street gangs: the new urban insurgency

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STREET GANGS:THE NEW URBAN INSURGENCY

Max G. Manwaring

March 2005

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ISBN 1-58487-191-1


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FOREWORD

The intent of this monograph is to identify some of the most salientcharacteristics of contemporary criminal street gangs (that is, the

gang phenomenon or third generation gangs), and to explain thelinkage to insurgency. As a corollary, Dr. Max G. Manwaringargues that gang-related crime, in conjunction with the instabilityit wreaks upon governments, is now a serious national security andsovereignty problem in important parts of the global community.Although differences between gangs and insurgents exist, in termsof original motives and modes of operation, this linkage infers thatthe gang phenomenon is a mutated form of urban insurgency. That

is, these nonstate actors must eventually seize political power toguarantee the freedom of action and the commercial environmentthey want. The common denominator that can link gangs andinsurgents is that some gangs and insurgents ultimate objective isto depose or control the governments of targeted countries.

Thus, a new kind of war is brewing in the global securityarena. It involves youthful gangs that make up for their lack of raw

conventional power in two ways. First, they rely on their streetsmarts, and generally use coercion, corruption, and co-optation toachieve their ends. Second, more mature gangs (i.e., third generationgangs) also rely on loose alliances with organized criminals anddrug traffickers to gain additional resources, expand geographicalparameters, and attain larger market shares.

This monograph contributes significantly to an understandingof the new enemies and the new kinds of threats characteristic of

a world in which instability and irregular conflict are no longer onthe margins of global politics. For those responsible for makingand implementing national security policy in the United States andelsewhere in the world, the analysis of the new threats provided bythe author is compelling. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleasedto offer this cogent monograph as part of the ongoing debate onglobal and regional security.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.DirectorStrategic Studies Institute


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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

MAX G. MANWARING holds the General Douglas MacArthurChair and is Professor of Military Strategy at the U.S. Army

War College. He is a retired U.S. Army colonel and an AdjunctProfessor of International Politics at Dickinson College. Hehas served in various civilian and military positions, includingthe U.S. Army War College, the U.S. Southern Command,and the Defense Intelligence Agency. Dr. Manwaring is theauthor and co-author of several articles, chapters, and reportsdealing with political-military affairs, democratization and

global ungovernability, and Latin American security affairs.He is also the editor or co-editor of El Salvador at War; BeyondDeclaring Victory and Coming Home: The Challenges of Peaceand Stability Operations; Deterrence in the 21st Century; and TheSearch for Security: A U.S. Grand Strategy for the Twenty-FirstCentury. Dr. Manwaring holds a B.S. in Economics, a B.S. inPolitical Science, an M.A. in Political Science, and a Ph.D. in

Political Science from the University of Illinois. He is also agraduate of the U.S. Army War College.


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SUMMARY

This monograph explains the linkage of contemporarycriminal street gangs (that is, the gang phenomenon or third

generation gangs) to insurgency in terms of the instability itwreaks upon governments and the concomitant challenge tostate sovereignty. Although differences between gangs andinsurgents regarding motives and modes of operations exist,this linkage infers that gang phenomena are mutated formsof urban insurgency. In these terms, these new nonstateactors must eventually seize political power to guarantee

the freedom of action and the commercial environmentthey want. The common denominator that can link the gangphenomenon to insurgency is that some third generationgangs and insurgents ultimate objective is to depose orcontrol the governments of targeted countries.

The author identifies those issues that must be takentogether and understood as a whole before any effective

countermeasures can be taken to deal with the half-criminaland half-political nature of the gang phenomenon. Thisis a universal compound-complex problem that must beunderstood on three distinct levels of analysis: first, the gangsphenomena are generating serious domestic and regionalinstability and insecurity that ranges from personal violenceto insurgent to state failure: second, because if their criminalactivities and security challenges, the gangs phenomenaare exacerbating civil-military and police-military relationsproblems and reducing effective and civil-military ability tocontrol the national territory; and, third, gangs are helpingtransitional criminal organizations, insurgents, warlords, anddrug barons erode the legitimacy and effective sovereignty

of nation-states . The analytical commonality linking thesethree issues is the inevitable contribution to either (a) failingand failed state status of targeted countries, or (b) deposingor controlling the governments of targeted countries. In these


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terms, we must remember that crime and instability are onlysymptoms of the threat. The ultimate threat is either statefailure or the violent imposition of a radical socio-economic-political restructuring of the state and its governance.

In describing the gang phenomenon as a simple mutationof a violent act we label as insurgency, we mischaracterize theactivities of nonstate organizations that are attempting to takecontrol of the state. We traditionally think of insurgency asprimarily a military activity, and we think of gangs as a simplelaw-enforcement problem. Yet, insurgents and third generationgangs are engaged in a highly complex political actpolitical

war. Under these conditions, police and military forces wouldprovide personal and collective security and stability, whilethey and other governmental institutions combat the rootcauses of instability and political warinjustice, repression,inequity, and corruption. The intent would be to generatethe political-economic-social development that will definethe processes of national reform, regeneration, and well-

being. The challenge, then, is to come to terms with the factthat contemporary security and stability, at whatever level,is at base a holistic political-diplomatic, socio-economic,psychological-moral, and military police effort.

This monograph concludes with implications and strategic-level recommendations derived from the instability, civil-military jurisdiction, and sovereignty issues noted above thatwill help leaders achieve strategic clarity and operate moreeffectively in the complex politically dominated, contemporaryglobal security arena.

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STREET GANGS:THE NEW URBAN INSURGENCY

The traditional problem of external aggression against

a states territory, markets, sources of raw materials andhydrocarbons, lines of communication, and peoples remainssalient, but does not hold the urgency it once did. However,the Western mainstream legally-oriented security dialoguedemonstrates that many political and military leaders andscholars of international relations have not yet adjusted to thereality that internal and transnational nonstate actorssuch

as criminal gangscan be as important as traditional nation-states in determining political patterns and outcomes inglobal affairs. Similarly, many political leaders see nonstateactors as bit players on the international stage. At best, manyleaders consider these nontraditional political actors to below-level law enforcement problems, and, as a result, manyargue that they do not require sustained national security

policy attention.1 Yet, more than half of the countries in theworld are struggling to maintain their political, economic, andterritorial integrity in the face of diverse direct and indirectnonstateincluding criminal gangchallenges.2

For sovereignty to be meaningful today, the state, togetherwith its associated governmental institutions working underthe rule of law, must be the only source of authority empoweredto make and enforce laws and conduct the business of thepeople within the national territory. The violent, intimidating,and corrupting activities of illegal internal and transnationalnonstate actorssuch as urban gangscan abridge sovereignstate powers and negate national and regional security.3 Thelogic of the situation argues that the conscious choices that the

international community and individual nation-states makeabout how to deal with the contemporary nontraditionalthreat situation will define the processes of national, regional,and global security and well-being far into the future.


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AN OVERVIEW OF THE GANGS-INSURGENCYPROBLEM

The primary thrusts of this monograph are to identify

some of the most salient characteristics of contemporarycriminal street gangs (that is, the gang phenomenon or thirdgeneration gangs). It also explains the linkage to insurgencywith assertions that gang-generated crime, in conjunction withthe instability it wreaks upon governments, is now a seriousnational security problem in important parts of the globalcommunity. Although gangs and insurgents differ in terms of

original motives and modes of operation, this linkage infersthat street gangs are a mutated form of urban insurgency.That is, these nonstate actors must eventually seize politicalpower to guarantee the freedom of action and the commercialenvironment they want. The common denominator that canlink gangs to insurgency is that some gangs and insurgentsultimate objective is to depose or control the governments of

targeted countries. As a consequence, the Duck Analogyapplies. That is, third generation gangs look like ducks, walklike ducks, and act like ducksa peculiar breed, but ducksnevertheless!

