SHANDONG UNIVERSITY

山东大学

School of Political Science and Public Administration

MASTERS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

TERM PAPER

Pinning down Power in Ukraine Crisis: West versus Russia

Presented By

Bright Mhango (M2013071)

Presented To

王学玉

Wang Xueyu, Professor

(Introduction to International Politics)

February 2014

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Pinning down Power in Ukraine Crisis: West versus Russia

In February 2014, the people of Ukraine managed to topple their government by way of

prolonged protest which was in part a call for the Eastern European nation to move closer to

Europe and away from Russia.

The deposed Russian-backed President of Ukraine Victor Yanukovych sparked the wrath of the

Ukrainians by refusing to sign a ‘trade agreement’ that would have brought Ukraine closer to the

EU. Instead he preferred closer ties with Russia which is sort of creating its own ‘EU’ called the

Customs Union.

This paper posits that Ukraine has been a battleground for power both between the West and

Russia (external power) and that of the state versus the citizens (Internal).

The paper will try to lay bare the various power struggles that were and are at play in the

Ukrainian crisis and conclude that with the West looking like having won, the power play has

only begun as Russia will not allow a nation so close to it and vital to its prestige get aligned

with the West, its arch-enemy.

Before the Ukraine case can be tackled, it is essential to discuss the notion of power as it occurs

in the discipline of International Relations. It will also feature a summary of two prescribed

course readings on Power.

Theory of Power in IR

The concept of power is one of the hotbeds of political scientists as it is yet to have one

definition agreed upon and yet very important in the study of International Relations (IR).

Power broadly put denotes the capacity of agents to bring about intended changes, or the ability

to overcome obstacles. Power in international relations may be defined as a state’s ability to

control, or at least influence, other states or the outcome of events that are somewhat significant.

One of the most widely used delimitations of Power comes from Robert A. Dahl (1957). Dahl’s

definition is useful in trying to marry the various terms that can be interchanged with the term

‘power,’ terms like; influence, control, coercion, force, persuasion, deterrence, compellence,

inducement and so on.

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Dahl suggested that underlying most such terms is the basic intuitive notion of A causing (or

having the ability to cause) B to do something that B otherwise would not do. Where A is the

influencer or nation with power and B is the one being coerced.

Barnett and Duvall (2005) warn however that Dahl’s view of power which dominates the study

of IR ignores some crucial aspects of power.

In their paper, Power in International Politics, Barnett and Duvall warn that the Dahl’s dominant

view of power obscure the full nature of power and call for the study of other forms of power

going on to say that without an adequate understanding of the nature of and the ways in that

power can differently affect different situations, the current work that is available on the concept

of power is not powerful.

The two offer four forms of power namely; compulsory power, institutional power, structural

power and productive power which they present in a 2 by 2 box (see figure below). The two axes

are separated based on the degree to which they emphasize the interaction of different units

being closely occurring in space/time, and secondly the degree to which power operates through

specific actors or through socially relationships.

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The two argue that power in general terms, is the production, in and through social relations, of

effects that shape the capacities of actors to determine their own circumstances and fate.

“The first dimension concerns whether power works in interactions or social constitution. One

position on this dimension treats social relations as composed of the actions of pre-constituted

social actors toward one another. Here, power works through behavioral relations or interactions,

which, in turn, affect the ability of others to control the circumstances of their existence…The

other position consists of social relations of constitution. Here, power works through social

relations that analytically precede the social or subject positions of actors that constitute them as

social beings with their respective capacities and interests” Barnett and Duvall (2005:9).

The second core analytical dimension concerns how specific—direct and immediate—are the

social relations through which power works.

Compulsory power means direct control over another and the classic illustration of which is

Dahl’s definition where power is the ability of A to get B to do what B otherwise would not do.

The two however add that ‘Compulsory power is not limited to material resources and also

includes symbolic and normative resources” (15).

Structural power is the direct and mutual constitution of the capacities of actors.

“Structural power shapes the fates and conditions of existence of actors in two critical ways.

One, structural positions do not generate equal social privileges; instead structures allocate

differential capacities, and typically differential advantages, to different positions…Two, the

social structure not only constitutes actors and their capacities; it also shapes their self-

understanding and subjective interests” (18).

