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AbstractThe aim of the paper is to prove that building social capital at local

level is mainly depended on confidence led-process among local

people: Social cohesion based on social capital may be concerned as

a part of the global bargaining problem, directly oriented to

globalization rules : From this point of view, local people

intervention should be useful, as to diversify these rules at the

local-at least- level adjusting them to its local identity including

communication code, customs, ethic , culture.

The win-win-win methodology [Papakonstantinidis Model]

should facilitate local people to readjust bargaining / globalization

rules locally, by reorganizing their acquired social capital, so to

succeed a sensitized local development process in terms of a

unique diversification rate from globalization rules , via social

cohesion links and behaviour, thus creating a discrete

spatial/cultural entity

Key-words: sensitization process, bargain, instant reflections,

social cohesion, win-win-win methodology (Papakonstantinidis

Model)

BIOSKETCH

Professor Leonidas A. Papakonstantinidis (Ph. D), Director of School of Management &Economics Technological Educational Institute-Kalamata, detached in the AdministrativeBoard of the Highest Technological Institute of Ionion Isles/ Greece, [email protected], Mathematician, Lawyer with an excellent (9.29) M.Sc in the field of Regional

1

Local Development Approach:

Building the Social Capital by awin - win- win methodology

Prof Papakonstantinidis (Ph. D)ISA/RC 26

MOLYVOS/ LESVOS
mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]


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Development, M. A Rural Development, Ph.D in Local Development Member of the E .UCommission task force for the Leader E. U Initiative (1989-1991), General Reporter of theEuropean Centre of Public Enterprises (C.E.E.P) (1985-1990), member of the E. UCommission (DG X) Green Team, Head of the Agricultural Banks Local DevelopmentOffice (1991-2001). 20 mono-graphies, 74 published scientific papers in authorisedscientific magazines, 117 active participations in World or European, Congresses,Conferences, For a .

1.Introduction

The new paradigm of Rural Local Development based on

sustainable development, environmental protection and social

cohesion - which has emerged since the middle of the 1990ies can

be characterised as follows:

- The real assets of a region are the actors, the

entrepreneurs, the politicians, the work force, organisations

and institutions, their material and financial resources and thespecific regional culture of cooperation & communication, by a

win-win-win methodological approach, confidential

indicators/social cohesion

- Spatial planning does no longer consist in the elaboration of

plans or in the decision about programmes. It must actively

promote the realisation of the planning goals by initiating and

supporting the cooperation between different stakeholders,

both from public administration and the private sector (win-win- win).

- Planning and acting in networks is increasingly important

2. The concept

The aim of the paper is to prove that:

Local Development may be concerned as a unique

diversification / declination from the globalization rules

The discrete entitys diversification rate from

globalization/ or bargaining rules, may be the crucial

parameter that Local Development mean should be

defined, as a social cohesions result at local level.

Local Development may be concerned as the limit of a

unique and continuous development process , applied in a

discrete spatial entity

Local Development is realized via good paradigms, rather,

than good practices, due to the identity of each place its

people with their owncommunication code, ethic, customs

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A win-win-win approach may be the appropriate

methodological tool toward introducing sensitization in

the development process. It may strengthen social

cohesion process by improving its confidential indicators

(so to trust each-other in interrelations process).

Three paradigms of successfully application in Greece are

given, to justify our focus on social capital, by the win-win-

win methodology [sensitization] in a local development

process.

3. Methodology followed

In order to meet with paper requirements-given by the

2.concept- it is necessary the appropriate methodology be

adopted, step -by- step as follow:

A theoretical base is given by the recent literature (in points) ,

connecting Local Development with Social Capital/ Social

Cohesion, as well as with The Bargaining Problem and

Games Theory & the Modern Innovation Theory : It is

accepted that local development is the result of a continuous

bargaining process, among all the involved actors in a

Community.

From the other hand, Community is viewed as a discrete

cultural entity [or the limit-end of a continuous sensitization

process] - which paper focuses on- in order to suggest the

win-win-win model/methodology.

According to the above theoretical base, it is necessary to

strictly define the Bargaining Problem (as the base of the

Globalization rules) by its mathematical & philosophical

validation and try to define the local development process

in terms of diversification rate (due to human intervention)

from the Globalization trend / perception / or even tide

The next methodological step may be characterized by the

need of introducing the confidence parameter in my

model: What is needed is a mutual confidenceamong local

people, thus encouraging their social cohesion process, by

their own social capital (physical and acquired) &their

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http://www.in.gr/dictionary/lookup.asp?Word=strengthenhttp://www.in.gr/dictionary/lookup.asp?Word=strengthen


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common sense, leading to collective choice -flag theme,

according to L-D planning & methodology term.

Next step is to make links between local development

process (as a continuous sensitization process) and the

bargaining perception in terms of a double combination

(local development as a diversification rate from those strict

bargaining rules, thus leading local operation in social capital

emergence & social cohesion at local level, and the magic

utility/shares bargaining combination, through a new

perception , coming from knowledge transfer and knowledge

transformation into a social cohesion behavior in the

bargain, including the two competitors AND the Community

as the third or invisible part in each negotiation between

those two competitors, thus transforming a conflict in terms of

instant reflections winning individual strategies in its limit-

end into a pure cooperation ( an approach towards round the

corners) which-according the Model- expresses the new

local development idea [This idea, could be extended step-

by-step all over the world - the society of the 2/3 at least

the economy of poor

The last step, including inputs coming from the aboveanalysis, concludes the papers contribution: to re-orient the

scientific theoretical base of the term community from a

structural perception to a three-part bargain-oriented local

development, (the win-win-win model) by introducing the

sensitization process, so that to succeed the cohesion locally,

in terms of social capital accumulation

4. Analysis

4.1 Theoretical base-1 / recent literature

Since the end of 80s endogenous local development has been

introduced to me by my excellent supervisor, Prof Kenneth

Wilkinson (89-91), during my post-graduate studies in U. C. G /IRL,

even if the UCLA Professors Friedman & Weaver had introduced,

since the end of 70s the alternative Local Development

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perception: They had focused on social capital / social values locally

despite the globalization process Especially (in points) :

Friedman / Weaver UCLA (1978) Territory and

Function: The base of an autonomous local development

may be a discrete value system, an ideology, the local

people reaction to the dominant ethos (principle, including

local communication code, customs, culture), thus creating

the social cohesion environment at local level. In this frame,

low hierarchy ( for example the neighborhood patterns)

are preferable, so to highlight to those connections links (like

links of a family - the smallest organizational unit, of a human

society )

From the other hand, Coleman (1988) defined that Social

Capital describes the cooperation processes of individuals, t

which minimize possible dilemma, coming from those

individuals, on a team or individual acting : In real terms, Dr

Coleman describes the process of Building Social Capital, by

confidence terms, which are developed in networks and

common actions, in the frame of networks, the information

diffusion, the frame of social networks operation : A standard

behavior code is formed based on this frame (on how to promote individual behavior through collective acting and

deciding)

Besides, Putnun (2000) describes social capital as the base

of social schemes creation (i. e networks)