This monograph will, then, identify those issues that mustbe taken together and understood as a whole before anyeffective countermeasures can be taken to deal with the half-criminal and half-political nature of the gang phenomenon.This is a universal compound-complex problem that must beunderstood on three distinct levels of analysis: first, the gangsphenomena are generating serious domestic and regionalinstability and insecurity that ranges from personal violenceto insurgent to state failure: second, because if their criminal

activities and security challenges, the gangs phenomenaare exacerbating civil-military and police-military relationsproblems and reducing effective and civil-military ability tocontrol the national territory; and, third, gangs are helping


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transitional criminal organizations, insurgents, warlords, anddrug barons erode the legitimacy and effective sovereigntyof nation-states . The analytical commonality linking thesethree issues is the inevitable contribution to either (a) failing

and failed state status of targeted countries, or (b) deposingor controlling the governments of targeted countries. In theseterms, we must remember that crime and instability are onlysymptoms of the threat. The ultimate threat is either statefailure or the violent imposition of a radical socio-economic-political restructuring of the state and its governance.

In describing the gang phenomenon as a simple mutation

of a violent act we label as insurgency, we mischaracterize theactivities of nonstate organizations that are attempting to takecontrol of the state. We traditionally think of insurgency asprimarily a military activity, and we think of gangs as a simplelaw-enforcement problem. Yet, insurgents and third generationgangs are engaged in a highly complex political actpoliticalwar. Under these conditions, police and military forces would

provide personal and collective security and stability, whilethey and other governmental institutions combat the rootcauses of instability and political warinjustice, repression,inequity, and corruption. The intent would be to generatethe political-economic-social development that will definethe processes of national reform, regeneration, and well-being. The challenge, then, is to come to terms with the factthat contemporary security and stability, at whatever level,is at base a holistic political-diplomatic, socio-economic,psychological-moral, and military police effort.

This monograph concludes with implications and strategic-level recommendations derived from the instability, civil-military jurisdiction, and sovereignty issues noted above that

will help leaders achieve strategic clarity and operate moreeffectively in the complex politically dominated, contemporaryglobal security arena. In short, these recommendationsestablish the beginning point from which civilian and military


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leaders might generate holistic civil-military success againstthe nonstate gang phenomenon and turn that success intostrategic political victory.

LINKING GANGS AND INSURGENCY I:THE CONFLICT CONTEXT WITHIN WHICH GANGSOPERATE

Before examining the characteristics of street gangs,it is useful to sketch the basic outlines of the largerpicture of the current conflict situation and the place of

insurgency and gangs in it. First, Dr. Steven Metz andLieutenant Colonel Raymond Millen argue that fourdistinct but interrelated battle spaces exist. They are(1) traditional direct interstate war; (2) unconventionalnonstate war; (3) unconventional intrastate war, whichtends to involve direct vs. indirect conflict between state andnonstate actors; and (4) indirect interstate war, which entails

aggression by a state against another through proxies.4

Nonstate Conflict and Gangs.

Street gangs operate most effectively in the second categoryof nonstate battle space. Nonstate war involves criminal andterrorist actors who thrive among and within various hostcountries. This type of conflict is often called guerrilla war,asymmetric war, and also complex emergencies. Thiskind of war is defined as acting, organizing, and thinkingdifferently from opponents to maximize ones own advantages,exploit an opponents weaknesses, attain the initiative,and gain freedom of action and security. In these terms,

nonstate war exploitsdirectly and indirectlythe disparitybetween contending parties to gain relative advantage anduses insurgent and terrorist methods. Moreover, it can havepolitical-psychological and physical dimensions, as well as


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lethal and nonlethal dimensions; it can have both ideological-political objectives and commercial (search-for-wealth)motives; and it is constantly mutating.5 As a consequence,there are no formal declarations or terminations of conflict; no

easily identified human foe to attack and defeat; no specificterritory to take and hold; no single credible governmentor political actor with which to deal; and no guarantee thatany agreement between or among contending groups will behonored. In short, the battle space is everywhere, and includeseverything and everyone.6

As a result, nonstate conflict is much too complex to allow a

strictly military solution to a given national security problem.Likewise, it is too complicated to allow a strictly police solution toa law enforcement problem. Street gangs may be consideredhalf political national security challenges and half criminallaw enforcement issues in these unconventional terms.7Nevertheless, these are not the only difficulties generated bythe gang phenomenon and other nonstate actors in nonstate

conflicts. Additional, nontraditional complexities furtherdefine the problem and dictate thoughtful responses. Asan example, in a national security scenario, the enemy isnot a recognizable military group or formation. The enemyis now the individual political actor or gang member whoplans and implements coercive intimidation, corruption,and instabilities, and exploits the root causes of violence forhis or her own commercial or political purposes. The enemyis also a composite of poverty, disease, and other causes ofcriminality and societal violence that must be dealt with onits own terms.8

In this context, the harsh realities of the new world disorderare caused by myriad destabilizers. The causes include

increasing poverty, human starvation, widespread disease, andlack of political and socio-economic justice. The consequencesare seen in such forms as social violence, criminal anarchy,refugee flows, illegal drug trafficking and organized crime,


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extreme nationalism, irredentism, religious fundamentalism,insurgency, ethnic cleansing, and environmental devastation.These destabilizing conditions tend to be exploited bymilitant nationalists, militant reformers, militant religious

fundamentalists, ideologues, civil and military bureaucrats,terrorists, insurgents, warlords, drug barons, and organizedcriminals working to achieve their own narrow purposes. Thosewho argue that instability and conflictand the employmentof terrorism and generalized violence as a tactic or strategyin conflictare the results of poverty, injustice, corruption,and misery may well be right. We must remember, however,

that individual men and women are prepared to kill and todestroy and, perhaps, die in the process to achieve their self-determined ideological or commercial objectives. In the end,Zbigniew Brzezinski reminds us that, behind almost every[violent] act lurks a political problem.9

Consequently, power is no longer combat fire poweror police power. It is the multilevel, combined political,

psychological, moral, informational, economic, social, police,and military activity that can be brought to bear holisticallyon the causes and consequences, as well as the perpetrators, ofviolence. At the same time, success or victory is not a formaldocument signed by responsible authorities terminating aconflict. Also, it cannot be defined in terms of killing or jailinga given number of enemies. As a result, success is beingdefined more frequently as the establishment of a viablecircular linkage between individual and collective securityand sustainable societal peace. Ultimately, then, success innonstate conflict comes as a result of a unified effort to applythe full human and physical resources of the nation-state andits international allies to achieve individual and collective

well-being that leads to societal peace.

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The Challenge and the Threat.

At base, nonstate guerrilla war, asymmetric war, or acomplex emergency situation is ultimately a zero-sum game,

in which there is only one winner or, in a worst-case scenario,there are no winners. It is, thus, total. This is the case withOsama bin Ladens terrorists, Maoist insurgents, the JapaneseAum Shinrikyo cult, Mafia families, warlords, transnationalcriminal organizations, institutionalized criminality in WestAfrica, and street gangs, among others. It is also the case withthe deliberate, direct financial attack or hacker attack that

can allow anyone with access to the appropriate knowledgeand technologyincluding gang membersto impair thesecurity of a nation as effectively as with a nuclear bomb.11Significantly, this is also the case with more subtle andindirect confrontation than the usual direct military-politicalchallenges to the state. That is, rather than directly competingwith a nation-state, sophisticated and internationalized

street gangs and their criminal/narco allies can use a mix ofcomplicity, indifference, corruption, and violent intimidationto co-opt and seize control of a state or a portion of a nation-state quietly and indirectly.12

In these terms, the destabilizing commercial and politicalactivities of third generation gangs may be characterized as agame of Wizards Chess. In that game, protagonists movepieces silently and subtly all over the game board. Under theplayers studied direction, each piece represents a differenttype of direct and indirect power and may simultaneouslyconduct its lethal and nonlethal attacks from differingdirections. Each piece shows no mercy against its foe and isprepared to sacrifice itself in order to allow another piece the

opportunity to destroy or control an adversaryor checkmatethe king. Accordingly, all the above threats can be seen asmethods of choice of globally connected commercial andideological movements, dedicated to self-enrichment at the


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expense of others, to the destruction of the contemporaryinternational system of cooperation and progress, or both.Over the long-term, however, this ongoing game is not aquestion of instability, illegal violence, or unconscionable

commercial gain. Ultimately, it is a question of survival.Failure in Wizards Chess is not an option.

