siena, ls09 - intenzionalità1 la naturalizzazione dell’intenzionalità sandro nannini...

Siena, LS09 - Intenzionalità 1

La naturalizzazione dell’intenzionalitàLa naturalizzazione dell’intenzionalitàSandro Nannini (Università di Siena)Sandro Nannini (Università di Siena)


Il problema mente-corpoIl problema mente-corponella vita quotidiananella vita quotidiana

EEEE……P(+M)……P(+M)(D)(D)AA

SDSD SP SP..C…..C…N N RR

(Suonano, vado ad aprire!) (Suonano, vado ad aprire!)


Il dualismo interazionisticoIl dualismo interazionistico

P P …D…D

SD SD SP SP..CP..CP CDCD..N ..N R R

Difficoltà: la chiusura del Difficoltà: la chiusura del

mondo fisicomondo fisico


Il naturalismoIl naturalismo

SD SD SP SP..CP..CP..CD..CD..N ..N R R

Teoria dell’identitàTeoria dell’identità

FunzionalismoFunzionalismo

EliminativismoEliminativismo

Riduzionismo ontologico / Riduzionismo ontologico / Riduzionismo metodologicoRiduzionismo metodologico


Naturalising mental statesNaturalising mental states

• A mental State X is naturalised iff:A mental State X is naturalised iff:

1.1. We know how X is implemented by a functional state Y We know how X is implemented by a functional state Y that has the same causes and brings about the same that has the same causes and brings about the same effects than X (effects than X (functional reductionfunctional reduction).).

2.2. We know how the functional state Y is implemented by a We know how the functional state Y is implemented by a brain process Z (brain process Z (neurological implementationneurological implementation).).

““X” belongs to the language of folk psychology, “Y” to the X” belongs to the language of folk psychology, “Y” to the language of cognitive psychology, “Z” to the language of language of cognitive psychology, “Z” to the language of neurosciences.neurosciences.


Naturalising mental statesNaturalising mental states

• Functional reduction [1] is a task of cognitive Functional reduction [1] is a task of cognitive psychologists, neurological implementation [2] is psychologists, neurological implementation [2] is a task of neuroscientists.a task of neuroscientists.

• The step (2) presupposes the step (1) and vice The step (2) presupposes the step (1) and vice versa (top down explanation and bottom up versa (top down explanation and bottom up explanation).explanation).

• Both steps presuppose a previous conceptual Both steps presuppose a previous conceptual analysis and modification of the language of folk analysis and modification of the language of folk psychology (psychology (this is the task of philosophersthis is the task of philosophers). ).


Weak Naturalism and Strong Weak Naturalism and Strong NaturalismNaturalism

• W.N.W.N.: The truth of (1) is sufficient to naturalise X and : The truth of (1) is sufficient to naturalise X and such a naturalisation is in principle always possible.such a naturalisation is in principle always possible.

• S.N.S.N.: Also the truth of (2) is necessary to naturalise X. : Also the truth of (2) is necessary to naturalise X. If no Y seems to completely implement X and be If no Y seems to completely implement X and be completely implemented by Z then either Y was not completely implemented by Z then either Y was not found out yet or there is a residue of X that cannot be found out yet or there is a residue of X that cannot be naturalised. Such a residue does not belong to the naturalised. Such a residue does not belong to the reality. It is a “fiction” of our mind that has no causal reality. It is a “fiction” of our mind that has no causal efficacy.efficacy.


Perception and sensory-motor Perception and sensory-motor coordinationcoordination

• Animals acquired the Animals acquired the ability to perceive some ability to perceive some features of the external features of the external world and of their own world and of their own body in order to body in order to execute movements execute movements apt to increase the apt to increase the probability to surviveprobability to survive (e.g. by catching preys (e.g. by catching preys or avoiding or avoiding plunderers).plunderers).


Perception and sensory-motor Perception and sensory-motor coordinationcoordination

• Human senses and Human senses and human sensorihuman sensori--motor motor coordination are the coordination are the result of biological result of biological evolution.evolution.

BiologicalBiologicalevolutionevolution


Perception and sensory-motor Perception and sensory-motor coordination:coordination:

Representation-Action Theory (RAT)Representation-Action Theory (RAT)• Perceptions can be Perceptions can be

conscious or unconscious: in conscious or unconscious: in both cases they are both cases they are mental mental representationsrepresentations of the of the internal and external world.internal and external world.