Concluding, an increasingly number of recent literature in

the local development field, currently recognizes (a) the not

only economic base of the local development field and (b) the

existence of social links between local development andsocial capital building at local level and the social

confidence indicators, as the main incentives, motivating

local development process : Theoretical Models, as The

Political Entity (Freedman-Weaver, UCLA, 1978, the Te

Selected Closed-Spatial Discrete Entity of the Intra-Scientific

Vienna Centre (Stohr & Todtling 1980), The Model of Building

the Community on successive social transformation (Doreen

Massey, 1992) The S.H.I.E.L.D Model, Papakonstantinidis,1997, Rome) The Tre Italy Model, Bagnasco, 1987, the

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Informal Local Economy (1991), The parallel system and

The sensitized Community (Papakonstantinidis, 1998 &

2002), The political Democracy (LSE, Fotopoulos, 1998), the

Grass Roots Model in Latin America (Luis Llambi, 2003) are

some of those theoretical approaches to local development

phenomenon, pre-existed to the suggested win-win-win

(Papakonstantinidis, final form, 2008)

4.2 Theoretical base -2: The Bargaining

Problem

The papers concept/ contribution is to be proved, that a strong

Correlation connecting local Development with the so-called

Bargaining Problem may be a realistic L-D Methodology, as well as

a realistic L-D process justification:

A-1The Bargaining problem (math)

Bargaining is an old problem in socioeconomic theory based onUtility Theory A two-person bargaining situation involves twoindividuals who have the opportunity, either to be competitors each-other (win-lose)[von Neumann-Morgenstern, 1928/1947-see at the zero sum two players game Theory] or to make coalitions (win-win)Following the literature (Kuhn W.H Nasar S, 2001), according toNash, a priori coalitions must be excluded, as they do not

generate pure individual strategies. In the opposite, a game(bargain) based on instant reflection strategiesmay be accepted(trusts theory), as it generates pure individual strategies [the bestfor me, according to my expectation from the bargain, in relationwith the best for the other part of negotiations, so both to win: win-win]

Bargain may lead either in agreement or disagreement Utilityexpresses the constraint or the fear factor of disagreement for thenegotiator who desires negotiations to be led in agreement more

than the other one. Who needs more, negotiation to be led in anagreement expects more utility, but probably he has to loose in

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terms of shares, due to risk lack In the opposite, who is indifferentabout agreement or expects less utility /per unit, has- to win inshares under the dogma the more risk, the more profit

According to the Bargaining Problem in its math expression An n

person game is a set of n players or positions, each with anassociate finite set of pure strategies and corresponding to eachplayer i a payoff function pi which maps the set of all n-tuples of pure strategies into the real numbers (Nash 1951) Each ofnegotiators has, therefore to think twice (2-person anticipation)according to his & the others expectations so both to win,maximising the outcome of negotiation (win-win)

Using the utility tools in the bargaining problem, it isnecessary to analyze pure individual winning strategies (Nash

Non-cooperative Game Theory- win-win model) in the bargain.The main characteristics of the John F. Nash Theory (1950-51) whichchanged a pure conflict, or pure a competitive perception of thebargain, in a non-cooperative- instant reflection game /or a win-win perceptionare referred on points, as follow:

Non-co-operative game, is a game / bargain betweenTWO (2) players/ individuals who have oppositeinterests

Each player makes his own choices, based on hisinstant reflections rational movements and his

physical cleverness The game/ bargain is defined by the result (pay-off)

and not by players expectations- It presupposes bestchoices by both players towards meeting individualinterests [winning strategies]

Players/ or negotiators do not regret, a posteriori,from their own decision taken, based on personalchoices, during the bargain

During the game/ bargain, a mutual respectbetween the TWO (2) bargainers to each-other best

choices is necessary , so that the bargain as aterm to be defined

It is recognized that The more decisive to break thecontact down in the negotiation(= less utility), themore satisfied(=better shares) after the end ofnegotiation, during the bargain/game

No ethic or social behavior is recognized as anacceptable one in the bargain, thus deriving unfairresults: That means, who really needs negotiationsto be led to an agreement has more probability toloose in shares, by getting the contact Besides,who holds the power (economic, information etc)usually doesnt need or, has less utility, in leading the

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bargain to agreement, based on a contact Bargainingis in favor of whom holds power and at the same timeis indifferent , either the bargain is going to anagreement or disagreement (or breaking thebargaining process down ) Thats socially unfair: In

social terms, who needs an agreement, from abargain, must pay for it, by loosing in shares

Information may be the link between knowledgecreation and the bargaining process. In particular,Information is a power factor in pure individualswinning strategies. The more information, the higherwinning payoff in the bargain.

Bargain may be concerned as the base of oureconomic and social life. Each of us activelyparticipates in thousand of negotiations even no

obviously: Driving in traffic, actively participating inthe market (buyer/sellers) relations betweenhusbands-wives, or even the love game may beforms or types of negotiation, / or game, accordingto Non Cooperative Games Theory.

Each of players / negotiators, starting negotiationswith the other, expects to gain the maximum profit.

Each of players knows the rules of the negotiation;otherwise each of them has no interest to participateas negotiator/ player in negotiations/ or game,without expecting profit for himself [according to

Games Theory). He knows a priori that the othernegotiator (or player) is as clever as he is. He has torespect that the other person may be as clever as heis.

Each of players participating in a negotiation has totake a decision (or to make a choice) in relation withthe other negotiators decision, or reacting to otherschoice (instant reflection) In real terms, he has tomake and follow a personal winning strategy, as hedoesnt trust the other one: [We need to trust each-

other -see at Contract Social J. J Rousseau] butnowadays conditions are going to overcome Rules,so we must go directly to bargain, by recognisingcompetitors instead of people who will to cooperate.

It is obvious that individual choices (strategies) maybe characterized by interdependence as well as byinteraction to others choices during the bargain.Each of negotiators has, therefore to think twice(2-person anticipation) according to his own as wellas to the others expectations, in a fixed moment sothat both not only to win, but moreover to maximise

their own individual profits, or else the outcome ofnegotiation (win-win)

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A two 2person anticipation is based on utilities.According to Nash Theory a unique solution existsthat maximises the product of the participantsutilities. There is, therefore an interaction betweenutilities and strategies In particular, utility

expresses individual choices based on individualnecessities (real or fantastic) Strategies expresschoices + will in personal level, taking into accountthe interaction factor (the others choices) Utility isthe subjective and strategy is the objectivefactor of the same anticipation.

Negotiation may lead either in agreement ordisagreement Utility expresses the fear factorconstraint of disagreement for those who desire theagreement, more than the other negotiators. Who

desires/ or needs more, negotiation to be led inagreement expects more utility, but probably he hasto loose in terms of shares, due to their fear toundertake a risk In the opposite, who is indifferentabout agreement or not, wins in shares underthe dogma the more risk, the more profit

In the n-person-games J. F Nash proved that thesegames have values: that is to determine what isworth to each player who has the opportunity toengage the game (except of the case of zero-sumtwo-players games)

We may regard the one person utility functions asapplicable to the two persons anticipations, eachgiving the same result that would give if it shouldapply to the corresponding one-person anticipation,which is a component of the two-person anticipation

A probability combination of two two-personanticipations is defined by making the correspondingcombinations for their components Thus, if [A, B] is a

two-person anticipation and 0 p 1 then p [A, B] +( 1 p ) [ C, D ] will be defined as [ p A + ( 1 p ) C

+ p B + ( 1 p ) D. The one-person utility functionwill have the same linearity property here as the one-person case. From this point of view onwards whenthe term anticipation is used- it shall mean two-person anticipation (a transportation problem frommanifolds to two-distance problem). In thebargaining situation one anticipation is especiallydistinguished, the anticipation of no cooperationbetween bargainers (zero-sum).

