sigelman sentencing transcript

8/21/2019 Sigelman Sentencing Transcript

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United States District Court

Camden, New Jersey

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

______________________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiffs

vs. NO. CRIM. 14-263

JOSEPH SIGELMAN,

Defendant. SENTENCE

______________________________ UNITED STATES COURTHOUSEONE JOHN F. GERRY PLAZA

4TH AND COOPER STREETSCAMDEN, NEW JERSEY 08101JUNE 16, 2015

B E F O R E: THE HONORABLE JOSEPH E. IRENAS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

A P P E A R A N C E S:

U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICEBY: PATRICK STOKES, ESQUIRE

ZACH INTRATER, ESQUIRE

TAREK HELOU, ESQUIREFor the Government

QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN, LLPBY: WILLIAM BURCK, ESQUIRE

WILLIAM PRICE, ESQUIREJUAN MORILLO, ESQUIREVERONICA YEPEZ, ESQUIRE

Counsel for Defendant

Certified as true and correct as required by

Title 28, U.S.C., Section 753./S/ Karen Friedlander, CRR, RMR


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THE DEPUTY CLERK: All rise.

(OPEN COURT, June 16, 2015, 10:05 a.m.)

THE COURT: Good morning, everybody. Please be

seated.

Okay. This is the day set for the sentencing of Mr.

Sigelman based on the plea that was taken yesterday. I did

receive, this morning, a sentencing memorandum from both the

government and the defendant. I do -- I'm going to want to

talk for a minute about the government's submission, but the

first issue I want to deal with is -- in the normal sentencing

process, when there's not an 11(c)(1)(C), when there's just a

plea or a finding of guilty, the sentencing is a three-step

process. And the first step is calculating the guidelines,

and that, of course, is an adversary proceeding. Each side

has its motive for, you know, wanting high or low, to the

extent it becomes a factor in the first -- in the third stage

under 3553(a).

Here, the government says, well, I should do that here.

They even put a brief, the government likes to lecture me, and

the -- but they come up with a range of anywhere from 24 to 32

based on a varying assumptions. Tell me, how --

MR. STOKES: Sure.

THE COURT: How am I going to make these assumptions

in a non-adversarial context, where neither side really cares

what it is?


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MR. STOKES: That's right, Your Honor. And our point

-- our point was that, it is our understanding that the Court

would want to have that information. We recognize and we, in

fact, say in our sentencing memorandum, that we don't think

it's necessary. In fact, we think because of the range that's

been stipulated to, the guidelines range here isn't

particularly relevant --

THE COURT: I mean, I don't even think that -- I

mean, I think the Third Circuit holding us to the proper,

which, of course, I agree with and I follow it hundreds of

times, I mean, I you know, is in the -- was not an 11(c)(1)(C)

situation. It was just --

MR. STOKES: Understand. We're not asking the Court

-- we're simply -- if the Court wanted the information, we

wanted to make sure it was available, so if there's been a

waive of PSR we --

THE COURT: Well, I see -- I see draft PSRs for

Weisman and Hammarskjold and that gave me a --

MR. STOKES: Fair enough, Your Honor.

THE COURT: It may not be quite identical. Their

plea may be a little different in some ways than his, but it's

very similar as to -- as to the, in effect, Count 1 or the

equivalent of Count 1.

MR. STOKES: That's right.

THE COURT: The conspiracy with a five-year max, and


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-- Mr. Sigelman's plea focused on the Foreign Corrupt

Practices Act. Well, I think maybe Weisman's and Hammarskjold

was on both of the frauds.

MR. STOKES: That's right. We haven't seen --

THE COURT: Even though it's one -- even though it's

one conspiracy.

MR. STOKES: Right.

THE COURT: They allocuted to both of them, where Mr.

Sigelman, in effect, allocuted basically to the Foreign

Corrupt Practices Act.

MR. STOKES: That's right. And I believe in their

plea agreement they stipulated to a guidelines calculation.

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. STOKES: That is roughly 33, if I'm not mistaken.

THE COURT: Yeah. Right. So I really hesitate here

to make a finding --

MR. STOKES: Your Honor --

THE COURT: As I say, I'm aware of what the range is.

I mean, I understand that the most favorable calculation

might -- in your brief, would be a 24, which would take him

down to a 51 to 63 range. And then it goes up from there.

MR. STOKES: Sure.

THE COURT: It could go up as high, where the high

end would be in the nineties or maybe even over a hundred,

depending on how you go, but --


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MR. STOKES: We understand, Your Honor --

THE COURT: It's not -- it's not my intention to make

a finding.

MR. STOKES: Okay.

THE COURT: I just -- this is not an adversary

proceeding, and it should be an adversary proceeding.

MR. STOKES: Right.

THE COURT: Even if there's stipulations, you know,

it's still an adversary proceeding. Here, neither side paid

any attention -- really paid any attention to that.

MR. STOKES: We agree, Your Honor. We don't think

it's necessary. We wanted to make sure the Court had the

information if it needed it.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, as I say, I, to some degree,

had something quite similar -- I had something quite similar

with Weisman and Hammarskjold, so I don't know if it's exact,

but I mean it certainly gave me an order of magnitude that was

pretty similar.

And by the way, just I note that when the plea is to a

371, but with no substantive plea on a substantive charge,

it's actually quite frequent that the guidelines exceed the

statutory max. Because the conspiracy guidelines take you

back to the, whatever crime you're conspiring, and frequently

that has a much higher guideline. And this is, in a sense, an

example of that, where, if you follow the guidelines, you're


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going to wind up with a number that exceeds the statutory

five-year maximum, so...

All right. The way I'm going to proceed, I'm really

going to proceed -- I'm going to really go to the third stage,

you know, the 3553(a). I'm going to hear from -- well,

whoever is doing -- whoever is doing the argument, from the

lawyer. I'm then going to hear -- by the way, if you have

anybody you want to speak, you know, like a family member or a

coworker or something, I'm going to let you orchestrate that.

I'm not saying you have to do that, but if you want to do it,

you just say, I want to -- I want to hear from so and so.

He'll come up to the podium, give his name and then he'll say

whatever -- he or she will say whatever they want to say.

But when you finish your presentation, I'm going to

offer Mr. Sigelman the chance. It's his constitutional right,

but I always -- I like to hear it and the -- well, and then

I'll turn it over to the government to give its take.

I'm going to alert the government to one thing that, I

don't know if it upset me is the right word, but sort of

caught my attention. The government filed a 25-page brief,

arguing very vigorously for a year sentence, or a year and a

day sentence, and pretty much implying that anything else

would not be a reasonable sentence, and I take issue with

that. Because when you do an 11(c)(1)(C), I never had one

with a range, by the way. Every one I've ever done has just


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been a number, you know, 132 months, 156 months, 84 months,

whatever it is, 33 months, you know. It's been a number.

This is the first one, believe it or not, I've ever

seen with a range, and this district has a history of being

hostile to 11(c)(1)(C)'s district wide. It was something the

U.S. -- a string of U.S. attorneys did not like and that's why

we never had them, or never had very many of them.

But my view is that when the government comes to me

with an agreement and says this is the range, they are, by

definition, saying, anything within this range is reasonable.

Because, otherwise, the government is in the position of

saying, I've agreed to this range, but I think it's

unreasonable, you know, the low end is unreasonable at this

range. Do you follow what I'm saying?


THE COURT: I think the nature of -- you know, in a

regular sentencing, you just take your position. Whatever

your position is, you take it. Here, though, you have in

advance signed an agreement, which in effect says, anything

within this very narrow range is reasonable. And for me to

receive a brief which is telling me, if you don't do what I

think -- anything else would be unreasonable --

MR. STOKES: Your Honor, we don't say that.

THE COURT: I have a feeling I'm being played with,

you know, maybe shift to me the criticism.


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MR. STOKES: Your Honor, first, we -- to be fair, we

did not say that in the brief. What we've said in the brief

is, we believe that an appropriate sentence here is, is the

top end of the range. We understand that we stipulated to a

range, and we understand that the Court --

THE COURT: But it's more than just -- when you

stipulate to it, you're saying it's reasonable; otherwise,

you're in the position of saying, I stipulated to that, but I

think it's unreasonable.