• Human beings construct a Human beings construct a representation of the external representation of the external world in order to move and world in order to move and act in it.act in it.


The computational brainThe computational brain

• According to the RAT the brain According to the RAT the brain acquires by means of the senses acquires by means of the senses a certain amount of a certain amount of informationinformation about some regularities of the about some regularities of the external world as regards the external world as regards the distribution of matter and distribution of matter and physical events in space and physical events in space and time and time and changes the formatchanges the format of of such information step by step such information step by step until a pattern of motor neurons until a pattern of motor neurons activity able to trigger a right activity able to trigger a right motor response is produced.motor response is produced.

Styles ofStyles of brain c brain computationomputationNo!!!No!!!

No representationsNo representations

May be!May be!

A Brooks’ robotA Brooks’ robot

UnlikelyUnlikely!!

Symbolic representationsSymbolic representations

Subsymbolic representationsSubsymbolic representations


Naturalising perceptions according to the Naturalising perceptions according to the RATRAT

Functional reductionFunctional reduction• A perception is functionally A perception is functionally

reducible to an reducible to an intermediate step in the intermediate step in the information processing of information processing of sensorisensori--motor coordinationmotor coordination

• Therefore it is similar to the Therefore it is similar to the activity pattern of hidden activity pattern of hidden units in aunits in an artificialn artificial neural neural network and is describable network and is describable as a vector in a state as a vector in a state space.space.


Naturalising perceptions according to the Naturalising perceptions according to the RATRAT

Neural implementationNeural implementation• Perceptions as vectors Perceptions as vectors

in a space state are in a space state are biologically biologically implemented by the implemented by the dynamics of brain dynamics of brain processes.processes.


Criticisms on the RATCriticisms on the RAT1.1. The sensory motor coordination does not need any The sensory motor coordination does not need any

inner representation of the external world inner representation of the external world (Antirepresentationalism; e.g. Brooks’ robots).(Antirepresentationalism; e.g. Brooks’ robots).

2.2. Perceptions are conscious. Brain processes cannot Perceptions are conscious. Brain processes cannot be conscious (Mind-Body Problem: can be conscious (Mind-Body Problem: can consciousness be naturalised?)consciousness be naturalised?)..

3.3. Perceptions are ‘intentional’ states. No brain process Perceptions are ‘intentional’ states. No brain process can be ‘intentional’ (semantic relations are not can be ‘intentional’ (semantic relations are not reducible to causal relations):reducible to causal relations):

a)a) The possibility of deceptive perceptionsThe possibility of deceptive perceptionsb)b) The neural implementation of contentsThe neural implementation of contentsc)c) The identification of a real object by means of a phenomenal The identification of a real object by means of a phenomenal

object.object.


Criticisms on the RATCriticisms on the RAT

1.1. The sensory motor coordination does not The sensory motor coordination does not need any inner representation of the external need any inner representation of the external world (Antirepresentationalism; e.g. Brooks’ world (Antirepresentationalism; e.g. Brooks’ robots).robots).


A reply to (1)A reply to (1)Mice in a labyrinthMice in a labyrinth


A reply to (1)A reply to (1)

M1M1ss recognise red (R), green (G) and yellow (Y) recognise red (R), green (G) and yellow (Y) colours and follow these rules:colours and follow these rules:

1)1) ‘‘If R go to right’If R go to right’2)2) ‘‘If G go to left’,If G go to left’,3)3) ‘ ‘If Y go ahead’If Y go ahead’ Therefore they are able to reach the food if theyTherefore they are able to reach the food if they enter enter

the labyrinth from South. If they enter from West the labyrinth from South. If they enter from West they have no chance to reach the food.they have no chance to reach the food.



M2M2ss instead enter the labyrinth sometimes from South instead enter the labyrinth sometimes from South and sometimes from West. and sometimes from West. TThey hey can can reach the food reach the food in both cases becausein both cases because they are able to they are able to rememberremember from which entrance they came and to from which entrance they came and to learnlearn by trial by trial and error that if they enter from South they must and error that if they enter from South they must follow the rule (1) but if they enter from West they follow the rule (1) but if they enter from West they must follow the rule (1must follow the rule (1**)), , that is, ‘If R go ahead’. that is, ‘If R go ahead’.



