section 1 - public finance

48
Economics 330 Economics of Health Care Dr. Greg Delemeester Spring 2010

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Page 1: Section 1 - Public Finance

Economics 330Economics of Health

Care

Dr. Greg DelemeesterSpring 2010

Page 2: Section 1 - Public Finance

Course Essentials

Course Web Page www.marietta.edu/~delemeeg/econ330

Grade Exams (60%) Problem Sets (15%) Article Reviews (5%) Policy Brief (20%)

Page 3: Section 1 - Public Finance

Economic Roundtable

…to promote an interest in and to enlighten its members and others in the community on important governmental, economic, and social issues…

Business networking opportunity Student memberships: $5

EconomicRoundtable.org

Page 4: Section 1 - Public Finance

Do you qualify for ODE? Omicron Delta Epsilon is the International Honor

Society in Economics.

Minimum qualifications for undergraduate membership are: 1. Junior standing or higher. Student must be in residence

at least one semester. 2. Twelve semester hours of economics with an average

grade of at least a B. 3. A general average of at least a B and a class standing

in the upper one-third.

– If interested, see Dr. Delemeester

Page 5: Section 1 - Public Finance

Health Economics Survey

Page 6: Section 1 - Public Finance

National Health Care Expenditures

Year Total Spending (in billions)

Percent change

Percent of GDP

Per capita spending

1950 $ 13 -- 4.5 $ 82

1960 28 8.8 5.2 148

1970 75 10.5 7.2 356

1980 254 13.0 9.1 1,100

1990 714 10.9 12.3 2,814

2000 1,353 5.9 13.6 4,789

2005 1,982 7.9 15.7 6,701

2006 2,113 6.7 15.8 7,071

2007 2,240 5.6 15.9 7,423

2008 2,339 4.3 16.2 7,681

Source: http://www.cms.hhs.gov/NationalHealthExpendData/

Page 7: Section 1 - Public Finance

Why do Americans spend so much on medical care? Aaron (1991)

Expansion of 3rd party payment system Aging of the population Expanded medical malpractice litigation Increased use of medical technology

Other factors Physician-induced demand Entry restrictions Predominance of not-for-profit providers

Page 8: Section 1 - Public Finance

Personal Health Care Expenditures

(in billions of dollars)Private Spending Public Spending

Year Out of pocket

Private Insurance

Federal State

1960 $ 12.9 $ 5.9 $ 2.0 $ 2.9

1970 24.9 14.0 14.4 7.8

1980 58.1 61.2 62.3 23.9

1990 136.1 204.7 172.8 63.5

2000 192.6 402.8 369.8 117.1

2005 247.5 599.8 562.3 176.9

2006 254.9 634.6 620.1 178.7

2007 270.3 665.0 661.3 188.7

2008 277.8 691.2 718.0 189.8

Source: http://www.cms.hhs.gov/NationalHealthExpendData/

Page 9: Section 1 - Public Finance

2008 National Health Care Dollar…

…Where it Came From …Where it Went

Page 10: Section 1 - Public Finance

1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 20100%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

Private vs Public Spending on Personal Health Care Expenditures

PrivatePublic

% o

f P

HC

E

Page 11: Section 1 - Public Finance

1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 20100%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

Spending as % of Personal Health Care Expenditues

Out of pocketHealth InsFedState%

of

PH

CE

Page 12: Section 1 - Public Finance

Changes in Hospital Usage

Short-Stay Community Hospital Characteristics, United States Category 1970 1980 1990 2000 2003 2004 2005 Beds (per 1,000 population)

4.17 4.38 3.73 2.93 2.79 -- 2.71

Admissions (per 1,000 population)

144.0 159.6 125.4 117.6 119.4 119.3 118.9

Average length of stay (days)

7.7 7.6 7.2 5.8 5.7 5.6 5.6

Outpatient visits (per 1,000 population)

657.2 893.2 1,211.6 1,882.8 1,933.4 1,943.7 1,972.0

Outpatient visits per admission

4.6 5.6 9.7 15.8 16.2 16.3 16.6

Percent occupancy 78.0 75.4 66.8 63.9 66.2 -- 67.3 Source: Health United States, various years.

Page 13: Section 1 - Public Finance

The Lockhorns

Page 14: Section 1 - Public Finance

Changes in Medical Care Delivery

Shift from private to public financingShift to 3rd party financingChanges in hospital usage and pricingDeregulation and growth in managed care

Page 15: Section 1 - Public Finance

Payment StructureTraditional fee structure

Fee for service Retrospective payment Incentive to overspend

Managed care Capitation and risk sharing Prospective payment Incentive to limit care

Page 16: Section 1 - Public Finance

Health Care As a Commodity

Demand is irregular Asymmetric information problems Widespread uncertainty Reliance on not-for-profit providers Insurance as the primary means of payment

Page 17: Section 1 - Public Finance

Health System GoalsAccess to care

Who’s covered? What’s covered?

