ickcrs ~IG. a Berena S\IG. four .303in rifles. three ',;re­cutters insulated to 12.000 volts. half a ton of ammunition and usefuldocuments, (As usual. most enem)' casualties' weapons had becn takenffom the field.) Total French losses were fOllr wounded: and a half-track.a truck. and a T-6 damaged.

51 Azz.dl .... (Maj. Z.rnri R.~hl.the eou~eou.....d<tr 01 Z_IComm.ndo 41 'All Khodj.',photoglllphed when he w••c:.ptured - .nd wounded for .t

I••" the third time - byTrinqui.,... ~ RPlMa bIltw.en

P.lellro .nd Aumal., Z$A, on17 November 1958. H.

eonvlne.d the Freneh to let himn8ilotl.te • 'Peaee oflhe B.....e'e••••·Il.. by Wilaya 4, but soonesc:.ped. Later. leadIns ald. toCot. Boumedle"n., he ,urvivedth. war .nd Its aft.rmafh.

'Amirouc:he the Terribl.' (Col. Aft

H.mOYdal, the c:ommand.r 01Wil.ya 3 killed on the Dj.beI

TumeY. on 28 March H'S9. An."Ktlv. gu.nilla I••d.r, he w ••

.Iso notorious lor the hldeou.e .....lty 01 the purge heunle..hed in lS58, p.rtty trieked

Into h by Freneh lntelllgeneemlslnform.tlon.

21

22

The General Reserve:'Les Paras'

Thc mobile reserw of 'inter­\'Clllion' 1I1liu, was based on thelOe and ~':;c Di\'i~iom

Pamchutislcs. Thcs<: \\c,'cjoined from September 1959 Iy.

thl" lie Di,;.sion d'lnfanterie(I;lIer. Croupcmcl1t Tanique11) \1 hich \I-as made up of themOloriscd infanu'\' 3c & .?e REIand I~e DBLE and Iheannourecl leI' REC of theForeign Legion, and al aile limelhe 2ge Tirailleurs. Al \'ariousdale' lhe rCSCIYC could also callupon addi1ional rncchatli~cd

ullil'. :'\'<1\')' and Air Foret:l.ommamlos. ('IC,

The O";ICI: airbomc rcgimcnls receivcd the lion's share or good men.experienced :\'COs and officers. modem weapons, lI"alhpon and nldio~.

up·to-lhe-minute lraining. access to 0pcl"alional illlelligence. and heli­copter 1m capacity. The~ Il"ere thus able to perfecl aggre~,i\'e. focusedand highh mobile tactics: Ihe\' pla\cd the major role in stopping deadthe .\L:\'·s attempt to reinforce and rcslIpph' the \fi1;was from Tuni~ia

and ~Iomcco in wimcr 195i-spring 1938: and ha\'ing done so. tht:'pn)\"idcd Gen, Chalk \,'ith a Icthalh cfficielll \,'capon fOI" hUllling do\mand dcslrO\'ing the d\,;ndling: and undersupplied AL:\ unit·, in theinterior dlll;ng 1959-60.

The pam units were di"ided bel',een ~letropolit..;Ul regimelHs(Ri'gimcnts de Chas'ieurs Pamcl1lltistes. Rep): Colonial rcgimenLS(RcgimcnLS de Paraehutistcs Coloniaux. Rep). "hieh \\('re relided~1;lI'inc regime-ilLS (Regilll(:nb ParachulislCS d"Inf,ullcrie de ~Iarine.

A well .et·up company of theALN'. 'Army of the Frontiers',c.1960, parade In French gre.nand cllmovflllg. flltlgue., caps.and bereb; note FM24/2h lindMAT411•. Frerw;h otflelllldomInsIsted on c.IlI"ll such fillht",...merely 'outlaws' lftot'$·...IoI, HLL)

throughout the w.r; Frerw;hsoldi.... clliled them "ell.' ­short for fel/llflhll' - lind wereunder no lIlu.kIns lIbout them.

A French captain with 1I unitmotoriHd In jaap. lind Dodge

tNch, photOllrllplMd durir>gOperation 'Jumella.' In July19S9, wtIen G.n. etwlu••ent2S,000 troop. Into KlIbytla. Hewears 1I net-cOYllred M111S,helmet, a deMrt cMdte searf~ M1lll17 flltlgues, lind c:lIn1es1I foldi"'ll·.toc:k M1A, US carbine;note metal rank clips on hisshoulderstrep. lind _It «u_on hi. lett s1ee"e.

Cot, Houan Boumedlenn4l (Ienl _

former CO of Wllaya 5. and ALN

chlef'of'ataff from Jan, tHO -InTunl.la, 11M2; nole also the

~' Egyptian camouftaV­uniform. and Italian hel.... lS­

1lte SKS nne. $Upplled 10 the

Tunla-based army were the only

SoYtet bloc weapon. recefved Inany quantIty; bas/calty hostile 10

Communl.m. the ALN.uppre..ed the local party when

II .howed .Ign. of Uklng up

arm., The auslere, IncOrnlpllble

Boumedlenne finally look power

In 11165 10 end the Inlernal

feudl"1l which lore AliClna apart

ener Independence, ""lInll withCromwellian rectitu<le until hi.

death fn)m cancer In 11178.

-

RPL\la) ill December 1958: and Foreign Lt'gionregimems (Rcgimcllls Elrallg~rs del'arac!llllistt"S. REP). Es)('lHiall\" these units \\'ereidenticll apart from their berets and insigni".although some delail~ of illlcrnal organi:s.1.tion\'aricd.

The rcput:ltion won b~ the paratroopers illIndochina was not mrnished by their defeatagaimt hopeless udds al Dien Bien Phil inspring 195'1: bill Ihe need to replace them illIndochina in 1954·55, and on-going securit\opcnuiolls in Tunisia and ~Iorocco, left fewunits immedi:uelv a\":1ilable for Algeria, Thearnl\' had been legalh llIl:lble to send conscripbto SE Asia, and the hean losses there amongpl'ofessional soldiers - particularh' juniorle<lders - now tamed serious problems. II is nOtgeneral'" understood that the m~orit\ of thenmk ;md file of the non·Foreign Legion (lVll!Jn

(lrro/JOr'"5 in Algeria \\'ere short-tenn conscripts,though mix(.'(1 with some dlree-year \"Olllnteers,recalled rc~en'ists, and an oflen battle-pro\'cllprofessional cadre,

... To bring rOllng conscripls - e\'cn those who'-'~ ~. had \'oJunteered for jump training - to lht:

standards of fitness, skill and morale requircdfor airborne illlel"':ention tlnib \l'a~ no eas\ lask: lhat it \\~b achie\'ed \\'asa tribute to Ihe remarkable leadership of the 'brotherhood' of paracolonels \\ho emerged from lhe tempering fire of Indochina, Famousnames included Bigeard and Trinquicr (3e RPC).Jeanpierre (leI' REP).Ducournau (\dl0 led the three-battaJion Airbornc Group during winter195....55). Fo~-.c\-Fran{oisand Chaleau:I0bert (2e RPC). Brcrhignac (9cRCP). and Romain-De~fos~~ (6t: RPC).

Thc first 18 mOlllhs sa\\ .1 complex pallern of lOUrs in Algeria b\'airborne elementS of\~\ning strength and cornl)Q~ilion dr.l.\\'n from the25(' DIA...P (25th Airborne [nfanu'\' Di\'ision) and the Colonial troops. Forinstance, the 8e BPC \I':IS of miscd regulars, conscriptS and fcc,.lledreSel'\;Sls: the 1(01' BPC had entirely career soldiers: and the 2e IWC(from Augusl 1955 redesignated 6c RPC) incoq)Ol<HCd man\' AfriC;1ll\·ohllltet.'I'~ from the 6e Til'aillelll'S SCm;galais. il was onl\' after the di~

tr.1Clion of the Suez affair in :'\O\'cmber 1956 that the classic p;utt'm oflhc airborne 'fire bl;~lde~' lruh emerg(."'(1.

Unit and Divisional OrganisationA reorganisation of French tacLical unib be~1I1 in th~ mid-19.:;o~.

Fomler" the infanu"\ regiment con.sisted of 1\\'0 or three b.'utalionsusualh sen;ng ~epar.lteh' (apart from the ler Rep, all para unitS \\'el'esingle alllonOIllOllS Ixmalions) .. [,.eh normalI\ had thrt'e rine companiesand a combined headquancrs, scn;ces and he;I\'\ \\'capons compall\,oftcn with a local auxilian compal1\. During 1955-56 most imen'cillionb;malions "ere redesignated regimcnts, th~ (Crill no\\' signifying ~Irong

singJc-ballalioll combat groups each of an IJQ and ~e""'iccs compau\', 23

...---

four rifle companies. :. hean' I,'capons com pam and a recollnaisSance"quadl'on: 1lI00or;~d regiments Often had twO tactical IIQs so that theycould opcnuc in 11m SCpar<lle combat groups.

