suunyavaada a reinterprertation

7/28/2019 Suunyavaada a Reinterprertation

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'Suunyavaada: A Reinterprertation

HARSH NARAIN

Philosophy East and West 13, no. 4, January, 1964(c) by The University Press of Hawaiip.311-338

P.311

PARADOXICALLY ENOUGH, the Maadhyamikas, who wereundoubtedly a most clear-headed group of Indianphilosophers, happen to be the most misunderstood ofthem today. A careful scrutiny of original texts ofthe the Maadhyamikas, as also of those of theirrivals, confirms the opinion that the Maadhyamikaphilosophy, 'Suunyavaada, is absolute nihilism ratherthan a form of Absolutism or Absolutistic monism, ascommonly believed today. The burden of this paper isto reveal and demonstrate the modern mistake ofregarding the 'Suunyavaada as a form of Absolutism

and to throw into relief its real, nihilisticcharacter.*

I

In the early days of Buddhist studies, scholarswere unanimously of the opinion that 'Suunyavaada wasrank nihilism or negativism, that it countenanced a

view of reality as pure void. Thus, according to H.Kern, 'Suunyavaada is "complete and pure nihilism, "and, according to M. Walleser, "negativism whichralically empties existence up to the lastconsequences of negation." H. Jacobi takes it that onthe Maadhyamika view "all our ideas are based upon anonentity or upon the Void." A. B. Keith holds that the Maadhyamikas' reality

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Abbreviations used to refer to frequently cited textsare as follows:

BCA 'Saantideva, Bodhicaryaavataava, Louis de LaVallee-Poussin, ed., with BCAP, BI (Vol. 983,New Series, 1901).

BCAP Praj~naakaramati, Bodhicaryaavataara-pa~njikaa(BCA ed.).

BI Bibliotheca Indica (Calcutta: Asiatic Society ofBengal, Baptist Mission Press, various dates).

CS The Catu.h-'sataka of AAryadeva, Sanskrit and

Tibetan Texts with copious Extracts from theCommentary of Candrakiirti (CSV). Reconstructedand edited by Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya.[Santiniketan: Kishorimohan Santra,Visva-Bharati, 1931], Vol. XXXIV, p. 308.

CSV Candrakiirti, Cantu.h-'sataka-v.rtti(CS ed.).CSt Naagaarjuna, Catu.h-stava, Prabhubhai Patel,

ed., Indian Historical Quarterly, VIII, No.2 (June, 1932), 316-331; No. 4 (December, 1932),

689-705.MK Naagaarjuna, Muulamadhyamaka-kaarikaa

(Maadhyamika-suutra), Louis de La VallPoussin,ed., with MKV, Bibliotheca Buddhica, Vol. IV(St. Petersbourgh: The Imperial Academy ofSciences, 1913).

MKV Candrakiirti, Muulamadhyamaka-kaarikaa-v.rtti(MK ed.).

VV Naagaarjuna, Vigrahavyaavarttani, K. P. Jayaswaland Raahula Saa^nk.rtyaayana, eds., JBORS, XXIII(1937),Part IV (n.d.), first appendix, pp. 1-31.

p.312

is "absolute nothingness." I. Wach characterizes them

as the most radical nihilists that ever existed.(1)But, exceptions apart, later scholars, viz., those


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from Th. Stcherbatsky down to T. R. V. Murti, find in'Suunyavaada an Absolutism more or less akin to thatof the Vedaanta. Stcherbatsky translates the term

"'suunyataa," used by the Maadhyamika, as relative orcontingent.(2) He hastens to add, however, that it"means not something void, but something 'devoid' ofindependent reality (svabhaava-'suunya'), with theimplication that nothing short of the whole possessesindependent reality, and with the furtherimplication that the whole forbids every formulationby concept or speech (ni.sprapa~nca) since they can

only bifurcate (viikalpa) reality and never directlyseize it...."(3) He sums up the Maadhyamika positionthus: "The universe viewed as a whole is theAbsolute, viewed as a process it is thePhenomenal."(4) Murti has it that the terms "'suunya"and "'suunyataa" are applied to phenomena as well asto the Absolute: to phenomena because, beingdependent on and relative to each other, they aredevoid of essence; to the Absolute because it is

devoid of conceptual distinctions.(5) According tohim, the Maadhyamika denies, not the real, butdoctrines about the real(6) Indeed, he regards'Suunyavaada as "a very consistent form ofabsolutism."(7)

Earlier orientalists find ample support from theIndian tradition, the verdict of which is that'Suunyavaada is pure nihilism.(8) The consensus of

Hindu opinion is in farer of regarding it as nothingbut nihilism.s The Hindus also find in it anoutright repudiation of all the four conceivablecategories of reality-viz., is, is-not, both, andneither--and hold it to be thesisless through and

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(1) All these references are taken from Th.Stcherbatsky, The Coception of Buddhist Nirvaa.na


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(Leningrad: The Academy of Sciences of the USSR,1927), p. 37.

(2) Ibid., p. 42.All documentation and hyphenation follow theauthor's preferred style.

(3) Ibid., p. 43.

(4) Ibid., p. 48.

(5) T. R. V. Murti, The Central PhiloJophy ofBuddhism (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd.,1955), p. 142, n. 1.

(6) Ibid., p. 218.

(7) Ibid., p. 234.

(8) See, for example, Gautama, Nyaaya-suutra, Ganga

Nath Jha, ed. (Poona: Oriental book Agency,1939), 4.1.37-41, and commentaries, glosses, andscholia thereon; Kumaarila,mimaa^msaa'sloka-vaartika (Varanasi: ChowkhambaSanskrit Series, 1898), 1.1.5. Niraalambanavaada,stanza (14); 'Sa^nkara, 'Saariiraka-bhaa.sya,Mahaadeva 'Saastrii Bakre, ed., and WaasudevaLaxman 'Saastrii Pa.na'siikar,, rev. (3rd ed.,

Bombay: Nir.naya-Saagar Press, 1934), 2.2.31, pp.478-479; 'Sa^nkara,B.rhadaara.nyaka-upani.sad-bhaa.sya (2ndimpression, Gorakhpur: Gita Press, 1355), 4.3.7,p. 905 Raamaanuja, 'Sri-bhaa.sya Vaasudeva'Saastrii Abhya^nkara, ed., Bombay Sanskrit andPrakrit Series Vol. LXVIII (Bombay:Nit.naya-Saagar Press, 1914), 2.2.30, pp.

495-496; Saa^mkhyapravacana-suutra. AA'subodhaVidyaabhuu.sa.na and Nityabodha Vidyaaratna, eds.


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(3rd ed., Calutta: Vaacaspatya Press, 1936),1.44-47, and Vij~naanabhik.su,Saa^mkhyapravacana-bhaa.sya, ad loc. (in the same

publication); Maadhava, Sarvadar'sama-sa^mgraha,Vaasudeva 'Saastrii Abhya^nkara, ed. (2nd ed.,Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute,1951),p. 29.

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though.(9) It will be shown in the sequel that'Suunyavaada in this respect is nothing but nihilismin its extremest form. The authors of theMaa,n.duukyakaarikaa (AAgama-'saastra) and theYogavaasi.s.ttha, however, seem to view 'Suunyavaadaas a form of Vedaantism, inasmuch as they tend toidentify "'suunya" with Brabman;(10) but they areexceptions which only prove the rule. Besides, theyseem to have been actuated by the ambition to effect

a synthesis between Buddhism and the Vedaanta ratherthan to interpr et the Maadhyamika systemobjectively.

Jaina writers endorse the nihilistic view of'Suunyavaada taken by the Hindu tradition.(11)

A much more significant fact is that even theYogaacaara school of Buddhism shares this view of'Suunyavaada. The Sarvasiddhaanta-sa^mgraha, ascribed

to 'Sa^mkara, quotes the Yogaacaara as criticizing'Suunyavaada on the score of its being totalnihilism.(12) Such stalwarts of the Yogaacaara schoolas Asa^nga, Vasubandhu, and Sthiramati regard it as adoctrine of absolute nothingness.(13)

By far the most significant point, however, isthe fact that the Maadhyamikas themselves refer toYogaacaaras and others as interpreting them

nihilistically, without taking the least excepti onto this interpretation. This point will be enlarged


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upon in the sequel.(14)In the face of such an almost unanimous verdict

of tradition, it is difficult to see how the

nihilistic interpretation of 'Suunyavaada can berejected as totally false.

II

Franke and Kern note that in early Buddhism thereis already a tendency to idealistic nihilism andthat, according to it, to quote Kern in the words of

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(9) See, for example, Udayana,Nyaayavaartikataatparya-pari'suddhi,Vindhye'svariiprasaada Dvivedin and Lak.sma.na'Saastrii Dravi.da, eds., BI, Work No. 209(1924), 1.1.1, p. 291.

(10) See Tbe AAgama-'saastra of Gau.dapaada,Vidhu'sekhara Bha.t.taacaarya, ed. and trans.(Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1943),4.83-84; Yogavaasi.s.tha, Vaasudeva Lak.sma.na'Saastrii Pa.na'siikara and Naaraaya.na RaamaAAcaarya, eds. (3rd ed., Bombay: Nir.naya-SaagarPress, 1937), 3.5.7, p. 140.

(11) See, for example, Prabhaacandra,Prameyakamalamaarta.n.da, Mahendra Kumaara'Saastri (2nd ed, Bombay: Nir.naya-Saagar Press,1941), pp. 39-98; Hemacandra,Anyayogavyavacchedadvaatri^m'sikaa, st, 17, andMalli.se.na, Syaadvaada-ma~njari, the eon, A. B.Dhruva, ed., Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series,Vol. LXXXIII (Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental

Research Institute, 1933), pp. 115-122.


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(12) See Sarvasiddhaanta-sa^mgraha, M. Ra^ngaacaarya,ed. (Madras: Government Press, 1909), p. 12.

