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Branden Ryan POLS 3670 Professor Minhaj March 30, 2012

Pakistani Nuclear Foreign Policy; Past, Present, and Future

The foreign policy decisions of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan have been reciprocally

contingent upon those of its larger eastern neighbor, the Republic of India, since the creation of

the independent state in 1947. Plagued by a history of constant conflict that has affected relations

between the two nations, the development of the India­Pakistan relationship has continued to

evolve into an increasingly complex dynamic between power politics and diplomatic

normalization. The development, acquisition, and proliferation of nuclear weapons in South Asia

represent significant areas of tension in the region. Indeed, the foreign policy of Pakistan is

wholly dependent on the existence of its nuclear capabilities in order to assert its influence in

global politics and protect those interests from the ever­present threat of India and its own

growing power in Asia and the world. Nuclear weapons have presented both challenges and

solutions for Pakistan, and the nuclear question continues to be a pervasive issue in the political,

economic, and social realms of policy between Pakistan and other states. A thorough analysis of

the historical context of the development of Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities, its nuclear foreign

policy throughout the last four decades, and the continuing issue of nuclear proliferation is

required in order to assess the implications of the Islamic Bomb. Ultimately, the evolution of

Pakistani foreign policy reflects the continuing importance of nuclear weapons as the primary

tools used to advance Pakistan’s various regional and global interests and are likely to remain

integral foreign policy components in the 21st century.

The historical context of the state of Indian­Pakistani relations is rooted in the Partition of

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India after the British Empire ceded colonial power over the subcontinent in the mid 20th

century. During the period of colonization and imperialism, the British Empire maintained

control of the Indian subcontinent, which included Hindu and Muslim areas. The struggle for

independence from the British Empire was initially waged by both Hindus and Muslims together.

Ultimately, Muslims demanded a separate homeland that would protect the interests of Muslims

because the Indian National Congress (INC), which stood for a unified India, was predominantly

Hindu. “The Muslims felt that they did not even have the basic security of life and honor” and

that the Hindu majority treated them unfairly and were unrepresented within the Indian

government. The All­India Muslim League (AIML) demanded a resolution to the issue, 1

resolving to push for the partition of India that would result in the creation of Pakistan. The INC

asserted that they were secular and represented all Indians regardless of religion, but they failed

to appease the demands of the AIML. The AIML proposed the Two Nation theory, which called

for the division of the population into Hindu and Muslim regions. The separation of India was

not amenable to the Hindus and was “immediately opposed by many Hindus who saw it as a

vivisection of ‘mother’ India.” Out of fear of possible civil war in India, Britain agreed to the 2

Partition in what was called the Mountbatten Plan, and a separate Pakistan was created on the

15th of August, 1947. Britain allowed the princely states to determine their own allegiances to 3

either Pakistan or India, which, in the case of provinces like Jahoor, Punjab, and East Pakistan,

which is now Bangladesh, resulted in conflict, as well Kashmir, an area still in contention today.

1 Shahid M. Amin, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: A Reappraisal (Karachi, Pakistan: Oxford University Press­Pakistan), 17. 2 Ibid., 21. 3 Sumit Ganguly and S. Paul Kapur, India, Pakistan, and the Bomb: Debating Nuclear Stability in South Asia, (New York: Columbia University Press), 10.

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Although this summary of the Partition of India is extremely brief and fails to elaborate

on the myriad of details on the proceedings before the eve of the Partition, these are omitted for

the sake of brevity. It is, however, important to note the conflictual nature inherent to the

relations between the two countries as this is the nexus of Pakistani nuclear policy. Indian leaders

accepted the Partition plan in order “to expedite the departure of the British colonists,” thus

allowing a Pakistani state to fail before unification. Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Prime Minister of 4

India, frequently articulated this stance:

Pakistan is a medieval state with an impossible theocratic concept. It should not have been created, and it would never have happened had the British not stood behind the foolish idea of Mohammad Ali Jinnah. [...] We want to cooperate and work towards cooperation, and one day integration will inevitably come. 5

Pakistan viewed its larger neighbor as an expansionist and hegemonic threat, seeking to reabsorb

the territory into a greater, Hindu­dominated Indian subcontinent. Assuming the primacy of the

realist framework of international relations, Pakistan had to address this threat to its survival if it

were to succeed as a viable state based on the principles of Islam in an increasingly troublesome

global society that was in the midst of separating into the capitalist and communist blocs of the

Cold War. “India’s efforts immediately after independence to undo Pakistan, particularly its

attempt to seize Kashmir, were the main causes for the bitterness and sense of insecurity” that

became prominent features of Pakistani foreign policy and cemented India as the foremost threat

to the Pakistani state. The bloodshed that accompanied the partition process would remain 6

imprinted on the minds of Pakistani policy­makers as they assessed Pakistan’s regional and

4 Amin, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, 25. 5 A. Z. Hilali, US­Pakistan Relations: Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Limited), 33. 6 Amin, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, 39.

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global role and was a central component of political and economic decisions. As asserted by

Amin, “the principle objective of Pakistan’s strategic policy has been at least to prevent India

from over running or subjugating Pakistan and, at the most, to pose as an equal of India.” This is 7

the context under which Pakistan’s nuclear policies are best understood due to the significance of

the Indian threat.

