The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 11 | Issue 18 | Number 1 | Article ID 3935 | May 05, 2013

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South Korea’s Christian Military Chaplaincy in the KoreanWar - religion as ideology? 朝鮮戦争における韓国軍キリスト教チャプレン制度—イデオロギーとしての宗教

Vladimir Tikhonov

Summary: The present paper examines themilitary chaplaincy in the context of a problemwhich has long intrigued researchers, namelythe reasons for the rapid growth of theChristian (Protestant and Catholic) churches in1950-80s South Korea compared to Japan orTaiwan. The author suggests that, whereas ageneral answer to the question may be the useof Christianity as a de facto state ideology inthe years 1948-1960 and its functioning as anideology of capitalist modernisation in the1960s-80s, a particularly important part ofgovernment-induced Christianization of SouthKorea was the institution of military chaplaincy.In 1951-1968, Christians – despite being anumerical minority! – monopolized thechaplaincy in the military, and fully utilised thismonopoly, “solacing” vulnerable youth forciblyconscripted for military service and makingmany “church family members”. The loyaltieswon in such a way, often lasted for life, thusproviding the churches with new recruits andthe hard-core anti-Communist state – withdocile anti-Communismt Christian subjects.

From its very beginnings in the wake of Japan’sdefeat and US occupation, South Koreasuffered from an acute deficit of politicallegitimacy. Its lack of nationalistic credentialswas mainly due to the fact that the privilegedlayers of the colonial society, tainted by theircollaboration with the Japanese, conspicuouslyretained their positions. While South Korea’s

first Constitution (1948) promised workers ashare in company profits (iik kyunjŏm), thereality of mass pauperism and hunger wageswas only too obvious (Sŏ 2007: 22-43). One ofthe ways of compensating for the evident lackof socio-economic progress was to emphasisethe “freedom and democracy” in South Korea –a s o p p o s e d t o w h a t S o u t h K o r e a npropagandists termed the “totalitarian regime”in the North. But the claims to “democracy”were belied by the authoritarian behaviour ofSouth Korea’s first president, Syngman Rhee(Yi Sŭngman), whose regime was by 1952routinely characterized as “dictatorial” even byhis conservative opponents from theparliamentary Democratic Party (Pak 1998).

Facing a serious deficit of compelling ideology– aside from rabid anti-Communism andprimordealist invocations of “Korean blood andglory” (Sŏ 1998) – the newborn pro-Americanregime turned to religious symbols tosubstitute for secular ideological tools. Thisturn was hardly new as such: ProtestantChristians, together with indigenousCh’ŏndogyo (Religion of the Heavenly Way)activists, were among the main organizers ofthe March 1, 1919 pro-independencedemonstrations, although none of themanticipated the degree to which the movementwould eventually radicalize participants (Lee2000), and the Protestant YMCA was amongthe many “cultural-nationalist” groupsconducting rural reconstruction work in the1920s and 1930s (Wells 1990: 98-162). Kim IlSung’s father, Kim Hyŏngjik, was a Protestantnationalist, and, unsurprisingly, some elements

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suggestive of formative Christian influencessurfaced in the chuch’e (self-reliance) ideologywhich substituted for Soviet “Marxism-Leninism” in 1960s-80s North Korea (Ch’oe1986). Raising the status of religious – mainlyChristian – ideology to that of state ideologywas, however, somewhat new in late 1940s-early 1950s South Korea, although state Shintoof colonial times (Grayson 1993) did provide ablueprint of sorts. Syngman Rhee’s religiousturn was greatly helped by a number ofinterrelated contextual circumstances:

The clashes between Protestant and1.Catholic establishments and NorthKorean authorities in 1945-1950 madethe overwhelming majority of Korea’sChristians North and South into hard-core anti-Communists, and guaranteedtheir loyalty to Seoul regime. The conflictwas hardly inevitable, since North Koreawas originally planned as a “people’sdemocracy” where “progressivereligionists” were ensured their rightfulplace as builders of a new society. Mao’sChina conducted a broadly similar policytoo in the early years of the PRC; inStalin’s USSR, by contrast, the OrthodoxC h u r c h w a s a t a r g e t f o r s t a t esuppression in 1930-1941, although itsposition was strengthened as a part ofthe wartime “national reconciliation”policy in 1941-1945 (Fletcher 1965).North Korea’s initial, rather tolerant,position towards religion seems to havebeen inf luenced by the wart imeimprovement in relations between theOrthodox and the Soviet state. In fact, asa result of the People’s Committees’2

elections in November 1946, 2.7% oftheir members (94 persons) turned out tobe “full-time religion practitioners”(sŏngjikcha); approximately the sameshare of pastors, priests and monks wasamong the People’s Committee memberselected in June 1949 (cited in Kim 2012,400). However, already in January 1946,

Christian political leaders in the northernpart of Korea, led by the chairman of theKorean Democratic Party, Cho Mansik,defied the Soviet occupation authoritieson the issue of the Allies’ proposedtrusteeship over Korea. The Sovietauthorities – unwilling to establish a“friendly” state of their own in the Northat this stage – were prepared to enforcethe decision of the December 1945Moscow conference of US, British andSoviet foreign ministers and put Koreaunder an Allied trusteeship for five years,something right-wing Korean nationalistsopposed to (although in reality it couldtheoretically be one way to keep Koreaintact. See Lankov 2001). When Cho wasplaced under house arrest, a sizeablenumber of his followers fled south. Theconflict between the majority of theChristian leadership and the Soviet andNorth Korean authorities afterwards wasostensibly ignited by such symbolicissues as Peoples’ Committees electionson Sunday, November 3, 19463; in thebackground, however, lurked the conflictbetween mostly middle-class and richerChristians, who comprised only about2 -3% o f Nor th Korea ’ s overa l lpopulation4, and the new power-holdersthemselves mostly hailing from andreliant upon the poorer majority of NorthKoreans (Han’guk Kidokkyo YŏksaHakhoe 2009, 45-50). In the end, around25% of the Presbyterian and 59% of theMethodist pastors from North Koreamigrated to the South, together with anestimated 70-80,000 lay Protestantbelievers and some 6,000 Catholics(Kang 2006: 410-431). Many of thesemigrants lost their possessions in NorthKorea, often due to the egalitarian landreform there in March 1946 (on thereform, see Armstrong 2003: 75-85), andthat too strengthened their support ofthe anti-Communist regime in SouthKorea.