The b;l~ic ~lrllC[lIrC of the 1.~Oo-man par'lchuw infallll)' regimenlfrom 1955 was as follows:

HeadquartersCommand & services Company (CeS)

Six officers, four NCOs. 157 men. 40 vehicles Incommand. HO. administratIVe. signals. transport andmedical platoons.

Support Company ICA)Six officers. 19 NCOs, 117 men, 25 vehicles Incommand, mortar (3 x 120mm. 6)( 81mm) and anti-lank(4 x jeep-mounted 75mm ACLl platoons.

Reconnaissance SquadronFive officers, 17 NCOs, 88 men, 33 vehicles incommand (12 jeeps) and three racee platoons (eachwith seven jeeps).

Four Rifle CompaniesEach with six officers, 23 NCOs, 184 men and threevehicles in one command and support(1 x 57mm RCl) and four nfle platoons (each with twoLMGs).

~Io~t of the acth'c regimcnLS \..cn: dhidcd bct\\"een the1\1'0 PalO\chule Di\·i,iom. \\llilt' their role was b\' defi­nilion 'nomadic'. and their mission miglu take Ihcm:lmwhcT'c in the COIl1ll0', the IOl' DI' initially opcr;'llcd111o~tlr ill the weSI of Algeria and lhe 25e Dr in lhe

24 ('a~1. Their ba~ic composition 11~IS as follows:

Ii 2e REP casu.lly I, e"acuatedIn a Sikorsky 5-!l!I(H-lIt). By1('58 some 40 ot ttMo similar butlarger S·$8 lH·34I. with apsce for12 infantry, we.. a''''dya",il,bte to. taetic:,I'ransportand escort - Slunshlp versionswe.. fitted wi1tl dual 12.7mmMG, and' 20mm cannon.

BELOW 11 w.. common 10'Mu.lIm detai_ to be made 10carry .adlos tOf" F..nch footpat.ol•. PtMItographed durlnSl a...t on the marc'" thl. man hasbeen gtQn buk Frenchf.tigues. (Courtesy Jim Worden'

ALGERIAN TROOPS1: Commando, Commando de Chasse Kimono 36; Tenes, 1959

2: Moghazni, Sections Administrative Specialiseesi Grande Kabylie, 1958·593: Sergent-chef, 2ge Regiment de Tirailleurs; Oranais, 1959

A

B

LES PARAS1: Chasseur. 1er Regiment de Chasseurs Parachutistes; Algiers, February 1957

2: Lieutenant·colonel Marcel Bigeard. 3e Regiment de Parachutk;tes Coloniaux; Tirnimoun, November 1957

3: Commando Parachutiste de l'Air, 1957·59

--..._-----

3

PARA AND CONSCRIPTS

1: RCl gunner, parachute infantry; winter field dress, 1957-60

2: Soldat, Sa Regiment d'infanterie; winter field dress, 1959

3: Soldat, 81e Bataillon d'infanterie; summer field dress, 1958

c

o

1: Soldat de 1ere classe, 152e Regiment d'infanteriei winter walking-out dress, Constantine, 1957

2: Soldat, 61e Compagnie de Transmissions, HQ 11e Division d'infanterie; Constantine, autumn 1960

3: Fuslller Marin, 3e Bataillon, 1er Deml-Brigade de FusiJiers Marins; Moroccan frontier, winter 1958

4: Sous-lieutenant, 1er Compagnie, 2e Regiment de Zouaves; Perregaux, 1957

1: General de Brigade Jacques Massu, 10e Division Parachutiste; Algiers, spring 1957

2: Lieutenant de vaisseau, Commando de Montfort; Oran, 14 July 1959

3: Sous-Iieutenant, Commando Georges (Cdo 135); Saida, 1960

4: Soldat, Be Regiment Parachutiste d'lnfanterie de Marine; Tebessa, 1959

E

F

ALN1: Moudjahid, AUrl!s mountains, February 1955

2: Dhabet el-aouel, Wilaya 1, spring 19583: Djoundi, Battle of the Frontiers, winter 1957-58

ALN1: Djoundi, Battle of the Frontiers, spring 1958

2: Zonal commando, 1957·58

3: Machine gunner, winter field dress, 1957-59

G

H

SECTIONS ADMINISTRATIVES SPECIALISEES, 1955-621: Lieutenant, SAS

2: Berber cald. Aures mountains

3: SAS nursing sister, 19sa

2

1De Division Parachutistelet RCP (from 1960, ge RCP)let REP2e RPCI2e RPIMa3e RPCI3e RPIMa6e APCI6e APIMa13e ADP (Regiment de Dragons Parachutistes ­recce unit. Ferret scout cars)2De GAP (Groupe d'Artirrerie Parachutiste)

Plus: 60e CGAP (airborne engineer company): 60eCaG (staff company): 60e CPT (parachute signalscompany); GT 507 (transport group); 60e CRD(divisional maintenance company); 60e SAl (supplysection); 405e CMP (parachute medical company);PMAH 10e DP (mixed light aircratVhelicopterplatoon)

25e Division Parachutistege RCP (from 1960, 1er Rep)14e RCP18e RCP2e REP8e RPCI 8e RPIMa1er RHP (Regiment de Hussards Parachutistes ­recce unit)1135e RALP (Regl.d'Artiliene Legere Parachutiste)

Plus: 75e CGAP; 75e CaG: 75e CPT: GT 513: 75e CRD: 75e SRI: 758 CMA(3Jrborne medical company); PMAH 25e DP.

These two divisions were disbanded in April 1961 after the 'Generals' Putsch',as were the 1er REP, 14e and 18e RCP.

For much of the war lhe Ixu.uroopers were almost cOlllinualh' COIll­millt·d. 35 elile Iighl inf,"nn:. 10 exhausting )earch-and-deslro\opermions in punishing alpine lerrain, ill blal.ing summer and freel.ingwinter alike (f\.ab\lia ha:" 6.00Q-fool peak:), and SIlOI\ lie) umil earlrsummer), Ther spent l1liln~ Illolllh) ,u it su'ctch awa~ frOIll lheil' Ixlsesoperating from tented forward !-IQs. Trucked into til(' sector, the\' \I'uukllake ofT across counu)' for'long opel-:ltioIlS. on fOOl and heavily loaded,sleeping in pup-tents and living on rudimenlar\' combflt rfllion~.

Although the\' I\'picall\' innicted on the AL:'" ten times thcil' own le\"elof casl\~lhit'"s. lheir lo\se~ in ugh' cnCOIllHl'l" battles in lhe lhic"- scrub.rock\ gOI'gcs. and (particularh' haled) dcep Gl\e~ of Ihe highland~wereIIUl Ilegligibl~. The 2e REP. for esample. suffered a 10lal of 711 casu­alties. againsl 3.650 encllu "-illed and j38 C';.lptured.

:"OIe this f\-pical imb..""ilance of dead 10 prisoner): il ,,-as l'are for dtllt~r

side 10 gi\"C quarlcr in Ihi) war. Tht'rc: i~ no poim in deming that beforethe Peace of the BI'a\e progrnmme 10 'IUrn' disillusioned guerrillas.lho~ encountered under arms were 1';:\I'eh 1~lkcn alive excepl for inter­rugation. and seldom ~lln'i\cd long: C\'en thereafter lhe proportion ofGlpltlrcd 10 killed lIdS 10\\ b\' cOIl\Cllliollal ~t:lll(lal'(ls. (It should berelllcmb~red that the fate of Ihe fel\' French prisoners taken bl the AL:\'was usuall\' C\'en grilllmer, although some I\cre exchilllged.)

Frel\Ch motortled ilndmech.nl5ed units - here the 2.

RZ. t057 - used milny types ofUS ".tIld.s supplied slnc. t~.

This M3 Nlf·tn"k served InI.roe numbe.... as did the M8

• ....-...-:! esr, Dodie We.ponsC.m..- .nd 8I8 patrol "ehlclfl,

.nd GMC 211l ton trvcks.(Courtesy Je.n-Luc O.Iau".1

33

3.

Sud Alouette II. and a Vertol

H·21 'banana' h.avy troop carrierduring. p.... op....tlon In the

ZEC. The flret douon H-21a, with

a 20-man capacity, arrived In late1957, During 1958 the 'vefltl/o~'

we.. often ta.k-grouped InHelicopter Inte,...entlon

Detachments comprlalng four

H·21s or six H·34s, a comlNlnd

IJouette, and en H-34 'Pirate'gunship, lc.:.urt••y.Jim Wonlen)

Ahhollgh a number of parachute drops I,'cre made in on(.... or twO­cOlllpan~' strength. when Ihe paras flew into ballle it ll'aS nonnallr ashclicoptcr-bol'llc air ca\11lry - a conccpt which the French pioneered inthis \\'ar. In 19t,·llhc French Army had juSt one helicopter in Algeria: bythe cnd of 1937 a crash acquisition progmlllme had assembled abo1ll80.From 1958 lift capacity and assault tactics \\'cre steadil\' impl'O\'ed: and bylhe end oflbe war some 120 transpon helicopters ,,'ere lirting an a\'l;,~rnge

of 21.000 troops lllomhl\',)lams \,'ere I\-picalh' airlifted inlO comlJ<lI in one- or tWo<ompan}'

sirength once the enelll~ had been located and fixed b\ troops on lheground: and lhe hclicoplers I,'ere often held n('arb\ (0 ~hift .loub-unitsaround the b..'mlefic1d as the Inelieal silllation de\'elopcd, B\ lhe m.yoroperations of 1959-60, French commandcrs had become experl in lheeo-ordination and flexible deplopncnt of their resources: 'hunting com­mandos' to track and locate the AI-.:" unit: rndio OPs airlifted ontocommanding peaks. working in conjunction with spotter aircrart: mech­anised and inralllry clements rorming the walls of the 'bolllc" andhelicopter insertion or its paratroopcr 'cork': close liaison with plcntifllllaclical air support. and with anillcry from ovcr the horil.Ol1.

