The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 8 | Issue 12 | Number 1 | Article ID 3322 | Mar 22, 2010

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South Korea's Global Nuclear Ambitions　　核に関する韓国の世界的野心

David Adam Stott

South Korea’s Global Nuclear Ambitions

David Adam Stott

Introduction

“We had been building nuclearpower stations for 30 years buthad failed in repeated attempts tobreak into international markets.”

South Korean President LeeMyung-bak in a January 2010 radioaddress. [1]

December 2009 was an historic month for theSouth Korean nuclear industry. In winning twobidding competitions to design and constructnuclear power plants in the Middle East, itdramatically signalled its arrival as aninternational force in the sector. The openingannouncement concerned Jordan’s first nuclearresearch reactor whilst the second, and mostimportant, was a massive contract to build atleast four nuclear power plants in the UnitedArab Emirates (UAE). The South Korean teamwas one of nine original bidders and beat offcompetition from France and an American-Japanese consortium from the final shortlist ofthree. As the USA, France and Japan accountfor almost half of the world’s total nuclearreactors, this was an impressive achievement,especially since it will be the first nuclearpower plant that Korea has exported.

The initial deal with the UAE to construct thereactors is worth around US$20 billion toKEPCO (Korean Electric Power Company) and

its partners, whilst Seoul estimates that Koreanfirms will reap a further harvest of US$20billion over the 60-year lifespan of the reactorsby way of maintenance, servicing and fuelsupply contracts. With a total value estimatedat around $40 billion, this was the largestcontract awarded in the Gulf last year, and thebiggest single contract that South Korean firmshave ever secured overseas. Indeed,, asidefrom military hardware, it is likely also thebiggest contract ever signed in the Gulf region.Moreover, both sides view the landmarkcontract as a stepping stone to a much deepereconomic relationship in which both countriespour greater foreign investment into the other.Indeed, Abu Dhabi has recently endowed SouthKorean firms with numerous large contracts toupgrade its petrochemical infrastructure.

Middle East states that have discussed

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bilateral nuclear cooperation agreementssince 2008.

Data from the International Atomic EnergyAgency (IAEA) indicates that 436 nuclearreactors are presently operating in some 30countries. However, with more than half ofthese 436 reactors due for retirement by 2030,countries which export nuclear infrastructurewill likely be competing for a bounty of newcontracts in the next decade. Indeed,worldwide another 53 nuclear reactors arecurrently under construction and a further 136are in the planning stages. Emerging marketsin the Middle East are keen to introducenuclear power into their energy portfolios, andSouth Korean consortia have been at theforefront of Arab moves to diversify both theireconomies and energy portfolios by adoptingnuclear power.

Given the increasing concerns over globalwarming and peak oil theory, nuclear powerhas been championed as a c lean andsustainable alternative for producingelectricity. Nuclear power does indeed emitcomparatively low levels of carbon dioxide, andcan generate a large amount of electricity froma single plant. Nevertheless, the drawbacks aremany. Notably, nuclear waste is so hazardousthat it has to be carefully managed for severalthousand years . The env ironmenta lconsequences of accidents or attacks can becatastrophic, as seen from the Chernobyldisaster of 1986, and it is a relatively easy stepto move from peaceful power generation toweapons development. Moreover, nuclearenergy is itself derived from uranium, a finiteresource albeit one which the IAEA expects tolast for at least 80 more years even withoutnew discoveries in technologies or deposits. [2]

This paper assesses the development of theKorean nuclear power industry. It then showswhy its clients in the Middle East want toharness nuclear energy and why they havechosen South Korea to lead this process rather

than more experienced exporters such asFrance or the US-Japanese consortium. Finally,the article concludes with a brief outline ofSouth Korea’s global nuclear export strategyand a wider discussion of economic tiesbetween South Korea and the UAE.

Korea’s nuclear energy

South Korea seems set to become a major forcein the global nuclear energy business,exporting technology and expertise around theworld. With few fossil fuel resources, likeJapan, South Korea has sought to harnessnuclear energy as a means to secure thecountry’s rapid economic development. Overthe last three decades, South Korea hasaveraged 8.6% annual GDP growth, with acorresponding leap in electricity consumption.In 1980 the country consumed some 33 billionkilowatt hours (kWh), which had risen by 2006to around 371 billion kWh. Today 20 reactorsaccount for 28.5% of South Korea’s totalcapacity but actually provide 36% of thecountry’s electricity. A further 12 plants are inthe construction or planning phases, which willfurther increase the nuclear share in thecountry’s electricity consumption, which isprojected to reach 59% of electricity supply by2030. All of South Korea’s nuclear power plantsare operated by Korea Hydro & Nuclear PowerCo Ltd (KHNP), a subsidiary of state utilityKorea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO).

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The genesis of the South Korea nuclearindustry can be traced to 1957 when it becamea member of the IAEA and immediatelyimplemented a nuclear research programme.The country’s first nuclear reactor, a smallresearch unit, achieved criticality in 1962.Thereafter, its first commercial power plantswere developed by foreign contractors, withKori 1 being the first to supply electricity fromApril 1978. This was followed by a further eightreactors being constructed in the 1980s. Kori 1and Kori 2, the first two commercial nuclearpower stations, were built under contract by anAmerican consortium, whilst Wolsong 1, thethird plant, was bought from Atomic Energy ofCanada (AECL). The next six, Kori 3 & 4,Yonggwang 1 & 2, Ulchin 1 & 2, again featuredforeign-designed reactors but with a muchgreater involvement in the construction fromlocal firms, particularly Hyundai. By the end ofthe 1980s, Korea had six nuclear power plantsconceived by American firm CombustionEngineering (now part of WestinghouseElectric), two from France’s Framatome (nowAREVA Nuclear Power) and one from AECL.

As in Japan, which imported its first turnkeyplants from the UK in the 1960s, theindigenisation of the Korean nuclear powerindustry quickly gathered pace, and strove forgreater self-sufficiency by standardisingnuclear power plant design. To this end, in1987 Korea began a ten-year reactortechnology licence agreement with CombustionEngineering, a collaboration which yielded theKorean Standard Nuclear Plant (KSNP). Thisagreement was subsequently extended in 1997,and since 1995 all nuclear plants in SouthKorea have been built almost exclusively withlocal technology.

The KSNP is now an internationally recogniseddesign, and has progressed to KSNP+, whichwas re-branded in 2005 as OPR-1000(Optimised Power Reactor) for export toemerging Asian markets. In South Korea eightOPR1000 units are in now operation, whilst a

further four are under construction and shouldbe supplying electricity between 2010 and2012. The KSNP+ project features numerousdesign improvements for enhanced safety andlower construction costs, and their advanceddesign, low operating costs and enviable safetyrecord have positioned Korea at the forefront ofthe global nuclear power industry.

