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------BY F R A N U R. KENComp a r soris

rleys considerable not entirely sulcere con- eager-to come to Washington, glad Darn k i n g manifested about the alleged&rious deterioratron in the personnel o theGovernment service Loud lament is madeover the mability to get good men to comet o Washington or to ge t them to st ay verylong when they do

. IReading some of these a l i o s t tearfuloutpourings, it would be easy to concludethat there is not a single man left of brainaor charaicter m the whole Federal Admmis-trstion, that the Government is now ex-cluaimly in the bands of the feeble-mindedand unfit; that the human level of official-dom fs alarmingly l o w There are severalthing.; th a t can be said about this presen-tation One is that it simply is not trueAnot-ier is that the effort t o make it seemtrue il not unmixed wth political prejudiceand personal disappointment

IFor example, some of the most pitifulbleating about this so-called deeply ds-hnbinrr state of affairs comes from formerm m b & of the Roosevelt inner circleand their not altogether dieinterested Ift-erary aides whose day of White Houseprivilege has departed and whose belief tsthat all virtue and wisdom went out ofthe Government when the Roosevelt regimeended. Thus, we are told that there IS agreat contrast between these dreary daysand those halcyon ones when 81r. Rooseveltwas President and crowds of brilhant

young men were irresistibly drawn to the &nhtration. The difference now is that%lm%-clamen cannot be induced-so it ir8gd-t.o t a k e oface under Mr. Truman,W there la no pretense of brilliance.. C t

make any sacriflce for the chance of hing win the war. No ma% who was Mcould refuse. Many who would have l ito have come were not asked. ,Whenwar was over, it was inevitable that mwtof these should return to private life. Un-doubtedly, there is legs brilliancy amongGovernment officials now than then, am?certainly it is more difficult to get menof large affairs to make sacridces to de-the Government in a peace period.It would he strange indeed if that weranot so and there s e e m no point in insistingon 60 obvious a fact. It IS n&e comparison 1of the post-war Reriod of bfr. Truman wi tbthe pre-war period of Bbr. Rowevelt thatthe effort to disparage the Truman Ad-milllstration IS made by members of thesmall but extremely articulate group whoonce a 0 profitably basked in the smiles ofthe late President. Their effort is singuiarly

* . I

unconvincing-particularly in regard to thdCabinet. Aa a m a t t e t l o f f i i clikely that most dispassionate add Fmen would agree that the Truman Ca inetas a whole is a better Cabinet than anyof the Roo.?pvelt Cabinets and that &emMr Trum an has put in a new man he ltasraised and not lowered the level. Cer

E he did that in replacing Mr. Henryt h a u w t h Mr. John Snyder ~1 8eI of the Treasury; Mr. Francm BiddleMr. Clark for Attorney General; M aPerkins with Mr. Schwellen tary of Labor; Mr. HenryMr. Averell Harriman PII Se merce Nor will many conte

, ing Gen. George MarshallState the public serviceterioratad. * . *

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..,. d WQat1 s f . Jvn 1.- I * f S - J ?On t h e next official plane, t he c o m i n g t o: W a s h i n g t o n of 8 u ch m en a s M r . W. S t u a r t

l S y m i n g t o n t o b e c o d e A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r yj of W ar fo r A i r , M r . J o h n Ni ch o l a s Brownt o b e c o m e A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y of t h e N a v yfor A i r a n d a n u m b e r of o t h e r s of t h e s a m et y p e d o es n o t b e a r o u t t h e i de a t h a t i t i si no longer possible to get good men tos e r ve t h e G o v e r n m e n t a n d t h a t we a r cwh o l l y i n t h e h an d s of mediocri t ies . The, r ep e t i t i v e i n s i s t en ce wi t h wh i ch t h i s a rg u -

~ m e n t i s p u t f o r t h m a k e s i t s e e m m o r e l ik ep la in a n t i - T r u m a n p r o p a g a n d a , n o t u n-t i n g ed wi t h m a l i ce , t h an an y t h i n g e l s e . Tob e s u re , i t is n o t e a s y for Mr. T r u m a n t o i n -

, d u ce t h e m en h e wa n t s t o co m e h e re to t ak et h e j o b s h e wan t s t h em to t a k e a n d t h a tthere have been some res igna t ions whichw e r e r e g r k t a b l e . B u t t h a t h a s b ee n t r u eh ev e ry Ad m i n i s t r a t i o n an d wi t h ev e ry

i

Pres iden t .i T h e t h i n g t h a t is not t ru e i s t h a t t h eI public re rv ice su ffers because th e personne l

of t h e Go v e rn m en t n o w i a l o wer t h a n i t wa sj u n d e r Mr. Roosevel t befo re the war . There, m a y n o t b e a s m u c h of a certain kind of8 brill iance now, b u t t h e re i s m u ch l e s sI m al ev o len ce . T h e re was m o re d ra m a an dj - s h o wm an s h i p u n d e r Mr. Roosevel t , butthe re i s more sou ndness and ba lance unde ri Mr. T ru m a n , In t h e R o o sev el t d ay s t h e re1 w a s t h e v a s t h i l a r i t y of a wild s p en d i n gi spree dur ing which dozens o f obscure men

~ c a m e t o t h e f r o n t with new and cos t iy goy-e rn m en t a l ex p e r i m en t s an d t h ey a l l s eem edbr i l l i an t t o each other . Also , the Dem o-c ra t i c p a r t y was i n t h e a s cen d an cy .

, * I *

I, the inev i tab le and eas i ly fo reseeneiices of those reck less days a re. T h e s p en d i n g g am e is played Out.e c o u n t r y has t u rn ed ag a i n s t t h e ex -p e r i m en t s an d t h e ex p e r i m en t e r s . T h e p ro b -lem is to recover our equi l ibrium. The Deni-o c ra t s , a s wa6 l o n g o v e rd u e , h av e lost con-t ro l of Cong ress and th e Eoosevel t type of; %brill iant young men would be wo rs e t h an

, helpleas in the kind of s i t u a t i o n t h a t n o w ex is t s and f o r which they were par t i a l lyreapansihle. One OB t h e t h i n g s t o b e t h an k -fu l for is- that we no longer have them.

.ICoDYrIRht. 1 9 4 7 1__- . . -

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THE

D I A L Q G U E S O F P L A T 0

1

VOL. ,

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T O h l Y F O R M E R P U P I L SI N B A L L I O L C O L L E G E

.4ND I N T H E U N I V E R S I T Y OF O X F O R J )W H O D U R I N G F I F T Y Y E A R S

H A VE B EE N T H E B E b T O F F R I E N D S T O h lE

T H E S E V O L U M E S A R E I N S C R I B E D

I N G R A T E F U L R E C O G K I T I O N

01; T H E I R N E V ER F A I L IN G A T T A C H M E N T

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x Preface to the Fimt Edition.to these gent lemen, and I hearti ly thank them for thepains and t ime which they have bestowed on my work.I have further to explain how far I have received helpfrom other labourers in the same f ie ld. T h e bookswhich I have found of most use are Stein har t andMilllers German Translation of Plato with Introduc-tions ; Zellers Philosophie der Griechen, and Pla-tonische Studien ; Susemihls Genetische Entwickelungd er Platonischen Philosophie ; He rma nn s Geschichted er Platonische; Philosophie ; Bonitz, PlatonischeStudien ; Stallbaums N otes and Introduct ions ; Pro-fessor Campbells editions of the Theaetetus, the Sophist , and the Politicus ; Professor Thompsons Phaedrus ; T h . M a r t i n 3 Etudes sur le TimCe ; Mr.Postes edition and translation of the Philebus ; theTrans lation of the Rep ublic, b y M essrs. Davies an dVaugh an, an d th e Translat ion of the Gorgias, by Mr.Cope.I have also derived much assistance from the great w orkof Mr. Grote, which contains excellent analyses of theDialogues, and is rich in original thoughts and observa-tions. I agre e with him in rejecting a s futi le the attemptof Schleiermacher and others to arrange the Dialogues ofPla to in to a harmonious whole . A ny such ar rang em entapp ears to me not only to be unsu pported by evidence, butto involve an anachronism in the history of philosophy.T h e r e is a common spirit in the writings of Plato, but nota uni ty of design in the whole, nor perhaps a perfect unityin an y single Dialogue. T h e hypothesis of a general planwhich is worked out in the successive Dialogues is a nafter-though t of the crit ics w ho have attributed a system towri t ings belonging to an age when system had not as yettaken possession of philosophy.If Mr. Grote should do me the honour to read anyportion of this work he will probably remark that I have

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xiv Preface t o the Second and Third EditiOns. ,Balliol College, w ho read ov er the Republic in th e S ec on dEdition and noted several inaccuracies.

In both editions the Introductions to the Dialogues havebeen enlarged, an d essays on sub jects having a n affinity tothe Platonic Dialogues have been introduced into severalof them. T h e analyses have been corrected, and innii-merable a lterat ions have been made in the Te xt . T h e rehave been added also, in th e T hi rd Edition, headings to th epages and a marginal an alysis to th e text of each dialogue.At the end of a lon g task, th e translator may withoutimprop riety point out the difficulties wh ich he ha s h ad toencounter. Th es e have been far greater than he wouldhave ant ic ipated; nor is he at a l l sanguine that he hassucceeded in overcoming them. Experience ha s m adehim feel that a translation, like a picture, is dependent forits effect on very minute touches ; and that it is a work ofinfinite pains, to be returned to in man y moods and viewedin different lights.