MR. STOKES: And we've not said that, Your Honor.

What we've said is that we believe, in light of all the facts

and the circumstances in the 3553(a) factors, we think that

the appropriate sentence here is the sentence we've

recommended. We've certainly not said that a sentence

somewhere else in the range is unreasonable. And we've said

that nowhere in our filing, and we certainly don't mean to say

that, Your Honor.

Our point is, we think that the appropriate outcome

here is as we've set it forth. We understand the defense

argument is what it is and -- and, you know, we've certainly

had discussions with the defense about that fact, we've had

discussions with the Court about that fact.

THE COURT: No, I --

MR. STOKES: And this is -- this is our position, but

we're certainly not intending to shift any blame anywhere or


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suggest anything.

THE COURT: Well, just be alert to how it hit me.

MR. STOKES: Mm-hmm. Certainly, Your Honor, our only

point was to let the Court know that we feel that this is our

-- we're advocates for the United States. This is our

position. That's all we meant by that, is that we think this

is, from the government's perspective, the right outcome.

We've won some and lost many. We understand that our --

THE COURT: You said won?

MR. STOKES: We've won some arguments, lost many in

courts, and so we are certainly aware of the fact that what we

have --

THE COURT: You're not talking about this case,

you're talking about courts, generally.

MR. STOKES: In general. And so we certainly

understand that the Court may disagree with us and -- and it

certainly is part of the stipulation, that there's a --

there's a range that the Court can sentence in, and we

understand that we have to live with that, and we're simply

making a recommendation as to what we think is the appropriate

sentence here, from our perspective.

THE COURT: Yeah. Again, an 11(c)(1)(C) with a

range, to me, to some degree, is almost a contradiction in

terms, but -- there's a whole concept to the (c)(1)(C). You

agree in advance to what it's going to be and you agree to


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something both sides think is reasonable, but -- all right.

Mr. Burck, or Mr. Price, or both of you.

MR. BURCK: Judge, it will be I.

THE COURT: Can any either work like a ventriloquist?

Can he make it look like you're speaking --

MR. BURCK: It would be much better that way.

THE COURT: But his lips don't move, but he's the

one, your know.

MR. BURCK: It's much better that way.

THE COURT: Like Edgar Bergen and Charlie McCarthy,

you know.

All right.

MR. BURCK: Judge, I won't be very long.

THE COURT: You can take as long as you want.

MR. BURCK: I don't know if you want me to do it here

or if I should do it at the podium.

THE COURT: As you see fit. You know I'm very loosey

about where you stand in the courtroom.

MR. BURCK: And I appreciate that, Judge.

Judge, again, I -- we're not going to take a lot of the

Court's time. The Court has seen two weeks of evidence in

this case, as --

THE COURT: I remember, there was very extensive

pretrial practice.

MR. BURCK: Extreme.


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THE COURT: I mean, motions and stuff, so I've --

I've gotten to see a lot over, you know, in addition to the

two weeks of trial, you know, as you know, we had --

MR. BURCK: A year and-a-half, a year.

THE COURT: Probably a half a dozen interactions over

various motions and things like that.

MR. BURCK: Absolutely, Judge. And Mr. Sigelman, as

you've noted, this case has received some attention, to go to

the fact that his background is also known to you. We've

decided to -- to really focus only on the aspect to give a

little more context to his life and what he's done, so that

you had some more history of his personal life and his work at

Office Tiger, his work at AG&P.

Obviously, his work at PetroTiger ended poorly, ended

badly, and in a plea here, but those other -- his other

businesses and his life with his family and his children.

So, Judge, we really don't want to spend much time

trying to lecture the Judge, lecture you about anything,

because, as we said in our paper --

THE COURT: The only person who has a license to

lecture me is my wife.

MR. BURCK: Exactly, Judge, and --

THE COURT: A license she exercises with great

diligence and frequency.

(Laughter.)


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MR. BURCK: Well, Judge, in the 3553(a) factors we've

said in our brief, we know you've done hundreds, thousands

potentially, sentences. This is not something that we're

going to lecture you about. You under -- you have a better

appreciation of that than anybody in this courtroom does.

So, Judge, our -- and just with respect to the

government's 30-page brief, we didn't have a chance to review

it and --

MR. STOKES: Twenty-five.

THE COURT: Twenty-five page.

MR. BURCK: Excuse me, 25-page brief. We didn't have

a chance to review it and respond to it, and I'm not going to

spend much time responding today. Obviously, the Court is

aware that Mr. Sigelman did not plead to anything related to

the five, really, five and-a-half counts.

THE COURT: Yeah, that's the difference, in a sense.

Even though the statute is the same, the allocution is

different.

MR. BURCK: Exactly, Judge. And he pled to the

object, the FCPA object in the first count. So much of their

brief --

THE COURT: Also he pled it in kind of a willful

blindness concept.

MR. BURCK: Exactly.

THE COURT: As opposed to a actual knowledge concept.


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MR. BURCK: Exactly.

THE COURT: Although as a legal matter they're the

same, but nevertheless there was a slight difference.

MR. BURCK: Exactly, Judge.

THE COURT: In the way the allocution went.

MR. BURCK: Exactly. So much -- most of what the

government has written in its brief, we actually disagree

with, certainly as it applies to the kickbacks and those

allegations, the allegations that the government dropped.

Even as to the FCPA, they largely rely on testimony of Mr.

Weisman, who we believe admitted to making false statements to

the jury, as the Court --

THE COURT: Well, I guess as to the first two

questions on whether -- was it Wednesday?

MR. BURCK: Thursday.

THE COURT: Thursday. The first two questions that

were asked at 8:30 when we started.

MR. BURCK: Right.

THE COURT: Created somewhat of a surprise.

MR. BURCK: Something of a surprise. And I think,

Judge, I think you actually -- you helped him, because you

asked him if he had hallucinated, what he had said.

THE COURT: That's right. The press picked that up.

No, he said he mis-remembered.

MR. BURCK: Mis-remembered, right.


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THE COURT: And I had never heard that word before,

and so I asked him whether he had an -- if that meant he had a

hallucination of some kind, and that was -- that was picked up

by Reuters. Somebody picked it up, Bloomberg.

MR. BURCK: And that was actually the best help that

Mr. Weisman got in those several days he was on the stand,

because, otherwise, he was admitting to making a false

statement to the jury.

But, Judge, all that aside, the fact is that what we'd

like to do is, again, we respect the Court a great deal. We

know the judgement that you have -- tremendous amount of

experience with sentencings and that you understand the facts

of this case, you understand Mr. Sigelman's personal history.

We don't intend to have his family or his friends or his

colleagues come and --

THE COURT: I didn't mean to suggest that you should

do that.

MR. BURCK: No. I just wanted to explain, Judge.

THE COURT: I just wanted to give you the opportunity

if you felt like it.

MR. BURCK: Absolutely, Judge. And typically --

typically we would, but we have viewed this as a

non-adversarial proceeding, and so we thought it would be --

again, we thought that the Court had a very good idea of Mr.

Sigelman's history.


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So Mr. Sigelman will speak briefly to the Court,

address the Court in a moment.

And just one last point. On the Court's point to the

government about 11(c)(1)(C) pleas, that explicitly the rule

says that any sentencing range that's agreed upon is, quote,

appropriate disposition of the case.

So by definition, the government is agreeing.

THE COURT: Well, that was the point I was trying to

make --

MR. BURCK: That's correct.

THE COURT: -- before, is that if you couple an

11(c)(1)(C) with a range, which is itself unusual, but that

anything within that range should, by definition, be deemed

reasonable.

MR. BURCK: That's right, Judge. And, in fact, the

rule requires it. It says that they -- by definition, they

have said it is an appropriate disposition.

So, Judge, as you know, we were asking for a

noncustodial term of probation with the Court's discretion as

to the terms, and the other aspects of the plea that were

already agreed to, and then of course the fine as the Court

deems appropriate.

And with that, Judge, I will ask Mr. Sigelman to stand

and address the Court.