Quality of care

Cost of care

Page 18: Section 1 - Public Finance

Private Health Insurance Coverage

(under age 65, numbered in millions)

With Health Insurance* Without Health Insurance

Year Number Percent Number Percent

1999 161.2 68.3 38.5 16.1

2000 160.8 67.1 41.4 17.0

2001 162.4 67.0 40.3 16.4

2002 159.4 65.3 41.7 16.8

2003 157.5 64.4 41.6 16.5

2004 159.5 64.0 42.1 16.6

2005 160.1 63.6 42.1 16.4

2006 155.8 61.5 43.9 17.0

2007 157.9 61.6 43.3 16.6

* Employer-based.

Source: Health, United States, 2008, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/hus/updatedtables.htm, Table 138 and 140.

Page 19: Section 1 - Public Finance

Health System GoalsAccess to care

Who’s covered? What’s covered?

Quality of care Medical outcomes Medical efficacy

Cost of care Who pays? How much?

Page 20: Section 1 - Public Finance

Review of Economic

Methodology

Page 21: Section 1 - Public Finance

Economic FundamentalsOptimizationMarginal AnalysisSupply and Demand

Equilibrium

Page 22: Section 1 - Public Finance

1) Health insurance coverage is expanded to cover all elective procedures, such as tummy tucks, nose jobs, and liposuction

2) The FDA (Food and Drug Administration) takes all silicone-based implants off the market fearing a connection with certain connective-tissue diseases

3) Personal finance companies start a nationwide lending program for cosmetic procedures not covered by health insurance

4) Medical malpractice insurance premiums increase for plastic surgeons

5) Medical schools announce that residents in plastic surgery can be licensed after only five years instead of the current seven years

What are the likely consequences of the following events in the U.S market for cosmetic surgery?

Page 23: Section 1 - Public Finance

OptimizationMarginal AnalysisSupply and Demand

Equilibrium Elasticity Welfare analysis Effects of government intervention

Economic Fundamentals

Page 24: Section 1 - Public Finance

Suppose the market for lasik eye surgery can be described by the following equations: Qd = 5100 – 6P Qs = - 400 + 5P

a) Solve for the market equilibrium price and quantity.b) Calculate consumer and producer surplus.c) Calculate the elasticity of demand at the equilibrium.d) Suppose the government imposes an excise tax of $100

per surgery on eye surgeons. What is the new equilibrium price and quantity? What happens to social welfare?

Page 25: Section 1 - Public Finance

Many buyers/sellers Homogeneous product No entry barriers Perfect information

Competitive Market Model

MC

quantity

$

q1

P1

ATC

MR1

AVC

Profit max rule: P = MC

LR Equil: π = 0

Page 26: Section 1 - Public Finance

Market Failures Market Power

MonopolyRestricted entry (AMA, CON)EOS

Monopsony

Externalities Communicable diseases/immunizations Uninsured and cost shifting

Public goods Free-riders R&D

Page 27: Section 1 - Public Finance

Imperfect/Asymmetric information Agency problem (induced demand) Adverse selection Moral hazard

Third-party payers

Imperfections in Medical Markets

Hospitals: 3¢ per $1Physicians: 20¢ per $1

Page 28: Section 1 - Public Finance

Dealing with Market Failure

Collective provision Medicare Medicaid

Government regulation Price controls Entry restrictions FDA

Tax Policy Tax exemptions

Government Failure?

Page 29: Section 1 - Public Finance

Economic Evaluation in Health Care

Page 30: Section 1 - Public Finance

The Inevitability of Trade-Offs

The value of a medical interventionThe inclusion of a drug on the formularyPaying for an experimental procedureInvesting in new technology

Is it worth it? How do we measure value to insure we get value for spending?

Page 31: Section 1 - Public Finance

Options for colorectal cancer screening

Is it worth the extra money?

Fecal blood test($20)

Sigmoidoscopy ($150 - $300)

Barium enema($250 - $500)

Virtual Colonoscopy ($500 - $900)

Colonoscopy($800 - $1200)

Page 32: Section 1 - Public Finance

Types of Economic Evaluation

Cost of illness studies Cost-benefit analyses Cost-effectiveness studies

Page 33: Section 1 - Public Finance

Cost of Illness Studies What does it cost? Burden of 5 chronic conditions in US (Druss et al., 2001)

Mood disorders, diabetes, heart disease, asthma, and hypertension Direct cost of treatment: $62 billionCost of treating coexisting conditions: $208 billionLost productivity: $36 billion

Role in analysis – increased awareness

$306 billion

Page 34: Section 1 - Public Finance

Cost-Benefit Analysis

Net PV =

time

Costs

Benefitstoday

tt

r

B

r

B

r

BC

)1()1()1( 22

11

0

The higher the discount rate, r, the lower the PVThe higher the discount rate, r, the lower the PV