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A large part of the new ruling elite in2.South Korea (?) was comprised ofChristians, especially Protestants, in asociety where only slightly over 2% of thepopulation (500,198 out of the totalpopulation of 20,188,641 in 1950) wereProtestants. The three most prominentright-wing émigré nationalists whoreturned to (South) Korea by late 1945and were contending for leadership –Syngman Rhee (1875-1965), Kim Ku(1876-1949) and Kim Kyusik (1881-1950)– either were devout Protestants or atleast experimented with Protestantism atsome point in their lives (Kim Ku’s case),and all of them agreed that the “newKorea” should be grounded in “Christianideals” (Han’guk Kidokkyo Yŏksa Hakhoe2009, 41). 21% of the parliamentdeputies elected in South Korea in thefirst-ever separate elections on May 10,1948 –elections that were seen asillegitimate and were boycotted by mostof the Left – were Protestants, a largepart of them being wealthier right-wingers. Among the administrative elite,the proportion of Protestants was evenhigher. 38% of the 242 persons whoserved as ministers or vice-ministersunder the Syngman Rhee presidency in1948-1960, were Protestants, a largepart of them being wealthy individualswith either American or Japaneseeducational background (Kang 1996:175-178). Small wonder that in such anatmosphere, the majority of Protestantclergymen identified “democratic spirit”,“anti-Communism” and “Christianity” aslargely synonymous, and felt committedto “grounding our new country in theGospels’ message”, with obviousencouragement from the politicalauthorities who saw them as theirstrongest, most unwavering supporters(Han’guk Kidokkyo Yŏksa Hakhoe 2009:43-44). The “inseparable alliance”be tween the new po l i t i ca l and

administrative elites and Christian,especially Protestant, leadership, wasfurther cemented by the Korean War in1950-1953, as right-wing Christianscame to regard the South Koreanauthorities as their only protectors fromthe threat o f “v ic t imizat ion byCommunists”. Buddhists felt moreestranged from what they – with goodreasons – tended to perceive as“Christian government”, but the interestsof the conservative sangha leaders,mostly abbots of the richer, land-owningtemples, were well served by the verymoderate South Korean version of theland reform (conducted in 1949-1950)which obliged the peasants to pay for theland they were to receive (Sŏ 2007:38-43) and additionally protected thelandholdings of the temples as long asthey were tilled by the monks themselves(Kim 2000: 108-111). Some renowned layand monastic Buddhist leaders (ChŏnChinhan, Paek Sŏng’uk etc.) joinedSyngman Rhee’s government too asministers, although such cases wererelatively rare.Christianity was one of the main links3.between South Korea and its Americansponsors. As Lee Chae-jin formulated it,South Korea as a separate state was aCold War creation of the Trumanadministration which primarily viewed itas “a buffer to protect security andintegrity of Japan in the larger context ofAmerica’s regional and global policies”(Lee 2006: 23). As a gateway to Japan,South Korea was a global asset of theUnited States; at the same time, the JointChiefs of Staff came by autumn 1947 tothe conclusion that South Korea’smilitary-strategic value was relativelylow. This conclusion was accepted by theTruman administration and was reflectedin the famous January 12, 1950 speechby Secretary of State Dean Acheson,excluding both South Korean and Taiwan

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from the US “defence perimeter” in thePacific, which otherwise included thePhilippines and, very centrally, Japan(Lee 2006: 24-25). US entry into theKorean War, dictated by the general ColdWar paradigm (Cumings 1990: 550), didcement US commitment to its militaryprotectorate in the southern half of theKorean Peninsula, but relations with theSyngman Rhee government remainedstrained on many counts (Park 1975). Insuch a situation, the image of SouthKorea as a “Christian country” couldserve as an important element inappealing to the American public animportant consideration in obtainingbadly needed humanitarian help throughProtestant and Catholic churches in theUS and elsewhere in the western world.No wonder then that a prominent layCatholic elder, John Chang (Chang Myŏn,1899-1966), was selected as SouthKorea’s first ambassador to the US inJanuary, 1949 (Lee 2006: 24). Anothergood example was the demonstrationsorganized by South Korea’s NationalChristian Council in June 1949 calling forthe adoption of the Korean Aid Bill by theUS Congress. “Let the churches of theworld unite their forces to protect thechurch in Korea” was one of the slogans,together with more direct appeals toAmerican Christian brethren (Haga2012). The chaplaincy in the military –the topic of this paper– was to becomeyet another link between South Koreaand it’s not fully reliable, but stillindispensable American protector andsponsor. It was fully modelled on theAmerican system – in fact, South Koreawas one of the first non-Europeansocieties penetrated by Americanmissionaries where such an institutiontook roots (Kang 2006: 346). USmissionaries were also well representedamong the pioneering chaplains in theSouth Korean army. For example, a US

Maryknoller with Korea experience since1931, George M. Carroll (1906-1981),was a chaplain to the United Nations’forces from the beginning of the KoreanWar and concurrently a member of thecommittee for the advancement of theestablishment of chaplaincy in theKorean army beginning in September1950. He was later charged with trainingof the Korean chaplains and translationof the relevant regulations of the USArmy into the Korean language. Anotherpioneer of Korean chaplaincy wasWilliam E. Shaw, a prominent Methodistmissionary who worked in Korea since1921 (Haga 2012; Kang 2006: 347). TheUS army employed 1618 chaplains by1953 (Johnson 2013), and fighting sideby side with it was a huge stimulus forthe new-born South Korean army todevelop a chaplain corps of its own, a keymeasure in uplifting Korean civilization.