The development of Pakistan’s “nukespeak” was the result of numerous years of differing

policy decisions and can best be attributed to the stances of Ayub Khan and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto

during the 1960s and 1970s. Ayub Khan did not view the nuclear option as a viable source of 8

security for the Pakistani people, although he was a vehement supporter of the formation of a

clear Pakistani identity separate from India with significant regards to religion and asserted that

reconciliation would not be possible given their two ideologies. Thus, while peaceful

reunification of the subcontinent was not a viable option, the security dilemma between India

and Pakistan did not necessitate a nuclear deterrent. “As evident in the writings and speeches of

Ayub Khan, the nuclear option was conspicuously absent in Pakistan’s strategic discourse”

throughout his tenure in the 1960s. The conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union 9

was subsequently characterized as a problem of the others and parallels were not drawn between

the Indian­Pakistani relationship and the Cold War. Rather, strengthening Pakistan’s Muslim

identity featured heavily in Ayub Khan’s domestic and foreign policy decisions.

The absence of nuclear strategy in Ayub Khan’s foreign policy decision making starkly

contrasts with that of Z. A. Bhutto whose foreign policy emphasized the importance of acquiring

7 Ibid., 165.

8 Haider K. Nizamani, The Roots of Rhetoric: Politics of Nuclear Weapons in India and Pakistan, (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers), 72. 9 Ibid.

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nuclear weapons in order to address the Indian threat. In the wake of the 1971 conflict that

resulted in the loss of East Pakistan and subsequent creation of Bangladesh, it became clear to

Bhutto that the development of nuclear weapons would act as a viable deterrent option for

Pakistan. Pervez Hoodbhoy, nuclear physicist, strategic analyst, and an advocate for peaceful

nuclear technology in Pakistan, notes that this constitutes the first phase of Pakistan’s nuclear

development from the years 1972­1987. Bhutto’s foreign policy was indeed characterized by a 10

strong aversion towards India; in an address to the UN General Assembly in 1965 while serving

under Ayub Khan’s government, he said that Pakistan was “facing a great monster” and a “great

aggressor” whose goal was to “annihilate Pakistan.” Bhutto also emphasized the importance of 11

fighting for Kashmir and linked Pakistani identity to the acquisition of the disputed territory, thus

embedding this issue deep in the minds of Pakistanis and again condemning the actions of India.

And although the Kashmir issue was vitally important to solve, the differences between India

and Pakistan, including their historical legacies, cultures, and identities, were irreconcilable. As

such, Bhutto articulated that “Pakistan’s security and territorial integrity are more important than

economic development” and that a nuclear deterrent acts as a tool to ensure this security. When 12

the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council drafted the Nuclear

Non­Proliferation Treaty in 1968, Bhutto recognized that this treaty was incompatible with the

security goals of Pakistan if India did not also agree to the tenets of the NPT, to which it did not;

consequently, Pakistan has not ratified the NPT to this day.

The loss of East Pakistan as a result of conflict between Pakistan and India in 1971

10 Pervez Hoodbhoy, “The Pakistani Nuclear Weapons Program” (presentation for the Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy, New York City, July 14, 2009). 11 Nizamani, The Roots of Rhetoric, 75. 12 Ibid., 78.

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caused Bhutto actively seek to create a nuclear program in Pakistan, though it was not yet an

immediate concern for the Pakistani government. Bhutto created the Pakistan Atomic Energy

Commission in order to research and develop nuclear technology. It was not until 1974, when

India tested its first nuclear explosion, that nuclear weapons became a foremost issue for the

government in order to remain competitive with India and obtain a nuclear deterrent to prevent

future acts of aggression by a potentially­nuclear India. On May 18, 1974, India conducted what

officials called a “peaceful nuclear explosion” which was viewed with skepticism and

apprehension by the Pakistani government, media, and population as an Indian nuclear weapon

would invariably give the country an advantage in the India­Pakistan security dilemma. 13

Pakistan could not accept that this test was peaceful in nature given the recent conflict three

years prior to the PNE. “Together with Pakistan’s catastrophic loss of the 1971 Bangladesh war,

the Indian test spurred the Pakistanis to energetically pursue their own nuclear weapons

program” and increased developmental activity at the Karachi Nuclear Power Plant. In 14

seemingly contradictory diplomacy, Pakistan also pushed to create a nuclear weapon­free zone

(NWFZ) in South Asia in order to prevent the emerging nuclear arms race between India and

Pakistan from escalating. This was coupled with attempts to agree to a simultaneous ratification

of many arms­limitations treaties. However, India’s repeated refusal to agree to such treaties

exemplified the security concerns in the region. Pakistan’s multilateral policy of proposing a

NWFZ was made through resolutions in the United Nations and regional forums; “these

resolutions every year won an overwhelming majority [votes] but had no effect on India’s

13 Ibid., 85. 14 Ganguly and Kapur, India, Pakistan, and the Bomb, 37.

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nuclear and missile programmes.” As such, Pakistan’s options for competing with India were 15

limited. As noted by Mehrunisa Ali, “Pakistan had the options of securing international

guarantees, seeking a security pact with China, achieving self­sufficiency in the nuclear field, or

accepting the Indian hegemony.” Indian hegemony, clearly unacceptable for the Pakistani 16

people and state, then, could only be countered by a nuclear program of Pakistan’s own design.

In a significant push towards nuclear development, Bhutto negotiated a deal with the French

government that would give Pakistan a nuclear reprocessing plant despite attempts by U.S.

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to persuade Pakistan otherwise.