The next evolutionary stage in Korean nucleartechnology is represented by the AdvancedPressurised Reactor-1400 (APR-1400), onwhich work began in 1992 and whose basicdesign was finalised in 1999. With a 60-yearshelf life, it is anticipated that costs will be10-20% under those incurred by OPR-1000units, due to design advancements andenhanced construction techniques. It is theseOPR-1000 and APR-1400 units that KEPCO hasbeen marketing in the Middle East and NorthAfrica.

Given its progress in developing the KSNP, in2007 KHNP opted not to renew its technologytransfer scheme with Westinghouse. Instead,the two firms agreed that either could markettechnology which they have developed togetherand implicitly not compete against each otherfor overseas contracts using APR-1400 units.Whilst Westinghouse still retains the patentsfor a few necessary technologies in theAPR-1400 from its acquisition of CombustionEngineering, South Korea aims to become fullyself-sufficient in this sector by 2012. Indeed, itis reported that Korean companies havealready become proficient in the design andmanufacture of all APR-1400 components.Whilst KEPCO has also offered APR-1400s inother territories such as Poland and Belarus, itis thought that Westinghouse is unlikely to let itcompete in lucrative markets such as the USand China unless KEPCO purchases in full thedesign’s intellectual property. Therefore, thecooperation agreement also specifies thatKHNP is to develop its own components toreplace those in the AP-1400 which requirelicensing from Westinghouse. This would

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enable Korean firms to meet the Ministry ofEducation, Science & Technology’s target forthe country to develop its nuclear industry intoone of the world’s top five by 2011, and allow itto compete even more forcefully in the globalmarket.

An artist’s impression of South Korea’sShin-Kori 3 and 4 reactors

A major step towards accomplishing this aimwas made when the UAE selected theAPR-1400 as the standard for its nascentnuclear power programme, with the first fourreactors scheduled to be on line by 2020, and afurther ten envisaged thereafter. Whilst thereare no APR-1400 plants presently in operation,the first two units currently under constructionin South Korea, Shin-Kori 3 and 4, are slated tobe finished in 2013-14 and will act as areference point for the UAE plants. The chiefdesigner of these APR-1400 units is KoreaPower Engineering Company (KOPEC) withDoosan as the lead manufacturer. Whilst Shin-Kori 3 and 4 are expected to take 51 months tobe completed, construction of the UAE plants isscheduled to take 48 months.

Nuclear power in the UAE

The Arab states of the Middle East and North

Africa look set to emerge as the next bigregional market for civilian nuclear power,hence the efforts that Korean and otherproducers are making to court them. Thistechnology would allow Arab states to moveaway from oi l and gas for electr ic i tygeneration, thus boosting exports volumes ofboth commodities. Such energy would alsoenable seawater desalination which is verycostly and consumes large amounts of fossilfuels in this mostly arid region. Therefore it ishardly surprising that countries such asAlgeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Kuwait, Libya,Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria,Yemen and the UAE have been discussingbilateral agreements with established nuclearpower producing countries and solicitingproposals from foreign contractors.

The s ix members of the wealthy GulfCooperation Council (GCC) – the UAE, SaudiArabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and Oman -announced in December 2006 that they werelooking into harnessing nuclear energy. Thesecountries all rely exclusively on fossil fuels forelectricity generation and have beenexperiencing 5-7% annual demand growth inrecent years. Given their locations, seawaterdesalination also consumes large qualities offossil fuels, especially natural gas. Indeed, by2007 around 75% of total world desalinationcapacity was concentrated in the Middle East.Removing excess salt and other minerals fromsea water to make potable water is very energyintensive. A 2009 report estimates thatelectricity demand in the GCC block willincrease 10% per annum to 2015, accompaniedby desalination demand rising annually by 8%,in total requiring 60 gigawatts of electricity(GWe) of new capacity by 2015. [3]

All six GCC members are signatories to theNuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), andFrance quickly signalled its willingness tocooperate whilst Iran also promised assistance.GCC members, led by Saudi Arabia, agreed inFebruary 2007 with the IAEA to launch a

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feasibility study into a GCC-wide nuclear powerand desalination scheme, with Riyadhenvisioning a programme emerging around2009. However, since the IAEA submitted apre-feasibility study to the regional body in late2007 there has been no progress in any jointGCC nuclear programme, and various memberstates have consequently signed their ownbilateral agreements with established nuclearenergy producers.

The UAE’s plans are the most advanced withAbu Dhabi in the vanguard of such unilateralmoves. In April 2008 it independently publisheda comprehensive nuclear energy policy outline,assembled with input from the IAEA and thegovernments of France, the US, Britain, Russia,China, Japan, Germany, and South Korea. Thiswhite paper forecast electricity demandgrowing by 9% per annum from 15.5 GWe in2008 to over 40 GWe in 2020, with natural gassupplies sufficient for only half of this. Atpresent, around 98% of the UAE’s totalcapacity is derived from gas. Indeed, in 2008Abu Dhabi, the wealthiest and biggest of theseven Emirates with the largest oil reserves,began importing natural gas from Qatar as itsown deposits contain too much sulphur to makepower generation cost effective. Imported coalwas dismissed as an option to meet thisshortfall due to environmental and energysecurity implications, whilst buttressing extantoil and diesel generation was also discounteddue to environmental and cost concerns.

The reason for this increasing demand hasbeen the urbanisation and construction boom ofthe last decade, as record oil revenues havefuelled economic expansion and populationgrowth. Indeed, the UAE was one of the fastestgrowing economies in the world between 2000and 2007, achieving a compound annualgrowth rate of 9.3% in the five years to the endof 2007. [4] Whilst some of these mega projectsare being delayed by the global credit crisis,they will nonetheless strain the UAE’s powergrid. In addition, the UAE is also formulating a

strategy for nuclear-powered seawaterdesalination, which consumes large quantitiesof fossil fuels to provide around 70% of theUAE’s water supply.

Therefore, the electricity from the UAE’snuclear reactors will bring at least four mainbenefits. Firstly, and most importantly, it willenable more cost-effective water desalination.Second, nuclear energy will begin to replacecostly natural gas imports in generatingelectricity. In addition, extra electricitycapacity will help the UAE diversify itseconomy and expand output of finished goods.Lastly, these nuclear reactors could allow theUAE to become a net exporter of electricity toother countries in the region even though manyof its neighbours are also looking at nuclearpower. To achieve these goals will requiremajor upgrades to the UAE’s electricityinfrastructure, however.