Institutional power means actors’ control over socially distant others

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“Specifically, the conceptual focus here is on the formal and informal institutions that mediate

between A and, as A, working through the rules and procedures that define those institutions,

guides, steers, and constraints the actions…and conditions of existence of others, sometimes

even unknowingly” (15)

Productive power leads to the production of subjects through diffuse social relations.

“Productive power and structural power overlap in several important respects…Yet structural

and productive power differ in a critical respect: whereas the former works through direct

structural relations, the later entails more generalized and diffuse social processes…productive

power…is the constitution of all social subjects with various social powers through systems of

knowledge and discursive practices of broad and general social scope” (20).

“This difference between direct and diffuse social relations of constitution has two important

implications for thinking about productive power. First, productive power concerns discourse,

the social processes and the systems of knowledge through which meaning is produced, fixed,

lived, experienced, and transformed…Second, discursive processes and practices produce social

identities and capacities as they give meaning to them…Discourse, therefore, is socially

productive for all subjects, constituting the subjectivity of all social beings of diverse kinds with

their contingent, though not entirely fluid, identities, practices, rights, responsibilities and social

capacities” (20-1)

Thomas Volgy, Lawrence Imwalle and John Schwarz in their paper Where is the New World

Order? Hegemony, State Strength, and Architectural Construction in International Politics

also tackle the question of power.

The trio start by quoting scholars who say that after the Cold War, a new type of international

system which is based on economics has emerged.

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Before the Kosovo conflict, a joint Russian/Chinese statement on their willingness to pursue a

“multipolar world” also stressed that “no country should seek hegemony … or monopolize

international affairs” (Gordon, 1997:A3). Soon after the Kosovo conflict began, Chinese official

organs publicly denounced America’s “global strategy for world hegemony” (Eckholm 1999).

Even France wondered that America seemed imperialistic in its leadership of NATO.

All this to speak of a vacuum that formed after the Cold War. Obviously, with the dissolution of

the Soviet Union, America emerged a mild victor and along with the rest of the West can be said

to be the new hegemon.

The trio starts by discussing the notion of a hegemon and suggest that a typical hegemon enjoys

to types of power.

“...hegemonic strength can be viewed from two different perspectives (Strange 1989). One is

through the concept of structural power: the capability and willingness of the hegemon to create

essential rules, norms, and modes of operation for various dimensions of the international

system. The hegemon enjoys “structural power through the capacity to determine the terms on

which those needs are satisfied and to whom they are made available” (Strange 1989:165-6).”

Apart from structural power, Strange suggests Relational power which is the capabilities of the

hegemon vis-à-vis other actors in the system, and its ability to get some groupings of others, by

persuasion or coercion, to do what they would not otherwise do.

Relational power is measurable by looking at the economy and size and strengths of the military

while structural power requires a more complex approach to gauge.

The paper then asks if the United States is a Hegemon and finds that while economically the US

is stronger than any other nation, it fails to satisfy the requirements of a hegemon when relational

power is inspected using the External Strength Index.

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The paper then concludes that despite the US being weak in terms of external strength, its policy

makers parade and speak in hegemonic terms and will continue to do so which includes the

expansion of NATO.

But tables are turning for the US, suggests the paper.

“At the same time, such efforts at leadership have begun to encounter substantial resistance.

NATO allies are chaffing against US terms for NATO expansion and the US has been unable to

stop the thawing of Russian/Chinese relations to combat US ‘hegemony’. In the economic realm,

the 1997 parliamentary elections in France may have provided a first indicator of growing

resistance to the American model of economic growth, with its attendant social welfare costs for

wealthy democracies. Recently, French, Russian and Third World policy makers have challenged

as well the right of the US to set rules for their multinationals to operate in regions identified by

the US as friendly to global terrorist activities (Cohen 1997)

…without a much stronger commitment of resources to develop a new, global architecture,

American interest in developing new global architecture may be insufficient to create new forms

of global order. American ‘hegemony’ without additional capabilities will probably dissipate

under the onslaught of greater interdependencies, domestic constraints, increasing systemic

complexities, and the numerous states chaffing against US leadership.”

The problem is being compounded by the fact that the US’ old enemy is no longer a bigger threat

to make the US policy makers to attribute more resources to boost external strength.