As a consequence, nonstate conflict will likely havedifferent names, different motives, and exert different typesand levels of violence. Nevertheless, whatever they are called,these unconventional nonstate wars can be identified by theirultimate objectives or by their results. That is, they are the

organized application of coercive military or nonmilitary,lethal or nonlethal, direct or indirect, or a mix of all the aboveillicit methods, intended to resist, oppose, gain control of, oroverthrow an existing government or symbol of power andbring about fundamental political change.13 Thus, accordingto El Salvadoran Vice-Minister of Justice Silvia Aguilar,Domestic crime and its associated destabilization are now

Latin Americas most serious security threat.14

LINKING GANGS TO INSURGENCY II:THREE GENERATIONS OF URBAN GANGS

This part of the monograph briefly reviews the evolutionof street gangs from small, turf-oriented, petty-cash entities tolarger, internationalized, commercial-political organizations.Also outlined here are the development of street gang violencefrom the level of protection, gangsterism, brigandage todrug trafficking, global criminal activity, and taking politicalcontrol of ungoverned territory and/or areas governed bycorrupt politicians and functionaries. Additionally, this threat

to the state is exacerbated by the instability generated throughthe corruption and the destruction of democratic governance,by the disruption of equitable commercial transactions and thedistortion of free market economic mechanisms, and through


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the normalization of intimidating violence by degradingpersonal and collective security. In sum, it would appear thatgangs present much more than annoying law enforcementproblems. Actually and potentially, they are national security

problems that threaten the effective sovereignty of the nation-state.

First Generation Gangs: Organization, Motives,and Level of Violence.

An analysis of urban street gangs shows that some

of these criminal entities have evolved through threegenerations of development. The first generationortraditional street gangsare primarily turf-oriented. Theyhave loose and unsophisticated leadership and focus theirattention on turf protection to gain petty cash and on gangloyalty within their immediate environs (designated cityblocks or neighborhoods). When first generation street gangs

engage in criminal enterprise, it is largely opportunistic andindividual in scope and tends to be localized and operatesat the lower end of extreme societal violencegangsterismand brigandage. Most groups stay firmly within this firstgeneration of development, but more than a few gangs havemoved to the second generation.15

Second Generation Gangs.

This generation of street gangs is organized for businessand commercial gain. These gangs have a more centralizedleadership, and members tend to focus on drug trafficking andmarket protection. At the same time, they operate in a broader

spatial or geographic area that may include neighboringcities and other nation-states. Second generation gangs, likeother more sophisticated criminal enterprises, use the level ofviolence necessary to protect their markets and control their


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competition. They also use violence as political interferenceto negate enforcement efforts directed against them by policeand other security organizations. And as they seek to controlor incapacitate state security organizations, they often begin

to dominate vulnerable community life within large areas ofthe nation-state. In this environment, second generation gangsalmost have to link with and provide services to transnationalcriminal organizations. In this context, these gangs have beenknown to develop broader, market-focused, and sometimesovertly political agendas to improve their market share andrevenues.16

Third Generation Gangs.

These gangs continue first and second generation actionsas they expand their geographical parameters, as well as theircommercial and political objectives. As they evolve, theydevelop into more seasoned organizations with broader drug-

related markets, as well as very sophisticated transnationalcriminal organizations with ambitious political and economicagendas. In this connection, they inevitably begin to controlungoverned territory within a nation-state and/or beginto acquire political power in poorly-governed space.17 Thispolitical action is intended to provide security and freedomof movement for gang activities. As a consequence, the thirdgeneration gang and its leadership challenge the legitimatestate monopoly on the exercise of control and use of violencewithin a given political territory. The gang leader, then, actsmuch the same as a warlord or a drug baron.18

That is, once a gang leader has achieved control of aspecific geographical area within a given nation-state and

takes measures to protect the gangs turf from the state, thatleader effectively becomes a warlord or drug baron. At thesame time, that status takes the gang into another, somewhatdifferent battle spaceintrastate war. This unconventional


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type of conflict pits nonstate actors (for example, warlords,drug barons, or insurgents) directly against nation-statesand requires a relatively effective warmaking capability.That, in turn, takes us back to the relationship between

warlordism/drug baronism and insurgency. Clearly, manydifferences exist, especially in terms of mode of operation andmotivation.19 The common denominators in both instancesremain, however, to accomplish the following objectives: (1)depose or control an incumbent government, and (2) force aradical political-socio-economic restructuring of the nation-state and its governance.

Implications.

The generic evolution of urban street gangs illustrates thatthis is a compound-complex issue that has implications atthree different levels of analysis. First, all three generations ofgangs generate serious domestic instability and insecurity. Of

course, as gangs evolve, they generate more and more violenceand instability, over wider and wider sections of the politicalmap, and create regional instability and insecurity. Second,because of their internal (intrastate) criminal activities andtheir international (transnational) commercial and politicalactions, they exacerbate the confusion regarding the traditionaldistinctions between police law enforcement functions andmilitary national security or defense functionsto the extentthat very little that is effective or lasting can be done to controlor eliminate them. Third, thus, second and third generationgangs erode the effective sovereignty of the nation-stateswithin which they operate. Additionally, when linked with orworking for transnational criminal organizations, insurgents,

drug barons, or warlords, the gangs activities further reducepolice and military authorities abilities to maintain stabilityand, in so doing, challenge the sovereignty of the states withinand between which they move.


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At base, successful third generation gang activity canlead to (1) their control of parts of targeted counties orsubregions within a country and the creation of enclaves thatare essentially para-states, or (2) their taking either indirect or

direct control of an entire state and establishing a criminal ora narco-stateor a narco-criminal state. Even if unsuccessful,third generation gang activity still can contribute significantlyto the degenerative processes of state failure and regionalinstability. In any case, none of the results of gang successor failure benefit the peoples of targeted countries or theinternational community. It is important to remember that

the primary characteristics of a gang and its leadership areindividual and group survival and personal gain. Beyondthis, there are no rules.20

LINKING GANGS TO INSURGENCY III:EXAMPLES OF CHALLENGES TO THE STATE

To further illustrate the points outlined above, we willexamine some vignettes that relate to the gang phenomenon.We intend to show briefly how differing types of gang activitiescontribute to the instabilities that lead to the erosion of statesovereignty and the processes of state failureas well as tothe creation of new criminal or narco-states out of legitimatemembers of the international community. Three examplesfrom the Latin American context will suffice: (1) the currentCentral American situation, (2) the Bolivian Coca-Coup ofthe early 1980s, and (3) a composite case that demonstratesthe results of contemporary third generation gang activity inat least two Mexican states and one Brazilian state.

The Central American Situation.

Youth gangs from California began moving into all fiveCentral American republics in the early 1990s. The main impetuscame as a result of convicted felons being sent from prisons in


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the United States back to the countries of their parents origins.These gangs include the famed Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13),Mara 18, and several others in El SalvadorMao Mao, CrazyHarrisons Salvatrucho, and Crazy Normans Salvatrucho.21

At the present time, the Salvadoran gang phenomenon isestimated to number approximately 39,000 active membersin El Salvador. Additionally, several thousand individualswith direct links back to El Salvador are located in the UnitedStates, other countries in Central and South America, Mexico,Canada, and Europe. In the early stages of their developmentand through the present, virtually all the Central American

gangs have flourished under the protection and mercenaryincome provided by larger criminal networks. The basis ofthis alliance is the illegal drug trade that is credited with thetransshipment of up to 75 percent of the cocaine that entersthe United States.22

Guatemalan gangs, as another example, appear towork closely with a clique of hard-line former military and

police officers and intelligence and security officials thathave transformed themselves into a highly profitable andpowerful criminal cartel. As might be expected, that cliquemaintains strong links to contemporary politicians andcustoms, immigration, judicial, police, and army officers. Inthat connection, 217 Guatemalan police officials were firedon November 14, 2004, for failing to carry out their dutiesand alleged participation in criminal activities. This followedthe firing of 320 officials of the Guatemalan equivalent of theU.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) in the late 1990s afterthe government discovered that they were on the payrolls ofvarious national and transnational criminal organizations.This, in turn, followed the discovery that a large group of active

military personnel, including Guatemalas Vice Minister ofDefense, was operating a drug smuggling and robbery ringin conjunction with Colombias Cali cartel.23 More recently,Guatemala has been euphemistically dubbed the CrownPrince of Central American drug trafficking countries.24


