Em 1928, no auge dos anos dourados da República, já estavam presentes alguns primeiros sinais da crise que iria assolar a Alemanha até o fim da República, como a ocorrência de lockout de empregadores e o ganho de força do Partido Nazista em áreas rurais do país1. Contudo, a volta do Partido Social-Democrata da Alemanha – SPD ao governo e o êxito do plano de política externa elaborado por Gustav Stresemann2 contribuíram para o êxito do projeto Republicano – pelo menos naquele ano.

O início da crise que culminara no fim da República tem início em 1929, com a chamada “quinta feira negra” e o desenrolar da Grande Depressão americana, que rapidamente se espalha para o restante do globo. Já na primavera de 1930, a crise chega à Alemanha, de modo que instituições financeiras americanas passaram a exigir o cumprimento das obrigações oriundas de empréstimos de curto prazo tanto do setor privado quanto do governo. A crise que se inicia no âmbito econômico rapidamente passa a afetar o campo político da República: a coalizão formada pelo SPD se desfaz por problemas envolvendo a política do seguro desemprego nos tempos da crise. Por um lado, os Sociais-Democratas e os Católicos se manifestavam de forma favorável à expansão do programa de assistência, seja por meio aumento do benefício ou do número de beneficiários, mesmo sabendo do comprometimento das contas públicas em virtude da crise e do dever de ressarcimento imposto pelo Tratado de Versailles e regulado pelo plano Dawes. Já os conservadores – integrantes do Partido Liberal da Alemanha – FDP, por exemplo – eram a favor da redução ou corte de tal benefício até a estabilização da economia e das contas públicas.

1930:

Na primavera de 1930, a crise chega a alemanha A coalizão se desfaz por problemas acerca de seguro desemprego (falta de

recurso) SPD e Católicos – aumento do benefício; Conservadores – corte de benefícios Presidente Paul von Hindenburg nomeia como chanceler Heinrich Brüning, de

centro Corte de gastos – crença na regulação privada Tentativa de se desvencilhar do tratado de versalhes Reichstag dividido, Brunning convoca novas eleições, mas a resposta nas urnas

se relacionava ao inativismo político do chanceler Suddenly, in a national election on 14 September 1930, the Nazi Party surged

ahead, winning 18.3 percent of the vote and 107 seats in the Reichstag. Ingovernabilidade do Sistema parlamentar Vontade de Brunning era criar um ambiente autoritário – utilização do art. 48

WRV Estado de exceção permanente – art. 48 como técnica de governo. Ditadura

presidencial pelos próximos 1 ano e meio. Hindenburg renovava os decretos de emergência, que fundamentava a ação

Brüning. Hindenburg é eleito em 1932, com 80 anos, já marcado pela senilidade. Políticas de austeridade de Brüning No verão de 1932, aproximadamente 1/3 da população ativa estava

desempregada – segundo estatísticas oficiais. Mas os números reais eram piores.

SPD era identificado como representante de um sistema falido1 349 weimar2 475 dictionaruHe aimed to restore Germany’s great-power status, and his strategy centered on ending the struggle in the Ruhr and stabilizing the economy as prelude to negotiating a compromise with France and reopening the reparations* issue. This was a courageous plan, part of his fulfillment policy,* but its realization ruined his reputation with old allies on the Right. Yet as leader of the DVP, he persuaded Germany’s industrialists to help stabilize the mark and forge a new understanding with the West.

Vergonha do SPD ao defender Hindenbrug e Brüning Brüning perde o apoio de Hindenburg e dos conservadores: Two factors were

decisive. His interior minister decided that the Nazis were becoming too bold and too disruptive. He wanted to rein them in a bit, so he issued an order banning marches of the storm troopers. That did not go over well with the many conservatives who wanted to use the Nazis to overthrow the republic. More important, Brüning, in his drive to cut the state budget, sought to eliminate government subsidies to estate owners in Prussia

30 de maio de 1932 – Brüning é demitido Hitler tenta chegar ao poder pela segunda vez (depois do Putsch da cervejaria),

concorrendo com Hindenbrug nas eleições presidenciais de 1932 – perdeu. Franz von Papen vira chanceler Von Papen adota políticas deflacionárias – acredita que pode destruir a

república e a submissão ao tratado de versalhes

Em Julho de 1932, ele tira o governo eleito da Prussia, bastião da democracia weimariana e instala um interventor la

Convocou eleições But in the middle of a depression, the population was unlikely to support a

sitting government whose policies offered no immediate redress of their grievances. Germans went to the polls on 31 July 1932. The Nazis received 37.3 percent of the vote, the highest they would ever achieve in a free election. They now became Germany’s largest party and had 230 delegates sitting in the Reichstag. They celebrated their triumph, but it is worth underscoring the fact that they did not achieve, and never would achieve, a majority in a freely contested election. They received a very large chunk of the vote, more than one-third. But the German people never elected the Nazis to power. Nearly two-thirds of the electorate cast their votes against the Nazi Party.