The importance of nuclear development in political discourse continued after General

Zia­ul­Haq’s military coup against Bhutto and remained an important element of Zia’s domestic

and external policies. The coup also threatened Pakistan’s deal with France due to the regime

change, to which Bhutto heavily criticized while jailed, and caused France to withdraw from

negotiations. It was also during the end of Bhuttos tenure as President and the beginning of Zia’s

government when Abdul Qadeer Khan brought his technical expertise to Pakistan in order to

develop Pakistani nuclear technology. Educated in Europe, Khan worked for various energy

companies, including the Physical Dynamic Research Laboratory in the Netherlands while

touring various centrifuge facilities. While at these facilities, Khan made numerous inquiries 17

into various types of technologies and was monitored by authorities for his actions, though he

was not detained and questioned. In 1975, Khan left the Netherlands “for Pakistan with copied

blueprints for centrifuges and other components and contact information” for companies that

15 Sartaj Aziz, “The Future of Nuclear Weapons in South­East Asia,” Global Dimensions (2002). 16 Nizamani, The Roots of Rhetoric, 88. 17 “A.Q. Khan Nuclear Chronology,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace vol. VIII (September 7, 2005).

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would provide the necessary components to build centrifuges needed to enrich uranium and other

nuclear materials. He then began work in the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission to research 18

and conduct nuclear experiments in power and weaponry under Bhutto and then Zia. “The Zia

regime adopted Bhutto’s views on the nuclear issue as a cornerstone of the security discourse,”

so there was little change in Pakistani foreign policy regarding the importance of acquiring

nuclear weapons. For Pakistan, the importance of a nuclear deterrent against India could not be 19

understated.

Cold War politics and the nuclear aspirations of countries, including Pakistan and India,

prompted the United States to adopt the Symington and Glenn Amendments to the Foreign

Assistance Act of 1979. These acts prohibited foreign assistance for countries attempting to

receive enrichment materials or technologies needed for nuclear development. This was

consistent with the goals of the Carter administration, which “ended nuclear cooperation with

India and Pakistan” and threatened the status of U.S.­Pakistan relations. However, the 1979 20

Soviet invasion of Afghanistan demonstrated the geo­strategic importance of Pakistan and the

U.S. could not afford to penalize Pakistan if it was to continue its support of the mujahideen. The

U.S. policy of containment took precedence over non­proliferation, and similarly, Zia sought the

assistance of the U.S. to maintain its ability to resist the Soviet Union. A. Q. Khan claims that

Pakistan produced enough enriched uranium needed to fuel a nuclear weapon and performed

cold tests during this period of complex Pakistani­U.S. relations in 1984. This strengthened the 21

18 Ibid. 19 Nizamani, The Roots of Rhetoric, 98. 20 Shirin R. Tahir­Kheli, India, Pakistan, and the United States: Breaking with the Past (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1997), 73. 21 Amin, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, 81.

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security dilemma between India and Pakistan as Indian officials believed that the Pakistani

government was capable of producing nuclear weapons by this time and also acted as a

consolidation of the nuclear security discourse in Pakistan by nationalizing and patriotizing the

nuclear issue. This was complicated by India’s vehement criticism of Pakistani foreign policy

goals as well as those of China, which India has always considered a major threat to its own

security. The U.S. did have information that Pakistan was working towards nuclear technology.

National Intelligence Council reports and National Security Council memorandums speculated in

1985 and 1987, respectively, that Pakistan was working towards having the capacity to design

and test a nuclear weapons device. Accordingly, the U.S. attempted to impose new sanctions on 22

Pakistan. This renewed attempt took form in the Pressler Amendment which “prohibited all aid

to Pakistan until the state proved that it possessed no nuclear explosive devices.” However, Zia 23

continued to offer assurances to the U.S. in order to receive aid and assistance, and noted in 1987

that Pakistan, despite the ease of building a potential nuclear bomb, was incapable of such a feat

because “Pakistan did not have weapons­grade enriched uranium” and “would not perform any

nuclear experiments of military purposes.” Aid to Pakistan was severely cut in 1990 in order to 24

stop the country from further developing nuclear weapons. Notwithstanding, the cold tests three

years earlier proved that Pakistan did possess nuclear capabilities long before 1998.

In 1988, Benazir Bhutto, daughter of Z. A. Bhutto, was the leader of the elected minority

government. Like her father, Bhutto championed nuclear weapons in Pakistan as a means of

security. Other leaders, such as religious leader Jamait­I­Islami, an enemy of Bhutto’s father,

22 Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth Nitkin, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues,” Congressional Research Service (November 30, 2011, 2). 23 Volha Charnysh, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Program,” Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (September 3, 2009, 2.) 24 Tahir­Kheli, India, Pakistan, and the United States, 79.

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also advocated for the importance of securing nuclear weapons. Irregardless of differences in

Pakistan, nuclear weapons became a point of convergence for different governments, factions,

parties, and people, providing a common goal for the people of Pakistan to pursue which

reflected in the foreign policies of the various leaders until and after the acquisition of such

weapons. The underlying principle of these foreign policies were the same; “Pakistan cannot rely

on any other country’s assurances to ensure its national security, especially in the face of the

‘enduring danger’ posed by India.” Hoodbhoy describes this as the second phase in Pakistan’s 25

nuclear development from 1987­2000, calling it the stockpiling stage after the initial cold testing

of nuclear power. During this period, Pakistan began increasing the amount of uranium that 26

was being enriched in order to be harnessed into a weapon, and internally, nuclear strategy

became an important topic of discussion for military leaders.