(13) Asa^nga, Bodhisattvabhuumi, Unrai Wogihara, ed.(Tokyo: n.p., 1930) p. 44; Sthiramati,Madhyaantavibhaagasuutrabhaa.sya.tika,

Vidhu'sekhara Bha.t.taacaarya and GiuseppeTucci, eds. (London Luzac & Co., 1932), p. 9;Yuan Chwang, Vij~naptimaatrataasiddhi-'saastra,restored into Sanskrit by RaahulaSaa^nk.rityaayana with the help of Wong Mow Lam,

JBORS, XIX, Part IV (December, 1933), Appendix,p. 4.

(14) See section IV (infra).

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Keith, "There is nothing internal nor external for

him with true discernment, and a realization ofnon-existence is the means to secure a safe crossingof the tumult of life."(15) The order of planes ofexistence on which the Buddha dwelt, as set out inthe Cuulasu~n~nata-sutta of the Majjhima-nikaaya,(16)lends support to this view. The planes are:

[1] Consciousness of humanity (manussa-sa~n~naa)[2] Consciousness of forest (ara~n~na-sa~n~naa)

[3] Consciousness of the earth[4] Consciousness of the infinity of space[5] Consciousness of the infinity of ideation[6] Consciousness of nothingness

(aaki~nca~n~naayatana-sa~n~naa)[7] Consciousness of

neither-consciousness-nor-unconsciousness[8] Objectless cessation of consciousness

[9] The supreme, ultimate void(paramaanuttaraa-su~n~nataa)


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As will be developed in the sequel,thesislessness, or repudiation of all views, of allmetaphysics, which is so zealously advocated by the

Maadhyamika, is nihilism carried to its logicalextreme. And it is significant that the Buddhahimself preaches such thesislessness to an ascetic,Diighanakha, in no equivocal terms.(17) There are agood many such suggestions in the Suttanipaata,too.(18)

That the Buddha analyzed the whole of realityinto a fivefold scheme of momentary reals railed

dharmas is common knowledge; that he occasionallypreached their ultimate unreality, so as to promptNaagaarjuna, and also Gau.dapaada, to claim that hepreached no dharmas at all,(19) is unknown to many.Of the five dharmas, he likens sensum (ruupa) to dotsof foam, feeling (vedanaa) to bubbles, perception(sa~n~naa) to a mirage, impression (sa^nkhaara) to abanana tree, and awareness (vi~n~naana) to illusion (maayaa).(20) A more clearly nihilistic teaching is:

"Depending on the oil and the wick does the light ofthe lamp burn; it is neither in the one nor in theother, nor is it anything in itself; phenomena are,likewise, nothing in themselves. All things areunreal;

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(15) See A. B. Keith, Buddhist Philosophy in Indiaand Ceylon (Oxford: The Clarendon Press,1923),p. 47. Quotations from Franke and Kern aretaken from this reference.

(16) See Majjhima-nikaaya, Pa.n.naasaka III entitledUpari-pa.n.naasaka and constituting Vol. III,Raahula Saa^nk.rtyaayana, ed. (Naalandaa: Paali

Publication Board, Bihar Government, 1958),sutta 21 (121 of the whole treatise) entitled


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"Cuulasu~n~nata-sutta," pp. 169-173. Cf. Udaana,Paul Steinthal, ed. (London: Oxford UniversityPress, 1948),VIII. 1, p. 80.

(17) See ibid., Pa.n.naasaka II entitledMajjhima-pa.n.naasaka and constituting Vol. II,sutta 24 (74 of the whole treatise) entitled"Diighanakha-sutta,'' pp. 193-197.

(18) See, for example, Sutta nipaata, Lord Chalmers,ed., Harvard Oriental Series, Vol. 37

(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1932),stanzas 794, 800, 803, 811, 824-834, 839, and877-914.

(19) MK, 25.24; CSt., 1.4; AAgama-'saastra, 4.99.

(20) See Murti, op. cit., p. 50, n. 2.

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they are deceptions; nibbaana is the only truth.(21)His rejection of both the existence view and thenon-existence view of reality,(22) too, serves toalign him with the 'Suunyavaadin, broadly speaking.

The Maadhyamika seeks to reconcile the Buddha's

realistic, dharma-positing, with nihilistic,dharma-denying, sermons by declaring the former as ofa secondary or empirical import and the latter as ofprimary or absolute import.(23) Indeed, there aresuggestions in the Buddha himself that the latter isa highter teaching than the former.(24)

III

The Maadhyamika philosophy is a development of


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the amorphous ideas of 'suunyataa contained in thecanonical Mahaayaana Suutras, especially thePraj~naapaaramitaa texts, which were systematized and

skillfully developed by Naagaarjuna into afull-fledged doctrine of 'suunyataa.(25) Let us,therefore, scrutinize these text to determine whatlight they can throw on the notion of 'suunyataa.

One of the texts has it that all dharmas, as wellas the soul, are non-existent.(26) Elsewhere, alldharmas are described as illusory and dreamlike.Indeed, the text goes to the length of declaring:

"Even the All-Enlightened One (Samyak-sambuddha) isillusory and dreamlike; even All-Enlightened-One-hood is illusory and dreamlike.(27)

This interesting statement, which has been put inthe mouth of Subhuuti, who is shown as addressing thesons of gods, takes the latter aback, and they askSubhuuti if he really means what he says. Let usquote their own words:

Well, Revered Subhuuti, do you say that even theAll-Enlightened One is illusory and dreamlike? Do yousay that even All-Enlightened-One-hood is illusoryand dreamlike?(28)

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(21) Majjhima-nikaaya, III, 40, p. 330. Cp.

Sutta-nipaata, sts. 757-758; MK, 13.2.

(22) Majjhima-nikaaya, Pa.n.naasaka I entitledMuulapa.n.naasaka and constituting Vol. I, P. V.Bapat, ed. (Naalandaa: Paali Publication Board,Bihar Government, 1958), sutta 11 entitled"Cuulasiihadanaada-sutta, " p. 92. Also seeUdaana, vagga 3, sutta 10, p. 33; Itivuttaka,

Ernst Windisch, ed. (London: Oxford UniversityPress, 1948:), nipaata 2, vagga 2, sutta 12, p.


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43; Samaadhiraajasuutra, Nalinaksha Dutt andShiv Nath Sharma, eds., Gilgit Manuscripts, Vol.II (Calcutta: Calcutta Oriental Press,

1941),9.27; MK 15.7.

(23) See MKV, 1.1, pp. 40-44; 15.11, p. 276; colophon(p. 594).

(24) See Majjhima-nikaaya, Pa.n.naasaka I, sutta 22entitled "Alagadduupama-sutta, " pp. 179-180,where dharmas are likened to a raft to be left

off after crossing the stream. Cp. "Mypropositions are elucidatory in this way: he whounderstands me finally recognizes them assenseless, when he has climbed out through them,on them, over them. (He must so to speak throwaway the ladder, after he has climbed up on it.)He must surmount these propositions; then hesees the world rightly." Ludwig Wittgenstein,Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (4th impression,

London: Rouledge and Kegan Paul, 1949),6.54.

(25) See MKV, p. 3.

(26) A.s.tasaahasrikaa-praj~naapaaramitaa,Rajendralala Mitra, ed., BI ( 1888), p. 29.

(27) Ibid.

(28) Ibid., p. 40.

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Subhuuti, undeterred by the question, replies:

Sons of gods, even nirvaa.na I declare illusory anddreamlike, let alone the question of any other


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dharma.(29) [The sons of gods are further confused.But Subhuuti goes on:] "If there were any other, morepeculiar dharma than nirvaa.n, I would declare it

illusory and dreamlike."(30)

These simple, straightforward statements hardly leaveany doubt about the fact that, according to the textsunder consideration, all is pure void.

That the Maadhyamika's is not only a no-doctrineattitude about reality but literally a no-realitydoctrine is further confirmed by such statements as

the following, contained in other Mahaayaana Suutras:

This all is mere name, subsisting by name alone. Thenamed as different from the name does not exist.Those dharmas which are designated by the variousnames are simply not there. Such is the dharma-nessof the dharmas. Nameness is devoid of name. nor doesname subsist by name. All dharmas are nameless thoughrevealed by name. These dharmas are non-existent and

are brought forth by ideation.(31)

All dharmas are false...illusory... dreamlike...water-moon-like...(32)

It is wrong to suppose that the Maadhyamikacharacterrizes as void only dharmas and not theineffable Absolute. Buddhism, the Maadhyamika system

not excepted, analyzes the whole of reality intodharmas, which are of two kinds--conditioned(sa^msk.rta) and unconditioned (asa^msk.rta)--and theAbsolute or the ineffable must, if at all, take itsplace somewhere in the list of the dharmas. To theBuddhist, to whatever school he belongs, there isnothing higher than nirvaa.na, which is a dharma.

Besides, there are clear indications in the

Praj~naapaaramitaa texts that 'sunyataa is notbeyond but identical with dharmas. Lest someone, like


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those who read Absolutism into them, should construe'suunyataa to mean something over and above thedharmas, these texts are never tired of repeatedly

reminding the reader that 'suunyataa is non-differentfrom the dharmas. Take, for example, the following:

Sensum is void ('suunya) of sensum. What is voidness('suunyataa) of sensum is not sensum, nor is voidnessother than sensum. Sensum itself is voidness;voidness itself is sensum. Feeling is void offeeling. What is voidness of feeling is not feeling,

nor is voidness other than feeling. Feeling itself isvoidness; voidness itself is feeling.(33)

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(29) Ibid. It is significant that even the Buddha andBuddhahood are accounted dharmas here.

(30) Ibid.

