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Contents

I. Introduction……………..………………………………………………………………………2

II. Methodology………..……...…………………………………………………………………..3

III. COP Operations: The Current and Future Need………..…………………..…………………4

COP Construction…………………...…………………………………………………….4

Wanat: A Painful COP Building Experience……...………………………………………6

IV. The Collapsible Fighting Position Design…………..………………………………………...8

Current Alternatives………..………………………………………………………..…….9

How the Collapsible Fighting Position Works…………..………………………………10

V. Testing Criteria: Measuring Success………………………………………………………….13

Ballistic Protection………………………………………………………………………13

Stability…………………………………………………………………………………..14

Fast and Easy Assembly………………………………………………………………….15

Ergonomics……………………………………………………………………………....16

VI. Conceptual Counterarguments…………...…..………………………………………………17

Does It Endanger the Rifleman?.......................... ……………………………………….17

Is It Detrimental to Counterinsurgency Strategy?……….………………………………19

Is the Potential Benefit Worth the Logistical Strain?........................................................21

VII. Implications…………………………………………………………………………………23

VIII. Conclusion……………………...………………………………………………………….25

IX. Bibliography……………………………...………………………………………………….27

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I. Introduction

One of the major ground-level components of current U.S. Army counterinsurgency

strategy is the establishment of combat outposts (COPs) in contested regions. COPs are

essentially independent bases inside insurgent-influenced territory that are run on the small unit

level, generally by platoons or companies.1 Such bases allow U.S. forces many tactical and

strategic benefits, from providing a secure location for soldiers to refit between missions to

serving as points of contact between the Army and civilian populations in contested areas.

Although COPs are run by small units, they possess sophisticated fortifications and

operational capabilities. In addition to extensive perimeter defenses, fully-functioning COPs may

contain several buildings to house tactical operations centers, dining facilities, latrines, and

barracks. The downside of extensive COP infrastructure is that it cannot emerge overnight. Since

COPs must instead be developed gradually, enemy forces know where they are being built long

before the COPs’ final defenses are complete.2 Consequently, the first 48-72 hours of

establishing defensive structures at COPs can be very dangerous for soldiers on the ground, as

the soldiers may be required to build fighting positions by hand in areas where natural cover is

sparse, terrain prevents the use of heavy vehicles, and enemy forces are prepared to attack

throughout the construction process.3

One proposed method to increase soldier survivability during COP setup is to provide

protective ballistic barriers that can be quickly assembled and emplaced between soldiers and

likely enemy avenues of approach. This project seeks to answer the question of whether it is

1 United States, Field Manual 3-24.2: Tactics in Counterinsurgency (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2009), 6-9.2 Timothy Hsia, “A Quick Review of Combat Outposts (COPs),” Small Wars Journal, November 27, 2008, http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/138-hsia.pdf (accessed 29 October, 2010), 3.3 Bruce Floersheim, Interview by author, February 1, 2011.

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possible to create such a transportable, collapsible fighting position that successfully protects

soldiers from small arms fire during COP setup operations in Afghanistan. This is an important

question because COP construction may occur in austere environments well into the future,

forcing soldiers to defend themselves with hasty fighting positions for days at a time. Current

defensive measures such as digging into the ground and filling sandbags not only leave soldiers

exposed to enemy fire but also divert time and manpower away from defending the COP.

The collapsible fighting position is still very much a work in progress. The prototype has

not been completed, and no physical tests have been performed. As such, it is impossible to be

certain whether the design will ultimately meet its intended goals. However, current information

suggests that the collapsible fighting position could provide soldiers with transportable, quickly-

assembled protection from small arms fire that would allow greater safety and more flexible

posturing of forces during COP setup operations in Afghanistan.

II. Methodology

The purpose of this paper is not to prove that the collapsible fighting position is

structurally sound or unsound, as pending real-world tests will be required to determine how well

it actually works. Rather, this paper addresses the criteria that the design must meet in order to be

useful for the Army. The criteria are:

1. Ballistic protection: Does the material stop small arms fire?

2. Stability: Will the design stand upright on uneven terrain when impacted?

3. Fast and easy assembly: Is the design faster and easier to emplace than current barriers?

4. Ergonomics: Can soldiers effectively engage targets from behind the barrier?

This paper first introduces the challenges, necessity, and prospective future of COP

operations in order to establish the potential need of a collapsible fighting position (section III).

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It further illustrates the challenges by examining a case study from the 2008 Battle of Wanat,

Afghanistan. This battle highlights current vulnerabilities in COP setup missions. In section IV,

the paper addresses the currently-available, prefabricated fighting position designs and explains

how the collapsible fighting position is potentially better designed to counter threats in

Afghanistan.

The paper then details the most important aspect of the project in section V: the design

criteria that must be met in order for the collapsible fighting position to be useful. It explains

why ballistic protection, stability, fast and easy assembly, and ergonomics are vital metrics. It

also proposes tests for each criterion that should provide reliable insights as to whether the

collapsible fighting position works according to its design. In section VI, the paper explains valid

concerns voiced by Army professionals about the feasibility of the project and examines whether

these issues render the collapsible fighting position unfit for duty. Lastly, section VII focuses on

the project’s implications and briefly examines how testing needs to progress from this point

forward in order to accurately gauge the collapsible fighting position’s effectiveness.