TIllis the ALN were cOl1sislt~llll)' outfought: and it \nlS thesetroops. and these taclics. "'hich destroyed Ulcir hopes of 1ll0\'il1g fromthe guerrilla to the mobile phase of the classic ),faoisl re\'Ollllionary','31' programme,

Representative Action, Airborne TroopsAn early benchmark for the tactiCl1 use of helicopter liflS \\-as the fighlbetween AL:\' CdoAI ('Ali Khodja') and lhe 3e RPC 011 23-25 ,\lay 1957ncar Agounenda, in the foothills fringing lhe great agricultural plain oflhe ~Iilidja south of the c<lpital. In cady ~la}' CdoA I had rOUled:1 Spahiunit. killing 60 for the loss oronl)' sen::n: a fortnight later lhe\' ambushedthe 5c BTA, killing :, c:'ptain and 15 men and persuading others to

defect. Intelligence suggested that Cdo.41 \,'ould now head west.escorting \\"i1a~'3 4 commanders to a rendez\'ous \\ith other forces ncar:-'ledca: and Lt. Col. Bigeard pickL-d .o\gouncnda 011 the Qued Boulbane.a knO\\1l AL'\ route. for an ambush. Tnlcked from their b<ISC at Sidi­Fcrnlch to Hill 895 by OI30hrs on 23 :-'Ia\·. Bigeard's ;00 pal'aS made acold, four-hour night approach march o"er rough tcrrain under StriCtnoi<te and light discipline. Bcfol'c dawn the\' were in place andconcealed. The I-IQ and mormrs \\'cre on Hill 1298; the 151. 2nd and3rd Cos. and the Reece Sqn. (on foot) were spread o\'er IOkm on fourcresLS o\'crlooking the enemy's probable route: the 4th and SuPPOrt Cos,wcre in rcscn·c. and helicopters and ground-anack aircr-Ift \\'cre onstand-b}' at :-'Iedea.

At 1030hrs thc most northerly and exposed compan}" (3rd, ·Bluc'.under Capt. LJamby) radioed sighting a large AL\' force approachinghis position above the north bank of the Oucd Boulbane from thc east:at 1045 he opcned fire. Already warned by a shepherd. Si Al.I.ecline­leading a column of at least three companies - was attcmpting tooutflank thc panlS from the nonh. LJamby, his 100 men otltnulllberedthree to one. calllC under fierce pressurc. The helicopu:rs werc alreadyon their \\';1),: Bigcard immedi:JlcJ~' ordered the Support Co. lifted ontohigh ground north of 3rd Compan\'. TIle first sticks jumped from thcdoors at 1055: the whole compam' were in action b,' 1130. \\llile the1st and 2nd Cos. forcc·marchcd anoss countr\, to the support of the 3rd.the Sikorskys lifted the unenb'<lged Recce Sqn. and 4th Co. sJighth north­east of Llaml,,"s battle.

Cnaccoulltably. the _-\L'\ took to the 10"'-I~ing Oued Boulb:me.dominated from higher ground b\ Ihe paras - 3rd. 4th. SuPPOrt andReece - north of it. and lsi. 2nd and HQ to the SQUlh.In a sene of nlllning battles onr somc 30 squarekilometre:>. which Ia:.ted 48 hours. CdoA I and oH leasltwO other kalibas made sc\'eral "igorous countcrattackswhich COItllC to hand-ta-hand fighting. Despite thesupport of tactical aircraft the paras ,,'cre tOO thinlystretchcd to maintain a tight cordon. ho\\·c\,cr. andSOtll/: 200 ALN c\'t:ntually managed to slip awarThey lefl 96 dead and a dozen prisoners. billcarried oIT ;,11 but 45 weapons and most of theirwounded: the paras lost eight dead and 29wounded.

If the French \,·ere encour.lged by thc successof balliefieid air portability, the ALN took fromAgollnenda the lesson that large-scale con­frontations in the hean of the counu,\, must infmure be a\'oided at all COSts. E\"en \\'hen the" didoccur. ho\\'c\er. the paldS did nOI ah\'a\"$ 1)."1" sucha low pricc for \'iCtory. For instance. dUI'ing the'Sattle of Sollk.-Ahras· jlLSt inside the :-'lorice Lineon 29 April 1958, the 3e Cie. 9c RCP. air-lifledonto the Djebel :-'Iolladjene, \,-as surrounded bysuperior numbers in thick bmsh \,'hich hamperedair suppOrt. and suffered neal'l\' 30%- dead and3011 \,·oUl\(led.

Pilra·hussilrs of the 1I1er RHPp....de in the fleld. withsquadron fallion mounted In Irifle muzzle. Re<:ea alamantlonen fought on foot, lalvlngtheir Irmoured cars al blaa.These men wear Blgearet eaps;M19471S6 eamouflage fatlgulls.tha trousers wllh brownse<:ondary paltem ove~r1nllng

the green primary; blue squedro...s.c:erf at left shoulder, M Ig50

TAP webbi"" with. fo~round.MInd grenade and MAT.gpol,fChes; en heve field dressings

taped to thIIleftsus.pender.

35

ABOVE TWo ~~I .J.ements ofthe Challe P1,n: 0,.. In..rted oncommanding c....ts. 'nd c10..

air lIUpport. Fitted wlttl m,chinegun, and rock.t.. 300 of the..T-ll T....n train.,.. dl,pe,..ed InIndepend.nt "Ight. were thebackbone of ttle very effKtiveArmee de l'AIr t.ctlcal effort;P-47 Thunderbolt•• 8·28Invade,... and I,ter A-I

Skyralde,.. and T-28 Trojanswere al,o employed.(Courte'y Jim Worden)

Para, wittl • m,n-portable 57mm·recoille.. rifle' c.non sansracul. ICSR) near~ 'MoriceWne·. US M1 and French M1951

Mlmet. were otten wom b)'

airborne unit. during the frontierbattl... (Courtny Jim Worden)

Mutiny, April 1961Tilc llilltin~'ofApril 1961 cannot be passed over without comment. :vlan)'lield-gr'ade and warrant onicers of the intervention uni15 were fightingthei.· third war in 20 rear.\> of virtually non-slOp aCli,-c selyicc in Europe,5omh-East Asia and i'iorth Africa. All had learned LO despise politicians:and ",. 1961 the select fe\,' \.-110 had reached the forcfrolll of lheir pro­fession were prob.'tbh· the most bailie-hardened comlxll leaders in the,,"arId. The} had \\'orkcd lirelessly to create their magnificcllI battalions:the" had dri"cn the enCIl1\' from the field: the" had been promised thatFrance '\'ould ne"er :Ibandon Algeria's Europeans and 10,..1:Ioluslims.

\\llen the alllhorit,· of Paris collapsed in :Iola\' 1958. huge Europeandemonslr::llioliS in Algicrs had called for the army to lake power. andsome officcrs had joined COIOII leaders on Committees of Public Safe~:

When Dc Gaulle returned to pO\\'cr he tl"allsferred m:lllr such'politicised' officers. He undcrstOod that shOrl-tcnn military \·ictory.achieved by ruthless llu::thods I\'hich alienated :.ll moderate opinion. hadno fut me. He hoped that patient concessions "'ould bu)' some future forthe Co/OilS in a semi·independem Algeria. \\'hich he \,'ould negotiate withthe FL~ from a position of unassailablc mililal"Y dominance. whileremaining e\OlSh'c about his intemions.

\\llen the para 'centurions' final'" undcrstood that - despiteC\'cf),thing they had ~mlTcred and achiC\'ed - outright ,iclon' was 10 bedenicr! them b,' the m:m they bclie"cd thC\ had brought to power. theirsense of bctra,..1 was biner. Isolated from lIu: increasing" sickenedmood of the French public at large (\\'hose sons pro\ided the conscriptsector troops). ioOllle par:a officers had cOllie to regard this as their O\,'nprh..tt:' \\':1.1'. The mutin\' of April 1961 \\':1.:0 not thought through in anydetail: it was a spasm of rage. which had no achie,..ble long-termobjeclive.