As the above discussion indicates, religion inthe Syngman Rhee government’s ideologicalpolicy, contained from the very beginning theseeds of a possible conflict between differentreligions. “Religion” meant first and foremostChristianity in both Catholic and (primarily)Protestant versions, but hardly “native”religions, Buddhism included. It is not that theywere deliberately excluded: rather, the verysituation in which Christian elites were todominate the new state and obtain importantadvantages through the ir ab i l i ty tocommunicate more directly with its chiefinternational backer, led to marginalization ofnon-Christians. The dominant view of Buddhismas peripheral in relation to Christianitytranslated also into administrative measureswhich the Buddhist community perceived asreligious discrimination. For example, USmilitary government in Korea made Christmasan official holiday, but did not allow KoreanBuddhists to take over the deserted JapaneseBuddhist temples despite the fact that forty-three such temples in Seoul were taken under

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de facto control and management of KoreanBuddhists after Japanese withdrawal. In theprovinces, however, a number of formerJapanese temples became the objects ofembittered disputes between Korean Buddhistsand other c la imants (Taehan PulgyoChogyejong Kyoyug’wŏn Purhak Yŏn’guso2008, 25). Nor was the Syngman Rheeadministration any more flexible on this issue.However, it conducted the 1949-1950 landreforms in a way arguably less ruinous for themonastic economy than more confiscatory –and thus more egalitarian – reforms in NorthKorea, allowing the temples to keep the landwithin atwo km. zone around them. That wasone of the factors beyond the willingness of themainstream sangha to collaborate with theperceived “Christian” government, and tomarginalize the few radicals – who protestedagainst the establishment of a separate SouthKorean state, and wished Korea to remainunified at any cost – within its own ranks(Taehan Pulgyo Chogyejong Kyoyug’wŏnPurhak Yŏn’guso 2005: 162-174). In any case,the alternative – the North Korean regime,which was gradually radicalising on account ofthe general Cold War confrontation andespecially Korean War – looked significantlyworse, especial ly for monks who hadcollaborated with the Japanese colonialauthorities, since the purge of collaboratorswas one of the main ways in which North Koreawas establishing its nationalist legitimacy (onthe collaboration between sangha and theJapanese colonial authorities, see Im 1993; onthe purge of collaborators in North Korea, seeArmstrong 1995). The only remaining realisticalternative was to emulate Christian successes- f irst and foremost, their success inproselytising. This pattern of institutionalbehaviour was clearly recognizable in the issueof establishing the Buddhist mil itarychaplaincy, to be treated below.

A part of this “religious turn” in the militarypivoted on the chaplaincy - initially purelyChristian, established in 1951. The chaplaincy,

a time-honoured institution utilized by theEuropean powers and the US as early as theFirst World War, gained renewed significancein the global Cold War. In the US military,chaplains were not only expected to preventdemoralization and to assure that soldiers werenot won over by radical doctrines. They werealso to aid in the “moral strengthening” of theoccupied areas of Europe and Japan throughactive proselytising, and to implement “moraltraining” programs instituted throughout thearmed forces in 1951. These programs weredesigned to forestall criminal behaviour andvenereal diseases in the ranks, as well ascurbing rapes and attacks against civilians, towin the “hearts and minds” during the ColdWar (Gunn 2009, 87-91). US mil i tarychaplaincy was the primary model for its SouthKorean counterpart; and, not unlike the USchaplains, especially Evangelicals, the SouthKorean chaplains also regarded their missionas a proselytising one, taking advantage ofprivileged access to youth experiencing dangerand hardships. As for Korean Buddhist effortsat religious propagation inside the military, thepre-1945 Buddhist chaplaincy in the Japaneseimperial military (Victoria 1997) was anobvious role model. While there were noKorean Buddhist chaplains during the PacificWar, pro-Japanese Korean Buddhist leadersactively encouraged younger monks tovolunteer for the service in the Japaneseimperial military – telling them, for example,that they were to “wield the sword which falserefute the false and disclose the true, andbecome military missionaries of KoreanBuddhism in battle” (Cited in: Im 1993, Vol. 2,441). Most of these people retained theirinfluence after 1945 and were keen to utilizeonce again the past experiences of the wartimecollaboration with the state.

In the South Korean case, the establishment ofthe field chaplaincy was an initiative ofChristian leaders, lay and ordained, includingsome leading military figures in the newlyestablished South Korean army and navy. It

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was, however, quickly embraced by theSyngman Rhee administration, assumedly inhope that it would ideologically cement thearmy of the new state lacking nationalisticlegitimacy and broadly perceived as externallyimposed (oesapchŏk) (Chin 2000: 108-139).However, once established, the chaplaincyplayed several roles. In addition to spreadingthe message of Christian anti-Communism –which belonged to the ideological mainstreamof the new state – it also functioned as a tool ofChristian proselytising, and was partlyresponsible for the strong numerical growth ofthe Christian churches in the 1950s and 1960s.As Christians were enlarging their share of thereligious market (on this theoretical approach,see, for example, Hadden 1987), their exclusiveright to military chaplaincy was increasinglyseen as an expression of unduly statefavouritism – that is, unfair competition – by theBuddhist community, eager to emulateChristian proselytising methods. In the end,institutional Buddhism succeeded inestablishing the military chaplaincy of its own,an event which signified further strengtheningof its cohesive ties with the authoritarian anti-Communist state.