The paper ends with a disclaimer saying the US should not be written off and has not been

dormant since the cold war and that it is and will continue to be a force to reckon with in

international affair especially because there are weaker rivals to challenge it.

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On the theoretical level, neo-realists, the crucial feature of any system is the distribution of

material power, and hence the dominant political reality of the post-Cold War order is the

preponderance of the United States. (Hurrell, 2006)

For institutionalist liberals, globalization and ever denser networks of transnational exchange and

communication create increasing demand for international institutions and new forms of

governance. Institutions are important in helping to explain how new norms emerge and are

diffused across the international system, and how state interests change and evolve.

Systemic liberals build on many of the same core ideas but develop a broader Kantian image of

the gradual but progressive diffusion of liberal values, as a result partly of liberal economics and

increased economic interdependence, partly of a liberal legal order coming to sustain the

autonomy of a global civil society, and partly of the successful example set by the multifaceted

liberal capitalist system of states. (Hurrell, 2006:7)

Russia has been on the decline since the Cold War ended, the reality of the past two decades here

has been one of decline and the dissolution of power. Nevertheless, its foreign policy is focused

on trying to arrest that decline and seeking to reassert regional and global influence. (Hurrell,

2006:2)

Ukraine and its value

Ukraine

Ukraine is Europe’s second largest country seated on top or Romania and the Black Sea and half

wedged into Russia. With a population of 45 million people, Ukraine only got independence in

1991 after the Soviet Union fell apart.

Since then, the country has been caught between moving towards joinining the

European Union and reconciling with Russia.

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The Russian factor in Ukraine is a very important factor, Russian is widely spoken in Ukraine,

and Russia provides most of Ukraine’s energy needs and despite countries from Europe being its

biggest trading partners, Russia is the biggest single trading partner to Ukraine1.

Russia’s Black Sea Fleet is also based in Ukraine and this Ukraine joining NATO would mean a

big blow to Russia.

Russia, wanting to revive its influence on Ukraine has in the ‘punished’ Ukraine for moving

towards Europe and has managed to have leaders such as Yanukovych dance to its tune.

In 2006, Ukraine was forced to agree to pay almost twice the former price for Russian gas after

Russia briefly to cut supplies in a move that sparked alarm in Western Europe as well. In January

2009, Russia again cut gas supplies in a row over unpaid fees.

To Russia, Ukraine is very important as it provides a buffer between it and NATO and losing it

to the West would leave Russia feeling naked as Putin once remarked in 2005, the very

dissolution of the Soviet Union was "a real drama." He said the break-up of the USSR in 1991

left tens of millions of Russians outside the Russian Federation2.

Putin of course wants Ukraine in the Eurasian Union, which is widely seen as Russia’s answer to

the emergence of the EU.

The EU on the other hand, would get a boost of confident to have one more member added to the

club at a time when some members such as Britain want to leave the Union. The EU is also eying

the electricity and gas exports and the heavy industry that produce anything from war ships to

planes bigger than Jumbo jets.

1 BBC (2014) Ukraine Profile retrieved on 24/02/14 from URL: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-180180022 BBC (2005) Putin deplores collapse of USSR retrieved on 24/02/14 from URL: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4480745.stm

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And apart from 45 million more consumers, Europe will use Ukraine to prevent Russia from

sliding back westward.

So obviously, Ukraine is important to both Russia and EU. It has so far managed to balance

between the two hegemons all this while but in reality, it has always been toyed by Russia while

being lured by the EU.

Barrack Obama and policy makers from the EU have pleaded with Russia not to see Ukraine’s

going West as a zero-sum game but it remains just a plea.

So far, Russia has pulled out its Ambassador from Kiev, has suspended the huge loan it offered

Ukraine, apparently as a move to influence it. The Russians has also declared that the interim

government in Ukraine is illegal and branded it a mutiny

Some of those so called Russians are Ukrainians that live in the east of the country and favour

stronger ties with Russia and would be happy to join Russia again while those in the east of the

country see Europe as the future and want to break away from Russia.

When Ukraine announced that it wanted to sign a trade agreement with the EU, Russia’s

influence surfaced.