THE COURT: Okay.


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THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, I stand before you today

with humility and remorse. I have tried throughout my life to

hold myself to the highest standards and to live virtuously.

Now, I accept responsibility for the actions that have led to

this plea.

Out from this, and the self-reflection this experience

has engendered, I will strive to earn back trust from those

around me, by my future deeds. I apologize to my family,

friends, and to this community for what has happened. It is

with deep respect to this Court, to the dedicated and selfless

jurors who listened carefully and devoted their time to this

case, to the prosecution, as well, and to the many fine and

hard-working people who have brought this trial together. To

them, I express my gratitude.

I also have a new and deep appreciation for the

instrument of the trial itself. With this, I commit to

leading a good life of -- a life of good works from here.

Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you very much, Mr. Sigelman.

MR. BURCK: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Stokes or Mr. Intrater, whoever is

going to make the argument.

MR. STOKES: I am, for the government, Your Honor.

Your Honor, clearly, the Court is very familiar with

the record, so just as Mr. Burck did not, I'm not going to


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belabor the facts of the case for very long, but I do want to

talk a little bit about what we believe the facts show and --

and why we think that a custodial sentence and, as we've

recommended, a sentence at the top of the range is the

appropriate sentence here, from the government's perspective.

First, Judge, I just want to make an important point,

we think. In the defendant's sentencing memorandum, he

acknowledges making a mistake, and understanding that in the

-- in the, you know, moments after a plea and a sentencing one

day later, I understand that word choice.

But we want to be clear that what the defendant has

admitted to in court, in his plea, is participation in a more

than six-month bribery scheme, in which he directed others and

approved payments, four payments of over $300,000, to a

government official, in order to obtain a contract, an oil

services contract, a Mansarovar contract.

THE COURT: In Colombia.

MR. STOKES: In Colombia. That's more than 45 --

that was worth approximately $45,000,000.

So this -- this wasn't sort of an aberrational moment,

one-time mistake or anything of that nature, but rather this

was a complex long-running scheme in which he, Knut

Hammarskjold and Greg Weisman and lower-level employees were

involved in, in orchestrating surreptitious payments, illegal

payments, what he's acknowledged were intentionally unlawful


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payments, in order to obtain this contract.

And certainly, he's -- he allocuted yesterday to

willful blindness, and what we would point out is, of course,

that willful blindness that he allocuted to relates to the

status of David Duran as an Ecopetrol employee, not with

regard to --

THE COURT: But that's a -- that's a -- that's an

element of the --

MR. STOKES: Absolutely.

THE COURT: -- of the offense. If he -- you knew

that the person you were paying the bribes to was a government

official. I mean, that's actually -- that's an element of the

offense.

MR. STOKES: That's right, Your Honor. And so I just

wanted to be clear that -- that he certainly isn't

acknowledging -- he acknowledges that he was -- he was aware

that he was making unlawful payments.

And -- and so, Judge, you know, we've argued this in --

through pretrial filings, and I think, you know, through our

evidence with Mr. Weisman, and other evidence that we've put

before the Court or described to the Court in the past and

would have put on in this trial, we think our evidence shows

that the defendant was actually aware of Mr. Duran's status,

but that's really of no particular moment to this sentencing,

of course, from a legal standpoint, whether he was


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intentionally blind to certain facts or whether he actually

knew it. It doesn't -- doesn't change, really, anything.

He's no less culpable, but we would simply point out

that the facts we -- we presented and would have presented had

trial continued, we think would have shown that he had, in

fact, greater knowledge.

Putting aside Mr. Weisman's testimony on this fact,

Mr. Hammarskjold would have testified to this fact, as well as

the vice-president of finance, Mr. Calderon, having

overheard -- I described it in our brief, but having overheard

a conversation with Mr. Sigelman in which Mr. Sigelman talked

about paying bribes to -- I'm sorry, Mr. Duran of Ecopetrol

asking for bribe payments.

And so, Your Honor, we -- we think it's important to

recognize, and certainly we have emphasized, that the

defendant's role in this case is not a minimal one. The

defendant was the undisputed leader of PetroTiger. The

evidence indicates that he was the undisputed -- that he was

the leader of this bribery scheme and that he was aware of all

facets. The e-mails and invoices from Johanna Navarro went to

him. He directed the payments. He was aware that these

invoices were false and that this was a cover-up scheme.

So this isn't aberration. The defendant, Your Honor,

is understandably, and appropriately so, which we're not

suggesting otherwise, in the opening and in closing, attacked


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Mr. Weisman, quite effectively, in fact, but in the end, he

has acknowledged the very crimes that Mr. Weisman, himself

acknowledged, Mr. Hammarskjold has acknowledged, and we think

that's important, but he has acknowledged what they -- what

Mr. Weisman testified to, that Mr. Weisman did not go into the

FBI and lie to them about the defendant's involvement in the

FCPA scheme, in order to curry favor.

That Mr. Weisman did not falsely implicate himself on

the FCPA scheme in order to curry favor with the FBI and the

kickback scheme, but rather that he, himself, was involved in

the bribery scheme.

THE COURT: But, in effect, he admitted perjury in

this courtroom.

MR. STOKES: Your Honor, we've taken a look at the

transcript, and I think we have a disagreement with the Court

on that point, but I'm not sure -- it's neither here nor

there, on whether he admitted perjury. We don't believe he

did. What -- but importantly, Your Honor --

THE COURT: It was an hallucination.

MR. STOKES: Certainly the Court suggested that, and

so what we -- Your Honor, what we believe the evidence would

have shown, with our additional witnesses, Mr. Hammarskjold,

Mr. Calderon, other -- Mr. Nunez, who is the treasurer of

PetroTiger, is -- and certainly Mr. Sigelman's own admissions,

is that this FCPA scheme most certainly happened, and Mr.


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Sigelman most certainly was involved in it.

And so we don't think that's a hallucination. We

understand Mr. Weisman was a very problematic witness on the

stand and admitted to making false statements in the

courtroom. We understand that. But the point I'm making,

Your Honor, is that there certainly were other witnesses that

we had brought to the Court's attention. And ultimately, I'm

not sure it matters, but Mr. Sigelman, himself, has

acknowledged the crimes --

THE COURT: But he was facing -- he was facing, like

a 20-year sentence or something like that. We had a jury, he

could have gone ahead. I was -- I had the next four weeks

blocked out to try the case.

MR. STOKES: That's right, Your Honor. We're simply

arguing facts here.

THE COURT: I'm not reluctant to try cases and -- but

you chose to go this route.

MR. STOKES: That's right, Your Honor. And so the

point I'm making is simply that -- is that we have a broad

sweep of evidence that we think supported the admissions that

Mr. Sigelman himself made.

In terms of a sentence, an appropriate sentence, Your

Honor, what we've identified in our memo is, we think the most

important 3553(a) factors are the seriousness of the offense

and general deterrence.


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I'll start with the second first. General deterrence.

In a complex white-collar case, certainly in a FCPA case,

where there are numerous difficulties to obtaining evidence

overseas, there are often opinions -- we are often -- the

government is in a position of obtaining evidence from

overseas, from years past, obtaining witnesses from overseas,

and because of the complex and difficult nature of building

these cases, we think that --

THE COURT: Well, I mean, that's a general statement.

The fact of the matter is, Duran was over in this country, in

fact, wanted to stay here, if he could have arranged it. And

he was, in a sense, in your control. I mean, he was

cooperating with you. Wasn't cooperating with the defense.


THE COURT: So I don't know what difficulty you're

exactly talking about. You had PetroTiger through the

investigation done by Sidley & Austin, basically dumped --

dumped the case in your lap.

MR. STOKES: So --

THE COURT: You know, I mean, so you could talk

generally how difficult this is. There may have been certain

legal issues, but -- what was difficult? What was the

particular difficulty here? You had --

MR. STOKES: Sure.