This paper shows how the military chaplaincywas established and functioned in the 1950s,how it fulfilled its ideological roles, and whatwere the competing influences in the process ofits institutionalization. It will hopefully help toimprove understanding of the role of such astate-sponsored institution as militarychaplaincy in the functioning of religiousmarkets under conditions of religious pluralismand relatively activist state building – but it wasnot fully able to dominate civil society (on“semi-competitive authoritarianism” in 1950sSouth Korea, see Han 1990). It will also shedsome light on the role religion and religiousideology played in the global Cold War, on theforefront of which both parts of divided Koreafound themselves by the late 1940s.

The Committee for the Advancement of the

Establishment of the Chaplaincy in the KoreanArmy (Kunjong chedo ch’ujin wiwŏnhoe) wasformed on September 18, 1950. Together withGeorge M. Carroll, mentioned above as one ofthe “fathers” of the Korean chaplaincy, itsmembers included the most prominent hard-line anti-Communists in the Korean churchworld, Rev. Han Kyŏngjik (1902-2000) fromPresbyterian Church and Yu Hyŏnggi(1897-1989) from the Methodist Church. Bothwere refugees from North Korea, and wereappalled by what they deemed a lack of fightingspirit in South Korean soldiers – forciblyconscripted by the government, which moststill had difficulties to recognise as their own.The anti-Communist churchmen obviouslyhoped that the chaplaincy would strengthen theélan of the South Korean troops, and their hopewas shared by Syngman Rhee who quicklyendorsed their proposal. In fact, a de factochaplaincy, under the name of “spiritualtraining” (chŏnghun), was already run by theSouth Korean navy from 1949 onwards, itschief, Admiral Son Wŏn’il (1909-1980), a son offamed Methodist pastor, Son Chŏngdo(1872-1931), being a firm believer in “Christianspirit” as the only way to effectively lead theSouth Korean military (Kang 2006: 348). Inconsidering the plan, Syngman Rhee was,however, fearful of opposition within the ranksof the army commanders (Haga 2012). A largepart of the middle- and high-ranking officers ofthe South Korean army were ethnic Koreanswith Japanese imperial army experience.Among army officers who received militarytraining before 1948 and eventually reachedthe full general rank, 226 served in theJapanese army, 44 served in the army ofManchukuo and only 32 fought against theJapanese, predominantly in Korean militaryunits attached to the Guomindang (Han 1993:130). Some of the former Japanese andManchukuo officers, notoriously colonel (in1952 promoted to full general) Paek Sŏnyŏp (b.1920), infamous for his brutal suppression ofthe Communist guerrillas in South Korea in1948-1950, were Christians, but the majority

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were not. Syngman Rhee feared possiblenegative reactions in the military ranks to whatcould appear to be imposition of his own faithonto the soldiers. Thus, when the Bureau ofMilitary Religion (Kunsŭngkwa , laterKunmokkwa) was created in the PersonnelDepartment of the Infantry General Staff onFebruary 7, 1951 (general order no. 31), it wassupposed to be staffed by civilians who were tobe paid by their own denominations. The firstKorean chaplains, trained by Shaw and Carroll,were dispatched to military units in early April1952; the number reached 139 by June 1952(Hwang 2008: 193-194).

A field church in the South Korean army,t h e e a r l y 1 9 5 0 s . S o u r c e(https://apjjf.org/admin/site_manage/details/ki.warmemo.co.kr)

Rhee’s worries notwithstanding, the newinstitution quickly proved its usefulness toSouth Korean army commanders. Chaplainsand their field churches were instrumental inincreasing the number of active, practicingChristians inside the army – under conditionswhen being Christian practically implied beinga committed anti-Communist, and thus, byextension, an active supporter of the SouthKorean regime rather than a passive victim offorcible conscription. The absolute majority ofchapla ins were Protestants , most lyPresbyterians and Methodists. By April 1954,

out of 296 military chaplains, 35 were Catholicsand the rest were Protestants, 209 of thembeing either Presbyterians or Methodists. TheProtestant chaplains built 186 militarychurches, and succeeded in raising thepercentage of Protestants in the army to 20%,almost five times higher than the share ofChristians in the general population at thattime (Kang 2006: 349). Especially important forSyngman Rhee’s anti-Communist cause was theministry to the North Korean and Chineseprisoners of war incarcerated – under ratherappalling conditions (Lee, Kang and Huh, 2013)- in a specially built concentration camp onKŏje Island near the southern coast of Korea.There, Harold Voelkel (1898-1984, Koreanname: Ok Hoyŏl), an experienced missionarywho first came to Korea in 1928, and sometwenty of his Korean colleagues in chaplaincywere busy converting the prisoners toChristianity and anti-Communism. The resultswere considered excellent: 15,012 out of some140,000 North Korean POWs became believersby April 1952, and several tens of thousandsmore showed at least some interest in theevangelization activities in the camp, someevidently in hope of receiving better treatment,and some genuinely adopting Christianity as apersonal way, both psychological and socio-political, out of the predicaments of nationaldivision, war and detention. Voelkel and hisKorean colleagues made a sizable contributionto making more than 80,000 North KoreanPOW decide to reject repatriation to the North(Kang 2006: 349-351; Yi 2010). As a reward,the status of chaplains was quickly raised. OnJune 16, 1952, all 139 active-duty chaplainswere given the status of salaried civilianemployees of the South Korean military and inDecember 1954, were further promoted toactive-duty military officers (hyŏn’yŏkchanggyo) (Kang 2006: 347). By this time, theSouth Korean military chaplaincy fullyresembled its US prototype. With onesignificant difference – while the US militaryhad non-Christian (namely Jewish) chaplainsalready from 1862, South Korea – in which,

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unlike the US, Christians were numerically atiny minority – at first did not allow any non-Christian denominations in its chaplaincyservices. This fact testifies to the degree ofChristian influence inside the South Koreanelites of the 1950s, and also to the paramountimportance of Christianity to Syngman Rhee’sstate, as well as the degree of Christian loyaltyto the militantly anti-Communist South Koreanregime.