Ifu 1 , u 2 are utility functions for two individualsand c (S) represent the Solution point in a set

S which is compact and convex, then , if a is a

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point ofS and b another point ofS so that

u1(b)>u2(a) and u2(b)>u2(a)a#c(S) For Nash an n-person game is a set of n-players or

positions each with an associate finite set ofpurestrategies and corresponding to each playeria

payoff function pi which maps the set of all n-tuples of pure strategies into the real numbers (n-tuples means a set of n items, with each itemassociated with a different player. From the other, amixed-strategy (si) are in 1-1 correspondencewith

each player pure strategies: (si) = a ci a i a, cia 0 and a ci a = 1 The payoff function pihasa unique extension to n-tuples of mixed strategieswhich are linear to the mixed strategy of each player[n-linear ] the extension is marked by pi pi(s1, s2,

sn), where &= s1, s2,, sn. An n-tuple has anequilibrium point if and only if for every player i , Pi(&) = max [ pi (&, ri, ] , (ri= the each playerdesirable outcome)

Concluding, at any moment according to the N.C. G Theory- there is only one equilibrium pointthat any individualat any moment- makes the bestchoices for himself, in relation with the otherpersons best choices. So there are more than one ofequilibrium points of best choices, thusintroducing the bargaining problems dynamic view

3.What the suggested win win- win is

The base of our analysis, in order be led to the conclusions, coming

from the above analysis, is- of course- the bargaining problem and,

thus, the resulted balance shares/utilities.

Win-win-win analysis methodology

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The following methodology is adopted-in points-(Papakonstantinidis, 2007):

knowledge creation creating a non conflict behavior inserting

sensitization integrated information creation uncertainty due to

negative entropy thus, smoothing potential conflictsclosing

differences in the competitive bargainpayoff-utilities & shares,influencing behavior in the bargain /individual winning strategies

influencing by a new behavior in the opposite, the moredecisive, the more risk ,should derive more profit in a globalizing

world but inserting sensitization in the bargainthussmoothing the conflict strategies taking into account the C factorconverting a bilateral conflict into a 3-part negotiation leadingto a new social perception , the win-win-win perception,including a real cooperation between negotiators, thus, carryingalongside a social markets perspective

A. The bargaining problem (Cooperative GamesTheorys version)

A-1 Utility Theory (math)Bargaining Problem is mainly based on Utility Theory- a maththeory of the New-classical School of Thought, able to satisfactoryexplain individual expectations/ anticipations, of a possible outcomeUsually it is expressed in the form of a mathematical function, f(u)= u 1/2

Figure 1Utility function f (u)

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U

f (u) = 0, max (u)

f (u) = u 1/2

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Papakonstantinidis, 2002, The Strategy of the Economic& Regional Development, p.p 198-199

New-classical School of Thought has adopted the hypothesis that:A fair Wealth distribution should let people meet their own needs inthe maximum point of their own utilities (max utilities = f (u) =0):

Suppose, the Utility of A is showed by U (A), the Utility of B isshowed by U (B)Then:

U (A) +U (B) =maxd U(A) / d U(B) = f (u) (A +B) = 0,or in a better expression , f (u)(A +B) = 0+k,where, kis a stable

parameter, explaining the exclusive personal preferences orpriorities : that means, that either A or B meet exactly, on that point (F(u) =0 , their unique personal preferences or priorities,without influences by other people utilities who have to meet theirown needs.

From this point of view:

f (u) (A +B) = 0+k, f (u) (A +B) = k, d U(A) / d U(B)= f(u) =( u 1/2 ) =k

( u 1/2-1)= k u -1/2) = k f(u) = k. u -1/2Individual winning strategies are corresponding 1-1 to utilities U (A)and U (B)Utility theory of the individual, is manly based on the concept ofanticipation

Lets A & B two anticipations. Then, if p is the property of

anticipations, or the probability and 0 p 1, then, there is ananticipation, represented by p (A) + (1 p) B, which is acombination of the two anticipations. There is a probability p forthe A anticipation and a probability 1 - p for the B anticipation. Thus assumptions suffice to show the existence of satisfactoryutility function u, (not a unique function) assigning a real numberto each anticipation of an individual.

In the Two person utilityTheorythere are two (2) individuals in abargain who have the opportunity to collaborate for mutual benefitin more than one way. In its simple/initial version, no action, takenby the one of individuals without the consent of the other can affect

the well-being of the other one, but in real terms there is only ONEdecision, taken by the involved in a bargain, individuals

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If A & B represent two individual alternative anticipations and smallletters (a & b)represent real numbers then the utility function willsatisfy the following properties u(A)>u(B) is equivalent to A is moredesirable than B If 0


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50 50 23 52 11964 5 55 40 31 1 240

( max )30 70 45 24 108020 80 50 12 600

10 90 61 4 2440 100 80 0 0

J.F. Nash highlighted the payoffs of the bargain, out ofpersonal expectations

A-5.1 Solving the Utility function, in the bargain

Suppose that winning strategies [ Pi, Qi] are in a fine ratio with theplayers (bargainers) UTILITY( linear function: corresponds 1-1to bargainers Utility Function), under the dogma the more decisiveto break the contract down, the more satisfied from the bargainleading to the contractThat is true: Bargainers expectations are 1-1 to expected Utilitiesfor each of them, coming from the bargain.

From the other hand, the more information, the more uncertainty,leading human mind, out of natural/ biological rules. Bargain getsits own rules out of cooperation People are competitive rather, than

co-operative: Winning strategies are led by bargaining rules (rules ofpure competition).Nash has described the bargaining problem notby expectations, but, directly, by the results (pay-off of the bargain)In math form:

Pi x Qi Ua + Ub = maxIf

Ua = x, Ub = (100-x)k

Then

Ua+Ub=max [ x(100-x)k] = 0

Thenx (100-x) + x [ (100-x)k] = 0then

1(100-x) + x k (100-x)k-1 = 0then

xk (100-x)k-1= - 1(100-x)k

thenx k (100-x)k-1 = - 1 (100-x)k-1 (100-x)1

thenxk = (100-x)1 (100-x)10k-1 : [- 1 (100-x)k-1]

if (100-x) # 0, then

xk = 100-xxk + x =100

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thenx(k+1) = 100

in real terms, x(k+1) = -100[the (-) defines the opposite interests of bargainers]

Finally:

Cases:

If k=0 , then each of a, b may win the 100% of bargaining result(output)

If k=1 , then each of them (a and b) my win the 50%If k>1 then a may win a percentage >50%

If k50%

In our example, the crucial point [the max] is 1240 (40x31) :this is the point of final agreement led by the bargain. On that pointthe shares are: 40% for A and 60% for B. On that point, personalsatisfaction or utility units are 40 units for A and 31 units for B :Thats the point of agreement, expressing fear of breaking downthe agreement for player A and , at the same time, the risk for

the player B of breaking down the agreement.In an 2-person anticipation, each of two (2) bargainers mayask themselves one question, as the result of good strategies[instant reflection thinking] in the bargain

What should be the best for me, taking intoaccount that the other person (bargainer in anegotiation) should try for the best for himselfthus recognizing that the other person may beas clever as I am.