THE COURT: -- two co-conspirators pled guilty early


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on cooperating, alleged co-conspirators. You had Duran, here

right in the country talking to you. It was not as if, you

know, he was hiding somewhere in the jungle of Colombia to

avoid -- he actually wanted to be here. And then you had

Sidley & Austin, turned over thousands and thousands of -- I

think it was 4,000 pages. I can't remember the number, but it

was some very large number of documents, and had done -- you

know, and Sidley does this kind of work in other context. I

mean, they know what they're doing, and they -- you know, and

they did all this investigation.

You know, you tell me as a general matter, it's hard to

prove Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. I guess as a generic

form of --

MR. STOKES: Absolutely, Your Honor.

THE COURT: -- that's difficult. But in this case,

what was the difficulty?

MR. STOKES: And, Your Honor, there's ample Third

Circuit case law, Supreme Court case law, and otherwise on the

point of general deterrence. And the point I'm making is

simply a general point, that the white -- complex white-collar

financial crimes are difficult to prove, FCPA cases are

difficult to prove, and so, therefore, we believe that a

sentence of incarceration is -- sends an important message

in --

THE COURT: Well, I guess they haven't been in my


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court because I tried several. I tried a nine

and-a-half-month criminal white-collar case, in which I gave

the longest tax fraud sentence ever given, twice what Al

Capone got, for someone who was engaged in a tax fraud trial.

I've done three or four --

MR. STOKES: And we certainly support that.

THE COURT: I've done three or four big white-collar

cases, all resulted in convictions and all resulted in

substantial sentences.

MR. STOKES: Absolutely.

THE COURT: I don't know what you're talking about.

MR. STOKES: So, Your Honor, the point we're making

is again --

THE COURT: You chose not to complete the trial, not

me.

MR. STOKES: Of course. Of course, Your Honor. And

the point we're making is that Mr. Sigelman has admitted the

crime --

THE COURT: In some form, you're going to have to

explain why, but maybe not here.

All right. Go ahead.

MR. STOKES: So, Your Honor, from a general deterrent

standpoint, we believe in all white collar -- complex

white-collar cases, a sentence of incarceration is

appropriate. I don't think that's a surprising argument for


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the government. We think it's appropriate here for that

reason.

THE COURT: And you use the word "appropriate," and,

of course, 11(c)(1)(C) says, agree that a specific sentence or

sentencing range in the -- is the appropriate disposition.

That's actually right from 11(c).

MR. STOKES: Understood.

THE COURT: So, yeah, a year and a day or a year, I

agree, would be appropriate. But equally, probation is

appropriate. By def -- you agreed to that. You can't back

off that. And your brief really does back off that.

MR. STOKES: Your Honor, and we disagree with the

Court, respectfully. And what we're putting forward is

certainly, as the agreement makes clear, Your Honor, we are

permitted to argue for a sentence within the range. That is

what we're doing, and we think it's -- we're entitled -- the

United States is entitled to make such an argument, and so

we're asking for a sentence of incarceration. We believe

general deterrence calls for it, Your Honor.

We also believe that this is a -- that this and these

types of cases are significant cases, and we believe that from

a deterrent standpoint, a sentence of incarceration sends a

more powerful message and, therefore, we ask the Court simply

to take that into account.

We ask for a sentence of incarceration, as we've put


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forth in our brief. We're asking for a sentence at the top

end of the range. We understand the Court may disagree with

that, but that's certainly why the government is reaching the

position it's reaching.

It's certainly not in any way, shape or form attempting

to change the terms of the agreement. We're arguing exactly

what our plea agreement permits us to argue and as the parties

contemplated.

THE COURT: Okay. Anything you want to add?

MR. BURCK: No, Your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, all right. I start with the

basic proposition, that although Mr. Stokes says that his

brief doesn't argue that probation will be an inappropriate

sentence, he really does. I mean, he really -- he really --

he really does argue that. And that the only appropriate

sentence would be the maximum. Doesn't use those words, but

that's the gist of the brief.

And I think that concept is -- of the notion that we

stipulate a range, that there would be a knock-down, drag-out

fight between the two parties, where within the range is

really not contemplated. You know, I don't think that's the

contemplation of 11(c)(1)(C).

So I start with the proposition, that by agreeing to

this, the government has, in fact by stipulation, agreed that

anything within that one-year range, meaning probation to a


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year and a day is and I guess the word, is the "appropriate

disposition." Those are the words in the rule.

And I start with that.

On the -- on the question of general deterrence, I

believe in general deterrence, don't get me wrong. I think

it's, you know, built into the warp and woof of our, you know,

our sentencing regime, has been for 200 years, or however long

we've been sentencing people. Although I do think it could be

overblown, and to some degree, general deterrence is like The

Emperor's New Clothes. I mean, you know what -- you know,

when I do a sentence, is three years enough general

deterrence, is one year enough, is ten years enough? You

know, that's in, really, a category, beauty is in the eyes of

the beholder.

And I believe that, in the case of Mr. Sigelman, at

least, a plea and conviction here has got pretty devastating

consequences for -- from the concept of general deterrence. I

mean, to stand up in a court, you know, and admit a crime like

that, for somebody with his background, you know, who started

-- well, three businesses, and to some degree or other, even

including PetroTiger have been successful, to different

degrees. But I just don't think you can, in his case,

minimize the impact of being a convicted felon. It's as

simple as that.

And, once again, I think when the government agreed


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that that's an appropriate disposition, they're really talking

about the factors of 3553(a), that it's appropriate. Whether

it's general deterrence, specific deterrence, just punishment,

seriousness of the offense, character of the defendant, all

those factors that are in -- and the principle of lenity, of

course, too, which is actually the first sentence of 3553(a),

which is, the sentence shall be no more serious than necessary

-- or severe than necessary to carry out the goals of

sentencing. That's the, I think, the very first -- very first

clause of 3553(a), if I'm not mistake, precedes all the other

seven factors.

Well, so I'm satisfied that -- that not with -- that

anywhere within the range that was allowed, will satisfy the

goals of general deterrence and specific deterrence. I mean,

that's a separate issue, as to whether he, himself, is going

to do it again. And, you know, I have -- there are people

that I sentence in certain kinds of cases that I sentence to

ten years, and I'm convinced they're going to go out, as soon

as they get out, they're going to be, within weeks, doing what

they were doing before they went in ten years earlier.

But that's not the case here. I am convinced that --

that the chance of recidivism in the white-collar field for

Mr. Sigelman is about as low a possibility as almost any case

I've had. I just don't see it.

And again, as to general deterrence, I think in the


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white collar world, that -- at least that we're dealing with

here, that, you know, standing up in a courtroom and pleading

guilty, and as I say, being branded a convicted felon, is a

very serious general deterrence.

I also believe that one of the very first things in

3553(a) is the character of the defendant. Now, clearly, he

showed, I'll call it a character flaw, if you want to call it

that here, in making the decisions he did make, with respect

to the -- that particular contract.

The -- but, in many other respects, you know, Mr.

Sigelman has the potential to do -- well, in fact, has done, I

mean, he's been responsible, in a way, for the employment of

thousands of people who had jobs. Office Tiger employed, I

believe it was thousands, that had thousands of employees, I

think.

MR. BURCK: Right.

THE COURT: I think there was more than 2,000 or

something, employees of Office Tiger.

MR. BURCK: Yes, Your Honor, thousands of employees.

THE COURT: What?

MR. BURCK: Thousands of employees both at Office

Tiger and AG&P.

THE COURT: I knew in Petro -- even PetroTiger had a

fair number -- fair number of employees. I don't remember the

exact number, but it was certainly in the hundreds, if not the


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thousands, and he's got a new venture, which, again, also

holds the possibility of -- of employment. So he has the

potential and proven ability to do great good for society.

And I do believe, as I say, I've done -- I had one year

where I did more than a hundred sentences, just one year, and

I don't know that, you know, that Mr. Sigelman, when it turns

-- when I consider the risk of recidivism, which is something

I always do consider when I sentence anyone and when I'm

looking at deterrence, is about as low as, I believe, I would

find in -- in the full range of cases I've had, which have

included white-collar cases, as well as more traditional fare,

you know, drugs and things of that sort, which I do.

And so I am going to sentence Mr. Sigelman to probation

with a three-year term of supervised release.