I. An English translation ought to be idiomatic andinteresting, not only to the scholar , but to the unlearnedreader. Its object should not simply be to re nd er th ewords of one language into the words of another or topreserve the construction and order of the original ;-thisis th e ambition of a schoolboy, who wishes to sho w th athe has m ade a good use of his Dictionary an d Gramm ar ;but is quite unworthy of the translator, wh o see ks to pro-duce on his reader an impression similar or nearly similarto that produced by th e original. T o him the feelingshould be more imp ortant than the exact word. H e shouldremember Dryden's quaint admonition not to ' lacquey byth e side of his au tho r, but to m ou nt u p behind him'.' Hemu st carry in his mind a com prehensive view of th e who le

Dedicitioii to the B n e i s .

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xviii PpTeface t o the Second and T h ir d Edi tions .degree the comm on dist inction between 06 an d &, and thecombination of the tw o su gge sts a subtle sh ade of negationwhich cannot be expressed in English. An d while Eng lishis more dependent than Greek upon the apposit ion ofclauses and sentences, yet there is a difficulty in usingthis form of construction ow ing to the wa nt of caseendings . F or the sam e reason there cannot be an equalvar iety in the order of words or an equal nicety ofemphasis in English a s in Gre ek.(2). T h e formation of the se ntence and of the paragraphgreatly differs in Gre ek and English. T h e l ines by whichthey are divided are generally much more marked inmodern languages than in ancient . Both sentences andpara gra phs ar e more precise and definite-they do not ru ninto on e another. T he y are a lso more regular ly developedfrom with in . T h e sentence marks an other s tep in anargument or a nar rat ive or a s ta tement ; n read ing a para-graph we s i len t ly turn over the page and ar r ive a t somenew view or aspect of the subject . Whereas in Plato wear e not a lways cer ta in where a sen ten ce begins and en ds ;and paragraphs a re f ew and fa r be tween . T h e languageis d istribu ted in a different way, and less articulatedthan in English. F o r it was long before the true useof the period w as attained by the classical w riters both inpoetry or prose ; i t was n ~ h h i j ~d p a s rchfvraiou 2 n i y i v v q p a .T h e balance of senten ces and the introduction of para-gra ph s at suitable intervals m ust not be neglected if th e

A n dm us t avoid giving it a numerical or mechanical character .of the translator ; much greater is that which ar ises f romth e restriction of the us e of th e gende rs. M en and women

$Yharmony of the Engl ish language is to be preserved .

still a caution has to be added on the oth er s ide, that w e(3). Th is , however , is not one of the greatest difficulties r

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pygface io the Secoiad nizd Third Edtzons. xixin English are masculine and feminine, and there is a similardistinction of sex in the words denoting animals ; but allthings else, wh ether outward ob jects o r abstract ideas, arerelegated to the class of neute rs. H ar d ly in som e flightof poetry do we ever endu e any of them w ith the charac-teristics of a sentient being, and then only by spea kingof them in the feminine gender. T h e virtues may bepictured in female forms, but they are not so describedin language; a ship is humorously supposed to be th esailors bride ; more doubtful are the personifications ofchurch and country as females. Now the genius of theGreek language is the opposite of this . T h e sametendency to personification which is seen in the Gre ekmythology is common also in the language ; and gendersare attributed to things as well as persons according totheir various degrees of strength and weakness ; o r fromfanciful resemblances to the male or female form, ors o m e analogy too subtle to be discovered. W hen thegender of any object wa s once fixed, a similar gende rwas naturally assigned to similar objects, or to words ofsimilar formation. T h is use of genders in th e denotationof objects or ideas not only affects the words to whichgenders are attributed, but the words with- whichthey are construed or connected, and passes into thegeneral character of the style. H en ce arises a diffi-culty in translating Greek into English which cannotaltogether be overcome. Sha ll we speak of th e soul an dits qualities, of virtue, power, wisdom, and the like, asfeminine o r neu ter ? T h e usage of the English languagedoes not admit of the former,-and yet the life and beautyof the style are impaired by the latter. Often th e trans-lator will have recourse to the repetition of the w ord, orto the ambiguous they, their, &c.; or fear of spoilingb 2

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sxthe effect of the sentence by introducing it. Collectivenouns in Greek and English create a similar but lesserawkwardness.

(4). T h e use of relation is far more extended in Greekthan in English. Pa rtly the gre ate r variety of gendersand cases makes the connexion of relative and antece-dent less ambiguous: part ly also the greater number ofdemonstrative and relative pronouns, and the use of t hearticle, make the correlation of ideas simpler and morenatura l. T h e G reek appears to have had a n ear o rintelligence for a long and complicated sentence whichis rarely to be found in modern nations ; and in order tobring the Greek down to the level of the modern, wemust break up the lon g senten ce into two o r more sh ortones. N eithe r is th e sam e precision required in G reekas in Latin or English, nor in earlier Greek as in later;thcre wa s nothing shoc king to the contemporary ofThucydides and Plato in anacolutha and repeti t ions. Insuc h cases the g eniu s of the English lan gu age requiresthat the translation should be more intelligible than theG reek . T h e want of more distinctions between the de-monstrative pronouns is also greatly felt. T w o genit ivesdepend ent on on e ano the r, unless familiarised by idiom,have an awkw ard effect in English. Fre que ntly th e nounhas to take the place of the pronoun. T h i s a n d t h a t are found repeating themselves to weariness in the roughdraft of a translation. As in the previous case, while thefeeling of the modern language is more opposed to tau-tology, there is also a greater difficulty in avoiding it.

(5).T h o u g h no precise rule can be laid down aboutth e repetition of words, there seems to be a kind of im-pert inence in present ing to the reader the same thoughtin the same words, repeated twice over in the same

Preface t o the Second nnd Thi~d ditions.

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Pyeface t o tht Secow' aizd Third Bditio?iJ.. xxipassage without any new aspect o r modification of it.And the evasion of tautology-that is, th e substitutionof one word of precisely the sam e mean ing for another-isresented by us equally with the repetition of words. Yeton the other hand the least difference of meaning o r th eleast change of form from a substantive to an adjective,or from a participle to a verb, will often remedy the un-pleasant effect, Rare ly and only for the sake of emphasisor clearness can we allow an important word to be usedtwice over in two successive sentences or even in the sameparagraph. T h e particles and pronouns, as they ar e ofmost frequent occurrence, are also the most troublesome.Strictly speaking, except a few of the commonest of them,' and,' ' the,' &c., they ough t not to occur twice in the samesentence. But the Greek has no such precise ru le s;and hence any literal translation of a Greek author is fullof tautology. T h e tendency of modern languages is tobecome more correct as well as more perspicuous thanancient. And, therefore] while the English translatoris limited in the power of expressing relation or con-nexion, by the law of his own language increased pre-cision and also increased clearness are required of him.The familiar use of logic, and the progress of science,have in these two respects raised t he standard. Butmodern languages, while they have become more exactingin their demands, are in many ways not so well furnishedwith powers of expression as the ancient classical ones.

Suc h are a few of the difficulties which have to heovercome in the work of translation ; and we are far fromhaving exhausted the list. (6). The excellence of atranslation will consist, not merely in the faithful render-ing of words, or in the composition of a sentence only,or yet of a single paragraph, but in the colour and style

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i5xxii Preface t o the Second and Third Editions.

of th e whole work. Equ ability of tone is best attainedby the exclusive us e of familiar and idiomatic wo rds.But great care must be taken; for an idiomatic phrase,element. N o word, however expressive and exact, shouldbe employed, which m akes the reader stop to think, orunduly attracts attention by difficulty and peculiarity, ordisturbs the effect of the surrounding language. I ngeneral the style of one author is not appropriate toanother ; as in society, so in letters, we expect every manto have a good coat of his own, and no t to dres s himselfou t in the rag s of ano ther. ( a ) Archaic expressions aretherefore to be avoided. Equ ivalents may be occasionallydrawn from Shak spere, who is the common property ofu s a ll ; but they must be used sparingly. Fo r, l ikesom e other men of genius of the Elizabethan andJacobean age, he outdid the capabilities of the language,and many of the expressions which he introduced havebeen laid aside and have dropped out of use. (b)A similarprinciple should be observed in the employment of Scrip-ture. Ha vin g a greater force and beauty than ot he rlanguage, and a religious association, it disturbs the eventranslation the quaint effect of some antique phrase inthe original, but rarely; and when adopted, it shouldhave a certain freshness and a suitable entourag e. I tis strange to observe that the most effective use ofScripture phraseology ar ises out of the application ofit in a sense not intended by the author. (c) A n o th e rtranslator will often be compelled to substitu te o ne foranothe r, or to paraphrase them, not giving word for word,but diffusing over several words the more concentrated

aif an exception to the general style, is of itself a disturbing I

-

flow of the style. It may be used to reproduce in th e 6A

caution : metaphors differ in different languages, and the ;i

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?

Prefuct t o the Second and Third Editions. xxvAncient and modern philosophy throw a l ight upon one

another : but they should be co mp aied, not confounded.Although the connexion between them is sometimes acci-dental, it is often rea l. T h e same ques t ions a re d iscussedby them un de r different conditions of langu age a nd civil-ization ; but in some cases a m ere word has survived, whi lenothing or hardly anything of the pre-Socrat ic , Platonic , orAristotelian meaning is re ta ined. T h er e a re o the r ques-tions familiar to the moderns, which have no place inancient philosophy. T h e world has grown older in twothousand years , and has enlarged i ts s tock of ideas andmethods of reasoning. Ye t the ge rm of mo dern tho ug htis found in ancient, and we may claim to have inheri ted,notwithstanding many accidents of t ime and place, thespi rit of G reek phi losophy. T h er e is, however , no con-t inuous grow th of the on e into the other, but a newbeginning, partly artificial , par tly arising ou t of th e qu es-tionings of th e mind itself, and also receiving a stim ulu sfrom the s tudy of ancient w ri t ings .