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In addition to drug smuggling, second and thirdgeneration gangs in Central America are known to be involvedin smuggling people, arms, and cars; associated murder,kidnapping, and robbery violence; home and community

invasions; credit card fraud; and other more petty criminal firstgeneration activities. As a result, crime rates have increaseddramatically to the point where the Honduran annual murderrateas only one exampleat 154 per 100,000 population, isdouble that of Colombias. The comparison of Honduras withColombia is interesting and important because Colombia, withits ongoing internal conflict, is widely considered to be the

most violent society in Latin America. More specifically, 3,500people, including more than 455 women, were murdered inGuatemala in 2004. A majority of those murders took place inpublic, in broad daylight, and many of the mutilated bodieswere left as grisly reminders of the gangs prowess. Clearly,the governments corruption and lack of control of nationalterritory have allowed criminal gangs and other organized

criminal organizations to operate with impunity within eachcountry of Central Americanand across borders.25

Central American gangs seeming immunity fromeffective law enforcement efforts and the resultant lack ofpersonal and collective security in that region have created adangerous synergy between organized criminality and terrorthat is blurring the traditional line between criminal andpolitical violence. In that context, the greatest fear hauntingmany Central American officials and citizens is that criminalviolence is about to spiral completely out of control andacquire a political agenda. This fear is exacerbated becausesecond and third generation gangs and their mercenary alliesare controlling larger and larger portions of cities, the interior,

and the traditionally inviolate national frontiersand haveachieved almost complete freedom of movement and actionwithin and between national territories. As a consequence,the effective sovereignty of all the Central American countries


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is being impinged every day, and the gangs commercialmotives are, in fact, becoming a political agenda for controlof state governing and security institutions and for control ofpeople and territory.26

The Bolivian Coca Coup of July 1980.

The level of corruption of the political, economic, social,and security organs of a nation-state is closely related to thedegree of weakness of the governmental apparatus, and is amajor agent for destabilization and state failure.27 As such,

governmental corruption is another point of entry from whichthe gangs phenomenaor a mutant cliquecan exert controland/or depose a given government. Over the past severalyears, the transnational narcotics industry has exacerbatedthe corruption problem so much that it has achieved majordestabilizing and legitimacy levels in Asias Golden Triangle(a 350,000-square kilometer area overlapping the mountains

of Laos, Myanmar, and Thailand) and South Americas WhiteTriangle (the coca producing areas of Bolivia, Colombia,and Peru). In this connection, the Bolivian situation in theearly 1980s is instructive.

Roberto Suarez Gomez was one of Bolivias leading drugbarons in the late 1970s and early 1980s. With his expandingwealth, Suarez became a factor in national politics andengineered his countrys 189th coup d tat. This Coca Coupplaced the Suarez gang/clique in political office. General LuisGarcia Meza was given the national presidency through areported $1.3 million bribe. Then, when Garcia Meza assumedoffice, he appointed Colonel Luis Arce Gomez, a relative ofSuarez Gomez, as the Minister of the Interior, thereby giving

him control of all counterdrug operations in Bolivia. Althoughthe Garcia Meza regime lasted only until October 1982endingin yet another coupthe fortune it generated for the Boliviannarco-elite clique, and the devastation it wreaked on the


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national economy, were significant. One observer suggestedthe following: Think of a preposterous figure, double it andknow damn well that youve made a gross underestimate.28Another observer noted that 10 years later, Bolivia had still not

recovered economically or politically from that experience.29Bolivias experience with narco-corruption shows that the

buying and use (renting) of public office make it difficult fora government to pursue the interests of a nation-state. Moreimportant, that experience demonstrates what can happenwhen the necessity of meeting a specific clients needs and theintensity of the clients expectations and demands mitigate

against responsible democratic governmentand against anyallegiance to the public well-being or respect for the consentof the governed. Thus, high levels of corruption within agovernment and society can lead to the collapse of the rule oflaw and a general weakening of the state in direct proportionto its legitimacy. Under these conditions, virtually anyonenot just a traditional street gangcan take advantage of the

situation. The tendency is that the best motivated, best armed,and best financed organization on the scene will controlthat instability for its own purposes. In this particular case,Bolivia had the distinction of having become the WesternHemispheres first narco-state.30 Today, Bolivia is no longera narco-state. It remains, however, a classic example of poorgovernance, lack of development, and rampant corruption thatappears to be leading the country toward a radical populistsolution to its political and socio-economic problems.31

A Composite Examination of Nonmilitary and NonlethalMethods for Establishing Control of a State or Part of aState.

A transnational nonstate actor, such as a third generationgang (a gang in an alliance with another criminal organization),has the capability to challenge the de jure sovereignty of nation-


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states over entire regions (or states) within those countries ownnational territories. This has proven to be the case in at leasttwo Mexican states and one Brazilian state.32 John P. Sullivanand Robert J. Bunker describe how unconventional attackers

have wielded power in various parts of Latin America andother parts of the world:

As an example, if the unconventional attackerterrorists,drug cartels, criminal gangs, militant environmentalists, or acombination of such actorsblends crime, terrorism, and war,he can extend his already significant influence. After embracingadvanced technology weaponry, including Weapons of Mass

Destruction (including chemical and biological agents), radiofrequency weapons, and advanced intelligence gatheringtechnology, along with more common weapons systems, theattacker can transcend drug running, robbery, kidnapping, andmurder and pose a significant challenge to the nation-state andits institutions. Using complicity, intimidation, corruption, andindifference, the irregular attacker can quietly and subtly co-optindividual politicians and bureaucrats and gain political control

of a given geographical or political enclave. Such corruptionand distortion can potentially lead to the emergence of a virtualcriminal state or political entity. A series of networked enclavescould, then, become a dominant political actor within a state,or group of states. Thus, rather than violently and directlycompeting with a nation-state, an unconventional nonstateattacker can indirectly and criminally co-opt and seize controlof the state.33

Thus, taking the activities of the gangs phenomena to theirlogical (and actual) conclusion can be a mix of possibilities onlylimited by the imagination and willingness to use unethicalways and means to disrupt, control, or destroy a targetednation-state. In this type of nonstate war, the traditional linesbetween civilian and military, lethal and nonlethal, and direct

and indirect attack on the state are eliminated, and the battlespace is extended well beyond traditional military-policedimensions to relatively uncharted political, psychological,socio-economic, and moral dimensions.34


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Gangs phenomena contribute significantly to national,regional, and global instability;

These organizations help transnational criminalorganizations, warlords, drug barons, and insurgentserode the effective sovereignty of the nation-state;and,

Gangs phenomena are challenging the traditionalways of dealing with law enforcement and nationalsecurity issues. Effective response requires not somuch a redefinition of military and/or police missions

as the holistic use of all the instruments of state andinternational power.

The common denominator(s) that links these three issuesis the presence of one or both of the following:

Targeted countries failing or failed state status, and/or

Criminal nonstate actors goals of deposing orcontrolling the governments of targeted countries orparts of targeted countries.

This analysis, hopefully, will stimulate strategic thinking andaction regarding a set of complicated security problems thatwhether or not one likes them or is prepared to deal withthemare likely to be with the entire global community far

beyond the year 2005.

Gangs and Instability.