Jubilant p.res examine e.ptul"1ldwe.pon••tter a winter cl.sh InIhe e.stem hilts, 1958; notaquilled Jackets and woollentoques. Visible among thewaapons are MG34s, FM24/2h,Beretta MP1g38s and.n MP40.Ape,., from Fre....n types, Genn.nWWII sm.ll arms .cqulred fromCzechoslovakia .nd YUog05I8ri8doml~led the At.H a....n...

37

This tragedy. and the purges ",hich followed. poisoned French armymorale for decades: and - most significantly - dcslro~'ed France's ncgo­dating position with the FL':. hastening the n:l)' end which the mutineershad sought to prc\"cllt. ~Ianr of those in\'oh'cd I,'ere men of unques­tionable honour; il was a further tragedy that some (though far from all)huer became associated with tbe murderous gangsterism of the OAS.

~"" '"' .c,~.

c

,, C:

> \

I II

£:

•

II~

A----,--(')e:-J

.L: ..Ie:::::?

L.oj

PostscriptAI the time of \\'riling (February 199i) an insurrCClion by the funda­mCllIaliSt Islamic Armed Grollp (CIA) against tbe government of theAlgerian Republic has been raging since 1992: deaths so far totalsomething bel\"Cell 80.000 and 100,000 men. women and children.There is documemed e\'idence for lhe revival of all the worSl hOlTors of195+62: in the 10\\'nS, assassinations and random bombings: in the coun­u')'sidc. atrocious mass.acres and mutilations: by the SeClll'ily forces,tOrture, summall' killings and reprisals, The reader ma)' recall lheamhor's COmll1elll at lhe beginning of this lext. thm the eventS of 1954­62 were shaped more by local factors lhan by any general tbeol)' ofrevolutiona1'Y or counter-insurgency "'arfare.

Schematic drllwl09' of FrenchM1947 fatigues: (AI four-pocket

Jacket, (B) two-pocket 'lightened'shirt/Jacket, (e) trousel'll, These

were all produced In both drabgreeo aod, uoder the 'all ann,'

deslgoatioo, camounage pattern.

(Chri,Ul Hook)

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bail, Rene. HeJiro!I/n-t's t'l UJIIIII/tIl1dos-J\[aril1t' I'll Algerit', Charles-Lav<tllzcllc(1983)

Galljac. Pau!. (eeL), Hisloi/l! (/es Paradllliisies Fmll(oi.f. Editions derAlbatros/SPL (1975)

Horne, Alistair. II Savoge Waro/Peace: tlllJ"ria /954-62, Macmillan (1977)Hurt':, Gen. R. (eeL), Dl.nl1u d:4friqui' 1830-1962, Charles-Lantllzelle

( 1977)Lcullietle, Pierre, SI Mid/(/r! (IIullht' Dmgol/, Hcinemann (1964)Massu,Jacqucs, /..(1 Fmit' Ba{ai/iediHgi'r. PIon (1971)i\1 una}', Simon, Ll'giollIwire, Sidgwick & Jackson (1978)Simon, j., L'/lljrmlnie d:·\Jn'qlle 1830-/962. L'Associalioll S)"mboles &

Tradition (1979)38 \\"ol'clen,James, The H'flYWlIrti I..pgiollllairl', Roben Hale (1988)

For the colour pl.lIe references I ha\·c dl,<!.\\·n 1H,~a\i.lr upon the publishedresearches of D.L.-.ssus,J.Sicard and P.Pi'·cu.."t in \<trious issues of Militm7nMagazine (panicularlr ~os. 3.... i. 8. 9. 10. 99. 102. 106. 126. 132 & 133).and wish to acl:nowledge mr greal debt (0 them. Published b\ HiSlOire& Collections. :; An,'lluc de la Ri:publique, 75011 Paris. France, underthe editorship of M.Philippc Charbonnier and the o\'erall direClion ofmy gl'ealiy respected colleague i\I.Francois Vau\'illier, Mifi/m711 is in Ill}'

opinion simpl), the best unifOl'1Il history journal in the \\·odd.

Schemlltic drawinga of French

.irt>ome troopa' camouflage

amock M1lMlI!53.IChrlstll Hook}

BElOW Scnemallc drawingsof French airborne troops'

camouflage amock M19471!5e,{Christa Hook}

39

\I

Si- J

­ •

,.

patterns of various shades of green and brown on light green(or less often, khaki drab) backgrounds: this was due to dis­persed mass production. and was not significant - smocksand trousers of differing appearance were often worntogether.

.,•

'.

'<

It

I

THE PLATES

Note: Although the Foreign LegIOnplayed a prominent part in FrenchoperatlOllS. no Legion figures areincluded here: see extensivematenal in Elite 6 French ForeignLegion Paratroops and Men-at­Arms 300 French FOfflIgn Legionsince 1945.

The most common uniformswere the French M1947 treill/s decombat or tenve de campagne(combat fatigues) in drab greenand later in camouflage flflish: andthe series of camouflage fatiguesfor airborne troops. The greenfatigues. the almost universalworking dress of French forcesthroughout the war, were alsoacquired in quantity by the ALN.The 'all-arms' camouflage versionbecame increasingly common from the late 19505. replacingthe green set in many French units.

The SImilarly camouflaged airnome troops' fatigues wereworn throughout the W81. There was some variatiOn in theexact pnnting of the basically similar streaked camoufIa99

Schematic drawings 01 French

aIrborne troops' camouflage

trousers: (AI M1947152,(Bl M1947153, (C) M1947156.

(Christa Hook)

c

•

5ehematic 01 typical camouflage pattern on khaki or· more

often - light gre"n ground. Th" primary colour (dark tonel

was more often green, the secondary (mid-tone) brown, findthe primary prlntad over the secondary, but reversals 01 all

these were known.

The airborne lenue de saul cam-cuflee went through several slightlyvarying versions, worn indiscrimi­nately In Algeria. The mainidentifying features 01 the varioussmocks were as follows VestoM1947/51 - Deep Denison-typecollar: external breast pockets.three-snap flaps. drainage eyelets.left pocket With zipped internalaccess via inner Yertical edge andpencil pocket on lace; smaller skirtpockets slanting inwards at boltom.two-snap flaps. drainage eyelets:vertical zipped vents either side ofupper back: two inwards-slantinginternal rear skirt pockets. pointedSingle-snap flaps: forward-buttoninghip and wrist tabs; Denison-type

'beaver taH' secured to three pairs of snaps front or back,Veste M1947/52 - Collar smaller; no rear pockets or zippedvents; broader wrist tabs with sliding-clamp buckles. VesteMI947/53 - Collar smaller: forward-buttoning wrist tabs:smaller hip tabs with sliding-clamp buckles. Veste M1947/54- 'Beaver tail' removed (and often cut oft earlier smocks byIndividuals).Veste MI947/56 - Skirt pockels oolarged, setvertically. three-snap flaps: wrist and hip tabs removed: draw­string hem: wrists elasticated: buttons under collar loroptional hood.

The trousers - \'lorn indiscflminately with matching or anyother models of smock - differed progressively as follows;Pantalon M1947/51 - Buckled tab at front waistband: twoslash side pockets. the left zip-fastooed: two internal rearpoCKets. pointed single-snap flaps: two bellows cargopockets on outside thighs. drainage eyelets, two-snap flaps;three small pockets on front thighs (two left. one right).drainage eyelets, pointed single-bulton lIaps.Pan/alon M1947/52 - Two buttons at front waistband: hiptabs adjusting backwards with sliding-clamp buckles.Pan/alan M1947/53 and /54 - Small thigh pockets removed;forward-buckling hip tabs: minor waistband differences.Panfalon MI947f56 - Side pockets covered by slantingthree-snap flaps, left pocket Zip removed.

Two sets of personal equipment were widely used inAlgeria. The M1946 brown leather set with black metalfittings consisted of a waistbelt. V-straps. a rear connector.and various alternative holsters and pouches; the mostcommon were doubled rifle ammunition pouches, and pairsof magazine pouches for the MAT49 sub-machine gun. Thisset was the most commonly used by the 'sector' troops.

B

• •

....,L.

"_ ;;--; A

I-I

r I.j\~ r1/ I

~ ::: P'~-"j'1\1

The green M1947 jacket had a fold-down collar. and fourinternally hung pockets with pointed external flaps; thetrousers had slash side and flapped rear pockets. and largecargo pockets on the outside thighs: apart from those for theshoulder straps and wrist and ankle tightening tabs. allbuttons were concealed. An M1947/52 variation hadexternally mounted skirt pockets. In ,952 a 'lightened' ­al/egee - shlrtljacket version also appeared. with breastpockets only. buttoned cufts. and (otten) a doubled shoulderyoke; this was worn either inside or outside the trousers.

The 'all-arms' camouflage version, tenue de combat cam­ouflee modele 1947 toutes armes. was authorised in 1954but not widely ayallable for some time. Originally identical tothe green sel, it acquired external jacket skirt pockets almostat once. A two-pocket 'Iightened' version with reinlorcedshoulder yoke was also produced.