III. COP Operations: The Current and Future Need

Understanding the origin, goals, and challenges of the project begins with understanding

COPs themselves—and the challenges they pose to the soldiers who build them. This

understanding reveals that COP setups can be highly dangerous but are likely to continue into the

future. Therefore, an effort to reduce soldier vulnerability during these operations is vital.

COP Construction

Combat outposts were not defined in U.S. Army doctrine prior to the current

counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, the absence of COP doctrine

did not prevent combat outposts from becoming an essential component of current U.S. strategy

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in Iraq and Afghanistan. A 2008 article in the Small Wars Journal noted that hundreds of COPs

existed at the time despite having no precedent in the Army’s field manuals.4 Finally, in 2009,

COPs received due recognition in Field Manual 3-24.2: Tactics in Counterinsurgency.

According to the manual,

[COPs] represent a cornerstone of counterinsurgency operations, in that they are a means to secure the population. Located in strategically important areas, a combat outpost provides security in its immediate area and direct contact with the local populace. These benefits are unavailable from remote bases. Although the strategy carries with it potential downsides in terms of increased protection concerns and limiting flexibility, the bases provide a huge increase in overall security in the area.5

Admittedly, the field manual’s definition is somewhat vague about how COPs actually

achieve the goal of undermining insurgents. Fortunately, this process is described by the U.S.

Army Combat Studies Institute in one of its recent reports. According to the Combat Studies

Institute, COPs near civilian populations threaten insurgents by serving as bases for soldiers to

conduct patrols (reducing insurgent freedom of movement), tying the Army to the indigenous

community (meaning insurgent attacks against the COP might alienate local support), and

providing construction and maintenance employment opportunities for the local population

(building local support for the counterinsurgents).6

The decision to build COPs cannot be taken lightly. Financially, individual COPs can

cost over a million dollars to build; the process requires extensive resourcing and manpower for

construction followed by occupation and monthly maintenance fees. 7 As the field manual on

Tactics in Counterinsurgency warns, “emplacing a company or platoon combat outpost in sector

4 Hsia, “Quick Review,” 1.5 United States, Tactics, 6-9.6 Staff of the U.S. Army Combat Studies Institute, Wanat: Combat Action in Afghanistan, 2008 (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2010), 69.7 Hsia, “Quick Review,” 3-4.

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is a deliberate operation requiring detailed planning and additional logistical support.”8 Yet these

concerns pale in comparison to the security challenges faced by soldiers establishing COPs.

COPs in Afghanistan may be established in urban or rural areas. Rural COPs have unique

benefits and downsides. While they tend to possess better natural defenses, the logistical and

construction requirements to build and maintain rural COPs are more difficult.9 Terrain is

perhaps the most difficult challenge faced by soldiers setting up COPs in Afghanistan. In the

rugged, rural landscapes where elevations are steep and roads are poor, construction materials

must often be transported by air or carried by individual soldiers; ground transport in such

situations is impossible.10 Without heavy machinery and large-scale defensive materials, soldiers

in these environments have to work with picks and shovels to create their fighting positions.11

Since COPs are now a major component of U.S. counterinsurgency operations, they will

likely continue to be used for the remainder of the war in Afghanistan. Moreover, the overall

success of COP efforts during current conflicts may encourage their use in future operations in

other parts of the world. The prospect of future COP setup operations means that the collapsible

fighting position project, if successful, could be useful to the Army for years to come. After all,

increasing soldier survivability is a timeless problem that the Army attempts to address every

day. Unfortunately, losses suffered in recent COP setup missions highlight just how vulnerable

soldiers still are in Afghanistan.

Wanat: A Painful COP Building Experience

The inherent risks of COP building operations are well illustrated by the 2008 Battle of

Wanat, a Taliban-led assault which claimed the lives of nine American soldiers and left twenty-

8 United States, Tactics, 6-9.9 Hsia, “Quick Review,” 1.10 Combat Studies Institute, Combat Action in Afghanistan, 18. 11 Tim Hetherington and Sebastian Junger, Restrepo (Outpost Films, 2010).

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seven wounded.12 The example of Wanat reveals several key issues with current COP building

efforts that the collapsible fighting position project hopes to address. Among the many factors

which contributed to the battle’s high cost in casualties, inadequate fighting positions left

soldiers perilously exposed to enemy fire.