The current threat environment in Latin America andaround the world is not a traditional security problem. Whilesome international boundary disputes remain alivesuchas the Bolivian desire to regain access to the Pacific Ocean,and the chronic problems between India and Pakistan,the Koreas, and Ethiopia/Eritreaonly a relatively fewconventional formations of enemy soldiers are massing and


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preparing to invade the territory of a neighbor. What wesee instead are numerous nonstate and transnational actors,including gangs, actively engaged in internal disruption anddestabilization efforts. This kind of action is not necessarily a

direct attack against a government. It is, however, an effectivemeans for indirectly weakening a regime. Whether broughtabout inadvertently or by a conscious effort, instabilityand its associated insecurity generate a vicious downwardspiral that manifests itself in diminished levels of individualand collective security, diminished levels of popular andinstitutional acceptance and support for the incumbent

regime, and diminished levels of governmental ability tocontrol its national territory. The intent might simply be tocreate and maintain a climate of violence, chaos, and regimeinadequacy that allows the actors freedom of movement topursue unconscionable personal and group enrichment.36

The instability process tends to move from personalviolence to increased collective violence and social disorder

to kidnappings, bank robberies, violent property takeovers,murders/assassinations, personal and institutional corruption,criminal anarchy, and the beginnings of internal and externalrefugee flows. In turn, the momentum of this coercive processtends to evolve into more widespread social violence, seriousdegradation of the economy, and further governmentalinability to provide personal and national security and toguarantee the rule of law. Over the past several years, manydecisionmakers, policymakers, and opinion leaders seem tohave been consistently surprised at the chaos, violence, andgovernmental degradation that stems from the destabilizingactivities of gangs and their drug-trafficking allies. Thesedecisionmakers also have been confused and unable to

decide what to do or how to do it beyond the usual crisismanagement and spin control tactics. This kind of piecemeal,ad hoc approach to the contemporary gang phenomenonreminds one of the frustration detailed in the following report,published by the West Indian Commission:


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Nothing poses greater threats to civil society in [Caribbean]countries than the drug problem, and nothing exemplifiesthe powerlessness of regional governments more. That is themagnitude of the damage that drug abuse and trafficking holdfor our Community. It is a many-layered danger. At base is the

human destruction implicit in drug addiction; but, implicit also, isthe corruption of individuals and systems by the sheer enormityof the inducements of the illegal drug trade in relatively poorsocieties. On top of all this lie the implications for governanceitselfat the hands of both external agencies engaged ininternational interdiction, and the drug barons themselvesthedons of the modern Caribbeanwho threaten governancefrom within.37

Thus, popular perceptions of corruption, disenfran-chisement, poverty, lack of upward social mobility, and lackof personal security tend to limit the rightand the abilityofa regime to conduct the business of the state. As a governmentloses the rights and abilities to govern fairly and morally, itloses moral legitimacy. In turn, the loss of moral legitimacy

leads to the degeneration of de facto state sovereignty.Conversely, stability begins with the provision of personalsecurity to individual members of the citizenry. It extendsto protection of citizens from violent internal nonstate actors(including gangs, organized criminals, and self-appointedvigilante groups) and external enemies. The security problemends with the establishment of firm but fair control over the

entire national territory and the people in it.38

The Civil-Military Challenge in Dealingwith Law Enforcement and National Security Issues.

Clearly, gangs and transnational criminal organizations arenow powerful enough to destabilize, challenge, and destroytargeted societies and states. The continued growth and theincreasing influence and power of these nonstate actors inindividual countries are spilling-over into neighboring statesand, in turn, generating associated transnational threats. The


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Such a common effort for the general welfare mustbegin with a civil-military dialogue. That dialogue wouldbe designed to help civilians understand the new realities ofgeopolitics and security and to help the military appreciate

the nationalism and competence of civilians. The policyobjectives would be for the military to join with civilianinstitutions to lend administrative and technical expertise, aswell as human and physical resources to help the state growout of its underdevelopment problems. That dialogue andunderstanding must be supported by long-term programs:(1) to professionalize and modernize the military, the police,

and civil governance; (2) to canalize democratically theoperational roles of professionalized and modernized civil-military institutions; and (3) to generate sufficient additionalorganization, funding, and staffing to create a critical massfrom which to define and implement effective, legitimatesecurity and stability actions.42

In the long term, governments cannot depend on an

outside power, such as the United States, or an organization,such as the OAS or the United Nations (UN), to do thesethings for them. At the same time, no government can simplylegislate or decree these qualities for itself. Governments can,however, develop, sustain, and enhance these qualities bytheir actions over time. Legitimization and internal stabilityderive from popular and institutional perceptions thatauthority is genuine and effective and that it uses morallycorrect means for reasonable and fair purposes. Establishmentof legitimate authority and internal stability, in turn, implies aserious anticorruption campaign coupled with a strong publicdiplomacy effort.43

Gangs Phenomena: A Silent Challenge to Sovereignty.

The brief snapshot presented above of gang-inducedinstability and state civil-military inability to control thenational territory requires further elaboration. To do this


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and better demonstrate why gangs and their national andtransnational criminal allies are or can be a threat to the state,we will examine briefly their organization, operations, andprofitability. The implications take us to the problems of

sovereignty, state failure, and survival.The organizations and activities of the gangs phenomena

reflect expertise in communications, marketing, transportation,banking, and negotiations with other organizations. SeniorU.S. and Latin-American officials have noted that gangsand their criminal allies function as a consortium in muchthe same way as virtually any multinational Fortune 500

company. Thus, the phenomenon is a business organizationstriving to control the price of commodities, such as oil, arms,microchips, automobiles, human body parts, or cocaine. Byperforming its business tasks with super efficiency and formaximum profit, the general organization employs its chiefexecutive officers and boards of directors, councils, systemof internal justice, public affairs officers, negotiators, and

project managers. And, of course, the company has a securitydivisionsomewhat more ruthless than those of other majorcorporations.44

The equation that links narcotics trafficking to gangs turnson a combination of need, organizational infrastructure,development, ability, and the availability of sophisticatedcommunications and weaponry. For example, traffickerspossess cash and lines of transportation and communication.Gangs possess followers, discipline, and organization.Traffickers need these to help protect their assets and projecttheir power within and among nation-states. Gangs are inconstant need of logistical land communications support andmoney. Both groups possess relatively flat organizational

structures that, when combined, can generate a moreefficient and effective organization than any slow-movingbureaucratic, hierarchical governmental system. Thatcombined organizational advantage of gangs and traffickersis a major source of power in itself. That is, a third generation


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gang can generate the economic and military power to equalor better than that of many nation-states. The organizationalso has additional advantages. No formal officials haveto be elected, no national laws or boundaries must be

respected, and no responsibility is owed to anyone outsidethe organization. Thus, the alliance acts as a state, demandsto be treated as a state, yet escapes most of the restrictionsimposed on the modern state.45 To be sure, these loose anddynamic mergers are subject to many vicissitudes, but suchmarriages of convenience have lasted and appear to be gettingstronger.

The annual net profit from gang-related activities isestimated to be in the billions of dollars. The precise numbersare not important. But the enormity of the amount of moneyinvolved is important, together with the additional benefitsthese financial resources can generate when linked to utterruthlessness of purpose and no moral or legal constraints.In this connection, a third generation gang can afford the

best talentwhether accountants, computer specialists,extortionists, or murderersand the best equipment andtechnologies. With such extensive resources, a gang can bribegovernment officials, hire thugs to intimidate those whocannot be bought, and kill those who cannot be intimidated.Bottomless pockets mean that gangs can move, shift, diversify,and promote operations at willand, most significantly,they can outspend virtually any legal political jurisdiction.Consequently, a gang can establish acceptance, credibility,and de facto legitimacy within and among the sovereignstates where its general organization operates.46

In short, the gang phenomenon represents a triple threatto the authority of a given government and to those of its

neighbors. First, through murder, kidnapping, intimidation,corruption, and other means of coercion, these violentnonstate actors undermine the ability of a government toperform its legitimizing functions. Second, by violently


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imposing their will over the elected officials of the state, theseactors compromise the legitimate exercise of state authority.Third, by taking control of portions of the national territory(including the borders), the various components of the gang

phenomenon are directly performing the tasks of governmentand acting as states within a state.47

The Common Denominators.

The sum of the political results of gang-related instabilityis an explosion of weak, incompetent, corrupt, and/or

insensitive governments throughout large parts of Africa,Asia, Europe, and Latin America.48 This explosion of weakstates and resultant chaos is also a cautionary story of failingand failed states. The situation is disheartening, and tooserious to ignore. Thus, we explore three related issues thatare crucial to understanding the problem: (1) what a failedstate is, (2) why states fail, and (3) why state failure matters.