US military church and the US and SouthKorean chaplains together with Sundayschool children. Late 1950s, South Korea.S o u r c e(https://apjjf.org/admin/site_manage/details/ki.warmemo.co.kr)

Buddhists found themselves in incomparablymore difficult circumstances than Christiansduring the Korean War for a number ofreasons. First, they did not dispose of anycomparable resources, since, unlike Christians,they received no significant financial or otherhelp from abroad. Foreign humanitarian,financial and technical help was of hugeimportance in a country almost completelydestroyed by the war, and almost half of the

foreign aid organizations which joined theKorean Association of Voluntary Agencies(KAVA), were Christian. US Presbyterians aloneraised USD 1,800,000 for Korea in 1950-1954(Rhodes and Campbell 1965: 322), and much ofthis money was channeled through Koreanchurches, which gave them an enormousadvantage in the domestic religious market. Bycontrast, institutional Buddhism lacked not onlyany aid from outside, but also internationalnetwork of contacts aside from its leaders’participation in the World Fellowship ofBuddhists’ meetings beginning from the secondmeeting in Japan in 1952 (Taehan PulgyoChogyejong Kyoyug’wŏn Purhak Yŏn’guso2000: 69). Second, as described above, theBuddhists were much more alienated from thenew state’s power centres than Christians.Third, the three year war destroyed a largenumber of richer temples (Pongsŏnsa,Kŏnbongsa, Naksansa, Wŏlchŏngsa etc.) whichbefore the war had contributed significantly tothe Korean Buddhists’ Central ExecutiveCommittee (Taehan Pulgyo Chung’angCh’ongmuwŏn), further undermining itseconomic position (Taehan Pulgyo ChogyejongKyoyug’wŏn Purhak Yŏn’guso 2000: 69).Finally, Syngman Rhee, in his populist attemptsto position himself as a devoted anti-Japanesepatriotic fighter, initiated on May 20, 1954, acampaign for expulsion of the married(“Japanized”) monks from Korean temples.Since the married monks were in the majority,the campaign opened the gates for embitteredstruggles between celibate and married monksover control of the temples, and left little roomfor other concerns until the early 1960s, whenthe s tate s tar ted to in tervene moresystematically to sort out the conflict (TaehanPulgyo Chogyejong Kyoyug’wŏn PurhakYŏn’guso 2005: 196-228). This explains whyinstitutional Buddhism was in no position toforcefully protest the discrimination to which itwas subjected as a result of establishment of aChristian-only chaplaincy in the country inwhich the majority of the actively religiouspopulation was predominantly Buddhist,

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especially in the countryside. The inability toprotest on the level of organized Buddhism didnot mean, however, that some individualmonks, temples and monastic groups did notattempt to challenge the newly establishedChristian monopoly on such an importantinstitution in a hard-core conscription society(Moon 2005) as military chaplaincy. Some ofthese attempts are also noteworthy for theideology deployed to legitimise the stateviolence of the Korean War in the name ofBuddhist religion and traditions. For example,the official mouthpiece of Korean Buddhism,Pulgyo Sinmun, editorialized in 1964 – in anattempt to persuade the military to allow theBuddhist chaplaincy in its ranks – that onlyBuddhism, “the essence of our nationaltradition”, with its “brilliant traditions of stateprotection”, had imbibed the “view of life anddeath acutely needed by the soldiers”.Buddhism – in addition to being a good“spiritual weapon” making soldiers morewilling to die for the state – was also advertisedas the “religion of harmony best suited to themilitary chain of command”, since, unlikeChristians, Buddhists were not supposed todistance themselves from non-believers (citedin Hwang 2008, 206). In a way, Buddhistleaders were struggling for the attention of themilitary bureaucracy, begging to beutilized as a“weapon” in the anti-Communist crusade.

The first to attempt compete with theChristians in the field of military chaplaincywere middle-level Buddhist leaders based inSouthern Kyŏngsang Province, especially thosebased in areas around Pusan, which were neveroccupied by the North Korean army and werethe least devastated by the war. Mansan (OKwansu, 1900-1971), a married monk whoworked as a missionary at Southern KyŏngsangProvincial Buddhist Executive Committee(Kyŏngnam Chongmuwŏn), took the initiativeand secured the cooperation of several localmonks, some of them, as abbots of temples inand around Pusan, were able to mobilizeresources needed for chaplaincy. Some of these

