shunglu report

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Third Report of HLC - City Infrastructure

1

Contents

Chapter Particulars Page No.

Acronyms 2

Executive Summary 4

1 Introduction 9

2 Elevated road over Barapullah Nullah 22

3 Ring road Bypass 34

4 Covering of portions of Sunehari Nullah & KushakNullah

47

5 Upgradation of Streetlighting 54

6 Streetscaping 90

7 Signage 123

8 Bus Queue Shelters 149

9 Tourist Infrastructure 158

10 Grade Separator at Raja Ram Kohli Marg and ShastriNagar Intersection at East Delhi

173

11 Construction of 3 level grade separator at Ghazipurcrossing on NH 24 bypass & road No. 56 at Ghazipuron NH 24 Delhi

178

12 Millennium Park Bus Depot 181

13 International Broadcasting Centre & Press Centre inPragati Maidan

187

14 Naraina T Point Flyover 193

15 Main Findings 197

16 Recommendations 229


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Acronyms

ASI Archaeological Survey of IndiaAA&ES Administrative Approval & Expenditure SanctionAGL Above Ground Level ASTM American Society of Testing MaterialsBSES Bombay Sub-urban Electric SupplyCGV Commonwealth Games VillageCGD Commonwealth Games DivisionCGF Commonwealth Games FederationCFO Chief Financial Officer.

CM Chief Minister, GNCTDCPWD Central Public Works DepartmentCOS Committee of SecretariesCMD Chairman & Managing DirectorCRRI Central Road & Research InstituteCWG Common Wealth GamesDDA Delhi Development AuthorityDCE Delhi College of EngineeringDIMTS Delhi Integrated Multi Modal Transit SystemDJB Delhi Jal BoardDMRC Delhi Metro Rail CorporationDTC Delhi Transport CorporationDTDC Delhi Tourism Development CorporationDUAC Delhi Urban Arts CommissionDWAB Delhi Works Advisory BoardEC Estimated costEFC Expenditure Finance CommitteeGOM Group of MinistersGNCTD Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi

HLC High Level CommitteeIIT Indian Institute of TechnologyIRC Indian Roads CongressITPO International Trade Promotion OrganizationITDC Indian Tourism Development CorporationL 1 Lowest BidderLG Lieutenant Governor, DelhiL&DO Land & Development Office


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MCD Municipal Corporation of DelhiMoI&B Ministry of Information & BroadcastingMoU Memorandum of UnderstandingMORTH Ministry of Road Transport & Highways

NDMC New Delhi Municipal CouncilNTPC National Thermal Power CorporationNIT Notice Inviting TenderOC Organizing CommitteePB Prasar BharatiPE Preliminary EstimatePIB Press Information BureauPWD Public Works DepartmentRE Revised EstimateROB Road Over Bridge


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Executive Summary1. Government of NCT of Delhi (GNCTD), a signatory to the Host City Agreement, was

obligated to improve road transport infrastructure to ease traffic congestion observed

during Bid Evaluation (August 2003). Mobility within Delhi is currently difficult and

congested and accordingly transport is seen as a risk area by the Evaluation Committee. A

significant improvement is planned (including 74 flyovers & development of metro lines)

and provision of dedicated lanes / escorts, as planned, will be necessary to achieve the

projected travel times.

City Infrastructure Projects 2. The Govt. of National Capital Territory of Delhi (GNCTD) took up an ambitiousprogramme to upgrade city infrastructure, especially road and transport sector for the

Commonwealth Games, 2010. The works taken up included elevated roads, flyovers, street

lighting, street scaping, bus parking areas, bus queue shelters etc. However, there does not

seem, to have been any plan for construction of 74 flyovers.

3. GNCTD gave to the HLC a list of 25 projects which were called CWG Projects and

another list of 51 projects which were labeled as city improvement projects. The HLC

identified 52 city infrastructure and Games Infrastructure Projects executed by the GNCTD,

MCD and NDMC at a cost of 7156 crore with PWD expending 76% of the total. The break

up of cost is at Table 4, Chapter 1.

4. The HLC selected 19 city infrastructure projects for detailed scrutiny. These projects

involving an expenditure of 3054 crore and are listed at Table 6, Chapter 1. Files anddocuments pertaining to these projects were studied. Interviews were held with officers

and field inspection of works was undertaken.

Period of Inactivity5. There was a three year period of inactivity (end 2003 to end 2006) except two

projects (Geeta Colony fly over and Munak canal bridges), which had been on the anvil for

some time. This delay, unintended or otherwise, compromised every subsequent stage of

planning and execution. During 2006, an Empowered Committee was constituted to


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monitor and by the end of 2006, 6 projects out of 47, for which in principle approval had

been given, were launched. This delay of three years in launching infrastructure projects,

which require three to four years for completion from date of approval, led to cascading

problems / difficulties, which have been outlined in this report.

Road Link from Games Village to JLN Stadium6. In order to provide a fast link between the Commonwealth Games Village at

Akshardham Temple and Jawahar Lal Nehru stadium, a tunnel project was conceived, but

had to be dropped and replaced by the elevated road over Barapullah Nullah. This project

has been completed at a cost of 390 crore (approximately). Work started very late and the

project was completed in a hurry. The project was split into two packages and ultimately

both packages were awarded to the same agency.

7. One of the major projects undertaken was the link road by pass between Velodrome

road and Salimgarh Fort. The project was delayed by 19 months. It was split into two

packages but both packages were awarded to the same contractor. A premium of 25% was

paid to the contractor on labour and machinery cost due to compressed time schedule.

Bus Parking near JLN Stadium8. A project was undertaken to cover a part of the Sunehri and Kushak Nalas to create

space for parking buses and vehicles. As in earlier cases, this project was also marred by

undue delay. As against the contracted amount of 303.97 crore, the work has been

completed with a likely saving of about 7 crore, which indicates that administrative

approval and sanctions were given to badly prepared and ill conceived estimates.

City Image Improvement ProjectsUpgradation of Streetlights

In order to improve the city image and provide safety and security to motorists andresidents, a major project was undertaken for modernization of Delhis streetlightingsystem. For unexplained reasons restricted tendering system was adopted, whichwas patently flawed. About 807 kms of road length coming within the jurisdiction of MCD, NDMC and PWD was taken up for upgradation. Administrative approval wasgiven for a total sum of 465 crore and the contracted amount was 285 crore.Unknown practice of involving a luminaire manufacturer as the leading partner was

introduced and a provision was made for fixing only imported luminaire on certainstretches. Successful parties imported luminaire at a much lower price than quoted


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and cited in the tender bid. While street lighting system has no doubt beenmodernized, expenditure has been far beyond what was necessary and called for.

Streetscaping9. Another important sector, in preparation for the CWG, was street scaping and

beautification of selected Delhi roads. A sum of 324 crore was committed for improving

about 77 kms of roads. The project envisaged expenditure ranging from 0.80 crore to 12

crore per km. and the average expenditure works out to 4.20 crore per km! Huge

amounts were paid to the selected consultants. A few contractors managed to bag the

entire work. Unrealistically high estimates were prepared and even then there were large

variations in the estimated and actual quantities. There are serious reservations about the

surfaces used for the foot paths and strong doubts about the quality of work executed.Horticulture intervention has been of a temporary nature as many plants have already

withered.

Signage10. It was also desired by the GNCTD to have State-of-the-art signage for the entire city

of Delhi. The work was undertaken by the PWD and the NDMC and the total outlay was

98 crore. Competition was restricted. The high cost of sheets was justified on grounds of

the long life and low maintenance cost. However, installed signage is already getting worn

out in NDMC area. There were anomalies in the NIT and instances of over-payment have

come to light. The signage installed does not conform to standards set by the Indian Roads

Congress.

Bus Queue Shelters12. Another project examined by the HLC was the construction of Bus Queue shelters

(BQS). Three packages for construction of 500 bus shelters were evolved but eventuallyonly one package for constructing 157 BQS was taken up at a cost of 18.97 crore. There

were wide variations in the bids made by the three bidders. The work was not completed

by the time the CWG started and even in December, 2010, five BQS had yet to be

constructed.

Tourist Infrastructure13. The HLC is of the view that the tourism infrastructure schemes were ill-conceived.

Under the pretext of shortage of hotel rooms in Delhi, the entire exercise undertaken was


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reduced to the auction of hotel plots on a fast track basis by DDA. DDA did not monitor

activities to ensure completion of the hotel projects ahead of the CWG. Only one hotel with

243 rooms was completed. Similarly, the objective of making available alternative tourist

accommodation of 5009 rooms at the Vasant Kunj flats was not achieved and only 778rooms could finally be made available. The plan to upgrade the Vasant Kunj flats to 3 star-

level was prohibitively expensive and ill-founded. Based on the 7554 nights accommodation

eventually provided to 671 national technicians, the upgradation cost worked out to 1.43

lakh per person per night. Besides, this accommodation did not add to the tourist

infrastructure as legacy investment.

Other Projects14. The findings of the HLC on four other projects are as follows:-

a) Grade separators at Raja Ram Kohli Marg and Shastri nagar intersection

delayed due to late clearance by the DDA and unusually long delay in shifting

of 11 KVA and 33 KVA lines.

b) Ghazipur three level grade separator delay in acquiring land from DDA, in

shifting IGL gas pipeline, shifting of 66 KVA line and shifting of storm water

drain.

c) Millennium Park Bus Depot has come up on 63 acres of precious land.