M3M3ss are able to construct by trials and errors a are able to construct by trials and errors a mapmap of the of the labyrinth. They labyrinth. They rememberremember that after entering the labyrinth from that after entering the labyrinth from South they weSouth they wentnt to East to East asas they turn they turneded to left at the red square. to left at the red square. Moreover they somehow have learned (or have the inborn Moreover they somehow have learned (or have the inborn knowledge) that East and West are opposite directions. knowledge) that East and West are opposite directions. Therefore, even if they Therefore, even if they never never used the entrance West they are used the entrance West they are able to able to forecast forecast that if they entered the labyrinth from West that if they entered the labyrinth from West they should go ahead at the red square instead of going to right they should go ahead at the red square instead of going to right as they always did till that moment in their life.as they always did till that moment in their life.



In other words, the richer and more ‘objective’ the In other words, the richer and more ‘objective’ the representation of the labyrinth is the more flexible representation of the labyrinth is the more flexible and efficient the behaviour of the mouse is.and efficient the behaviour of the mouse is.

Similarly human beings cannot work like Brooks’ Similarly human beings cannot work like Brooks’ robots. They need an inner representation of the robots. They need an inner representation of the environment in which they act.environment in which they act. Otherwise their Otherwise their behaviour would not be so flexible as it is. Mental behaviour would not be so flexible as it is. Mental representations are in humans ‘multi-purpose’ representations are in humans ‘multi-purpose’ representations.representations.



2.2. Perceptions are conscious. Brain processes Perceptions are conscious. Brain processes cannot be conscious (Mind-Body Problem: cannot be conscious (Mind-Body Problem: can consciousness be naturalised?)can consciousness be naturalised?)..



There is a double disjunction between perception There is a double disjunction between perception and consciousness:and consciousness:

• BlindsightBlindsight• Anton’s syndromeAnton’s syndrome


BlindsightBlindsight

Blindsight allows people Blindsight allows people to use visual to use visual information they get information they get through their eyes even through their eyes even though they have no though they have no consciousness of the consciousness of the visual experiencevisual experience..

Perception without consciousnessPerception without consciousness


The doctor asks what is The doctor asks what is on the table in front of on the table in front of youyou: : “A clock” you say “A clock” you say as though the doctor is as though the doctor is an idiot.an idiot.

Anton’s syndrome

Consciousness without perceptionConsciousness without perception


A reply to (2)A reply to (2)• Conclusion: you can perceive something without been Conclusion: you can perceive something without been

aware of perceiving it and you can be aware of aware of perceiving it and you can be aware of perceiving something without really perceiving it.perceiving something without really perceiving it.

• Consciousness and perception are two distinct Consciousness and perception are two distinct phenomana implemented by different brain phenomana implemented by different brain processes.processes.

• The RAT naturalises only ‘mere perceptions’, that is, The RAT naturalises only ‘mere perceptions’, that is, the functional basis common to all perceptions the functional basis common to all perceptions independently of their being conscious or independently of their being conscious or unconscious.unconscious.



3.3. Perceptions are ‘intentional’ states. No brain Perceptions are ‘intentional’ states. No brain process can be ‘intentional’ (semantic process can be ‘intentional’ (semantic relations are not reducible to causal relations are not reducible to causal relations):relations):

a)a) The possibility of deceptive perceptionsThe possibility of deceptive perceptions


S

O*

RF. Dretske’s theory:R(O*)R(O*) is true iff OOBB is true.

A girl sees a cat and her perception is true because it is caused by an animal that is really a cat.

B

O

A reply to (3a)A reply to (3a)

B


S

O*

RThe girl is looking at a squirrel but in the dark she sees a cat:O’O’ R(O*) R(O*) is true but R(O*)R(O*) is false.