Novo parlamento composto em setembro de 1932. Papen governou por decretos

Herman Görring em setembro de 1932 como chefe do partido nazista Outra eleição. Germans voted on 6 November 1932, and the results are notable.

The Nazi surge had broken. Their share of the vote fell to 33.1 percent, their number of deputies to 196.

In the late fall of 1932, a Nazi assumption of power was only a possibility—by no means whatsoever a foregone conclusion. Weimar Germany’s third chancellor in 1932 was a close aide of President Hindenburg and another army general, Kurt von Schleicher. He claimed that he had a plan for dealing with the combined economic and political crisis

Meanwhile, in early January 1933, secret negotiations began between Papen and Hitler, prompted by a small circle of advisers around President Hindenburg. The established conservatives now entered into serious negotiations with the radicals

So in January 1933, Hindenburg’s advisers presented him with a plan for a new government. Adolf Hitler would preside as chancellor, Franz von Papen would serve as vice-chancellor

On 30 January 1933, in a constitutionally legal manner, he named Hitler chancellor. Weimar Germany was finished.

In 1928, at the height of the “golden years” of the Weimar Republic, the Social Democrats returned to the government in a large coalition. There were worrisome signs—employers locked out workers in the Ruhr iron industry, the Nazis were gaining some support in depressed rural areas, a very large number of splinter parties had entered into the election—but the revival of the SPD’s electoral fortunes, the loss of votes on the extremes of the political spectrum, and Stresemann’s generally

successful foreign policy all boded well for the republic. The impact spread very quickly to Germany, and by spring 1930 its economy was in a tailspin. The collapse of stock values soon precipitated a banking crisis, particularly as American financial institutions demanded repayment of their short-term loans to German businesses and governments. Capital evaporated, leading to a rapid decline in production and then, finally, a demand crisis as both consumers and businesses lacked the resources to purchase goods in the marketplace. By the late spring of 1930, a full-scale economic depression was under way in Germany, its most visible signs shuttered factories and throngs of unemployed workers. In one generation, Germans lived through three social catastrophes: total war, hyperinflation, and, now, depression on a scale that no one had ever experienced previously. The political ramifications were immediate. The SPD-led coalition government broke up over the issue of unemployment insurance. With tax revenues declining drastically and ever increasing numbers of workers lining up for unemployment insurance payments, the government faced a severe budgetary shortfall. The Social Democrats and some Catholics wanted to preserve and even expand benefits. Conservatives wanted payment levels cut and access to benefits made more restrictive. Each of the parties retreated to its own base; consensus and compromise were not possible. In this situation, the president, Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg, named a new chancellor, Heinrich Brüning from the Center Party, who formed a new government with some of the same figures, but without the Social Democrats. And also without Gustav Stresemann, the most effective advocate of foreign policy compromises, who had died in the fall of 1929, just before the onset of the Depression. Brüning sought to lead Germany out of the Depression by following deflationary policies, which meant balancing the state budget through drastic cutbacks in personnel and services (as we saw in chapter 4). The state’s model should be carried over into the private sector, Brüning believed. Businesses should expect no aid from the government and would have to let their own purchases and investments fall to the level where a market equilibrium was reached. At that point, businesses would again find it profitable to invest and produce and could then hire more workers. In a time of unprecedented misery, Brüning believed that only financial rigor in the public and private sectors could restore Germany’s economy. Internationally, Brüning’s policy evolved: Stresemann’s policy of fulfillment, he came to believe, had made far too many concessions to the Western powers. While Brüning kept up negotiations, he was also determined to overthrow the Versailles Treaty and revive Germany’s great-power status. By the last months of his chancellorship, Germany would be headed toward the confrontational path that it had abandoned after the hyperinflation crisis. However, Brüning could find no legislative consensus for his policies. The Reichstag remained deeply divided. In a remarkable display of self-delusion and political myopia, he called for new elections, fully expecting that he would get widespread support in the polls. It was a most foolish act: of course the population, sliding ever deeper into depression, was not going to come out in droves to support a man and a government that had no active policy to redress their misery. Suddenly, in a national election on 14 September 1930, the Nazi Party surged ahead, winning 18.3 percent of the vote and 107 seats in the Reichstag. The shock was huge as newspapers trumpeted the Nazi success in big, bold headlines. From a small sect on the margins of the political system, the Nazi Party had now become a major force. Germany already faced an extremely difficult political situation because of the large numbers of parties represented in the Reichstag and the deep social and political divisions among them. Now it became ungovernable through normal parliamentary mechanisms. The Nazis never had any intention of working productively within the system. They simply used all the legislatures in Germany, from the Reichstag to the Landtage to city councils, as arenas of propaganda. The situation, a disaster for those Germans committed to democracy, presented Brüning with a wonderful opportunity. He wanted to use his office to overthrow the republic and create some kind of authoritarian political system. He happily deployed the powers granted to him by President Hindenburg. The basis of