What Is a Failed State? First, whatever the causes,instability within a nation-state leads to a crisis of governanceand a downward spiral into violence, loss of de jure and defacto sovereignty, and failing and failed state status. In thenovel, The Constant Gardener, author John le Carr vividly andsuccinctly captures that linkage. He answers the question,When is a state not a state? from the point of view of acommonsense practitioner:

I would suggest to you that these days, very roughly, thequalifications for being a civilized state amount toelectoralsuffrage, ahprotection of life and propertyum, justice,health, and education for all, at least to a certain levelthen themaintenance of sound administrative infrastructureand roads,transport, drains, et ceteraandwhat else is there?ah yes, theequitable collection of taxes. If a state fails to deliver on at least aquorum of the abovethen one has to say the contract betweenthe state and citizens begins to look pretty shakyand if it failson all of the above, then its a failed state, as we say these days.49


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State failure is, thus, a process by which the state losesthe capacity and/or the will to perform its fundamentalgovernance and security functions. Over time, the weaknessesinherent in its inability to perform the business of the state

are likely to lead to the eventual erosion of its authorityand legitimacy. And, in the end, the state cannot control itsnational territory or the people in it.

The Road to Political Failure. The State Failure Projectdeveloped a series of circumstances under which statesfail.50 As suggested by le Carr in the above quotation, thosecircumstances center on legitimate governance functions.

That is, if the state does not fairly and adequately provide forsecurity, basic human needs and socio-economic development,and general freedoms under the rule of law, and if it doesnot promote trust and cooperation among communal groups,both motive and opportunity for instability and violenceandgangsexist. Failure to deal with progressively worseninginternal social, economic, political, and security problems

results in virtually complete turmoil, generally ineffectiveinstitutions, and illegitimate governance. The ultimate resultis state failure.51

Additionally, states fail for two other reasons. First,pressures to liberalize political and economic systems quicklyand radically may result in the collapse of governmentalauthority and the rule of law. Simply holding democraticelections for national leaders without attending to otherpatterns of responsible democracy risks creating weak andvulnerable institutions. In this immature democraticsituation, security and law and order are often progressivelyreplaced by, at best, irresponsible democracy and corruptionor, at worst, criminal anarchy and armed factional violence. In

any case, the state collapses under the weight of irresponsible,misguided, insensitive, inept, and/or corrupt leadership.52

Second, states collapse as a result of the conscious violentefforts of nonstate actors to bring them down or controlthem for their own nefarious purposes. As noted above, the


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thread that permits human destabilizers, such as gangs andother organized criminals, to develop, grow, and succeedis adequate freedom of movement and action over time.These groups attempt to attain and maintain their freedom

of action through (1) establishing supporting undergroundinfrastructure; (2) taking political control of ungoverned orcorrupted rural and urban enclaves; (3) infiltrating governmentand social organizations for intelligence and political purposesand for recruiting popular support (whether willing, bribed,or intimidated); and (4) taking direct actions that distractand disburse security forces and correspondingly weaken

the incumbent government. All these means of generatingfreedom of movement and action include deliberate acts ofterror against key individuals and institutions associated withgovernance, economic development, and security. Gangs anddrug cartels operating in Latin America and elsewhere callthese activities business incentives. But, whatever theyare called, these gang actions are aimed at lessening regime

authorityand replacing it with their own.53 Why State Failure Matters. The argument in general is

that failing or failed state status is the breeding ground forinstability, criminality, insurgency, regional conflict, andterrorism. These conditions breed massive humanitariandisasters and major refugee flows. They can host perniciousnetworks of all kinds, involving criminal business enterprises,narco-trafficking, and/or various forms of ideologicalinsurgency. They spawn conditions and activities most peoplefind repugnant, such as human rights violations, torture,poverty, starvation, disease, the recruitment and use of childsoldiers, trafficking in women and body parts, traffickingin and proliferation of conventional weapons systems and

weapons of mass destruction, genocide, ethnic cleansing,warlordism, and criminal anarchy. At the same time, theyusually are unconfined and spill over into regional syndromesof poverty, destabilization, and conflict.54


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Threats involving the gang phenomenon come in manyforms and in a matrix of different kinds of challenges thatvary in scope and scale. If these threats have a single featurein common, it is that they are systematic, well-calculated

attempts to achieve political ends.55 In that connection, twoof the many consequences that the gang-narco alliance hasgenerated will be elaborated. First, we examine the erosion ofthe vital democratic institutional pillar of regime legitimacyand stability; then, we discuss the erosion of the centralgovernance of the state. The erosion of democracy and associated institutions. The

policy-oriented definition of democracy that has beengenerally accepted and used in U.S. foreign policy over thepast several years is probably best described as proceduraldemocracy. This definition tends to focus on the electionof civilian political leadership and, perhaps, on a relativelyhigh level of participation on the part of the electorate. Thus,as long as a country is able to hold elections, it is considered

a democracyregardless of the level of accountability,transparency, corruption, ability to extract and distributeresources for national development, and protection of humanrights and liberties.56

In Central America and elsewhere in the WesternHemisphere, we observe important paradoxes. Electionsare held on a regular basis; however, leaders, candidates,and elected politicians are also regularly assassinated orcorrupted, for example, in Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala,Honduras, the Caribbean states, and Mexico.57 Additionally,intimidation, direct threats, and the use of violence againsta given person and his or her family play an important roleprior to elections. As a corollary, it is important to note that,

although the media and academia are generally free fromstate censorship, journalists and academicians who opposethe gang phenomenon are systematically assassinated.58

As a consequence, it is problematic to credit most CentralAmerican and some Latin American elections as democratic


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or free. Neither competition nor participation in elections(leaving aside accountability and transparency) can becomplete in an environment where armed and unscrupulousgangs and their narco-allies compete violently to control the

government before and after elections. Moreover, it is difficultto credit some of these countries as democracies as long asleaders and the media are subject to corrupting controls orvetoes imposed by vicious nonstate actors. As an additionalexample, Ambassador David Jordan argues that Mexico maybe considered an anocratic democracy. That is, Mexico is astate that has the procedural features of democracy but retains

the features of an autocracy, in that members of the ruling eliteface no real accountability.59 Sullivan and Bunker write aboutthe narcostatization of two of the Mexican states, QuintanaRoo and Sinaloa. These states have achieved narco-state statusas a result of an advanced level of governmental corruptionand very low levels of accountability.60 In either situation, theactions of the gang-narco alliance have debilitating effects on

democracy and associated institutions and tend to erode theability of the state to carry out its legitimizing functions. This,in turn, can lead to the eventual erosion of governmentalauthority and to a process of state failure. The example ofHaiti immediately comes to mind. The erosion of central governance and revisiting the processof state failure. The primary implications of the complex andambiguous situations described above are straightforward.The contemporary, chaotic global security environment reflectsa general lack of legitimate governance and civil-militarycooperation in many parts of the world. Instability thrives underthose conditions. Instability, violence, terrorism, and criminalanarchy are the general consequences of inept, misguided,

insensitive, and/or corrupt governance. Nevertheless, wemust remember that, as important as instability might be ina national or transnational threat environment, it is only asymptomnot the threat itself. Rather, the ultimate threat is


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state failure. In that connection, probably the most insidioussecurity problem facing the nations of the world centers onthe threat to a given nation-states ability and willingnessto control its national territory and the nonstate actors who

are seeking violent change within the borders of that nation-state.61

The violent, intimidating, disrupting, and corruptingactivities of illegal nonstate actors can abridge or negate thesepowers. The situation in Central America is instructive. InCentral Americas New War, it appears that commercialprofit is the primary motivation for the various destabilizing

gangs and their narco-trafficking allies. Like their narco-terrorist cousins in Colombia, Central American gangs andnarco-traffickers are not particularly interested in taking defacto control of any one of the regions seven small republics,and they are not sending conventional military forces acrossnational borders. What they are doing is ensuring they willhave maximum freedom of movement and action within

and between national territories.62 Significantly, we mustremember that this is the purview of legitimate sovereigngovernance.