(31) Bhavasa^mkraanti-suutra, restored withNaagaarjuna's Bhavasa^mkraanti-'saastra in threerecensions, along with the commentary ofMaitreyanaatha, from the Tibetan and Chineseversions into Sanskrit by N. Aiyaswami 'Saastrii(Adyat: Adyar Library, 1938), pp. 5-6.

(32) Ratnakuu.ta-suutra, quoted in MKV, 1.1, pp.52-53.

(33) 'Satasaaharikaa-praj~naapaaramitaa,prataapacandra Gho.sa, ed., BI (1902), Part I,p. 554.

p.317


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The same remarks have been made in the text asregards the remaining three complexes (skandhas),viz., perception (sa^mj~naa), impression

(sa^mskaara), and awareness (vij~naana).We shall see in due course that this view is

fully shared by Naagaarjuna.Murti is of the opinion that "Praj~naapaaramitaa

as non-dual intuition is the Absolute."(34) Thedifficulty in determining the meaning of the term"Absolute" apart, the statement is misleading. Thedefinitions of "praj~naapaaramitaa"--literally,highest

wisdom--available in the texts under considerationlend full support to the nihilistic interpretation ofthe Maadhyamika system. Says one of these texts:"What is non-apprehension of all dharmas is calledPraj~naapaaramitaa. When there is no feeling,ego-consciousness, experience, practice, then thereis Praj~naapaaramitaa--so is it said."(35)

A more emphatic assertion of the non-differenceof 'suunyataa from the phenomenal world and,

consequently, a repudiation of the non-Absolutisticcharacter of praj~naapaaramitaa, is contained in thesame text a bit earlier, as follows:

Praj~naapaaramitaa should not be taken to be over andabove the complexes, seats (aayatasus and bases(dhaatus). What is the reason for it? Because,Subhuuti, the complexes, seats, and bases themselves

are void ('suunya), abstract (vivikta), and quiescent('suunta) is praaj~naaparamitaa.(36)

Here the significance of the emphasis represented bythe expression "themselves" (eva) cannot gounnoticed.

Elsewhere, All-Enlightenment is defined as "wherenothing is cognized.(37) In elucidation of this

remark of his, Subhuuti says to the Buddha withoutbeing refuted:


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On account, Lord, of the nihility ('suunyatva) of alldharmas, there is no dharma which could be cognized.

That is to say, Lord, all dharmas are 'suunya. Thosedharmas, Lord, for the cessation of whichrighteousness is preached are non-existent; likewise,he who experiences the ultimate All-Enlightenment,that which is to be experienced, he who knows, thatwhich is to be known--all these dharmas are'suunya.(38)

These texts list many kinds of 'suunyataa, amongwhich are included 'suunyataa of the conditioned,'suunyataa of the unconditioned, transcendental'suunyataa, absolute 'suunyataa, and 'suunyataa of'suunyataa,(39) which leave no doubt that there is

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(34) Murti, op. cit., p. 228.

(35) A.s.tasaahasrikaa-praj~naapaaramitaa, p. 177.

(36) Loc. cit.

(37) Ibid., p. 313.

(38) Ibid., pp. 313-314.

(39) See, for example,'Satasaahasrikaa-praj~naapaaramitaa, part I, pp.191-192. The concept of 'suunyataa-'suunyataa isexplained in the sequel.

p.318

absolutely no room for the postulation of an Absolute


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in the Maadhyamika system.To sum up: According to the early formative texts

of the Mahaayaana discussed above, all dharmas

without exception are 'suunya. 'Suunyataa is nothingover acid above the dharmas, so that one cannotinstall it as the Absolute over against the dharmas.The highest wisdom consists in the non-apprehensionof any dharmas, of anything whatsoever. Since thereis nothing to apprehend, non-apprehension of anythingcan alone be the highest wisdom. Were there somethinglike the Absolute, the apprehension of it would be

said to be the highest wisdom. Hence, the question ofthere being an Absolute simply does not arise.Accordingly, the philosophy taught by these texts ispure and simple nihilism.

IV

Now we come to the Maadhyamika philosophicalliterature proper. Earlier(40) we noted that the

Maadhyamikas themselves refer to the nihilisticinterpretations of their philosophy without a word toindicate that they should be interpreted onAbsolutistic lines. Let us enlarge upon thisproposition by producing negative evidence for thethesis that the Maadhyamika philosophy is nihilistpar excellence.

The whole of Naagaarjuna's Vigrahavyaavartanii

seems to accord tacit approval to the critics'ascription of nihilism to him. The imaginary criticin the work proceeds on the assumption that'Suunyavaada is absolute nihilism and raises theobjection that, if all is void, the Maadhyamika'sproposition that all is void is itself void and hencedevoid of validity.(41) This argument of theimaginary critic is developed by Naagaarjuna in 20

stanzas of the 72-stanza work. It is strange thatthis work, small in size but great in merit, has


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received little consideration by those favoring anAbsolutistic interpretation of 'Suunyavaada. EvenMurti, who is probably the most serious student of

the Maadhyamika system today, makes almost negligibleuse of it. Naagaarjuna nowhere in this workrepudiates the ascription of nihilism to him. On theother hand, his reply, that he does not find anyreality whatever to postulate Or deny,(42) serves toconfirm the truth of the ascription.

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(40) See section II (supra).

(41) VV, st. 1. The discussion of this issuecontained in this small work will be foundinteresting reading by those having an idea ofthe examples of systematic ambiguity cited anddiscussed by Bertrand Russell in connection withhis theory of logical types developed in his

Logic and Knowledge, Charles Marsh, ed. (London:George Alien & Unwin, 1956), pp. 59-102.Russell's thesis is ably discussed in F.Waismann, "Language Strata, " in Logic andLanguage, Second Series, Antony Flew, ed.(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1953), pp. 16-18.

(42) VV st. 30.

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Such implicit confirmations of the ascription ofnihilism to the Maadhyamika way of thinking are notlacking in the later Maadhyamika works as well.Bhaavaviveka's reference to the Yogaacaaras ascribing

nihilism to the Maadhyamika without the least concernon his part to correct them is a case in point.(43)


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He also raises the question, as raised in theVigrahavyaavartanii, that, if all is void, the veryproposition that all is void is itself void and hence

devoid of sense.(44) Chapter X of AAryadeva's'Sata-'saastra(45) is devoted entirely to thisproblem. In his Catu.h-'sataka, too, the problem israised at one place.(46) The La^nkaavataara-suutracontains the remark: "The essence of all entities isunreal, and this proposition, too, is unreal."(47)

'Saantideva discusses the question of universalnihility vis-?vis the question of the validity of

the means of knowledge (pramaa.na) thus: "If themeans of knowledge is false then what is known by itis false, and hence the essential non-being ofentities fails to be established."(48) He purports tosay that on the Maadhyamika view the means ofknowledge, being 'suunya (false), no longer remaintrue means of knowledge, and, in the absence of anyvalid means of knowledge, the knowledge that all is'suunya, or false, is itself false. His reply to this

objection is not much to the point, an d so we ignoreit here. We have adverted to this question, first, tobring home to the reader the significant fact that,in whatever context the imaginary objector raisesobjections to the doctrine of 'suunyataa, he proceedson the assumption that 'suunyataa is nothing but purevoid, and, second, to note that the Maadhyamikanowhere takes exception to such an assumption.

The Maadhyamika invokes his thesis ofthesislessness to answer such arguments.(49) That,however, this thesislessness springs from theconsciousness of absolute void or, what is the samething, the non-apprehension of anything whatsoever,is made abundantly clear by Naagaarjuna, AAryadeva,and Candrakiirti.(50) Indeed, the Maadhyamika thesisof thesislessness is nothing but absolute nihilism in

disguise.


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_____________________________________________________

(43) See, for example, Bhaavaviveka, karatalaratna,restored from Huen Tsang's Chinese version intoSanskrit by N. Aiyaswami 'Saastrii(Santiniketan: Visva-Bharati, 1949),p. 57.

(44) Ibid., pp. 45-63, passim.

(45) AAryadeva, 'Sata-'saastra, English rendering

from the Chinese version by G. Tucci,Pre-Diisnaaga Buddhist Texts on Logic fromChinese Sources, Gaekwad's Oriental Series, Vol.XLIX (Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1929), pp.26-89.

(46) See CS, 8.9 and CSV thereon.

(47) La^nkaavataara-suutra, Bunyiu Nanjio, ed.,

Bibliotheca Otaniensis, Vol. I (Kyoto: OtaniUniversity Press, 1923), gaathaa 265, p. 300.Advayavajra, Advayavajra-sa^mgraha, HaraprasaadSaastrii, ed., Gaekwad's Oriental Series, Vol.XL (Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1927), p. 26.

(48) BCA, 9.139.

(49) VV, st. 29.

(50) See note 42 (supra); CS, 16.25; MKV, 1.1 pp. 44,55-58. The following words of Candrakiirti areespecially noteworthy: "Sages find nothing whichcould be false or true." (Naiva tvaaryaa.hki~ncid upalahante yan m.r.saa am.r.saa vaasyaad iti.) MKC, 1.1, p. 44.


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p.320

V

Now about positive evidence of Maadhyamikaphilosophical literature proper.

Naagaarjuna unequivocally expresses the view thatobjects, being essenceless, do not exist.(51) Heopenly declares, "Essencelessness of objects isproved by the phenomenon of change. And there can beno object without essence. Hence the 'suunyataa of

objects.(52) According to him, the fact of changepresents an insoluble problem, a veritable dilemma,to the realist.