Considering the great and fundamental differenceswhich exis t in ancient and modern philosophy, i t seemsbest that we should at f i rs t s tudy them separately, andseek for the interpretation of either, especially of theancient, from itself only, com paring th e sa m e au th or withhimself and with his contemporaries, and with the generals ta te of thou ght and feeling prevalent in his age. After-wards comes the remoter l ight which they cas t on oneanother . W e begin to fee l tha t the anc ients had thesame thoughts as ourselves, the same difficulties whichcharacterize all periods of t rans i t ion , a lmost the sameopposition between science and religion. Altho ugh w ecannot maintain that ancient and modern philosophy areone and continu ous (as ha s been affirmed with m ore truth

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xxvi Prefuce t o the Second and T h ir d Edi tions .respecting ancient an d modern history) , for they areseparated by an interval of a thousand years, yet theyseem to recur in a sort of cycle, and we are surprisedto find thatthe new is ever old, and that the teaching.of the past has still a m ean ing for us.

111. I n the preface to the first edition I expressed astrong opinion at variance with Mr. Grotes, that theso-called Epistles of Plato we re spu riou s, His friendand editor, Professor Bain, thinks that I ought to givethe reasons why I differ from so eminent an authority.Rese rving th e fuller discussion of the que stion for an oth erplace, I will shortly defend my opinion by the followinga r g u men t s :-(a) Because almost all epistles purporting to be of

the classical age of G ree k literature ar e forgeries. Ofall docum ents th is class are the least l ikely to be preserve dand the most likely to be invented. T h e ancient worldswarmed with them ; the great l ibrar ies s t imulated thedemand for them ; nd a t a t ime whe n there was no regu larpublication of books, they easily crept into the w orld.

(b ) When one ep is t le out of a number is spur ious ,the remainder of the series cannot be admitted to begenu ine, unless there be som e independent gro un d forthinking them so : when all but one are spurious, over-whelming evidence is required of the genuineness of theo n e : when they are all s imilar in s tyle o r m otive, l ikewitnesses who agree in the same tale, they stand or falltogether . But no one, not even Mr. Gro te, would main-tain that all the Epistles of Plato are genuine, and veryfew critics think that more than one of them is so. Andthey are clear ly all writ ten from the sam e m otive, w he the rser ious or only l iterary. N or is there an example in Compare BentleysWotks (Dyces Edition), vol. li. 136 foll., 2 2 2 .

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Y4

Preface to the Second and Third Editions. xviiGreek antiquity of a series of Epist les , continuous andyet coinciding with a succession of events exte ndin g overa great number of years.

The external probabil i ty therefore against them isenormous, and the internal probability is not less: forthey are tr ivial and unmeaning, devoid of delicacy andsubtlety, wanting in a single fine expression. An d eve nif this be matter of dispute, there can be no dispute thatthere are found in them ma ny plagiarisms, inappropriatelyborrowed, which is a common note of forgery (compare330 C foll. with Rep. iv. 425 E , 426 B, i. 488 A : 347 Ewith Phaedrus 249 D : 326 A, and 328A with Re p. v.473 C, D, &c.) . T h e y imitate Plato , wh o never imitateseither himself or any one else; reminiscences of theRepublic an d the L aws are continually recurr ing in th em ;they are too like him and also too unlike him, to begenuine (see especially Karsten, Commentatio Crit ica dePlatonis quae feruntur Epistolis, p. 1 1 1 foll.). T h e y ar efull of ego tism, se lf-a sse rtio n, affectation, fau lts wh ich ofall writers Plato was most careful to avoid, an d into whichhe was least likely to fall (ib. p. gg foll.). T h e y a b ou n d inobscurities, irrelevancies, solecisms, pleonasm s, inco nsist-encies (ib. p. 96 foll.), aw kw ardn esse s of c onstru ction ,w rong u ses of words ( ib . pp. 58,59, 117,121). T h e y a l s ocontain historical blun ders, such a s the statem ent respect-ing Hipparinus and Nysaeus, the nephews of Dion (328A),who are said to have been well inclined to philo-sop hy, and well a ble to dispose the m ind of their bro therDionysius in the same course, at a t ime wh en th ey couldnot have been more than six or seven years of age-also foolish allusions, su ch a s the com parison of theAthenian empire to the empire of Darius (332 A, B),which show a spirit very different from that of Plato ; and

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?

xxviii Preface t o the Second nizd Third Editiom.mistakes of fact, as e.g. about the T hi rty T yr an ts (p.324C),whom th e writer of th e letters seems to have confused withcertain inferior magistrates, making them in all fifty-one.These palpable errors and absurdities are absolutely irre-concileable with their genuinen ess. And as they appearto have a common parentage, the more they are studied,the more they will be found to furnish evidence againstthemselves. T h e Seventh, which is thought to be themost important of these Epistles, has affinities with theThird and the Eighth , and is quite as impossible andinconsistent as the rest. It is therefore involved in thesam e condemnation.-The final conc lusion is that neitherthe Seventh nor any other of them, when carefullyanalyzed, can be imagined to have proceeded from thehand o r mind of Plato. T h e othe r testimonies to thevoyages of Plato to Sicily and the court of Dionysius areall of them later by several centuries than the events towhich they refer. No extant writer mentions them olderthan Cicero and Co rnelius Nep os. It does not seem im-possible that so attractive a theme as the meeting of aphilosopher and a tyrant, once imagined by the g enius ofa So ph ist, may have passed into a romance which becamefamous in Hellas and the world. It may have created oneof th e m ists of history, like the Trojan war or the legendof Arthur, which we are unable to penetrate. In the ag eof Cicero, and still more in that of Diogenes Laertius andAppuleius, many other legends had gathered around thepersonality of Plato,-more voyages, mo re jou rn ey s tovisit tyrants and Pythagorean philosophers. But if, as weagree with Karsten in suppo sing, the y ar e the forgery ofsome rhetorician or sophist, we cannot agree with him inalso sup pos ing that they ar e of a ny historical value, th erather as there is no early independent testimony by

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Preface to the Second and T h i ~ d ditioas. xxixwhich they are supported or with which they can becompared.

I\'. T h e r e is another subject to which I must brieflycall attention, lest I should seem to have overlooked it.Dr . H en ry Jackson, of Trinity College, Cambridge, in aseries of articles which h e ha s contributed to the Jou rnalof Philology (1881-6Vol. x. 132-1o, 253-293 ; xi. 287-331; xiii. 1-40; xiv. 173-230, extending to about 200pages), ha s put forward a n entirely new explanation of th ePlatonic Ideas.' H e sup po ses that in the mind of Platothey took, at different times in his life, two essentiallydifferent form s :-an earlier on e wh ich is found chiefly inthe Republic and the Pha edo , and a later, which appearsin the Th eae tetus , Philebus, So ph ist , Poli ticus, Parmeni-des, Timaeus. In the first stag e of his philosophy Platoattributed Ideas to all things, at any rate to all thingswhich have classes or common notions: these he sup-posed to exist only by participation in them. I n the laterDialogues he no longer included in them manufacturedarticles and ideas of relation, but restricted them to ' typesof nature, ' and having become convinced that the manycannot be parts of the one, for the idea of participation inthem he substituted imitation of them (xi. 292). T o q uo teD r. Jackson's own ex pressions (x. 2g7),-' whereas in theperiod of the Republic and the Phaedo, i t was proposedto pass thro ug h ontology to the sciences, in the period ofthe Parmenides and the Philebus, i t is proposed to passthrough the sciences to ontology' : or , as h e repeats innearly the same words (xi . 320),-' whereas in the Re-public and in the Phaedo he had dreamt of passingthrough ontology to the sciences, he is now content topass throug h the sciences to ontology.'

This theory is supposed to be basCd on Aristotle's

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axxx Preface t o the Scrod and Third Editions.Metaphysics (Book I. c. 6),a passage containing an accountof the ideas, which hitherto scholars have found impos-sible to reconcile with the sta tem en ts of Plato himself.T h e preparat ions for the new depar ture are d iscovered inthe Parmen ides and in the Theae te tus ; and i t is said tobe expressed under a different form by the adpas and theZincipov of the Philebus (vol. x. 275 fo lk) . The ndpas ofthe Phi lebus is th e principle which gives form a nd me asu reto the Bnripou ; and in the L a t e r T h e o r y is held to be theaduou o r p&pm which converts the Infinite or Indefiniteinto ideas. T h e y are neither mpaiuovra nor tlncipa, butbelong to the P k K T b U y d ~ o swhich partakes of both.

With great respect for the learning and abil i ty of Dr .Jackson, I find myself unable to agree in this newlyfashioned do ctrine of the Ideas, which he ascribes to Plato.I have not the space to go in to the question fully; butI will briefly state some objections which are, I th ink,fatal to it.