The proposal / The frameInformation/ behavior & the bargainingproblem

2.1 Knowledge transfer, knowledge transfer, information,behavior

Paper conception is mainly based on Games Theory especially onits Non-Cooperative Games Theorys version by J. F Nash, 1950- in

relation with the New Innovation Theory (N. I. T) - (M. M. Fischer,2000)

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x = 100 /


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A system of innovation is a set of actors or entities such asfirms, other organizations and institutions that interact in thegeneration use and diffusion of new and economically useful-knowledge in the production process (Fischer M.M, 2002) There isno general agreement about the specification of the sets of actors

and specificationsFollowing the above mentioned, let us see , now, the innovation asan interactive process:Research is interacted with the general scientific and technologicalknowledge pool, based on the logic of the firm-specificknowledge.This knowledge pool is interacted with a number of firm-specific

knowledge base interactive systems, i. e potential market, inventand analytic design, redesign and produce, distribute and market(Fischer M.M, 2001)

From the other hand, knowledge is the most strategic resourceand knowledge creation becomes the key for firms to stay abreastof product and process innovation.

At this point, it is necessary to introduce the term of theorganizational knowledge as a complex interactive processcharacterized by a continuous and dynamic interaction between twoforms of knowledge: tacit and codified. From this point of view,knowledge conversion through information channels- are bothvaluable, for innovation diffusion and human relation progress(Papakonstantinidis L. A, 2003)

N. I. T provides us with useful methodological tools as knowledgecreation and knowledge transfer. According to the New InnovationTheory , knowledge conversion is introduced corresponds [1-1] toa specific type ofinformation, Possible cases/orders, between tacitand codified knowledge produce the four (4) major processes ofknowledge conversion, leading to types of behavior (take at table 2)

2.2 Information as bargaining strength factor in the Age of Information (2007) the information

factor is the most important: The more

information, the more preparation in negotiation,the more strength in the bargain

But information has to be formed by knowledgeconversion

According to the New Innovation Theory ,knowledge conversion is introduced corresponds[1-1] to a specific type of information, Possiblecases/orders, between tacit and codifiedknowledge produce the four (4) major processesof knowledge conversion, leading to types of

behavior. Table 2Table 2

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Scheme: Knowledge Creation/ Information/ Types ofBehavior

Papakonstantinidis, 2003

Literature (Reinsmann , Fischer, Nonaka, Takeuchi and others)introduced various processes of knowledge conversion based onthe proved and build information systems incorporated in anorganizationPossible cases/orders, between tacit and codified knowledge

produce the four (4) major processes of knowledge conversion :

Tacit knowledge to tacit knowledge produces the sympathizedknowledge (socialization)

Tacit knowledge to codified knowledge produces the conceptualknowledge (externalization)

Codified knowledge to tacit knowledge produces the proceduralknowledge (internalization)

Codified knowledge to codified knowledge produces thesystemic knowledge (combination)

Each of these processes of knowledge conversion

corresponds [1-1] to a specific type of information (as aform of human energy) (Papakonstantinidis L. A, 2003),particularly:

Social Information-Sensitization

External Information- Participation

Internal Information-Involvement

Combined Information-Networking

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SocializatioS m athetic


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B-1 The suggested win-win-win approach (step bystep)

B-1.1 Introduction

According to the above analysis, paper contribution inthe scientific thought (2007) should be summarized inintroducing the third WIN or the third person in a two-

parts bargain, i.e the C invisible part, which should bethe Community interest = C , thus taking part ascommunity be presence in every two-parts bargain,claiming its own share from this

Suppose that:

Ua = Pi, Ub = Ri , Uc = Qi , ....in a math approach(tables 1, 2):

Ua = x , Ub = (100-x)k and f = [ x (100-x)k ] =0 , so that Ua + Ub = max From the other hand,final equation, coming from the math modeldevelopment has the form of

lim Pi(&) Qi(&) Ri(&) = max Pi Qi Ri = max Ua Ub Uc =Ua+Ub+Uc

i

or, how to transform a competition into an absolutecooperation, taking into account the integratedinformation, coming from knowledge transfer AND thesensitization process in the community, thus maximizingbargainers utilities and the Community utility (Uc)

B-1.2 The Suggesting win-win-win Sharing Vs NashSharingOr, The Sharing problem in a Bargain [ Utilities, Shares,strategies, decision- choices, behaviour, Final Agreement]Having defined

How information formed by the knowledge creation andknowledge transfer should contribute to what we call socialmarket

How and why sensitization should be introduced togiven information so to turn it to an integratedinformation

How integrated information should influence human

behaviour, during the bargain, or negotiations

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How a human social behaviour could lead to a newperception of thinking or taking a decision, in the bargain

How socialization could influence human choices or winningstrategies during the bargain, in the frame of instantreflection (Nash)

How , the scientific thought , could transfer the problem fromutilities (personal perception) to pay-offs (objectiveperception = counting size)

THEN it should be easy to analyse the bargaining problem by itspay-off (Tables 1 & 2): [ Table 1 concerns TWO (2) bargainers . InTable 2, the3rd or invisible part i.e the COMMUNITY- (peopleexpectations) is introduced- letter C (in the example)

TABLE 3 (Papakonstantinidis Proposal)The Suggesting Sharing between A , B and C

Share (%)

Share (%)

Utility A

Utility B

Utility

AXB

ShareC

(%)

Utility C

UtilityAXBX

C90 4 1 71 71 6 1 71

80 13 2 70 140 7 2 28070 22 5 68 340 8 3 102060 31 10 64 640 9 4 256050 40 16 60 960 10 5 4800

max41 50 23 52 1196 9 4 478432 60 31 40 1240 8 3 3720

23 70 40 24 960 7 2 192014 80 50 12 600 6 1 600

Note : C is the Community , as the third invisible part in the

bargain- In real terms it reflects the confidence indicators,other wise, if and which level each member of theCommunity trusts the other, during the bargain (each of usrealizes thousand of negotiations/ bargains per day [ traffic,love relations, buying ..

C as the new [ the third, or invisible] bargainer in thebargain between two persons , claims its own share , cuttingit from A+B s shares

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The less shares for A+B the more share for the invisiblebargainer C ( the confidential factor- trust level(GREECE=22%

The more integrated information (=sensitization) for A+B ,the more uncertainty (size of entropy close to 1/3) for A+B ,

the less shares for them, the more share for the Community Utility is a personal matter: Utility units are not compared

each other

Utility units expressed the fear of breaking down theagreement (of sharing):

If A needs more the agreement than the payoff, then heshould be ready to accept any form of agreement.