40

The web equipmeot type TAP ('troupes aeroporfoos' wasusually (though not universally, nor exclusively) issued to theparas and other intervention units. This comprised awalstbel! with eyelets and various typeS 01 quiCk-releasebuckle, adjustable suspend~ crossing at the rear, a webcarner for a US·type canteen, a Iafge first-alCl pouch,doubled rille ammo pouches, pairs of live-pocket MAT49magazne pooches, a sirrilar slightly smaller pouch lor riflegrenades, a US-style three-pocket grenade pouch with legties, etc, Both equlpmeflt sets wefe seen in use by the AlN,Wor1d War II vmtage US Army webbing items were also stillin quite widespreacI use by both sides.

A: ALGERIAN TROOPSMost MuslIm troopS were divkled between the traditlOl'l3lregular units 01 !he Army of Africa -the tlralfleurs and spahJsaJgen'ens; the hams - auxiliaries locally raised as extraplatoons al'ld companies by many FrerlCh umts; from t959,the commandos de chasse {tracking units), often partlycomposed of 'turned' ALN fighters; and the moghaZnl auxil­iaries raised and (ed by district officers of the SAS (see underPlate H1),A1: Commando, Commando de Chasse Kimono 36;Tenes, 1959 In December t958 Gen, Challe ordered theraising of 'hunting commandos'; by April 1959 there wereabout 251n each army corps, al'ld in lime at least 150 wouldbe affiliated to French sector units. Most had about t40 men,but some commandos tegers had only about 70. Between30% and 60% of the rank and file were Muslim volunteers,including veterans of regular Ul'1Its, harlas, and 'turned' AlNfighter.; - 01 which there was no shortage. There was a higherthan usual proportion 01 French cadre, drawn either !rom the'parent' UI'Ilt or !rom several In that sector,

The commandos' task. was to cut the tracks of locallyactive AlN unitS, and to follow them 101' however long it toottand wherever they led. KeepII'Ig in frequent contact withbase, they were to'mark their men' (Gen. Challe was a rugbyenthuslClst) while the intervention units got ktto place to

MOrGC<:.n tir.m.ur oftiwl h RTM In fieldunlfo"", 1058: lIreen

Mt047 fll191.H1S O"'MoU.... <:Nw'neck._.t..,M1lM5_b

.nklets, M11150 bel1,with. whit. <:ItI<:he......pped tlOhtly Into.tu~n - 'Indilon-.tyt.',ICourt••y Je.n-Lu<:Oet.vve)

An Americ:.n <:orporal 01 the:H IIEI who HfVed In Algen.under the n.me DonaldThorn••• H......rs tiwlllreenberet adopted by LegionInf.ntry c.1l18O: Ind thetwo-pocket IIhlrtljl<:ket....ri.nt 01 tiwl '.II-e"".'c.mou"llI. tIUg_.,with I rank t..b (twogreen .tripe. on ark

bhloe) "-nol"ll from I

button. ICourt••yJim Word..,)

surround, fix, and wipe out the katiba. With good fieldcraftskills and local knowledge, these commandos were oftenhighly effective. Algiers Army Corps commandos were codedeither 'K-Kimono' 01' 'P-Partlsan' followed by a numbel"; K36was afliliated to the 1IV22e RI at Tenes, ZOA.

Green or camouflage fatigues were issued, W!!h B'98<Wdcaps or camouflage beretS, but not bush hats or helmets.Equipment, and weapons inclUding LMGs but nothingheavier. were standard ISSUe; but note dagger made fromcut-down German Mauser bayonet. The North Afocanhooded woollen robe - djellaba - was carried as agreatcoatlblanket. Commandos. harlus, and FI't!f'ICtI reccepartIeS qurte often disgUISed themselves Il"I lui or outer natIVeClothing.A2: Moghazni, sections Adminislratlves SpeciaJiseesjGrande Kabylle, 1958-59 Mounted cavalry were quite widelyused Il"I Algeria; in very broken terraJn a horse is mOl'e capablethan a VehICle, quieter, easier to refuel, and gIVes a betterVieW. The district officers of !he SAS were gwen the means torecruit and traJn a maghzen, 30 to 40 strong. Fatigueuniforms and eqUipment were issued, in this case the Mt948khaki shirt, green Mt947 trousers, M1917 boots, and M1935belt eqUipment.

The usual distinguishing headgear (as among the narkis)was the all·red Mt946 bonner de police, and the subjeclphotograph also shows plain red shouldernoards. TheFrench army's standard Issue 7.5mm MAS36 bolt-action riflewas a rather flimsily built weapon; it took only live roul'lds,and had no safety catch. Horses and saddlery were locallyobtained.A3: Sergent-chef, 2ge Regiment de TIrailieurs; Oranais,1959 This career NCO leading an urban patrol, no doubt aveleran of 'M:>r1d War II and Inooctuna. wears the M1957bonnet de police fcalot, Ifl RTA branch colours of pale blueand yellow, wrth the two diagonals of rus rank as a brass PIll""on badge. A lui double chevron In brass is - unusually ­pinned to the left breast of his 'lightened' Mt947 fatsgueshirtf)OC.ket; and lhe 2ge RTA badge is fobbed to the nghtpocket button. Two ctouble magazane pouches lor the Wldely­used US Ml carbine are earned on hIS French Ml946 leatherbah. and another on the bun of hIS weapon; he also camas 41

42

A)'OUnsI French aspi,.."t (offieer c.ndidate - two black ursKroU elrtgl. rank lace on ehouldera. sous·lieutenanl rankhtc. on "apl_ari"" Zoullve sld.cap end M1114e battl.-d ..... The 6eunon of the 2, RZ on his ,I"ve Ie gold on

midnight blue with the triple edging (here In red) 01 unit, 01

the tradltlonel Army of Afric.; 1M regiment's cllellon lany.,.dI. In yellow f1Kked with green. the ribbon colou,.. of the

MiKUllIle Militalre. See under ~t•• 01 .. 04.(Courtesy ....n.Lue Dela_e'

Of37 hand grenades. Mt945 web anklets are wom withrubber-soled M1945 brown leather bools.8: LE5 PARASe1: Chasseur, ler Regiment de Chasseurs Parachutistes,10. Division Parachutiste; Maison·Cam~e. Algiers,February 1957 During lhe 'Bartle 01 Algiers' Lt. Col. Meyer's181" ReP took control of the eastern sector 01 the city. Forurban dllty this paratrooper wears only an unsupported behWIth one set of MAT49 pouches balanced by a canteenbehind his other hlP. The rifle sectIOn was divided intO a lireteam, with the 7.5mm LMG Onilially the old magazine-loadedFM24129, later the belt-fed AA52) and ammo carriers armedwith rilles, and an assauli team of voltigeurs armed with thiseKcelient 9mm SMG, His camouflage fatigues are ofM1ga7!52 and /53 patterns; the boots are M1952 'rangers'.at thiS date issued in brown and overpolished black to gIvethis dark shade. FIOITI 1954 the Metropolitan chasseufs para­chutlstes reverted from red to the royal blue beret wtuchmart<ed their pre-'Nofkl War II f1Jf Force origins; this was wornuntil September 1957 (see under Plate £4). The PUr Force

RIGHT Som.com~ndo.deCIl,ss, w .........n:I-.:I

thl. patch, In blackand whita on red, a. amark of good service;e.g., on. photo show.It wom on the leftshol.llder of c.m­ounage ,.tlgue. by

Cdo.133 'Oriffon'attach-.:l to the 23eSpahl. al O'ryvma,ZSO, o~...ting.galnst Kallba S33 Insummer 1961. See

coIouM> of royal blue and orange-yellow are also seen in theecusson, the diamond-shaped insIgl'lla of branctt and unitworn on the left sleeve of servtee dress and sometimes dis­play«! on fatigues. Parachute wngs (for e.ght jumps) andregimootal badge are pinned to the right breast and pocket.Insignia would not generally be worn in the field, thoughsome photos show paras on operations displaying divisionalshoulder patches,82: Ueutenant-colonel Marcel 8igeard, 3e Regiment deParachutistes Coloniaux; Timimoun, November 1957Bigeard - 'Bruno', from his long-time radio callsign - was afamous member of the elite circle of paratroop colonels. Acharismatic leader, htghly decorated lor MaqulS service inWOOd War II and lor hIS command of the 6e BPe InIndochina, he had been prominent In the defence of DianBien Phu. He returned from a Viet Minh prison camp InSeptember 1954; and under his command the 3e RPCachieved many successes, both In the bled and the AlgieM>casbah. This is the pose in which he was otten pho­tographed: crouched over a map, surrounded by SCR300radios, orchestrating his companies' movements on foot, bytruck and by helicopter, Bige.atd commanded the Subversiveand GueniDa Warfare Instruction centre ... 1958. and theSalda sector of the Sud-Oranais from 1959.