If there be no essence, what would undergochange? If [,again,] there be an essence, what wouldundergo change? The same object cannot undergo change(viz., cannot become another object), nor can anotherobject do so; for the youth does not age nor does

the aged one age. If the same object becomes another,milk itself would become curd. [If you say that somethingelse becomes curd,] what other than milk can becomecurd?(53)

The Maadhyamikas are never tired of describingthe world as pure illusion, but in so doing theynever suggest that they see anything non-illusory

behind it.(54)Naagaarjuna's method is to consider the various

modes of being countenanced by common sense as wellas by philosophies in general and to repudiate allof them by showing that they lack law, lack logic,and hence are a chaos rather than a cosmos. This is achaotic or irrationalistic conception of reality, asit were, Hegel, who is in a way the most

thorough going rationalist ever born and whose cosmicor rationalistic conception of reality can perhaps


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never be surpassed, declares that the real isrational and that the rationalist real. TheMaadhyamika is prepared to grant this proposition,

that only the rational can be real; but his findingis that there is nothing rational is which premise heconcludes that there is nothing real. In sum: Hegeltakes it that the real is rational; the Maadhyamikathat the apparently real is the irrational, and henceat bottom unreal.

So, the only conclusion that can be drawn fromthe Maadhyamika's method is that he endeavors to

drive at the thought that all is pure void. The modesof being examined by him are: causality, motion,matter, space, existence,

_____________________________________________________

(51) MK, 1.10.

(52) Ibid., 13.3.

(53) Ibid., 13.4-6.

(54) See ibid.,, 7.34; 23.8; CSt. 1.14; 2.4. 18, 34;3.5, 17, 31; Bhavasa^mkraanti (first recensionof Bhavasa^mkraanti-'saastra), st. 6;Cittavi'suddhi-prakara.na, Prabhubhai Patel, ed.(Santiniketan: Visva-Bharati, 1949), st. 19.

Such statements abound in the Praj~naapaaramitaaand other Maadhyamika Suutras as well. Cp.Udaana, VIII. 1, p. 80.

p.321

non-existence, qualificans and qualificand, light and

darkness, soul, substance, relativity, time, change,relation, essence, value or morals, etc. What he


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seems to be concerned to drive at through hisexamination of such modes or categories of being isto demonstrate that the universe is a chaos and not a

cosmos, that nothing can be said to be in any of thestates conceivable by man, and that, this being so,nothing whatever exists.

As noted above, according to Buddhism, reality isdivisible into the conditioned and the unconditioned.Naagaarjuna argues: "There being no proof ofemergence, endurance, and extinction, the conditioneddoes not exist; and, in default of the establishment

of the conditioned, how can there be theunconditioned?"(55) The logical corollary from thisproposition is that, there being neither theconditioned nor the unconditioned, there is noreality whatever.

Naagaarjuna takes enormous pains to demonstratethat nothing possesses absolute being, that all isrelative. Reality is characterized byinterdependence. Nothing exists in its own right,

independently of other things. The existence of eachobject is borrowed from its relationship to otherobjects. This is the doctrine of what may be calleduniversal relativity. It rejects all thought of anAbsolute as the ground of the realm of relativity.According to it, all is relative(pratiitya-samutpanna). "No Absolute(apratiitya-samutpanna) real whatever existx."(56)

'"There is no non-relative subsistence of anythinganywhere at any time."(57)

Naagaarjuna remarks in two of his works that,since this world is non-existent, the other world isnon-existent also.(58) This will also be foundsignificant in this connection.

What we wish to drive at vis-?vis the positionof the Maadhyamika is best illustrated by the very

interesting discussion of the relativity of dharmaswith reference to fire and fuel given in the


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Muulamadhyamaka-kaarikaa (Maadbyamika-kaarikaa).Naagaarjuna writes:

If the fire is relative to the fuel, or the fuelis relative to the fire, which of the two came first,to which the fire [or] the fuel is relative? If anentity becomes possible in and through its relationto that entity which itself owes its existence to itsrelationship so the former, which entity can exist onaccount of which? The entity which owes its existenceto anoter is non-existent; how, then, can it need the

latter? If, on the other hand, it so needs when it isexistent, the question of needing simply does notarise.(59)

_____________________________________________________

(55) MK, 7.33.

(56) Ibid., 24.19.

(57) CS, 9.2, with CSV.

(58) Bhavabheda-'saastra (third recension ofBhavasa^mkraanti-'saastra), p. 21;Bhavasa^mkraanti, 4. Cp. Udaana, VIII. 1, p. 80.

(59) MK, 10.8, 10-11.

p.322

Naagaarjuna's suggestion(60) that his denial ofthe world should not be take to imply belief inanother order of reality like the Absolute, immanentin or transcendent to phenomena, is quite in

conformity with the spirit of the Praj~naapaaramitaatexts, which refuse to set 'suunyataa over against


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the dharmas and to acknowledge the positive knowledgeof any such reality in the highest wisdom conceivedby them. As already shown, the Maadhyamika holds that

'suunyataa is non-different from the dharmas and thatthere is total non-apprehension of any realitywhatsoever in the highest wisdom. This is the tone ofthe whole gamut of Maadhyamika literature.Naagaarjuna goes to the extent the Tathaagata andnirvaa.na, thereby making it indisputably clear thatthere is nothing like the Absolute over and above therelative. He says, "Where there is no superimposition

of nirvaa.na, nor elimination of sa^msaara(phenomena), what can there be conceived likesa^msaara and nirvaa.na?"(61)

Candrakiirti comments that such superimpositionand elimination are ruled out on account of thenon-being of both nirvaa.na and sa^msaara.(62)Naagaarjuna establishes complete equipollency betweensa^msaara and nirvaa.na thus:

This world is of the same essence as theTathaagata, and, since the Tathaagata is essenceless,this world, too, is essenceless.(63)

Sa^msaara has nothing to distinguish itself fromnirvaa.na. Nirvaa.na has nothing to distinguishitself from sa^msaara. Sa^msaara belongs to the samecategory as nirvaa.na. There is not the minutest

difference between the two.(64)

That which constitutes this process of births anddeaths due to causes and conditions constitutesnirvaa.na without causes and conditions.(65)

Elsewhere Naagaarjuna expresses the view that'suunyataa is nothing other than existents, nor is

there any existent without 'suunyataa.(66) Thesewords occur in the Advayavajra-sa^mgraha as well.(67)


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Praj~naakaramati has expressed himselfcategorically against the attempt to install'suunyataa over against the realm of being. His words

are: "'Suunyataa is not different from being, forbeing itself is of the nature of that; otherwise, inthe event of 'suunyataa's being different from being,there would be no essencelessness of dharmas."(68)

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(60) See notes 55-58 (supra) and 64-66 (infra).

(61) MK,, 16.10. Cp. CSt, 1.5.

(62) MKV, 16.10, p. 299.

(63) MK, 22.16.

(64) Ibid., 25.19--20. Cp. CSt, 1.5;Cittavi'suddhi-prakara.na, st. 24.

(65) MK, 25.9.

(66) CSt, 3.41.

(67) Advayavajra-Sa^mgraha, p.24.

(68) BCAP, 9.34, p. 416.

p.323

The doctrine of universal relativity(pratiitya-samutpaada) is the stepping stone to thedoctrine of 'suunyataa. The knowledge of the formerat once leads to the knowledge of the latter. Their

relation is so intimate that Naagaarjuna does nothesitate in identifying the two. He says, "What is


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relativity we call 'suuyataa. It ('suunyataa) isrelative being (upaadaaya-praj~napti). It is themiddle path."(69) This proposition is pregnant with

implications. The Maadhyamika turnedpratiitya-samutpaada (relativity or, literally,dependent origination) into pratiitya-samutpaada(dependent or relative being).(70) In this sense, heexpressed pratiitya-samutpaada otherwise asupaadaaya-praj~napti (relative being). In fact, hispratiitya-samutpaada is tantamount to a denial ofcausation altogether. Indeed, in another work,

Naagaarjuna has remarked that what has come intobeing through causes and conditions has, in fact, norcome into being at all. And, since it has not comeinto being, it is 'suunya, or void, pure andsimple.(71) It is significant that Candrakiirtiinterprets pratiitya-samutpaada to mean"non-origination by nature" (sva-bhaavenaanutpaada.h).(72)

The Maadhyamika system is an extension of the

Buddha's theses of soullessness, universalevanescence, and the quietude of nirvaa.na.(73) Hisdoctrine of soullessness and denial of substance orabiding reality led to the denial of a realitysubjacent to phenomena. From the position that thechanging phenomena have no underlying, changelessreality, it was only a short step to the positionthat phenomena have no underlying reality at all. The

former position made short work of the latter. TheNaiyaayikas, Puurva Miimaa^msakas, Lokaayatas, andBuddhist realists like the Sarvaastivaadins andVaibhaa.sikas hold that appearances are real. TheAdvaita Vedaanta and the Vij~naanavaada hold thatappearances are unreal, and posit a realityunderlying them. Early Buddhism dismissed substance,including the soul (pudgala-nairaatmya or

pudgala'suunyataa), but postulated two orders ofreals called dharmas, personal and non-personal,


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which come out of nothing, endure for just a moment,and then rela pse into nothing, thanks to the law ofdiscontinuous continuity (pratiitya-samutpaada). The

Satyasiddhi and Maadhyamika schools went a stepfurther and dismissed the dharmas (dharma-nairaatmyaor sarva-dharma-

_____________________________________________________

(69) MK, 24.18. Also see CSt, 2.20; 3.38.

(70) We remember having read it somewhere.

(71) CSt, 3.3. Also, Naagaarjuna, Yuktii.sa.s.tikaa,referred to in Murti, op. cit., p. 89, n. 2.Also, Advayavajra-sa^mgraha, p. 25.

(72) MKV, 24.18, p. 503 ? La^nkaavataara-suutra(gaathaa 582, p. 337), however, says: "All thisis uncreated. But it is not that things do not

exist. Things do exist, but they do so withoutsufficient reason, like fata morgana, dream, andillusion."