There is confusion about whether the structures are temporary or this will be

a permanent location for the DTC Bus Depot.

d) International Broadcasting Centre and Main Press Centre in Pragati Maidan -

ITPO overestimated the cost of renovation and ended up with an unspent

balance of 25.90 crore, which should be immediately refunded to the

Ministry of I & B. The ITPO has wrongly billed electricity and water charges of

5.95 crore on the project.

e) Naraina T-point Flyover the cost of delay is estimated at 6.89 crore and

excess payment of 62.71 lakh has been made to the consultant M/s EIL.

Main Findings15. Scrutiny of selected projects shows that:


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i. design consultants were given very little time for preparation of design,

estimates and bid documentation Barapullah Nala, Salimgarh by-pass;

ii. tenders were invited and, at times, accepted even before AA&ES of the project;

iii. instead of specific pre-qualifications for high value projects, a general panel of prequalified contractors were allowed to bid;

iv. high value packages were split to enable existing prequalified contractors to bid;

v. arbitrary additions were made to the list of prequalified contractors;

vi. four contractors captured 60% of PWD work by value, on their terms, to the

detriment of economy and efficiency.

vii. It is likely that the conduct of key Members of Works Advisory Board, including

its Chairman, was complicit in causing undue gain to contractors. The

magnitude of gain / loss has been quantified vis--vis those projects examined by

HLC in Chapter 15.

16. PWD could well have resorted to alternative methods for accelerated construction

e.g. design, build, turn-key, fixed cost, fixed time, lump sum etc. but it failed to do so.

Monitoring of projects by PWD was inadequate and ineffective. The collapse of foot over

Bridge adjacent to JLN stadium was an example of inadequate supervision. Despiteadditional payments, amenities legally due to workers were generally denied by contractors

and labour laws, in general were ignored.

17. Efforts of the Empowered Committee were by and large ineffective. Many projects

were monitored and abandoned, on going project issues could not be resolved; by and large

value addition of this initiative was limited. GNCTD also used this opportunity to launch

projects not connected to its declared objective, in particular streetscaping and street-

lighting projects. Poorly conceived and executed signage project added to cost and caused

undue gain to two suppliers.


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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Government of NCT of Delhi was a signatory to the Host City Contract signed on 13th

November, 2003 at Montego Bay, Jamaica along with Government of India, Indian Olympic

Association and Commonwealth Games Federation.

1.2 As the Host City, Government of NCT of Delhi had, inter alia, made the commitment

to upgrade city infrastructure especially road and transport infrastructure and the same had

been noted by the Evaluation Commission of CGF. Even though, city infrastructure was

adequate for hosting the CWG 2010 even in 2003, Delhi Government embarked on an

ambitious programme to upgrade city infrastructure at a considerable cost.

1.3 While undertaking the aforesaid task should have been welcome, the manner in

which and the cost at which the task was accomplished, raised several questions. As a part

of the enquiry into all CWG related projects especially with reference to time, cost, quality

and legacy value, the HLC through its team of experts /consultants examined several works

related to city infrastructure. Based on the reports of individual projects, which have been

Box 1: Extracts from Report of CGF Evaluation Commission

The Evaluation Commission of Commonwealth Games Federation (CGF) made thefollowing observations about the city infrastructure in its Report sent to all MemberAssociations before the crucial vote for selection of Host City for CWG 2010:

With a fast growing population of 13.8 million, Delhi is a mega city experiencing rapideconomic expansion. Delhis city infrastructure is adequate; however some road andtransport infrastructure will need to be improved:

(i) A plentiful supply of good quality hotel rooms exist;(ii) Mobility within Delhi is currently difficult and congested, and accordingly

transport is seen as a risk area by the Evaluation Commission. A significantinfrastructure improvement is planned (including 74 flyovers anddevelopment of the metro lines) and provision of dedicated lanes /escorts, asplanned, will be necessary to achieve the projected travel times.

It is evident that Govt. of NCT of Delhi had committed to expand the metro network aswell as construct 74 flyovers across the city before the Commonwealth Games in 2010and the same had been noted by the Evaluation Commission.


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reproduced in the later chapters of this Report, an attempt has been made to throw light on

shortcomings from planning to implementation stage and lessons for the future.

CWG Projects1.4 GNCTD provided to the experts of HLC two lists of projects which were stated to be

the list of projects undertaken for the CWG 2010. The first list contained names of 25

projects with an approved cost of 3752.98 crore and was titled "Commonwealth Games

Projects" 1

Table 1: List of Commonwealth Games Projects

. The projects approved by GNCTD under this category are shown in Table 1 .

S.N. Name of the Project Agency AmountSanctioned( In Crore)

1 Thyagraja Sports Stadium PWD 297.002 Chhatrasaal Sports Stadium PWD 100.003 Ludlow Castle Sports Complex PWD 20.004 Talkatora Indoor Sports Stadium NDMC 150.005 Shivaji Sports Stadium NDMC 180.006 Purchase of 574 low floor air-conditioned buses for Games family DTC 354.00

7 Bus parking opposite Millennium Park for CWG PWD 60.008 Bus Parking at Raj Ghat for CWG PWD 19.009 Bus parking at Safdarjung Airport for Park & Ride facility for

CWG/utility structures/lighting/security systemsNDMC 40.00

10 Bus parking at Barapullah Nallah & Sunehri Nallah for CWG MCD 324.00

11 Bus parking at R.K. Puram Nallah for CWG MCD 15.0012 Water Treatment Plant(1 MGD) DJB 35.0013 Sewerage Treatment Plant(1 MGD) at Games Village DJB 28.00

14 Barapullah Elevated Road for CWG PWD 549.0015 Ring Road Bye-Pass for CWG PWD 654.3916 RUB at Vivek Vihar for CWG MCD 11.4817 RUB at Sewa Nagar for CWG MCD 26.00

18 Street Scaping Works around CWG Stadium:PWD PWD 269.69MCD MCD 160.00NDMC :- NDMC(A) Streetscaping of Brig. Hoshiyar Singh Marg 5.17(B) Streetscaping of Aurobindo Marg 6.48(C) Streetscaping of Mandir Marg 6.56(D) Streetscaping of Park Street & Old R.K. Ashram Marg( ParkStreet to Mother Teresa Crescent)

2.56

(E) Streetscaping of Old R.K. Ashram Marg (Park Street to Kali BariMarg)

2.52

1 See Relevant Document 1 A


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(F) Streetscaping of Udyan Marg 1.81

19 U.P. Link Road for easy access to U.P. for CWG PWD 334.0020 Tetra Communication system for secured communication for CWG

monthly rental for two monthsIT,GNCTD

8.60

21 Construction of Fire Station at Mayur Vihar for CWG PWD 3.4222 Cultural events ( to be held during the Games) Art and

CultureDeptt.

28.30

23 Greening of Games Venues by using potted plants to project GreenGames

PWD /DDA /NDMC /MCD /Env /DPGS

28.00

24 Equipment for Polyclinic in Games Village DHS 23.80

25 Centralised Accident Trauma Services(CATS) and Advance LifeSupport(ALC) Ambulances at various CWG venues

DHS 9.20

TOTAL 3752.98

1.5 The second list contained 51 projects having an approved cost of 24,849.31 crore

and was titled "City Improvement Projects" 2

Table 2: City Improvement Projects

. The projects approved by GNCTD under this

category are shown in Table 2 .

S.No. Name of Project Agency AmountSanctioned ( In

Crore)

1 Geeta Colony Bridge PWD 129.072 Bridge at Neela Hauz PWD 46.573 ITO Chungi PWD 81.774 R.R. Kohli Marg PWD 230.00

5 Shatsri Nagar Pusta PWD6 BJ Marg/RTR Marg PWD 59.647 Nelson Mandela/Vivekanand Marg PWD 104.308 Aruna Asaf Ali/Africa Avenue marg PWD 82.609 Corridor improvement of Road No.56 PWD 200.0010 Flyover on NH-24 byepass near Gazipur PWD 245.5611 ROB on road No. 63 PWD 34.1512 Mukerba Chowk PWD 195.2213 RUB on Road No. 58-64 PWD 37.7014 Naraina PWD 119.7615 Mangolpuri PWD 31.24

2 See Relevant Document 1 A


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16 Azadpur PWD 153.6017 Behra Enclave PWD 54.6618 Nangloi NH-10 PWD 77.9919 Shyam Lal Collge PWD 98.3220 Apsara Border PWD 226.47

21 ROB on Road No. 68 PWD 107.0022 IGIA terminal 3 Runway and Associated works-

resolution of sewer dischargeDJB 18.00

PWD 181.00MCD 7.24

23 Widening of Roads PWD 108.0024 Strengthening & Resurfacing of Roads

1. PWD PWD 260.002. NDMC NDMC 19.38

25 Signages

1. PWD PWD 72.002. MCD MCD 3.253. NDMC NDMC 18.90

26 Street Lighting

1. PWD PWD 198.002. MCD MCD 95.273. NDMC NDMC 53.42

27 Beautifcation of Flyovers1. PWD PWD 3.60

2. MCD MCD 3.0028 Connaught Place Restoration / Redevelopment NDMC

29 Gole Market Redevelopment NDMC

30 Bus Q Shelters DTC 20.00

31 Augmentation of DTC Fleet DTC 1,455.00

32 Construction of Depots

(A) Ghumanhera DTC 81.63

(B) Dwarka Sector-2(C) Dwarka Sector-8(D) Okhla-3(E) Narela(F) Kanjhawla - |(G) Kanjhawla - ||(H) Rohini -4

33 Dadri NTPC Thermal-980 MW Power Deptt. NTPC Project

34 Aravalli JV NTPC and Haryana - 750 MW Power Deptt. 429.00

35 Damodar Vallley Corporation-1800 MW out of 2500MW

Power Deptt.