The Battle of Wanat occurred on July 13, 2008 as a platoon of the 173rd Airborne

Brigade Combat Team attempted to establish a COP in eastern Afghanistan.13 The proposed

eight-week construction plan involved U.S. soldiers and Afghan workers creating an outpost

with exterior and interior defensive walls, guard towers, and other permanent fortifications.14

This was in keeping with common COP setup procedures and necessitated the use of heavy

equipment. For the first days of the operation, however, soldiers were on their own to build what

fortifications they could by hand, aided by a single Bobcat front-end loader vehicle.15 The Bobcat

was useful for filling HESCO barriers, defensive structures used extensively to form COP

perimeters. HESCO barriers are essentially metal frames containing large cloth sacks that are

packed with sand to stop enemy fire.16 While HESCO barriers provide excellent protection, they

are large and take considerable time to fill. Such barriers therefore cannot be used to protect

soldiers during the initial hours of COP setup if vehicles such as the Bobcat are not present.

It is a tragic and telling statistic that eight of the nine Americans killed at Wanat died on a

ridge that had no HESCOs because it could not be reached by the Bobcat.17 The soldiers manning

this observation post had to reinforce their position entirely by hand.18 Consequently, when

12 United States, Oversight Review: Reinvestigation of Combat Action at Wanat Village, Afghanistan (Arlington: Department of Defense, 2010), 4.13 Combat Studies Institute, Combat Action in Afghanistan, v.14 Ibid., 47.15 Ibid., 77.16 Ibid., 70.17 Ibid., 229.

18 Combat Studies Institute, Combat Action in Afghanistan, 102.

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insurgents attacked five days into the COP building operation, the soldiers at the observation

post had only sandbags for cover.19

Ultimately, U.S. and Afghan forces repelled the insurgent attack. However, the tragic

losses suffered at Wanat sparked heated debates that are still ongoing. Looking beyond the

controversy, it is possible to learn important lessons about COP operations from Wanat. For

instance, it is noteworthy that even though a Bobcat successfully filled several HESCO barriers

before the COP was attacked, the vehicle could not be used in more rugged terrain. Since some

COPs are established in locations that can only be reached by air or on foot, 20 HESCO barriers

can sometimes be filled only by hand and are therefore not ideal for protecting the initial soldiers

at an emerging COP. Moreover, the terrain at Wanat was difficult to dig into, reducing the

effectiveness of hand-dug fortifications and making the process of filling sandbags particularly

difficult.21 Given these conditions, the soldiers could have benefitted from some type of

defensive material other than sandbags and shovels. Since it is entirely possible that similar

terrain will be encountered in future COP operations, there is a legitimate need for defensive

measures that do not require exhaustive digging.

IV. The Collapsible Fighting Position Design

The dangers of current COP setup operations in Afghanistan and the likely prospects of

such missions continuing into the future create a need for new risk mitigation measures. Whether

the ideal solution is a doctrinal improvement or a tangible, physical design remains to be seen.

However, a group of West Point seniors representing the mechanical, systems, and psychological

engineering disciplines developed a collapsible fighting position that may offer a viable

improvement for the current situation. The collapsible fighting position is designed to be

19 Ibid., 213.20 Ibid., 26.21 Ibid., 97, 110.

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modular, lightweight, and resistant enough to be used as temporary ballistic cover for soldiers at

emerging COPs. If it works according to the design, it will be transportable by ground or air and

can be assembled in 20 minutes.

Current Alternatives

Figures 1 and 2: Defenshield (left)22 and Protech (right) 23 armored fighting positions

The collapsible fighting position project is not the first attempt that has been made to

design moveable ballistic walls. Companies such as Nationwide Structures, Defenshield, STS

Security Products, and Protech all sell modular armored structures for military use. Currently-

available designs appear capable of performing their intended duties in Iraq and Afghanistan

admirably. Nevertheless, the current options do not meet the COP-focused needs of this project.

An evaluation of the various companies’ current designs by the engineer team determined that

the commercial models are too large and not sufficiently mobile to serve as protective barriers

during the initial phases of COP setups in rugged terrain. They are heavy structures designed to

22 Fox Hole, Defenshield, http://www.defenshield.com/sidebarimages/9.jpg (accessed January 23, 2011).23 Armored Fighting Position, Protech, http://www.protecharmored.com/CMFiles/Images/SRS%20AFP1.jpg (accessed January 23, 2011).

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stay in place for extended periods of time at locations such as traffic control points; they are not

meant to be set up hastily on COP perimeters and removed after HESCOs and other defenses are

in place. Transporting and emplacing them on the mountainous terrain of many parts of rural

Afghanistan would likely be impossible.24

How the Collapsible Fighting Position Works

Figure 3: Collapsible Fighting Position, front. The most recent design of the collapsible fighting position is three panels high rather than the two panel height pictured.

The collapsible fighting position is a structure consisting of 12 to 15 individual ballistic

panels held together by built-in clamps and large enough to accommodate four soldiers at a time.

12 panels are necessary for basic stability and protection while an additional three panels can be

24 The analyses of the current, commercially-available fighting positions were performed by Cadet Kyle Volle, a mechanical engineering major.

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added for overhead cover. No external equipment or tools are required for assembly. Each panel

is made of bullet-resistant, composite glass that is capable of reliably stopping 7.62 x 39 mm

ammunition, the standard round fired by an AK-47. While this material does not stop higher-

caliber small arms fire and RPGs, the assumption is that this is a worthwhile tradeoff since the

glass’s light weight makes it easier to transport and since the fighting position itself is only

meant for temporary use, to be removed once harder barriers such as HESCOs are emplaced.