In that regard, ample evidence clearly demonstrates thatCentral American and other states authority and presencehas diminished over large geographical portions of the LatinAmerican region. However, contrary to popular perceptions,these areas are not lawless or ungoverned territories. Infact, they are governed by the gangs operating in the areaswhere state institutions are absent or only partially present.In this sense, the nexus is not simply criminal and commercialin nature. It is more far reaching. For its self-preservation, thegang-narco alliance in Central America and elsewhere has

had little choice but to control states or parts of states. Thus,whether a third generation gang is a criminal or an insurgentorganization is irrelevant. Its putative objective is to controlthe state to ensure its own ends, and that is definitely a seriouspolitical agenda.63


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A states failure to extend a sovereign presence throughoutits national territoryfor whatever reasonleaves a vacuumin which gangs, drug cartels, leftist insurgents, the politicaland narco-Right, and the government may compete for power.

A brief description of the town of Tocache, in the UpperHuallaga Valley of Peru, at its most prosperous moment inthe mid-1980s, illustrates this kind of situation. Many townsin Central America, the Caribbean Basin, Bolivia, Mexico, andelsewhere in the world are not unlike Tocache.

Tocache had six banks (for laundering money), six fax machines,

several stereo dealerships, a discotheque, and one of the largestNissan outlets in the country. Tocache also had no (and still doesnot have) paved streets, clean drinking water, or a sewage system.Whatever education that takes place in or around the town iscontrolled by Sendero Luminoso officials. Commerce betweencoca producers and narco-traffickers in the area is controlled bySendero Luminoso officials. Tax collection, conflict adjudication,and general security functions in and around town are performed

by Sendero Luminoso officials. In all, the nonstate entity withthe strongest motivation, the best organization, and the mostphysical power in the area exercises political control of Tocacheand the area around it. To be sure, the Peruvian governmentsends security forces and representatives into to area from timeto time to provide law and order and a certain presence. But,the government has never exerted effective political control overthat portion of the national territory.64

Whether conducted by insurgents or a third generation gang,this kind of activity is a real and substantive threat to nationalsecurity and sovereignty, and it must be addressed as such.

Gang phenomena-induced instability, the associatedchallenge to civil-military missions, the silent challengeto sovereignty, and the attempt to either control or depose

governments are the most salient lessons that should havebeen learned through involvement in the contemporaryglobal security arena. The consistency of these lessons derivedfrom relatively recent experiencefrom the White Triangle


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to Mexico and from Central America to Haiti and the rest ofthe Caribbean Basininspires confidence that the lessons arevalid.65 At the same time, more than half of the countries in theworld are struggling to maintain their political, economic, and

territorial integrity in the face of diverse direct and indirectnonstate (including criminal) challenges.66

State failure is an evolutionary process, not an outcome. It isa process by which the state loses the capacity and/or the willto perform its essential governance and security functions.67However, just because a state fails does not mean that it willsimply go away. In fact, failing and failed states tend to linger

and go from bad to worse. The longer they persist, the morethey and their spillover problems endanger regional andglobal peace and security.68 Ample evidence demonstratesthat failing and failed states become dysfunctional states,rogue states, criminal states, narco-states, or new peoplesdemocracies.

IMPLICATIONS

The primary implications of this monograph are clear.The abilities of fragile, besieged, failing, or failedgovernments to control, protect, and enhance their countriesstability, sovereignty, and general well-being are severelythreatened in the contemporary global security environment.A major challenge derives from street gangs that are alliedwith narco-trafficking or other criminal organizations (that is,again, third generation gangs or the gang phenomenon). Thecommon denominator that clearly defines gangs as mutationsof insurgents is the irrevocable need to depose or control anincumbent government to force a radical socio-economic-

political restructuring of the nation-state and its governance.Thus, we reiterate that if third generation gangs look likeducks, walk like ducks, and act like ducksthey indeed areinsurgent-type ducks.


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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STRATEGIC LEADERS:A PURPOSE-BUILT BRIDGE TO THE FUTURE

The United States is embroiled in a world of dangerous

uncertainty. Numerous political actors are exerting differingtypes and levels of power within a set of cross-cutting alliances;the playing field, rules, and players are more complex; andidentifying the objectives of the game is more perplexing thanin the past. Since the end of World War IIand especially sincethe ending of the Cold WarU.S. and other Western politicaland military leaders have been struggling with the new

aspects of unconventional nonstate wars. Yet, the WizardsChess nature of the contemporary conflict dilemma is stillnot well-understood. Strategic leaders often complain that agiven asymmetrical conflict or complex emergency has beendealt with successfully from the military point of view buthas been lost politicallyas if these dimensions of conflictwere not interdependent.

Those results are contrary to the popular wisdom ofescalating the level of the conflict militarily to the point wherevictory is assured. That wisdom is based on the notion that theenemy military force is the primary center of gravity in a warof attrition. In order to win, one must have something like a10-to-1 ratio of military manpower superiority. The problemsare that an asymmetrical war or a complex emergencyor a confrontation with the gang phenomenonis not aconventional war of attrition and that the center of gravity isnot the enemy military force. Rather, as Carl von Clausewitzexplained as early as 1832, two centers of gravity exist in thiskind of situationthe personalities of the [enemy] leadersand public opinion.69 In that context, there are other more

effective ways to render the enemy powerless than to attackhim militarily. The situation can be described as one wherethe United States or other Western powers have been busyconducting a war of attrition and alienating public opinion,while the nontraditional actors in asymmetric nonstate wars


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operations. At the same time, the U.S. military is not the onlyactor in any kind of U.S. involvement in the internationalsecurity environment. A bewildering array of U.S. civilianagencies, international organizations, and nongovernmental

organizations, as well as coalition and host country civilianand military organizations, respond to complex emergenciesand state collapse. For any degree of success in going beyonddeclaring victory and going home and actually providing thefoundations of a sustainable and just peace, involvement mustbe understood to be a holistic process that relies on variousU.S. and other civilian and military agencies and contingents,

working together in an integrated fashion. The creation ofunity of effort to gain ultimate success must be addressed atdifferent levels.

At the highest level, the primary parties to a givenconflict situation must be in general agreement withregard to the threats, end-state, and associated set of

operations designed to achieve a common politicalvision. Although such an agreement regarding a strategicor operational end-state is a necessary condition forunity of effort, it is not sufficient by itself. Sufficiencyand clarity are achieved by adding appropriate policyimplementation and military management structureand mind-state adjustmentsat the following three

additional levels. An executive-level management structure that can

and will ensure continuous cooperative planning andexecution of policy among and between the relevantU.S. civilian and military agencies (that is, verticalcoordination). That structure must also ensure thatall civil-military action at the operational and tactical

levels directly contributes to the achievement of themutually agreed strategic political end-state. Thisrequirement reflects a need to improve coordinationand cooperation within the operational theater andbetween the theater commander and Washington.


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Steps must be taken to ensure clarity, unity, andeffectiveness by integrating coalition military,international organizational, and nongovernmentalorganization processes with U.S. civil-military planning

and implementing processes (that is, horizontalcoordination). It has become quite clear that the politicalend-state is elusive, and operations suffer when there isno strategic planning structure empowered to integratethe key multinational and multi-organizational civil-military elements of a given operation. It is also clearthat duplication of effort, an immediate consequence

of the absence of such a strategic planning body, iscostly in political, personnel, and financial terms. Theselessons have been demonstrated over and over againin such diverse operations as the Hurricane Mitchnatural disaster relief operation in Central Americaand the various man-made disaster relief operations inthe former Yugoslavia.73

At a base-level, however, unity of effort requireseducation as well as organizational solutions. Evenwith an adequate planning and organizationalstructure, ambiguity, confusion, tensions, andunwanted third and fourth order complications arelikely to emerge. Only when the various civilian

and military leaders involved in an operation candevelop the judgment and empathy necessary to workcooperatively and collegially will they be able to planand conduct operations that meet the needs of the hostnation and use the appropriate capabilities of the U.S.interagency community, international organizations,nongovernmental organizations, and coalition military

forces. Unity of effort ultimately entails the type ofprofessional civilian and military education and leaderdevelopment that engenders effective diplomacy andprofessional competence.


