sistempolícobrasileiro: disfuncional’ou’má’gerência?’ · 2017. 12. 6. · •...
TRANSCRIPT
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Sistem Polí,co Brasileiro: Disfuncional ou Má Gerência?
Custos de Governabilidade no Presidencialismo de Coalizão
Brasileiro
II Seminário: Desafios da Desigualdade, PUC-‐Rio Visões da Democracia no Brasil, 10 de Setembro de 2015
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Democracia Sustentável em Regimes Presidencialistas MulFparFdários
Este conceito tem sido considerado quase impossível. É quase unanimidade
na literatura especializada a afirmação da improvável sobrevivência da
“combinação diRcil” de presidencialismo com mulFparFdarismo
M o t i v a ç ã o
Entretanto, presidencialismo mulFparFdário é a combinação dominante em
regimes com separação de poderes. O que explica então a estabilidade
democráFca nestes regimes? Quais as condições necessárias para um
sistema como este funcionar?
P e r g u n t a
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3 Condições Necessárias:
O presidente necessita se consFtucionalmente forte e capaz de exercer o poder de
agenda
P o d e r e s d o P r e s i d e n t e
A Lealdade parFdária e a ideologia não são suficientes para determinar o
comportamento de voto dos parlamentares.
D i s p o n i b i l i d a d e d e b e n s -‐ d e -‐ t r o c a
Um conjunto de insFtucionalizado e efeFvo de checks capaz de estabelecer limites a
ações do presidente
I n d e p e n d ê n c i a d e C h e c k s & B a l a n c e s
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• Manutenção de um executivo forte • Manutenção da representação proporcional:
Fragmentação partidária • Re-centralização política e enfraquecimento dos
governadores • Governo de coalizão e institucionalização de
mecanismos de bens-de-troca – Ministérios, empregos públicos – Recursos orçamentários
• Institucionalização de uma rede de accountability – Judiciário Independente – Ministério Público Independente – Polícia Federal Independente – TCU/CGU Independente – Agências Reguladoras Independentes – Mídia investigativa e Independente
ConsFtuição de 1988: Novo Equilíbrio!
ExecuFvo Forte (Ausência de Gridlock)
LegislaFvo e outros checks fortes
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índice de custo de governabilidade -‐ ICG
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5min 10min 15min 20min 25min 30min
G E R Ê N C I A D E C O A L I Z Õ E S
TEMPO:
Coalizões grandes, com maior diversidade ideológica e com
uma maior concentração de poder em apenas um de seus membros seriam
mais diRceis de serem coordenadas e gerenciadas e, por consequência, mais
custosas.
H I P Ó T E S E S
Quanto mais desproporcional for a coalizão do presidente, quanto maior a
diversidade ideológica e o número de par,dos aliados, maior o número e o
volume de gastos do execuFvo com os cargos de livre nomeação.
Quanto maior o número e volume de gastos decorrentes dos cargos de
livre nomeação, menor a produção de políFcas e menor o sucesso
legislaFvo dessas iniciaFvas.