Because the engineering team has not yet been able to acquire samples of the composite glass for

independent testing, it is not known how heavy each panel will be; currently, estimates suggest

that the panels will weigh approximately 40 to 50 pounds each. The panels are designed to fit

inside a Joint Modular Intermodal Container (JMIC), a collapsible cargo box that can be loaded

into the back of a Chinook helicopter or transported as a sling load by Chinooks and

Blackhawks. Each JMIC will hold 24 panels, enough for the construction of two collapsible

fighting positions.

The following scenario illustrates how a COP setup involving the collapsible fighting

position might occur. At the start of the COP building operation, helicopters or trucks would

transport the collapsible fighting position panels alongside other supplies and troops to the

construction zone. Once there, soldiers would unload the JMIC containing the fighting position

panels and work in two-person teams to carry the panels from the crate to key defensive

positions on the perimeter of the COP. The soldiers would then clamp the panels together and

form the fighting positions to protect themselves. From this point forward, they would take cover

and return fire from behind the fighting position as necessary while digging and reinforcing

permanent fighting positions around the perimeter. The collapsible fighting position would likely

remain in place for at least two to three days during this process. Once the walls and

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fortifications of the COP were completed, the collapsible fighting position panels would be

broken down, repacked into the JMIC, and transported out for future use if still serviceable.

The technical characteristics of the collapsible fighting position such as weight and bullet

resistance must be rigorously evaluated according to specific criteria in order to assess whether it

is actually a useful piece of equipment. Since these tests are still pending, it is too soon to tell

whether the design is capable of performing the mission proposed above. If it can do so,

however, it will be a far superior design to other currently-available models of transportable

ballistic protection.

Figure 4: Collapsible Fighting Position, rear. Like the previous image, the above concept shows two-panel height rather than the current three-panel configuration.

V. Testing Criteria: Measuring Success

Currently, the engineering team is building a fully-functioning prototype of the design to

perform the requisite physical tests. It remains to be seen how well the collapsible fighting

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position resists ballistic impacts, whether it is stable when emplaced on rugged terrain, if soldiers

can indeed assemble the design quickly and easily, and if the soldiers are comfortable shooting

behind it. Testing these four metrics accurately is essential to gauging whether the collapsible

fighting position is a worthwhile design.

Ballistic Protection

First and foremost, the collapsible fighting position must stop small arms fire. No matter

how fast and easy it may be to emplace compared to currently-available barriers, the design

serves no purpose if it cannot protect soldiers from enemy attacks. It must be able to endure

multiple ballistic impacts over a period of days since it is intended for use throughout the first

48-72 hours of COP setup operations. Moreover, the collapsible fighting position will be

subjected a wide range of weather conditions that may affect its ballistic resistance. It must

therefore provide reliable protection even after being exposed to the elements.

The collapsible fighting position panels are made of S-2 glass, a composite material of

impact-resistant fibers similar in many ways to Kevlar (i.e. more like tough fabric than the

traditional “glass” that the name indicates). Bullets striking S-2 glass are stopped by the stiff

material’s ability to either absorb the rounds directly or cause them to rebound.25 S-2 glass

appears to be a viable material for the collapsible fighting position since it is able to provide

ballistic protection at an acceptable weight and size for carrying and emplacing during COP

setups.

It is impossible to know how well the collapsible fighting position will react to being shot

—particularly in potentially weak points such as joints between panels—until bullets are fired at

a full-scale prototype. It is therefore imperative to build such a prototype and shoot it repeatedly

25 Biju Mathew, James M. Sands, and Uday K. Vaidya, “Flexural Fatigue Response of Repaired S2-Glass/Vinyl Ester Composites” (Aberdeen Proving Ground: Army Research Laboratory, 2009), 2.

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with 7.62 x 39 mm ammunition. The ballistic tests should include firing on the armor plates from

multiple angles and firing shots at each of the joints. Impacted areas should be shot repeatedly to

test the structure’s resistance to recurring hits. Additionally, the tests need to be conducted over a

period of three or more days to simulate the S-2 glass’s endurance over time. Tests should also

be conducted in multiple types of weather, subjecting the panels to high levels of heat, cold,

precipitation, and other conditions that may weaken the S-2 glass’s ballistic resistance.

Stability

An unstable fighting position poses several problems. If it cannot stand up at all, it cannot

be emplaced anywhere; if it can stand up on flat ground but not on uneven terrain, it is still not

useful for operations in rugged areas. Even if it can stand in the mountains of Afghanistan, it

must be able to remain standing when impacted by enemy fire. A fighting position that falls after

being hit could crush the soldiers behind it or leave them dangerously exposed to further attacks.