(I) . F irst, the foundation of his argu m ent is laid in theMetaphysics of Aristotle . But we cannot arg ue, ei therfrom the Metaphysics, or from an y other of the philo-sophical treatises of Aristotle, to the dialogues of Platountil we have ascertained the relation in which his so-called works stand to the phi losopher h imself. T h er e isof course no dou bt of th e grea t influence exercised uponGreece and upon the world by Aristotle and his philo-sophy. But on the o ther hand a lmost every one wh o iscapzble of understanding the subject acknowledges thathis writings have not come down to us in an authenticform like most of the dialogues of Plato. How much ofthem is to be ascribed to Aristotles o wn ha nd , how m uchis due to his successors in the Peripatct ic School, is aquestion which has never been determined, and probably I

5

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xxxii Preface t o the Second end Thiyd Editions.to the o rder adopted in this work, end s with the Republic,the conception of M ind an d a way of speaking more inagreement with modern terminology, in the latter half.But there is no reason to su pp os e that Platos theory, or,rather, his various theories, of the Ideas underwent anydefinite change du rin g his period of authorship. T h e y aresubstantially the same in the twelfth Book of the Laws(962, 63 foll.) as in the Meno and Phaedo ; and since theLaw s we re written in the last decade of his life, th ere is notime to which this change of opinions can be ascribed. Itis true that the theory of Ideas takes several differentforms, not merely an earlier and a later one, in thevarious Dialogues. T h ey are personal and impersonal,ideals an d ideas, existing by participation o r by imitation,on e an d many, in different parts of his writings or & en inth e sam e passage (cp. Vol. 11. p. 13 foll.). T h ey are th euniversal definitions of Socrates, and at the sam e time ofmore than mortal knowledge (Rep. vi. 485). But theyar e always th e negations of se nse, of matter, of generation,of the particular: they are always the subjects of know-ledge and not of opinion ; and they tend, not to diversity,but to unity. O th er entities or intelligences ar e akin tothem, but not th e same with them, such as mind, measu re,limit, eternity, essence (cp. Philebus sub j n . ; Timaeuspass im): these and similar terms appear to express thesam e tru ths from a different point of view, an d to belongto th e same s ph ere with them. But w e ar e not justified,therefore, in attempting to identify them, any more thanin wholly opposing them. T h e grea t oppositions ofthe sensible and intellectual, the unchan geable an d thetransient, in whatever form of wo rds expressed, ar e alwaysmamtained in Plato. Bu t the lesser logical distinctions,as we should call them, w he the r of ontology or predication,

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pycface t o the Second ana Thzya Edit ions. xxxvanother , or that even in th e sam e dialogue h e alwa ys in-tended th e tw o parts to be connected with each other . Wecannot argue from a casual sta tement found in the Par-menides to other sta teme nts which occur in the Phi lebus.Much more t ruly is his own ma nner described b y himselfwhen he says tha t w ord s a re more p lastic than w ax (R ep . ix. 588 C), and whi ther the wind blows, the a rgu-m en t fo llow s (ib. iii. 394 D). T h e dia logues of P la to a r el ike poems, isolated and separate works, except wherethey are indicated by the author himself to have anintent ional sequence.

I t is this method of taking passag es out of their contextand placing them in a new connexion when they seem toconfirm a preconceived theory, which is the defect of Dr.Jacksons procedure. I t may be compared , though no twholly the sam e with i t, to that method which the Fa th er spractised, som etimes called the mystical interpretation ofScripture, in which isolated w ord s ar e separated from theircontext, and receive any sen se which the fancy of theinterpreter may suggest . I t is akin to the method employedby Schleierm acher of arran gin g the dialogues of Plato inchronologica l orde r according to what he deem s the t ruearrange me nt of the ideas contained in them. (Dr. Jacksonis also inclined, having constructed a theory, to make thechrono logy of Platos writ ings depe nde nt upon i t1.) Itmay likewise be il lustrated by th e ingenu i ty of those wh oemploy symbo ls to f ind in Sh ake sp eare a hidden meaning.In the three cases the error is nearly the same:-wordsare taken out of their natural context , and thus becomedesti tute of any real meaning.

(4). According to Dr. Jacksons Later Theory, PlatosIdeas , which w ere once regarded as t h e summa genera of

See J. of Philol. xiii. 38, and elsewhere.c 2

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xxxvi Preface t o the Second and Third Editions.all things, a re now to be explained a s Forms or T y p e s ofsome things only,-that is to say, of natural objects :these w e conceive im perfectly, but ar e always se ekin g invain to have a more perfect notion of them. H e say s(J. of Philol. xi. 319) hat Plato hoped by the stud y of aseries of hypo thetical o r provisional classifications toarrive at one in which natures distribution of kinds isapproximately represented, and so to attain approximatelyto the know ledge of th e ideas . But whereas in th eRepublic, and even in the Phaedo, though less hopefully,he had sought to convert his provisional definitions intof indones by t rac ing the i r connexion wi th the suwwaumgenus, the &yuOdv, in the Parmenides his aspirations areless ambitious, and so on. But where does Dr. Jacksonfind any such notion as this in Plato or anywhere inancient philosophy ? Is it riot an anachron ism, gra ciou s tothe modern physical philosopher, and the more acceptablebecause it seems to form a link between ancient andmodern philosophy, and between physical and metaphysicalscience ; but really unmeaning ?

(5).To this Late r Theory of Platos Id ea s I oppose th eauthority of Professor Zeller, who affirms that none of thepassages to which Dr. Jackson appeals (Thea et. 185C. foll. ;Phil. 25 B foll. ; T im. 57 C ; Parm. 130 B foll., 142B-155 E,157 B-159 E) i n the smallest degre e prove his point; andthat in th e second class of dialogues, in which the LaterTheory of Ideas is suppo sed to be found, quite as clearlya s in th e first, ar e admitted Ideas, not o nly of naturalobjects, but of prope rties, relations, wo rks of art, negativenotions (T heaet. 176E; Parin. 130B foll.; Soph. 254 B foll.,258 B) ; and that what Dr. Jackso n distinguishes as th efirst class of dialogues from the second equally assert orimply that the relation of things to the Ideas, is one of

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Preface to the Second and Third Editions. xxv i iparticipation in them a s well a s of imitation of them (Prof.Zellers summary of his own review of Dr. Jackson, Archivfiir Geschichte der Philosophie, Vol. I, Berlin, 1888, p.617, 18).In conclusion I may remark that in Platos writingsthere is both unity, and also growth and development;but that we must not intrude upon him either a systemor a technical language.

BALLIOL OLLEGE,October, 1891.

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N O T EThe chief additions to the Introductions in the ThirdEdition consist of Essnys on fhe following suyects :-

( I ) Language . . . . . . . Vol. I, 295-321.(2)The decline of Greek Literature . . ,, 424-419.(3)The ' Ideas ' of Plato and Modern Philo-(4) The myths of Plato . . . . . ,, 316-324.(5) The relation of the Republic, Statesman and(6) Th e legend of Atlantis . . . . . ,, 429-433.(8)Comparison of the Laws of Plato with

Spartan and Athenian Laws and In-stitutions . . . . . . . Vol. V , ccxiii-ccxxxvi.

sophy . . . . . . . Vol. 11, 12-25.Laws. . . . . . . . Vol. 111, ccxi-ccxvii.

(7) Psychology . . . . . . . Vol. IV, 75-191.ii

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C H A R M I D E SL Y S I S . .L A C H E S . .PROTAGORASE U T H Y D E M U SCRATYLUS .P H A E D R U S .I O N . . .SYMPOSIUM

C O N T E N T SPACE. . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . 39* I1. . . . . . . . . . 1 r 3 . . . . . . . . . I %

. . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . 25I391

491* 513

. . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .

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I N T R O D U C T I O N.THE ubject of the Charmides is Temperance or u o @ p o o L v ~ , Chamilrcs.

peculiarly Greek notion, which may also be rendered Moderation,Modesty, Discretion, W isdom , without completely e xha ustin g byall these term s th e various associations of the word. It may bedescribed as mens sana in corpore sano, the harmony or dueproportion of the higher and lower elements of human naturewhich makes a man his own master, according to the definitionof the Rcpublic. In the accolnpanying translation the word hasbeen rendered in different places either Temperance or Wisdom,as the connection seemed to require: for in the philosophy ofPlato cro@pou i rq still retain s an intellectual e lemen t (as So crate s isalso said to have identified uo@pou;v~ ith uo@h Xen. Mem. iii. 9,4), and is not yet relegated to the sp he re of moral virtue, a s in theNicomachean Ethics of Aristotle (iii. IO).T he beautiful youth, Charmides, who is also the most temp erateig of human beings, is asked by Socrates, What is Temperance?He answe rs characteristically, (I) Quietness. But Temperanceis a fine and noble thing ; and quietness in many or most cases isnot so fine a thing a s quickness. H e tries again an d says 2) hattemperance is modesty. But this again is set aside b y a sophistical

161 application of Homer : for temperance is good as well as noble,and Homer has declared that modesty is not good for a needyman. (3)Once more Charmides makes the attempt. Th is time162 he gives a definition which he has heard, and of which Socratesconjectures that Critias must be th e auth or : Temperance isdoing

ones own business. But the artisa n w ho m akes ano ther mansshoes may be temperate, and yet he is not doing his ownbusiness; and temperance defined thus would be opposed to the* Cp. Cic. Tusc. iii. 8, 16, uw$ywu t h~ ,quam soleo equidem turn temperan-

Steph. ANALYSIS.

tiam, tum moderationem appellare, nonnunquam etiam modestiam : oll.32

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4 AnaCysis 162-1 4.Clrarmides. division of labour which ex ists in every temp erate or well-ordered

AN*ysls. state. How is this riddle to be explained ?Critias, who takes the place of Charmides, distinguishes in his 163answer between making and doing, and with the help of amisapplied quotation from Hesiod assigns to the words doingand w or k an exclusively good sens e : Temperance is doingones

own business ; 4 4 ) is doing good.Sti ll an elem ent of knowledge is wanting which Critias is readily 164induced to admit at the suggestion of Socrates ; and, in the spiritof So crates and of Greek life generally, proposes a s a fifth definition, 165( 5 ) Te mperance is self-knowledge. But all sciences have asubject : number is the subject of arithmetic, health of medicine-what is the subject of temperance or wisdom ? Th e answer is that 166(6) Temperance is the knowledge of what a man knows and of 167what he does not know. But this is contrary to analogy ; there isno vision of vision, but only of visible things ; no love of loves, butonly of beautiful things; how then can there be a knowledge ofknowle dge? That which is older, heavier, lighter, is older, heavier, 168and lighter than something else, not than itself, and this seems tobe true of all relative notions-the object of relation is outside ofthem ; at any rate they can only have relation to themselves in theform of that object. W he ther there a re any such cases of reflexrelation o r not, and whether that sort of knowledge which weterm Temperance is of this reflex nature has ye t to be determ ined 169by the great metaphysician. But even if knowledge can knowitself, how does the knowledge of what we know imply the 1 7 0knowledge of what we do not know? Besides, knowledge is anabstraction only, and will not inform us of any particular subject,such a s medicine, building, and the like. It may tell u s that 1 7 1we or other men know something, but can never tell us what w eknow.Admitting that there is a knowledge of what we know and of 172what we do not know, which would supply a rule and measure ofall things, still there would be no good in this ; and the knowledgewhich temperance gives must be of a kind which will do us good ; I73for temperance is a good. But this universal knowledge does nottend to our happiness and good : the only kind of knowledge whichbrings happiness is the knowledge of good and evil.Critias replies that the science or knowledge of good and evil, andTo thls I74

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Beginnings of Lop2 and Metaphysics. 5all the other sciences, are regulated by the higher science or CharntiJeJ.knowledge of knowledge. Soc ra tes replies by again dividing th e ANALYSIS.abstract from th e conc rete, and as ks how this knowledge conducesto happ iness in the same definite way in which medicine conduces

And now, after making all thes e concessions, which a re reallyinadmissible, we are still as far as ever from ascertaining thenature of temperance, which Charmides has already discovered,

176and had therefore better rest in the knowledge that the moretemperate he is the happier he wTill be, and not trouble himselfwith the speculations of Socrates.