Various crises in the period before the official nuclear tests of India and Pakistan

occurred during the decade preceding the tests. These conflicts served to increase the tension of

India­Pakistan relations and continued to elevate the importance of a nuclear deterrent for

Pakistan. Operation Brasstacks of 1986­1987 and the Kashmir crisis of 1990 were two major

periods of escalation between India and Pakistan. 1986 saw provocative brinksmanship by the

Indians when General Sundarji commanded a training exercise in the Rajasthan desert. This 27

was intended to dissuade Pakistan from aiding Sikh insurgents in Punjab, but it resulted in the

positioning of both Pakistani and Indian troops at the border between the two nations. “Some

people have argued that there was some power asymmetry in conventional weapons in favor of

25 Nizamani, The Roots of Rhetoric, 108. 26 Hoodbhoy, “The Pakistani Nuclear Weapons Program”. 27 Saira Khan, Nuclear Weapons and Conflict Transformation: The case of India­Pakistan, (New York: Routledge), 101.

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Pakistan” as well as the threat of nuclear retaliation by Pakistan, demonstrating that this was,

indeed, the first nuclear crisis between the two countries, whether or not the presence of nuclear

weapons was founded. It is important to note that this crisis did not evolve into armed conflict 28

between the two nations, although it demonstrated the fragility of India­Pakistan relations and

the potential for exponential increases in conflict escalation. Resolution to this example of

brinksmanship was only possible due to third­party intervention by the U.S., and de­escalation

occurred in 1987, though the nuclear dimension of Operation Brasstacks was clear.

The 1990 Kashmir Crisis was driven by the value placed on Kashmir by Pakistan and the

adamant opposition of any claims to Kashmir by India. The conflict “can be traced to the

indigenous insurgency that erupted in the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir in 1989. After 29

supporting the mujahideen in Afghanistan and the Sikhs in the Punjab area, the Kashmir Crisis

allowed Pakistan another opportunity to exercise its brinksmanship abilities to deter India. The

Kashmiri uprising against the Indian government prompted Pakistan to position troops and

military equipment along the border once again, increasing the tension along the line of control

separating the region. As noted by Benazir Bhutto, Pakistan’s nuclear policy was not

Kashmir­centric, but rather a byproduct dispute resulting from the overarching conflict with

India, and that “the nuclear capacity’s utility in Kashmir ‘came out’ as a major factor in Pakistani

strategic thinking.” Like Operation Brasstacks, this crisis did not result in direct conflict. 30

However, de­escalation was only possible due to the U.S.’s efforts, again, to prevent a possible

full­scale war between the potentially­nuclear countries. In the wake of the fall of the Soviet

28 Ibid., 103. 29 Ganguly and Kapur, India, Pakistan, and the Bomb, 38. 30 Ibid., 39.

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Union, the U.S. had few lingering interests in the region but pursued mediation in order to

prevent nuclear war. “The acquisition of nuclear weapons by the two states has created

deterrence, forced the U.S. to become involved in de­escalating potentially serious nuclear

crises,” and has allowed Pakistan to ensure its security against conventionally­more power India.

Indeed, many scholars have asserted that the acquisition of nuclear technology has allowed 31

Pakistan to act more aggressively against India. The cyclical nature of escalation near the line of

control between India and Pakistan and the absence of conflict vis­à­vis one another indicates the

de facto deterrence power that existed between the two during these crises, but this dynamic

would soon become consolidated when both countries were officially declared nuclear states in

1998.

On May 11 and 13, 1998, India conducted its first official tests of explosions, signalling

its first use of nuclear weapons and its de facto membership into the exclusive club of states

possessing nuclear weapons. Held in Pokhran, India performed five explosions on these two

days, signifying the incorporation of nuclear weapons into the Indian arsenal. While these tests 32

were unprovoked, India’s announcement to the global community prompted a similar response

by Pakistan, as dictated by the close ties between Indian and Pakistani foreign policies. On May

28 and 30, 1998, two weeks after India’s tests, Pakistan conducted six tests at Chagai in

Balochistan. “The tests were a technological expression of political value invested in the nuclear

option as a guarantor of national sovereignty,” demonstrating to the world that Pakistan would be

able to actively deter India from future acts of aggression. According to the Congressional 33

31 Khan, Nuclear Weapons and Conflict Transformation, 106. 32 Nizamani, The Roots of Rhetoric, 111. 33 Ibid.

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Research Service, seismic activity suggests that Pakistan’s tests yielded explosions between ten

and five kilotons, capable of inflicting much damage if used. The importance of these tests was 34

felt around the country as public sentiments responded positively to Pakistan’s reaction to India’s

tests and elevated the approval of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif.

The international community strongly condemned the tests of both India and Pakistan,

but Pakistan, in particular, was punished by an array of sanctions, including those from the U.S.,

for its nuclear tests. As a state that had yet to ratify the NPT to the CTBT and refused to sign the

FMCT, the nuclear explosions further alienated Pakistan from the non­proliferation goals of the

West despite its earlier attempts to promote non­proliferation. United Nations Security Council

Resolution 1172 was issued a week after Pakistan’s tests, condemning both India and Pakistan

for conducting tests and calling upon “India and Pakistan [to immediately] stop their nuclear

development programs,” abide by international non­proliferation norms, cease nuclear activity,

and adopt the treaties intended to promote non­proliferation. Individual nations were more 35

harsh with criticism for Pakistan while India enjoyed relative support for their efforts. Sharif

cited India’s actions as eliciting an inevitable response and claimed that Pakistan “never wanted

to participate in this nuclear race.” U.S. President Bill Clinton expressed similar concerns, and 36

like many other Western leaders, voiced the negative opinions of the tests that were held

internationally; “Pakistan had missed ‘a truly priceless opportunity’ by not showing restraint”

and “would face sanctions.” Despite international condemnation, leaders believed that this was 37

a significant display of Pakistani self­reliance and that the price of sanctions was inconsequential

34 Kerr and Nitkin, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons,” 4. 35 “U.N. Security Council Resolution 1172”, United Nations Security Council (adopted June 6, 1998). 36 “1998: World Fury at Pakistan’s Nuclear Tests,” BBC News ­ On This Day. 37 Ibid.