BB

O‘

An objection on Dretske‘s theoryAn objection on Dretske‘s theory


The RAT reply to (3a) The RAT reply to (3a)

The girls pursues the goal G to carry the cat in her arms

(D(G*)D(G*)) and executes an action A in order to get G. Perceiving the cat (R(O*)R(O*)) is necessary to get G because A is caused by

D(GD(G**) & R(O*)) & R(O*)::

OR(O*) [& D(G*)]AG



D(G*) R(O*)

B

G

OA

T1

T2


R(O*)

Dretske’s theory

O


B

MindMind

BodyBody

SS

Physical worldPhysical world

The RAT

Physical worldPhysical worldO

MindMind

R(O*) D(G*)

R(S*)R(S*)R(W*)R(W*)R(W* S*)R(W* S*)

SS

G

BodyBody B Hand etc.

Emotions



(a) is a valid objection against Dretske’s theory (a) is a valid objection against Dretske’s theory but not against the RAT.but not against the RAT.



3.3. Perceptions are ‘intentional’ states. No brain Perceptions are ‘intentional’ states. No brain process can be ‘intentional’ (semantic process can be ‘intentional’ (semantic relations are not reducible to causal relations are not reducible to causal relations):relations):

b)b) Semantic relations are necessary Semantic relations are necessary conceptual relations. Causal relations are conceptual relations. Causal relations are contingent empirical relations: how can a contingent empirical relations: how can a chain of causal relations implement a chain of causal relations implement a semantic relation?semantic relation?


A reply to (3b)A reply to (3b)

CContents can be naturalised by means of the ontents can be naturalised by means of the ‘adverbial theory’ (of perceptions etc.). “I see ‘adverbial theory’ (of perceptions etc.). “I see red” means “I see redly”: the content of a red” means “I see redly”: the content of a mental representation is part of its form. mental representation is part of its form. Therefore it can be implemented by certain Therefore it can be implemented by certain physical properties of a brain processphysical properties of a brain process..


An objection to the adverbial theoryAn objection to the adverbial theory

1 1

I see a green squareI see a green square I see a red circle

2 2

I see a red squareI see a red squareI see a green circle

I see greenly, squarely, redly, and I see greenly, squarely, redly, and circularycirculary

Distinguishing Distinguishing between (1) and (2) is between (1) and (2) is impossibleimpossible..


A reply to 3b(In defence of adverbial theory)

• Many neuroscientists think that the form and Many neuroscientists think that the form and the colour of a same object are connected by the the colour of a same object are connected by the brain thanks to a common temporal codebrain thanks to a common temporal code (synchronisation). (synchronisation).

• Therefore the difference between perceiving Therefore the difference between perceiving (1) and perceiving (2)(1) and perceiving (2) might be implemented by the might be implemented by the difference between difference between two dynamics of the braintwo dynamics of the brain..


Criticisms on the RATCriticisms on the RAT3.3. Perceptions are ‘intentional’ states. No brain Perceptions are ‘intentional’ states. No brain

process can be ‘intentional’ (semantic relations process can be ‘intentional’ (semantic relations are not reducible to causal relations):are not reducible to causal relations):

c)c) A functional state of the brain cannot identify A functional state of the brain cannot identify the real object from which is caused and on the real object from which is caused and on which the action of the agent is directed.which the action of the agent is directed.

Therefore the RAT is insufficient to explain why Therefore the RAT is insufficient to explain why perceptions are instead sufficient to identify perceptions are instead sufficient to identify external objects.external objects.


A reply to 3c: the 1-eaters and the 2-A reply to 3c: the 1-eaters and the 2-eaterseaters

11000200000000200000001100000002000000020000110000000000000000000011222200222200000000001100000000000020000200110000000000000000000011222222????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????

1000200000010000000200100000000001222200000010000000201000200000010000000200100000000001222200000010000000200100000000001222??????????????????????????????0100000000001222??????????????????????????????

10001000220000001000000000100000000000220010000000001000000000010001222222220000001000000100000000000000220010000001000000000010000001222?222???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????

Which is the right representation? Which is the right representation?

It depends on what you eat!It depends on what you eat!


A reply to (3c): frogs and A reply to (3c): frogs and fliesflies

• A frog recognizes flies as food only if A frog recognizes flies as food only if they are moving.they are moving.

• We human beings instead recognize We human beings instead recognize

flies as flies independently of their flies as flies independently of their movements.movements.

• Therefore, the representation that an Therefore, the representation that an animal has of its environment is animal has of its environment is functional to the actions that it is able functional to the actions that it is able to execute in that environment.to execute in that environment.