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36 Bawana Gas Based - 1500 MW Power Deptt. a. 860.00 - Loanfrom PFCb. 1100.00 -Equity of GNCTDc. 300.00 - IPGCLSavings2,260.00

37 Munak Lined Canal DJB 360.00 38 New Delhi-Railway Station - IGI Project DMRC 16,887.0039 IGI - Dwarka Sector 21 DMRC40 Dwarka Sector 9-21 DMRC41 Central Sectt. To Badarpur DMRC42 Central Sectt. To Gurgaon DMRC43 Shadara to Dilshad Garden DMRC44 Indraprashta - Yamuna Bank DMRC45 Yamuna Bank - New Ashok Nagar DMRC

46 New Ashok Nagar Noida DMRC47 Yamuna Bank - Anand Vihar DMRC48 Vishwavidyalaya Jahangirpuri DMRC49 Inderlok Mundka DMRC50 Kirti Nagar to Ashok Park DMRC51 Underpass at Shanti Path DMRC

TOTAL 24,849.31

1.6 The cost of the projects included in the two lists works out to 28,602.29 crore. This

does not include many projects, which were pursued for a considerable time but eventuallyabandoned (e.g. East West corridor, Mahipalpur bypass, signal free intersection at Noida

More), and some others, which were undertaken and completed but their cost was not

included in the two lists (e.g., improvement of Connaught Place and Gole market areas at

S.N.28 and 29 of Table 2 , corridor improvement at ISBT Anand Vihar, and widening of Minto

Road). If their cost is included, the total cost of projects undertaken by GNCTD, MCD and

NDMC, will be much more than 28602.29 crore indicated in Tables 1 and 2 above. In the

absence of firm data on the cost of these projects, the cost of CWG projects can be put as

30,000 crore even according to very conservative estimates.

1.7 The figure of expenditure by GNCTD as appearing in the brochure published by

MOYAS is 16,560 crore, the break up of which is produced in Table 3 below:


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Table 3: Approximate Cost of Project of Government of Delhi

S. No. Name of Project Cost ( in crore)

1 Flyovers & Bridges 3700.00

2 ROB/RUB & IGI Terminal Work 450.00

3 Stadia 670.00

4 HCBS (Ambedkar Nagar to Delhi Gate) 215.00

5 Augmentation of DTC fleet 1800.00

6 Construction of Bus Depot 900.00

7 Widening, Strengthening & Resurfacing of roads 650.00

8 Street lighting 650.00

9 Streetscaping 525.00

10 Improved road signage 150.00

11 Metro connectivity 3000.00

12 Power plants 2800.00

13 Water supply (STP, WTP, Munak Canal etc.) 400.00

14 Health 50.00

15 Parking facilities by covering nallahs 400.00

16 Communication & IT 200.00

Total 16560.00

The expenditure indicated above is essentially the same as indicated in Tables 1 and 2 but

for expenditure on metro projects, which is shown as 3000 crore in Table 3 above as

against 16, 887 crore in Table 2.

Expenditure on City infrastructure including Games infrastructure1.8 Excluding the expenditure of 1809 crore on acquisition of low floor buses by DTC

(S.6/ Table1 and S.N.37/ Table2); 2689 crore on power infrastructure (S.N.34 and 36/

Table 2); 16,887 crore on DMRC (S.N. 38 to 51/ Table 2) and 61.30 crore on some

miscellaneous items (S.N. 22,24,25/ Table 1), the total cost of 52 city infrastructure and

Games infrastructure projects executed by GNCTD, MCD and NDMC was 7155.99 crore.


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This comprised 47 city infrastructure projects and 5 sports stadia. The agency wise break up

of expenditure is presented in Table 4 below:

Table 4: Agency wise break up of expenditure

S.N Agency Level of expenditure (crore)

Percent of total

1. PWD 5444.72 76.1%2. MCD 645.24 9%3. NDMC 486.79 6.8%4. DJB 431.00 6%5. DTC (excluding Acquisition of buses) 101.63 1.4%6. Others (IT, Art & Culture, DHS) 46.61 0.7%

Total 7155.99 100%Major projects handled by various agencies

1.9 PWD: The major projects handled by PWD, apart from three Games & Training

venues (Thyagaraja, Chhatrasal and Ludlow Castle), included Barapullah elevated corridor,

Ring Road Bypass, UP Link Road, Streetscaping, Street Lighting, Signage and 21 flyovers.

1.10 MCD: Covering of Sunehri and Kushak Nallahs was the main project handled by MCD

apart from the projects of streetscaping, street lighting and signage.

1.11 NDMC : The main projects handled by NDMC were Talkatora and Shivaji stadia,

streetscaping, street lighting and signage. NDMC also handled the project relating to

development of Connaught Place and Gole Market areas, the cost of which has not been

provided in the lists mentioned above.

1.12 DJB: Munak lined drain was the main project handled by DJB.

1.13 DTC : The main projects undertaken by DTC (apart from acquisition of buses) wereconstruction of 8 bus depots and Bus Q shelters.

1.14 DDA: DDA undertook development of tourist infrastructure in the city which

included, inter alia, construction of Vasant Kunj Flats with 3 Star Facilities; auction of Hotel

sites etc.


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Governance StructurePWD

1.15 PWD, GNCTD was responsible for implementation of most of the City Infrastructure

Projects. It followed the CPWD Works Manual 2007 in respect of delegation of technical andfinancial powers while approving tenders for sanctioned works. The power for sanction of

works was delegated to the Expenditure Finance Committee (EFC) and the Council of

Ministers. The position is briefly stated below.

Table 5

January 2003 till October 2007

Above 1.2 crore upto 100crore

EFC chaired by FinanceMinister

Ref No. F8/2/97/A/cs/4804-15 dated 9.1.2003

Above 100 crore Coucil of Ministers after EFCapproval

October 2007 till January 2009

Above 5 crore upto 100crore


Ref No.:F8/2/2007/AC/Fi/07/9659dated 17.10.2007

Above 100 crore Council of Ministers after EFCapproval

January 2009 till July 2009

Above 5 crore and upto50 crore


Ref.No.:F3/30/CS/2007/Pr(Fin)/10dated 14.01.2009 3

Between 50 and 100 crore EFC chaired by Chief Minister


July 2009 till Games

Between 5 and 100 crore EFC chaired by Chief Ministerfor all Games Projects

Ref.No.:3/30/CS/2007/PSFdated 15.07.2009 4


3 See Annexure 1 A 4 See Annexure 1 B


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1.16 As regards tender approval, the provisions of CPWD Works Manual 2007 as applied

to GNCTD, specify that the power of approval of tenders upto 4 crore rests with the Chief

Engineer, beyond which it is approved by Delhi Works Advisory Board (DWAB) which has

unlimited powers. DWAB is headed by Principal Secretary, PWD and has Engineer-in- Chief and the concerned Chief Engineer of PWD as Member, besides a Chief Engineer from some

other Department and a representative from Finance Department as Members.

1.17 As indicated in Table 5 above, the powers of Expenditure Finance Committee are

stipulated in orders issued with the approval of LG. Order dated 15 th July, 2009, which has

been issued by the Finance Department, specifies that all CWG projects with an estimated

cost of between 5 to 100 crore would be put up before the EFC headed by the Chief

Minister and those beyond 100 crore before the Council of Ministers. Thus, after 15 th July,

2009, the power to consider and clear all CWG projects has been granted to the Chief

Minister.

1.18 The Works Manual provides that tenders below the estimated cost are to be

approved. In case the tenders are beyond 10% of the estimated cost, a justified cost of the

work has to be worked out on the basis of current market rates and the tenders compared

with the justified cost. A tender in excess of upto 5% of the justified cost is to be ignored,

upto 10% can be approved, and beyond 10% has to be rejected. PWD, GNCTD follows the

provisions of the Works Manual in toto. The estimates are not revised if the tender is below

10% of the justified cost.

MCD

1.19 In Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD), the powers of administrative approval for

projects of upto 25 lakh vests with the Municipal Commissioner ; the Ward Committee exercises similar powers for projects between 25 lakh and 1 crore and all other projects

need to be approved by the Corporation . All proposals are routed through the

Commissioner and the Works Committee in case of projects of more than 1 crore.

1.20 As far as approval of tender is concerned, the Municipal Commissioner has powers

to approve tenders of upto 25 lakh; all other tenders are approved by the Standing

Committee comprising of of 18 councillors.


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NDMC

1.21 In case of NDMC, all works of more than 1 crore have to be placed before the

Council for approval. The Engineer- in- Chief has powers to accord administrative approvalto residential projects of upto 50,000 and non-residential projects of upto 2 lakh and

approve tenders of upto 50 lakh. Chairman, NDMC has powers to accord administrative

approval and award works of works in the range between 50 lakh and 1 crore. Thus, for

all practical purposes, major CWG related projects were approved by the Council.