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when compared to the security concerns that these tests helped erase. The dominant Hindu threat

to Pakistani security was now able to be deterred, thus constituting a foreign policy victory for

Pakistan. As explained by Nizamani, nuclear weapons allow Pakistan to pursue all of its foreign

policy goals without fear of retribution by stronger regional powers, including India and Russia:

This objective conflict [between regional players] facilitates a tripartite alliance of Western­Jewish­Hindu forces against the Muslim world (of which Pakistan is a fortress) Faced with this situation, the key objectives of Pakistan’s security policy are strengthening of an independent Islamic identity, bringing Kashmir in the fold of Pakistan to complete the unfinished agenda of the 1947 partition, and, finally, building the solid foundations of an Islamic Ummah in world politics [with the nuclear option as the pivotal tool for both diplomatic and military goals]. 38

Because national security is synonymous with national interest, the importance of nuclear

weapons post­Chagai continues to remain relevant.

Pakistan’s foreign policy relations with India were relatively peaceful immediately

following the Pokhran and Chagai tests in 1998. February 1999 saw the signing of a joint

document by Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee and Sharif, called the Lahore Declaration. In this

significant bilateral treaty, India and Pakistan resolved to work together to increase

understanding between one another and work towards augmenting security between the two

nations. The Lahore Declaration also featured numerous confidence­building measures intended

to foster a sense of mutual security and stability, including discussing all mutual issues,

particularly ones over nuclear technology and weaponry, technology and communications,

promoting human rights and humanitarian issues, creating relations marked by peace and not

tension, and encouraging economic prosperity for both countries. Specifically, the nuclear issue 39

received further consideration. Both India and Pakistan agreed that they would consult one

38 Nizamani, The Roots of Rhetoric, 113. 39 “Lahore Declaration,” United States Institute of Peace (signed February 21, 1999).

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another before any tests, exercises, or advances in technology while simultaneously ensuring the

security of their own nuclear weapons against use by any non­state actors, refrain from further

nuclear testing in the region, and increase tele­communications to promote the directives of the

confidence­building measures. 40

The measures of the Lahore Declaration were short­lived. In May of the same year, India

discovered that Pakistani troops had crossed the border into Indian­controlled Kashmir. In

response, India engaged in direct warfare to remove the Pakistanis from the region. “The

operation was characterized by intense, close­quarters combat, with Indian infantry and artillery

ejecting the Pakistanis from the mountainous terrain peak by peak” to regain control and push

Pakistanis back over the line of control. This event was known as the Kargil crisis of 1999 after 41

the region in Indian­Kashmir where Pakistan entered. It also signalled the deadliest fighting

between India and Pakistan since the 1971 war. Though India was conventionally much stronger

than her western neighbor, the Indians did not cross the line of control into Pakistani­Kashmir. 42

Due to the unique strategic goals of the Kargil conflict, many scholars attribute the actions of

both Pakistan and India to the new presence of a declared nuclear threat. Pakistan has always

been conventionally weaker than India, but due to the viable nuclear deterrent, Pakistan could

pursue a policy of increased aggression towards India in order to further promote the Kashmiri

cause in the international arena. Khan notes that this policy of conflict escalation was based on

the assumption that India would not retaliate against Pakistan; India discredited these

assumptions and used her ground and air forces to push Pakistani troops back across the line of

40 Ibid. 41 Ganguly and Kapur, India, Pakistan, and the Bomb, 47. 42 Khan, Nuclear Weapons and Conflict Transformation, 107.

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control. India possessed the infrastructure needed to extend their campaign and invade 43

Pakistani­Kashmir but refrained from doing so, perhaps out of tactical, rational decision­making

processes or out of fear of a nuclear strike in response. Again, de­escalation was initiated by the

United States to quell the limited, small­scale conventional conflict between the two states;

“Prime minister Nawaz Sharif traveled to Washington and signed an American­prepared

agreement to restore the LOC” in mid­July to put an end to the two­month long hostilities. The 44

Kargil conflict was an instance where fighting did occur between India and Pakistan after they

acquired international status as a nuclear power, but it is important to note both the non­nuclear

nature of this crisis and the repeated patterns of American intervention in the region to staunch

any escalation from becoming nuclear.

As aforementioned, the U.S. has been highly critical of Pakistan’s nuclear aspirations

since Bhutto’s initial policies and nukespeak. After India, arguably, the U.S. has had the most

significant impact on Pakistani foreign policy since 1947. The geo­strategic importance of

Pakistan to the U.S. was evidenced throughout the Cold War as the state acted as a buffer against

the USSR. As such, Pakistan has been a primary recipient of American assistance throughout its

existence. The Pressler Amendment during the first Bush administration ushered the first barrage

of sanctions on Pakistan prior to Chagai tests in 1998, followed by the Glenn Amendment during

the Clinton Administration after the tests. “The most important difference was that the sanctions

of the Bush administration did not ban US support [and] assistance to Pakistan by multilateral

financial institutions,” though was imposed retroactively, whereas the Glenn Amendment was

43 Ibid., 109. 44 Ganguly and Kapur, India, Pakistan, and the Bomb, 47.

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not. Despite the setbacks that the sanctions brought, A. Q. Khan was able to capitalize on his 45

connections to European factories and markets to secure the needed materials for further nuclear

development after the cold tests. Khan has also been reported to have played instrumental roles

in the proliferation of nuclear technology to numerous states, including Libya, North Korea, and

Iran, although his actions will not be treated in this paper because they do not represent official

Pakistani nuclear foreign policies and are largely based on speculation. Benazir Bhutto and

Sharif’s governments were faced with the challenge of appeasing the U.S. government to

overcome sanctions while also maintaining the integrity of the Pakistani nuclear program. Before

the Glenn Amendment, Bhutto managed to prompt the U.S. to issue the Brown Amendment

authorizing the sale of old F­16s to Pakistan in 1995 to act as a regional pressure against Russia.