Page 35: Section 1 - Public Finance

Cost-Benefit Criterion If net benefit stream is positive, project is acceptable

If ratio is greater than one, project is acceptable

Examples Clarke (1998): mobile mammographic screening and travel cost method Ginsberg and Lev (1997): riluzole and ALS

tt

n

tt

tn

t r

C

r

BCB

)1(/

)1(/

11

ttt

n

t r

CBNPV

)1(1

Page 36: Section 1 - Public Finance

Challenges of Cost-Benefit Analysis

Valuing benefits How do you place a value on a human life? Willingness-to-pay approach

wealth life expectancy current health statuspossibility of substituting current consumption for future

consumption

Choosing a discount rate

Page 37: Section 1 - Public Finance

Cost-Effectiveness Analysis

Measures health benefit by health outcome, not the dollar value of life

Using the decision makers’ approach Maximize the level of health for a given population subject

to a budget constraint Practical guide for choosing between programs or

treatment options when budgets are limited

Page 38: Section 1 - Public Finance

Cervical Cancer ScreeningThe medical evidence is clear: Cervical cancer screening

saves lives. Much of the focus of cost-effectiveness research addresses issues concerning the appropriate screening interval.

D.M. Eddy (Screening for cervical cancer, Annals of Internal Medicine 113, 214-226, 1990) studied the issue and estimated that annual screening for a hypothetical cohort of 1,000 22-year-old women screened until age 75 would cost $1,093,000 and would save 27.6 life years. If screened every three years instead, the cost would be $467,000 and 26.8 life years would be saved.

Is annual screening cost effective?

Page 39: Section 1 - Public Finance

Incremental Cost-Effectiveness Ratio

If CA > CB and EA < EB, B dominates.

If CA < CB and EA > EB, A dominates.

If, however, CB > CA and EB > EA, choice is not obvious. Use CE.

AB

AB

EE

CCICER

Page 40: Section 1 - Public Finance

ICER Curve: 2 Treatments

Cost

Effectiveness

A

B

CA CB

EA

EB

Large ICER = flat slopeLarge ICER = flat slope

AB

AB

EE

CCICER

Page 41: Section 1 - Public Finance

Cervical Cancer Screening: Redux D.M. Eddy (Screening for cervical cancer, Annals of Internal

Medicine 113, 214-226, 1990) studied the issue and estimated that annual screening for a hypothetical cohort of 1,000 22-year-old women screened until age 75 would cost $1,093,000 and would save 27.6 life years. If screened every three years instead, the cost would be $467,000 and 26.8 life years would be saved.

What is the ICER?

500,782$8.266.27

000,467000,093,1

ICER

Page 42: Section 1 - Public Finance

ICER Curve: Multiple Treatments

Cost

Effectiveness

A

BC

D

E

FG

Treatments C and E are dominatedTreatments C and E are dominated

“flat of the curve”“flat of the curve”

Page 43: Section 1 - Public Finance

Measuring Costs

Direct – associated with use of resources Medical Non-medical

Indirect – related to lost productivityIntangible – associated with pain and suffering, grief,

anxiety, and disfigurement

Page 44: Section 1 - Public Finance

Measuring Effectiveness

Surrogate measures stated in terms of clinical efficacy Blood pressure, cholesterol levels, bone mass density, or

tumor sizeIntermediate measures stated in terms of clinical

effectiveness Events (heart attack, stroke, cancer), scores on exams

Final outcomes measure economic effectiveness Events avoided, disease-free days, life-years saved,

quality-adjusted life years saved

Improvements in Health

Page 45: Section 1 - Public Finance

Survival Measures

Time (years)

Survivalprobability

100%

90%

77%

A

B

C

D

1.5 6.5

Survival function for treatment group

Survival function for control group

Improved Life Expectancy Due to Clinical Treatment

Life expectancy = area under survival function

Gain in LE during trial = ½(.90-.77)1.5 = 0.0975 yrsGain in LE after trial = ½(.90-.77)5 = 0.325 yrs

Total Gain in LE = 0.4225 yrs

LE w/o treatment = ½(1.00-0.0)6.5 = 3.25 yrs

Problem Set 1: #16

Page 46: Section 1 - Public Finance

Quality of Life Measures: QALY

Quality-Adjusted Life Year Measured on a preference scale anchored by

death (0) and perfect health (1)

Page 47: Section 1 - Public Finance

Calculating a QALY

Time (years)

Utility

6 15

U(H1)

U(HD)

Normal 55-yr old male has LE of 25 more yrs

Diabetic 55-yr old male has LE of 15 more yrs

Value of one year in chronic health state is x/t

Utility value of 15 years = 6/15 = 0.40

QALY of remaining 15 years = (.40)(15) = 6 years

x = healthy yearst = chronic health years

Page 48: Section 1 - Public Finance

Decision Trees

Handout

Treatment A Treatment BMortality Rate 2% 5%Life Expectancy for Survivors

20 years 10 years

Initial Treatment Cost $10,000 $3,000Follow up cost, year 1 $5,000 $1,000Annual follow up costs, all subsequent years

$1,000 $500