(73) These are said to be seals in Naagaarjuna,Mahaapraj~naapaaramitaa-'saastra, cited inJunjiro Takakusu, The Essentials of BuddhistPhilosophy, Wing-tsit Chan and Charles A. Moore,

eds. (1st Indian ed., Bombay, etc.: AsiaPublishing House, 1956), p. 140.

p.324

'suunyataa), too. The Maadhyamika, in effect, callsappearances unreal without positing a reality behind

them. Dasgupta is right when he says:


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The Maadhyamika view has no thesis of its own whichit seeks to establish, for it does not believe in thereality or unreality of anything or in the

combination of reality or unreality. Thus there is noultimate thesis in Naagaarjuna. It is, therefore,neither idealism nor realism nor absolutism, butblank phenomenalism which only accepts the phenomenalworld as it is but which would not, for a moment,tolerate any kind of essence, ground or realitybehind it.(74)

It is in this vein of blank phenomenalism thatNaagaaarjuna says: '"This all is groundless, andgroundless has it been called."(75) '"This all issupportless, and supportless has it been called."(76)

Murti is of a different opinion. He observes,

The Tattva, however, is accepted by the Maadhyamikaas the Reality of all things (dharmaa.naa^mdharmataa) , their essential nature (prak.rtir

dharmaa.naam). It is uniform and universal, neitherdecreasing, nor increasing, neither originating nordecaying. The Absolute alone is in itself (ak.rtrimasvabhaava). The Absolute is that intrinsic form inwhich things would appear to the clear vision of anAArya (realized saint) free from ignorance.(77)

Murti seems to have the following statements of the

Muulamadhyamaka-kaarikaa and Candrakiirti's commentsthereon in mind: "self-being is inartificial andnonrelative to other [being]."(78) "Not realizablethrough other, calm, inexpressible through words,exempt from conceptualization, of not manymeanings--this is the definition of tattva."(79)

There is reason to believe that Murti is wrong intaking it for granted that these statements of

Naagaarjuna make him an Absolutist. It is true thatNaagaarjuna appears to argue as if he believed in so


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many laws of thought and being, so many truths. Hewields logic as skillfully as others, as though hewere demonstrating that at least logic contained the

whole truth and that it was an exception to thetheory of absolute nihility propounded by him. Atfirst sight, it appears that for him the law assumedin his argument is unquestionably real and that it isnot a non-entity, not an illusion. But the actualposition is that he employs popular notions to refutepoppular theses, thereby trying to demonstrate thatour notions of things are self-contradictory. It is

not that he really believes, for example, that whatis self-subsistent alone can cause another. He simplymeans to say that on the realist's own logic whatdoes

_____________________________________________________

(74) S. N. Dasgupta, Indian Idealism (Cambridge:University Press, 1933), p. 79.

(75) Bhavasa^mkraanti, st. 10.

(76) Bhavasa^mkraanti-parikathaa (2nd recension ofBhavasa^mkraanti-'saastra), st. 8.

(77) Murti, op. cit., p. 235.

(78) MK, 15.2 Cp. CSt, 3.35-39,42.

(79) MK, 18.9.

p.325

not exist cannot make others exist. So, when he

defines tattva or svabhaava, he does not mean to suggestthat there is a reality conforming to his definition.


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What he does mean to suggest is that it follows fromthe realist's own way of thinking that reality, ifthere were a reality, should be such.

Candrakiirti has made a categorical statement inthis direction which should settle the matter onceand for all. He states a possible objection againstthe Maadhyamika's thesis thus: If the Maadhyamika hasno thesis of his own, he is far from justified inpropounding the thesis that things are caused not bythemselves, nor by other things, nor by both, nor byneither. To this, Candrakiirti's reply is that the

thesis in question is, as a matter of fact, not athesis of the Maadhyamika at all and that theMaadhyamika's method is to meet the realist on thelatter's own ground by facing him with thedifficulties arising out of the latter's ownlogic.(80)

Moreover, it can also be shown that Naagaarjuna'sdefinitions of tattva and svabhaava are fullyapplicable to his void ('suunya). Murti remarks:

"Tattva as Dharmataa or Bhuutako.ti is accepted bythe Maadhyamika as the underlying ground ofphenomena."(81) But the question is, What is there towarrant the assumption that tattva, dharmata, andbhuutako.ti cannot be identified with the void?Naagaarjuna says, "On cessation of the object ofconsciousness, the object of speech ceases to exist.For dharmataa is, like nirvaa.na, uncaused and

imperishable."(82) Candrakiirti's explanation is:"Dharmataa is the essence of dharma, the nature ofdharma, which neither originates nor perishes, likenirvaa.na."(83) Giving an alternative explanation, hewrites that in this verse Naagaarjuna explains theproposition, made in an earlier verse,(84) that allspeech (prapa~nca) ceases in 'suunyataa: "... howthen can speech cease to exist in 'suunyataa? The

reply is, on cessation of the object of speech,etc...."(85)


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In another connexion, Candrakiirti tries to givea third, clearer definition of dharmataa in thesewords:

What is this dharmataa of the dharmas? The character(svabhaava) of dharma. What is this character? Nature(prak.rti). What is this nature? It is what is this'suunyataa. What is this 'suunyataa? Essencelessness(ni.hsvabhaavya). What is this essencelessness? Such-ness (tathataa). What is this suchness, So-being(tathaa-bhaava), changelessness, everlastingness."

(86)

Lest someone should be misled by the word"everlastingness," Candrakiirti

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(80) MKV, 1.1, p. 57; MK, 24.10; VV, st. 28.

(81) Murti, op. cit., P. 237.

(82) MK, 18.7.

(83) MKV, 18.7, p. 364.

(84) MK, 18.5.

(85) MKV, 18.7, p. 365.

(86) Ibid., 15.2, pp. 264-265.

p.326

adds that, being non-relative and inartificial, only

the non-origination of things is called theirnature.(87) He also suggests that this


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non-origination is identical with non-being.(88) Itis significant that, in explanation of the versequoted as footnote 84, Candrakiirti makes it

perfectly clear that "'suunyataa itself is callednirvaa.na on account of its being characterized bythe cessation of all speech."(89)

Besides, in another work, Naagaarjuna has madethe significant remark that dharmataa is 'suunya,like space.(90) In fact, according to him, allessence is like space.(91) As a matter of fact, asindicated in the Advayavajra-sa^mgraha,(92) dharmataa

is nothing other than dharmas, which are at bottom'suunya, nothing.The Absolutist interpreter of 'Suunyavaada sets

much store by its concept of dharmataa, as well astathataa. We have seen that dharmataa is nothingmysterious like an Absolute and that it is butanother name for 'suunyataa, or void; We have now toexamine the concept of tathataa.

We have seen how Candrakiirti uses "dharmataa"

and "tathataa" interchangeably. Bhaavaviveka'sobservations on the nature of tathataa will, however,be found decisive. He writes:

If it be contended that the Tathataa, although it isforeign to words (abhilaapa, vyavahaara-vivikta)(sic) is nevertheless a reality (tattva): in thatcase, the expression Tathataa refers only to the

AAtman of the Tiirthikas under another name. Just asthe Tathataa, although it is a reality, isnevertheless from the point of view of exact truth,beyond the concepts of being and not-being, it is thesame with AAtman. The Tiirthikas think that theAAtman, which is real, omnipresent, eternal, agent,enjoyer, is nevertheless foreign to every concept(beyond the pale of conceptions). As it transcends

the domain of words, and as it is not the object ofthe dealing-with-ideas intellect (vikalpa-buddhi), it


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is said to be foreign to concepts. The doctrines ofthe Tiirthikas say: "The words do not go there; thethought does not realize it, therefore it is named

AAtman." The AAtman being such, is it reasonable toassert that "the knowledge (j~naana) which takes theTathataa as its object leads to deliverance, whilethe knowledge which takes the AAtman as its objectdoes not'-? (sic) But what is the difference betweenthe Tathataa and the AAtman, since both are ineffableand real? It is only by esprit de parti(pak.sa-graha.na) that it is so said.(93)

This emphatic repudiation of identity betweentathataa and the Absolute should set at rest allspeculation about the meaning of tathataa. Tathataa,

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(87) Ibid., 15.2, p. 265.

(88) Ibid., Cp., however, note 72 (supra).

(89) MKV, 18.5, p.351.

(90) Bhavasa^mkraanti, st. 2.

(91) Ibid., st. 3. Cp. BCA, 9.155.

(92) Advayavajra-sa^mgraha, p. 44.

(93) See Louis de La Vall-Poussin, "The Maadhyamikaand the Tathataa," Indian Historical Quarterly,IX, No. 1 (March, 1933), 30-31. Bhaavaviveka'swork quoted from is mentioned by La

Vall-Poussin as Jewel in Hand or Gem in Hand.

p.327


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dharmataa, nirvaa.na, and 'suunyataa are more or lesssynonymous terms, used to designate the void in

various ways. It is difficult--rather, impossible--toconvey the true idea of the void. But some name orother has to be given to it to make discourse aboutit possible. This exigency of discourse isresponsible for the invention or employment of theaforesaid terms, be they ever so imperfect.Candrakiirti remarks that, though the fire isessenceless, it has to be spoken of as an entity, and

some essence has to be superimposed upon it just toguard against the auditors" being frightened.(94)Dharmataa, etc., are born of suchsuperimposition.(95)

Bhaavaviveka's position is clearly summed up by

Louis de La Vall-Poussin as follows: "Buddhism isalien to every metaphysical interest, being merely apath leading to final rest by an unconscious andobjectless contemplation.(96)

Thus, Absolutism is quite foreign to theMaadhyamika way of thinking.

VI

So far we have tried to show how the Maadhyamikais a repudiator of being. We Shall see presently thathe is concerned as much with repudiating non-being as

with repudiating being. His repudiation of non-beinghas been a source of much distortion of hisstandpoint.