In Indochina late in 1953 he devised the field cap whicharmy slang would name after him, copying the Word War IIJapanese and Afrika Korps equivalents; by 1957 it hadbecome regUlation Issue to the RePs and RPCs, and waswotn by various other intervention units (captured caps weremuch prized by the AlN). It is made flOITI standard Frenchcamouflage cloth: but Bigeard's personal uniform for thISSaharan operation was a heavily modified suit 01 BritIShM1942 WIndproof camouflage - 'sausage skin', a materialpopular in Indochina lor its coolness. (Photos 01 his menduring this operation show standard camoullage smocksand caps worn with khaki shorts.) His only insignia is a chestrank patCh. his only equipment a US M1936 pistol belt and apair 01 old Afrika Korps tinted plastic goggles.83: Commando Parachutiste de l'Air, 1957-59 TheGeneral Reserve's need for high-quality recce and inter­ventlQO units led to a call lor AIr Force volunteers in March1956. By May 'Commando 10', the 150 survivors of pun­ishing selection tratrllng. were ready lor combat orientatJOn;

Cdos.20 and 30 were operational by October, and Cdos.40and 50 in February 1957 and February 1959 respectively. InApnl 1957 the first three. grouped as the GCPA al Reghaiaand Boofarik air bases. became a helicopter intervention unitfor the Corps d'Armee d'AJger,

They specialised in long fightlllQ patrols. typICaIy betrlginserted by helicopter on a suspected ALN route andremaining concealed in ambush for days if necessary; whencontact was made they were highly skiJIed at co-opera.tionwith tacticalaJrCfaft. (The Aif Commandos also provided doorgunners fO( S-561H-34 gunship helicopters, manning12.7mmf.5Oca1 machrne guns, and German MG151 2Qmmaircraft cannon rigged on pedestal mounts.)

In the lield AJf CommancIos wore para fatigues with acamouflage cap of flaner outline than the Bige3rd type: whennot tactical they wore the bJeu roi Alr Force befElt With a goldbadge. His M1950 TAP web equipmeot includes two pairs 01car1ouch;eres M1950153. and the large 'commando type'first-aid pouch. The 7.5mm MAS49/56 setf-loadill9 rifle, withintegral grenade launcher and detachable len-roundmagazine, replaced the MAS36 in Intervention units fromabout 1957. Taped to his heavily loaded M1951 all-armsbergram rucksack is an air visibility panel; these were alsoseen in yellowlblack bars and white/red triangles, the coloursbeing reversed 00 the other side, and sometimes bore addi­tional recognition leners.

Cl: RCl gunner, parachute infantry; winter fielddress, 1957-60 This para hom the command and supportplatoon of a rifle company marV'aandles the American 57mm'recoiUess rifle'; despite its 22kg (48.51b) weight and the dIS­advantage of its highly visible back-blast. its 3kg (6.6Ib)fragmentation round was valuable for delivenng fire intocaves, gunies and other" heavy cover. He wears the Bigeardcap with the split neck flap down (II was usually tucked upinside), Ml947152 and 153 JUmp latlgues. M1950 webbingand jump boots. In cold weather a quilted. coItaness, Iong­sleeved olive drab Jacket was often worn under the smock.His personal weapon is the 9mm MACSO pistol in one of twoversions 01 the M 1950 web holster; his canteen is the M 1952.An air ylSibillty panel is taped to his web knapsack (musetted'allegement M1950151). Note also the coloured scarf tied atthe shoulder as a field identification sign: usually in red, blue,green, yellow Of white, these were widely worn throughoutthe French forces at the shoulder or neck (or both, in coo­trasting colours), the position and colour changing accordingto operation orders. At Agounenda the heayily engaged 3eCie.. 3e RPe were 'blue company',

Th••ih... AirborneFon:•• betel bad~ - _

u~er Pl,le. 8' ,~ E1.

M19C$ b,ttled..... with the Foreign Legion" ,pKlIIlc:te,.••, _m for, doc:oration parade by the co of tM 2.REP ,~ one 0' hi...'Ve,nt-m,jors (three aold c:he'lrons.~ L.-glon kuuon wtth gold HOlen-flam. lIren~e, triple11_ edglnill. Not. "'Ie ,Itemating 1I01dI.i..... r lIalons 0' th<IIHlut.nant..co!one''s rank around the top ed~ 0' his bltc:kkepi. (Court••y Jim Wonlen'

C2: Soldat, 5e Regiment d'inianterie; winter lield dress,1959 nus conscnpt seMng WIth the sector 1lOOPS wearsthe French M1951 steel helmet: it was also common to wearthe fibre Uner alone. The Ml947/52 fatigues haye externalskirt pockets: it was unusual but not unknown for themidnight blue M 1945 ecusson to be worn in the field. Thisbears the I'IIne·name grenade of the Infantry below lhe unitnumber, Within the double edging of Metropolitan (andColonial) units, all in red. The trousers are gathered into theUS-inspired M1951 web gaiters, over M1945 boots. HisMt946 leather equipment Includes belt, braces, and twodouble rille ammunition pouches. The 5e RI were one 01many sector units which carried US small arms: photos showthe M1 Garand, M3 'grease gun' and BAR in widespread useas well as the ubiquitous M 1 carbine, thus complicatingammunition resupply, Jackal and fox cubs were popular pets.C3: Soldat, 81e Batamon d'infanterie; summer field dress,1958 This sector unit provided a weak company for anisolated post at Guentis In the arid Nemencha Mount8Jns ofthe south-east Constantinois. Asmed with an MAS36, thisconscnpl wears the lightest kit lor local duty in summer ­perhaps standing guard over the weelo;ly market in lheMuslim village. The Ml949 fabric bush hat was seen in boththe ongmal sand-khaki and later drab green. The M1948khaki shirt has its sleeves shortened here: rt is worn withmatching shotts, and canvas and rubber pataugas. TheMl946 leather belt and pouches atQ worn wrthout braces.and with the webbing carrier of lhe M1951 canteen loopedon at the back. 43

44

Typlul Of the hith

q....Uty ot F......,h..-vl....ntal breastbad,.s, tMt of theIe RCP Is of scarletenlm.1 wIth goldd.t.aUs .nd I dullgold flllure 01 St.Mlehael, pAtron saInt01 paratroopers.

01: Soldat de 1ere classe, 2e Sataillon, 152e Regimentd'lnfanterie; winter walking-out dress, Constantine, 1957Thts recafled reseMSt wears on the left front of hIS Ml957caIot - to( the Infantry. mldmght blue WIth red top fold andp1P'fl9 - the red enamelled diagonal bar 01 his rank. HisM1946 wool serge battledress is worn en tenue de SOItIe,

WIth the added shoulderboards of his branch and the col·lective cItation lanyard of his regiment: daily barracks dress.lenue No.3. dispensed with these. but still displayed theecusson; the Infantry grenade is repeated on the shoulder­boards. His single rank chevron in red on midnight blue buttsdown against the dlamon<l on the left sleeve. and Is wornalone 011 the right sleeve with a solid triangle of the backingIn the bight. The 152e wore the citation fourragere 01 thelegion d'HOl1Il8Ur. Fobbed to the right pocket is theenamelled JegIlTlental badge 01 the 152e. 'les DlablesRouges'. He wears the khaki shirt wrth a stJghtly dar1l;er be;and civil'.an-sty!e shoes.

The uniforms 01 Muslims locally recrurted into FrenchMetroPOlitan and Colorllal units were distlf'lQuJshed on fOtlTlalocca5lOflS by a broad red waist sash worn under the leather

be'.

02: Seldat, 61e Compa9nie de Transmissions, HQ 11eDivision d'lnfanterie; Constantine, autumn 1960 Divislonalpatches were not WIdely worn for other than paradeoccas.IOOS. That of the 11 e 01 was issued from February1957: a white-bladed sword WIth yellow and black hilt on ared shJeId set on a pale blue backlng bord8l"ed WIth black. ItIS worn here on Ml947 an-arms camouflage fatigues by asoIdH!t 01 the dMsional SlQnals company: an enamelledcompany badge IS pinned to the nght pocket. A black beretIS worn with a yellow metal version of the swOtd insignia - anon-regulatIOn affectation. (Pemaps. in a division now almostentirely composed of Foreign Legion units, the signallers feltthe need to cut a bit 01 a dash, too.)03: Fusilier Marin, 3e Bataillon, 1er Oeml-Brigade deFusillers Marins; Moroccan frontier, winter 1958 The3.000-strong ler OBFM was formed in July 1956 from con­scripts. With HQ at Nemours, ZOO, the three battalions (andtheir formidable locally recn.rited 'Commando Yatagan') wereresponsible for some 800 square kilometres. Although theTuniSIan border was the greater threat. the western 'barTage'- stretctung from the coast VIa MarM. Am-selra and Beni­Qunlf south to Colomb-B8char - got plenty of attention fromthe ALN Ifl Morocco. From 1959 the OBFM's ler Bo. jOinedthe General Reserve; the 3e patIOlled the barrage itself. andthe 2e provtded defence in depth further east.