Monitoring Mechanism devised by GNCTD1.22 GNCTD constituted an Empowered Committee under Chief Secretary, GNCTD for

reviewing and monitoring the projects. The Committee held 27 meetings between 26 th

October 2006 and 12 th August 2010. The Minutes of these meetings were provided to the

HLC Team.

1.23 A former Chief Secretary of GNCTD was appointed Special Adviser for

Commonwealth Games. He inspected and reviewed individual projects and sent his

inspection reports to Chief Secretary with copies to concerned officers.

1.24 In addition to their own monitoring mechanism, GNCTD was part of the overall

monitoring of Commonwealth Games by Group of Ministers (GoM), in which CM, GNCTD

and LG, GNCTD were Special Invitees. Chief Secretary and other senior officers of GNCTD

also attended the meetings of Committee of Secretaries (COS), chaired by Cabinet

Secretary.

Scope of Report

1.25 This Report reflects the findings and conclusions of the High Level Committee (HLC)on various aspects relating to the development of city infrastructure with special reference

to construction of flyovers, bypasses, elevated corridor, improvement and upgradation of

street lights, streetscaping, street furniture, tourist infrastructure etc.

1.26 The HLC through its team of officers / experts examined the CWG projects of the

GNCTD, MCD, NDMC and DDA against the Terms of Reference of the Committee, with

special focus on:


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Planning and execution of city infrastructure projects execution and delivery with

reference to time, cost and quality;

The effectiveness of the organizational structure and governance, in particular,

within GNCTD, MCD, NDMC and DDA; Weakness in management, alleged irregularities, wasteful expenditure and

wrongdoing in performance of the tasks assigned to various agencies.

Criteria1.27 The HLC evaluated the management and performance of the key functions carried

out by Departments like the PWD of GNCTD, MCD, NDMC and DDA in the background of

reasonable timelines for initiating and completing the projects in accordance with

established standards, generally accepted best practices and conformity to good

governance.

Methodology1.28 The key procedures followed for the purpose of review were:

a. Identification and examination of relevant file notes of the concerned Works

Divisions of GNCTD, MCD, NDMC, DDA, Public Works Department of GNCTD, extracts

of the Notes for Cabinet, records of the meetings of EFC, GoM, and correspondenceon the subject matter.

b. Interview with officers and functionaries responsible for planning, execution and

monitoring of the city infrastructure projects.

c. Examination of reports from the Chief Secretary and other senior officers of different

Departments of GNCTD; MCD, NDMC and DDA.

d. Cross checking information provided with data available from other Departments of Government of India.

e. Field inspection of works selected for detailed scrutiny.

Projects selected by the Committee for detailed scrutiny1.29 The HLC selected 13 City Infrastructure Projects of varying size and cost range for

detailed scrutiny. The projects selected are presented in Table 6 below. The aggregate cost

of these projects is 3053.83crore (approximately 42.7% of the total infrastructure cost of 7155.99 crore including Games infrastructure). Three of these projects (streetsacping, street


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lighting and signage) were implemented by three agencies, viz, GNCTD, MCD and NDMC in

their respective jurisdictions. Thus, in all 19 projects/ sub projects were examined.

Table 6: Projects selected for detailed scrutiny

S.N. Name of Project Approved Cost (crore)

Projectowner

1. Barapullah Elevated corridor (Package I and II) 498.00 GNCTD2. Ring Road Bypass

Package IPackage II

654.39 GNCTD

3. Covering of Sunehri and Kushak Nallahs 325.50 MCD4. Ghazipur Grade Separator 245.56 GNCTD5. Naraina T Point 119.76 GNCTD6. Raja Ram Kohli Marg 229.68 GNCTD

7. Streetscaping 269.00160.0025.10

GNCTDMCDNDMC

8. Street lighting 198.0095.2753.42

GNCTDMCDNDMC

9. Signage 72.003.2518.90

GNCTDMCDNDMC

10. Bus Parking at Millenium Park 60.00 DTC11. Sewa Nagar RUB 26.00 MCD

12. Tourist Infrastructure Vasant Kunj Flats DDA13. Facilities for Media in Pragati Maidan 75.00 ITPOTotal 3053.83

1.30 The cost range of these projects is as follows:

No. of projects of more than 500 crore: 1

No. of projects between 200-500 crore: 5



No. of projects upto 50 crore: 4

Total: 19


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1.31 Self contained chapters on various projects executed by different agencies which

were inspected by the Teams of HLC have been included in this Report. An attempt has

been made to cover all aspects of these projects from planning stage to execution and also

highlight the major findings on each of these projects.

1.32 Certain patterns and method in the madness which have come to light and which

are visible in a slew of projects executed by different agencies have been included in the

Chapter captioned Main Findings. The recommendations of HLC are contained in the last

chapter of the Report.

Box 2: Metro Expansion in run up to CWG 2010

Government of NCT of Delhi undertook an ambitious programme under Phase II of construction of Metro Rail network. As against approximately 65 kms constructedduring the previous eight years ending October 2006, it was decided that under PhaseII, 85 kms of Metro lines would be constructed through financing by GNCTD and others.

While this was way beyond what had been accomplished in the past, it did not deterGNCTD to undertake two additional lines, viz. Central Secretariat Badarpur Stationline (20.4 km) and Airport Express Line (22.7 km). For these lines, in the name of theGames, Government of India provided 3000 crore which has been displayed in MYAS

publication as expenditure connected with conduct of CWG, 2010.

It is another matter that this ambitious programme led to the following consequences:

a) A further strain on the construction industry in Delhi which was burdened, inany event, by the numerous projects approved by GoI, GNCTD and others forthe Games. This led to cost overruns and eventually to time overruns;

b) Decline in the quality of work; witness the Laxmi Nagar incident (19.10.2008)and Jamrudpur (12.7.2009 /13.7.2009);

c) Significant increase in the number of fatal accidents at various Metro and CWGsites due to inadequate safety measures, night shifts and poor supervision. Inreply to a Rajya Sabha Question, it was acknowledged that 109 deaths hadtaken place of which 93 workers died at different sites of Delhi Metro.

Unfortunately, most of the targets could not be met; Badarpur Line was completedupto Sarita Vihar; Airport Express Line remained incomplete and, thus, the objective of assisting the GNCTD to complete two additional lines in time for CWG 2010 was notaccomplished.


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Chapter 2: Elevated Road over BarapullahNullahIntroduction2.1 The elevated road constructed over Barapullah Nullah provides a direct link between

Ring Road near Sarai Kale Khan and Jawahar Lal Nehru Stadium. It was constructed to

provide seamless and shortest possible road link between JLN Sports Complex and the

Commonwealth Games Village that was constructed by DDA near Akshardham Temple. The

road alignment was approved as late as 09-04-2008 though work had been initiated on 12-

06-2006. This was largely because GNCTD was initially in favour of construction of a tunnel

link from Ring road to Lodhi road and the Chief Minister of Delhi had even gone on record to

state that the elevated road over Barapuliah Nullah did not have much legacy value 5

. The

work of providing connecting links to the Elevated Road from and to Lala Lajpat Rai Marg

was also taken up at a later stage.

2.2 In order to enhance the legacy use of this project, GNCTD proposes to take up the

construction of links between JLN Stadium and Aurobindo Marg near INA and between Star

City Mall on the eastern side of river Yamuna and Ring Road near Sarai Kale Khan in phases

at a future date.

Project at a GlanceS.No.1 Sanctioned Cost (26.08.2008)

Elevated Road498 Crore

2 Sanctioned Cost (08.07.2009) for connecting links

51 Crore

3 Name of the Division Commonwealth Works Division 111, PWD,GNCTD

4 Name of Consultant M/s Tandon Consultants Pvt. Ltd5 Date of issue of Tenders 02-07-20086 Eligibility criteria for contractors Contractors of Category A(for Flyover works

costing more than 100 Crore) borne on theempanelled list of GNCTD dated 19-05-08)

7 Name of Contractor for both Packages M/s DSC Ltd. ,8 Date of commencement of work 11-09-2008 (for both Packages)9 Date of award of work for connecting

links14-07-2009

5 See letter of Delhi CM dated 17 th March 2008 addressed to Minister, HRD at Relevant Document2A


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10 Stipulated date of completion (forboth Packages)

10-03-2010

11 Actual date of completion (for bothPackages)

22-09-2010

12 Likely date of completion of

connecting links

May , 2011

13 Awarded cost of work (for bothPackages)

433.71 crore

14 Likely Completion cost of ElevatedRoad

390 crore

15 Cost per sqm - 56,00016 Likely Cost of Connecting links 50 crore17 Cost per sqm - 46,300

Master Plan2.3 To facilitate the movement of players during CWG from Games Village to JLN

Stadium, Elevated Road on Barapulla Nullah has been provided between East Delhi and

South Delhi based on MPD-62 (Master Plan of Delhi 1962). This link is a part of the main

link which consists of 3 parts i.e.

(i) the portion from Star City Mall on the East of river Yamuna to Ring Road near

Sarai Kale Khan on the West of the river;(ii) the portion from Ring Road to JLN Stadium; and

(iii) the portion from JLN Stadium to Aurobindo Marg near INA.