The collapsible fighting position design takes into account the potential unevenness of the

terrain in which it will be used. While figures 3 and 4 show a collapsible fighting position with a

bottom row of panels aligned in a flat base, the actual base does not have to be flat. Rather,

panels may be vertically aligned at different heights to accommodate variations along the ground

below them. An emplaced collapsible fighting position could therefore have a much more

undulating appearance than the box-like configurations in the illustrations.

Stability can be assessed concurrently with the ballistic tests described above since the

collapsible fighting position is designed to remain upright under fire in the challenging

landscapes of Afghanistan. Accordingly, ballistic tests need to be conducted not only on flat

firing ranges but also on ranges that incorporate natural or man-made variations in terrain. If

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bullet impacts cause the current collapsible fighting position to be unsteady on uneven ground,

the design will need to be reworked to provide greater stability.

Fast and Easy Assembly

The collapsible fighting position may be bullet-resistant and stable, but soldiers already

have sandbags, HESCO barriers, and other materials that provide similar or better protection.

The collapsible fighting position must therefore provide a more efficient and simple means of

emplacing ballistic protection. Sandbags and HESCOs both take time and energy to fill, and

additional equipment may be needed to emplace some of the larger barriers. Building defensive

barriers can put soldiers’ lives in danger as they balance digging, filling, and other tasks with

providing perimeter security for the COP.

A collapsible fighting position with a confusing assembly process could similarly take an

inordinate amount of time to emplace. In order to minimize the risk of creating a confusing

design, the collapsible fighting position team includes engineering psychology majors who

assess whether assembly components (such as the clamps which hold the panels together) are

easy enough to locate, understand, and use that untrained soldiers could employ the design. The

collapsible fighting position therefore requires no tools and only a few, easily-operated parts to

assemble, theoretically making the emplacement process fast and easy.

Soldiers should be involved in tests to determine how long it takes to transport and

assemble the panels in different types of terrain. These tests should study separate groups of

soldiers: one which has been trained to assemble the collapsible fighting position and one which

has not. This will allow the project team to assess both how quickly the design could

theoretically be employed in a tactical environment and how difficult it is for inexperienced

soldiers to use the collapsible fighting position. It is possible that both experienced and

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inexperienced soldiers would be required to use collapsible fighting positions on COPs, so if a

design takes significantly longer for an untrained soldier to assemble, it should be further

simplified. Lastly, the effects of weather on the design should be assessed as they were in the

ballistic tests since rust, corrosion, warping from temperature fluctuations, and other weather

variations could prevent the clamps that hold the panels together from working as intended.

Ergonomics

Even if the collapsible fighting position resists small arms fire, is stable, and can be

assembled quickly, it could be detrimental to users if it is uncomfortable to stand, kneel, or lie

behind for extended periods and while firing at enemy targets. Soldiers provide 24-hour security

along the entire perimeter of emerging COPs and must spend days and nights observing the area

around them and potentially combating attackers. Accordingly, the collapsible fighting position

should be as comfortable as possible for soldiers to position themselves behind for hours at a

time. It also needs to allow soldiers to see and engage enemies. Panels that obscure vision or

prevent soldiers from positioning their weapons effectively to fire at enemies will greatly

diminish the COP’s security and its defenders’ personal safety.

Unlike the previous criteria, the success or failure of the collapsible fighting position’s

ergonomics is gauged by users’ preferences. The current design allows for several variations

based on such preferences. Since the height of the fighting position depends on how many panels

the user attaches vertically, it can be built shorter or taller depending on factors such as the user’s

height and whether he or she prefers to fire while standing or kneeling. Leaving open spaces

along the top row of panels creates windows that soldiers can use to see and shoot without

leaving the protection of the collapsible fighting position. The design team is also considering

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developing half-size panels that can be emplaced along the top row to create improved

observation and firing slits (as seen in figures 3 and 4).

Soldiers will be the crucial evaluators in tests of the design’s ergonomics. Tests to

measure these characteristics should involve soldiers firing from multiple stances while behind

the collapsible fighting position. The results will then be used to evaluate the users’ comfort

(subjective) and shooting accuracy (objective). Both characteristics are important since they

affect how willing soldiers will be to use the design and how well they will be able to engage

enemies when taking cover.

VI. Conceptual Counterarguments

Structurally, the collapsible fighting position must be bullet-resistant, stable, easy to

emplace, and comfortable to use. These are all vital issues for the engineering team to address.

However, the project must also address challenges outside the realm of design and ergonomics if

it is to be of use to the Army. A collapsible fighting position design that is perfect on paper but

fails according to the following criteria could have serious repercussions.

Does It Endanger the Rifleman?

An important consideration is the psychological effects that use of collapsible fighting

positions may cause. Complacency is one of the most obvious concerns. Without proper training,

soldiers using the collapsible fighting position may overestimate the level of protection it offers.

They may position themselves in disadvantageous, exposed terrain without realizing that they are

not protected from RPGs and prolonged small arms fire behind the collapsible fighting position.