If A has decide to break down the future agreement, thenhe risks more but at the same time- wins more from theagreement

The utility range expressed the optimist instant reflection ofeach part

The suggested sharing according to the win-win-win model-derives a new equilibrium point different from that of Table 1

B-1.3 Solving the Utility function, in the bargain: 3-part bargain suggestion (Papakonstantinidis)

By introducing C = Community, as he third or invisible part ofnegotiations between TWO bargainers, then, let, a, b the bargainers

and c the invisible partThen, let us to define utilities:Ua = xUc = lx, when l = is a factor of the x proportionUb = (100-x-lx)k

It is obvious according to example 1- that:

Ua + Ub + Uc = max

x [ (100-x-lx)k

] = 0then

x (100-x-lx)k + x [(100-x-lx)k] = 0then

1(100-x-lx)k + xk (100-x-lx)k-1= 0then

xk (100-x-lx)k-1 + 1(100-x-lx) k = 0then

xk (100-x-lx)k-1 + 1(100-x-lx)k-1(100-x-lx) = 0then

xk (100-x-lx)k-1 = -[1(100-x-lx)k-1(100-x-lx)]

if (100-x-lx) # 0, thenxk = -[ (100-x-lx)]

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thenxk +x +lx = 100 .... (really ...= -100)

[the (-) defines the opposite interests of bargainers]x(k+1+l) = 100

finally

Cases

If k=0 , l = 0, then each of a, b, c bargainers may win the 100%of bargaining result (output)

If k=1 , l=0 then each of the a and c may win the 50% and thebargainer b nothing at all

If k=1 , l=1 then each of the a, b and c bargainers may win the33.33 % (equal portions) : This is the best point- fair sharing

If k>1, l>1 then a and b may win a percentage >33.33%, butthere is a portion for the Community- C (as the third-or

invisible part of the bargain between TWO)If k


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The resulted from the above analysis- conclusions are lined withProf. G. Swensen (Denmark) Confidence Indicators accordingto which, a Flag Theme process my be built as follow:

Social Confidence Indicators2008

Table -1

Country Indicator (%)2007

1 Denmark 64.5

2 Norway 63.93 Sweden 62.34 Finland 56.45 Netherland 53.96 New Zeeland 52.67 Canada 47.08 Australia 46.99 Indonesia 46.710 Iceland 45.311 North Ireland 43.912 Suisse 42.113 USA 42.1

lim Pi(&) Qi(&) Ri(&) = max Pi Qi Ri = max Ua Ub Uc =Ua+Ub+Uc

i

or, how to transform a pure competition into theabsolute cooperation, taking into account theintegrated information, coming from knowledgetransfer AND the sensitization process in thecommunity, thus maximizing the bargainersutilities(Ua, Ub) and the Communitys utility (Uc),coming from the bargain (Papakonstantinidis, 2007, Dec

31)

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14 Japan 42.0

Table 2


15 Vietnam 41.416 Eire(Ireland) 41.217 Thailand 38.918 India 38.319 Taiwan 38.220 Egypt 37.921 United Kingdom 36.9

22 Germany 36.123 Spain 33.624 Montenegro 33.025 Austria 32.826 South Korea 32.527 Italy 31.428 Belgium 31.4

Table 3


29 Russia 31.230 Belarus 30.531 Ukraine 29.132 Bulgaria 28.633 Jordan 27.7

34 Czech 27.535 Chong-Kong 26.836 Dominican Republic 26.537 Luxemburg 26.038 Pakistan 25.739 Albany 25.740 Hungary 25.641 Lithuania 25.242 Mexico 25.1

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Table 4


43 Armenia 24.744 Estonia 24.545 Serbia 24.346 GREECE 23.747 Morocco 23.548 Israel 23.549 France 23.5

50 Poland 22.851 Nigeria 22.752 Singapore 22.553 Ghana 22.454 South Africa 22.255 Bangladesh 22.256 Bosnia 22.0

Table 5


57 Slovakia 21.958 Croatia 21.059 Argentina 20.860 Malta 20.761 Chile 20.562 Azerbaijan 20.5

63 Uruguay 20.464 Latvia 19.265 Georgia 18.766 Moldova 18.467 Slovenia 18.268 Portugal 15.769 Romania 15.070 Venezuela 14.8

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Table 6


71 El Salvador 14.672 Puerto Rico 14.373 Zimbabwe 11.974 Algeria 11.275 F. Y. R. O. M 10.976 Colombia 10.877 Turkey 10.4

78 Malaysia 10.379 Ecuador 9.580 Tanzania 8.181 Peru 7.882 Uganda 7.683 Costa-Rica 7.484 Philippines 6.685 Brazil 4.8

Ave - 28.1UN Statistics, 2001

FLOW CHARTFlag theme

26

LocalAbilitie

Leadership

Properties

Flag Theme

ActiveParticipationRoles in

planning/

Creating ateam

psychology

Jointing theendogenousforces on acommon

oal

Converging individual strategies on a commongoal, through cooperation


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PAPAKONSTANTINIDIS, 2007

Flag Theme may be concerned as an innovative idea- an open discussiontheme based on the sensitisation process at local level which concentrates localresources, skills, abilities, talents, leadership as well as priorities and properties

at local level.

Especially,

1. Social Cohesion necessary for the L-D process- may be , atthe same time, the cause and the result of building the SocialCapital at Local Level

2. Building the Social Capital at Local Level, may be proved tobe equivalent to Social Confidence Building at Local Level

3. By building Social Confidence among local people, then,Community [ the C factor ] participates as the THIRD orinvisible part in any two-person negotiations

4. By introducing the C factor in any 2-person negotiation, thenwhat should be result, could improve individual strategiesand /or behavior in the bargain, from a pure conflict toround the corners of this conflict, then transformingcompetitors to instant alliances (including the Communityprofit: This is the papers contribution)

5. By including the C factor in any negotiation between twocompetitors who have opposite interests, then, a newbargaining behavior is been accepted (including winning

individual strategies): thus, the negotiation result istransferred from the win-loose perception to sharesperception (the Communitys share included) instead ofpure individual shares

6. Local Development is mainly based on this new perception7. Based on this perception (round the conflict corners-the

Community within) its easy for local people to find a FLAGTHEM (2007- S Africa) for their L-D process: see at Flow Chart

8. That is the win-win-win Methodology/PapakonstantinidisModel)

9. According to win-win-win methodology, L-D process, in terms

of diversification rate, from Globalizations Rules may be justified, thus creating a new organizational DISCRETESPATIAL ENTITY, the COMMUNITY

CONCLUSIONS1. The more Information, the more uncertainty2. Information, as a form of negative Entropy goes to increase, as it

is spent

3. Uncertainty -as the Information Age (21st

century) result- goesto be increased, following the evolution

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4. Technological changes and human and social relations move inthe opposite direction-vice versa.