In Naagaarjuna, the negation of the world is socomplete that it ceases to be mere negation andbecomes the sole substitute for reality, so to speak.All naming is determination, and, when there isnegation, pure and simple, with no existence besides

it--that is to say, when there is absolute orindeterminate negation--even calling it negation is


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not justified, since it will become determinate inthe process of being named. Naming is intended tomark something out of its context, the group of its

co-existents, and, when there is negation alone, thequestion of marking it out by naming is entirelyruled out. Naagaarjuna observes: "The negation ofbeing and non-being is called nirvaa.na."(97) '"They

who see the being and non-being of things do not seethe quiescent good worth seeing."(98) "Being andnon-being are both phenomenal (conditioned orsa^msk.rta)."(99)

Against the concept of non-being, Naagaarjunaargues like this: When there is no being, how can itsnon-being be thought of?(100) If being is not proved,

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(94) MKV, 15.2, p. 264.

(95) See ibid.

(96) La Vallee-Poussin, "The Maadhyamika and theTathataa," p. 30.

(97) Naagaarjuna, Ratnaavali, G. Tucci, ed., JRAS,1934, p. 316, chap. 1, st. 42.

(98) MK, 5.8.

(99) Ibid., 25.13.

(100) Ibid., 5.6.

p.328

non-being is not proved, either; for what people callnon-being is but the opposite of being.(101) The


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Buddha himself repudiated both being and non-being inthe Kaatyaayana dialogue. If existence is there bynature, its negation cannot be; for there can be no

change in nature.(102) If there is no being, therecan be no non-being, since without one there can beno many.(103) Praj~naa-karamati argues againstnon-being in the same vein. According to him, non-being is something subjective and unreal. When thereis nothing to deserve the name of being, it is simplyfoolish to talk of non-being as the negation ofbeing.(104) 'Saantideva says:

When there is no being which would be negated,non-being becomes supportless, and hence there can beno presentation of it. When neither being nornon-being is presented to consciousness, there beingno other alternative, the intellect ceases tooperate.(105)

Without positing being, a figment of imagination, its

non-being cannot be grasped. Therefore, the non-beingof being, which is false, is, evidently, falseitself.(106)

Thus, non-being is doubly unreal. Candrakiirtiremarks in the same vein:

"The son of a barren woman" is nothing but words. No

objective counterpart of the expression is found ofwhich positivity or negativity could be predicated.Therefore, how is it possible to think of "no-object"in terms of being and non-being?(107)

If something existed, its repudiation would lead tonegativism and hence to a false view. When we findnothing whatever, what can be stolen (lost) there?

Non-being is nothing whatsoever....(108)


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The position is that being and non-being arecorrelatives, so that the one cannot be thought ofsave in relation to the other. If, therefore, there

is no object, how can there be a non-object ornon-being?

From the foregoing account it is evident that theMaadhyamika's denial of non-being is a semanticalrather than an ontological proposition. He does notdeny that all is reducible to non-being or that allis non-being; he simply demurs to calling thenegation of being by the name of non-being.

It will thus be appreciated that, shorn of verbalformulation, there is in effect hardly any realdifference between the Maadhyamika and theSatyasiddhi school founded by Harivarman. Takakusuhas sought, however, to make a fine distinctionbetween the two thus:

Analyzing those five objects the school [theSatyasiddhi school] reduces them to molecules, and

further reduces them to even finer atoms, and by thusrepeating the

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(101) Ibid., 15.5.

(102) Ibid., 15.7-8.

(103) Ratnaavalii, 1.71.

(104) BCAP, 9.2, p. 358.

(105) BCA, 9.34-35.

(106) Ibid., 9. 140.

(107) MKV, 25.8, p. 528.


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(108) Ibid., 13.2 p. 239.

p.329

process the school finally attains the finest elementwhich has an entirely different nature from the firstobjects. Going one step further, the school attainsthe Void. Thus the nihilism of this school is a"destructed" or abstracted Void. In other words, the

non-entity asserted in this school is simply anabstraction from entity, or merely an antithetic Voidas against existence. And this is not the syntheticVoid or transcendental Void advanced by the Sanron[Maadhyamika] School.(109)

Takakusu's distinction does not really hold good.The process by which he says the Satyasiddhi schoolreaches its void is nothing peculiar to that school.

It is shared by the Maadhyamikas as well. 'Saantidevahas urged it as an argument against the reality ofdharmas.(110) In the Catuh-'sataka, AAryadeva employsa similar argument in refutation of the atom.(111)His Hastavaala-prakara.na is wholly devoted to asimilar argument.(112) According to Advayavajra, suchan argument is to be met with in "western"Vaibhaa.sikas as we11.(113) It is suggested in the

La^nkaavataara-suutra, too.(114) Besides, therecurrent recourse in Maadhyamika literature tolikening reality to a banana tree, which, when allits skins are peeled off, has nothing left as itskernel, indicates a similar frame of reference.(115)

Hence, while Buddhism in general and theSatyasiddhi school in particular tend to makeapproximations to 'Suunyavaada by means of the

foregoing argumentation, it is the Maadhyamika alonewho enjoys the credit of presenting 'Suunyavada as a


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systematic philosophy.The Buddha preached that all comes out of nothing

and relapses into nothing; Harivarman contends that,

if all comes out of nothing and relapses intonothing, all is nothing; the Maadhyamika argues that,if things are not there, nothing is not there also,because the absence of one member of the pair ofopposites is bound to mean the absence of the othermember as well. When, however, the Maadhyamikaexpresses his disapproval of the tendency to identifyhis 'suunyataa with non-being, he means to say only

that "nothing" is meaningless without the duality ofbeing and non-being, and that, since being is notthere, nothing is not there also. So, betweenHarivarman and the Maadhyamika the issue is merely asemantic one rather than ontological.

The burden of the Maadhyamika dialectic is toshow that all is void, nothing. The Maadhyamika,however, is not satisfied with the words "void" and"nothing." "Void" presupposes a filler thereof.

Likewise, "nothing"

_____________________________________________________

(109) Takakusu, op. cit., p. 78.

(110) BCA, 9.86-87.

(111) See CS, 13.5-6, with CSV.

(112) AAryadeva, Hastavaala-prakara.na, F. W. Thomasand H. Ui, eds., JRAS, 1918, pp. 277 and 281,sts. 1 and 3.

(113) See Advayavajra-sa^mgraha, p. 15.

(114) La^nkaavataara-suutra, gaathaa 583, p. 337.


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(115) See, for example, Ratnaavali, 2.1; BCA, 9.151.

p.330

presupposes some "thing." Hence, he finds these termsinadequate to express what he actually means.

So, the Maadhyamika repudiates being andnon-being, the former on ontological and the latteron semantic grounds. There is, however, a thirdalternative, viz., both being and nothing rolled into

one (ubhaya-sa^mkiir.naatmataa), and a fourth one,viz., a category exclusive of both being and nothing(ubhaya-prati.sedha-svabhaavataa).(116) What does theMaadhyamika say about these two categories?Praj~naakaramati's reply is:

Not that, in the event of both being and non-beinghaving been negated as shown above, the mixture ofboth of them or negatedness of both is the real state

of affairs. Since the idea of being is the ground ofall ideation, after its repudiation all of theseideations stand repudiated with one stroke.(117)

Out of the four categories (ko.tis) of reality thatcan be conceived by man, viz., being, non-being,both, and neither, the first two are basic or primarycategories, while the latter two are derivative from

these. And, when the Maadhyamika has his reasons torepudiate the basic or primary categories, thederivative ones stand repudiated of themselves.

The Maadhyamika is also inclined to distinguishbetween non-being (abhaava) and 'suunyataa, (118)which, as should be manifest from the foregoingaccount, is quite in keeping with his basic position.

VII


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We have seen how Naagaarjuna rejects being andnon-being. Now note that he rejects 'suunyataa, too.In Chapter XV of the Muulama-dhyamaka-kaarikaa will be

found self-essence, existence, and non-existence allrepudiated with the felicity characteristic ofNaagaarjuna. We have shown that his rejection ofnon-being is semantic rather than ontological.Similarly, his rejection of 'suunyataa, too, issemantic rather than ontological.

He says, "Were there something non-'suunya, therewould be something, 'suunya, too. But, since there is

nothing non-'suunya, where will the 'suunya be?"(119)It is obvious that here Naagaarjuna has risen toa height of imagination at which he finds inadequateeven the concept of 'suunyataa, not, however, onontological but on purely semantic grounds, as wasthe case with his repudiation of non-being. What isleft after negating everything conceivable ischaracterizable neither as non-being nor as 'suunya,for the simple reason that

_____________________________________________________

(116) See BCAP, 9.2, p. 358.

(117) Ibid.

(118) See MK, 13.2, with MKV, p.239.

(119) MK, 13.7. Cp. Yogavaasi.s.tha, 3.10.14.

p.331

there is nothing in opposition to which theseconcepts could logically observation: '"The Buddhas

preach 'suunyataa as the exclusion of all[ontological] theses. We declare incurable those who


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tend to erect 'suunyataa itself into a particularthesis.(120)

The residue after the negation of everything

whatsoever is truly ineffable. All descriptionproceeds by relating one thing to another. Withoutthis process, there can be no speech at all. And,when there is nothing at all in relation to which theso-called residue is to be described, it is nothingbut indescribable or ineffable (prapa~ncopa'sama),where language loses all its utility and efficiency.They who erect this 'suunyataa into a particular

theory, or convert it into a veritable being, as isthe case with those who read Absolutism into theMaadhyamika system, are incurable. Candrakiirti says,"Those who see being even in 'suunyataa are not suchas we talk with. He who, in reply to the remark, 'Ishall give you no money,' says, 'Well, let me havethe no-money, cannot by any means be convinced of thenon-existence of money."(121)

Of the Buddha, the highest being, Naagaarjuna

declares: "He cannot be called 'suunya, nor can he benon-'suunya, nor both, nor neither. He is called so[viz., 'suunya, non-'suunya, both, and neither] forempirical purposes."(122) Our interpretation ofNaagaarjuna's refutation of 'suunyataa is fully borneout by the following passage of Candrakiirti:

If there were something like 'suunyataa [lover and

above the objects], the essence of objects woulddepend upon it. But this is not the case. Here'suunyataa is propounded as the genericcharacteristic of all reals. There is no non-'suunyareal, and non-'suunyataa itself does not exist. [Thatis to say, all reals being 'suunya, there is nonon-'suunya real; and hence 'suunyataa, in default ofits opposite, simply does not exist.] And, when there

are no non-'suunya objects and there is nonon-'suunyataa, it follows that, in the absence of


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its opposite, 'suunyataa, too, like the garland ofsky-flowers, is not there.(123)

As a matter of fact, there is hardly any realdifference between non-being and 'suunyataa. By theformer, the Maadhyamika seems to mean determinatenegation, while, by the latter, indeterminatenegation. Otherwise, both the terms denote one andthe same fact. That is to say, when he speaksgenerally, he defines 'suunyataa such as in thesestatements: "That is called 'suunyataa which is

non-existent by nature."(124) "'Suunyataa is theessencelessness of all reals, characterized bynon-cognition."(125)

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(120) MK, 13.8. Cp. note 137 (supra).

