tatget attack

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TARGET ATTACK A presentation by: 05/07/22 Imrana Abdullahi Yari & Aneesh Kumar 0 5 / 0 7 / 2 0 2 2 b y i m r a n a y a r i & a n e e s h 1

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Page 1: tatget attack

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TARGET ATTACKA presentation by:

Monday 1 May 2023

Imrana Abdullahi Yari&

Aneesh Kumar

01/05/2023

by imranayari & aneesh

imrana abdullahi
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201/05/2023 by im

ranayari & aneesh• Every morning in Africa, a Zebra wakes up it knows that it has to run faster than the fastest Lion or it will be killed.

• Every morning a Lion wakes up it knows that it has to run faster than the slowest Zebra or it will starve to death.

• In Africa, it doesn't matter whether you are a Lion or a Zebra; when the sun comes up you had better be running!

01/05/2023 by imranayari 2

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3In the Beginning……….

• Target Attack in the News! Data Breach!

Stolen of data Accessing the web services Exploiting the web Vulnerability Propagation of targets Infiltration and Privilege Escalation Early Warning Bypass Security Measures The Blackpos Malware Information Stored In The Magnetic Strip

Impacts on this Attack• Mitigation

01/05/2023 by im

ranayariby im

ranayari & aneesh

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4by im

ranayari

Time line before the actual event

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Dec 18 Dec 19 Dec 20 January 10 January 13 January 16 January 17

The 30 days of the Attack, 2013-2014

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6Target letter to unlucky shoppers01/05/2023 by im

ranayari & aneesh

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7 Stolen of data

Phishing emails to HVAC vendorsCitadel malware(Zeus Trojan): password

stealing malware. Web browser cookies and stole credential

Accessing the web services Stolen token was used

According to Fazio Mechanical: Online billing system, online contracting system and online project

management. Stolen Credentials were used to access the

hosted services.

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ranayari & aneesh

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8 Exploiting the web Vulnerability Unknown vulnerability to the public Hint, xmlrpc.php file found on the attackers tool

list. Use for user enumeration and Ddos attacks

Through a legitimate file upload e.g. an invoice:- to malicious

Leverty from CSIRT gives an advisory on web shell:

Known as Backdoor Trojan or Remote access tool Mostly written in php and .net Permissions as an administrator Connections to database server Search for password, configurations files or directories Self-deletes on detection Displays all security measures and file permissions Access to Phpinfo(): creates web pages and php configurations

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ranayari & aneesh

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9 Propagation of targets Reconnaissance detection to found

intelligent information, e.g. credit card Active Directory: allows to connect, search

and modify, e.g., using LDAP. Target uses Active Directory to store all their credentials, As said by former security member.Shared internet files and directories e.g. print

services and shared hard drives.Using Service principle name (SPN) to

locate the SQL server.SQL related tools found on the attackers

tool list: Osql.exe, bcp.exe and isql.exe. Perhaps these tools used to access the SQL server of the POS machine.

01/05/2023 by im

ranayari & aneesh

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2 Scenarios To Infiltration – ARIBA (The United States Senate committee on commerce, science, and transportation, 2014) OR CENTRAL REFREGERATION CONTROL Application Vulnerability Exploitation (O'Reilly, 2015) Admin Access Malware Delivered As Patch Updates

by imranayari

Infiltration and Privilege Escalation

Early Warning

(Howlett, 2014)

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ranayari & aneesh

Bypass Security Measures 2 Sce 0- Day Attack So Unlikely That Signatures Were Present

To Fool The Ids Data Transfer Only Between 10 Am To 5 Pm Used The Name Best1_logic Which Is The Default Test User

Name In The Bmc Software Only Way For Detection Was Anomaly Detection NARIOS To Infiltration – Ariba (The United States)

The Blackpos Malware First Of All The Name Sounds Scary “Blackpos”-horror Flick It Is A Ram Scraper Why Is It A Success?? Answer- POOR Pci-dss(payment Card Ind. Data Security

Stndard) POLICY

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ranayari

12 Parties Involved In E-currency Transaction Issuer – Bank Who Gives Card Belonging To A Brand-

visa Brand – Offers Infrastructure For Connectivity Security Acquirer- Merchant Bank Psp – Payment Service Provider Pci-dss Requires Its Members To Send Only Encrypted But What About When It Is Swiped??? Attaches Itself To The Registry To Run On Startup Checks For Pos.Exe – Bye Bye Pan

Ram Scrapers

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(Trend Micro, 2014)

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14 33 Data Tracks Track 1 Stores Pan Among Other Data Track Stores Ed – Expiry Date Dd- Discretionary Data Like Cvv1 May Pass Card Number Through Luhn

Information Stored In The Magnetic Strip

Some Estimates Go Upto A Billion Dollars Customer Credit Cards Floating In The Dark Web For Sale 40 Million Credit Cards Stolen Replacing Costs X 40 Million Credit Cards

Impact Of The Hack

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15 What Can We Do To Face A Zero Day Attack In This

Scenario Anomaly Detection Network Segmentation Changes In Pci Policy Pin Data Encrypted Only During Transit No Encryption When Data Transferred In Internal

Network

Mitigation

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16Questions & Answer

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THANK YOULet’s meet at the topImrana Abdullahi Yari

25046111Aneesh kumar