This composite flQure. from photos of a half-track crew.wears M1947 fatigues with the OBFM's left sleeve patch andnaval headgear, a woollen toque: US M1955 body armour,and a US M 1 helmet painted with a red anchor (the pho­tographed crew wear a mi:o:ture of these and French M1951helmets). The chest pouch rig for five SMG magazines. inbright green canvas and light brown hide. is often seen inphotos of both lhe DBFM and the Naval Commando Group(see Plate Ell.04: Sous-lieutenant, ler Compa9nie, 2e Regiment deZouaves; Perregaull, 1957 To the ZOuaves. as 10 thelegIOn, AJgena was home. The 2e RZ served !rom autumn1955 In the ZEO. equrpped with US half-tracks. In 1956--58they operated alongside the leglOn's 5e REI; once theeastern 0ranaJs was more Of less pacified they adopted therotJIlne of most sectOl' troops - patrols, guarding Europeanfarms. trying to protect natllle villages !rom FLN pressure.night ambushes on suspected enemy routes, convoyescorts. and 'hearlS and minds' miSSions such as publicworks and medical ald.

This young officer wears the Zouaves' red bonnet depolice with a midnight blue top fold; his rank Is marked by asingle small chevron of gold lace at the cap lront, and asingle gold horizontal bar on a buttoned-on midnight bluechest tab. His 'lightened' M1947 camouflage fatigueshlrtl"/8Cket is worn OtIIside the trousers of the Blltlsh M 1942WlOC!proof camouflage SUIt (a combination widety seen Inphotos of this unrl. together with the M1951 fibre helmet

Frenc:h bonnetll de polh:l: ltopllight side 01 TirelUeurs~riens eap, .nllsted ranks. Ml!M&, in pale bl~ withlemon yellow top fold Ind tum-up pipl",; (bottom) len aide

of officer qUllity Inflnt.ne C~ille e.p, resembling ttlemore rounded shape whleh would become unlv.rall withthe Ml1157, In midnIght blue with red pIpIng, lieutenant'stwo gold laea chevrons, and - broken he.e - lhe gold anchorbadge 01 ColonIal reglm.nts. (Courtesy Denis L"susl

l.ner). He wears a single leather SMG magazine pouch on aUS M1936 web pistol belt, and carries an MAT49. Note theunusually robust tropical boots. no doubt a prrvate purchase.

E1: General de Brigade Jacques Massu, 10e DivisionParachutiste; Algiers, spring 1957 A h'9hly decoratedveteran of the Uberation and Indochina. Massu slepped ontothe woOd stage in 1957 as general offICeI'" commanding thelOe DP when it was caned into A1g18rs erty and given a fTeehand to root out the Fl..N bombers. HIS routine sanctioning oftOtlUI9 10 extract information remaJr'lS htghly controversial;Massu was always completely sttalghtforward in taklngresponsibility fOf what he considered distasteful butunavoidable methods, given his mission and resources. Hissuccess made hllTl a hero to the pieds noirs; he supportedthe relum of De GauUe and was completely loyal to him.although hiS outspoken advocacy of the army's viewpoint gothim dismissed as GOC Algiers Army Corps in January 1960.(His promised support for De Gaulle during the Paris riots ofMay 1968. when commander of French troops in Germany.earned the release of army personnel still in prison for theiractivities in 1961-62.)

The dar\( red beret was worn by all French Metropolitanand Colonial para units in Indochina from 1951; from 1954returning Metropolitan units reverted to royal blue (see PlateB1) while Colonials retained red. all para units still weanngthis silver Airborne Forces badge; Massu favoured a largesize Colonial beret. His M1947156 fatigues are modified wllha fuJI-length smock zip; his M1950 web belt has the Rapcobuckle, and he wore dar\( brown M1950153 jump boots.Insignia are hIS two gold rank stars on black shoulder strapslides, parachutJst's wmgs, the 108 DP patch on the nghlshoulder. and hIS mpressive array 01 medal ribbons mountedon t:Xack in the FnlOCh style.E2: Ueutenant de vaisseau, Commando de Montfort;Oran, 14 July 1959 The Groupement des Commandos·Marine cornpnsed Cdos. de MontfOfl and Trepel. whichamved from Momcco and Tunisia in 1955. joined in 1956 byCdos. Jaubert and Penlentenyo: each was the equIValent 01a strong company group. Their green beret pulled right inBritish lashion commemorated the Free French NavalCommandos' exploits in World War II. It was worn. with theirdistinctive badge. lor all duties until c.1960. when Blgeardcaps were adopted lor operations. The GCM characteris·tically wore camouflage para smocks with green fatiguetrousers for all duties until about mld·1959, thereafterwearing lull camouflage suits when tactical. A number ofphotos c.1956-59 show smocks in this unusual blotchedcamouflage instead of the usual streaked pallern, and whatappear to be while-lined dar1l khaki shins. Rank inSignia werenaval; for this parade the CO wears naval shoulder boards.the unit'S fourrage,e in the yellow and green 01 the MedailleMilitaire ribbon. and fuJI personal decoratlOflS: note Ihat thedes'9n of the ;Ump smock prevented the lanyards' lerruleends belOQ earned across to the centre of the breast in theusual parade style.

Soldle... of the 2e Zouaves patrolli"'ll _.r Pe~u.. In the0 ..._ .., tgS7. Both w••r M1947 g...." f.lig....., one wTttl

the rR .na bl.... Z_v••ideeap .nd _ with • bu.h h.t.The ..-dlo. Ir. the US SCR300 Ind, fONflround, SCR5311

'h.ndie·u.lkl.'.jCourtesy Je.n-Lue oelluv.'

Th. gold beret badge

of the Air ForceCommlndo. - In

under PI". 83.

E3: Sous-lieutenanl, Commando Georges (Cdo 135);Saida, 1960 Some commandos de chasse acqUIred metalbreast badges. and a few - e.g. Commando Georges andCommando Cobra. raised largely lrom former ALN fightersby the use RIMot in the Saida sector. ZSD. in February 1959- wore shoulder patches at teast for parades. (Initiallynumbel"ed Cdos. 47 and 43. these two unlts were later redes­ignated t35 and 134 respectively. Indicating aHiliation tounits of the 13e 01.) A photo of an Algerian officer shows theunit's brass crescent and dagger breast badge: a red andblack shoulder patch with gold-Iellered 'Georges' (afttlf thefounding commander. Lt. Georges Grillet): French rank bars,and a red unit searl. The 'Medal fOf security Operations andMaintenance of Order' was Introduced in January 1958 fOf 90days' service - it was the A1genan War C3mpalQn medal 10 allbut name.E4: Soldal, Be Regiment Parachutiste d'lnfanterie deMarine; Tebessa, 1959 In September 1957 all Metropolrtanpara unl1s were ordered back IOto the red beret; so In June1958, to dlStlOQUlSh them from the chasseurs parachutJstes.

LEFT The dull gold berel b.clge of the

N.val Commando Group - .... under

Plate E2.

RIGHT The berat b.dge of the Colonial

Parachute Regiments from June 1958,'dartl .lIver winged fl.1 and dagger on I

gold fouled anchor - ... under Plale E4,

the Colonial units received this new cap badge of the silverwinged fist and dagger superimposed on a gold anchor, InDecember 1958 Colonl8l units reverted to their historic title of'Mame reglfTlel'\ts', The use of camouflage fatigues WIthparade embellIShments for formal occasions - such as theparade at which thIS paf3 tIas been awarded the Croix deValeur Militaue. the eqUIValent of the Croix de Guene for thIS'waf that was not a war' - became very IT'IariIed in the late1950s. The M 1946 shouldert>oards In mldmght blue bear III

red the two small chevrons and fouled anchor of Marinetroops. the anchor repeated inSIde double red edging on themidnight blue sleeve Scusson. This, hke the 25e DP patch onthe right shoulder, is temporarily attached with hooks andeyes. The Be RPc/RPIMa's citation lanyard In the pale blueand red of the ribbon of the Croix de Guerre TOE ('forexternal theatres of operations') is worn on the left shoulder.Para wings and the 8e RPC/RPIMa unit badge are pinned tothe right breast.

F AND G: ARMEE DE LIBERATION NATIONALEAlthough it evolved Into a well-supplied guemDa army, theALN was never 'uruform' In its clothing and equipment: weillustrate only a sample of the wide vanety seen. FrenchlatJQVeS acqull'ed VI3 TunISia or Mon:x:co gradually becamethe most convnon dress, but were never unIVersal: and ahuge range of headgear was worn. For Instance, a Slf"lQIephoto showing about 20 men of one unit in 1958 includesFrench M1947 and US M1943 fatigues; French bush hatsand bonnets de poJlce, berets in both green drab and cam·ouflage cloth, and a variety of visored field caps; French,British and US webbing and French leather equipment;Mauser K98 and Garand Ml rifles, and a BAR. We have notillustrated figures 01 the external forces who only returned 10Algena after the cease-lire. Photos of parades in Tunisiashow what appear to be Egyptian airbom& camouflagelatigues and Italian M1933 steel helrne1S, S1monov SKS rifles.and old Hitlet]lJgend daggers as sidearms, (Others show mentraInIng with earty AK47s and RPGs, but Soviet blocequlJ)l'Tlel'lt played VIrtually no part Ifl the Waf itself.) Filmtaken Ifl Tunisia shows some otrlCefS wearing completeFrench camouflage even extending over the VISOl" of a stiff­topped OfflCef'S cap, wrth a brass badge lfl the shape 01 astar between the points of an upwards crescent: and appliedkhaki or camouflage shouldert>oaTds wrth stars 01 f3nk.