The UAE’s nuclear plans gathered pace in April2008 with the publication of its nuclear policyoutline. This was followed in mid-2008 withappointment of the UAE ambassador to theIAEA, and establishment of a Nuclear EnergyProgram Implementation Organisation uponthe IAEA’s recommendation. The nationalEmirates Nuclear Energy Corporation (ENEC)was subsequently founded, charged withfacilitating all nuclear power projects withinUAE. It is ENEC which has been dealing withall the prospective foreign suppliers oftechnology and expertise, and which chose theKorean consortium over the other bidders.

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UAE Prime Minister and Vice-PresidentSheikh Mohammed with the Korean PrimeMinister Han Seung-soo on June 22, 2009.

In order to facilitate commercial agreements,t h e U A E h a s a l s o b e e n v e r y a c t i v ediplomatically to secure bilateral nuclearcooperation agreements with establishedindustry players. The UAE first signed a fullnuclear cooperation agreement with France inJanuary 2008, followed by a MoU with the UKin May 2008 and subsequently the US andJapan in January 2009. On June 22, 2009, SouthKorea became the fifth country to sign such adeal during a visit by Prime Minister HanSeung-soo. Bilateral nuclear cooperationagreements are precursors to any commercialdeals and in this sense those signed by the UAEcontain significantly more substance than thoseof other Arab states. Seoul’s agreement withthe UAE is s imi lar to that s igned byWashington, which permits the use of UStechnology and expertise in the UAE’s nuclearprogramme.

To secure their participation, and to maintainits image as an outward-looking, foreigninvestment-friendly nation, the Emirates hasstressed that it will not enrich uranium itselfbut import nuclear fuel for its plants. Thesesupplies will come from a foreign partner and,furthermore, the UAE will return all spentnuclear fuel rather than reprocess it. The IAEA

will also have the right to conduct snapinspections and be allowed unlimited access tothe nuclear sites. Those states and companiesinterested in exporting nuclear power probablyhope that the UAE nuclear power programmewill become the template for other interestedgovernments in the Middle East and NorthAfrica.

Rather than taking the more tortuous route ofdeveloping indigenous expertise, the ENEC hasbeen proposing joint-venture schemes withforeign contractors to construct and operate itsnuclear power plants. These will be similar tothe UAE’s existing water and electricity set upsin which the government has a 60% stake and40% is owned by joint venture partners. TheENEC originally invited nine companies tosubmit proposals for the construction of its firstnuclear power plant, sparking stiff competitionamong foreign contractors to break into thislucrative new market. ENEC subsequentlywhittled their number down to a final short listof three candidates in mid-May 2009. Thesewere the French team of GdF Suez, AREVA andTotal; an American-Japanese consortium ofGeneral Electric and Hitachi; and a SouthKorean bid spearheaded by its national powercompany KEPCO, partnered by other Koreanfirms Samsung, Hyundai and Doosan HeavyIndustries. It is understood the UAE willstandardise on one technology.

Although the French consortium wasconsidered by many the favourite, it wasannounced on December 28, 2009 that KEPCOwon the contract to build and operate the fournuclear reactors. The Korean bid wasconsidered the underdog because of the high-level diplomacy carried out by the French andthe long-standing ties between Washington andthe Emirates. Indeed, the French consortiumwas quietly confident given that FrenchPresident Nicolas Sarkozy has been particularlyproactive in nuclear diplomacy since enteringoffice in May 2007. In trying to promote theFrench civilian nuclear industry worldwide, he

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has signed several bilateral agreements tobuild nuclear reactors or extend technicalassistance, namely with Morocco, Algeria,Libya, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE, Tunisia,Jordan, India and China. The agreement withthe UAE is the most comprehensive of theseand was sealed during Sarkozy’s tour of theMiddle East in January 2008, during which helobbied for French firms in the newly-announced power plant bid. French companiesAREVA and Suez already jointly operate apower and desalination station in Abu Dhabi.Furthermore, France also opened a naval baseoutside Abu Dhabi in May 2009, and hasrecently been in advanced talks with theEmirates to replace its ageing fighter fleet withFrench-made Dassault Rafale multi-purposefighter jets. France is already one of the UAE’smajor suppliers of military hardware and haseven proposed opening a branch of the Louvremuseum in the country. Meanwhile, the Gulfstate also plays host to more than 2,000 USmilitary personnel, and has been a valuedpartner in recent American operations inAfghanistan and Iraq, as well as in the 1990Gulf War and in Somalia in 1992.

Nevertheless Abu Dhabi, the driving forcebehind the deal, has ostensibly based itsdecision on the merits of the proposal. It islikely that KEPCO offered the lowest price, andthe Korean government was also heavilyinvolved in supporting the KEPCO bid behindthe scenes. Emirati nuclear officials havepraised Korea for its on-time delivery recordand enviable safety history. Indeed, SouthKorea’s reactors have had the fewestproduction stoppages of any country in theworld. Perhaps, the UAE government was alsokeen to strengthen its bilateral relationshipwith an emerging economy and reduce anyleverage Paris, Tokyo or Washington mighthave in future arms or oil deals. [5]

The Korean bid was considered verycompetitive in terms of both timeframe andcost. The French European Pressurised Reactor

(EPR) design would take 57 months toconstruct. The US-Japanese consortiumAdvanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR), likethe APR-1400, would take 48 months to build.Korean government data claims that bothconstruction costs and electricity generationcosts are significantly lower for its APR-1400units than for the other consortia’s designs (seetable below). Each APR-1400 unit can generate1,400 megawatts (MWe) but the French EPRhas a slightly larger capacity at about 1,600MWe.

* This refers to the so-called ‘overnight cost’, orthe cost if no interest was incurred during

construction due to it being completedovernight. This term can also refer to the cost if

the project is fully paid for up front in a lumpsum.

Given the cost benefits, UAE officials werereportedly impressed that the technicalspecifications of the APR-1400 were on a parwith those from the other consortia. Indeed,the APR-1400 features innovative safetymeasures not found in other reactors. Forexample, given the tensions on the Koreanpeninsula the designers saw fit to include amissile shield, and the APR-1400 alsoshowcases structural enhancements to preventor reduce earthquake damage to the reactor.The APR-1400 also features a state-of-the-artcontrol room with numerous innovativecontrols. All three short-listed consortia offeredplants with an operating duration of 60 years,which is double the lifespan of most nuclearreactors on line today, and all three offeringsrequire refuelling after around 18 months ofoperation.