A reply to (3c): frogs and A reply to (3c): frogs and fliesflies

• It is not the case that we human It is not the case that we human beings see flies as they are, beings see flies as they are, frogs instead see them as they frogs instead see them as they appear to them.appear to them.


A reply to (3c)A reply to (3c)• Mental representations are Mental representations are constructionsconstructions of of

the mind (=brain), not the the mind (=brain), not the copiescopies of real of real objects.objects.

• There is similarity between the activity There is similarity between the activity patterns of hidden units in an artificial neural patterns of hidden units in an artificial neural network and mental representations: they are network and mental representations: they are a a representation (= a state space partition)representation (= a state space partition) of the input apt to get the desired output.of the input apt to get the desired output.

• Every species lives in its own Every species lives in its own phenomenalphenomenal world adapted to a certain kind of interaction world adapted to a certain kind of interaction with the with the realreal physical world. physical world.


ConclusionConclusion• Perceptions can be naturalised only if the Perceptions can be naturalised only if the

common sense concept of ‘perception’ is common sense concept of ‘perception’ is radically changed: perceptions are not radically changed: perceptions are not copiescopies of of real objects passively received from the external real objects passively received from the external world but formats given to sensory inputs in world but formats given to sensory inputs in order to order to constructconstruct a stable and multi-purpose a stable and multi-purpose model of reality that is able to control the very model of reality that is able to control the very flexible behaviour of human beings.flexible behaviour of human beings.

• TheseThese perceptions can be functionally reduced perceptions can be functionally reduced and therefore can be implemented by brain and therefore can be implemented by brain processes.processes.


Action theory and cognitive turnAction theory and cognitive turn

by Sandro Nanniniby Sandro Nannini

(University of Siena)(University of Siena)


Linguistic turn and cognitive Linguistic turn and cognitive turnturn

• From the meaning of psychological terms to From the meaning of psychological terms to empirical hypotheses on the nature of mental states empirical hypotheses on the nature of mental states (from G. Ryle to naturalism in the philosophy of (from G. Ryle to naturalism in the philosophy of mind).mind).

• My aim is to defend the causal theory of action from My aim is to defend the causal theory of action from a naturalistic point of view by doing a “cognitive a naturalistic point of view by doing a “cognitive turn” in action theory as well.turn” in action theory as well.


““Intentionalists” and Intentionalists” and “causalists”“causalists”

Intentional explanationsIntentional explanations• ““She raised her arm because she intended to greet a She raised her arm because she intended to greet a

friend”.friend”.• ““She did X because she intended to get Y”She did X because she intended to get Y”..• ““A did X because A intended to get Y and believed A did X because A intended to get Y and believed

that doing X had brought about her getting Y”.that doing X had brought about her getting Y”.

• IIAA(Y) (Y) B BAA(X(XY) Y) X X



Intentional descriptionsIntentional descriptions• ““She raised her arm because she intended to raise it”She raised her arm because she intended to raise it”• ““She did X because she intended to do X”She did X because she intended to do X”..• ““Her doing X was intentional”.Her doing X was intentional”.

• IIAA(X) (X) X X

• Every intentional explanation implies an intentional Every intentional explanation implies an intentional description; “description; “IIAA(Y) (Y) B BAA(X (X Y)Y)X” can be so X” can be so

expanded:expanded:

• 1) I1) IAA(Y) (Y) B BAA(X (X Y)Y) IIAA(X)(X)

• 2) 2) IIAA(X)(X) X X



“The logical connection argument”“The logical connection argument”• L. Wittgenstein, G. Anscombe, A. Melden, and G.H. von L. Wittgenstein, G. Anscombe, A. Melden, and G.H. von

Wright: the causal theory of action is false because it is Wright: the causal theory of action is false because it is logically impossiblelogically impossible that an intention is the cause of an that an intention is the cause of an action.action.

• 1) The direct “Logical connection argument”: In 1) The direct “Logical connection argument”: In ““IIAA(X)(X)X” the relation “X” the relation “” cannot be causal because ” cannot be causal because IIAA(X)(X) mentions mentions X.X.