Moreover, the presence of armored walls around the developing COP may create a false sense of

security that reduces soldiers’ efforts to create strong, permanent fighting positions. Few types of

protection are as effective as fighting positions that utilize natural terrain advantageously. In this

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regard, it is worth noting that HESCO barriers and hand-dug pits reinforced with sandbags have

thus far been largely successful for long-term COP security.26

Additionally, it is possible that the armored walls could produce a “fortress mentality”

among the soldiers in the COP. As Major Randall Ashby observed, people have a tendency to

confuse better technology for greater security even though the best security measure is the

presence of more troops.27 Protected behind the collapsible fighting position, soldiers might

become complacent being defensively postured and be less willing to leave the COP on patrols.

This is a very dangerous prospect in Afghanistan, where the varying landscape in many areas

allows free, unobserved movement by insurgent forces if the terrain is not patrolled. In fact, a

lack of patrolling around Wanat during the COP setup operation allowed insurgents to move in

and dominate the surrounding hills, a fact which had disastrous consequences.28

If the collapsible fighting position is adopted, it is vital that the soldiers who use it know

its limitations. The fact that it feels sturdy and looks well-fortified does not mean that it can stop

all types of enemy fire. The design sacrifices some amount of protection for reduced weight so

that it can be carried and emplaced quickly around a COP. Clear instructions, trained company

and platoon-level leadership, and experience should help mitigate the risk.

With regards to patrolling, it is a basic component of security on COPs and elsewhere to

send out regular patrols in order to maintain control over an area.29 If leaders fail to send out

patrols from the COP or coordinate patrolling of the area with adjacent units, they are more to

blame than a collapsible fighting position. While the fortress mindset is a legitimate concern, it is

also important to remember that completed COPs are protected by strong walls. If soldiers can

26 Nicholas Bilotta, Interview by author, January 27, 2011.27 Randall Ashby, Interview by author, February 24, 2011.28 Combat Studies Institute, Combat Action in Afghanistan, 110.29 United States, Tactics, 6-11.

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operate effectively from COPs with permanent walls, it is difficult to accept the idea that the use

of collapsible fighting positions would make the soldiers more hesitant to go outside the wire

later on.

Is It Detrimental to Counterinsurgency Strategy?

Beyond safety issues, the armored walls of the collapsible fighting position could hinder

U.S. counterinsurgency efforts. While better initial security provided by the collapsible fighting

position might enhance soldiers’ protection and ability to build permanent defenses, it could

simultaneously make employing local labor for COP construction a less pressing concern.30 This

is potentially detrimental to the COP’s ability to improve relations between the Army and the

local population by providing job opportunities. The collapsible fighting position’s walled

appearance could also give civilians the impression that the COP is an unapproachable, hostile

fortification. Major James Pope, an infantry officer with counterinsurgency experience in both

Iraq and Afghanistan, warned that “the more you fortify, the more you look like an occupier.”31

In the aforementioned article on Combat Outposts in Small Wars Journal, engineer officer

Timothy Hsia similarly cautions that “COPs should not be seen as forbidding moat like fortresses

by the local nationals who live in its vicinity,” adding that an effective COP provides “a meeting

place for the local populace to engage with US forces and to share intelligence or concerns.”32

These are important concerns, particularly since COP building is not an objective unto

itself but rather a component of a much broader counterinsurgency strategy. Nevertheless, local

labor is useful to soldiers no matter how well they are protected during the initial phases of COP

setups. COP walls require hours of work to create; the COP at Wanat, for instance, would have

30 Bilotta, Interview by author.31 James Pope, Interview by author, February 24, 2011.32 Hsia, “Quick Review,” 7.

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taken a predicted eight weeks to build even with local labor and heavy machinery involved.33

Soldiers benefit from local help just as much if they are covered by a collapsible fighting

position as they benefit from such help if they are fighting from sandbag-reinforced foxholes.

Similarly, there is little risk of the collapsible fighting position making a COP appear

“over-fortified.” Finalized COPs regularly have walls of HESCO barriers or other materials

around them, yet Afghan civilians are not expected to view them as hostile fortresses. Indeed, the

same officer whose article warns against making COPs into “forbidding moat like fortresses”

also believes that protective measures such as guard towers and concrete walls are “absolutely

necessary” to a good defense.34 In fact, “hardening” of a COP—to include using “concrete and

expedient barriers…to defeat or negate the effects of an attack” is encouraged by the official

Army Field Manual on Tactics in Counterinsurgency.35 If a finished COP is thusly fortified, and

hand-dug fighting positions, sand bags, and HESCO barriers are already emplaced as quickly as

possible during current COP setup operations with negligible detriment to civilians’ perceptions,

it is hard to accept that the collapsible fighting position will have a profoundly negative effect in

this regard.

Is the Potential Benefit Worth the Logistical Strain?