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If the KEPCO consortium can replicate itsdomestic success in the UAE, South Koreastands to become the world’s preeminentnuclear reactor exporter. At present, SouthKorean domestic build times are some of thefastest in the world, but the country’s nuclearpower industry is unproven on foreign soil.Even though its engineers have forged aconvincing technical reputation, projectmanagement has been something of an Achillesheel. To assist with the transition to workingoffshore, KEPCO has brought in AMEC, anexperienced British engineering consultancyfirm, to help with project management onnuclear and other energy projects overseas.Nevertheless, South Korean firms havecertainly made great strides in the last decadeas previously clients refused to consider themfor large-scale resource developments as theylacked experience. Since then Koreanengineering companies have built up a solidreputation around the world on a wide range ofinfrastructure projects. Moreover, the deal wasa personal triumph for South Korean PresidentLee Myung-bak, a former CEO of HyundaiEngineering and Construction, who travelled tothe UAE to lobby for the Korean bid just beforethe announcement. Furthermore, he seesexporting nuclear technology as a way for hiscountry to be internationally recognised as anadvanced nation during its 2010 presidency ofthe G-20 organisation of major economies.

Seoul expects the nuclear power plant deal tobring in about $40 billion over the life of theagreement. Construction of the reactors alonewill cost $20 billion, which Korean mediaspeculate will create around 110,000 jobs overthe next 10 years. The remaining $20 billionwill come from contracts to operate, maintainand supply fuel to the reactors during their 60-year lifespan. The Ministry of KnowledgeEconomy hailed the deal as the biggest singlecontract that Korean firms have ever securedoverseas. Korean presidential spokesman LeeDong-kwan expressed hope that the deal willtransform nuclear infrastructure into a pillar of

its export-driven economy similar to that ofcars and electronic goods. The next step is forENEC and KEPCO to establish a joint-ventureentity to build and operate the four plants.ENEC is still assessing other potentialcontractors for ancillary services to its nascentnuclear energy programme, such as fuelsuppliers, investment partners and educationservices.

It is clear that KEPCO will be deeply involved inall aspects of the project: construction,engineering, procurement, nuclear fuelling andmaintenance. As well as being assisted by itsown subsidiaries, the other consortiummembers Samsung, Hyundai and Doosan HeavyIndustries will also play major roles. KHNP willbe at the centre of the project as theconstruction contractor and operator, and alsoresponsible for engineering and procurement.KOPEC will design the nuclear power plants,Korea Nuclear Fuel (KNF) will provide thenuclear fuel, while Korea Plant Service andEngineering (KPS) wil l be part of themaintenance team. In addition to AMEC, othernon-Korean companies involved includeWestinghouse, now 67% owned by Toshiba, andits Japanese parent company due to theircontrol of patented technologies still necessaryto bui ld the APR-1400. Speci f ical ly ,Westinghouse will supply equipment,engineering and fuel-service contracts to theKEPCO consortium.

It is not clear exactly how lucrative control ofthese patents will be for Westinghouse,particularly since KEPCO has expressedconf idence that i t can replace thesecomponents with its own designs by the end of2012. Indeed, technology controlled byWestinghouse forms the basis of around 50% ofthe world’s presently operating nuclear plants.Nevertheless, the two firms still seemcommitted to their business cooperation modeas in early 2009 KEPCO subsidiary KNFestablished a new joint venture company withthe American nuclear pioneer to manufacture

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control element assemblies (CEAs) for plantsusing Combustion Engineering designsoperating in both the US and South Korea.Westinghouse and KNF hold 55% and 45%ownership respectively of the new company,KW Nuclear Components (KWN), located at theKNF fuel fabrication plant in Daejeon, south ofSeoul. It seems that Shin Kori 4 will be the firstplant to feature these new CEAs.

In addition to the direct economic benefitsthere could be trickle-down effects throughoutthe wider economy. UAE officials have stressedthat 60% of the workforce to operate the plantswill be Emirati nationals who will be trainedboth overseas and at Abu Dhabi’s KhalifaUniversity. This should also lead to thedevelopment of specialised human resources inother areas, and should greatly spur thediversification of the Emirates economy awayfrom a reliance on oil exports. The agreementcalls for the first phase of the scheme to startdelivering nuclear energy by 2017, with thefour plants eventually meeting up to 25% of thecountry’s electricity needs after 2020 when allare scheduled to be operational.

AREVA’s troubled Olkiluoto 3 reactordevelopment in Finland.

Despite their experience, the French bid wasdamaged by AREVA’s troubles pertaining to the

Olkiluoto 3 reactor development in Finland,which is significantly behind schedule and overbudget. The UAE’s review of the firm’s recenttrack record in Finland will have uncoveredunseemly rows with both the Finnish nuclearregulatory agency and the project ’ssubcontractors, and would have hurt theFrench consortium’s reputation. Moreover, theFrench bid to construct the reactors wassignificantly higher than KEPCO’s, withspeculation rife that it originally started at US$40 billion, double that of the Korean team.Whilst the French consortium reportedlylowered their bid in November 2009, it was notenough to convince the UAE authorities. TheUS-Japan bid fronted by GE and Hitachi offereda proven reactor design which is operating atvarious power plants in Japan, but one whichwill be almost 30 years old when the UAE’sfirst plant comes on line. From the outset AbuDhabi has stressed its interest in the mostcutting edge nuclear technology on the market.

Nuclear power in Jordan

Following the lead of wealthier Arab states, inMay 2009 Amman outlined an ambitious plan toestablish four nuclear power plants in southernJordan over the next 30-35 years. Originally thescheme called for the first of these to becomeoperational by 2017, but it is unlikely to meetthis date and recent statements suggest a 2020start is more realistic. As a necessary first step,Jordan has signed bilateral nuclear cooperationagreements or preliminary memoranda ofunderstanding (MoU) with eleven differentcountries including South Korea, Japan,France, China, Canada, Russia, and the UnitedStates. Amman also plans to sign similaragreements with Romania and the CzechRepublic before the end of 2010, in addition toseeking assistance from IAEA. The deals withSouth Korea and Japan cover infrastructure forboth nuclear electricity generation and waterdesalination.

In November 2009 the Jordan Atomic Energy

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Commission (JAEC) chose Austral ianconsultants WorleyParsons to prepare the pre-construction phase of the first power plant.WorleyParsons will also assist JAEC in selectingthe contractors to build the nuclear reactors.By November 2009 the options had beennarrowed down to five bidders: the KEPCOAPR-1400, French firm AREVA, the CanadianEnhanced Candu 6 and two Russian Rosatomreactors. The deadline for deciding this finalstrategic partner is late 2012. In contrast to theUAE, which will standardise on one technologyfor its first four nuclear power plants, JAECChairman Khaled Toukan has stated thatJordan may turn to different technologies andcontractors for the construction of its fourproposed plants. Hence, unsuccessful biddersfor the first power plant will retain thepossibility to export their nuclear technology insubsequent projects. [6] Given Seoul’s recentsuccess in securing the UAE deal, South Koreamust be considered among the favourites.Moreover, Hyundai Heavy Industries recentlyselected WorleyParsons as its subcontractor forthe Umm Shaif gas re-injection project in AbuDhabi, in a deal that could be worth up toUS$150 million for the Australian firm. Thismight give the KEPCO bid a further advantage.