monks later came to play an important role onthe Korean Buddhist scene – Yi Pŏphong, theJapanese-educated and married abbot of Pusan-based Kŭmsusa, is currently the spiritual headof Avatamsaka-sutra-based Wŏnhyojong(Wŏnhyo Order), and Tŏg’am (An Hŭngdŏk,1912-2003), also a Japanese-educated marriedmonk, was to become one of the leaders of theseparate order for married monks, theT’aegojong (T’aego Order), which would beestablished in 1970. The activist monks wereable to visit at least some front-line militaryun i t s due to he lp rendered by somecommanding officers who were eitherBuddhists or favourably inclined towardsBuddhism. One of them, then colonel (latergeneral) Ch’oe Honghŭi (1918-2002), becamewell-known as a systematiser of t’aekwŏndo (aKorean martial art) in the late 1950s; another,Sin T’aeyŏng (1891-1959), a lieutenant-general,was to become the South Korean Minister ofDefense during the last period of the war(March 29, 1952 to June 30, 1953). Both hadJapanese military experience. Sin, who enteredthe Japanese Imperial Army Academy in 1912,was often mentioned as one of the “elders” ofone of the influential groups inside the SouthKorean military, namely the network ofJapanese Imperial Army Academy alumni.Ch’oe, a Hamgyŏng Province native who wasproud of his mastery of Confucian classics,seemed to intensely dislike the “Christiangeneral” Paek Sŏnyŏp, who was especiallyfavoured by fellow Christian Syngman Rhee.Yet another important helper was a marriedmonk, Posŏng (Chŏng Tusŏk, 1906-1998, laterthe supreme spiritual leader of T’aegojong),who served as a Korean Army Academy teacherduring and after the Korean War, and wasseemingly alienated by Christian hegemonythere. In the end, either pro-Buddhistsympathies or antipathy towards Christianityon the part of some important military figureslaid the foundation for an “informal” chaplaincyconducted by some Buddhist clerics during thewar. With the ass istance of f r iendlycommanders, they were even able to build the

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first, short-lived military Buddhist temple,Towŏnsa (Kangwŏn Province, Yanggu County),close to the DMZ, in a mountainous area whereseveral military units were based (Ch’oe 1997:301-302; Han 1993: 167-173; Hwang 2008:192-198).

What was the message that activist monkssought to extend to the soldiers? Thedeclaration of intentions drawn up by the 15member-strong Society for Buddhist MissionaryWork in the Army (founded March 7, 1951),mentioned such standard themes of SouthKorean propaganda as “sacred war” (sŏngjŏn)and “unification of the country through thedestruction of Communism” (myŏlgongt’ong’il). It also mentioned, however, militarychaplaincy as the “first step toward making of aBuddhist world” (segye purhwa), as well as the“spir i t of hwarangs” as the “guidingphilosophy” of the South Korean army (Hwang2008: 197). It was indeed so, in a way. TheJapanese-educated historian Yi Sŏn’gŭn(1905-1983), one of the chief ideologists of theKorean military (appointed chief of theSpiritual Training Department Chŏnghunkwa ofthe Ministry of Defense in February 1950),wrote and published in 1950 a book in which he– as an admirer of bushido – suggested that thehwarang organization of aristocratic youth inthe sixth-tenth century Silla Kingdom (on thisorganization, see Lee 1993: 101-107), with itsdistinctive culture of battlefield self-sacrifice,was the source of a “genuinely Korean spirit”,as well as a “spirit of anti-Communism” (Yi1950). Since two of the hwarang organization’searly seventh-century members were known tohave received their “five commandments” froma well-known Buddhist preceptor, Wŏn’gwang(541-630?) , and the fourth o f thesecommandments prescribed never to retreat inbattle (for English translation of thecommandments see Lee1993: 100), the self-styled Buddhist chaplains would claim that thebrave South Korean soldiers were indeedupholding Buddhist priest Wŏn’gwang’s “fivecommandments” (Hwang 2008: 197). In a way,

the ample appropriation of Korean ancienthistory – in which Buddhism did play a cruciallyimportant role – for the sake of developingSouth Korea’s distinctive brand of cultural andhistorical nationalism helped the activist monksto root their claims to nationalistic legitimacyin the military’s own ideological guidebooks.The traditional-style Buddhist chant writtenand put to music by Mansan, Chonggunhoesimgok (The Melody of Converting one’sHeart while Following the Army), againmentioned Wŏn’gwang’s “five commandments”as the “greatest spiritual weapon” the SouthKorean army possessed. In reality, however,much of the “ideological work” by the Buddhistmonks in the army was about distributing theamulets and pictures of Avalokiteshvara(Kwan’ŭm) and rings with Amitabha’s image,all supposed to assuage the loneliness and fearthe soldiers felt, and conducting funeralservices for fallen soldiers, 65% of whomreportedly were from Buddhist families (Hwang2008: 198-199).

The enthusiasm of some Buddhist figuresnotwithstanding, the May 6, 1952 petition ofthe Society for Buddhist Missionary Work inthe Army, in which it asked the DefenceMinistry to grant Buddhist chaplains the samestatus as their Christian colleagues, wasrejected. Given both the political anddiplomatic weight of the Christian communityand its unwavering support for the SyngmanRhee regime, it was deemed wiser to keep itslucrative monopoly on religion inside the armyranks intact. The Buddhist community was inno position to protest, for reasons enumeratedabove, and concentrated on missionary work inunits whose commanders were supportive.Ch’oe Honghŭi was reportedly one suchcommander who used his military authority andconnections to help rebuild an importanttemple, Naksaksa, in Kangwŏn Province. Yetanother crucially important field of Buddhistmissionary work was the Korean Army, Navaland Air Forces Academies, whose graduatescould potentially help institutional Buddhism in

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a society in which the military was among themost dominant institutions (Hwang 2008:200-201).