One of the issues that has come up was the issue of

whether he could go overseas during probation. I have no

particular opposition to that, but I believe that can be -- I

mean, I don't oppose that, but I think he should get -- get

leave from probation when he does it. He should call them. I

mean, if they turn it down and he thinks they're wrong, he can

come to me and I can decide it.

But I'd feel a little more comfortable if when you go

overseas, that if he had to go to them and say, look, I want

to spend a week in wherever, and I'm going to leave this day,

come back this day, I'm going to stay at this hotel or this


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house, wherever -- wherever he is staying, and -- because

they're going to look not just at the terms of his probation,

but they're going to look at the terms of, you know, is he

doing a good job on probation. And I can't predict now. I

mean, I think it's going to be as clean as a hound's tooth,

but I really don't know. I mean, I think they should have the

right to make that judgment at the time.

And, for instance, if for some reason they thought he

was being noncompliant in certain ways, they might decide that

it's not appropriate to let him go, to travel overseas. Do

you follow me?

So I am not -- I mean, I'm not in any generic sense

opposed to him, you know, keeping up his business and trying

to make it grow and expand it and do whatever he does, but I'd

like it to be cleared on each occasion by probation.

Now, they may, after a year or two, they may say, you

know, well, we'll make a blanket now where he can do -- he's

done it so many times, we're satisfied he's not going to...

But, I really want them to make the call, based on the facts

on the ground at that very moment, whether he can look back

and say, okay, he started his three-year term of probation on

this date and he's had no violations, he's reported fully,

he's done this, he's done that, and they can make the

decision.

And as I say, he always has the right to -- and I


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handle those all the time, where probation has turned

something down and they come to me, the attorneys petition me

to, in effect, overrule them. And sometimes I do, sometimes I

don't. But -- and he has that right.

Now, the next issue I want to deal with, there has been

an agreement that he will pay restitution, and I think it's,

in effect, to PetroTiger. I mean, it will go through the U.S.

Attorney's Office, but --

MR. STOKES: That's right, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I mean, it will go through the clerk of

the court.

MR. STOKES: The clerk's office.

THE COURT: But at the end of the day, it's going to

go back to PetroTiger.

MR. STOKES: That's right.

THE COURT: And the number, I think, is what, 239,000

and change?

MR. STOKES: Yes, Your Honor, it's --

THE COURT: What's the exact number?

MR. STOKES: It's $239,015.54.

THE COURT: Okay. That number he's agreed to make

restitution for, and -- and I believe -- and I'm going to --

I'm going to direct it, that that be paid within 30 days from

today.

MR. STOKES: I believe, if I could correct the


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number, I think we got -- it's not going to make it much of a

difference, but it's $239,015 --

THE COURT: 0015?

MR. STOKES: You have 239,015. 45, not 54.

THE COURT: 45 cents, okay. I want that paid in 30

days. Okay?

The next issue is that a -- a fine. I believe there

should be a fine paid here, and I -- by the way, I confer with

the parties that they agreed I had a right to impose a fine

here. That their (c)(1)(C) agreement did not limit in any way

my discretion in that field. And I'm going to impose a fine

of $100,000. And once again, I want that paid in -- in 30

days.

Now, granted, I don't have -- you know, normally, when

probation does it, there's a form, a financial form you fill

out with your, you know, kind of down and dirty financial

statement that the defendant is supposed to give to the Court.

I don't have that, but I have other indicia.

For instance, I know he has a 500,000-dollar bail

package, which he would be entitled to have returned, and that

would cover, quite candidly, both the restitution number to

PetroTiger and the fine.

But I have every reason to believe there are other very

substantial assets here from, you know, my overall history

here.


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So, even though I don't -- have not seen -- that form

was never filled out, that probation normally gets filled out

when they do a presentence report, I have enough information

from other aspects of this case to say that a

hundred-thousand-dollar fine, and that's within the statutory

limit, the fine is actually the highest of 250 or -- gain or

loss and -- so I want a hundred-thousand-dollar fine paid to

the government.

Also, I'm imposing a special assessment, pursuant to

3013 of Title 18, of $100. That's mandatory. Again, that's

3013, and he has to pay that $100, also within 30 days, I want

that paid.

The -- otherwise, it will be the -- it will be the

standard conditions of probation.

Now, where does he intend to live?

MR. BURCK: In Miami, Your Honor.

THE COURT: In the place that -- in the condo he owns

in Miami?

MR. BURCK: Yes, Your Honor, yes.

THE COURT: All right, then, he will be supervised,

what, by the Miami probation department, their people will be

doing it?

MR. STOKES: Your Honor, that's our best guess. Our

understanding is that that's where he was supervised in the

past, and I would assume that would continue.


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THE COURT: Okay. Once again, I have no particular

aversion to him doing some traveling within the United States,

if -- related to his business ventures, but I want the same

condition. I want him to clear it with, I think it will be

probation in Miami. I want him to clear it with them in

advance. Again, because they have all the facts up to date

and I'm -- right now, I'm predicting what's going to happen to

him, you know, and I don't know. They'll know, if he says, I

want to go to New York because I'm negotiating a deal, I have

to be in New York, you know, for a couple of weeks. But we'll

know how he's done on probation. They'll know whether he

reported, they'll know whether he had any violations, you

know. They'll -- they'll be in a position to analyze that.

And once again, as I say, if counsel thinks it's -- a

mistake has been made or it's inappropriate, they can come to

me and at least I can say, which is not always the case,

sometimes I have prisoners who really don't have, or

probationers or supervised release people who don't have

access -- really have meaningful access to counsel. But he

does. He'll have -- if he needs counsel, he'll do something

-- he can get counsel. I'm satisfied of that. Even with my

impaired vision, my eyes tell me that he'll be able to do

that.

And -- all right. Is there anything else? Oh, I want

to advise the defendant, he does have a right to appeal. He


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has 14 days. You can appeal. Even if you plead guilty, you

can appeal -- you can appeal your sentence. You have a right

-- you have a right to appeal. That -- that doesn't mean the

right hasn't been waived, but that's a different story.

That's a decision that's not made by me. That's made by the

Circuit and, indeed, the clause in this case, even

specifically gives the U.S. Attorney the right to challenge --

if he files an appeal, to challenge that he's waived that

right of appeal, or has waived that post-conviction relief

right.

But still, check with your office, Mr. Intrater, you'll

see how they do it in every case.

MR. INTRATER: Will do, Judge.

THE COURT: But the -- he has a right to appeal and

-- and what makes this unique is that regardless of the advice

he gets from counsel, that's his decision. That's not a

decision that is kind of delegated to counsel. It's not kind

of a strategic or tactical decision in the course of trial,

whether to object or not to object. The attorney can make

that decision. But this is one where, you know, make the

decision to take the stand is only the defendant can make.

So I'm asking Mr. Burck to consult with his client, and

if he wants to appeal, to -- to file a notice of appeal with

the district court clerk. I'm not committing you to taking

the appeal, you understand that. Just if, for some reason, he


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wants to file, that he -- that it gets filed, that's all.

MR. BURCK: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And again, I recognize that he has a very

broad waiver of both the right to appeal and his right to

post-conviction relief. And the government has clearly

reserved the right to bring that -- to move before the

Circuit, and at least in my case, in the few cases where

someone did file, the Circuit has dismissed it on motion. The

U.S. Attorney's Office filed a motion to strike the appeal,

and at least in my -- there were a few cases I've had of that,

been successful. They've been -- in other words, they've

enforced the waiver. I don't know what across the board they

do, but in the few cases that I've had, they've always, to my

knowledge, they've always enforced it. On motion, on motion

practice.

So if you'll do me that favor and, as I say, if he

wants -- if he files an appeal, he's got to either go out and

hire or a lawyer, or you, for that matter, or he can do

whatever he wants to do, but I'm not -- I'm not saying you

have to -- you have to do it. That's something he'll have to

decide on himself.

MR. BURCK: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So with that, if there's nothing further.

MR. STOKES: Your Honor, just, we -- under the plea

agreement, have agreed to dismiss the remaining counts.


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Camden, New Jersey

38

THE COURT: Oh, strike 2 through 7.