In the meantime, Jordan is also looking toestablish its first nuclear research reactor, andin early December 2009 JAEC announced thatanother South Korean consortium had won thecontract to build it. This small-scale 5 MWenuclear plant will be located at the JordanUniversity of Science and Technology (JUST) tofacilitate research and training for indigenousnuc lea r eng ineer ing s tuden t s andprofessionals. [7] The consortium of the KoreaAtomic Energy Institute (KAERI) and DaewooEngineering and Construction will build thereactor at the JUST facility in Irbid, 70kilometres north of Amman. At present, thereare around 240 research reactors in operationglobally, and 50 new units are expected to befinished within the next decade-and-a-half. TheJUST plant is due to be on line within the next

five years, and is slated to also provide somecommercial services to cover costs. Lee Jong-min, a KAERI researcher, has explained theKorean role. “About 97 percent of the wholedesign and construction process will be basedon Korean technology, when calculated in cost.However, the fuel used in the reactor will bepurchased from a foreign provider and aJordanian construction company will be pickedto build the reactor based on our blueprint.” [8]If this project is successful, it should furtherbenefit Korean firms targeting the MiddleEast’s burgeoning nuclear energy market.

Like the UAE, Jordan is a very dry countrywhich suffers from a ‘water deficit’ of about 1.4million m3 per day but, unlike the UAE, hasvirtually no oil or gas resources to power large-scale seawater desalination. As such, thecountry has to import around 95% of its energyrequirements at a cost of around one-fifth of itsgross domestic product. Moreover, waterscarcity will become an even greater problemin the near future due to population growth,measured at 2.5% per annum in the 2004census, and climate change, which potentiallymakes precipitation more unpredictable in theregion. Therefore, it is envisaged that thenuclear power plants will generate up to 750MWe of energy for desalination and waterpumping. Compounding water shortages isspiralling demand for electricity, increasing5.4% annually, also spurred by demographicsand an average economic growth rate of 7%per annum since 1999. At present, the countryhas a total generating capacity of around 2400MWe but anticipates demand rising to 3600MWe by 2015 and 4800 MWe by 2030, placingJordan on the precipice of an energy crisis.

It is envisaged that Jordan’s nuclear project willwork in tandem with the Red Sea-Dead SeaWater Conveyance Concept which aims torestore the Dead Sea, whose depth has beenfalling one metre a year mostly due to theoveruse of water from the Jordan River foragricultural and industrial purposes. A

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feasibility study has been assessing thescheme’s plan to construct a canal from theRed Sea to pump sea water to the Dead Sea.Regional cooperation on water has beenhampered by the long-running Arab-Israeliconflict, and the success of the Red-Deadscheme depends on cooperation betweenJordan, Palestine and Israel.　The project is alsocrucial to Jordan’s nuclear power programmeand will, if realised, complement it bygenerating hydroelectric power for use indesalination. Raed Abu Saud, Jordan’s Ministerof Water & Irrigation, envisages that, “Around40% of the desalination plants that will beestablished in Jordan will use their energy fromthe nuclear plants, which will be our mainconsumers. This will encourage us to carry outthe first phase of the Red-Dead project faster.”[9]

The first reactor will be located in AqabaGovernorate along the Red Sea coast, andshould produce 750 - 1,100 MWe of electricityinitially using seawater for cooling. Aqaba waschosen because of its proximity to the Red Sea,pre-existing infrastructure at the Port of Aqabaand the electrical grid. JAEC has plans toestablish up to six reactors at the site. It ishoped that when the Red-Dead project isoperational, likely after 2025, the threeremaining power stations will be establishedusing desalinated water from the Red-Deadproject for cooling. The JAEC and the Ministryof Water and Irrigation envisage that thenuclear power plant will provide 726 MWe ofelectricity for the Red-Dead project’s waterpumping and desalination procedures, with thereactors eventually receiving 400 million m³per annum of desalinated water from the Red-Dead scheme for cooling. JAEC ChairmanKhaled Toukan explained that, “With the twoprogrammes, one is really supporting the other,and that is how we are going to move forward”.[10] Officials have even voiced the hope thatnuclear power could provide as much as 60% ofthe Kingdom’s energy by 2035, thus reducingJordan’s heavy dependence on fossil fuel

imports. [11]

The genesis of Jordan’s nuclear initiatives canbe traced back to 2007 when the Kingdom’senergy minister announced that significanturanium deposits had been discovered,estimated at two per cent of the world total.The most recent data states that Jordan haslow-cost uranium resources of around 140,000tonnes, with an additional 59,000 tonnes lockedin four separate phosphate deposits. Thesediscoveries have prompted a dramatic reversalof energy strategy, which King Abdullah II firstalluded to in an interview with Israelinewspaper Ha’aretz on January 19, 2007. Sincethen Amman has moved faster than most otherArab countries to sign bilateral cooperationdeals with established nuclear energy states,and to ink infrastructure developmentcontracts with international nuclearconsultants.

With many countries in the Arab world lookinginto nuclear energy schemes, Jordan could reapa commercial windfall if its uranium reservesare indeed large enough to make miningfinancially viable. Uranium would thus enablethe country to reduce costly oil and gas importsto meet its energy needs and it would offer theKingdom a potentially lucrative foreign revenuesource. Naturally, its discovery has led toconsiderable international interest from majormining firms eager to secure a stake. TheKingdom has already signed uranium miningagreements with major players such as British-Australian resource giant Rio Tinto, SinoUranium, a wholly owned subsidiary companyof China National Nuclear Corporation, and theJordanian-French Uranium Mining Company, ajoint venture between the French energyconglomerate AREVA and the Jordan EnergyResources. Although no uranium deals withJordan have been mooted as yet, Seoul isknown to be casting around for suppliesthrough investment in overseas extractionprojects. At present South Korea’s self-sufficiency in uranium-based nuclear fuel is

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only enough to meet 6.7% of demand, but thegovernment has set a goal of 25% by 2016 and50% by 2030.