Russian health inspectors found fault with Ukrainian sweets, Russian customs officials slowed

down cross-border traffic and Russia's energy giant Gazprom reminded Ukraine's Naftogaz of its

huge debt3. But this coercion was only after Russia failed to entice Ukraine with significantly

lower gas prices, large-scale industrial co-operation projects, and soft credits.

The rest is now history.

In November 0f 2013, President Victor Yanukovych's government refused to sign an accord that

would have meant greater co-operation with the European Union and instead pivoted to Russia.

3 BBC (2013) Analysis: Russia's carrot-and-stick battle for Ukraine retrieved on 24/02/14 from URL: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-25401179

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That deal that Yanukovych refused among other things demanded that the former Prime Minister

Yulia Tymoshenko who until her release in 2014 had spent 2 years in jail.

Thousands of people, especially from the west of the country, outraged that a long-standing

aspiration for integration with Europe had been ditched overnight, poured into central Kiev for

peaceful protests occupying the Independence Square, known as Maidan and the crisis was to

drag on until the end of February.

And despite Obama’s sweet talk, which analysts have said is fear of pushing Putin too far at a

time the US wants him in Syria, Iran and other trade issues, his government is still rooting for the

pro-EU camp in Ukraine and a leaked tape of the US officials suggests that the US role might be

bigger in the background4.

United Kingdom Foreign Secretary William Hague was quoted at the height of the Ukraine

protest saying: "It's in the interests of the people of Ukraine and Russia to trade with the

European Union."

He added: "It's important that Russia doesn't do anything to undermine that package... We don't

know, of course, what Russia's reaction will be5."

Hague added that he would talk to the Russians to try to reason with them that Ukraine was not a

zero-sum game.

George Osborne, the Chancellor of Britain announced6 that his country and the EU were ready

with a chequebook to help the Ukrainians who are almost bankrupt and deep in debt. The debt

4 BBC (2014) Ukraine crisis: Leaked phone call embarrasses US retrieved on 23/02/14 from URL: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-26072281

5 BBC (2014) Ukraine crisis: William Hague warns of 'many dangers, retrieved on 24/02/14 from URL: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-263130756 Peter Dominiczak, and David Blair (2013) Ukraine revolution: Britain offers cash to Kiev as the world waits on Putin, retrieved on 26/o2/04 from URL: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ukraine/10657082/Ukraine-revolution-Britain-offers-cash-to-Kiev-as-the-world-waits-on-Putin.html

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was to be alleviated by Russia’s loan package which is now in limbo with the fall of the pro-

Russian regime.

As of February 26, there were still fears that the country might see Russian troops coming in to

intervene, but so far Putin has not made a move yet.

Hegemonic stability theory states that the international system stays stable if only one hegemon

is in power, and so far for Ukraine, Russia has always been the hegemon and with the fall of the

Soviet Union. Now a new hegemon is in town and as the theory states, instability is prevailing.

The newswire AFP quoted Russian Economy Minister Alexei Ulyukayev saying If Ukraine goes

ahead with signing a partnership deal with the European Union Moscow will punish it by raising

import duties on Ukrainian goods.

This apart from withholding the $15 billion loan package and calling the interim government

illegitimate.

While Russia throws in tough cards, the West has been buoyed by Ukraine’s brave moves and

many European parties and organizations such as the International Monetary Fund have said they

stand ready to pump cash into Ukraine.

So, in theory, Russia which has power and influence over Ukraine looks to have fallen to the

attraction (soft power) of the EU, which really did not do a lot of stunts to actively woo Ukraine.

And the EU being a new and rising hegemon is eager to partner with the US to counter Russia

which is also trying to wake up as a new hegemon.

Russia can cause a war in Ukraine by fanning the Pro-Russian sentiment in the east, it can

directly intervene and restore the order it wants. It can squeeze the insolvency of Ukraine even

more by raising tax on Ukrainian exports to Russia or it can raise the prices of gas and freeze

Ukraine to submission.

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Doing this however would only push Ukraine further West which seems ready to assume the

burden of the ailing state.

The EU have little options in Ukraine, they can defend it from a Russian invasion which would

only trigger World War 3 and this option might now even be possible with the rigidity of the EU

and the reluctance of some members such as Germany to involve in war.