Brüning’s rule was article 48 of the Weimar Constitution. It gave the president the power to declare a national emergency, in which case the chancellor could rule by decree, so long as his orders did not violate the constitution. The framers envisioned article 48 as a provision that would be used only in the rarest instance when the republic itself was threatened. Instead, article 48 became a regular means of governance because the Reichstag could come to no agreement on anything of substance. For the next two and one-half years, Germany still had a Reichstag with which Brüning had to consult and constitutional liberties remained in force. But in essence Germany was governed under a presidential dictatorship. Politically, the republic had been overthrown well before Hitler came to power. Brüning relied on President Hindenburg to renew periodically the emergency situation declaration, which Hindenburg did willingly. His elections to the presidency in 1925 and 1932 were Weimar fiascoes. The Center and Right adored him as a figure of masculine prowess, order, and stability, and a link to the bygone imperial age. The most that can be said of him is that he did not actively undermine the republic during his presidency, and he took seriously his oath to the constitution. But the election of a general who, in his most fundamental beliefs, was hostile to democracy made a travesty of the republic. Moreover, by the time of his reelection in 1932, Hindenburg was well into his eighties and beset by senility. An image of leadership that had a comic-opera quality to it in 1925 lost any levity with the onset of the Great Depression and the accompanying political crisis. Weimar needed at its helm a vigorous, committed democrat, not an octogenarian, semilucid field marshal. All through the latter half of 1930 and 1931 and on into 1932, Brüning issued one decree after another that led to the firing of large numbers of civil servants and cutbacks in unemployment and other social welfare benefits. People looked high and low, but there was no sign of an economic revival. Instead, Germany slipped deeper into depression and the political system into paralysis. By the summer of 1932, nearly one-third of the labor force was unemployed, according to official statistics. But the real numbers were even higher. Women were often the first fired, and relatively few received unemployment benefits. The common view was that the position of the male breadwinner should be preserved: women would be “double-dipping” if their husbands were employed or received unemployment insurance and they did as well. Meanwhile, the Nazis kept up their agitation and constant stream of attacks on the republic. They were winning an ever increasing number of supporters. Newspapers reported daily on brawls involving the Nazis. Germany was in crisis, Germans were suffering, and there seemed no way out. Social Democrats, the most faithful supporters of democracy, were now identified with a system that was failing. Many SPD members fought vigorously against the Nazis and wanted to engage in full-blown opposition, perhaps in coalition with the KPD (which that party would have countenanced only if the alliance were on communist terms). But the SPD leadership could think of nothing better than to defend the republic, even as its substance was being hollowed out by Brüning and his successors. In the Reichstag SPD delegates tolerated Brüning’s government, and in the presidential election of spring 1932, the party advocated support for Hindenburg as the lesser evil. It was a sad situation for Social Democrats to be seen supporting antidemocratic figures, one connectedto the authoritarian bastions of the crown and army (Hindenburg) and the other in quest of a modern, twentieth-century dictatorship (Brüning). A mood of demoralization swept through the ranks of the SPD. Brüning’s policies were also failing, and, finally, he lost the support of Hindenburg and other conservatives. Two factors were decisive. His interior minister decided that the Nazis were becoming too bold and too disruptive. He wanted to rein them in a bit, so he issued an order banning marches of the storm troopers. That did not go over well with the many conservatives who wanted to use the Nazis to overthrow the republic. More important, Brüning, in his drive to cut the state budget, sought to eliminate government subsidies to estate owners in Prussia. This was a program of welfare payments to the most elite group in Germany, Prussian nobles, including the president. A small group of advisers around Hindenburg