Other nuclear markets

The UAE deal has given rise to an outpouringof confidence in South Korea and ambitiousgovernment targets after years of trying to kickstart nuclear exports. Seoul is hoping that thedeal will showcase its nuclear power industrythroughout the world, especially in developingmarkets where KEPCO’s units should be cost-attractive. This would be crucial to diversifyingSouth Korea’s economy, particularly in heavyindustry, which seeks to move away fromdeclining sectors. In the short-term, KimYoung-hak, Vice Minister of KnowledgeEconomy, has said that South Korea is aimingto sign deals to build a further six reactorsoverseas by 2012, in addition to the four UAEreactors. In the longer-term, the Ministry hasset a goal of exporting 80 nuclear reactors by2030. It estimates that these would be wortharound US$400 billion, making South Koreathe third largest nuclear exporter with a 20%share of the global market. The Ministry seesnuclear power as integral to its approach asKorean firms offer increasingly customisedexport strategies to suit individual countries.

Consequently, KEPCO is targeting new marketsin India, Indonesia, Vietnam, Thailand,Malaysia, South Africa, Turkey, and elsewherein the Middle East to meet this goal. In doingso, it will face strong competition from theUSA, France and Russia, however. Indeed, aKEPCO director has admitted that at presentthere are no other specific export deals on thetable. “There are not many deals open tointernational bidding. But the UAE contract willhelp us win more deals as we now have a trackrecord and some international recognition.Nuclear deals are often big national projectsworth billions of dollars. So, strong nationalpower and effective diplomacy are needed.”[12] KOPEC is also aiming to expand its reactor

business and has targeted the Europeanmarket in particular.

To consolidate their reactor exports, SouthKorean firms also have ambitions to provideservices for the operation, maintenance andrepair of reactors, in particular to overhaul andextend the shelf life of heavy water reactors.This market is worth an estimated US$78billion per annum worldwide, and in order tocompete Vice Minister Kim has stated thatSouth Korea will train 2800 new nuclearexperts by 2011. [13]

The most recent nuclear energy cooperationdeal signed was with Turkey on March 15,2010. KEPCO and the Turkish state powercompany Elektrik Uretim AS inked a jointfeasibility study into deploying the APR-1400 inSinop, a city near the Black Sea. If thiscollaboration bears fruit, a full nuclearcooperation agreement between Ankara andSeoul will be signed to facilitate reactordevelopment. Whilst no formal bidding processhas been mentioned as yet, KEPCO seems to bein a strong position and a decision might evenbe forthcoming by the end of 2010. However,Turkish Energy Minister Taner Yildiz has statedthat Ankara is still open to alternativeproposals from other foreign firms if any offermore attractive terms for the proposed Sinopplant. Moreover, whilst KEPCO estimates thescheme’s preliminary stages will take up to twoyears to complete, the Turkish authorities arekeen to shorten this timeframe. This is becauseTurkey is looking to establish three nuclearpower plants, and previously signed a similardeal with Russia’s Rosatom for a nuclear powerplant at Akkuyu on the Mediterranean coast.The Turkish government is aiming to havenuclear reactors operating in two regions by2023, and thus wants the Akkuyu and Sinopprojects to carry on simultaneously. Ankara hasstressed that the South Koreans will have totake onboard a local partner if any reactorproject emerges. [14]

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KEPCO and its subsidiary KHNP (Korea Hydroand Nuclear Power, a KEPCO subsidiary) havein place a similar agreement with theIndonesian state electricity firm PT PerusahaanListrik Negara (PLN) to undertake a feasibilitystudy for the archipelago’s first nuclear powerplant. Moreover, in July 2007 KEPCO andKHNP also s igned a memorandum ofunderstanding with private sector energy firmPT Medco Energi Internasional to conductanother feasibility study into building twopower plants for around US$3 billion. Ratherthan the APR-1400, it is thought that anyscheme with Indonesia would more likelyinvolve the older OPR-1000 design. KAERI hasalso designed an economical dual-use nuclearpower plant with a daily production capacity of40,000 m³ desalinated water and 90 MWe ofelectricity. The first of these was envisaged forMadura Island, close to Indonesia’s secondlargest city of Surabaya. It was originallyforecast that this plant would be operational by2015 but this now appears doubtful.

The Indonesian central government previouslyapproved in principle the construction of four1000 MWe units on the Muria peninsula on thenorth coast of Central Java. Whilst acommissioning date was provisionally set for2016, the central government National PowerMaster Plan (RUKN) for 2008-2025 notablymakes no mention of a nuclear power plant,despite the 2007 RUKN doing so. This climbdown by President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyonois related to opposition since September 2007by the local branch of Nahdlatul Ulama,Indonesia’s largest Islamic organisation, to theMuria peninsula nuclear scheme. This wasfollowed by a large protest in Central Javaagainst the proposed power plant in April 2009when the President was on the campaign trailseeking re-election. Indeed, during the 2009election campaign, no candidate spoke infavour of Jakarta’s nuclear plans. [15]Elsewhere in the region, Malaysia, Thailandand Vietnam have each informed the IAEA oftheir interest in harnessing nuclear power, and

Korean firms will be among the favourites toconstruct and operate any such plants thatmaterialise in the Association of SoutheastAsian Nations (ASEAN). In February 2009, theDeputy Secretary General of ASEAN stated thatmost of its member countries were open to theidea of developing nuclear energy in future.

Whilst KEPCO’s plans in Indonesia are injeopardy, in August 2009 it signed anagreement in Mumbai to conduct a joint studywith Nuclear Power Company of India (NPCIL)to assess the ‘licensability and constructability’of APR-1400 reactors in India. Since the defacto nuclear trade embargo against India wasabandoned in 2008 there have been a string ofsuitors looking to sell nuclear reactors to sucha potentially huge market. Seoul is nowcompeting with Russia, France and the US toexport power plants to India. Other memorandaexchanged at the Mumbai meeting betweenNPCIL and KEPCO covered a wide range ofnuclear services and India is reportedlyinterested in establishing up to 50 nuclearpower plants. However, no commercial dealscan be sealed until both governments sign abilateral nuclear cooperation agreement.

Potentially the most lucrative market in theAsia-Pacific for South Korean nuclearcontractors is the People’s Republic of China(PRC), which is looking to construct more than100 nuclear power plants in the comingdecades. Nuclear energy is especially attractivefor China given that most of its industry islocated in fast-growth central and southerncoastal areas very far from its main coalreserves concentrated in the north andnorthwest. Transporting coal causes hugelogistical problems, and consumes almost halfof China’s rail capacity, whereas nuclear powerplants can usually be constructed relativelynear to high demand areas. After securing theUAE deal KEPCO stated it was now focused onwinning new reactor deals in Turkey, Jordanand China. Back in July 2004 KEPCOannounced it was planning to establish four

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nuclear power plants in China, but progresssince then has been scant. KEPCO has,however, since established a strongerreputation in China as the largest foreign windpower generator in the country. Interestingly,Seoul’s Ministry of Knowledge Economy hasrecently gone on record as saying that it is nowconsidering tying up with other global playersto penetrate major markets such as China andthe US. In all likelihood this would meanWestinghouse and its parent company Toshiba,given their long-standing business ties. So far,KHNP has only secured contracts to sellnuclear components and support facilities toboth China and the US. However, with Chinahaving ambitious plans for at least a 600%increase in nuclear energy capacity by 2020,South Korean firms will be keen to join theFrench, Russia, Canadian and American reactormanufacturers already active in China incommissioning some very advanced reactordesigns.