MR. STOKES: And as well as the first object of Count

1, the wire fraud object, so --

THE COURT: Do you understand that, Larry? Count 1

had two objects in the conspiracy.

MR. STOKES: It's counts 2 through 6. There are two

separate --

THE COURT: I thought there were seven.

MR. STOKES: No, there's six, but there are two

forfeiture allegations that are related. So those would also

-- we would dismiss those, as well.

THE COURT: Yeah. Subject, of course, to the, you

know, the restitution.

MR. STOKES: Absolutely, subject to.

THE COURT: Okay. Remember, on the first count,

we're dismissing the object of the kickback scheme and --

MR. STOKES: And then Counts 2 through 4 are

substantive FCPA violations, Count 5 is the money laundering

conspiracy.

THE COURT: Money laundering count.

MR. STOKES: Count 6 is the substantive money

laundering charge.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. STOKES: And then there's the first forfeiture

allegation, the second one, which are actually, Judge, just


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Camden, New Jersey

39

for the record, are separate and apart from the restitution,

but we obviously are dismissing the forfeiture allegations, as

well.

THE COURT: Yeah. Okay. We'll -- we'll do that and

if I have any questions as to the form, I'll contact the two

of you. But I think it's pretty straightforward and --

anything else?

MR. ANTONISON: Judge, I have one thing for

probation. Can you waive the mandatory drug testing

conditions?

THE COURT: Yeah. We do -- I wouldn't say all the

time, but -- in white-collar cases where there are no drugs

involved, we waive it routinely.

MR. ANTONISON: I just need you to say it on the

record.

THE COURT: What? All right. Normally, within 15

days of the start -- I think it's 15 -- normally, within 15

days of the start of probation, there's a mandatory drug test.

It's right in the -- it's right in the standard terms and

conditions. It's also true for the first 15 days of

supervised release, mandatory drug test.

I see nothing in this case that has suggested the need

for that.

MR. STOKES: The government doesn't object.

THE COURT: Probation always, at any time, I think,


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Camden, New Jersey

40

has the power to order a drug test, if they want.

MR. ANTONISON: Correct.

THE COURT: For whatever the reason, they suspect

something, they can do it. But I don't see any -- to make it

mandatory on them, 15 days, unless the government has any

objection to that?

MR. STOKES: We don't have any objection.

THE COURT: Okay. I'll waive that.

MR. ANTONISON: Okay. One more thing. Due to the

nature of his business --

THE COURT: Say again, due to the nature of?

MR. ANTONISON: His business, will you add the

self-employment business disclosure special condition as a

condition of probation with the parties' input?

THE COURT: You -- oh, you didn't get a --

MR. ANTONISON: I can show him, Your Honor. The

government has already seen it.

THE COURT: I know what it is. I have -- I have a

copy of it right here. Show it to -- show it to Mr. Burck.

You know the -- Mr. Stokes, there is a standard

condition of either probation or supervised release, that when

somebody goes into business themselves, when they're --

they're, in a sense, self-employed, that they -- there are

certain forms they have to fill out, certain information they

have to give. And I actually have the language because it's


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Camden, New Jersey

41

in the Weisman draft presentence report. That's what he's --

that's what he's raising now, right now.

I guess the reason I hesitated a little bit was that

when you're forming a corporation and there's -- there may be

other shareholders, it's not quite self -- it's kind of --

it's a form of self-employment. I mean, you're an

entrepreneur, but it's not like somebody, you know, who just,

you know, repairs computers, he goes from house to house

repairing, you know -- you know, true self-employment.

What's your feeling, Mr. Burck?

MR. BURCK: We have no objection, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. We will put that in. That's --

that's actually very standard. We do that all the time.

You certainly have no objection to that.

MR. STOKES: No, Your Honor, we think that's

appropriate.

THE COURT: So I'll put that in, as well. But -- all

right, anything else?

MR. BURCK: Not for Mr. Sigelman, Your Honor. Thank

you.

THE COURT: Okay. Anything from the government?

MR. STOKES: Not from the government.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, thank you all for a most

interesting year and-a-half.

RESPONSE: Thank you, Your Honor.


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Camden, New Jersey

42

THE COURT: You don't know what I learned in that

year and-a-half, but some day --

MR. STOKES: You may have learned a little bit about

Ecopetrol.

THE COURT: What?

MR. STOKES: You may have learned a little bit about

Ecopetrol, which we've all learned more about than anything.

THE COURT: Yeah, I don't know. Ecopetrol, when they

went public, filed a 300-and-some-odd page -- and it was not

an S-1, but it was kind of the equivalent of an S-1, with the

Securities and Exchange Commission. Of everybody in this

room, I was the first one who actually read it. Because the

day I was assigned the case, I went on the computer and got it

and read it. So, I did learn -- I did learn that.

MR. STOKES: Right.

THE COURT: And so -- okay.

MR. STOKES: Thank you, Your Honor, we appreciate it.

MR. BURCK: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So long.

(11:01 a.m.)