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Gerência Coalizão
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Modelo analí,co
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Dinâmica do jogo da Coalizão
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Popularidade Presidencial
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Restrições: Índice de Necessidade de Coalizão
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Restrições Exógenas
PCdoB
PDT
PFL
PL
PMDB
PP
PSB PSD
PSDB
PT
PTB
Floor Ideology = 6.29Floor Ideology = 6.29Floor Ideology = 6.29Floor Ideology = 6.29Floor Ideology = 6.29Floor Ideology = 6.29Floor Ideology = 6.29Floor Ideology = 6.29Floor Ideology = 6.29Floor Ideology = 6.29Floor Ideology = 6.29Coalition ideology = 6.24Coalition ideology = 6.24Coalition ideology = 6.24Coalition ideology = 6.24Coalition ideology = 6.24Coalition ideology = 6.24Coalition ideology = 6.24Coalition ideology = 6.24Coalition ideology = 6.24Coalition ideology = 6.24Coalition ideology = 6.24
Coalition Ideological Range = 3.13Coalition Ideological Range = 3.13Coalition Ideological Range = 3.13Coalition Ideological Range = 3.13
0
30
60
90
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10Ideology
Seat
s
Not a Coalition Member Coalition Member
Brazilian Chamber of Deputies − Cardoso 1 − Mar 1995
*The PP is not plosed due to party fusion inconsistency in DB
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Restrições Exógenas
PCdoB
PDT
PFL
PL
PMDB
PP
PPS
PSB
PSDB
PT
PTB
Floor Ideology = 6.2Floor Ideology = 6.2Floor Ideology = 6.2Floor Ideology = 6.2Floor Ideology = 6.2Floor Ideology = 6.2Floor Ideology = 6.2Floor Ideology = 6.2Floor Ideology = 6.2Floor Ideology = 6.2Floor Ideology = 6.2Coalition ideology = 6.4Coalition ideology = 6.4Coalition ideology = 6.4Coalition ideology = 6.4Coalition ideology = 6.4Coalition ideology = 6.4Coalition ideology = 6.4Coalition ideology = 6.4Coalition ideology = 6.4Coalition ideology = 6.4Coalition ideology = 6.4
Coalition Ideological Range = 5.6Coalition Ideological Range = 5.6Coalition Ideological Range = 5.6Coalition Ideological Range = 5.6Coalition Ideological Range = 5.6
0
30
60
90
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10Ideology
Seat
s
Not a Coalition Member Coalition Member
Brazilian Chamber of Deputies − Cardoso 2 − Mar 1999
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Restrições Exógenas
PCdoB
PDT
PFL
PL
PMDB
PP
PSB
PSDB
PT
PTB
Floor Ideology = 6.2Floor Ideology = 6.2Floor Ideology = 6.2Floor Ideology = 6.2Floor Ideology = 6.2Floor Ideology = 6.2Floor Ideology = 6.2Floor Ideology = 6.2Floor Ideology = 6.2Floor Ideology = 6.2Coalition ideology = 6.4Coalition ideology = 6.4Coalition ideology = 6.4Coalition ideology = 6.4Coalition ideology = 6.4Coalition ideology = 6.4Coalition ideology = 6.4Coalition ideology = 6.4Coalition ideology = 6.4Coalition ideology = 6.4
Coalition Ideological Range = 3Coalition Ideological Range = 3Coalition Ideological Range = 3Coalition Ideological Range = 3
0
30
60
90
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10Ideology
Seat
s
Not a Coalition Member Coalition Member
Brazilian Chamber of Deputies − Cardoso 2 − Mar 1999
*without the PPS, because seats < 5
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Restrições Exógenas
PCdoB
PDT
PFL
PL
PMDB
PP
PPS
PSB
PSDB
PT
PTB
PSL
Floor Ideology = 5.86Floor Ideology = 5.86Floor Ideology = 5.86Floor Ideology = 5.86Floor Ideology = 5.86Floor Ideology = 5.86Floor Ideology = 5.86Floor Ideology = 5.86Floor Ideology = 5.86Floor Ideology = 5.86Floor Ideology = 5.86Floor Ideology = 5.86Floor Ideology = 5.86Coalition ideology = 2.89Coalition ideology = 2.89Coalition ideology = 2.89Coalition ideology = 2.89Coalition ideology = 2.89Coalition ideology = 2.89Coalition ideology = 2.89Coalition ideology = 2.89Coalition ideology = 2.89Coalition ideology = 2.89Coalition ideology = 2.89Coalition ideology = 2.89Coalition ideology = 2.89