Despite a wealth of new projects in thepipeline, KEPCO’s president and CEO, KimSsang-su, has hinted at the difficulties ofopening up new nuclear markets. “Countrieslike Turkey and India have preconditions likethe extent of technology transfer, mandatoryuse of local parts and components, andfinancing issues that need to be resolved.”Similar conditions prevail in China, too. Kimalso revealed that Seoul has to engage bothNew Delhi and Beijing in substantial bilateralnegot iat ions before any commercialbreakthroughs can be made. Moreover, manyprospective customers require outsidefinancing to pay for their nuclear reactors, andsome countries have been offering theirmineral resources in partial exchange forKEPCO reactors. [16]

Non-nuclear markets

“Our relationship with SouthKorea, which has seen sustainedgrowth in recent years, has

ushered in a new age of strategicpartnership which will serve theinterest of the two countries.”

Sheikh Khalifa, President of theUAE and Ruler of Abu Dhabi, uponsigning the nuclear contract withthe South Korean President LeeMyung-bak. [16]

Nuclear cooperation with the UAE is alreadyhaving wide commercial benefits for SouthKorean enterprises. Indeed, South Koreanstatistics indicate the total value of contractssecured by state companies such as KEPCO inthe UAE during 2009 alone surpassed US$32billion. Given that the total value of all suchcontracts won in the UAE is just over US$35billion, it is obvious that the UAE’s rulers haverecently began entrusting South Korean firmswith their country’s transformation. Indeed, asstated by Kim Ji-ho, Samsung Engineering AbuDhabi’s business development manager, “Twoto three years ago there were no big contractshere with Korean companies”. [17] It seemslikely that further deals are in the offing, invarious sectors such as chemicals, renewableresources, nuclear energy, petrochemicals,defence and property.

Many of the other deals announced in 2009concern upgrades to Abu Dhabi’s oil and gasinfrastructure. For instance, in NovemberSouth Korean firms secured the four maincontracts with Abu Dhabi National OilCompany (ADNOC), worth a total of US $9.63billion, for the US$10 billion expansion of theEmirate’s largest oil refinery at Ruwais. Thefollowing month, Hyundai Heavy Industriesinked a US$1 billion scheme with the AbuDhabi Gas Liquefaction Company (ADGAS) forthe construction of a gas processing plant onDas Island close to Abu Dhabi. The 49-monthproject to process gas from Umm Shaif, anoffshore field, is a significant undertakinginvolving multiple sites and large tracts of landreclamation. This deal followed the first major

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petrochemical contract award to a SouthKorean firm in 2006 when Hyundai was chosento develop gas re-injection capabilities toincrease production from Abu Dhabi’s UmmShaif offshore oilfield. Since then, SouthKorean contractors have forged a strongreputation in the UAE which has culminated inprofitable nuclear reactor development.

Source: Tamsin Carlisle, ‘South Koreancompanies strike it rich in UAE’, The National

(Abu Dhabi), March 2, 2010

South Korean construction companies havealso been very active in major propertydevelopments in both Abu Dhabi and Dubai.

Upon winning the main contract to erectDubai’s Burj Khalifa tower, the world’s tallestbuilding, Samsung became the first SouthKorean enterprise to win such a large deal inthe UAE. Numerous Korean firms are nowbidding for contracts in lucrative propertydevelopments such as ADNOC’s new headoffice, the Louvre Abu Dhabi, Zayed NationalMuseum, and the Arzanah Medical Complex.

Bilateral trade has been increasing too. TheUAE’s imports from South Korea reachedUS$2.81 billion in late 2007, up from US$1.77billion in 2005. Both sides see the contract asstrengthening a relationship in which anincreasing number of small and medium scaleKorean enterprises are investing in the UAE.By the end of 2009, some 43 South Koreanfirms were operating in Abu Dhabi, and afurther nine have registered in the Emiratesince January 2010. Despite increasingly closecommercial ties, foreign direct investment fromSouth Korea in the UAE remains comparativelysmall. The Emirates are especially keen toboost Korean investment in order to helpdiversify their economy and enhance jobopportunities for a burgeoning population. Inparticular, South Korean companies are beingtargeted by the UAE to invest in the IT,construction, automobile, and energy sectors,and to establish production and assembly unitsfor electronics and automobiles. This campaignfeatures Abu Dhabi highlighting its strategiclocation close to important markets in theMiddle East and Europe, whilst offeringcompetitive costs of production and transport.

For its part, Seoul sees a bilateral relationshipfounded on a secure and stable supply of oiland gas. Abu Dhabi is presently South Korea’ssecond-largest supplier of both commodities,whilst the UAE is South Korea’s second largestexport market in the Middle East. During hisvisit to sign the bilateral nuclear cooperationagreement in June 2009, Prime Minister HanSeung-soo said he hoped to see bilateralbusiness links deepen beyond energy and

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construction with greater investment in SouthKorean industry from Abu Dhabi. “Frankly, wewould like to see more of the funds from AbuDhabi come to Korea to invest. If we find reallygood partners in the private sector, even in thegovernment sector, then we can make a muchgreater improvement in our relationship.” [18]

Nevertheless, for the medium-term at least, oiland gas will continue to form the bedrock ofthe relationship. In an era of increasingresource nat iona l i sm in which hostgovernments seek greater control of thenatural resources in their territories, foreignfirms have been manoeuvring to retainexploration rights in the UAE. Even in theinvestment-friendly Emirates, the renewal ofexisting oil and gas concessions has been aconcern. Seoul will be hoping its increasingparticipation in the development of the UAE’sindustrial infrastructure will further cement thefoundation of the bilateral relationship.