Before the collapsible fighting position can be emplaced to protect soldiers on COPs, it

must first be transported to the construction sites. Often, COP construction in the rural regions of

Afghanistan occurs on rugged terrain. This can prevent transportation of supplies using ground

vehicles, limiting supply methods to aircraft and overland carrying by individual soldiers. With

each panel of the collapsible fighting position weighing an estimated 40 pounds and 10 panels

required for a single structure, the design is not suitable for soldiers to transport long distances

33 Combat Studies Institute, Combat Action in Afghanistan, 47.34 Hsia, “Quick Review,” 4.35 United States, Tactics, 6-8.

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on their own. This is an area where the collapsible fighting position is far outclassed by

sandbags. Sandbags, albeit time consuming to fill, can be stored and transported easily in

rucksacks. Air transport, unfortunately, is essential for the collapsible fighting position to reach

some of the remote environments for which it is designed.

Regarding this aspect of the collapsible fighting position, Captain Nicholas Bilotta asked,

“Is the juice worth the squeeze?”36 In other words, Captain Bilotta and other veterans of COP

operations37 questioned whether the potential benefits of employing a collapsible fighting

position are worth the strain that transporting the design may place on aircraft availability. After

all, even if the collapsible fighting position increases survivability for soldiers at one COP, the

air transportation logistics involved in getting it there might prevent another COP from receiving

vital air support. According to Command Sergeant Major Rodney Harris, even a good fighting

position design “doesn’t help anybody” if it places more demands on limited aircraft

availability.38

Contrary to these concerns, a closer look at air cargo transportation operations in

Afghanistan suggests that the collapsible fighting position could likely be delivered to COPs

without placing undue burden on aviation assets. Major David Hughes, who flew Chinook cargo

helicopters in Afghanistan, recalled that helicopters were generally available when needed and

were used extensively to transport personnel and equipment for COP setup operations.39

Helicopter availability is extensive enough that Major Hughes suggested it would even be

possible to send in the collapsible fighting position on a helicopter by itself if necessary, as there

would generally be several other aircraft available to transport the rest of the soldiers and

36 Bilotta, Interview by author.37 Thomas Donatelle, Interview by author, January 27, 2011; Rodney Harris, Interview by author, February 2, 2011.38 Harris, Interview by author.39 David Hughes, Interview by author, March 24, 2011.

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materiel.40 Major Aaron Ashley, who serves as the aviation branch representative at West Point,

affirms that aircraft are readily available for transporting cargo in Afghanistan. According to

Major Ashley, the main concerns with using helicopters there focus on fair weather and fuel

availability rather than struggling to have enough aviation assets to keep COPs adequately

supplied.41 Even so, the projected weight of a 327 pound JMIC fully loaded with 40-pound

collapsible fighting position panels is barely over 1,500 pounds—well within the carrying

capacity of a Blackhawk helicopter, which can fly an estimated 2,000 to 3,000 pounds in poor

flying conditions.42 Chinooks, moreover, can lift considerably heavier loads. Weight, air asset

availability, and all other considerations included, Major Ashley maintains that aviation units

exist to support ground forces, and “if the Army says [the collapsible fighting position] is better

for soldiers, aviators will find a way to get it to them.”43

VII. Implications

While many implications of this project cannot be fully determined until physical tests

have been conducted, there are two possible conclusions: either the collapsible fighting position

adequately protects soldiers or it does not. At this point, the outcome rests entirely on how the

design performs in testing. Section V of this paper proposed initial tests that should be used to

evaluate the collapsible fighting position’s ballistic protection, stability, speed and ease of

assembly, and ergonomics. The proposed tests are all conducted in controlled, non-combat

environments to determine if the design actually works as intended. If the collapsible fighting

position passes these initial tests, then—and only then—it will be reasonable to undertake the

40 Hughes, Interview by author.41 Aaron Ashley, Interview by author, March 1, 2011.42 Lee Evans, Interview by author, March 29, 2011.43 Ashley, Interview by author.

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expensive and potentially hazardous process of sending prototype models of the collapsible

fighting position to Afghanistan for combat testing. Even if the project reaches an Afghanistan

testing phase, the harsh conditions of combat may uncover flaws in the design that controlled

tests failed to reveal. Thus, simply reaching the Afghanistan testing phase is no guarantee of

success.

Risk assessment and mitigation must receive special attention in the Afghanistan tests

since they will be conducted in an active warzone. The first Afghanistan trials should expose the

collapsible fighting position to small arms fire without potentially endangering the lives of

anyone behind it. For example, the position can be set up around the perimeter of a COP in an

area where it will likely receive fire but which is away from personnel. This will provide a

relatively safe way of testing the design’s endurance and stability in its intended wartime

environment while not placing soldiers directly in the line of fire.

Another test could evaluate the usefulness of the optional overhead cover panels by

setting up a collapsible fighting position—again, away from personnel—at a COP that is known

to receive indirect fire regularly and waiting until the collapsible fighting position is impacted by

mortar rounds. This will allow the individuals conducting the test to study how well the

collapsible fighting position would shield occupants from the blast. After several impacts, it

should be possible to determine if the 15-panel configuration which includes overhead cover

actually provides better protection than the basic 12-panel model. If not, then the 12-panel model

is preferable by far since it takes less time to emplace and allows the extra panels to be used on

another collapsible fighting position.