(121) MKV, 13.8, pp. 247, 248.

(122) MK, 22.11. Cp. CSt, 4.10.

(123) MKV, 13.5, p. 246. Cp. Ratnaavalii, 2.4-5.

(124) MKV, 20.18, p. 403. It is significant that"naasti," "abhaava," "asat," etc., used in thisconnection are illustrated by space, etc.

(125) BCAP, 9.54, p. 447.

p.332

The following words of Candrakiirti serve to sumup the Maadhyamika's position admirably well: "The wise

who have attained the truth do not find anythingwhatsoever which could be false or otherwise."(126)


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Stanza 30 of the Vigrahavyaavartanii suggests thesame position.

Unlike the Hegelian dialectic, which has three

moments or stages--thesis, antithesis, andsynthesis--the Maadhyamika dialectic tends to havefive moments (ko.tis)--thesis, antithesis, synthesis,anti-synthesis, and super-synthesis. The well-knowndialectical formula of Hegel is [1] being, [2]nothing, and [3] becoming; that of the Maadhyamika,[1] being (sat), [2] nothing, (asat), [3] both(ubhaya), [4] neither (anubhaya), and [5] quietude

(tuu.s.nii^mbhaava), (127) non-apprehension(anupalambha), (128) the inexpressible(prapa~ncopa'sama), the essenceless (ni.hsvabhaava),or beyond-the-four-moments(catu.sko.tvinirmukta).(129) There is, however, thisdifference, that, while Hegel affirms the reality ofall the three moments, the Maadyamika denies that ofhis first four moments. His reality, or, rather, hisapology for one, is beyond the four moments. This

beyond-the-four-moment category, suggested by theMaadhyamika, must not be construed, however, to meana fifth moment along the lines of the fifth momentpredicated of Brahman by 'Sriihar.sa and certainother Advaitists.(130) The word "'suunyataa," whichis often used to denote the second moment of"nothing," is also used to denote this so-calledfifth moment.(131) However, this moment is not found

mentioned as such in Maadhyamika literature. This isout innovation offered here to facilitate theunderstanding of the Maadhyamika standpoint.

That things are existent is the thesis; that theyare non-existent is the anti-thesis; that they areboth existent and non-existent is the synthesis; thatthey are neither existent nor non-existent is theanti-synthesis; and that they are none of these is

the super-synthesis. The first four momentsconstitute what is called the expressible


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(prapa~nca), while the fifth moment is theinexpressible (prapa~ncopa'sama).

There are philosophers of being who maintain that

the ultimate reality is of the nature of Being. Thereis also at least one philosophy of nothing--that ofHarivarman-maintaining that the ultimate reality isof the nature of nothing. Jainism is the philosophyof being-cum-nothing, so to speak. Skeptics

_____________________________________________________

(126) See note 50 (supra).

(127) MKV, 1.1, p. 57.

(128) See, for example, notes 35 and 42 (supra); MK,25.24; BCAP, 9.45, p. 437; 9.54, p. 447.

(129) Advayavajra-sa^mgraha, p. 19. Also, see ibid.,pp. 46, 54, 57.

(130) See 'Sriihar.sa, Nai.sadhiya-carita, Haragovinda'Saastrii, ed. (Varanasi: Chowkhamba SanskritSeries Office, 1954), 13.35. Cp. AppayaDiik.sta, Siddhaantale'sa-sa^mgraha,Muula'sa^mkara Vyaasa, ed (2nd ed., Varanasi:Acyuta-granthamala Office, Vikramii 2011, 4.6,pp. 516-517). Also see Murti, op. cir., p. 161,

n.

(131) Cp., for example, MK, 13.8.

p.333

like Sa^mjaya Bela.t.thiputta and Pyttho expressed

their inability to say whether the ultimate realitywas being, nothing, or both. That it is neither


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being, nothing, nor both would be the fourthalternative. The Maadhyamika system maintains thatthe real is devoid of all these four categories.

'Sriihar.sa, taking his cue from the Maadhyamika,regards his Brahman as belonging to a fifth category,as shown above.

However, as pointed out earlier, the Maadhyamikaposits no category of his own. He examines thecategories posited by others with a view to showingup their hollowness. Candrakiirti writes, "We do notpostulate the non-being of it. What then? We simply

repudiate the being conceived by others. Likewise, wedo not postulate its being. What then? We simplyrepudiate the non-being of it as conceived byothers."(132)

Five stages are discernible in the Maadhyamika'streatment of the ultimat truth. First, things areshown to be essentially chaotic and hencenon-existent. Then, second, non-existence, too, is

demonstrated to be false, together with things. Thatis to say, both being and non-being are rejected asfalse. In the first stage, 'suunyataa is presented asnon-being. In the second stage, it is said to bebeyond both being and non-being. Third, even'suunyataa is rejected on the ground of there beingno non-'suunya, and essencelessness(ni.hsvabhaavataa) is established. Fourth, the

doctrine of non-apprehension (anupalambha orapraaptatva)(133) is Set forth. Finally, rejection ofall ontology is the result.

As suggested above, one is bound to arrive at theconclusion, after a scrutiny of the hybrid andseemingly conflicting utterances of the Maadhyamikas,that being and nothing are the only reallyfundamental positions, the rest enjoying only a

derivative status. "Is" and "is-not" are the onlypositions that one can possibly take with regard to


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ultimate reality. The other hypotheses are onlysemantic hypotheses. Strictly speaking, theontological issue is between the first two hypotheses

only. And the Maadhyamika adheres to the hypothesisof non-being to the last. In effect, theMaadhyamika's seeming objection to non-being isdirected, not toward non-being as such, but towardstyling it as non-be1ing. Non-being cannot be thoughtof save as opposed to being, and, he argues, if thereis no being, how can there be--or, what is the samething, how can anything be styled as--non-being? At

bottom, both the Satyasiddhi and the Maadhyamikaschools hold the same position: blank phenomenalismwithout a reality subjacent to phenomena.

The Maadhyamika's method is something like this.He first seeks to show that all is relative, hencechaotic, hence essenceless, and hence void. Lestundiscerning people should erect his void into apositive reality like the

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(132) MKV, 20.3, p. 393. Also see note 80 (supra).

(133) See Takakusu, op. cit., p. 104.

p.334

Brahman of the Vedaanta or the Absolute of theWestern idealists, as has been done by those tryingto see the Maadhyamika through Vedaantic orAbsolutistic eyes, he later refuses to admit even thevoid, saying that the void can be there only whenthere is a non-void. This leads him to affirm thedoctrine of non-apprehension, ending in the

repudiation of all metaphysics.This interpretation of the Maadhyamika's method


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may sound novel, but it is based on definiteindications in Maadhyamika writings. For examp le,one relevant verse of Naagaarjuna suggests that in

the first instance all is declared imaginary and thatthen imagination itself is dismissed as false.(134)Elsewhere, he contends that even the conception bywhich 'suunyataa is conceived is itself 'suunya(135)'Saantideva writes in the same vein: "Bycontemplation on 'suunyataa, the conception of beingvanishes. By contemplation on the idea that there isnothing whatsoever, that, too, vanishes

afterwards."(136)In fact, the Maadhyamika literature abounds insuch suggestions.(137)

VIII

Praj~naakaramati has discussed an interesting

question as to the raison d're of the beneficent

bodhisattvas involving themselves in such activitiesas almsgiving, etc., which are, according to theMaadhyamika, 'suunya, or false. His reply is thatthey do so spontaneously, involuntarily, orunpremeditatedly (avicaarata.h).(138) If he held anyother view of 'suunyataa than as void, his immediatereply would be that, his 'suunyataa not beingidentifiable with the void, the objection waspointless.

Some people are inclined to the view that theMaadhyamika's emphasis on nihilism springs from hisextra concern for the attainment of renunciation, andthat, otherwise, his thesis of the void need not betaken seriously on ontological grounds. There arethose who tend to take even the 'Sa^mkarite'sworld-negating attitude in this light. A casualutterance of a Kumaarila (vis-?vis Buddhist nihilism)

or a Vi.t.thale'sa (vis-?vis Advaitism) is theirmain support.(139) But their interpretation is


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demonstrably false and far-fetched. Here we confineourself to the clarification of the Maadhyamika'sposition. Now, it is not difficult to discover the

true character of the Maadhyamika's emphasis onnihilism. AAryadeva has raised the issue and answeredit un-

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(134) CSt, 3.34.

(135) See Bhavasa^mkraanti-parikathaa, st. 12.

(136) BCA, 9.33.

(137) Also see note 105 (supra).

(138) BCAP, 9.4, p. 372.