175 to health.

In th is Dialogue may be noted ( I ) Th e Greek ideal of beauty andgoodness, the vision of the fair soul in the fair body, realised inthe beautiful Charmides ; 2 ) The true conception of medicine asa science of the whole a s well as the parts, and of the mind as wellas the body, which is playfully intimated in the sto ry of th eThracian ; (3) The tendency of the age to verbal distinctions,which here, as in the Protagoras and Cratylus, are ascribed tothe ingenuity of Prodicus; and to interpretations or ratherparodies of Homer or Hesiod, which are eminently characteristicof Plato and his contemporaries; ( 4 ) The ge rm of an ethicalprinciple contained in the notion that temperance is doingones own business, which in the Republic (such is the shiftingcharacter of the P latonic philosophy) is given a s th e definition, notof temperance, but of justice; (5) The impatience which is ex-hibited by Socrates of any definition of temperance in which anelement of science or knowledge is not included ; 6)T he beginningof metaphysics and logic implied in the two questions : whetherthere can be a science of science, and whether the knowledge ofwhat you know is th e sam e-as the knowledge of wha t you do notknow ; and also in the distinction between what you know andthat you know, d O I ~ F Ynd ~ T L tv ; here too is th e first conceptionOf an absolute self-determined science (the claims of which,however, ar e disputed by Socrates, who ask s cui bono ?) as well asthe first suggestion of the difficulty of the abstract and concrete,and one of the earliest anticipations of the relation of subject andobject, and of th e subjective elemen t in knowledge-a ri chbanquet of metaphysical questions in which we taste of many

I N T R O U U C .TWN.

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6 Characters of the Dialogue.Clramides. things, (7) And still the mind of Plato, having snatched for

a moment at these shadows of the future, quickly rejects them :thus early has he reached the conclusion that there can be noscience which is a science of nothing (Parmen. 132 B). (8) Theconception of a science of good and evil also first occurs here,an anticipation of the Philebus and Republic as well a s of moralphilosophy in later ages.The dramatic interest of the Dialogue chiefly centres in theyouth Charmides, with whom Socrates talks in the kindly spirit ofan elder. His childlike simplicity and ingenuousness are con-trasted with the dialectical and rhetorical ar ts of Critias, wh o is th egrown-up man of the world, having a tincture of philosophy. N ohint is given, either here or in the Timaeus, of the infamy whichattaches to the name of the latter in Athenian history. He issimply a cultivated person who, like his kinsman Plato, is ennobledby the connection of his family with Solon (cp. Tim . 20, 21), andhad been the follower, if not the disciple, both of Socrates and ofthe Sophists. In the argument he is not unfair, if allowance ismade for a slight rhetorical tendency, and for a natural desire tosave his reputation with the company ; he is sometimes nearer thetru th than Socrates. Nothing in his language or behaviour isunbecoming the guardian of the beautiful C harmides. H is loveof reputation is characteristically Greek, and contrasts with thehumility of Socrates. N o r in Charmides himself do we find anyresemblance to the Charmides of history, except, perhaps, themodest and retiring nature which, according to Xenophon, at onetime of his life prevented him from speaking in the Assem bly(hlem. 3, 7) ; and we are surprised to hear that, like Critias, heafterwards became one of the thirty tyrants. In the Dialogue heis a pattern of virtue, and is therefore in n o need of the charmwhich Socrates is unable to apply. W ith youthful naivete; keepinghis secret and entering into the spirit of Socrates, he enjoys thedetection of his elder and guardian Critias, who is easily seen tobe the author of the definition which he has so great an interestin maintaining (262B). The preceding definition, T em perance isdoing ones own business, is assumed to have been borrowed byCharmides from another ; and when the enquiry becomes moreabstract he is superseded by Critias (cp. Theaet. 168E ; Euthyd.zgo E). Socrates preserves his accustomed irony to the end ; he

INTRODUC-T I O I .

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The dsfilzitions of temperance. 7is in the neighbourhood of several great truths, which he views in Charnridcs.various lights, but always either by bringing them to the test of INTRODUC.common sense, or by demanding too great exactness in the use of 'IoN'words, tu rn s aside from them and com es at last to no conclusion.Th e definitions of tem peran ce proceed in regular order from thepopular to the philosophical. The first two are simple enoughand partially true, like the first thoughts of an intelligent youth ;the third, which is a real contribution to ethical philosophy, isperverted by th e ingenuity of Socrates, and hardly rescued by anequal perversion on the part of Critias. The remaining definitionshave a higher aim, which is to introduce the element of knowledge,and at last to unite good and truth in a single science. But thetime has not yet arrived for the realization of this vision of meta-physical philosophy; and such a science when brought nearer tous in the Philebus and the Republic will not be called by the nam eof uw $ po ui v ~ . Hen ce w e see with s urpris e that Plato, who in hisother writings identifies good and knowledge, here opposes them ,and asks, almost in the spirit of Aristotle, how can th ere be aknowledge of knowledge, and even if attainable, how can sucha knowledge be of any use ?The difficulty of the Charmides arises chiefly from the twosenses of the word uw#pou6y, or temperance. From the ethicalnotion of temperance, which is variously defined to be quietness,modesty, daing our own business, the doing of good actions, thedialogue passes on to the intellectual conception of u w ~ p o u ~ u ~ ,which i s declared also to be the science of self-knowledge, or of theknowledge of wha t w e know and do not know, or of the knowledgeof good and evil. T he dialogue represents a stage in the historyof philosophy in which knowledge and action were not yet dis-tinguished. Hence the confusion betiveen them, and the easytransition from one to the other. T he definitions which a reoffered ar e all rejected, but it is to b e observed that they all tendto throw a light on the nature of temperance, and that, unlike thedistinction of Critias between roie iu , rrpdrmr, f ' p p yd [ da t , none ofthem are merely verbal quibbles. It is implied that this question,although it has not yet received a solution in theory, has beenalready answered by Charmides himself, who has learned topractise the virtue of self-knowledge which philosophers arevainly trying to define in words. In a similar spirit we might say

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C H A R M I D E S , O K TEMPERANCE.PERSOAT OF THE DIALOGUE.

S O C R A T E S ,ho i s the m m a t o r .C H A E R E P H O N . C R I T I A S .

C H A K M I D E S .

S C E N E-The Palaestra of Taureas, which is near the Porch of theKing Archon.E S T E R D A Y evening I r e tu rned f rom the a rmy a t Po ti - C ~ aum i des .'?: Y daea, and having been a good whi le away, I thought ESocrates,hat I should l ike to go and- look a t my o ld haunts .went in to the palaes tra of Ta urea s , which i s over agains t the who h at emple ad jo in ing the porch of the King Archon, and there I just *e-turned tofound a n um be r of persons, most of whom I knew, but not all. &hens,My vis i t was unexpected , and no sooner d id they see me visltshisenter ing tha n they sa lu ted me f rom afar on a ll s ides ; a n d andld friendsellsChaerephon, w ho i s a k ind of madman, s tar ted up and ran to them the

me, seizing my hand, and saying, H o w did you escape, :;z:cctSocra t es ?-(I sho uld expla in tha t an engagement had taken Potidaea.place a t Pot idaea n ot long b efore we came away, of which th enews had only jus t reached Athens .)You see, I repl ied, that here I am.T he re was a report , he sa id , tha t the engagement w as veryThat , I repl ied, was not far from the t ruth.I suppose, he said, that you were present .I was.T h e n s it down, a nd tel l u s the whole s tory, which a s yet weI took th e place which he assigned to me, by the s ide of

SO 1

severe, and that many of our acquaintance had fallen.

have only hear d imperfect ly .

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I OCharmids. Crit ias the son of Cal laeschrus, an d when I had saluted himSKRATES~and the rest of the company, I told them the news from thec ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~rmy, and answered their several enquiries.

Return o f Socrates from Potidaea.

CRlTlAS,

He pro-ceeds tomake en-quiriesabout thestate ofphilosophyand aboutthe youth ;and is toldof thebeautifulCharmides,

T he n, when there had been enough of th is , I, in my turn,began to make enquir ies about matters a t home-about th epresent s ta te of phi losophy, an d about t he youth . I askedwhether any of them were remarkable for wisdom or beauty,or both.to some youths who were coming in , an d ta lking noisilyto one another, followed by a crowd. O f th e beauties,Socrates, he said , I fancy that you will soo n be able toform a judgment. For t hose who a re ju s t en te r ing a r e theadvanced guard of th e great beauty, as he is thought to be,of the day, and he is l ikely to be not far off himself .