F1: Moudjahid, Aures mountains, February 1955 A fugitivebeing hunted through the hills by Ducournau's paratroopers

46 during the first winter. A composite 01 various prisoner

photos. he wears the red Berber skullcap and civilian clothes:With thiS heavy macklnaw-stY'e hunting jacket and corduroyshe rs probably a good deal better eqUiPped than most. He isarmed only WIth a shotgun, though at close Quarters heavyboar-shot could be devastatlng - and in the mountains manyencounters took place at vety close quarters.F2: Dhabet el-aouel, Wilaya 1, spring 1958 A composIle,Iarge+y hom a photo 01 a fighter captured south of Tebessaby the 2e REP: his weapon is not visible, but grven the sma.SIZe of the rounds in his ammunrtlOn belts we have paintedhim WIth an M1Al Thompson, a prestige weapon among theALN. A cheche is rolled into a makeshift turban, The M1939US Army service tunIC appears In many photos: we haveadded one white and one red star to the shoulder straps forthe rank of dhabet el-aouel, equivalent to /irst lieutenant. onthe command staff of a katiba. The trousers appear to beFrench M1948 khaki stacks, and variations on the Frenchissue pataugas were widely worn.F3: Djoundi, Battle 01 the Frontiers, winter 1957-58 A

composite from severnl photos, iI1ustratlng a typical ALNsoldier of the middle Waf years moving up to try to cross the'barrage'. Various knitted cap-comforters and balactavas,some wrth integral visors, were widely used. among them thISUS Army 'bearue'. The greatcoat is French army issue; andpersonal equipment optlOflS seem to have Il"Idoded SIX oretght of the pouches, single-size only, from the Ml935 set.The most obvious signs of President Nasser's decision 10

supply the ALN from British surphJs stocks in Egypt are theMk.llt steel helmet (smaller num~ 01 the Mk.lI. and theRAC rimless pattern, were also seenl: and the SMLE Mk.IUrifle. A BritiSh No. 36 grenade Is carried in the French 'boulebasket' leather carrier.

G1: Djoundi, Battle of the Frontiers, spring 1958 A com­posite lrom photos. The ALN wore any French camouflageuniforms they could get, the dress of the famous paras beingfsh to bestow prestige. ThIs certainly did not come - in thenumbers photographed - hom French dead, so must havebeen bought by ALN agents 00 the open martlel. This soldierwears the 'lightened. an-arms' VE!rslOO, wrth a 8IgeaId capmade from French poncho material. Note plfl-on badge, withthe AlN's red star-and-<:rescent on a halved greenlwhitebaclong, on I'\Is left chest: vanous katIDa insignia were alsolocally produced, but details are unknown, and insignia ofany lund were very rare In the lield. The US web rille bettcarries ammunition for his Czech,made Mauser K98, by farthe most common rille in ALN service. though the MAS36.Garand, Ml carbine, SMLE and British No.4 were also used

in quantity. Packs were enormously various. and the non­military colour of these straps suggests that this lighter has alocally made rucksack or knapsack.G2: Zonal commando, 1957-58 This djoundi wears a USMl943 field jacket with French Ml947 trousers, and one ofa number of field cap designs worn IndJscriminately withinALN units; others Included an Afrika KOtps-style high-frontedshape made ugly by the fact that its unstrHened visor floppedsharply down over the eyes, and a 'Mao' or 'railroadengineer' style. His British-style web beh supports an M1951canteen and leather Ml946 SMG magazine pooches. TheGetman MP40 sut>-machine gun was widefy used. as werethe MAT49 and 8efetta M1938; rare photos also show a fewGetman SIUrmgewehr St(;.44 assault rifles. The standardALN left shoulder patctl was the most common insignia.though very far from unwersal.G3: Machine gunner, winter fiekt dress, 1957-59 ThiSsoldier wears a mot'8 substantial field cap of woollen cloth,and over his Ml947 fatJgUeS, fOt warmth, the ubiquitousNorth Afncan djeI/aba. He was photographed crewv'Ig aFrench FM24129 LMG. but we have subslJluted the GermanMG34 which often figured in French aftl!l"-action photos andreports. The MG42 was less commonly encountered, as wasthe old lewis; the FM24/29. Bren, and Browning AutomaucRifle were acqUifed If! quantrty; and lripod-mounted machlneguns included the HotchkISS and Vtckers. All ALN ammo­nitoo resupply was a logIStIC nightmare.

H: SECTIONS ADMINISTRATIYESSPECIALlSItES. 1955·62H1: lieutenant, SAS Created by Governor-GeneralSoustelle in 1955, the SAS was an ambitIOUS 'hearts andminds' initiatrve to provide villagers wIth practical help and avisible French presence, improVing therr lives while pro-

Going ho",e: ",en 01 the 2e Zou.v•• lnot. badge painted onsuitca..) In fully badged battledre•• len". d. SOfti•• Th.

~~-t;hef(right - on. gold abov. two red c:heVTOns) hasthe Zouave crescent end ~lm.nlal nu",ber on his snoulderboard••• w.n •• his .lMva kuuOl'l. IJ••n-Luc Delaw.1

Probably photognllphed .ft.r the 11M2 c....-flre. two ALN

men chat to village,.. One w.a,. • beret In French ~"'­

oufIaga mat.rial and wnat .ppear to be Egypti.n .Irbotne

~rnoufIag. t.tigue,. The outfit on tM right rese",b1esFrench camouflage. but aho_ ....rtlc.l nIIther th.n hori.

zontal streeks. Khaki, green .nd varlo". Freneh coloUredsidecap. _re worn by the ALN, ~....ti..... with added

badges.

tectrng them from Intimldauoo. Some 400 small voIUnt6el"

teams were led by Arabic-speaking junior oHicers wrth localknowledge. Generously funded. the programme coveredpublic health. education. building. agncultural aSSIstance andadminrstration of justice. as wen as local counter-Insurgencyintelligence and liarson With the anned forces. Many of these'kepis bleus' were admirably devoted and courageous men;in remote posts, protected only by a handful of local auxil­ranes, thQlr real popularrty With the Muslim villagers madethem prime targets of the FLN. This oHicer wears the sky­blue cap, dark red shoulderboards and sleeve badge, and90ld crescent-and-star insignia of the SAS wrth the M1948khaki shirtsleeve uniform; he carries a Kabylie girt childwearing typically colourful local costume.H2: Berber caid. Aures mountains The type of Muslimwhose plight - caught between the army and the FLN,neither of which could protect the remote villages from theother, but both of which Inflicted reprisals for 'collaboration'- was perhaps the most pitiable of all. He wears a typicalmixture of local dress and European cast-olfs; the colourfulstraw hat was a regional speciality. His medals mark him asa TIrailieur veteran of one or both Wortd Wars. Basicweapons. including ancient Lebels, were Issued to trustedvillage militias 'or self-defence.H3: SAS nursing sisler, 1958 A composite, from two nursesphotographed in the Seni-Douala country south of TIzi­Ouzou. where a fOtmer para captain had responsibility for26.000 Berbers in 23 vinages spread over more than 80square kilometres. Travelling between villages escorted bythe maghzen and men from 11I121e RI. thrs ntne is armedwlttl a 12-bore S{)OI'lJng shotgun; she wears a bush hat. khakidrill shrrt. M1947152 para trousers and pataugas. anddisplays the same green fiek:I srgn at her shoulder as thetrooPS accompanyng her. 47

48

Notes sur les planches en couleur.,~ e.--0IIa-'""""':l& 1_ IWll-.__llll_Ol~_ ..... ne< __ 8IOInllll __0II~-.1I

~lIIlrIIMi_d__*,-*"'_ A2~s- "--lIlI..~ G<..-l\-.,lot It5&-H I _ II _ \oIUMlt&& ... --..., MI9&1 elIS_Mlg" dII__OII.-",.¥'m .. _OIl Ida MIM .... Illlogt II'" _ ....... 1~.~ lIlIlI* lrUSJI>AJ s.r;.n.~ nt~ 1II r.-..- 1115f .. _ .. _ eo IIIla'*1¥'I51.iII_lIf..........'1111 01,.,__II~US¥I_.'-__ ~"'IMll._iII_"__ I ...-OFI1

II a-- 1• ....-.OIO-''--'IlIO'-~_e-.. ... -....�9!1IlDl1 ..... 1II

_MAl.q __ OI"'*I2~.....~~)t~1II,,--c.ar.. t__ II151I_ .. cIIlII ......._lII~ ..l!lo12_tl ... ia.-.__ II_

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MARTIN WINDROW left,. was born in 1944 and educated at Wellington College. He

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MIKE CHAPPELL spent 22 years in infantry soldiering retiring in 1974, as RSM of the1st Bn., The Wessex Regiment (Rine Volunteers). Since beginning to paint military subjects

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