(139) See N. K. Devaraia. An introduction to

'Sa^nkara's Theory of Knowledge (Varanasi:Motilal Banarsi Dass, 1962), pp. 205-206.

p.335

equivocally. He says,"It is not that the non-'suunyais shown to be 'suunya simply by the desire to attain

nirvaa.na; for the Buddhas do not describe nirvaa.naas attainable through false vision."(140)Candrakiirti comments: "Are these objectsnoh-'suunya, but shown to be 'suunya for theattainment of renunciation? Or are they demonstratedto be 'suunya by nature? It is said in reply [here hequotes the above verse of AAryadeva, and then says,]... entities are known to be 'suunya by nature."(141)

The Maadhyamikas are serious thinkers and do notbelieve in make believes like the ones read into them


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by the interpreters just criticized. Otherwise, theywould have broken down over such a fundamentalquestion.

By the Absolutist interpreter of 'Suunyavaadamuch is made of Naagaarjuna's rejoinder to theobjection: "If all this is 'suunya, there is neitherorigination nor decay, and the negation of the fourNoble Truths will become chargeable againstyou."(142) On behalf of the objector, Naagaarjunarefers to the chain of negations which will follow ofthemselves in the wake of the negation of the four

Noble Truths, and concludes that such a state ofaffairs will lead to chaos. His reply is:To this we rejoin,

You do not appreciate the purpose of 'suunyataa,'suunyataa, and the meaning of 'suunyataa; that iswhy you raise this objection. The Buddhas preach thedharma with reference to two truths--the empiricaltruth and the transcendental truth. Those who do not

know the division of the two truths do not know thegreat essence in the Buddha's teaching. Thetranscendental is not preached save vis-?vis theempirical, and, without recourse to thetranscendental, nirvaa.na is not attained. Wronglyapprehended, 'suunyataa destroys the unintelligent,even as a wrongly caught serpent or wrongly practicedscience... If, then, you criticize 'suunyataa, it is

not our fault, for the criticism does not apply tothe 'suunya.(143)

What Naagaarjuna seems to mean is that there aretwo truths, one for the higher souls and one for thelower, and that the highest doctrine, that of'suunyataa, is not meant for the latter, who must betaught to adhere to the four Noble Truths as also to

all other canons of righteousness taught by theBuddha. According to AAryadeva, the truth is preached


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in three steps. In the first step, the seeker is toldthat there is such a thing as sin which attaches toand pollutes the self and that, therefore, one should

beware of sin. In the second step, he is toldthat not only the sin but the self itself does notexist. In the third and final step, it is revealed tohim that all is nothing, void.(144)

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(140) CS, 8.7.

(141) CSV, 8.7, p. 7.

(142) MK, 24.1.

(143) Ibid., 24.7-10, 11, 13.

(144) CS, 8.15.

p.336

Candrakiirti expounds the idea of Naagaarjunathus:

'Suunyataa is preached with a view to putting an endto all speech; therefore, the purpose of 'suunyataa

is cessation of all speech. You, on the other hand,who construe 'suunyataa to mean non-being (naastitva)and thereby only enlarge the net of speech do notknow the purpose of 'suunyataa.... Hence, how canthere be non-being in 'suunyataa, which is of theessence of cessation of all speech? So, you do notknow even 'suunyataa.... What pratiitya-samutpaadameans is also meant by 'suunyataa, but what

non-being (abhaava) means is not what is meant by'suunyataa.(145)


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We take it that Candrakiirti purports to say that'suunyataa is neither being, not non-being, nor both,

nor neither; that it would therefore be incorrect toidentify it with non-being; and that it is only thiswrong identification that gives rise to the objectionthat it will strike at the root of ail practice, allrighteousness.

In this connection, Naagaarjuna makes anotherobservation which deserves notice. He says, "Allfares well with him with whom 'suunyataa fares well;

nothing fares well with him with whom 'suunyataa doesnot so fare."(146) Candrakiirti tries to bring outthe idea of this pithy remark thus:

With him with whom this 'suunyataa fares well,pratiitya-samutpaada, too, fares well; with him withwhom pratiitya-samutpaada fares well, the four NobleTruths fare well. How so? Because suffering isphenomenal (pratiitya-samutpanna), not

non-phenomenal. And, being essenceless, it is'suunya. Suffering being there, its origination,its cessation, and the way leading to its cessationfare well with him.(147)

Thereafter, Candrakiirti goes on recounting thetenets of Buddhism the uselessness of which wasapprehended by the imaginary objector to the

'suunyataa doctrine and which would be reinstated bythe proper appreciation of 'suunyataa.

Naagaarjuna continues:

By seeking to lay your faults at our doors you haveforgotten the very horse you are riding. If youregard objects as essentially existent, then, bydoing so, you see objects [emerging] without causes

and conditions. Thereby you fail to explain effect,cause, doer, means, action, origination, cessation,


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and consequence. Pratiitya-samutpaada is called'suunyataa by us. It is relative being, it is theMiddle Path. There is no non-relative [or uncaused]

dharma, and, therefore, there is non-'suunya dharma.If all this is non'suunya, there is neitherorigination nor decay, and denial of the four NobleTruths becomes chargeable against you. How can therebe uncaused suffering? For suffering is said to benon-eternal, which would not be possible if it hadessence. If it is existence by nature, then what isthere to originate? Therefore, there is no

origination for one

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(145) MKV, 24.7, p. 491.

(146) MK, 24.14.

(147) MKV, 24.14. p. 500.

p.337

who rejects 'suunyataa. If suffering exists, it willnot cease. By upholding its essence, you speakagainst its cessation.(148)

Thereafter Naagaarjuna recounts the theses ofBuddhism, which will, in his opinion, lose theirsignificance on the non-'suunyataa doctrine, and thuslays the same charges at the doors of thenon-'suunyataa-vaadin as the latter sought to do athis.

It is obvious that here Naagaarjuna purports todefine 'suunyataa in its empirical aspect alone.

Candrakiirti has it that "pratiitya-samutpaada" asused by Naagaarjuna in the present context means


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emergence of things through causes and conditions(hetupratyayaanapek.sya praadurbhaava.h) or,conversely, non-emergence of things without causes

and conditions, of themselves(svabhaavenaanutpaada.h).(149) So, the denial of'suunyataa in its empirical aspect is tantamount tothe belief in the immutability of things, whichprecludes all possibility of oringination orelimination of suffering, thereby rendering thedoctrine of the four Noble Truths altogethermeaningless. Therefore, 'suunyataa in its empirical

sense alone seems to be in question here.Naagaarjuna has elsewhere, too, suggested thatbelief in the being of things is tantamount to beliefin their eternity. He has, accordingly, characterizedthe realist as an eternalist in these words: "Ifthere were being in the nature of things, it wouldnot be non-existent; for the negation of naturecannot be established."(150) As a matter of fact,according to him, "To say [it] is' is eternalism, to

say '[it] is not' is the philosophy of cessation.Therefore, the wise should not adhere either to [thedoctrine of] 'it is' or to [that of] 'it is not.'For what is by nature, of that it can never be saidthat it is not; to say 'it is not now, it was before'means [belief in the doctrine of] cessation."(151)

Indeed, as suggested above, the Maadhyamikadenies not only being but also non-being--in fact,

even being-cum-non-being andneither-being-nor-non-being.

The last difficulty in giving credence to thenihilistic interpretation of the Maadhyamika'sstandpoint is the religious fervor shown by him as aMahaayaanist. If all is void, how can this fervor beexplained? The best course for a nihilist would be tobe unruffled by emotions and sentiments, rather than

to be so devoted to the Buddha as to erect him into averitable Godhead. The reason, though slightly


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difficult to appreciate, is not far to seek. The

_____________________________________________________

(148) MK, 24. 15-23.

(149) MKV, 24.18, p. 503.

(150) MK, 15.8.

(151) Ibid., 15.8-11. Also see CSt, 3.21. Elsewhere,

however, Naagaarjuna remarks: "Isness without birthand death is simply unthinkable (prasajyetaastibhaavo hi na jaraamara.na^m vinaa). MK, 25.4. Ata third place, again, he remarks: "Being iseither eternal or non-eternal" (...bhaavo hinityo'nityo'thavaa bhavet). MK, 21.14. It isdifficult ot reconcile the three statements.

p.338

Maadhyamika does not present a much greater problemon this score than the Advaitin, who claims not onlyconsubstantiality but veritable identity with theAbsolute and declares the world to be illusory, but,nevertheless, does not lag behind others in hisdevotion to gods and goddesses. As a matter of fact,

they both share the common Indian trait ofdichotomizing truth into the transcendental and theempirical, in effect wholly unconnected with eachother. While contemplating the transcendental truth,the Maadhyamika considers everything as illusory andvoid and goes to the extent of declaring theTathaagata himself, the object of his devotion, to benothing better than illusory. But, while

contemplating the empirical truth, he distinguishesbetween his gods and their devotees and behaves as if


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he were as much a realist as others.(152) This is thecase with the Advaitin as well. Indeed, the Indianshave never been able to reconcile the empirical with

the transcendental, and one need not be surprised ifthe Maadhyamika fares no better.

IX

Is the Maadhyamika's thesislessness tantamount toan admission of failure on his part to fathom themystery of the ultimate reality? His tone does not

disclose any such defeatist mentality.(153) He doesnot seem to regret the fact that he is not in aposition to talk about the real. As a matter of fact,he is not at all a skeptic. We does know, but cannotexpress. He believes in the void, pure and simple.But he is not in a position to explain to others whatthe state of affairs would be like in the absence ofall that we can perceive or conceive as real.Language can operate only in the world of being.

Where there is absolutely no being whatsoever, itsoperation is bound to come to a standstill.

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(152) Cittavisuddhi-prakara.na, st. 83.

(153) MKV, 1.1, p. 56.

suunyavaada a reinterprertation

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