From the very inception of the serviceacademies, Christians dominated them, andBuddhist activists had to fight an uphill battle.By 1966, at the most technologically advancedAir Force Academy, Protestants comprised34.7% of the student body, and Catholics anadditional 20.5%. In the largest and mostinfluential Army Academy, Protestant studentsaccounted for 24.2% and Catholic students for17.1% of the total respectively (Kang 2006:355). Christian churches were quicklyexpanding in the 1950s and 1960s, and by1970, Protestants alone const i tutedapproximately 10% of the South Koreanpopulation (Han’guk Kidokkyo Yŏksa Hakhoe2009: 116), but even taking this into account,the share of Christians among academystudents greatly exceeded that among thegeneral population. The main reason for such aphenomenon was the strong position ofChristians among the academies’ teachers, aswell as among the South Korean elite ingeneral; Christian faith counted as one of thefactors of personal success. Sometimes,Christianity was even forcibly promoted – bothby teachers and senior students (sŏnbae) whowielded significant power over youngerstudents. Yu Sangjong (brigadier general) – theBuddhist officer who later made decisivecontribution to the establishment of theBuddhist chaplaincy in the late 1960s –remembers that his school seniors made churchattendance obligatory to him and his fellowstudents . Chr i s t i an i ty was seen as“American/civilized religion” and a symbol ofstate loyalty. Buddhist monks could not enterthe Army Academy unless they changed thetraditional robes for “civilized” Western suits(Pak 2009). Despite all odds, and, significantly,with the help of the two future militarydictators of South Korea, Chŏn Tuhwan (ChunDoo-hwan) and No T’aeu (Roh Tae-woo) – bothwere Yu’s seniors at the same academy at that

time, and both were Buddhists – Yu succeededin organising the first-ever Buddhist students’society at the Army Academy in 1954. TheNaval Academy followed suit in 1959 and theAir Force Academy – in 1960 respectively (Pak2009). Some former members of this society –Pak Hŭido (b. 1934, the Army Chief of Staff in1985-1986), Yi Sŏkpok (former commander ofArmy’s fifth division, currently chairman of theBuddhists Society for Defending the Republicof Korea Taehan Minguk Chik’igi PulgyodoCh’ongyŏnhap ) , Sŏn Yunhŭi ( formercommander of the South Korean militarypolice) and others – later played central roles indeveloping cohesive ties between the militaryand Buddhist establishments (Pak 2009).

A prayer meeting of the Protestant militaryc h a p l a i n s , 2 0 1 1 . S o u r c e(http://pann.news.nate.com/info/250538748)

In conclusion, although the Syngman Rheeregime’s favouritism towards Christians ingeneral and especially close ties withProtestants did not save it from a relativelyeasy demise in April 1960 as a result of a“student revolution” – grounded in thefrustration of the middle classes, and especiallyyounger, educated urbanites at the lack ofsocio-economic development, the “privatisationof power” by ruling groups and their underlingsand subsequent corruption (Sŏ 2007: 266-300) -it did have important consequences. Thenumber of Protestant believers alone grew

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thrice in 1950-1960 (Han’guk Kidokkyo YŏksaHakhoe 2009: 116), and the Christianchaplaincy system in the military contributedsignificantly to this growth. Under the“Christian president” Syngman Rhee, mostcommanding officers, their own personalreligious affiliation notwithstanding, providedchaplains with privileged access to barrack life,and chaplains made use of the resources madeavailable to them by their congregations to winsoldiers’ “hearts and minds” (Kang 1996:352-353). The soldiers who became Christiansin such a way, tended to have long-lastingloyalty to the denomination they firstencountered while undergoing the deprivationsof military service, and, by extension, tobecome loyal to the hard-core anti-Communiststate that the churches whole-heartedlysupported. Consequently, the South Koreanstate , i ts in i t ia l external ly imposedcharacteristics notwithstanding, was able togradually win a sort of Gramscian “ideologicalhegemony” in society. “Christian presidents”did not emerge in South Korea after SyngmanRhee’s overthrow in 1960 and until Kim Young-sam’s (Kim Yŏngsam) assumption ofpresidential powers in 1993. However,conservatively interpreted Christianity,especially in the form represented by the“mammoth churches”, with their message that“God blesses the rich” and extreme anti-Communist rhetoric, did become one of theimportant ideologies of the quickly developingindustrial capitalism in South Korea (Kim2012). A small minority of left-wing Protestantsin pre-1950 South Korea relocated to NorthKorea either immediately before or during theKorean War, as their survival in the anti-Communist “fortress state” in South Korea wasclose to impossible. Rev. Kim Ch’angjun(1890-1959), a US-educated Methodist pastorwho ended up as one of the foremost critics ofUS war crimes in 1950-53 in Anglophonepublications abroad, and was ultimately buriedin the Patriotic Martyrs’ Cemetery inPyongyang, is a case in the point. Interest inlabour, human rights and unif ication

reappeared among a minority of KoreanChristians only in the 1970s, in the course ofthe struggle against the semi-fascistic Yusin(revitalization) system (1972-1979) (Yi 2001,374-380).

Buddhists remained in the majority amongSouth Korea’s religious population in the1950s, but were in a comparatively weakerposition due to their relative alienation fromstate power, relatively weaker economicposition vis-à-vis the Christian churcheslavishly supported by the Korean state andfrom abroad, weaker nationalist legitimacy (onaccount of their full-spectrum collaborationwith the colonial powers from 1910 to1945 andthe well-known images of the “Japanized”married monks), and preoccupation withinternal affairs from the beginning of the purgeagainst the “Japanized” monks initiated on May20, 1954 by Syngman Rhee himself withdevastating effects on institutional Buddhism.Thus, it lacked the negotiating power vis-à-visthe state needed to formally challenge theChristian monopoly on military chaplaincy.Some activist monks attempted, however, tomake local, de facto challenges to the Christianmonopoly by mobil is ing a network ofsympathetic non-Christian officers, and bydeploying Buddhism’s own version of religiouslegitimization for state violence, deliberatelylinked to state-promoted nationalisticdiscourses on “hwarang spirit”. In a way,instead of trying to resist the state whichopenly engaged in practices of religiousdiscrimination in favour of Christians,Buddhists – the monastic establishment beingjust as anti-Communist as their Christiancounterparts – entered a “competition inloyalty” of sorts against the Christians. Thesuccesses were limited in the 1950s, but morepronounced in the 1960s and 1970s when new,non-Christian military dictators, interested inwinning the allegiance of the predominantlyBuddhist rural and lower-class urbanpopulations, entered into an ideological alliancewith the conservative monastic establishment,