Coalition Ideological Range = 5.21Coalition Ideological Range = 5.21Coalition Ideological Range = 5.21Coalition Ideological Range = 5.21Coalition Ideological Range = 5.21Coalition Ideological Range = 5.21
0
25
50
75
100
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10Ideology
Seat
s
Not a Coalition Member Coalition Member
Brazilian Chamber of Deputies − Lula 1 − Mar 2003
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Restrições Exógenas
PCdoB
PDT
PFL
PL
PMDB
PP
PPS
PSB
PSDB
PT
PTB
PV PSCPSOL
Floor Ideology = 5.46Floor Ideology = 5.46Floor Ideology = 5.46Floor Ideology = 5.46Floor Ideology = 5.46Floor Ideology = 5.46Floor Ideology = 5.46Floor Ideology = 5.46Floor Ideology = 5.46Floor Ideology = 5.46Floor Ideology = 5.46Floor Ideology = 5.46Floor Ideology = 5.46Floor Ideology = 5.46Coalition ideology = 3.74Coalition ideology = 3.74Coalition ideology = 3.74Coalition ideology = 3.74Coalition ideology = 3.74Coalition ideology = 3.74Coalition ideology = 3.74Coalition ideology = 3.74Coalition ideology = 3.74Coalition ideology = 3.74Coalition ideology = 3.74Coalition ideology = 3.74Coalition ideology = 3.74Coalition ideology = 3.74
Coalition Ideological Range = 5.54Coalition Ideological Range = 5.54Coalition Ideological Range = 5.54Coalition Ideological Range = 5.54Coalition Ideological Range = 5.54Coalition Ideological Range = 5.54Coalition Ideological Range = 5.54Coalition Ideological Range = 5.54
0
20
40
60
80
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10Ideology
Seat
s
Not a Coalition Member Coalition Member
Brazilian Chamber of Deputies − Lula 2 − Mar 2007
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Restrições Exógenas
PCdoB
PDT
PFL
PMDB
PP
PPS
PSB
PSDB
PT
PTB
PV PSC
Floor Ideology = 4.66Floor Ideology = 4.66Floor Ideology = 4.66Floor Ideology = 4.66Floor Ideology = 4.66Floor Ideology = 4.66Floor Ideology = 4.66Floor Ideology = 4.66Floor Ideology = 4.66Floor Ideology = 4.66Floor Ideology = 4.66Floor Ideology = 4.66Floor Ideology = 4.66Floor Ideology = 4.66Coalition ideology = 3.64Coalition ideology = 3.64Coalition ideology = 3.64Coalition ideology = 3.64Coalition ideology = 3.64Coalition ideology = 3.64Coalition ideology = 3.64Coalition ideology = 3.64Coalition ideology = 3.64Coalition ideology = 3.64Coalition ideology = 3.64Coalition ideology = 3.64Coalition ideology = 3.64Coalition ideology = 3.64
Coalition Ideological Range = 5.29Coalition Ideological Range = 5.29Coalition Ideological Range = 5.29Coalition Ideological Range = 5.29Coalition Ideological Range = 5.29Coalition Ideological Range = 5.29Coalition Ideological Range = 5.29
0
25
50
75
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10Ideology
Seat
s
Not a Coalition Member Coalition Member
Brazilian Chamber of Deputies − Roussef 1 − Mar 2011
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Componentes índice de governabilidade
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• Número de ministérios e posições na burocracia
• Log natural do total de gasto com a execução das emendas individuais dos legisladores no orçamento (Pork)
• Log natural do total de gasto dos ministérios
• Dados de Janeiro de 1995 a Dezembro de 2013 (228 months)
• Anélise de Componente Principal (PCA)
Custos de
Coalizão
Número de Ministérios
Gasto Ministerial Pork
Índice de Custo de Governabilidade -‐ IGC
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• Technical steps – FormaFve Index: causality
flows from the indicator to the construct (Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer, 2001; Edwards and Bagozzi, 2000).
– Instead of defining weights arbitrarily, we let the data variance define it.
– Time series decomposiFon to handle seasonal variaFon and random variaFon.
– One factor extracFon, accounts for 70% of the variance.