Clearance by Regulatory Authorities2.4 An alignment proposal was made on 12-06-2006 and submitted to various

Regulatory Authorities. After considering various alternatives, the present alignment was

cleared on 20-06-2008. The formal approval by the Governing Body of Unified Traffic &

Transportation Infrastructure (Planning & Engineering) Centre (UTTIEPC), under the

Chairmanship of the L. G. Delhi, was accorded on 20-03-2009.

Preparatory Work 2.5 A preliminary estimate was prepared and submitted for approval on 10.06.08 for

499 crore. This was revised to 498 crore based on tenders received which were considered

reasonable and justified. The preliminary estimate stipulated a total period of 24 months

including 02 months for preparatory works. It was stated that the Consultant had already

been appointed for preparation of NIT. Rates adopted in the estimate were based on


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approved tendered rates of flyover at Mukarba Chowk, Ghazipur, Raja Ram Kohli Marg and

other such works of DMRC during the last quarter of 2006-07, modified by adding 10% to

bring them at par with the market rates and also to take care of other cost influencing

factors like :

A factor of 7.5% was applied for limited time available for construction, investment

required for shuttering, temporary works, establishment costs, T&P and machinery.

Pier height significantly high

Alignment crosses major roads requiring obligatory clearances

Central span length as long as 100m in continuous modules; and

Two contractors will be required to complete the project within the available timeframe; this increased the establishment and T&P costs of the project

Cost also included costs for shifting of services, works contract tax, computerization

of records, and purchase of software, traffic diversion scheme and contingencies.

M/s Tandon Consultants Pvt. Ltd. were the Design Consultants for this project.

2.6 Sanction for 498 crore was accorded in terms of approval by EFC in its 6 th meeting

of the year 2008-09 held on 30.07.08 and by the Council of Ministers vide Cabinet Decisionno. 1437 dated 18.08.08. Sanction of the project was conveyed to PWD on 26.08.08.

2.7 Tenders were issued on 2.7.08 to firms of category A (for flyover works costing more

than 100 crore) borne on the empanelled list of GNCTD dated 19.05.08.

Contract Details2.8 For tendering purposes, the work was divided into two packages namely, Package 1

and Package 2 . The sanctioned detailed estimate of both Packages stipulated that theestimate was based on market rates. The analysis of rates adopted was of MoRTH wherever

applicable otherwise based on assessment. The coefficients of MoRTH were suitably

modified considering the difficult site conditions, foul conditions, height of the road,

squeezing of time period i.e. time period of 18 months for execution etc. The tendering

process was initiated in anticipation of A/A & ES.

2.9 The detailed estimated cost put to tender was reduced by 10% (as discussed with

Finance Secretary, GNCTD) to eliminate the enhancement over 2006-07 rates adopted in the


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preliminary estimate. Justified rates based on market rates were prepared by Consultant

and checked by the Department.

Justified Rates 2.10 The procedure for arriving at justified amount was discussed in the Delhi Works

Advisory Board meeting held on 20.08.08. During the meeting of experts of HLC with the E-

in-C, PWD, it was stated that the justified cost had been worked out taking into account

various elements viz., time constriction, extra height, extra mobilization of plant /

equipment / support system, difficult working conditions, combination of various modern

technologies etc. Though the lowest bidder in both the packages was the same, separate

agreement had been signed for each package. It was stated that stringent provisions had

been kept to ensure quality of construction and timely completion of the project. The

package wise details are given in Annexure 2 A .

Delay in commencement 2.11 The alignment proposal was initiated on 12-06-2006. The proposal remained adrift

with various alternatives being proposed, turned down, examined and re-examined by

Government until a final decision was taken to construct the Elevated Road over Barapullah

Nullah on 09-04-2008. The chronology of events has been given in Annexure 2 B .

Reasons for delay in completion of works2.12 The project with stipulated date of start as 11 th September, 2008 was scheduled to

be completed by 10 th March, 2010. It was put to use for CWG 2010 on 22.9.2010, just ahead

of the commencement of Commonwealth Games, after missing several deadlines set by the

Chief Minister, Delhi. The HLC was informed that the delay had occurred mainly due to the

following reasons:

Non availability of land (to be made available by PWD as per Agreement) from DDA

for preparatory works like casting yard etc. DDA was requested for allotment of land

on 25.08.08 and the land was allotted by DDA on 13-1-09. In the meantime, the land

belonging to Delhi Transco limited was made available on 24.10.08 / 17.11.08 i.e.

one and half to two months after award of work.

Delayed receipt of various approvals from Ministry of Railways. Drawings were

submitted to Railways for approval on 1 st June, 2008 but the approval came on 17 th


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July, 2009. Approval from the Commissioner of Railway Safety was received on 20 th

September, 2009 i.e. 12 months after award of work. A chronological history is at

Annexure 2 C.

In January 2010, Railways informed that the construction of cast-in-situ spanbetween Piers 32 and 33 should not hamper the construction of their Road Under

Bridge which was taken up by them while the work on Barapullah Elevated Road was

in progress. Railways suggested that in view of this requirement, the PWD should

bridge their cast-in-situ span instead of supporting the proposed cast-in-situ

construction from ground as per normal practice. This change forced redesigning of

support system of cast-in-situ construction and rescheduling of the work in this span

and adjoining two spans and delayed the work further by 60 to 75 days.

Thereafter, traffic blocks for launching the precast segments over railway tracks

were issued for working during night hours only in May 2010.

Due to above delays, the officers reported that the construction period stretched into the

rainy season of the year 2010 which resulted in further delays.

Additional Work

2.13 Even when construction of Elevated Road over Barapulla Nullah had commenced,

the Delhi Traffic Police, in the first quarter of 2009, demanded provision of connectivity to

the Elevated Road from & to Lala Lajpat Rai Marg by providing loops on either side of the

Elevated Road before the CWG at all costs 6

Request made by Delhi Traffic Police for two connectivities

. The chronological history of the same is given

below:

21-01-09

PWD informed Empowered Committee that the work can be taken up in Phase-IIonly .

02-04-09

Delhi Traffic Police requested PWD for reconsideration 22-04-09

Preliminary Estimate submitted by PWD to Govt. 09-06-09

Sanction accorded by Govt. of Delhi for 51 Crore 08-07-09

Permission given by the Government for getting the work executed under deviationin the existing Agreement of Package-II of Elevated Road over Barapulla Nullah

14-07-09

6 See letter dated 24.04.2009 at Relevant Document 2B .


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2.14 The additional work was executed under the existing Agreement of Package-2 of

Elevated Road over Barapulla Nullah due to the following considerations:

To avoid loss of time in the formality of calling of tenders etc.

Difficulty in finding suitable casting & fabrication yard for such an agency near

the works site as the two loops pass through heavily built up area.

With two different agencies working side by side there would have been

several logistic problems including coordination and matching of precise time

schedules in various interlinked activities.

2.15 However, this additional work could not be completed before the CWG on

account of the reasons cited as under:

800 mm diameter sewer line was causing obstruction to the Moolchand side

connectivity. During discussions, the EE informed that in June, 2010 the Delhi

Jal Board expressed its inability to remove / divert the said sewer line and

desired that the PWD itself should get it done. The shifting of sewer line could

be completed only in September, 2010. High Tension Electric line and some other utilities causing obstruction were

shifted during May, 2010.

This work is now likely to be completed by May 2011.

Likely Completion Cost of the Work

2.16 Based on present status of work and an analysis of the pending bills, it is

estimated that the final cost of construction of main work would be about 390 crore.

The average cost per square metre would in that case be about 49,872 (say, 49,900).

The final cost of additional work in Package II is expected to be about 50 crore with

average cost per square meter being 46,300.

Contract Management

Consultants contract with M/s Tandon Consultant Pvt. Ltd.2.17 Professional Indemnity Insurance Policy, which was to cover the period from


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26.03.2008 to 25.03.2009 was actually issued on 3 rd September, 2008.. Thus, there was

no insurance between 26.03.2008 to 02.09.2008 although it was covered in the policy

issued on 03.09.2008.

2.18 The Consultant, M/s Tandon Consultant Pvt. Ltd. is reported to be the one who

had designed Pier No 76 of DMRC near Jamrudpur that had collapsed resulting in

fatalities. They were reportedly blacklisted by DMRC. The EE clarified during

discussions that the said incident had occurred after the award of consultancy contract

for this work. It was not explained whether any rechecking of the design of this work

was sought or done after the said incident had occurred near Jamrudpur.

Construction Contract 2.19 Item No. 1.6 of the BOQ provides for lateral load test of piles. No such test was

conducted in either of the two Packages . The reason for dispensing with this test and

the authority who directed to dispense with the same was not forthcoming. However,

the EE intimated that two sets of lateral load tests were carried out in the portion

coming over Railway tracks and found to be as per norms and it is also contemplated to

carry out lateral load test for the piles provided for the work of connecting links

(Additional work being executed under Deviation) as the strata is the same and the test

results will be representative of the entire stretch. The fact remains that a contractual

obligation was not carried out.

2.20 The Third Party Quality Assurance Agency (TPQA) {Delhi College of Engineering

(DCE)} was required to regularly inspect the work and submit monthly consolidated

report. Though they carried out regular inspections and issued inspection reports from

time to time, they did not submit these reports in consolidated manner at the end of

the month. On issuance of show cause notice on 27 th January, 2010, the TPQA (DCE)

started submitting reports.