Crit ias, glancing at the door, invited my attention I

W h o is he, I said ; and w ho is his father ?Charmides, he repl ied , is h is name ; h e is my cousin , andthe son of my uncle Glaucon : I ra ther th ink tha t you knowhim too, a l though he was not grown up at the t ime of yourdepar ture .Cer ta inly , I know him, I said, for he was remarkab leeven th en when he wa s stil l a child, an d I should imaginethat by th is time he m ust be a lmost a young man.You will see, he said, in a momen t wha t p rog ress he hasmade and what he is l ike. H e had scarcely said the word,when Charmides entered.Now you know, my friend, that I cannot m easure anything,and of the beautiful, I am simply such a measu re as a whitel ine is of chalk; for a lmost a l l young persons appear to bebeautiful in my eyes. Bu t at that moment, when I saw himcoming in, I confess that I was qui te astonished at h is beautyand s t a tu re ; al l th e world seemed to be enamo ured of him ;amazement and confus ion re igned when he en te red ; and

a troop of lovers followed him. T h a t grow n-up m en likeourselv es shou ld have been affected in this way wa s notsurprising, but I observed that there was the same feel ingamong the boys ; all of them, down to the very least child,turn ed a nd looked at h im, as if he had been a s ta tue.Chae rephon cal led me and sa id : W h a t d o you think ofh im , S o c r a t e s ? H a s h e n o t a beautiful face?

Most beautiful, I said.

5 4

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him.

The curefor theheadache.

The eyes,as phy-sicianstell us,cannot be

12Charmides. person w ho had the cure , he looked at me in such a n inde-SO---S, scr ibable manner , and was just g oing to ask a question. Anda t that mom ent all the people in the palaestra crowded aboutThe fee- us, and, 0 r a r e I caught a sigh t of the inwards of his gar-gestedto ment, and took the f lame, T h e n I could no longer containSocratesby myself. I thoug ht how well C ydias understood the na turethe sight of of love, when, in speaking of a fair youth, he w arns som e on eno t to bri ng the fawn in the sight of the l ion to b e devouredby him, for I felt that I had been overcome by a sort of

wild-beast appe tite. Bu t I controlled mvself, and when he

How t o c a m a hadache.

C H A R M I D E S

ings sug-

a sk ed m e i i i k n ew t h e c u re o f t h e h ea da ch e, I answered,but w ith an effort, that I did know.A nd what is it ? he said.I replied tha t i t was a kind of leaf, which required to beaccompanied by a charm, and if a person would repeat thecharm at the sam e time that h e used the cure , h e would bemade whole ; but that without the charm the leaf would beof n o avail.said.

T h e n I will write out the charm from your dictation, he 156With my consen t ? I said, or without my consent ?With your consent, Socrates, he said, laughing.V ery good, I said ; and are you qui te sur e that you knowmy name ?I ought to know you, he replied, for th ere is a great dea lsaid about you am ong my companions; and I rememberwhen I was a child seeing you in company with my cousinCritias.I am glad to f ind that you remember me, I s a i d ; f o r Ishal l now b e more a t home w ith you a nd shal l be better ableto explain the nature of the charm, about which I felt adifficulty before. F o r th e charm will do more, Ch armid es,than only cure the headache. I dare say that you havehea rd eminent physicians s ay to a patient who comes to

them w ith bad eyes, that they cannot cure his ey es by them-cured with- selves, but that if his eyes are to be cured, his head must beout the t r ea ted ; and then again they say that to th ink of cur ing th ehead* nor head alone, and not the rest of the body also, is the heightwithout of folly. An d arguin g in this way they apply th eir methodsthe body: to the whole body, and tr y to treat a nd heal the w hole andthe head

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The c w e of Zanaolxis. 1 3the par t together .

Yes, he said.An d they ar e r ight, and you would ag ree with them ?Yes, he said, certainly I should .H is approving answers reassured me, and I began bydegrees to regain confidence, and the vital heat returned.Such, Charmides, I said, is the nature of the charm, which Ilearned when serving with th e arm y from on e of the physiciansof the Thracian king Zamolxis , who are said to be so skilfulthat they can even give immortali ty . T hi s T hra cia n to ld methat inthese notions of theirs, which I was just now m ention-ing, the G reek physicians are qui te r ight as far as they go ; utZamolxis , he added, our king, who is also a god, says fur ther , th at as you ought not to a t temp t to cure the eyes without thehead, or the head without the body, so nei ther ought you to nor theat tempt to cure the body without the soul ; and this, he said, ::zith-is the reason why the cure o fm any d iseases is unknown to th e soul.physicians of Hellas , because th ey a re ignoran t of the whole,which ou ght to be studied also ; for the part can never be wellunless t he whole is well. For all good an d evil, wh ether inthe body or in human nature, originates, as he declared, inthe soul, an d overflows from thenc e, a s if from th e head into

1 5 7 the eyes. And therefore if the head and body ar e to be well ,you must begin by curing the soul; that is the first thing.And the cure, my de ar youth, h as to be effected by the use ofcer ta in charms, and these charms are fa ir words; and by.them temperance is implanted in the soul, a nd wh ere tem per-ance is, there heal th is speedily imparted, not only to thehead, but to the whole body. And h e who taught me thecure an d the charm at the same t ime added a special direct ion : Let no one, he said, persuade you to cure the head, untilhe has f irst given you his soul to be cured by the charm.For this, he said, is the great error of our day in the treat-ment of the human body, that physicians separate the soulfrom the body. A nd he added with emphasis, at the sametime making me swear to h is words, L e t no one, howeverrich, or noble, or fair, persuade you to give him the cure,without the charm. Now I have sworn, and I must keep myoath, and therefore if you will allow me to app ly the Th rac ia n

Did you ever observe that th is is what Charmides.th ey s a y ? SOCRATES,CHARMD s.

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14Charmides. charm first to your soul, as the st ranger d irected, I willSOCRITES. afterw ards proceed to apply the cure to your head. Bu t ifcHARY& not, I do not know what I am to do with you, my de arCharniides.Crit ias, when he heard this, said : T h e headache will be anunexpected gain to my young relation, if the pain in his head

com pels him t o improve h is mind : n d I can tell you, Socrates,tha t Charmides is not only pre-eminent in beauty among hisequals, but also in that q uality which is given by the charm ;an d this, a s you say, is temperan ce ?

Th odZe ancestry of Charmides.

CRIT~ AS

Yes, I said.T he n let me tell you that he is the most temperate of hum anbeings, an d for his age inferior to n one in a ny quality.Yes, I said, Ch arm ides ; and indeed I think that you oughtto ex cel others in all good qualit ies ; or if I am not mistakenthe re is no on e present who could easily point out twoAthenian houses, whose union would be likely to produce a

better o r nobler scion than the two from which you ar esp rung . The re is your fathers house, which is descendedfrom Critias the son of Dropidas, whose family has beencommemorated in the panegyrical verses of Anacreon, Solon,an d m any other poets, a s famous for beauty and virtue and all

Theout- other h igh for tune: and your mothers house is equal ly 158ward form distinguished ; for your maternal uncle, Pyrilampes, is re-mides does puted never to have found his equal, in Persia at the court ofno dis-credit to the great king, or on the continent of Asia, in all the places tohis great which he went as ambassador, for stature and beauty ; thatancestors. whole family is not a wh it inferior to th e other. Having suchancestors you ought to be first in all things, and, sw eet sonof Glaucon, your outward form is no dishonour to anyof them. If to beauty you ad d temperance, an d if in oth errespec ts you ar e what Crit ias declares you to be, then, d ea rCharmides, blessed art thou, in being the son of thy mother.And her e l ies the point ; or if, as he declares, you have this

gift of temperance already, and are temperate enough, in thatcase you have no need of an y charms, whether of Zamolxis o rof Abar is the Hyperborean, and I may as well let you havethe cure of the head at on ce ; but i f you have not yet ac-quired this quality, I must u se th e charm before I give you themedicine. Please , therefore, to inform me w heth er you admit

Hashealso)temperance

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His tem.erance. ' 5th e t ru th o f wh at Cr i t ias ha s been say ing ;-have you o r have Ciurmides.you no t th i s qua li ty o f t emp eranc e?

C har m ide s blushed, an d th e blush heightened his beauty , Thefor modesty is becoming in youth ; e then sa id ve ry ingenu - modestously , tha t he rea lly could no t a t once answer , e i ther yes , o r reply ofno, to th e quest ion which I h ad as ke d: For , sa id he, if Charmides'I a f f irm th a t I am not tempera te , tha t would be a s t r a n g ething for me to say of myself, an d also I should g ive the l ieto Cri t ias , and many others who th ink as he te l ls you, thatI am tempera te : but , o n the o th er ha nd, i f I say tha t I am, Ishal l have to pra ise myself, which would be i ll man ne rs ; a n dtherefore I do no t know how to a nsw er you .I said to h im : T h a t i s a na tura l rep ly , Charmides , an d Ith ink tha t you a n d I ough t toge the r to e nqu i r e whe the r youhave th is qua l i ty ab out which I am ask ing o r no t ; a n d t h e nyou will no t be compel led to say what you d o no t l ik e ;nei ther shal l I be a rash pract i t ioner of medicine : therefore,.if yo u plea se, I will sh are the e nqu iry with you, but I will no tpress you i f you would ra ther not .T h e re i s no th in g which I sh ould like be tter , h e said ; a n das far as I am co ncern ed you may proceed in the way whichyou think best.question ; or i f temperance abides in you, you m ust have an :t$ir-opin ion about he r ; sh e must g ive some in timation of he r m c e :natu re an d quali ties , which ma y enab le you to form a notion What is i t ?of her.