43/50

$

$100 [2] - 34:10, 34:11

$100,000 [1] - 33:12

$239,015 [1] - 33:2

$239,015.54 [1] -

32:20$300,000 [1] - 17:14

$45,000,000 [1] -

17:19

/

/S [1] - 1:24

0

0015 [1] - 33:3

08101 [1] - 1:10

1

1 [4] - 3:22, 3:23, 38:3,

38:4

10:05 [1] - 2:2

11(c) [1] - 25:6

11(c)(1)(C [7] - 2:11,

3:11, 6:24, 9:22,

15:4, 15:12, 25:4

11(c)(1)(C) [1] - 26:22

11(c)(1)(C)'s [1] - 7:5

11:01 [1] - 42:20

132 [1] - 7:1

14 [1] - 36:1

14-263 [1] - 1:5

15 [5] - 39:16, 39:17,

39:20, 40:5

156 [1] - 7:1

16 [2] - 1:10, 2:2

18 [1] - 34:10

2

2 [3] - 38:1, 38:6,

38:17

2,000 [1] - 29:17

20-year [1] - 21:11200 [1] - 27:7

2015 [2] - 1:10, 2:2

239,000 [1] - 32:16

239,015 [1] - 33:4

24 [2] - 2:20, 4:20

25-page [2] - 6:20,

12:11

250 [1] - 34:6

28 [1] - 1:23

3

30 [4] - 32:23, 33:5,

33:12, 34:11

30-page [1] - 12:7

300-and-some-odd

[1] - 42:93013 [2] - 34:10, 34:11

32 [1] - 2:20

33 [2] - 4:14, 7:2

3553(a [7] - 8:12, 12:1,

21:24, 28:2, 28:6,

28:10, 29:6

3553(a) [2] - 2:17, 6:5

371 [1] - 5:20

4

4 [1] - 38:17

4,000 [1] - 23:6

45 [3] - 17:18, 33:4,

33:5

4TH [1] - 1:9

5

5 [1] - 38:18

500,000-dollar [1] -

33:19

51 [1] - 4:21

54 [1] - 33:4

6

6 [2] - 38:6, 38:21

63 [1] - 4:21

7

7 [1] - 38:1

753 [1] - 1:23

8

84 [1] - 7:1

8:30 [1] - 13:17

A

a.m [2] - 2:2, 42:20

aberration [1] - 19:23

aberrational [1] -

17:20

ability [1] - 30:3

able [1] - 35:22

absolutely [6] - 11:7,

14:21, 18:9, 23:14,

24:10, 38:14

accept [1] - 16:4

access [2] - 35:19

account [1] - 25:24

acknowledged [6] -

17:25, 20:2, 20:3,20:4, 21:9

acknowledges [2] -

17:8, 18:16

acknowledging [1] -

18:16

Act [3] - 4:2, 4:10,

23:12

actions [1] - 16:4

actual [1] - 12:25

add [2] - 26:9, 40:12

addition [1] - 11:2

additional [1] - 20:22

address [2] - 15:2,

15:24admissions [2] -

20:24, 21:20

admit [1] - 27:18

admitted [6] - 13:11,

17:12, 20:12, 20:17,

21:4, 24:17

admitting [1] - 14:7

advance [3] - 7:19,

9:25, 35:6

adversarial [2] - 2:24,

14:23

adversary [4] - 2:14,

5:5, 5:6, 5:9

advice [1] - 36:15

advise [1] - 35:25

advocates [1] - 9:5

AG&P [2] - 11:13,

29:22

agree [6] - 3:10, 5:11,

9:25, 25:4, 25:9

agreed [9] - 7:12,

15:5, 15:21, 25:10,

26:24, 27:25, 32:21,

33:9, 37:25

agreeing [2] - 15:7,

26:23

agreement [9] - 4:12,

7:9, 7:19, 25:14,

26:6, 26:7, 32:6,

33:10, 37:25

ahead [2] - 21:12,

24:21

Al [1] - 24:3

alert [2] - 6:18, 9:2

allegation [1] - 38:25

allegations [4] - 13:9,

38:10, 39:2

alleged [1] - 23:1

allocuted [4] - 4:8,

4:9, 18:2, 18:4

allocution [2] - 12:17,

13:5

allowed [1] - 28:13

almost [2] - 9:23,

28:23

AMERICA [1] - 1:2amount [1] - 14:11

ample [1] - 23:17

analyze [1] - 35:13

AND [1] - 1:9

and-a-half [4] - 11:4,

12:15, 41:24, 42:2

and-a-half-month [1] -

24:2

ANTONISON [6] -

39:8, 39:14, 40:2,

40:9, 40:12, 40:16

apart [1] - 39:1

apologize [1] - 16:8

appeal [14] - 35:25,36:1, 36:2, 36:3,

36:8, 36:9, 36:14,

36:23, 36:25, 37:4,

37:9, 37:17

applies [1] - 13:8

appreciate [2] - 10:19,

42:17

appreciation [2] -

12:5, 16:15

appropriate [21] - 8:3,

8:13, 8:18, 9:20,

15:6, 15:17, 15:22,

17:5, 21:22, 24:25,

25:1, 25:3, 25:5,

25:9, 25:10, 26:15,

27:1, 28:1, 28:2,

31:10, 41:16

appropriately [1] -

19:24

approved [1] - 17:14

argue [4] - 25:15,

26:7, 26:13, 26:15

argued [1] - 18:18

arguing [3] - 6:21,

21:15, 26:6

argument [5] - 6:6,

8:20, 16:22, 24:25,

25:17

arguments [1] - 9:10

arranged [1] - 22:11

aside [2] - 14:9, 19:7

aspect [1] - 11:10

aspects [2] - 15:20,

34:4

assessment [1] - 34:9

assets [1] - 33:24

assigned [1] - 42:13

assume [1] - 34:25


Camden, New Jersey

43

assumptions [2] -

2:21, 2:23

attacked [1] - 19:25

attempting [1] - 26:5

attention [5] - 5:10,

6:20, 11:8, 21:7

Attorney [1] - 36:7

attorney [1] - 36:19Attorney's [2] - 32:8,

37:9

ATTORNEY'S [1] -

1:14

attorneys [2] - 7:6,

32:2

Austin [2] - 22:17,

23:5

available [1] - 3:15

aversion [1] - 35:2

avoid [1] - 23:4

aware [7] - 4:18, 9:11,

12:14, 18:16, 18:23,

19:19, 19:21

B

background [2] -

11:9, 27:19

badly [1] - 11:15

bail [1] - 33:19

based [3] - 2:6, 2:21,

31:19

basic [1] - 26:12

beauty [1] - 27:13

becomes [1] - 2:16

beholder [1] - 27:14

belabor [1] - 17:1

Bergen [1] - 10:10

best [2] - 14:5, 34:23

better [3] - 10:6, 10:9,

12:4

between [1] - 26:20

big [1] - 24:7

bit [4] - 17:2, 41:3,

42:3, 42:6

blame [1] - 8:25

blanket [1] - 31:17

blind [1] - 19:1

blindness [3] - 12:23,

18:3, 18:4

blocked [1] - 21:13Bloomberg [1] - 14:4

board [1] - 37:12

branded [1] - 29:3

bribe [1] - 19:13

bribery [3] - 17:13,

19:19, 20:11

bribes [2] - 18:11,

19:12

brief [16] - 2:19, 4:20,


44/50

6:20, 7:21, 8:2, 12:2,

12:7, 12:11, 12:21,

13:7, 19:10, 25:11,

26:1, 26:13, 26:17

briefly [1] - 15:1

bring [1] - 37:6

broad [2] - 21:19, 37:4

brought [2] - 16:13,21:7

building [1] - 22:7

built [1] - 27:6

Burck [5] - 10:2,

16:25, 36:22, 40:19,

41:10

BURCK [39] - 1:17,

10:3, 10:6, 10:9,

10:13, 10:15, 10:19,

10:25, 11:4, 11:7,

11:22, 12:1, 12:11,

12:19, 12:24, 13:1,

13:4, 13:6, 13:15,

13:18, 13:20, 13:25,14:5, 14:18, 14:21,

15:10, 15:15, 16:20,

26:10, 29:16, 29:19,

29:21, 34:16, 34:19,

37:2, 37:22, 41:11,

41:19, 42:18

business [6] - 31:13,

35:3, 40:10, 40:12,

40:13, 40:22

businesses [2] -

11:16, 27:20

BY [2] - 1:14, 1:17

C

c)(1)(C [1] - 33:10

c)(1)(C) [1] - 9:24

calculating [1] - 2:13

calculation [2] - 4:12,

4:19

Calderon [2] - 19:9,

20:23

CAMDEN [1] - 1:10

candidly [1] - 33:21

Capone [1] - 24:4

carefully [1] - 16:11

cares [1] - 2:24

carry [1] - 28:8case [27] - 9:13,

10:22, 11:8, 14:13,

15:6, 16:12, 17:1,

19:16, 21:13, 22:2,

22:18, 23:15, 23:18,

24:2, 27:15, 27:22,

28:21, 28:23, 34:4,

35:16, 36:6, 36:12,

37:7, 39:22, 42:13

cases [14] - 21:16,

22:8, 23:21, 24:8,

24:24, 25:21, 28:17,

30:10, 30:11, 37:7,

37:10, 37:13, 39:12

category [1] - 27:13

caught [1] - 6:20

cents [1] - 33:5certain [6] - 19:1,

22:21, 28:17, 31:9,

40:24

certainly [25] - 5:17,

8:14, 8:16, 8:20,

8:25, 9:3, 9:11, 9:15,

9:17, 13:8, 18:2,

18:15, 19:15, 20:20,

20:24, 20:25, 21:1,

21:6, 22:2, 24:6,

25:14, 26:3, 26:5,

29:25, 41:14

Certified [1] - 1:23

challenge [2]