convinced him that Brüning had to go, and he was duly fired on 30 May 1932. Hitler had made his second bid for power (the first was the putsch attempt in 1923) in the spring of 1932 by running against Hindenburg for the presidency. He was most hesitant to undertake the campaign, but was pushed along by Goebbels and other top Nazis. Hitler understood that the Nazi Party was an engine that had to keep accelerating. It kept its supporters in a high state of agitation and mobilization. It had no intention of participating in the normal work of governance; power was its immediate goal and the raison d’être of its existence. If he did not make his move in 1932, just as Germany’s political and economic situation was reaching its nadir, his political support could evaporate. He tried and he lost. He did force Hindenburg into a runoff election, but in the end Hindenburg trumped him (figs. 9.1, 9.2). A distraught Hitler and a chastened Nazi Party: that seemed like the perfect situation for established conservatives who wanted to use the Nazis to help them overthrow the republic but had no intention of fully turning power over to them. They were still too uncouth, too unpredictable to trust completely. Enter Franz von Papen, a Catholic noble from Westphalia and onetime member of the Center Party whom Hindenburg tapped as Brüning’s successor. Papen, too, believed that the path out of the Depression lay through deflationary policies. Papen, even more fervently than Brüning, also wanted to overthrow the republic and the Versailles system, and he thought the Nazis could serve his purposes. In July 1932, he threw out the elected government of Prussia, a bastion of Weimar democracy, and installed his subordinate in its place. Fool that he was, Papen repeated Brüning’s mistake: he called elections, believing that he would find powerful support in the populace that he could then use to implement his program. But in the middle of a depression, the population was unlikely to support a sitting government whose policies offered no immediate redress of their grievances. Germans went to the polls on 31 July 1932. The Nazis received 37.3 percent of the vote, the highest they would ever achieve in a free election. They now became Germany’s largest party and had 230 delegates sitting in the Reichstag. They celebrated their triumph, but it is worth underscoring the fact that they did not achieve, and never would achieve, a majority in a freely contested election. They received a very large chunk of the vote, more than one-third. But the German people never elected the Nazis to power. Nearly two-thirds of the electorate cast their votes against the Nazi Party. Still, as leader of the largest party in Germany, Hitler made another bid for power. He believed the chancellorship was rightfully his. He had an audience with Hindenburg, that man who embodied the bearing and beliefs of the Prussian officer corps. To him, Hitler was a lowly, uncouth rabble-rouser, who in four years of army service during World War I had risen only to the rank of corporal. Hindenburg received him but refused to name him chancellor. Papen ruled as caretaker until the new parliament convened in September 1932. Like Brüning, he governed by decree. But the Nazis thought they had been double-crossed by Papen, because he, rather than Hitler, had received the bid to serve as chancellor. The Reichstag met in early September with Hermann Goering presiding as the parliamentary leader of the largest party. The Nazis entered a motion of no confidence in the government, which the Communists supported. Papen’s government fell before it had even begun, and new elections had to be held, the third major election in 1932—not exactly a situation to inspire confidence in the republic. Germans voted on 6 November 1932, and the results are notable. The Nazi surge had broken. Their share of the vote fell to 33.1 percent, their number of deputies to 196. Germany was no closer to political consensus, nor was there any clear path to power for the Nazis. In fact, the party descended into disarray. Hitler had made two bids for power in 1932 and had failed both times. The party coffers were empty, and a great deal of grousing and opposition against Hitler had emerged in the party’s ranks. In the late fall of 1932, a Nazi assumption of power was only a possibility—by no means whatsoever a foregone conclusion. Weimar Germany’s third chancellor in 1932 was a close aide of President Hindenburg and another army general, Kurt von Schleicher. He claimed that he had a plan for dealing with the combined economic and political crisis. He believed

that behind his program for government-supported jobs creation, he could put together a coalition that ranged from the social democratic trade unions on the left to the anti-Hitler Nazis on the right. Schleicher, too, suffered from delusions: the cleavages between the political parties were much too deep for his idea ever to become reality. Meanwhile, in early January 1933, secret negotiations began between Papen and Hitler, prompted by a small circle of advisers around President Hindenburg. The established conservatives now entered into serious negotiations with the radicals. Every other plan and government in the course of 1932 had failed. The officers, nobles, and high state officials around Hindenburg, supported by a few other businessmen and bankers, believed they could use the Nazis to carry out their goal of overthrowing the republic from within. The Nazis believed they could use the conservatives for the same purpose. They all shared the same language and enough of the same goals that the engineering of the grand, anti-Weimar coalition became, in the final weeks, a fairly simple matter. All of them despised the republic. They wanted an authoritarian system domestically and a revival of Germany’s great-power status internationally. They sought to promote a völkisch politics that meant, most immediately, severe restrictions on Jews. Trade unions, socialism of all stripes, modern art, sexual reform movements—all of these were to be driven from public life. The coalition was antidemocratic, antisocialist, and anti-Semitic. The established Right was not enthralled with Hitler and the Nazis, who remained too radical and unpredictable. But after all the failed plans and with Germany still, formally, a republic, still mired in depression, still living under the strictures of Versailles, Hitler and the Nazis had become acceptable to the established conservatives and large segments of the middle class. So in January 1933, Hindenburg’s advisers presented him with a plan for a new government. Adolf Hitler would preside as chancellor, Franz von Papen would serve as vice-chancellor. Of the ten other members of the government, only two were Nazis. Hindenburg, reassured by the presence of so many conservatives, overcame his distaste for Hitler. On 30 January 1933, in a constitutionally legal manner, he named Hitler chancellor. Weimar Germany was finished.