SXRATES,CHARMIDES.

159 I think, I said, that I had better begin by as kin g you a A w e s t i o n

I s n o t th a t t r u e ?Yes, he said, that I think is true.You know yo ur na t ive language , I said , and therefore youCertainly, he said.In o rder , then , tha t I may form a con jec ture wh ether youhave temp erance abiding in you o r not, tell me, I said, what,in you r op in ion , i s Tem peran ce ?At f i rs t h e hes i ta ted , a nd wa s ve ry unwi ll ing to an sw er :then he sa id tha t he thought temperance was d o ing th ings Firstdefini-order ly and qu ie t ly , such th ings fo r example as walking in

the s t reets , a nd ta lk ing , o r any th ing e lse of tha t na ture .a word, he said , I sho uld an sw er that, in m y opinion, quietness.temperance is quietness.

must be able to tell what you feel about this.

I n BnCe is

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Temperance is pietness-is modesty. I 7T h e fo rmer . Charnrida.A n d is no t sh rewd ness a qu ickness o r c l everness of t h e SXRhTES,True .And i s i t no t bes t to u nde rs tand what i s sa id , w hethe r a tthe wri ting-masters o r the music-masters, o r anyw he re else,not as quie tly as possib le , bu t a s quickly as po ss ib le?

160C H A R h l l n K S .soul, and not a qu ie tness ?

Yes.And in t he sea rch ing s o r de l ibe rat ions of the soul , no t thequietest , as I imagine, and he w ho with difficulty del iber atesan d discovers , is t hough t wo r thy o f p ra ise, bu t he who doe sso most eas i ly and quickly?Qu i te t rue , h e sa id .

And in a l l tha t con cern s e i ther body o r soul, swi f tnessan d ac t iv i ty ar e c learly bet ter tha n s lowness a nd quie t-nes s ?Clearly they are.T h e n t e m p e r a n c e is no t qu i e tnes s , no r i s t he t empera t e Temper-l ife quiet ,-certainly no t upo n this view ; or t he l ife which is ~ ~ it em pera te i s supp osed to be the good. And of two th ings , morequiet-on e i s t rue ,-e ither never , o r very se ldom, do the quie t act ions in life app ear to be bet ter than th e quick an d ener-ge ti c ones ; or supp os ing tha t of the nobler ac tions , the re areas many quie t, as quick a nd vehement : s ti ll , even i f w e gra ntth i s , t emperance wi l l no t be ac t ing quie t ly any more thanact ing quickly an d ene rget ical ly , ei ther in walking o r talkingo r in any th ing e l se ; no r will th e quie t life be mo re tem pera tethan the unqu ie t , see ing tha t t empera nce i s admi tt ed by usto be a good and noble th ing , and the quick have beenshown to be as good as t he quie t.I th ink , h e sa id , Socra tes , tha t you a re r igh t.Then once more , Charmides , I said, fix your a t ten t ion ,and look within ; con s ider the effec t which temperance ha supon yourse l f , and the nature of tha t which has the ef fec t .Think over a l l th i s , and , l ike a brave youth , t e l l me-Whati s t emperance ?

After a moment s pause , in which he mad e a rea l manly Secondeffort to think, he said : My opinion is, Socrates , that Et$-n:t emperance makes a man ashamed o r modes t , and tha t anceist e m p e r a n c e is t he sam e as modes ty . modesty.VOL. I. C

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18 Temperance is a man doing his own business.

But Homersays thatmodesty isnot alwaysgood.

Thi r ddefinition :Temper-ance isdoing ourown busi-ness.Charmideshad heardthis fromCritias,who deniesthat hesaid it.

Th e te rmsof thedefinitionare am-biguous.

Very good , I said ; an d d id you no t admit , jus t now, tha tYes, cer ta inly , he said.An d the t empe ra te a r e a l so good ?Yes.And can tha t be good wh ich doe s no t make men good ?C erta inly not.And you would in fer tha t temperance is not only noble ,T h a t i s m y o p in io n. 161We l l , I s a i d ; b u t s u r e l y y o u wo uld a g r e e w ith H o m e r

tem peran ce i s nob le ?

but a lso good ?

wh en he says, Modesty is not good for a needy man 1Yes, he said ; I agree.T h e n 1 supp ose tha t modesty is a n d is not good ?Clear ly .Bu t temperance , whose p resen ce makes men on ly good ,T ha t appe a r s to me to be a s you say .And the in ference is that temperance cannot be modesty-

if tem peran ce is a good, an d if modesty is as much an evil asa good ?All that , Socrates, appears to me to be t rue ; but I shou ldl ike to kn ow w hat you th ink about a no ther def ini tion of tern-perance, which I jus t now remember to have heard f romsome one , who sa id , Tha t t emperance i s do ing ou r ownbusiness. W a s he r igh t who affirmed tha t ?You m o n s t e r I s a id ; th is is wha t Cr i ti as , o r somephilosopher has to ld you.So m e o ne else , then , sa id Cr i t ias ; fo r cer ta in ly I h a v enot.But what matter , sa id Charmides, f rom whom I hea rdthis ?N o m atter a t a ll , I replied ; or the po in t i s no t who sa idthe words , but w he the r they a r e t rue o r no t.T h e re you a re in the r ight , Socra tes , he rep l ied .T o be s ur e, I s a i d ; y e t I doubt whether we sha l l ever beab le to d iscover the i r t ru th o r fa l sehood; fo r they a re akind of r iddle.

and no t bad , i s a lways good ?

What makes you th ink so ? he sa id .

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Because, I said , he wh o u t t e red them se em s to me to have Ciramides .meant one th ing , and sa id ano ther . Is the scr ibe, for SKRATES,example , to be rega rded a s do ing no th ing w hen he r eads o r C"rRm' i ' xs~wri tes ?I shou ld r a th e r th ink tha t he was do ing someth ing .An d do es the sc r ibe wr ite o r read , o r teach you boysto wr ite o r read , your own nam es on ly , o r d id you wr i te yo urenemies ' nam es a s we ll a s you r own and yo u r f r i ends '?A s m u ch o n e a s t h e o th e r.And was th e re any th ing medd l ing o r in t empera te in th i s ?Ce r ta in ly no t .And ye t if read in g a nd wr i t ing a re the sam e as do ing , you w r i t i n g isdo in g ; i swritingyour

were do ing wha t was no t you r own bus iness ?But they a r e th e sa me a s do ing .An d the h ea l ing a r t , my f r iend , and bu ild ing , a nd weaving ,and do ing any th ing whatever which is done by art ,- these youro,v.na l l c learly come un der the head of do in g ? business ?Certainly .And do you th ink tha t a s ta te would be wel l o rde red by a hfust alaw which compelled eve ry ma n to weave and wash his ow ncoat, an d make his own sho es, and h is own f lask an d str ig il , malie his

162 and o the r implements , on th is p r inc ip le o f every on e do in g coat,and per forming h is own, an d ab s ta in ing f rom what is not hisown ?

etc. ?

I th ink not , he said .But, I sa id , a tempera te s ta te will be a w el l -o rde redOf course , he repl ied .Then t emperance , I said, will not be doing one's ownbusiness ; no t a t leas t in th is way , o r do ing th ings o f th issor t ?

state.

Clearly not.T h e n , a s I was jus t now say ing , he who dec la red tha t tem-pe rance i s a man do ing h i s own business had ano the r and ah idden mean ing ; fo r I do not th ink that he could have beensuch a fool a s to me an this. Was he a fool who told you,C h a r m i d e s ?Nay, he repl ied , I cer ta inly thought h im a very wiseman.T h e n I am quite cer ta in tha t h e put for th his def ini tion as

c 2

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2 0

Th e secretdissatisfac-tion ofCritias,

who main-tains thedefinitionagainstSocrates.

Critias draws verbal distinctions,a r iddle , th inking that n o on e would know the meaning of thewo rds d oin g his own business.

I dare say, he replied.An d what is the m eaning of a man do ing h is own bu sines s?Can you tell me ?Indeed, I cannot ; a n d I should not wonder i f the manhimself who used th is phrase did not understand what hewas saying. W her eup on h e laughed sly ly , and looked atCritias.Crit ias had long been showing uneasiness, for he felt thathe had a reputat ion to maintain with Charmides and the restof th e company. H e had, however , h i ther to managed torestrain himself; but now he could no longer forbear, and Iam convinced of the truth of th e suspicion which I enter ta inedat the t ime, that Charmides had heard th is answer abouttemp erance from Critias. And Charmides, who did not wa ntto answ er himself , but to m ake Critias answer, tr ied to stirh im up. H e went on point ing out that he had been refuted,at which Cri t ias gre w angry, and appeared, as I thought,inclined to quarrel with him ; just as a poet might quarrelwith an actor who spoi led his poems in repeat ing them ; sohe looked hard at h im and said-Do you imagine, Charmides, that the author of this defini-t ion of temperance did not understand the meaning of hisown words, because you d o not unders tand them?Why, a t h is age, I said, most excellent Critias, he canhardly be expected to understand ; but you, who are older ,and have studied, may well be assumed to know the meaningof them ; and therefore, if you a gree with him, and a ccept hisdefinition of temperance, I would much rather argue withyou than with him about the t ru th or falsehood of thedefinition.I entirely agree, said Critias, and accept the definition.V ery good, I said ; and now let me repeat my quest ion -Do you admit, as I was just now saying, that all craftsmenmake o r do someth ing ?I do.And do they make or do their own busines s only, or tha t of 163

They make or do that of oth ers also.others a lso ?