- 36:7,36:8

chance [4] - 6:15,

12:7, 12:12, 28:22

change [3] - 19:2,

26:6, 32:17

character [3] - 28:4,

29:6, 29:7

charge [2] - 5:20,

38:22

Charlie [1] - 10:10

check [1] - 36:11

children [1] - 11:16

choice [1] - 17:10

chose [2] - 21:17,

24:14

Circuit [5] - 3:9, 23:18,

36:6, 37:7, 37:8

circumstances [1] -

8:12

clause [2] - 28:10,

36:6

clean [1] - 31:5

clear [5] - 17:11,

18:15, 25:14, 35:4,

35:5

cleared [1] - 31:15

clearly [3] - 16:24,

29:6, 37:5

CLERK [1] - 2:1

clerk [2] - 32:10, 36:24

clerk's [1] - 32:12

client [1] - 36:22

closing [1] - 19:25

Clothes [1] - 27:10

co [2] - 22:25, 23:1

co-conspirators [2] -

22:25, 23:1

collar [10] - 22:2,

23:20, 24:2, 24:7,

24:23, 24:24, 28:22,

29:1, 30:11, 39:12

colleagues [1] - 14:15

Colombia [3] - 17:17,

17:18, 23:3

comfortable [1] -

30:22Commission [1] -

42:11

commit [1] - 16:16

committing [1] - 36:24

community [1] - 16:9

complete [1] - 24:14

complex [5] - 17:22,

22:2, 22:7, 23:20,

24:23

computer [1] - 42:13

computers [1] - 41:8

concept [5] - 9:24,

12:23, 12:25, 26:18,

27:17condition [4] - 35:4,

40:13, 40:14, 40:21

conditions [3] - 34:14,

39:10, 39:20

condo [1] - 34:17

confer [1] - 33:8

consequences [1] -

27:17

consider [2] - 30:7,

30:8

conspiracy [5] - 3:25,

4:6, 5:22, 38:5,

38:19

conspirators [2] -

22:25, 23:1

conspiring [1] - 5:23

constitutional [1] -

6:15

consult [1] - 36:22

contact [1] - 39:5

contemplated [2] -

26:8, 26:21

contemplation [1] -

26:22

context [3] - 2:24,

11:11, 23:8

continue [1] - 34:25

continued [1] - 19:5

contract [5] - 17:15,

17:16, 18:1, 29:9

contradiction [1] -

9:23

control [1] - 22:12

conversation [1] -

19:11

convicted [2] - 27:23,

29:3

conviction [3] - 27:16,

36:9, 37:5

convictions [1] - 24:8

convinced [2] - 28:18,

28:21

COOPER [1] - 1:9

cooperating [3] -

22:13, 23:1

copy [1] - 40:19corporation [1] - 41:4

correct [4] - 1:23,

15:10, 32:25, 40:2

Corrupt [3] - 4:1, 4:10,

23:12

Counsel [1] - 1:19

counsel [6] - 35:14,

35:19, 35:20, 35:21,

36:16, 36:17

count [3] - 12:20,

38:15, 38:20

Count [6] - 3:22, 3:23,

38:2, 38:4, 38:18,

38:21country [2] - 22:10,

23:2

Counts [1] - 38:17

counts [3] - 12:15,

37:25, 38:6

couple [2] - 15:11,

35:10

course [11] - 2:14,

3:10, 15:21, 18:3,

18:25, 24:16, 25:4,

28:6, 36:18, 38:12

Court [29] - 3:2, 3:13,

3:14, 5:12, 8:5, 8:22,

9:4, 9:16, 9:18,

10:21, 12:13, 13:12,

14:10, 14:24, 15:1,

15:2, 15:21, 15:24,

16:10, 16:24, 18:21,

20:15, 20:20, 23:18,

25:13, 25:23, 26:2,

33:17

court [5] - 17:12, 24:1,

27:18, 32:11, 36:24

COURT [116] - 1:1,

2:2, 2:3, 2:23, 3:8,

3:17, 3:20, 3:25, 4:5,

4:8, 4:13, 4:15, 4:18,

4:23, 5:2, 5:5, 5:8,

5:14, 7:16, 7:24, 8:6,8:23, 9:2, 9:9, 9:13,

9:22, 10:4, 10:7,

10:10, 10:14, 10:17,

10:23, 11:1, 11:5,

11:20, 11:23, 12:10,

12:16, 12:22, 12:25,

13:2, 13:5, 13:13,

13:16, 13:19, 13:23,

14:1, 14:16, 14:19,


Camden, New Jersey

44

15:8, 15:11, 15:25,

16:19, 16:21, 17:17,

18:7, 18:10, 20:12,

20:19, 21:10, 21:16,

22:9, 22:15, 22:20,

22:25, 23:15, 23:25,

24:7, 24:11, 24:14,

24:19, 25:3, 25:8,26:9, 26:11, 29:17,

29:20, 29:23, 32:10,

32:13, 32:16, 32:19,

32:21, 33:3, 33:5,

34:17, 34:20, 35:1,

36:14, 37:3, 37:23,

38:1, 38:4, 38:8,

38:12, 38:15, 38:20,

38:23, 39:4, 39:11,

39:16, 39:25, 40:3,

40:8, 40:11, 40:15,

40:18, 41:12, 41:17,

41:21, 41:23, 42:1,

42:5, 42:8, 42:16,

42:19

Court's [4] - 10:21,

15:3, 15:19, 21:7

COURTHOUSE [1] -

1:8

courtroom [5] - 10:18,

12:5, 20:13, 21:5,

29:2

courts [2] - 9:11, 9:14

cover [2] - 19:22,

33:21

cover-up [1] - 19:22

coworker [1] - 6:9

created [1] - 13:19

CRIM [1] - 1:5

crime [3] - 5:23,

24:18, 27:18

crimes [3] - 20:2,

21:9, 23:21

criminal [1] - 24:2

criticism [1] - 7:25

CRR [1] - 1:24

culpable [1] - 19:3

curry [2] - 20:7, 20:9

custodial [1] - 17:3

D

date [2] - 31:22, 35:6

David [1] - 18:5

days [10] - 14:6,

32:23, 33:6, 33:13,

34:11, 36:1, 39:17,

39:18, 39:20, 40:5

deal [4] - 2:10, 14:10,

32:5, 35:9

dealing [1] - 29:1


45/50

decide [3] - 30:21,

31:9, 37:21

decided [1] - 11:10

decision [7] - 31:24,

36:5, 36:16, 36:17,

36:18, 36:20, 36:21

decisions [1] - 29:8

dedicated [1] - 16:10deeds [1] - 16:8

deemed [1] - 15:13

deems [1] - 15:22

deep [2] - 16:10, 16:15

def [1] - 25:10

Defendant [2] - 1:7,

1:19

defendant [10] - 2:8,

17:11, 18:23, 19:17,

19:23, 28:4, 29:6,

33:17, 35:25, 36:21

DEFENDANT [1] -

16:1

defendant's [3] - 17:7,19:16, 20:6

defense [3] - 8:19,

8:21, 22:13

definition [4] - 7:10,

15:7, 15:13, 15:16

degree [4] - 5:14,

9:23, 27:9, 27:20

degrees [1] - 27:22

delegated [1] - 36:17

department [1] -

34:21

DEPUTY [1] - 2:1

described [2] - 18:21,

19:10deterrence [16] -

21:25, 22:1, 23:19,

25:19, 27:4, 27:5,

27:9, 27:12, 27:17,

28:3, 28:14, 28:25,

29:4, 30:9

deterrent [2] - 24:22,

25:22

devastating [1] -

27:16

devoted [1] - 16:11

difference [3] - 12:16,

13:3, 33:2

different [4] - 3:21,

12:18, 27:21, 36:4

difficult [6] - 22:7,

22:21, 22:22, 23:15,

23:21, 23:22

difficulties [1] - 22:3

difficulty [3] - 22:15,

22:23, 23:16

diligence [1] - 11:24

direct [1] - 32:23

directed [2] - 17:13,

19:21

dirty [1] - 33:16

disagree [4] - 9:16,

13:7, 25:12, 26:2

disagreement [1] -

20:15

disclosure [1] - 40:13

discretion [2] - 15:19,33:11

discussions [2] -

8:21, 8:22

dismiss [2] - 37:25,

38:11

dismissed [1] - 37:8

dismissing [2] -

38:16, 39:2

disposition [5] - 15:6,

15:17, 25:5, 27:2,

28:1

DISTRICT [3] - 1:1,

1:1, 1:12

district [3] - 7:4, 7:5,36:24

documents [1] - 23:7

dollar [2] - 34:5, 34:7

done [13] - 6:25,

11:11, 12:2, 22:17,

23:7, 24:5, 24:7,

29:11, 30:4, 31:18,

31:23, 35:11

down [5] - 4:21, 26:19,

30:20, 32:2, 33:16

dozen [1] - 11:5

draft [2] - 3:17, 41:1

drag [1] - 26:19

drag-out [1] - 26:19

dropped [1] - 13:9

drug [4] - 39:9, 39:18,

39:21, 40:1

drugs [2] - 30:12,

39:12

due [2] - 40:9, 40:11

dumped [2] - 22:17,

22:18

Duran [4] - 18:5,

19:12, 22:10, 23:1

Duran's [1] - 18:23

during [1] - 30:16

E

e-mails [1] - 19:20

early [1] - 22:25

earn [1] - 16:7

Ecope

sigelman sentencing transcript

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