2.21 Maintenance of Site Records is an essential feature of any construction work.

However, Inspection and Hindrance Registers were not found maintained. The EE

informed during discussions that the purpose was achieved through letters.

2.22 BOQ Items 6.4.3 & 6.4.4 of Bituminous Macadam and Dense BituminousMacadam, respectively, had apparent errors in their nomenclatures which could give


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rise to disputes. This appears to have happened due to lapses of the Consultant who

prepared the BOQ. The EE informed that the Consultant has been warned that if these

errors result in undue payment to the contractor the cost will be recovered from the

Consultant.

Conclusions2.23 Based on examination of documents, files related to the Project and interviews

with engineers, the major observations of the HLC are as under:

Cost of Delay2.24 The site for Games Village near Akshardham Temple was decided in 2003 itself.

The need for a direct link between the Games Village and the Jawahar Lal Nehru Sports

Complex was known since that time. Various alternative alignments were beingexplored since 2006. The process could have been started in 2004 itself and an

alignment decided much earlier. In that case it would have been possible to appoint a

consultant, frame estimates, call tenders and award the work on contract, following a

normal time frame, in 2005. The work, including connecting links to Lala Lajpat Rai

Marg, could easily have been completed in 2008. The cost of the work, including

connecting links, would in such a scenario have been about 331 crore as against the

present cost of 440 crore i.e. at a staggering saving of 109 crore . Thus, the delay in

decision making cost the Government dear.

2.25 During the intervening period from June 2006 to January 2008 the matter

remained under correspondence / consideration / approval by various Regulatory /

Government agencies i.e. ASI, DUAC, Zoo Authority, Traffic Police, DDA, Delhi Wakf

Board etc. In fact, the commitment of GNCTD to this project till the year 2007 was also

wavering at best.There was undue delay in the approval of alignment. The processstarted on 12-06-2006 and decision was finally taken on 09-04-2008. Due to delay in

Box 1: Non compliance with Quality Control measures

The contractor, M/s. DSC Ltd., did not comply with Quality Controlmeasures such as conducting lateral load test of piles, which wereextremely important keeping in view that the entire stretch was anelevated corridor. PWD officials also did not insist on the same.


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approval of the road alignment, the Estimation and Tendering processes for the work

could start only in 2008, resulting thereby in late start of work and crashing of time for

execution of the work to 18 months and consequent escalation in cost of work

including connectivities at a likely cost of 440 crore.

2.26 Similarly, though the Railways were being constantly approached for according

various approvals they were neither prompt nor showed a sense of urgency in the

matter.

Poor Monitoring mechanism2.27 It was observed that the Monitoring Committee under the Chairmanship of the

Chief Secretary, GNCTD failed in its responsibility of monitoring and taking prompt

decisions, as seen from the delays in approval by various Authorities. Perhaps theMonitoring Committee did not have any proper and effective monitoring mechanism.

Poor planning & coordination2.28 Notwithstanding the insistence of Delhi Traffic Police on completion of the two

connecting links to and from Lala Lajpat Rai Marg before the commencement of CWG

2010 at all cost, authorities should have known that it was almost impossible to do so

since the shifting of High Tension Electric Line and 800 mm diameter DJB Sewer Line

was likely to take time. The connecting links could not be completed before CWG 2010

and are now expected to be completed only by May 2011.

2.29 In view of the twin constraints mentioned above, it would have been more

appropriate and prudent to call for separate tenders for this additional work and

provide normal construction period. This would have resulted in fair competition and

cost savings of about 3.49 crore.

2.30 On the other hand, if this additional work had been part of the main work and

Box 2: GNCTDs first choice was tunnel link

It is evident from the records of the GoM that Chief Minister, GNCTD,was in favour of construction of a tunnel link starting near MillenniumPark on Ring road to Lodhi Road. This project was opposed tooth andnail by ASI and ultimately had to be abandoned. But not before a goodtwo years were lost in the process.


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taken up in the year 2007 with a 3 year period of completion, the cost saving within the

component of this additional work itself would have been 8.85 crore.

2.31 HLC is of the view that the decision to take up the additional work of two

connecing links under the existing contract was not a prudent and well thought outdecision. The work could not be completed in time and Government has also had to

bear the additional cost due to its categorization as emergency work.

No rationale for Two Packages2.32 No records are available to show the reason why both the packages were

awarded to a single contractor! Why was a condition not incorporated that a single

agency would not be awarded both the packages and why, in the alternative, an option

was not given to the tenderers that they could offer a discount for being awarded both

the packages. Any prudent person would have sought and obtained discount for

awarding the second package to the same agency on the ground that there would be

savings on the establishment, T&P, machinery etc. Loss due to aforesaid lapse is

assessed at 4% of the cost of Package 2 i.e. 6.32 crore.

2.33 Had timely action, as detailed in foregoing paras been taken, the work would

have been taken up for construction latest by August, 2007 enabling normal

construction time of 3 years required for a work of this magnitude and nature. This

would have resulted in much lower tendered costs as there would not have been any

necessity of increase in men and material costs @ 10% over 2007 rates and further

enhancement of the rates by 7.5% for limited time available, for completion of work by

August 2010 i.e. much before October, 2010, the month during which the CWG were to

be held. Further award of two packages to a single contractor had resulted in saving inestablishment costs to the said contractor as considered by the Department itself. This

cost is assessed to be 4% of the cost of the work. Thus the saving effected, would have

been 74 crore as detailed below:

i. Total likely cost of the work including connectivities 440 crore

= (390 + 50) crore

ii. Saving in cost had the work been taken up in 2007 37.44 crore

instead of 2008 = 10% of the total cost i.e. 440/1.175 crore plus


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iii. Saving in cost for limited time available @ 7.5% of 28.09 crore

the total cost i.e. 7.5% of 440/1.175 plus

iv. Saving in Establishment cost @ 4% of

(i) Package 2 = 390/(205+201)x201x1/1.175x0.04/1.04 6.32 crore

(ii) Additional work of connectivities = 50x0.04/1.04 1.92 crore

Total = (a+b+c+d) 73.77 crore

Say 74 crore

Likely Savings if work had commenced early2.34 Further, if the work had been taken up in the year 2005 as detailed in para

2.24 or in the year 2006, the saving, based on approved Cost Indices (approved by

Director General, CPWD) would be as below:

Year Cost Index Cost i/c connectivities Likely Saving

2008 114 (in 4/08) Actual Cost 440 crore -

2007 (440 74) Crore= 366crore

74 crore

2006 90.77 (in 4/06) 440x90.77/114= 350crore

90 crore

2005 85.77 (in 4/05) 440x85.77/114= 331crore

109 crore

Box 3: Responsibility for Delay

The inspection reports of Special Advisor, CWG indicates that thecontractor delayed the projects and went on revising the projectmilestones in every review, mainly because his own failures, likedelay in fabrication and mobilisation of launching girders, labourproblems due to non-payment, problems with his suppliers whowere not paid in time, contractors reluctance to put in additionalefforts like night working.

This is all the more astounding because the Contractor had quoted ahigher price assessed at 28 crore only on account of compressedtime frame for completion.


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Undue Gains to Contractor2.35 It is observed that on account of bidding being confined to a set of prequalified

contractors and acceptance of higher tenders, the contractor has received undue benefits

as his quoted price was considered justified and accepted. In Barapullah Project, the price

quoted was 23-24% higher than the estimated cost. Since the rates for most of the items in

this project were analysed on the basis of MORTH Data Book, which provides for the

coefficients for labour, material and machinery, and the Department had input the prevailing

market rates for arriving at the cost estimate, there was no justification for such high rates,

especially because the time gap between estimates and the tenders was only 2-3 months.

Assuming that the contractor might have factored in the risks involved in executing this high

profile time bound project to the extent of 5% (say for example liquidated damages for delay)and costs involved in accelerating the project by another 6 or 7%, (actual cost considered in

Barapullah project is 7.5%), the maximum justification for the rates, prima facie, appears to be

of the order of about 12%. Thus, the contractor of this project has got undue gains to the

extent of at least 12%, if not more. This works out to about 53 crore.

Legacy Use2.36 The HLC notes that the project does not have any significant legacy use at present. Since

during the period of the Games, Delhi Traffic Police had reserved a dedicated lane formovement of Games related vehicles on major arterial roads leading to various Games venues

from the Games Village, the objective of ferrying athletes and officials to JLN Sports Complex

in the shortest possible time could have been served through use of dedicated CWG lane. This

would have avoided blocking of capital of 440 crore unnecessarily till a new bridge on river

Yamuna linking East Delhi with this road and the portion linking it to Aurobindo Marg as per

approved Plan are taken up and completed.

Box 4: Cost of Delay & loss to Government

If work on this project had commenced in 2005, the cost saving hasbeen assessed at 109 crore . Even if work had commenced in 2007,there would have been savings of 74 crore.

Since the work of both packages was awarded to the samecontractor, PWD should, through negotiation, have sought andobtained discounts from the contractor of 8.24 crore on account of lower establishment cost etc. This can be construed as loss toGovernment.

The undue gain to contractor is estimated at about 53 crore.


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Chapter 3: Ring Road Bypass Background

3.1 In May 2006, the GNCTD decided to construct a Ring Road Bypass betweenVelodrome Road and Salimgarh Fort. The approval from the various authorities was finally

obtained by 7 th December, 2007.