Conclusion

The UAE power plant deal is the biggest singlecontract that South Korean firms have eversecured overseas. Seoul claims that the dealmakes South Korea the world’s sixth largestexporter of nuclear reactors by contract value,and it hopes to launch itself into the top threein the next 20 years with new demand fromemerging markets where its price-competitiveunits are expected to be particularly attractive.It will face strong competition from the USA,France and Russia. Nevertheless, in a verycompetitive bidding process for the UAE’snuclear power plants, KEPCO was able tooutshine the French and US-Japanese consortiaboth financially and technically. Jordan is alsolooking to embrace nuclear energy, and aKEPCO consortium is one of five bidders beingconsidered to construct and operate its firstnuclear power plant. Given Seoul’s recentsuccess in negotiating the UAE deal, and thatanother South Korean consortium has alreadysigned a contract to build Jordan’s first nuclear

research reactor, the KEPCO bid must beconsidered among the favourites.

Indeed, with more than half of the world’sinventory of 436 nuclear reactors scheduled forretirement by 2030, South Korean companieswill likely be competing for a bounty of newcontracts in the next decade, especially asChina and India are keen to establish around150 new nuclear power plants between them.In fact, KEPCO has been trying to enter theChinese nuclear reactor market withoutsuccess s ince at least 2004, and nowrecognises that a different approach isnecessary. This will likely involve Seoulmassaging its diplomatic relations with Beijingwhilst KEPCO collaborates with moreestablished nuclear reactor exporters such asWestinghouse which already has a presence inthe Chinese market. This approach seeminglyreflects Seoul’s realisation that the key tosuccess in the reactor export market is theability to offer increasingly customised nuclearenergy packages to suit individual countries.Developing economies are likewise keen tointroduce nuclear power into their energyportfolios, especially since reactors do not emitgreenhouse gases and help reduce dependenceon fossil fuels. With demand for nucleartechnology likely to grow rapidly, along withthe role that high-level lobbying plays in suchdeals, governments in nuclear power exporterswill have to be increasingly proactive in theirnuclear diplomacy, as both Seoul and Pariswere with regard to the UAE deal.

If South Korean nuclear contractors canreplicate their domestic success overseas,South Korea stands to become one of theworld’s pre-eminent reactor exporters. Atpresent, its domestic build times are some ofthe fastest in the world but the country’snuclear power industry is unproven on foreignsoil. Even though its engineers have forged aconvincing technical reputation, projectmanagement has been something of an Achillesheel, which KEPCO is attempting to address by

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bringing in foreign engineering consultancies.Nevertheless, South Korean firms havecertainly made great strides in the last decadeas previously oil and gas developers werereluctant to award them large contracts due toa perceived lack of experience. Since thenSouth Korean firms have established a solidreputation overseas for successfully completingmajor projects on time and within budget.

Moreover, China’s relentless rise is likelyfocusing attention in the Middle East andbeyond towards East Asia as a whole. Whetherthis will indeed become a genuine ‘Look East’economic policy is not yet clear, however.Nonetheless, the UAE-South Korea nuclear dealdoes indicate that this is a distinct possibilityand seems to be already providing newopportunities for South Korean firms. Forinstance, since the bidding was opened for theUAE’s nuclear plants South Korean firms havesecured numerous other big-ticket contracts inthe Emirates. Given that it is still heavilydependent on oil and gas supplies from AbuDhabi, Seoul is therefore hoping that nuclearcooperation with the UAE, and potentially otherGCC members, will also have a positive spillover effect into stable and secure oil supplies.

Those states and companies interested inexporting nuclear power probably hope that theUAE nuclear power programme will becomethe template for other interested governmentsin the Middle East and further afield. Naturally,the UAE has its own interests in developing acivilian nuclear programme. Nuclear power willincrease the sustainability of its oil and gasreserves, simultaneously allowing more ofthese resources to be exported, thus boostingearnings. The GCC relies exclusively on fossilfuels for electricity generation, and waterdesalination also consumes large qualities of oiland gas. Rising living standards, populationand infrastructure requires ever greaterelectricity and desalination capacity whichmany Arab states want nuclear power to meet,whilst maximising economic growth by

exporting their natural resources.

David Adam Stott is an associate professor atthe University of Kitakyushu, Japan and anAsia-Pacific Journal associate. His work centerson the political economy of conflict inSoutheast Asia, Japan's relations with theregion, and natural resource issues in the Asia-Pacific. From April 2010 he is on research leaveat the University of Adelaide. He wrote thisarticle for The Asia-Pacific Journal.

Recommended citation: David Adam Stott,"South Korea’s Global Nuclear Ambitions," TheAsia-Pacific Journal, 12-1-10, March 22, 2010.

See the following articles on related themes:

David Adam Stott, Japan and the United ArabEmirates – A Nuclear Family?

David Adam Stott, China, Japan and Indonesia’sLNG Ploys

Ruediger Frank, Mark Selden and Oh Young-jin, The Coming Crisis in Finance and Energy:Korea as a solution for East Asia?

Geoffrey Gunn, Southeast Asia’s LoomingNuclear Power Industry

Notes

[1] Christian Oliver, ‘S Korea eyes widernuclear exports’, Financial Times, January 22,2010.

[2] International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),‘Global Uranium Resources to Meet ProjectedDemand’, June 2, 2006.

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[3] World Nuclear Association, ‘Nuclear Powerin the United Arab Emirates’, June 2009.

[4] Global Research figures, part of Kuwait’sGlobal Investment House. Link.

[5] Nevertheless, the UAE repeatedly asked theother two consortia to reduce their prices tomake them more competitive with the SouthKorean bid. This seems to suggest that the UAEwas trying to favour the other two bidders, notwholly surprising given the close ties the UAEhas had with both France and the UnitedStates.

[6] Taylor Luck, ‘Nuclear power could provide60% of Kingdom’s energy needs by 2035’,Jordan Times, July 9, 2009.

[7] Kim Tong-hyung, ‘Korea to Build NuclearResearch Reactor in Jordan’, Korea Times,December 4, 2009.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Taylor Luck, ‘Nuclear energy to supplyJordan desalination plants’, Jordan Times, May22, 2009

[10] Taylor Luck, ‘Nuclear power could provide60% of Kingdom’s energy needs by 2035’,Jordan Times, July 9, 2009.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Christian Oliver, ‘S Korea eyes widernuclear exports’, Financial Times, January 22,2010.

[13] World Nuclear News, ‘South Korea seeksto boost reactor exports’, January 13, 2010.

[14] Richard Tanter, Arabella Imhoff and DavidVon Hippel, ‘Nuclear Power, Risk Managementand Democratic Accountability in Indonesia’,Austral Policy Forum 09-22A, December 7,2009.

[15] Tamsin Carlisle, ‘South Korean companiesstrike it rich in UAE’, The National (Abu Dhabi),March 2, 2010.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Chris Stanton, ‘UAE to sign nuclear pactwith S Korea’, The National (Abu Dhabi) June21, 2009.