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Leader Development.

The study of the fundamental nature of conflict hasalways been the philosophical cornerstone for understanding

conventional war. It is no less relevant to nontraditional warinvolving nonstate actors. In the past, some wars tended tobe unrealistically viewed as providing traditional militarysolutions to conventional military problems. This view istoo simplistic. At this time the complex realities of particularpast conflicts must be understood as a holistic cooperativeprocess that relies on various unconventional civilian and

military solutions to nontraditional political-psychological-military problems. At a minimum, eight educational andcultural imperatives can be used to modify Cold War andethnocentric mindsets and to develop the leader judgmentneeded to deal effectively with complex, politically dominated,multidimensional, multiorganizational, multinational, andmulticultural contingencies.74 They are:

Concepts such as enemy, war, and victoryshould be reconsidered and redefined for intrastateconflicts. At the same time, leaders at all levels mustunderstand how to apply all the instruments of nationaland international powerincluding the full integrationof legitimate civil and military coalition partnersto

achieve agreed political ends. Civilian and military leaders at all levels must learn

the fundamental nature of subversion and insurgency,with particular reference to the way in which force canbe employed to achieve political ends and the way inwhich political considerations affect the use of force.Additionally, leaders need to understand the strategic

and political-psychological implications of operationaland tactical actions.

Civilian and military leaders at all levels must learn thatpower is not simply combat firepower directed at an


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enemy military formation or industrial capacity. Poweris multilevel and combines hard and soft political,psychological, moral, informational, economic, societal,military, police, and civil bureaucratic activity that can

be brought to bear directly and indirectly within agiven security environment.

U.S. civilian and military personnel are expected to beable to operate effectively and collegially in coalitions ormultinational contingents. They must also acquire theability to deal collegially with civilian populations andlocal and global media. As a consequence, efforts thatenhance interagency as well as international culturalawareness, such as civilian and military exchangeprograms, language training programs, and combined(multinational) exercises, should be revitalized andexpanded.

In that connection, planners and negotiators who

will operate at the strategic and high operationallevels should be nurtured to function in coalitionaldecisionmaking and planning situations that can blendU.S. deliberate planning processes with concurrentmultinational and multiorganizational practices.

Leaders must learn that an intelligence capabilityseveral steps beyond the usual is required for nonstateconflicts. This capability involves active utilization ofintelligence operations as a dominant element of bothstrategy and tactics. Thus, commanders at all levelsmust be responsible for collecting and exploiting timelyintelligence.

Civilian and military leaders must understand

the totality of small, intrastate wars. Negotiations,agreements, and accords notwithstanding, complexemergency situations are zero-sum games in whichthere can be only one winner or no winners.


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Finally, education and training for contemporaryman-made or natural emergencies must preparemilitary peacekeepers/enforcers or humanitarianrelief providers to be effective war fighters. The

contemporary savage wars of peace will continue toput military forces into harms way.

CONCLUSIONS

These are the essential components of strategic clarity.Even though every conflict situation differs in one way or

another, none is ever truly unique. Throughout the universe ofcontemporary conflict in generaland complex emergenciesinvolving nonstate actors in particularthere are analyticalcommonalities. The final outcomes of the New Wars, suchas those ongoing in Central America, the Caribbean, Mexico,and the Andean Ridge of South America brought about bynarco-traffickers and gangs, are not determined primarily by

the skillful manipulation of violence on the battlefield. Controlof these situations and their resolutions will be determinedby the qualitative judgments and unity of effort establishedbefore, during, and after conflicts are politically recognized tohave begun and ended.

Two common denominators underlie the discussion of theissues considered. The first is the need to understand and tobehave as though the Cold War is over, combined with learninghow to optimize capabilities in an ambiguous, nontraditional,global security environment. In colloquial terms, this firstcommon denominator relates specifically to mind-set, and,in more formal terms, it refers to leader judgment. The secondcommon denominator involves the political partnership

requirements that will permit doctrinal and structural changerelated to coalitions and operations involving mixes of militaryand civilian organizations. This requirement is fundamentalto maintaining unity of effort in unconventional nonstate


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conflict. These common denominators are essential for successin complex emergencies. Thus, we must develop leaders andorganizational structures that can generate strategic clarityand make it workthe sooner, the better.75

To dismiss the above recommendations as too difficult,unrealistic, or simply impossible is to accept theinevitability of unattractive alternatives. At best, internationalleadership can leave forces in place to maintain a de factomilitary occupation, as in Cyprus. Or, at worst, leadershipcan declare victory and go home with the sure knowledgethat that particular set of problems will erupt again and again,

and the time, treasure, and blood expended will have been fornothing.

*****

AFTERWORD

The political-psychological issues of the urban gangphenomenon in the global security environment translate intoconstant subtle and not-so-subtle struggles for governmentalpower that dominate life throughout most of the world. This,in turn, leads to the slow but sure destruction of the state, itsassociated government, and the society. And, again, the basicthreat devolves to that of state failure.

This contemporary political war situation is extremelyvolatile and dangerous and requires careful attention. Inthese terms, the United States, the other countries of theWestern Hemisphere, and the entire global community mustunderstand and cope with the threat imposed by diversethird generation gangs that are engaged in destabilizing and

devastating violence, which is more and more often beingcalled terrorism, criminal anarchy, narco-terrorism,or complex emergency situations. If the United Statesconcentrates its efforts and resources elsewhere and ignoreswhat is happening in Latin America and the Caribbean,


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the expansion of gangs, of lawless areas, and of generalinstability, as well as the compromise of effective nationalsovereignty and security could easily destroy the democracy,free market economies, and prosperity that have beenachieved in recent years. In turn, that would profoundly affectthe health of the U.S. economyand U.S. concomitant powerto act in the global security arena.

ENDNOTES

1. To be fair, it must be noted that some scholars and journalists arebeginning to understand this problem and are writing in these terms.See, as three examples, Anthony T. Bryan, Transnational Organized Crime:The Caribbean Context, Coral Gables, FL: University of Miami, The DanteB. Fascell North-South Center Press, 2002; Ivelaw Lloyd Griffith, Drugsand Security in the Caribbean: Sovereignty Under Siege, University Park,PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997; and El delito comouna amenaza geopoltica, in Clarin.com, 3 de Julio de 2003. Relatedinternational relations theory may be found in Barry Buzan, People, Statesand Fear, 2nd ed., Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991; Keith

Krause and Michael C. Williams, eds., Critical Security Studies, Minneapolis:University of Minnesota Press, 1997; and Mohammed Ayoob, DefiningSecurity: A Subaltern Realist Perspective, in Krause and Williams, 1997,pp. 121-146.

2. One published map of the world emphasizes this particular point.See World Conflict and Human Rights Map 2001/2002, preparedby PIOOM for IIMCR with the support of the Goals for AmericansFoundation, St. Louis, MO, June 2003. It should also be noted that this

idea was articulated earlier by Robert D. Kaplan, The Coming Anarchy,The Atlantic Monthly, February 1994, pp. 72-76; and Robert D. Kaplan, TheComing Anarchy, New York: Random House, 2000, pp. 3-57.

3. This idea is not new. In the authors opinion, it was best stated byAlexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison, in The Federalist Papers[17871788], New York: Mentor, 1961.

4. Steven Metz and Raymond Millan, Future Wars/Future Battle Space:

The Strategic Role of American Landpower, Carlisle, PA: Strategic StudiesInstitute, 2003, pp. ix, 15-17.

5. Steven Metz and Douglas V. Johnson II,Asymmetry and U.S. MilitaryStrategy: Definitions, Background, and Strategic Concepts, Carlisle, PA:Strategic Studies Institute, 2001, pp. 5-6. Also see Steven Metz, The Future


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of Insurgency, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1993, pp. 13-15; andSteven Metz and Raymond Millan, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the21st Century: Reconceptualizing Threat and Response, Carlisle, PA: StrategicStudies Institute, 2004, p. 15.

6. A very interesting and sobering analysis of this type of conflict maybe found in Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare, Beijing:PLA Literature

street gangs: the new urban insurgency

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