Although this was compromised by the Glenn Amendment, Clinton bypassed these restrictions 46

through the Brownback Amendment to allow Pakistan to receive financial assistance. However,

the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the U.S. presented new opportunities for Pakistan to

benefit from its strategic location near South Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East, and upon

George W. Bush’s declaration of war on the Taliban regime and al­Qaeda terrorists, Pakistan

aligned herself once again with the U.S. and sanctions were lifted as Pakistan became an integral

factor in the War on Terror. Hoodbhoy states that 9/11 marks the end of the second phase of

Pakistan’s nuclear policy, terming the third as the “protective phase” from both Americans and

from potential non­state actors, including terrorists. The most recent conflict between India and 47

Pakistan clearly reflects this concern by all three actors.

45 B. Raman, “Pakistan’s Post­Chagai Nuclear Diplomacy,” South Asia Analysis Group (January 2, 1999). 46 Ibid. 47 Hoodbhoy,“The Pakistani Nuclear Weapons Program”.

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In December 2001, the Indian Parliament was attacked by terrorists in New Delhi, again

creating immense tension between India and Pakistan. India linked the attacks to two terrorist

groups called Lashkar­e­Toiba and Jaish­e­Mohammed, and in response to the attacks, India

positioned troops along the line of control in Operation Parakram. Because these two terrorist 48

groups originate in Pakistan, hostilities were renewed and the Indian government was

immediately critical of then President Pervez Musharraf’s government. India made three specific

demands of Musharraf at the risk of full­scale retaliation for these terrorist attacks on India’s

symbol of democracy:

[Of Pakistan, India demanded that Pakistan] ban the two terrorist groups [...] because they were responsible for two major attacks on india ­ on the Jammu and Kashmir Legislature and on the Indian Parliament; extradite twenty individuals, who, according to India, had been involved in terrorist activities on Indian soil; [and] stop cross­border terrorism and infiltration of insurgents into Kashmir. 49

India’s military mobilization was responded in kind by Pakistani troops being stationed along the

line of control and relations were incredibly strained. Again, the U.S. encouraged Pakistan to

agree to India’s efforts to eliminate terrorist groups but actively sought to de­escalate the

situation at the risk of another potential nuclear crisis in South Asia. Musharraf’s subsequent

efforts to remove the terrorist groups from Pakistan and bouts of diplomatic bargaining on the

issue of cross­border terrorism aided de­escalation and neither side launched military strikes one

the other for the duration of the conflict between 2001­2002. While the potential of nuclear war

attracted the attention of the international community, the absence of war between India and

Pakistan in the wake of the terrorist attacks suggests that the nuclear deterrent has been integral

in preventing full­scale incursions into either country.

48 Ganguly and Kapur, India, Pakistan, and the Bomb, 54. 49 Khan, Nuclear Weapons and Conflict Transformation, 111.

Ryan 19

This summary of Pakistan’s nuclear history is essential in determining the current state of

the country’s arsenal and the prospect for peace in South Asia. India and the United States have,

undoubtedly, possessed paramount roles in the course of nuclear development in Pakistan in

terms of the state’s foreign policy goals, both past and present. “Islamabad’s nuclear doctrine is

centered on a minimum deterrent and is primarily aimed at deterring a conventional Indian

attack,” and though Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine has always been semi­ambiguous, Pakistani

leaders have consistently articulated this policy. Pakistan possesses uranium­based weapons by 50

way of the extensive work in uranium enrichment undertaken by A. Q. Khan and continues to

pursue gains in vertical proliferation by developing plutonium­based weapons. Estimates on the

number of warheads controlled by Pakistan range from 60 to 120, though exact estimates are

difficult to ascertain. U.S. intelligence reports indicate that Pakistan possesses both airborne 51

and land­missile delivery capabilities stemming from the sale of F­16s to Pakistan in the

previous decades. Development in delivery systems is presumed to contribute to Pakistan’s

unofficial nuclear doctrine of minimum credible deterrence. According to the Congressional

Research Service, as derived from various statements by Pakistani officials:

[The] four policy objectives for Islamabad’s nuclear weapons [are to]: deter all forms of external aggression; deter through a combination of conventional and strategic forces; deter counterforce strategies by securing strategic assets and threatening nuclear retaliation; and stabilize strategic deterrence in South Asia [by preventing Indian aggression in the region based on a no­first­use policy against non­nuclear states]. 52

India remains the primary target of Pakistani nuclear policies. As of 2012, Pakistan has

continued to develop its ballistic missile systems, as has India. In March, the Pakistani military

50 Charnysh, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Program,” 2. 51 Kerr and Nitkin, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons,” 7. 52 Kerr and Nitkin, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons,” 12.