5. Its world necessity for changing status, in the benefit ofcivilization, in real terms of quality of life

6. The two-poles [0 - 1, black & white] system leads human

relations to dead-end7. Life itself is a marvelous paradigm of cooperation than

competition8. Introducing a three-poles dealing system may improve the

bargaining perception thus influencing social behavior,introducing a new bargaining perception/ethic

9. A new bargaining perception including the Community profitas the third or invisible parameter in a bargain between TWOpersons-players may change some Globalization negativeconditions, providing them with rules/ social rules throughsocial behavior changing.

According to the above mentioned reasons,The Suggesting WIN-WIN-WIN Model:

1. May be concerned as a prediction of the future world, based onbargaining problem- especially in its diversification/ declinationfrom bargaining rules (Rules of Globalization)

2. In this future world, small societies & communities may have

an important role, thus promoting the community development: Development may be power in the future. At any case,development will obtain the role defined by its own name, i. ethe real improvement of quality of life for all the people onearth !!

3. Reforming a bilateral contradiction in a 3-part bargain betweentwo players (including the Community C as the invisible partbetween TWO, in fact may reverse the base of humannegotiation : From competition to co-operation

4. Reforming the competition to step towards social cohesion ,

the objective perception of the world may be changed into amore ideological: From things to ideas and from materialsto minded and feeling world

5. The C partner my be proved to be the key-factor, against thewar feelings which reformed the human society into a jungleof records AND MONEY at any field of human life (athletic,economic life, social life etc) C-factor is the ancient Greekphilosophys METRON

Each of the THREE parts (A, B, & C) in any bargain, may askitself THREE questions, thus maximizing its own profit (notonly economic, but also, social, cultural, environmental etc

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What should be the best for me, taking into account that theother person (bargainer in a negotiation) should try for thebest for himself thus recognizing that the other person as

clever as I, AND taking into account [at the same time] thatCommunity as the third or invisible part of negotiations

between TWO, also participates and also tries under thesame conditions [ Community as clever as the two

bargainers] so bargainers AND Community to be winners(or win-win-win) ?

See at tables 1& 2 the sharing problem and utilities paradigm[The win-win-win perception]

Whats the difference, from Nash Theory?

Introducing the sensitisation process in suggested Model wehave more possibilities to create a new form of information,called the integrated information in the bargain

Integrated Information is the new term introduced to thesuggested model which leads to a new social existence i.ethe socialization The introduced information plus issensitization thus creating a new behavior type. This typesocialization let me introduce the factor C (Community,World Values, social cohesion, solidarity, may GOD) in thebargain, as the third or invisible part of negotiationThus Sensitization may be proved to be a useful planningtool, especially, in the most of rural areas.

By introducing the C factor in the bargain it is succeeded abilateral relation to be transformed into a three part relation(A & B competitors and the C part- the invisiblepart),thus smoothing the conflicts -the 2-poles perceptionin negotiation, at local (at least) level, thus, round thecorners (see the scheme, below) introducing a new L-DMethodologys Definition based on Globalizations

Diversification Rate Each of two (2) bargainers may ,now, ask himselfTHREE (3)

, instead of TWO (2) questions:

What should be the best for me, taking into account thatthe other person (bargainer in a negotiation) should trythe best for himself thus recognizing that the other

person may be as clever as I am, AND taking [at the sametime] into account that Community- as the third orinvisible part of negotiations between two (2) also

participates and also tries to do the best for itself (orwin-win-win)?

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Papakonstantinidis (08)

R*: diversification Rate

PART II: win-win-win Application

3. EUROPEAN UNION

3.1 The European Social Cohesiondimension

The contribution of cohesion policy to EU growth

If the EU is to realize its economic potential, then all regions wherever they are located,

whether in existing Member States or in the new countries about to join, need to be

involved in the growth effort and all people living in the Union given the chance to

contribute. The cost of not pursuing a vigorous cohesion policy to tackle disparities is,

therefore, measured not only in terms of a loss of personal and social well-being but also in

economic terms, in a loss of the potential real income and higher living standards. Given

the interde- pendencies inherent in an integrated economy, these losses are not confined

A

B

R*

win win - win

Conflict

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to the less competitive regions or to individuals who are not working or who are in un-

productive jobs but affect everyone in the Union.

Strengthening regional competitiveness throughout the Union and helping people fulfill

their capabilities will boost the growth potential of the EU economy as a whole to the

common benefit of all. And, by securing a more balanced spread of economic activity

across the Union, it will reduce the risk of bottlenecks as growth occurs and lessen the

likelihood of inflationary pressure bringing growth to a premature end. It will equally make

it easier to sustain the European model of society and to cope with the growing number of

people above retirement age and so maintain social cohesion2.

Situation and trends

A narrowing of disparities between EU Member States but major

challenges remain

Disparities in income and employment across the European Union have narrowed over the

past decade, especially since the mid-1990s. Between 1994 and 2001, growth of GDP per

head in the Cohesion countries, even excluding Ireland, was 1%ayearabovethe EU average,

and the proportion off working -age population in employment in all apart from Greece in-

creased by much more than the average.

In Greece, on the other hand, as in Ireland, growth of labor productivity was over twice

the EU average over this period and it was also well above average in Portugal. In these

two countries, therefore, the productive base seems to have been strengthened, increasing

the potential for continued convergence in income in future years.

Despite the narrowing of disparities, large differences remain. In Greece and Portugal, GDP

per head is still only around 70% of the EU average and in Greece and income and higher

living standards. Given the interde- pendencies inherent in an integrated economy, these

losses are not confined to the less competitive regions or to individuals who are not

working or who are in unproductive jobs but affect everyone in the Union.

Strengthening regional competitiveness throughout the Union and helping people fulfilltheir capabilities will boost the growth potential of the EU economy as a whole to thecommon benefit of all. And, by securing a more balanced spread of economic activityacross the Union, it will reduce the risk of bottlenecks as growth occurs and lessen thelikelihood of inflationary pressure bringing growth to a premature end. It will equally makeit easier to sustain the European model of society and to cope with the growing number ofpeople above retirement age and so maintain social cohesion

4. Successful Greek Rural Tourismparadigms/ win-win-win

1. ETANAM N-W Greece-Wet land area Amvrakikos Gulf

Amvrakikos Gulf, in North-West Greece may be an excellent paradigm ofa

win-win-win Rural Tourism: Rural Tourism services Providers, and tourists andthe Community (Preveza) have succeeded to win, or to get profit, through Rural

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Tourism activities, due to LeaderEU Application in this area, even if it was lessdeveloped and isolated, far away from the metropolitan centers. Indeed, since1992, Amvrakikos Gulf -with a wonderful landscape including both a wet-land and mountain area- had a limited tourist activity, due to its isolation, as it was awayfrom the metropolitan centers. Fishing was the main local populationemployment. Age average was 65+ as young people leaved their place, looking

for a better income as well better living conditions in the nearest urban centers.In 1992 a year after L. E. A. D. E. R, European Union Initiative (Program)application in Greece- a Local Action Group named ETANAM (from the initialletters of Greek works Etairia ANaptyxis AMvrakikou / i.e AmvrakikosDevelopment Company ) in the form of an Anonymous Society (S.A) has beenappeared in this area, by some young educated people, who had come back totheir place (In real terms, ETANAM was there before Leader E.U Program, as abranch of the Agricultural Bank of Greece, with a limited responsibility in the localdevelopment process)ETANAM S.A was the result of a continuous sensitization, or win-win-win processamong local people: It was an agreement/ a compromise between localauthorities, rural cooperatives, tourist accommodations owners Association, etc,who decided, to joint their own forces - instead of acting alone and each-other

competitive (win-win relations between rural tourism providers ) by offeringhigher quality rural tourism services- under the umbrella of Leader EU Program.[win-win relations between tourism providers and consumers(tourists)]As Local Authorities (Municipality of Preveza and other small villages around

