political joke of the day “ 这场斗争其实和中国人没关系, 这场斗争是有...
Post on 22-Dec-2015
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Political joke of the day
“这场斗争其实和中国人没关系, 这场斗争是有个蒙古人向美国人举报新加坡人杀了英国人”
This political struggle has nothing to do with Chinese people: it’s a Mongolian reporting to Americans that a Singaporean killed a Brit.
Roadmap: Upcoming Topics
1: Institutions of the Party-State Can the state control its own agents?
2: Civil Society and Village Governance Can the state control society? Can society influence the state?
3: Media/Internet Politics How effective is state control over the media? Conversely, how effective is the media as a
government watchdog? Is the internet a virtual civil society?
Institutions of the Party-State: Reading questions
What are the major types of authoritarian regimes?
Which type has the longest regime survival, on average?
Why?
Institutions of the Party-State
Major debate about the capacity of the Chinese state
Defining terms State capacity +
Institutions of the Party-State
Major debate about the capacity of the Chinese state
Defining terms State capacity*
Ability of state to penetrate society regulate social relationships extract resources use them in intended ways
*Joel Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States Pei’s terms: mobilizing political support,
providing public goods, and managing internal tensions
Institutions of the Party-State: Reading questions
Major debate about the capacity of the Chinese state Where does Pei Minxin stand?
Alternative argument: Yang Dali +
Institutions of the party-state
7
1) How is the party-state structured?2) What are the mechanisms of party
control?
Review: Chinese Communist Party parallels and dominates all other state institutions8
Communist Party
legislature executive
General Secretary
(Hu Jintao)
Chairman
(Wu Bangguo)
Premier
(Wen Jiabao)
Politburo of Central Committee
National People’s Congress
State Council
party structure parallels and
dominates all other elements of the state
bureaucracy
Traditionally a rubber stamp for party decisions;
nominally elected but party supervises
nomination of candidates
implements party policy;
oversees all government
ministries, state-owned factories,
schools, etc.
(Stay tuned for more on interest representation by NPC and Local Peoples’ Congresses)
Institutions of the party-state CCP central hierarchy
General Secretary Politburo Standing Committee (9) Politburo (25) Central Committee National Party Congress (18th Autumn 2012)
Personnel Symbolic transfer of leadership
“Ideology” Public articulation of “party line”
Institutions of the party-state CCP major
commissions Military Affairs (MAC) Discipline Inspection
Central Advisory 1982-1992 only
Institutions of the party-state How institutionalized
is authority?
Deng Xiaoping Position as of 1985?
(“Man of the Year”) Position as of 1992?
(“southern tour”)
Hu Jintao
Institutions of the party-state CCP central hierarchy
Political-Legal Committee---law, security, police Zhou Yongkang 周永康
Supreme People’s Court Wang Shengjun 王胜俊 (no legal training)
Institutions of the party-state CCP major
departments Secretariat
Organization Dept Personnel
Propaganda Media, education
5 Levels of Government; 6 Levels of Party
14
Central Provincial Municipal /prefectural County Township
(lacks full complement of government offices)
Village (party only) (more on village elections on
Wednesday)
Institutions of the party-state
15
What are the mechanisms of Leninist party control? Democratic centralism Party discipline
Applies to 80 million party members (~5% of population)
Central Commission for Discipline Inspection Monitors corruption within party (Bo Xilai and Gu Kailai)
Harvard’s Samuel Huntington (Dali Yang, p. 49)
“Organization is the road to political power, but it is also the foundation of political stability and thus the precondition of political liberty.”
Love to hate?
Institutions of the party-state
16
What are the mechanisms of Leninist party control within and beyond the CCP? Nomenklatura
List of positions for which party vets candidates Examples beyond the party itself +
Institutions of the party-state
17
What are the mechanisms of Leninist party control within and beyond the CCP? Nomenklatura
List of positions for which party vets candidates Examples beyond the party itself
Government executives Standing Committees of People’s Congresses Editors of major newspapers University leadership Trade Union leadership Buddhist Association, Chinese Catholic Church
leadership Lawyer’s Association leadership State-owned corporation leadership
Institutions of the party-state
18
What are the mechanisms of Leninist party control within and beyond the CCP? “Double-hatting”
Concurrent party and other positions Village head and village party secretary concurrently
“Interlocking directorates” Example: Ma Wen
Minister, Ministry of Supervision (government) Deputy Secretary, Central Commission for Discipline
Inspection (CCP) Party core groups and party committees
Example: Party group ( 党组 ) in leadership of local People’s Congress Must follow party line
Institutions of the party-state
19
What are the mechanisms of Leninist party control within and beyond the CCP? “Double-hatting”
Concurrent party and other positions Village head and village party secretary concurrently
“Interlocking directorates” Example: Ma Wen
Minister, Ministry of Supervision (government) Deputy Secretary, Central Commission for Discipline
Inspection (CCP) Party core groups and party committees
Example: Party group ( 党组 ) in leadership of local People’s Congress Must follow party line
Institutions of the party-state
20
Problems with Leninist party leadership: competing sources of authority
Vertical-horizontal relations (tiao-kuai guanxi 条块关系) Examples:
Horizontal: territorial governments like a county County party secretary is ultimate local authority ( 一把手 )
Vertical: substantive agencies National tax office ( 国税局 ) at county level Environmental protection agency at county level People’s Bank county-level branch
Local Communist Party secretaries often hold sway over bureaucrats in the local offices of central agencies Ex: local environmental protection bureau
Less likely to implement the policies of the State Environmental Protection Agency if the local CCP party secretary cares more about industrial output and jobs then clear air or water
Institutions of the party-state
21
Premise: What do local leaders (cadres) care about? Political careers (Barbara Geddes, Politician’s Dilemma)
Leading cadre evaluation system Specific, measurable, quantifiable criteria Linked to “high-powered” incentives
Bonuses (often as much as the base salary itself) Promotion prospects
Determined by performance on key targets Important for signaling the priorities of higher levels
Shifting emphasis—demonstrates political learning Economic: output sales profits Economic political
With privatization, cadres directly manage fewer enterprises With “losers” emerging during the later reform process, more
protests, seen as threats to CCP control
Institutions of the party-state How to conceptualize cadre
management? Principal-agent problem
Who are the principals? Who are the agents? What are the defining characteristics of the
principal-agent problem?
Institutions of the party-state Principal-agent problem
Defining characteristics Interest conflict Information asymmetry
Institutions of the party-state Principal-agent problem
Analytical insights “Moral hazard”
Performing only to measured criteria
Institutions of the party-state Leading cadre evaluation system as a principal-
agent problem: gaming the system Early example (GVIO 工业总产值 )
Politically motivated bank loans to local enterprises Subsequent adaptations
Current example (Investment 招商引资 ) Manipulate requisitions of rural land for development
Contrast Dali Yang p. 48 (auctions) QUESTION: Dali Yang: “rent seeking”
Institutions of the party-state Principal-agent problem
Analytical insights Multitask problem
Difficult to promote multiple targets simultaneously Example: environmental protection targets vs.
growth/investment
Institutions of the party-state
27
Premise: What do local leaders (cadres) care about? Political careers (Barbara Geddes, Politician’s Dilemma)
How much does money/corruption undermine this analytical framework?