Ryan 20

tested the Hatf­II Missile, reflecting the strides that Pakistan has made in the past decade since

the beginning of the War on Terror. The current relationship between Pakistani and Indian 53

nuclear relations, as history suggests, is influenced by the alignment of China and Russia to each

country, respectively, with American strategic interests influencing both, creating a complex web

of competing political and socio­economic goals supported by the existence of nuclear weapons.

The debate over future prospects of peace between India and Pakistan, hinged on the

question of their nuclear arsenals, can be divided into two primary sides: nuclear optimists and

nuclear pessimists. Optimists believe that nuclear proliferation increases stability between states

due to the fear of second­strike capabilities, thus decreasing the potential for attack and

decreasing uncertainty in other states’ actions: they will not strike because of the presence of a

nuclear deterrent. Pessimists, conversely, believe that the nuclear factor allows countries to

pursue more aggressive foreign policies, thus increasing the chances of instability in regions and

promoting conflict escalation and increasing uncertainty. This issue dates back to the writings of

Kenneth Waltz and Scott Sagan in the early 21st century. Waltz subscribes to the optimist view

and Sagan the pessimist. Subscribing to the bureaucratic politics theory, Sagan expresses doubts

that Pakistan’s nuclear technology, controlled by its military, will act as a stable deterrent due to

the potential for aggression and misuse as a military tool. Similarly, geographic proximity and 54

the nature of the Indian­Pakistani conflict further complicate nuclear relations between the two

states. Sagan cites the 1988 Ojheri Incident as an example of the potential for an accident to

spark full­scale nuclear war and believes that “nuclear South Asia will be a dangerous place

53 “Pakistan Test­fires Nuclear Capable Ballistic Missile,” PressTV (March 5, 2012). 54 Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed,” (New York: W.W. Norton, 2002).

Ryan 21

because of any unique culture inhibitions against strategic thinking in both countries.” Waltz 55

does not share these prescriptions due to the historical narrative provided by the past two

centuries. The Cold War did not result in nuclear conflict between the U.S. and the USSR despite

the conflicts and crises that punctuated the period, and indeed, nuclear weapons have never been

used as tools of war between any states (with the notable exception of Hiroshima and Nagasaki,

although scholars note that Japan did not have the means to retaliate and the attacks only

expedited inevitable loss). Instead, Waltz argues that the presence of nuclear weapons increases

stability based on the fear of mutually assured destruction via second­strike capability. “In a

nuclear world, any state ­ whether ruled by a Stalin, a Mao, a Saddam, or a Kim Jong­Il, will be

deterred by the knowledge that aggressive actions may lead to its own destruction,” thereby

asserting that states should acquire nuclear weapons in order to stabilize the world system. The 56

history of conflict between India and Pakistan suggests that the nuclear optimists possess more

credence to their argument as none of the aforementioned crises have resulted in nuclear war.

Nevertheless, the future of nuclear non­proliferation and conflict resolution remain in constant

flux with few predictions available for policy makers.

The future of Pakistani nuclear foreign policy will depend on the actions of India as their

bilateral relations and wholly based on a action­reaction dynamic. The security dilemma present

between India and Pakistan is unlikely to be reconciled in the near future. Concerns over the

stability of nuclear weapons facilities in Pakistan have also raised doubts by the international

community and have required Pakistan to alter its nuclear foreign policy to address these

55 Scott D. Sagan, “Nuclear Instability in South Asia” in International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues, ed. Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis. (Longman ­ Pearson), 220. 56 Kenneth Waltz, “Nuclear Stability in South Asia” in International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues, ed. Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis. (Longman ­ Pearson), 233.

Ryan 22

concerns. Many leaders and analysts have voiced their fear that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons have

the potential to be used by non­state, religiously extremist actors if the government falls. Former

President Musharraf has repeatedly praised the security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, stating that

“they are very well dispersed and they are in very strong positions,” making them “very hard

targets.” The National Command Authority currently oversees the security of all Pakistani 57

weapons complexes and have worked to assure the global community that they are

well­protected. Under the NCA, Pakistan’s protection system features a policy called “C4I2SR”,

signifying “command, control, communication, computers, intelligence, information,

surveillance, and reconnaissance”; these efforts were developed with assistance from the U.S. in

a control structure that would protect Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal and ensure the U.S.’s interests in

keeping terrorists from acquiring nuclear weapons. Compartmentalization of Pakistan’s nuclear 58

weapons also contributes to the protection of these assets and hinders non­state actors, generally

without adequate means of fully infiltrating such facilities, from acquiring and using such

weapons for extremist purposes. Therefore, while this issue has received much global attention

and has been incorporated into Pakistan’s nuclear foreign policy, especially to appease the U.S.,

non­proliferation attempts must be the main focus for the international community if lasting

peace is to be achieved.

Pakistan’s non­proliferation and nuclear disarmament proposals are extensive. Such

efforts include a joint­declaration by India in Pakistan to abandon attempts to create nuclear

weapons in 1978, the creation of a South Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in 1978, inspection

infrastructure for the two countries in 1979, joint recognition and ratification of the NPT in 1979

57 “Pervez Musharraf on Pakistani Nuclear Weapons,” Fareed Zakaria GPS Blogs on CNN, November 5, 2011. 58 Kerr and Nitkin, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons,” 12.

Ryan 23

as well as the associated IAEA guidelines, a regional test­ban treaty (like the CTBT) in 1987,

and a South Asia Zero­Missile Zone in 1994, though all of these have failed due to India’s

refusal to adopt any measures. Pakistan has maintained that it will not adopt non­proliferation 59

measures unilaterally due to security concerns rooted in its policies towards India. The allusion

to the Pakistan­India­China­Russia relationship made earlier is the cause of India’s opposition to

disarmament agreements, especially given India’s continued economic growth and role as a

regional power. In turn, though Pakistan has voiced desires to join the non­proliferation regime

and has flirted with arms control in its foreign policy decisions, they will only be adopted on a

contingent basis.