Preveza) decided to actively participate in this central forum i.e the Local ActionGroup named ETANAM S.A then it was obvious that they had also to coordinatethe rural tourism system as well as to claim profit for themselves, coming fromrural tourism activity in Amvrakikos Gulf Area- the third win (the win-win-winmodel)ETANAM S.A succeeded to change the route in Amvrakikos Wet-land Area: Fromless developed and isolated rural place, Amvrakikos changed in a developedtourist place, with thousands of tourists per year. Local income has improved 2 or3 times above Young people came back to work in rural tourism services Anobservatory has been made for tourists, in order to see the wonderful birds to puttheir eggs in the sound Nowadays, Amvrakikos Gulf is a famous tourist destination, combining sea, wet-land and mountain landscape: it is a simple but wonderfulwin-win-win example of an endogenous local development based on a purecooperation, instead competition

2. Tychero-Evros Community Redefinition by LEADER E.U InitiativeApplication in Greece

Tychero [ its name means luck, lucky place ] Evros, Greece, may be atypical case of territory-community redefinition as the reaction against the

Globalization impact on communitys socioeconomic parameters.Since 1991, Tychero- Evros has been a typical small less developed ruralvillage, on the Greek-Turkish Evros boarders, experienced by structuralsocioeconomic problems, increasingly depopulation due to low income., lack ofjob opportunities. It was seemed that Tychero -during the globalization procedure-should to be eliminated, by the economic and social pressure. At that moment(March, 1991) LEADER E. U Initiative turned over the statistical data, especiallyfor Tychero Evros. The Mayor of Tychro at that moment captured the LEADERmessage, using it as a Flag Theme in order to sensitize local people towardstheir places redefinition through the social cohesion, in the frame of thebargaining rules; he succeeded to convince local population to adopt the win-win-winmodel taking into account in their two-person bargain -and thefollowed behavior - the community as the third or invisible part of each of

negotiations

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In particular, LEADER EU Initiative consists a typical case of territory-communityredefinition, by the Modern Innovation Theory application in European ruralareas.European Rural Areas are experienced by less development in comparison withurban centers- depopulation, less educational level, increasingly unemploymentat local level, isolation etc, due , mainly, to low information flow and migration

trends.As big cities had incorporated global metropolitan strategies and Member-Stateshad no more state policies for their less developed areas, European Union had todo something for assuring its peripheries viability. European Union in fact had tochange the existing organizational structures in those less developed rural areasespecially in South Europe [Greece, South Italy (Mezzogiorno), Spain, Portugal,some areas in South of France ] We had (during the 1989-1991 period) to plan aquite different concept for those less developed rural areas, in a frame out ofexisting Regional Fund quotas From this point of view, Modern InnovationTheory , suggested by the new trends in Regional Policy, based on knowledgecreation and knowledge transfer should to be the suitable methodological tool tostart with.Applying knowledge conversions suggested by the Modern Innovation Theory-

we discovered that social cohesion and active participation should to befaced in the frame of tacit to conceptual, as well as in the frame of tacit tocodified knowledge conversions, thus generating social behavior and activeparticipation trends in less developed rural areas.(socialization andexternalization). But local people had no converging approaches in the bargain;each of them could maximize personal profit, without links with their own(common) place. Each of them could create winning strategies in the bargain bythe political support or information , using it as a power factor in the bargain,with the result of a temporary personal welfare. LEADER EU Initiative applicationin less developed rural areas especially in Greece- a revolution in planning andachieving the development procedure in those places; Local Action Groups andthe integrated local Business Plan, been legislating for the first time, in 1991(15.03) by the LEADER , changed dramatically the existing perception on spaceand territory in rural areas, by introducing both social cohesion and activeparticipation in planning, without state intervention; It was a revolution, by theresult of a step by step local people understanding of a common place (teampsychology- team behavior) influenced their pure individual strategies in thebargain. For this, information had a special role in knowledge transfer andnew knowledge creation Before LEADER , each of participants in a negotiationin this sub-space entity had to meet his/her own needs, by maximizing individualprofit either strategizing alone, or by a priori coalitions (win-loose model) AsNash introduced the concept of pure-instant reflections strategies, the moreinformed of them applied the instant reflections strategies with their potentialcompetitors, during the bargain, taking into account a 2-person information, i.ewhat is the best for me in relation with my competitors best or expectations at

that specific moment, as to maximize even more individual profits (the win-winmodel)LEADER E.U Initiative has been planned in such a way as to include newmethodological tools (bottom-up approach, integrated local development project,financing bargain at local level , team psychology , flag them etc) Approachinglocal people in European Rural Areas, we discovered that a new tool should beadded, to complete the development process, i.e the sensitization processAccording to our concept sensitization could be seen both, as a fundamental

base of information [ as a form of transferred energy which increase, as it isspent- the Carno paradox] and at the same time- as strategic power factoraccumulation for its owner; in fact, sensitization [ as a development process]could influence pure individual strategies and /or therefore individual behavior,leading individual strategies toward convergence. Indeed , after LEADER

sensitization seminars provided people lived in those less developed areas, witha team psychology formed-step-by-step, letting people redefine their pure

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strategies, taking for first time- into account the place, they live. A commonconscious highlighted the place [ the territory-community]had been born; Thenew data helped us to create an imaginative and fruitful synthesis , by making aninnovative reverse; instead of analyzing a given - existing communitystructure, we tried to redefine it in the new term territory-community, forplanning development policies reasons, at the limit-point of the sensitization

procedure. The last one should to be concerned as the third or invisible side ofa 3-person integrated information (including the territory-community as thethird-invisible part) in a 3-level bargain: In particular each of bargainers, has after LEADER application in rural areas of Europe-especially in Greece- to askhim/her self three different questions, ie What is the best for me, in relationwith the best of competitors at that specific time (instant reflection strategies)and at the same time, in relation with the best of all the people lived in that sub-spatial entity : Sensitization Process may be concerned as a long continuousprocess [ as the successive terms of a mathematical integration process]approaching step-by-step closer and closer to sensitization limit: This limitredefines, what we call in this paper as territory-community term. On this limit,each of the three participants may win, by converging pure individualwinning strategies towards pure cooperation, rather than competitiveness

[ pure cooperation as the limit of the 3-persons best winning competitivenessstrategies ] , On that limit on which territory-community term is redefined asan autonomous sub-spatial unit with is own identity- socioeconomic profit for allthe involved parts of the bargain, became maximum: In real numbers, a few,only, Local Actions Groups-in LEADER EU terminology- in Greece have realizedsteps toward sensitizing their local people. From this point of view, these sub-spaces units, could be characterized starting forms of territory-communityentities. If LEADER finance committee ( European Commission- DG AGRI) shouldtake into consideration this key-point then a few only places could deriveprofit from LEADER finance resources. But during the LEADER II (1994-1997)and LEADER + (2000-2004), LEADER philosophy has changed dramatically, byadopting the perception of a private sector emphasizing the quantitative (bigsizes) rather, that the qualitative (sensitization) criteria by a stronger member-states intervention Tychero captured the fluent changes message. Nowadays, Tychero may beconcerned as a European successful model of territory-community redefinition,by applying the win-win-win Theory , made by the author-presenter

3. The Local Rural Tourism Quality Contracts paradigm in Parnon/Lakonia

(a) PARNON Area Profile & Problems

Parnon (Lakonia place) is a wonderful mountain and forestry area in South-East Greece , in 1600 meters high.