3.2 The Preliminary Estimate for the project was 661.40 crore and the same was

approved on 5 th May, 2008 for 654.39 Crore. The estimated date of completion for the

project was before October 2010 as per the AA&ES.

3.3 The contract for the construction was awarded for Package I and II on 7 th January,

2009 and 5 th December, 2008 respectively. Both the contracts were awarded for a period of

18 Months. Though the project was in use during the Commonwealth Games, they have not

yet been handed over to PWD as some finishing and touch-up works are in progress.

Project Details

3.4 The details of the project are given in the table below:

Table 1: Details of the project

Particulars Details Date

Preliminary Estimateprepared

661.4 crore 09.01.08

AA&ES 654.39 crore 05.05.08Participants in bids forEngineering Consultant

1. B&S Engineering Consultants2. Tandon Consultants Pvt. Ltd.3. L&T Ramboll Engineering Consultants

Winning bidder forengineering consultant

B&S Engineering Consultants1.24 crore

07.05.08

Participants in bid forconstruction of Package I FirstCall

1. Gammon India Ltd.2. Simplex Infrastructure Ltd.3. DSC Limited4. Afcons Infrastructures Ltd.5. ITD Cementation India Ltd.

-

Participants in bid forconstruction of Package ISecond Call

1. Simplex Infrastructure Ltd.2. Gammon India Ltd.3. DSC Limited

-

Successful Contractor Simplex Infrastructure Ltd. -Appointment of Contractorfor Package I

194 crore 07.01.09

Estimated time forcompletion 18 Months -


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Stipulated date of completion July 2010 -Cumulative amount billed tilllast RA bill

161 crore -

Participants in bid forconstruction of Package II

1. Simplex Infrastructure Ltd.2. DSC Limited

3. L&T Ltd. ECC Division

-

Successful Contractor Simplex Infrastructure Ltd. -Appointment of Contractorfor Package II

214 crore 05.12.08

Estimated time forcompletion

18 Months -

Stipulated date of completion July 2010 -Cumulative amount billed tilllast RA bill

133 crore -

Summary of Findings# Observation

1 There was a time gap of 19 months in obtaining no objection certificate fromvarious agencies.

2 An extra premium of 25% for labour and machinery was paid to the contractor onaccount of time compressions. The additional cost implication attributable to this isto the tune of 13 crore

3 The project was divided without citing any reason for the same. Eventually bothcontracts were awarded to same contractor.But the negotiating officers did not ask for any rebate for award of both packages onthe lower of the two rates which could have led to possible savings of 24 crore

4 An additional two months was taken in inviting bids for Package II as compared toPackage I

5 The tender for Package I was recalled as the rates quoted by the lowest bidder weremore than the justified cost which was 14% above Detailed Estimate.The NIT for second call was floated one month after Lowest bidder refused forfurther negotiation.It was observed that in the second call the Justified cost increased from 14% aboveDetailed Estimate in the first call to 17 % in the second call though time gap was only3 months.

6 The Justified cost for both the packages appears to be inflated by about 23.34crore in comparison to the DSR rates of 2007, after adjusting for the cost indices forthe year 2008.

7 The tenders for both the packages were approved two months after rate negotiation8 The cost implication of delays in the start of the construction is 35 crore . This is a

notional calculation, based on assumptions.9 Back dated changes made in the Hindrance Register after the observations by CVCs

Chief Technical Examiner


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Main Observations

Delay in obtaining no objection certificate

3.5 In the meeting held at the Office of Chief Secretary Govt. of NCT on 16 th May, 2006 it

was decided to go ahead with the proposal and seek the approval from various authorities 7

1. High power Samadhi Committee

.

Agencies which were approached for providing No Objection Certificate (NOC) were as

under:

2. Working Group (Road alignment) constituted by Ministry of Urban Development

3. Delhi Urban Arts Commission on 10 th September, 2007 vide letter

no.19(12)2006/DUAC

4. Yamuna Samiti on 31 st January, 2007 vide letter no.16/1/YC2006 BP 1/49-68

5. Yamuna - Removal of Encroachment Monitoring Committee

6. Traffic Police and security unit of Delhi on 27 th October, 2007 vide letter no.

M/1/125/02/19641/X-III(A) DHQ

7. Approval by ASI on 12th

December, 2007 vide letter no. 12/445/2206-NOC-9979

8. Technical Committee of DDA

The date by which all the approvals were available was 12 th December, 2007.

Preliminary Estimates (PE)

3.6 The office of Chief Engineer CW-1 submitted on 9 th January, 2008 the Preliminary

Estimate of 661.40 crore for approval of Govt. of Delhi. The estimated time completion for

the project as per the PE was 30 months. (6 months was for getting AA&ES and award of

contract; plus 24 months for the construction)

Administrative Approval and Expenditure Sanctions

3.7 The EFC 8 of the Govt. of Delhi accorded the AA&ES for an estimated cost of 654.39

crore on 05 th May, 2008 vide Sanction no.II/10/2008-09 F 4(8)/2006/PWD-III/489-99.

7 DUAC, Yamuna Encroachment Removal Committee, Samadhi Committee, ASI, Traffic Police etc8 Expenditure Finance Committee


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Detailed Estimate and NIT

Appointment of Engineering Consultant

3.8 M/s B&S Engineering Consultant was appointed the Engineering consultants on 7 th

May, 2008 for a tendered amount of 1.24Crore.

Splitting of the project in two packages

3.9 The project was split into two packages while preparing the detailed estimate and

floating the NIT. However there is no document or record on files to justify the need for

splitting the work into two packages

Approval and Press Notice

3.10 The relevant facts regarding the bidding process is given in the table below:

Table 2: Approval and Press Notifications DetailsDetails Package I Package II

Date of preparationof DetailedEstimate

10 th July, 2008 05 th September, 2008

Date of approval of NIT

11 th July, 2008 04 th September,2008

Date of publishing

of NIT

07 th July, 2008 08 th September, 2008

Eligibility forbidding

Contractors pre-qualifiedunder Category A list of P.W.D, GNCTD for theconstruction of Flyovers/Bridges/ROBs costingmore than 100 crore

Contractors pre-qualified under CategoryA list of P.W.D, GNCTD for theconstruction of Flyovers/Bridges/ROBscosting more than 100 crore

Date of Pre-bidmeeting

08 th October, 2008 23 rd September, 2008

Date forsubmission of bids

13 th October,2008 29 th September,2008

Cost mentioned inthe NIT 157 crore 183 crore

Awarding of contracts

Contract details of Package I

3.11 The Pre-bid meeting was held on 25 th July, 2008 and, as per the request of all the

applicants, the last date of tender submission was extended from 29.07.2008 to 05.08.2008.

The financial bids were opened on 05.08.2008. The details of the bids received are given in

the table below:


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Table 3: Status of Bidders for Package I first call Contractor Name Value Comments

L1 M/s Gammon India Ltd. 206 Crore 31% above the EC

L2 M/s Simplex InfrastructuresLtd.

210 Crore 34% above the EC

L3 M/s DSC Limited 233 Crore 48% above the EC

L4 M/s Afcons InfrastructuresLtd.


L5 M/s ITD Cementation IndiaLtd.


3.12 As the rate quoted by Gammon India, L1, was more than 10% above the EC, justified

cost was prepared which worked out to be 14% above the estimated cost of 157 crore.

M/s Gammon India Ltd.s bid was 17% above the justified cost and they were called for

further negotiation to the Office of Chief Engineer.

3.13 The negotiation meeting was held at the Office of Chief Engineer on 22.08.2008

wherein they refused to consider any reduction in the rates for the said work. The same was

confirmed in writing through their letter no. P/9365 A dated 26.08.2008.

3.14 As per the decision of DWAB in the meeting held on 23.09.2008, the tender was

recalled. The Notice for recall was posted on the website of the Department on 24.09.2008

and the press notice for the same was published on 26.09.2008.

3.15 The Pre-bid meeting for the second call was held on 08.10.2008 which was attended

by the bidders. The financial bid was opened on 13.10.2008 and the standing of the bidders

was as under:

L1 M/s Simplex Infrastructure Ltd. 195 crore 24% above the EC

L2 M/s Gammon India Ltd. 206 crore 31% above the EC

L3 M/s DSC Limited 227 crore 45% above the EC

3.16 As the amount quoted by the L1, M/s Simplex Infrastructure Ltd, was more than 10%

above the estimated cost, a fresh justified cost was prepared, which came out to be 17.62%


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above EC, as against the justified cost of 14% above EC in the First call. The following reasons

were given by the Project Manager and EE for the increase in the justified cost:

Increase in the rates of Aggregate since July 08 rates based on which the previous

justification was prepared

Increase in the rates of Bitumen since July 08 rates based on which the previous

justification was prepared

Increase in the minimum daily wages to labour from August 08

3.17 As per the recommendation of the Project Manager and Executive Engineer, a

negotiation meeting was held with M/s Simplex Infrastructure Ltd. on 16.10.08. Item no.7.6

(Manhole chambers) and 7.7 (Extra depth for Manhole chambers) were agreed to be

removed from the scope of Contractor as the rates quoted were very high and not agreeable

to PWD.