Other issues have affected Pakistan’s nuclear foreign policy in the last three years, often

involving the U.S. In late 2007­early 2008, the U.S. negotiated a nuclear deal with India that

would augment India’s nuclear technology and potentially benefit India’s weapon arsenal. The 60

India­centric character of Pakistan’s nuclear program dictates that this constitute a direct threat

towards Pakistani security. By providing India with more reactors and centrifuges capable of

increasing enrichment efforts, India’s weapons­production capabilities also increase. Senator

Mushahid Hussain Sayed has been critical of these evolving negotiations, calling it a means of

“promoting India as a regional power in order to counter Chinese influence in the region”

through efforts that are in violation of the NPT. In accordance with Pakistani nuclear policies, 61

as evidenced throughout their relations, Pakistan will continue to develop its own nuclear

capacity, exemplified in the wake of this deal by the Haft­II Missile tests. Furthermore,

59 A. H. Nayyar, “A Pakistani Perspective on Nuclear Disarmament and Non­Proliferation,” Dialogue on Non­Proliferation: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. FES Briefing Paper 9 (August 2008, 5). 60 Ibid., 6. 61 “Indian­US deal ‘Not for Energy but to Encounter China’,” TheNews Pakistani Newspaper (March 19, 2012).

Ryan 24

Pakistan’s recent refusal to accede to new fissile material bans in the Conference on

Disarmament also reflect this trend. The Conference on Disarmament, a special organ of the

United Nations, is composed of 65 nations and can only create declarations upon consensus from

all members, making it difficult for the body to be effective given divergent nuclear policies.

“Islamabad’s objection derailed the latest attempt to end the 15­year deadlock in negotiations of

new arms control agreements” as the Pakistani government found that the proposal compromises

Pakistani security in light of India’s nuclear expansion. Pakistan has been heavily involved in 62

the Conference on Disarmament and current President Asif Ali Zidari’s government has stated

that it wishes to continue to engage in multilateral negotiations in the forum, though it will not

acquiesce to a fissile material ban at the expense of benefitting India. 63

Pakistan, along with the rest of the global community, is entering into new stage in the

current world order. Global politics now features not just state actors, but many new players,

including corporations, non­governmental organizations, and non­state groups. The U.S.’s

infiltration of Osama bin Laden’s Abbottabad refuge has marred U.S.­Pakistan relations. The

current era of nuclear relations in South Asia is no longer likely to feature talks of

non­proliferation and disarmament as conflict escalation continue to reflect the fragility of

diplomacy in the region. General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani issued a strong statement in 2011

warning the “United States not to launch a military offensive” as the country does indeed possess

nuclear weapons and “should not be compared with Iraq or Afghanistan.” Pakistan has also 64

voiced support for Iran in recent months, threatening to further complicate U.S.­Pakistani

62 “Pakistan Again Blocks Conference on Disarmament Work Plan,” NTI Global Security Newswire (March 16, 2012). 63 Ibid. 64 “Pakistan Army Chief Warns US Against Launching Attack in North Waziristan,” The Indian Express (October 19, 2011).

Ryan 25

relations amidst Iran’s nuclear development program. Pakistani officials have made it clear that

Pakistan will “stand by Iran to dispel any threat or actual use of force” in the region, highlighting

Pakistan’s seemingly contradictory policies. President Zadari has also confirmed this element 65

of Pakistan’s foreign policy in a joint meeting with Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Hamid Karzai

of Iran and Afghanistan, proclaiming that Pakistan would support Iran if attacked by the U.S. It 66

remains to be seen whether or not these statements will affect the status of nuclear weapons in

the region, particularly in the case of the U.S.­India nuclear technology deal, and though South

Asia has not yet seen nuclear war, the stability of the region continues to be questioned with

nuclear developments in Iran and North Korea coupled with Western intervention.

The international ramifications of the Islamic Bomb have been clear; Pakistan’s nuclear

development in the face of sanctions, conflict, economic disparity, and political transition

demonstrates the importance of national security and interest in forming foreign policy. The

future of Pakistan’s nuclear foreign policy is uncertain due to the changing dynamics of the

international community and the failings of the non­proliferation regime. India continues to act

as a threat to Pakistani national security, precluding a future of unilateral disarmament in

Pakistan. The nuclear­optimist assertion that nuclear weapons will establish stability has proven

true in South Asia thus far though the possibility of uncontrolled nuclear escalation cannot be

discounted. If lasting peace is to come to the region, Pakistani foreign policy must undergo

fundamental changes in order to significantly alter regional discourse. Both India and Pakistan

must address the underlying tensions that have resulted from years of animosity, including the

65 “Indian­US Deal,” TheNews Pakistani Newspaper. 66 Omar Farooq Khan, “Won’t Help US Attack Iran: Pakistan President Zadari,” The Times of India (February 18, 2012).

Ryan 26

long­standing dispute over Kashmir, and non­proliferation and disarmament must take

precedence within political agendas to overcome the security dilemma. Until these measures are

bilaterally adopted, the West refrains from intervention in the region, and the problems posed by

Iran and North Korea are solved, Pakistani nuclear policy will continue to adhere to its standard

of credible minimum nuclear deterrence well into the 21st century.

Ryan 27

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