This place was one of less developed rural and isolated areas, in my country,before the LEADER II E. U Initiative (Program) application in Greece (1997),experienced by depopulation, low income per capita, low production, lowlabor specification, low information flow

Mayor and Local Government Organizations had no opportunity to improvetheir tourist services offered, due to bureaucracy reasons and lack ofinformation/and /or finance. Local people in Parnon Mountain area weredisappointed with local organizations quality services offered. Youngerpeople were ready to leave.

PARNON S.A the Local Action Group /Organization in Parnon Mountain Area ,

was unable to help or to maintain people in their place (home), working intourism activities, before the LEADER II E.U Program (1997) State interventionin local places was limited due to strict bureaucracy .

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PARNON S.A , the Local Organization should have a social profit, if it was ableto combine technological changes coming up from applying a win-win-winphilosophy, with those of networking local rural tourism SMEs around theFlag theme, thus promoting local production through clustering them in theEuropean level , with other SMEs , from all the European Rural Tourism places, by the same characteristics. (olive-oil and wine producer places)

PARNON S.A created then the Local Tourist Quality (Production and services)Contract promoting it to the European Area (among the 25 E. U members-states ): It was a gentlemen agreement concerned the quality of their localproduction and /or tourism services

Creating the site TOSIPO.GR , PARNON S.A has promoted links withother olive-oil and wine producers mountain European places, combined bythe rural tourism services or tourism and cultural events , thus promoting theParnon Mountain Area Tourism Identity

(b) TO. SI. PO Cluster(www.tosipo.gr) : A Rural Tourism toolTO. SI. PO [ from the initial letters of the Greek words Topiko SymphonoPoiotitas that means Local Quality Contract] created by the Local ActionGroup of LAKONIA (S-E Peloponnesos) PARNON S.A, in order to promote highquality rural tourism services to visitors, thus intervening positively in theIntegrated Rural Development, by forming a special thematic route, the olive-oilthematic route for rural tourism developmentEspecially:

1. TO. SI. PO is a typical case of development cluster including twenty six(26) partners & members etc around a flag theme which is the thematicroute OLIVE-OIL ROUTE

2. During the 2000-2005 period (The Equal E.U Initiative 2nd period ) TO. SI. POhas specified in consulting its organizations-members and the depended fromthese organizations SMEs , on how to promote their olive-oil production in theinternational market

3. This cluster has been approved and participated in the Equal 2000-2005E.U Initiative, on gender employment equality

4. Following the 2000-2005 Project, TO. SI. PO Cluster realized activities as forexample:

Promotional Materials Edition

Quality Rural Tourism Map Edition (mapping all the olive-oil producer areas,as well as rural tourism destinations participated in this Cluster

Creating a promoting CD-ROM Material for rural tourism destinations-olive oilproducers

Creating production distribution and selling networks in East Europe, E.UCountries and the U.S. A

Participating in other interstate networks focused on Rural Tourism

Destinations as well as oil-olive production promoting Transferring know-how on olive-oil standardization into organizations, SMEs

and local agencies, participated in the cluster

Promoting the olive-oil consumption though campaign on olive-oil therapyqualifications , especially in Rural Tourism Accommodations

(c) TO.SI. PO Cluster as a typical win-win-win (PapakonstantinidisModel) case

TO. SI. PO may be seen as a successful European case in the frame of theEqual E.U Initiative- 2000-2005

The key-point for its success should be its methodology, followed by (andcompetitive) the PARNON S.A the Leader of the TO SI. PO Cluster

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Methodological steps are divided in two categories: those of creating theCluster and those of maintaining the Cluster alive in the World and theEuropean (and competitive) olive-oil Market

Creating a cluster presupposes the win-win-win process, i.e gatheringseparate information [ the uncertainty factor], combining tacit knowledgewith the codified knowledge (the knowledge creation factor, according to

the new innovation theory- chapter 3 ) and then introducing thesensitization factor in the separate information thus transforming theinformation system into a new form of integrated information system.Introducing the new information system (enriched by the sensitization factor), in the organizations decision making, (winning strategies, as well as inindividual winning behavioral strategies) then a new bargaining approachmay be achievable. In a new bargaining environment, smoothingconflicts/and/or the competitive trends in the bargain should be achievable,through a new bargaining behavior (the win-win-win-behavior, accordingto the above analysis) : PARNON S.A , the leader of the TO. SI. PO Clusterhas based its approach on win-win-win methodological steps, in order toconvince local people, organizations, local agencies and public authorities to

co-operate instead of each acting alone in a competitive environment. Win-Win-Win Methodological tool has been applied by the cluster leaderPARNON S.A , so to create links between its partners and organizations-members , as well as between PARNON S.A and the SMEs depended on theseorganizations and local agencies.

Methodological [ win-win-win]steps, followed by the leader PARNON S.A arereferred below:

1. Specifying the subject, looking for common interest problems [ lowcompetitiveness in a global olive-oil market, low income per capita at locallevel poor areas, decreasing local SMEs evolution, increasing depopulation,old population , local quality problems etc ]

2. Defining individual problems, at local level.3. Creating knowledge by combining tacit with the codified knowledge and

know-how at local level4. Gathering information from all the olive-oil producer N. E Peloponessos areas5. Enriching the information gathered by sensitization-creating an animation

mechanism, by the younger people at each of future partners and areas6. Animating local people to cooperate around a common flag theme i.e

promoting the olive-oil production through interstate agreements7. Creating links among future partners, by both the combined knowledge and

the sensitization process [ integrated information] thus influencing thebargaining behavior (smooth negotiations, instead of competitiveperception)

8. Introducing sensitization in the bargain , thus influencing the % individualshares (or reducing individual profits, due to a common goal- facing theproblem by instant non-cooperative- reflection)

9. Establishing a new bargaining ethic , something like the Englishcommon low [ no written rules]

10.Taking part in this new bargain: Each of these partners trusts the other. Thats the solution , or the suggested win-win-win social market in realterms, in a real example

11.By the same way, maintaining the TO. SI. PO Cluster is depended on trustbase

12. Now, local results (economic, social, psychological etc) for this area, throughinterstate agreements (with Italy, Spain, France, Germany Belgium, U.S.A,East Europe etc) underline the success of this cluster experiment

REFERENCES

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