The EU can only play underground politics, appeasing Russia by appealing to international law

while letting the protest movement which is pro-EU pivot to Brussels and naturally boot out

Russia. The EU can also cause Ukraine to break up into two with one part going east.

The US can challenge a Russian invasion, but lessons from the Russian-Georgia war indicate

that the stakes are not big enough with the elections coming up soon and domestic politics taking

center stage in the US.

The only option the US has is to support the protest movement and to engage the Russian

machine in diplomacy to let it take defeat without losing too much face.

That is on an external power note. Internally, the power play in Ukraine was between state and

citizens and on a lesser extent between eastern citizens and western citizens.

The state had all the material power that a realist would think as enough to get by on, but it

lacked the moral support and was faced with a citizenry that in part was also materially

equipped. Thus influence, force and power of the state failed to beat the moral power of the

population and the population won.

The future looks dark for Ukraine however, as power politics will continue between, on the

inside, those that are pro-Russia and those that want Brussels and on the outside, those from the

West and those from Russia.

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The game will largely rely on Putin, which the hegemon with most to lose incase Ukraine moves

to the EU. As the paper went to print, Putin had ordered his army to practice for war7, a tactic

Morgenthau would describe as psychological show of power to Ukraine and NATO.

The Russian Parliament quickly gave Putin power to invade Ukraine and Obama and Nato

warned Russia that there would be consenquences if it used troops in Ukraine, but the warning

was too late and Russian troops were said to be in Crimea already and had a say on business

there, including knocking down the internet and telephone services8.

Now the ball

In a nutshell, Power is the ability of any actor to persuade, influence, force or otherwise induce

another actor to undertake an action or change an objective that the latter would otherwise prefer

not to do. It is also the ability of one actor to persuade, influence, force or otherwise induce an

actor to refrain from an action it would prefer to undertake.

Power can be seen in the population of a country, its size, its natural resources, its industrial

capabilities, its leadership and its diplomatic ability among others.

The paper has discussed the notion of power and hegemony and used it to argue that the

Ukrainian crisis is more about power politics between Russia and the West.

Bibliography

7 RT (2014) Putin orders ‘combat readiness’ tests for western, central Russian troopsRetrieved on 27/02/14 from URL: http://rt.com/news/putin-drill-combat-army-864/8 Michael Weiss (2014) Russia Stages Coup in Crimea retrieved on 02/03/14 from URL: http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/03/01/so-russia-invaded-crimea.html

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Baldwin, D (2012) Power and International Relations, retrieved from URL:

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Barnett, Michael N. and Raymond Duvall. (2005). Power in global governance. Cambridge,

UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press.

BBC (2014) Ukraine crisis: William Hague warns of 'many dangers, retrieved on 24/02/14

from URL: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-26313075

BBC (2013) Analysis: Russia's carrot-and-stick battle for Ukraine retrieved on 24/02/14

from URL: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-25401179

BBC (2014) Ukraine crisis: Leaked phone call embarrasses US retrieved on 23/02/14 from

URL: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-26072281

BBC (2014) Ukraine Profile retrieved on 24/02/14 from URL:

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-18018002

BBC (2005) Putin deplores collapse of USSR retrieved on 24/02/14 from URL:

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4480745.stm

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Hurrell, A (2006) Hegemony, liberalism and global order: what space for would-be great

powers? International Affairs 82, pp 1-19

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Michael Weiss (2014) Russia Stages Coup in Crimea retrieved on 02/03/14 from URL:

http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/03/01/so-russia-invaded-crimea.html

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RT (2014) Putin orders ‘combat readiness’ tests for western, central Russian troops

Retrieved on 27/02/14 from URL: http://rt.com/news/putin-drill-combat-army-864/

Thomas J. Volgy, Lawrence E. Imwalle and John E. Schwarz Where is the New World Order?

Hegemony, State Strength, and Architectural Construction in International Politics in

Journal of International Relations and Development, Issue 2, Pages 246-262

Peter Dominiczak, and David Blair (2013) Ukraine revolution: Britain offers cash to Kiev as

the world waits on Putin, retrieved on 26/o2/04 from URL:

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ukraine/10657082/Ukraine-revolution-

Britain-offers-cash-to-Kiev-as-the-world-waits-on-Putin.html

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