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allowing the latter to fully deploy its doctrine of“state-protected Buddhism” (hoguk Pulgyo).The Buddhist chaplaincy in the military wasestablished in 1968, first and foremost becauseBuddhists were a significant group amongSouth Korean troops sent to fight in theVietnam War after 1966. It was calculated thatBuddhist chaplains would “strengthen” theirsp i r i t and he lp them to bu i l d someunderstanding with the largely BuddhistVietnamese (Hwang 2008: 212-241). For theanti-Communist monastic establishment, anycriticism of the Vietnam War and Koreaninvolvement in it was unthinkable. Theestablishment of Buddhist chaplaincy in thewake of the dispatch of Korean troops toVietnam was celebrated as an “achievement” inthe Buddhist missionary field, indeed as a“milestone” of sorts for contemporary KoreanBuddhism (Taehan Pulgyo ChogyejongP’ogyowŏn 1999: 234).

The dominant paradigm of anti-Communismand “state-protective Buddhism” waschallenged only by minjung (“People’s”)Buddhist activists in the 1980s, but even then,the legitimacy of the Buddhist chaplaincy in themilitary was rarely, if ever, questioned(Jorgensen 2010). While it was widelyrecognized that, as a matter of principle,Buddhists should totally abstain from badkarma-generating violence, even the minjungmonks approved of “altruistic violence” (“forthe purpose of saving other sentient beings”),and were perhaps too nationalistic to questionthe very institute of the national army – asopposed to the obviously “anti-national”, USA-dependant military dictatorship (Jorgensen2010). Thus, not unlike mainstream Catholicsand most Protestant denominations, themajority in the South Korean Buddhistcommunity came to perceive the institute ofmilitary chaplaincy as a fully legitimatemissionary tool, essential for “competition inthe acquisition of believers” since religiousloyalties gained in the military by theconscripts in their early twenties tend to stay

long (Taehan Pulgyo Chogyejong P’ogyowŏn2007: 203-205) – without much thought givento the Cold War origins of this institution inSouth Korea, its ideological underpinning, orits essentially problematic relationship toBuddhism’s original teachings on ahimsa (non-violence).

Vladimir Tikhonov (Korean name Pak Noja):Born in Leningrad (St-Petersburg) in theformer USSR (1973) and educated at St-Petersburg State University (MA:1994) andMoscow State University (Ph.D. in ancientKorean history, 1996). Vladimir Tikhonov is aprofessor at Oslo University in Norway. Aspecialist in the history of ideas in earlymodern Korea, he is the author of Usŭngy ō ’ l p ’ a e ŭ i s i n h w a(http://www.aladdin.co.kr/shop/wproduct.aspx?isbn=8984311529) (The Myth of the Survival ofthe Fittest, 2005) and Social Darwinism andNationalism in Korea - The Beginnings,1883-1910 : Survival as an Ideology of KoreanM o d e r n i t y(http://www.amazon.com/dp/9004185038/?tag=theasipacjo0b-20) (Brill, 2010). He is thetranslator (with O.Miller) of Selected Writingsof Han Yongun: From Social Darwinism toS o c i a l i s m W i t h a B u d d h i s t F a c e(http://www.amazon.com/dp/1905246471/?tag=theasipacjo0b-20) (Global Oriental/University ofHawaii Press, 2008) and editor (together withTorkel Brekke) of Buddhism and Violence:Militarism and Buddhism in Modern Asia(Routledge, 2012).

Recommended Citation: Vladimir Tikhonov,"South Korea’s Christian Military Chaplaincy inthe Korean War - religion as ideology?" TheAsia-Pacific Journal, Vol 11 Issue 18, No. 1,May 6, 2013.

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Notes

1 This paper was initially presented at the XXVIIInternational Conference on Historiographyand Source Studies of Asia and Africa «LocalHeritage and Global Perspective», the OrientalFaculty of Saint-Petersburg State University,April 24-26, 2013. The research was supportedby a National Research Foundation of Koreagrant funded by the Korean Government(NRF-2007-361-AM0005) as well as PLURELgrant (Oslo University, Norway). I am verygrateful for insightful crit icisms andsuggestions by Mark Selden, which contributedgreatly in improving the paper.

2 Peoples’ Committees were the main type ofelected authority in early (1945 to 1950) NorthKorea. They originated from the spontaneouslyformed local self-governing bodies whichmushroomed all over Korea immediately afterimperial Japan’s demise in August 1945. In theUSA-occupied South Korea, however, theseself-governing bodies were never officiallyacknowledged by the Occupation authorities.See (Armstrong 2003: 67-70).

3 The conservat ive major i ty o f bothPresbyterians and Methodists – which alreadyregarded the new, egalitarian regime as“devilish” –opposed both doing anything otherthan prayer on Sunday and to the use ofchurches as polling stations in some districts.K im I l Sung a t tempted to persuadeconservative church leaders to collaborate inthe “historical national enterprise” – with thehelp of his maternal relative, Rev. KangRyang’uk (1903-1983) – with little result(Han’guk Kidokkyo Yŏksa Hakhoe 2009, 48-49)

4 On the phenomenon of the predominantChristianization of the enterprising populationof northwestern Korea in the 1900s and duringthe colonial period, see Kang 1999.