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which he has Zearned from Prodicus. 21And a re they t empera te , see ing tha t they make no t fo r Chartirides.W h y no t ? he said .N o objection on m y part , I said , but there may be adifficulty on his who proposes as a definit ion of temperance,do ing ones own business , and then says tha t there i s no

reason w hy those who do the bus iness o f o th ers should no t betemperate .the bus iness of o the r s a r e t empera te ? I said , th ose w ho make,

themselves or t he ir own bus iness on ly ? SOC EA TES,CRlTlAS.

N a y , sa id he ; d id I ever acknowledge tha t those who do and isnot those w ho do. contra-W h a t I ask ed ; do you mean to say tha t do ing and : c . onsbymaking are n o t t h e s a m e ?N o more, he r ep li ed , t han m ak ing o r work ing a r e thesame ; hus m uch I have l ea rned f rom Hes iod , w ho says tha twork is no d isgrace , Now do you imagine tha t if he hadmean t by work ing and do ing such th ings a s you were de-scr ib ing , he would have sa id tha t there was no d isgracein them-for example, in the manufac ture of shoes, or insell ing pickles, o r sit t ing for hi re in a ho us e of i l l-fame ? T h a t ,Socra tes , i s no t to be suppos ed : but I conceive him to hav ed is t ingu ished making f rom doing and work ; and , whi leadmit ting tha t the making any th ing might somet imes becomea disgrace, when the employment was not honourable , tohave thoug ht tha t work was neve r any d isgrac e a t a ll. F o r He tries toth ings nob ly and usefu lly ma de he ca lled wo rks ; a n d s u c h ~ ~ ~ $ ~ ;makings he cal led workings, and doings ; and he mus t be sup - distinc-posed to hav e ca lled such th ings on ly mans p ro per bus iness , tions*and wha t is hur tfu l, no t h is bus iness : and in tha t sen seHesiod , and any o ther wise man , may be reasonably supp osedto call h im wise w ho doe s his own work.0 Critias, I said, no soon e r had you opened your mouth,than I pret ty well knew that you would cal l that which is 1proper to a man, and that which is h is own, good ; n d t h a tthe makings ( T O &C ~ S ) of the good you would call do ings(r&rr), for I am no s t rang er to the end les s d is tinc tions whichProdicus d raw s about names. Now I have no object ionto you r giving names a n y signification which you please,

The English reader has to observe that the word make (wort%), inGreek, has also the Sense of do (wphrrrrv).

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2 2 Know thysedf Charruides. if you will on ly tell me wh at you mean by them.s ~ c ~ ~ T E ~ ,

Pleasethen to begin again, an d be a l it tle plainer. Do you meanthat th i s do ing or m aking , or w hatever i s the word which youwould use, of good actions, is tem peran ce ?

CRIT14S.

I do, he said.T h en not he who doe s evil, bu t he who doe s good, i s t em-Yes , h e sa id ; and you, friend, would agree.N o mat te r wh e ther I should or not ; ust now, not what I

think, bu t what you ar e saying, is the point at i ssue.Fourth W el l , he answered ; I mean to say, that h e who do es evil ,an d not good, is not temperate ; and tha t he is t empera te w hoa n c e i s t h e do es good, and not ev i l : for temperanc e I define in plaindoingOf wo rds to be t he do ing of good actions.actions. but I am cur ious to know wheth er you imagine tha t tem pera temen a re i gnoran t of the i r own temperance ?

pera te ?

definition :Temper-

good A n d you may be ve ry l ikely r ight in what you a r e saying ;164

I do not th ink so, he sa id .And yet were you not saying, just now, that craf tsmenmight be temperate in doin g anothers work, as wel l as indoin g the i r own ?I was, he repl ied ; but what is your drift ?I have no part icular-dri f t , but I wish that you would tell mewhether a physician who cures a pat ient may do good to him-self and good to an oth er also ?Cross-tion bySocra tes of

Cr i t i as ,who admitsthat the Yes.

examina-I think that he may.A n d h e w h o d o e s so d o e s h is d u t y ?

temperateman doesnot alwaysknow him-self to beact ingtemper-ately, andthen di-gresses intoa lengthyexplana-tion of theDelphicmotto,Knowthyself,

And does not he who does h i s duty ac t t empera te ly orY es, h e acts wisely.But must the physician necessari ly know when his t reat -

me nt is l ikely to pro ve beneficial, an d when not ? o r m us t t h ecraf tsman necessar ily know when he is likely to be benefited,an d w hen no t to be benefi ted, by the work which he is d o i n g ?I sup po se not.T h e n , I sa id , he may somet imes do good o r harm, and notknow what he is himself doing, an d yet, in doing good, a s yousay , he ha s don e temperate ly o r wisely . W a s not tha t you rstatement ?

wisely ?

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is ApoZZos sahtation of Ais worshippeers. 23Yes. Chamridcs.Th en, a s would seem, in doing good, he may act wisely or SWRATES,

which heexplains asBut that, Socrates, he said, is impossible ; and therefore if meaningthis is, as you imply, th e neces sary consequence of an y of m y s:zm-previous admissions, I will withdraw them, rather than admittha t a man can be tempera te o r wise w ho do es no t knowhimself; and I am not ashamed to confess that I was in error .Fo r self-knowledge would cer ta inly be maintained by me tobe the very essen ce of knowledge, an d in this I agree wi thhim who dedicated the inscription, Know thyself at Delphi.That word, i f I am not mis taken , i s pu t there a s a sort ofsalutat ion which the god addresses to those who enter thetem ple ; as much a s to say tha t the o rd inary sa lu ta tion of H a i l is not r ight, an d that the exhorta t ion Be temperate would be a far better way of sa lu t ing one ano the r. T h enotion of him who dedicated the inscription was, as I believe,that the god spe aks to those w ho enter h is temple, not a s menspeak ; ut, when a w orshipper enters , the f irst word which hehears is Be tempera te Th is, however, l ike a proph et h eexp res ses in a so r t of r iddle , for Know thyse l f a n d Betemperate I a r e t h e s a m e , a s I maintain , and as the le t te r simply [crw#phi, yvS6i craurdv], an d yet they may be easily mis-

16sunderstood ; and succeed ing sages who added Never toomuch, or , G iv e a pledge, an d evil is nigh at hand, wouldappear to have so misunderstood them ; or they im agined thatKnow thyself was a piece of advice which the god gave,and not his salutation of the worshippers at their f irst comingin ; and they dedicated their ow n inscr ipt ion un de r th e ideathat they too would give equally useful pieces of advice. Sh allI tell you, Socrates, why I say all th is ? My object is to leavethe previous discussion (in which I know not w hethe r you or Fifthdefini-I ar e more r ight, but , a t a ny rate , no clear result was attained), gmLr-and to r a i se a new one in which I will attempt to prove, anceissrlr-if you deny, that temperance is self-knowledge. knowledge.

Yes, I said, C rit ias ; but you come to m e as though I pro-fessed to know about th e quest ions which I ask , and a s thoughI Could, if I only would, ag ree with you. W h e re a s th e fact

temperately , an d be wise o r temperate , but not know his own cRIT1hawisdom or temperance ?

,

Reading, according to Heundes conjecture, 6 p o h ~ a o v ~ d sot.

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24 A rather warm dispute arisesCharmides. is that I en qu ire with you in to the t ru th of that which is ad-SOCRATBS, vance d from time to time, jus t be cause I do not know ; a n d

when I have enquired, I will sa y wh ether I ag ree with you ornot.CRITIAS.

Pl ea se then to allow m e time to reflect.Reflect, he said.I am reflecting, I replied, and discover that temperance, orwisdom, if implying a knowledge of anything, must be ascience, and a science of something.Yes, he said ; he science of itself.

Is no t medicine, I said, the science of health ?True .And suppose, I said, that I were asked by you what is th euse or effect of medicine, which is this science of health, I

should answer that medicine is of very great use in pro-duc ing health, which, as you w ill admit, is an excellenteffect.

But tern-science ofsomething.

Granted.And if you were to ask me, what is the result or effect ofarchitecture , which is the science of building, I should sayhouses, and so of other arts, which all have their differentresul ts . Now I want you, Crit ias, to answer a similarquestion about temperance, or wisdom, which, according toyou, is th e science of itself. Ad mitting this view, I ask ofyou, w hat good work, wo rthy of th e nam e wise, doe s tem-pe rance or wisdom, which is the science of itself, effect?Answer me.

No ma- T h a t is not the t rue way of pursuing th e enquiry , Socrates,any he sa id ; or wisdom is not l ike the other sciences, any morethan in the t han they a r e l ike one ano the r : but you proceed as if theyw ere alike. F o r tell me, he said, what result is the re ofsciences. computation o r geometry , in the sam e sen se as a house is t h eresul t of bui ld ing, or a garment of weaving, or any other

work o f any o th e r a r t ? Can you show me any suc h resul t of 166them ? You cannot.subject which is different from the science.

What theno f i t ?is the result

terial result

But still T ha t i s t rue , I said ; ut still each of these sciences has a~~~~~~

I can show youhaveasub- that the ar t of computat ion ha s to do with odd and eve nject-matter* numbers in their numerical re la t ions to themselves and toeach other. Is not that t rue ?Yes, he said,

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between Socrates and C d i a s . 2 5An d the odd and even numbers a re no t t he same wi th t he Charnrides.T he y a r e not.T h e ar t o f weighing , again , has to do wi th l igh ter andheavier ; but the ar t of w eighing i s o ne th ing , and th e heavyand t he l ight another .

art of computation ? SOCRATES,CRITlAS.

.Do you admit that ?Yes.Now, I want to know, what is that which is not wisdom,an d of which wisdom is the sc ience ?Yo u ar e just fall ing into the old erro r , Socrates , h e said. Temper-You come asking in what wisdom or temperance differs from ::::: 15the other sciences , and then you t ry to discover some respect defined toin which they ar e al ike ; but they are not , for al l the other ofsc i