secure neighbor discovery in wireless networks

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Secure Neighbor Discovery in Wireless Networks Marcin Poturalski, Panos Papadimitratos, Jean-Pierre Hubaux 1

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Secure Neighbor Discovery in Wireless Networks. Marcin Poturalski , Panos Papadimitratos, Jean-Pierre Hubaux. Neighbor Discovery (ND). “Who are my neighbors?” In wireless networks: “Can I communicate directly with B?” Fundamental Building Block. Neighbor Discovery: Routing in ad-hoc networks. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Page 1: Secure Neighbor Discovery in Wireless Networks

1

Secure Neighbor Discoveryin Wireless Networks

Marcin Poturalski, Panos Papadimitratos, Jean-Pierre Hubaux

Page 2: Secure Neighbor Discovery in Wireless Networks

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Neighbor Discovery (ND)

• “Who are my neighbors?”

• In wireless networks:

“Can I communicate directly with B?”

• Fundamental Building Block

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Neighbor Discovery:Routing in ad-hoc networks

CA B

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Naïve Neighbor Discovery

A B“A: Hello”

A is a neighbor

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Naïve ND: relay attack

C

BA “A: Hello”A is a neighbor

“A: Hello”

PHY preamble … MAC A … … IP A … “A:Hello” ……PHY preamble … MAC A … … IP A … “A:Hello” ……

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Routing in ad-hoc networks:Violation of ND

BA C D

M

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Routing in ad-hoc networks:Violation of ND

7

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• ND is an important and fragile building block

• Secure ND protocols have been proposed– Distance Bounding

• Does not quite solve the problem…

• To what extent is secure ND possible?

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Outline

• Model of wireless networks– language: set theory, 1st order logic

• Specification of ND• Investigate two classes of protocols:– Time-based (T-protocols)– Time- and Location-based (TL-protocols)

• Results:– T-protocol ND impossibility (general case) – T-protocol solving ND (restricted case)– TL-protocol solving ND (general case)

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Model

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Traces and events

Trace is a set of events

A

B

C

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S

S,P

Feasible traces

System execution: feasible traceTraces feasible with respect to:

- setting S- protocol P- adversary A

12

S,P,A

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Setting

{ A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H }

………

H

A

C

B

D

G

FE

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Trace feasible wrt setting SCausal and timely message exchange

A

B

14

v – signal propagation speed

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Trace feasible wrt setting SCausal and timely message exchange

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Local trace

A

B

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Local view

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Protocol

Actions:

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Correct nodes follow the protocol

Trace feasible wrt protocol

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Trace feasible wrt adversary

Adversarial nodes can only relay messages,with minimum delay

A

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Neighbor Discovery Specification

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Neighbor Discovery specification

1) Discovered neighbors are actual neighbors

2) It is possible to discover neighbors

Protocol P solves Neighbor Discovery for adversary A if

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Neighbor Discovery specification

1) Discovered neighbors are actual neighbors

2) It is possible to discover neighbors

Protocol P solves Neighbor Discovery for adversary A if

in the ND range R

2-party ND

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Results

• T-protocol ND impossibility (general case) • T-protocol solving ND (restricted case)

• TL-protocol solving ND (general case)

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Results

• T-protocol ND impossibility (general case) • T-protocol solving ND (restricted case)

• TL-protocol solving ND (general case)

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T-protocol impossibility

No T-protocol can solve Neighbor Discovery for adversary if

Proof (sketch):

Any T-protocol P which satisfies ND2 cannot satisfy ND1

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T-protocol impossibility

A B

C

A B

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T-protocol impossibility

A B

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T-protocol impossibility

A

B

A

B

C

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T-protocol impossibility

• Trace b is feasible in Sb

• A declares B a neighbor in b

• A and B are not neighbors in Sb

• ND1 is violated

A

B

C

C

A B

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Results

• T-protocol ND impossibility (general case) • T-protocol solving ND (restricted case)

• TL-protocol solving ND (general case)

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Temporal packet leash:

T-protocol solving ND

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Results

• T-protocol ND impossibility (general case) • T-protocol solving ND (restricted case)

• TL-protocol solving ND (general case)

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TL-protocol solving ND“Geo-Temporal” packet leash:

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Conclusion

• Investigation of Neighbor Discovery in wireless networks for two general classes of protocols

• T-protocols can solve ND iff

• TL-protocols can solve ND if

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Conclusion

• Problems with proposed protocols:– require synchronized clocks– require very accurate time measurements– require line-of-sight communication (TL)– require secure location (TL)

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Future work

• Reasoning about a wider range of protocols– e.g. Challenge-Response schemes

• Multi-party ND?

• Moving closer to the physical layer– ?