• 2) The “verification argument” (von Wright): the 2) The “verification argument” (von Wright): the presence of presence of IIAA(X)(X) can be verified only by means of the can be verified only by means of the presence of X. presence of X.



“The logical connection argument”“The logical connection argument”1) The direct “Logical connection argument”: In 1) The direct “Logical connection argument”: In

““IIAA(X)(X)X” “X” “” cannot be causal because “” cannot be causal because “IIAA(X)(X)” ” mentionsmentions “X” – “X” – Reply: in an intentional explanation X is Reply: in an intentional explanation X is explained by explained by IIAA(Y) and not by I(Y) and not by IAA(X)(X)..

• 2) The “verification argument” (von Wright): the 2) The “verification argument” (von Wright): the presence of “presence of “IIAA(X)(X)” can be verified only by means of the ” can be verified only by means of the presence of X. – presence of X. – Reply: verification Reply: verification explanation. The explanation. The example drawn by C.G. Hempel. example drawn by C.G. Hempel.

• The Logical Connection Argument (LCA) does not prove The Logical Connection Argument (LCA) does not prove that intentional explanations are not causal that intentional explanations are not causal explanations.explanations.


““The killer nephew”The killer nephew”

However, intentionalists have still an argument against the However, intentionalists have still an argument against the causal character of intentional description.causal character of intentional description.

““The killer nephew” (KN) proves that intentional The killer nephew” (KN) proves that intentional descriptions cannot be based on causal relations because descriptions cannot be based on causal relations because there are cases where “there are cases where “IIAA(X)(X) X” is true but “ X” is true but “IIAA(X)(X)

X” is false.X” is false.

Usual reply: the wayward causal chains.Usual reply: the wayward causal chains.


““The killer alpinist”The killer alpinist”

Counter-reply: “the killer alpinist”.Counter-reply: “the killer alpinist”.

However, either the state of excitement caused the release However, either the state of excitement caused the release of the rope at least an instant before than planned or the of the rope at least an instant before than planned or the death of the hated friend was caused death of the hated friend was caused bothboth intentionally intentionally and unintentionally (that is, the ‘killer alpinist’ is a and unintentionally (that is, the ‘killer alpinist’ is a strange case of strange case of co-determinationco-determination by the same cause but by the same cause but considered under two distinct descriptions since the considered under two distinct descriptions since the same mental state is implicitly described both as the same mental state is implicitly described both as the intention of killing the friend and as a mere state of intention of killing the friend and as a mere state of excitement).excitement).


Intentional content and causal Intentional content and causal explanationsexplanations

But the ‘killer nephew’ and ‘the killer alpinist’ in spite of these limits But the ‘killer nephew’ and ‘the killer alpinist’ in spite of these limits throw light on a weaken point of the causal theory of action that a throw light on a weaken point of the causal theory of action that a causalist cannot evade: Intentions do not explain actions (or causalist cannot evade: Intentions do not explain actions (or describe them as intentional) simply because they are the causes describe them as intentional) simply because they are the causes of the corresponding actions but also because of their of the corresponding actions but also because of their contentcontent. In . In order to intentionally describe the intentional action of doing X it order to intentionally describe the intentional action of doing X it is not sufficient to show that the action was executed because of is not sufficient to show that the action was executed because of the intention of doing X. It is also necessary to show that the the intention of doing X. It is also necessary to show that the intention was not causally efficacious merely thanks to its being a intention was not causally efficacious merely thanks to its being a state of excitement whatsoever but thanks to its content, that is, to state of excitement whatsoever but thanks to its content, that is, to its being the intention its being the intention ofof doing X. doing X.


Intentionality naturalisedIntentionality naturalisedConceptual analysisConceptual analysis

Intentional and non-intentional Intentional and non-intentional descriptionsdescriptions

• 1) S caused the death of the friend1) S caused the death of the friend• 2) S was P (an intention) and P’ (a state of excitement)2) S was P (an intention) and P’ (a state of excitement)• 3) S would have caused the death of the friend even if it 3) S would have caused the death of the friend even if it

was not P’ provided it was P.was not P’ provided it was P.• If instead the first alpinist committed only an involuntary If instead the first alpinist committed only an involuntary

manslaughter then (1) and (2) are still true but (3) is manslaughter then (1) and (2) are still true but (3) is substituted bysubstituted by

• 3*) S would have caused the death of the friend even if it 3*) S would have caused the death of the friend even if it was not P provided it was P’.was not P provided it was P’.