3.18 The confirmation of the acceptance, eliminating the two items, was sent to M/s

Simplex Infrastructures Ltd. on 7 th January, 2009 9

Table 4: Details of Contractor - Simplex

.

Name of the contractor M/s Simplex Infrastructures Limited

Address Vaikunth (2nd Floor), 82-83,Nehru Place ,New Delhi- 110019

PAN No./ TIN No. AAECS0765R / 07830225201

Date of Award 7 th January, 2009

Estimated Cost (Detailed Cost) 157 crore

Value of Contract signed 194 crore

Period of Contract 18 months

Contract details relating to Package II

3.19 The Pre-bid meeting was held on 23 rd September, 2008 and based on the request of

the bidders, the last date for filling the tender was extended from 25 th September, 2008 to

29 th September, 2008. The Pre-bid meeting was attended by all the three contractors who

9 Confirmation sent vide letter no. 54(17)/RRB1/EE-121/PWD/2009/10 dated 07 January,2009


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purchased the tender namely M/s Simplex Infrastructures Ltd., M/s Larsen & Toubro Ltd. and

M/s DSC Limited.

3.20 After opening the tender on 29 th September, 2008 the status of the contractors was

as under:

L1 M/s Simplex Infrastructure Ltd. 214 crore 24% above the EC

L2 M/s DSC Limited 252 crore 46% above the EC

L3 M/s Larsen & Toubro Ltd. 272 crore 57% above the EC

3.21 The justified rates worked out were found to be 200 crore i.e. 16.30% above the

estimated cost of 172 crore. The amount mentioned in the press notice was approximately

183 crore.

3.22 As per the opening of bid and the worked out justified rates, the recommendation

was sent by the Project Manager and Executive Engineer to the Office of Chief Engineer for

further negotiations on 7 th October, 2008.

3.23 The acceptance for the contract was confirmed to the Contractor on 5 th December,

2008, i.e. 1.5 Months after the final negotiation meeting and after the meeting of DWAB was

held on 1 st December, 2008.

Table 5: Details of contractor Package II Name of the contractor M/s Simplex Infrastructures Limited

Address Vaikunth (2 nd Floor), 82-83,Nehru Place , New Delhi-110019

PAN No./ TIN No. AAECS0765R / 07830225201

Date of Award 5 December 2008

Value of Contract 2,14,73,63,432

Period of Contract Package 2- 18 Months

Delay in completion of procedural formalities

3.24 As is evident from the chronology of events given in table below, it was observed

that there was a time gap of nineteen months in the start of the project on account of timespent in seeking the No-Objections and clearance from various authorities as mentioned in


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Para 0. Subsequently there were delays in according AA&ES and in preparation of detailed

estimate for Package II.

Table 6: Chronology of events leading up to the commencement of construction

Events Date Time taken

Conceptual approval by Chief Secretary 16 th May, 2006Approval by various authorities 12 th December, 2007 19 monthsPreparation of PE for AA&ES 9 th January, 2008Administrative approval & ExpenditureSanction

5 th May, 2008 4 Months from the date of submission of PE

Appointment of Engineering Consultant 7 th May, 2008Preparation of detailed estimate andNIT for Package I

10 th July, 2008 2 months from appointmentof Engineering Consultant

Preparation of detailed estimate and

NIT for Package II

5 th September, 2008 4 months from the date of

appointment of EngineeringconsultantOpening of Bids for Package I 5 th August, 2008Forwarding memo to CE 12 th August, 2008Negotiation with Gammon India Ltd. 25 th August, 2008Start of retendering process 24 th September, 2008 1 month after the rejection of

the tenders in first callRecall for Package I 26 th September, 2008Opening of Bids for Package I 13 th October,2008Negotiation with Simplex 16 th October ,2008Award of tender to Simplex 7 th January, 2009 2.5 months after the

negotiationsOpening of Bids for Package II 29 th September ,2008Forwarding memo to CE 7 th October,2008Negotiation with Simplex 13 th October, 2008

16 th October, 2008Award of tender to Simplex 5 th December, 2008 1.5 months after the

negotiations

Chronology of the delay in obtaining NOC3.25 The entire process of obtaining NOCs from various agencies took 19 months i.e. from

16 th May, 2006 to 12 th December, 2007.

3.26 HLC carried out an analysis of the delay in decision making and the time taken by

respective agencies in giving NOC. This analysis is tabulated below. As can be seen, the

proposal for NOC was with PWD for almost 9 months and with ASI for 10 months.


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Table 7: Time taken by PWD and ASI in giving NOC # Date Description Duration Duration

Attributable to(in days)

PWD ASI

1 16-May-06

Conceptual approval to the projectwas provided by Chief Secretary,GNCTD

2 30-Aug-06 PWD sent the proposal and details toall the agencies for NOC

106 Days from date of conceptual approval

106

3 19-Sep-06 DDA letter asking to get NOC fromYamuna Samiti and ASI first

19 days from the dateof proposal

4 25-Oct-06 ASI raised queries and requested fordrawings and site inspection

56 days from the dateof proposal

56

5 1-Nov-06 Reply from PWD and request forconfirming site visit date

7 days from the letterfrom ASI

7

6 10-Nov-06 Discussion between ASI and PWD

7 17-Nov-06 Reply from ASI asking again fordrawings and joint inspection

16 days from reply fromPWD

16

8 20-Nov-06 Drawings from PWD with necessaryclarification

19 days from therequest from ASI

19

9 15-Dec-06 Letter from CS,GNCTD to ASIrequesting faster resolution of thematter

107 days from the dateof proposal from PWD

10 4-Jan-07 Letter from CS,GNCTD to PMO seekingintervention for faster resolution of the matter

127 days from the dateof proposal from PWD

11 31-Jan-07 Clearance from Yamuna Samiti 154 days from the dateof proposal from PWD

12 7-Feb-07 ASI asked PWD to redraft the proposalas in present situation road alignmentis too close to Salimgarh fort

79 days from date of detailed drawings fromPWD

79

13 29-Jun-07 Revised proposal from PWD 142 days from the dateof refusal from ASI

142

14 11-Jul-07 Presentation on the revised proposaland in principle approval from ASI

12 days after thesubmission of redrafted

12


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proposal

15 30-Jul-07 Revised proposal to DDA,DUAC forapproval

19 days from the dateof presentation to ASI

16 1-Aug-07 DUAC letter asking for model of theproject along with revised drawings

2 days from the date of redrafted proposal fromPWD

17 14-Sep-07 ASI asking for more copies of drawings 65 days from date of revised proposal fromPWD

65

18 17-Sep-07 Reminder and additional copies of drawings sent by PWD to ASI

3 days from date of request for more copiesof drawing

3

19 12-Dec-07 Clearance from ASI 86 days from date of detailed drawings fromPWD

86

Total Time consumed in days 289 302

Cost implication (Notional) of delayed start 3.27 Had the delay mentioned above been avoided, the project could have been started

in the month of January 2008. The value of contracts executed, in December 2008 and

January 2009, was 410 Crore. Had these contracts been executed in or around January 2008,

the potential cost savings could have been to the extent of 35.38 Crore as mentioned in

Table below.

Table 8: Potential Savings in cost had project been started without delay # Assumed

ProjectStart Date

Buildingcostindex(1)

PotentialSaving(inMonths)

Cost of Projectwith startdate as

per col. A( incrore)

Tendercost( incrore)

SavingAmount( incrore)

Saving(in %)

A B C D E F=(E-D) G=(F/E)1 Jan-09 116 0 410.38 410.38 0.00 0.00%2 Jan-08 106 12 375.00 410.38 35.38 8.62%3 Oct-07 100 15 353.78 410.38 56.60 13.79%4 Jul-07 99 18 350.24 410.38 60.14 14.66%


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Observations

Cost implication of 25% premium paid for time compression

3.28 As per the contracts, a premium of 25% was paid to Simplex on labour and

machinery cost due to compressed time schedule. On the basis of an analysis carried out,

had the delays mentioned in Para 0.5 been avoided, the potential saving to the government

on labour and machinery could have been to the tune of 5.1 Crore and 8.55 Crore for

Package I and Package II respectively. Refer Annexure 3A and Annexure 3B for this

calculation.

Different rates adopted in the packages for same items

3.29 It was observed that rates of items in package II were higher than the rates for thesame items in Package I. Since the negotiation meeting was held in the office of Chief

Engineer on 13 th October, 2008 for Package II and on 16 th October, 2008 for Package I,

uniform rates should have been applied for both the packages. This was not done as is

evident in comparison of the rates for two packages. Refer Annexure 3C for a comparison of

rates between package I and II.

3.30 Since the rates for both the packages were available, the lower of the two rates

quoted by the Contractor M/s Simplex Infrastructure should have been negotiated. Had the

lower of two rates been considered, the total cost saving to the Government could have

been to the tune of 24 crore. In other words, the total tendered cost, based on lower rates,

for both the Packages put together could have been 386 crore instead of 410 crore

resulting in a potential saving of 24 crore i.e. around 6%. Refer Annexure 3D for the cost

saving had the lower of two rates been considered.

Charging of potentially inflated rates

3.31 It was observed that the rates for certain basic materials considered by PWD for

arriving at justification of the tendered cost appear to be higher than the DSR of 2007, after

applying the 2009 cost indices. The DSR 2007 rates for seven items were obtained.

Thereafter, the cost indices

shunglu report

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