Índice de Custo de Governabilidade -‐ IGC
−0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4
−0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
CGI Biplot of score variables
Comp.1
Com
p.2
1234567891011
121314151617181920212223242526272829303132333435
363738394041424344454647
48
49
50515253545556575859 606162
63646566676869707172
73
7475767778798081828384
85868788
89
9091
92
93949596
97
9899100101102103104105106107108
109110111112113114115116117118119120121122123124125126127128129130131
132133134135136137138139140141142143144145146147148149150151152153154155156157158159160161162163164165166167168169170171172173174175176177178179180181182183184185186187188189190191192193194195196197198199200201202203204
−10 0 5 10 20
−10
05
1020
log.tot_expen
log.tot_amen
tot_min
Scree Plot CGI
Variances
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
Comp.1 Comp.2 Comp.3
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Governing Cost Index -‐ GCI LimitaFons
Nature of variables: mixing stock (cabinet and jobs) variables and flow (budget and pork) variables in the same index.
Scale problem: PCA demands standardizaFon. Is it feasible to have a composite index with so different measures?
InnovaFon and advantages
It measures different levels of resources mobilizaFon to buy support.
However, with the advantage of comparing between and within presidents
15
20
25
30
35
40
94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14Year
Tota
l num
ber o
f cab
inet
s termCardoso1
Cardoso2
Lula1
Lula2
Rousseff1
23.5
24.0
24.5
25.0
25.5
94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14Year
Log
of T
otal
Cab
inet
Exp
ense
s
term
Cardoso1
Cardoso2
Lula1
Lula2
Rousseff1
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Índice de custo de governabilidade -‐ ICG
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Custos de Gerência da Coalizão no Brasil (média por mandato), 1995-‐2013
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Estratégias de Gerência da Coalizão no Brasil (média e desvio padrão por mandato), 1995-‐2013
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Gerência de Coalizão e ICG no Brasil (por mandato), 1995-‐2013
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Custos de Gerência de Coalizão no Brasil, 1995-‐2013. ICG
Nota: Erro padrão em parênteses. *p ≤ 0.10 **p ≤ 0.05 ***p ≤ 0.01
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Quadro Sumário dos Custos de Governabilidade e Eficiência da Coalizão
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Compe,ção Virtuosa entre as Ins,tuições de Controle
0"
0.5"
1"
1.5"
2"
2.5"
0"
500"
1000"
1500"
2000"
2500"
3000"
3500"
4000"
2004"
2005"
2006"
2007"
2008"
2009"
2010"
2011"
2012"
2013"
2014"
Compe&ção)Virtuosa)nas)Ins&tuições)de)Controle)
PF:"Operações"x10" PF:"Presos" MPF:"Processos"/10" TCU:"Responsáveis"condenados" TCU:"Valor"Condenações"(em"bi"R$,"eixo"2)"
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Crenças do Eleitor e Avaliação do Governo
Fonte: World Values Survey, LaFnobarómetro e DataFolha
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Conclusões
• Gerência de coalizões importa para o custo de governabilidade e sucesso legislaFvo do presidente em um ambiente mulFparFdário
• Se o presidente não faz o “dever-‐de-‐casa” ao montar coalizões com um menor número de parceiros, ideologicamente homogêneas e não comparFlha poder de forma proporcional com os seus aliados, não importa o quanto o presidente gaste, este não consegue mais apoio do legislaFvo.
• Maior será a necessidade do uso de moedas paralelas (heterodóxas) de recompensa.
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CoaliFon Management Ma^er... – Ideologically heterogeneous coaliFons and disproporFonal cabinets tend to be more expensive
over Fme;
– PresidenFal decisions about how to manage coaliFons influence governing costs, even when controlling for exogenous constraints;
– Spend more poliFcal and financial resources with coaliFon allies does not necessarily lead to greater poliFcal support for the president in Congress.
...and do so over Fme à partners get Fred of being mistreated – Increasing coordina,on problems can lead to poli,cal crisis due to presiden,al coali,on
choices rather than insFtuFonal malfuncFoning
• Implica,ons to the literature: – We may need to consider downplaying the role of consFtuFonal and agenda
powers of the execuFve overcoming the centrifugal governability problems and costs of mulFparty presidenFal regimes.
– If the president does not do the homework of managing well his/her coaliFon, increasing the cost of governing does not necessarily generate more legislaFve support, but rather it leads to intertemporal cycling majoriFes and presidenFal defeats in Congress.
Conclusion