Intentionality naturalisedIntentionality naturalisedConceptual analysisConceptual analysis

The “adverbial theory of intentionality” The “adverbial theory of intentionality” (ATI)(ATI)

How can intentionality be a monadic property P?How can intentionality be a monadic property P?This is possible if, for example, “I see a red spot” is This is possible if, for example, “I see a red spot” is

equivalent to “I see equivalent to “I see red-spotlyred-spotly”, that is, if the ”, that is, if the contentcontent of a of a mental state is interpreted as mental state is interpreted as extensionallyextensionally identical to the identical to the formform of the physical process that implements it. of the physical process that implements it.

However, unless one accepts the mind-body dualism this is However, unless one accepts the mind-body dualism this is not plausible within the limits of the observable open not plausible within the limits of the observable open behavior. behavior. The examples of the KN or KA cannot be The examples of the KN or KA cannot be rejected only by means of the conceptual analysis of rejected only by means of the conceptual analysis of common language. Causalists need a “cognitive turn” to common language. Causalists need a “cognitive turn” to justify ATI!justify ATI!


Intentionality naturalisedIntentionality naturalisedcognitive sciences (1)cognitive sciences (1)

The argument of the wayward causal chains becomes obvious and The argument of the wayward causal chains becomes obvious and clear if we take into account not only the open behavior but alsoclear if we take into account not only the open behavior but also the the part of the causal chain that is internal to the brain.part of the causal chain that is internal to the brain.

For example, voluntary movements are prepared in the prefrontal For example, voluntary movements are prepared in the prefrontal cortex, emotions (excitement etc.) are implemented in the lymbic cortex, emotions (excitement etc.) are implemented in the lymbic system instead.system instead.

Moreover if mental representations and desires drive voluntary Moreover if mental representations and desires drive voluntary movements then the content of mental states might be implemented movements then the content of mental states might be implemented by the dynamics of the brain processes that process information by the dynamics of the brain processes that process information from sensory inputs to motor responses. Artificial networks offer a from sensory inputs to motor responses. Artificial networks offer a model for the dynamics of such processes.model for the dynamics of such processes.


Intentionality naturalisedIntentionality naturalisedcognitive sciences (2)cognitive sciences (2)

• Mental states are implemented by brain processesMental states are implemented by brain processes• Intentional actions and unintentional actions are caused by different brain Intentional actions and unintentional actions are caused by different brain

processesprocesses• The content of our mental states, given a certain train of sensory stimuli, The content of our mental states, given a certain train of sensory stimuli,

has been established by biological evolution in a way functional to the has been established by biological evolution in a way functional to the requirements of the sensori-motor co-ordination in order to surviverequirements of the sensori-motor co-ordination in order to survive

• The content of mental states is implemented by the dynamics of the neural The content of mental states is implemented by the dynamics of the neural processes that implement such statesprocesses that implement such states

• This dynamics controls the motor response necessary to improve the This dynamics controls the motor response necessary to improve the probability of survivingprobability of surviving

• Therefore the Intentionality of mental states is naturalizable and plays an Therefore the Intentionality of mental states is naturalizable and plays an essential role in the essential role in the causalcausal chain that connects our brain processes to our chain that connects our brain processes to our bodily movements (i.e., in a naturalistic perspective, the causal chain that bodily movements (i.e., in a naturalistic perspective, the causal chain that connects our mental states to our actions, including our intentional connects our mental states to our actions, including our intentional actions).actions).


The causal theory of action The causal theory of action rescuedrescued

• Therefore the recent philosophy of mind oriented Therefore the recent philosophy of mind oriented towards naturalism has completely rescued the good towards naturalism has completely rescued the good old-fashioned causal theory of action from the old-fashioned causal theory of action from the attacks of which it was the object during the fifties attacks of which it was the object during the fifties and the sixties by Neowittgensteinians.and the sixties by Neowittgensteinians.


Tahnk you for your attention!Tahnk you for your attention!


Thank you for your attention!Thank you for your attention!

siena, ls09 - intenzionalità1 la naturalizzazione dell’intenzionalità sandro nannini...

Documents