If successful, the ultimate goal of these tests is to refine the design to the point that it is

practical to test it in real COP setup missions. If the initial Afghanistan tests suggest that the

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collapsible fighting position can be used effectively in this capacity, the final trials will involve

soldiers actually using the design for protection during these missions. Assuming the collapsible

fighting position can pass this final test, the prospect of producing it on a larger scale and

distributing it to Army units across Afghanistan finally becomes viable.

This report has affirmed the other prerequisites for the collapsible fighting position to be

a feasible solution: COP building operations provide an ongoing and future need for security

improvement, the collapsible fighting position project theoretically meets the need better than

other available designs, and potential tactical and strategic repercussions of using the collapsible

fighting position appear to be outweighed by benefits that the design could bring—if it works. If

it does work, then the collapsible fighting position will, as hypothesized, provide soldiers with

transportable, quickly-assembled protection from small arms fire that would allow greater safety

and more flexible posturing of forces during COP setup operations in Afghanistan. It should

therefore become a standard piece of equipment for the Army, available at the platoon level.

Conversely, if the collapsible fighting position does not work, it must be scrapped

altogether or redesigned and retested rather than forced onto soldiers and commanders against

their best interests. Its shortcomings must be evaluated honestly since its adoption by the Army

could otherwise cause serious problems. Most importantly, it is vital to ensure that the design

does not overburden soldiers with cumbersome cover that is little better than sandbags. If the

collapsible fighting position is merely a design that works in theory but fails to perform well

under real-world conditions, then it should not be produced or fielded. As obvious as this may

seem, enthusiasm for the project could mislead the Army to adopt it even if it does not work as

intended. This would ultimately put soldiers’ lives at risk or, at the very least, cause unnecessary

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hardship for the men and women who must transport, maintain, and use the collapsible fighting

position.

VIII. Conclusion

Much work remains to be done on the collapsible fighting position. Beyond simply

making improvements based on feedback and observations, the engineers must determine if the

design works at all based on live tests. The true size, weight, ballistic resistance, and other

characteristics of the collapsible fighting position remain unknown at the time of this writing.

What can be determined at this point is which characteristics of the design must be

evaluated to assess the collapsible fighting position’s effectiveness and how these characteristics

can be tested. It is also possible to assess the collapsible fighting position’s ability or inability to

meet deeper, conceptual challenges such as making soldiers dangerously complacent, creating

COPs that appear too fortified, and placing undue stress on air transport assets. Such questions

require research and reasoning rather than physical tests. Based on current evidence, it appears

that the collapsible fighting position will not have these harmful effects.

COP operations are ongoing at this moment, and the soldiers involved in them deserve to

have the best protection possible. That best protection might not be the collapsible fighting

position—indeed, it could ultimately be an ineffective design—but it is impossible to know until

further tests are conducted. Given the potential of the collapsible fighting position and the

current lack of similar products for soldiers on emerging COPs, the project is worth continuing.

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IX. Bibliography

Primary Sources:

Ashby, Randall. Interview by author. February 24, 2011.

Ashley, Aaron. Interview by author. March 1, 2011.

Bilotta, Nicholas. Interview by author. January 27, 2011.

Donatelle, Thomas. Interview by author. January 27, 2011.

Evans, Lee. Interview by author. March 29, 2011.

Floersheim, Bruce. Interview by author. February 1, 2011.

Harris, Rodney. Interview by author. February 2, 2011.

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Hetherington, Tim and Sebastian Junger. Restrepo. Outpost Films, 2010.

Hughes, David. Interview by author. March 24, 2011.

Junger, Sebastian. War. New York: Hachette Book Group, 2010.

Pope, James. Interview by author. February 24, 2011.

Secondary Sources:

Bird, Clay, Connors, Farquhar, Lynn C. Garcia, Dennis Van Wey, and Donald P. Wright. A Different Kind of War: The United States Army in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), October 2001-September 2005. Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2009.

Hsia, Timothy. “A Quick Review of Combat Outposts (COPs).” Small Wars Journal (2008). http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/138-hsia.pdf (accessed 29 October, 2010).

Mathew, Biju, James M. Sands, and Uday K. Vaidya. “Flexural Fatigue Response of Repaired S2-Glass/Vinyl Ester Composites.” Aberdeen Proving Ground: Army Research Laboratory, 2009.

Melin, Nicholas O. “Combat Outpost Construction in Afghanistan’s Paktika Province.” Engineer 38, no. 2 (2008): 34-37. http://www.proquest.com (accessed January 25, 2011.

Staff of the U.S. Army Combat Studies Institute. Wanat: Combat Action in Afghanistan, 2008. Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2010.

United States. Field Manual 3-24.2: Tactics in Counterinsurgency. Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2009.

United States. Oversight Review: Reinvestigation of Combat Action at Wanat Village, Afghanistan. Arlington: Department of Defense, 2010.

Images:

Armored Fighting Position. Protech. http://www.protecharmored.com/CMFiles/Images/ SRS%20AFP1.jpg (accessed January 23, 2011).

Fox Hole. Defenshield. http://www.defenshield.com/sidebarimages/9.jpg (accessed January 23, 2011).