thakur 94 (1)

From Peacekeeping to Peace Enforcement: The UN Operation in SomaliaAuthor(s): Ramesh ThakurSource: The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 32, No. 3 (Sep., 1994), pp. 387-410Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/161981 .

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The Journal of Modern African Studies, 32, 3 (1994), pp. 387-4 10 Copyright K) I994 Cambridge University Press

From Peacekeeping to Peace Enforcement: the UN Operation

in Somalia by RAMESH THAKUR*

[Peacekeepers] should not... have the obligation, the soldiers, or the equipment to engage violators in hostilities. International peacekeeping forces express and facilitate the erstwhile belligerents' will to live in peace; they cannot supervise peace in conditions of war. Turning them into a fighting force erodes international consensus on their function, encourages withdrawals by contributing contingents, converts them into a factional participant in the internal power struggle, and turns them into targets of attack from rival internal factions.1

THE above quotation represents a conclusion reached on the basis of a study of four decades of peacekeeping operations by the United Nations, and the thesis of this article is that the muddled UN operation in Somalia is a triumph of new world order hopes over cold war era experience, and that this results from the UN ignoring the lessons of its own institutional memory. I shall argue that peacekeeping based on consent was an innovative attempt to circumvent the world body's failure to develop as a collective security system; that attempts to convert such operations into international exercises for enforcing peace are fraught with grave risks resulting from conceptual confusion; and that they will jeopardise the UN's peacekeeping and peacemaking credentials.

The Somalia operation also highlights both the need for and the risk of co-operative coexistence between the United States and the United Nations. After the battle in Mogadishu in October 1993 which left i8 US soldiers dead, the UN Security Council established a commission of inquiry comprising Matthew Nglube, a former ChiefJustice of Zambia, and Generals Emmanuel Erskine of Ghana and Gustav Hagglund of Finland, former commanders of peacekeeping forces. They concluded that the US and UN had to share blame with General Mohamed Farah

* Professor of International Relations, Department of Political Studies, University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand.

1 Ramesh Thakur, 'From Great Power Collective Security to Middle Power Peacekeeping', in Hugh Smith (ed.), Australia and Peacekeeping (Canberra, Australian Defence Studies Centre, i990), p. 20.



388 RAMESH THAKUR

Aidid for the descent of the humanitarian mission in Somalia into a vicious confrontation in the streets of the capital. The warlord was held responsible for launching the attack in June I993 which killed 24

Pakistani soldiers. The US was criticised for operating under a separate military command, and for launching raids inconsistent with the basic tenets of UN peacekeeping. The report questioned the strategy of aggressive peacekeeping that had been adopted by the UN, and recommended financial reparations for Somali civilian victims of the fighting.2

BACKGROUND

UN intervention in Somalia has its origins in the wish to provide desperately needed food and other relief supplies to the war-torn, famine-stricken country. President Mohamed Siyad Barre, the dicta- torial leader of Somalia for 2I years, was ousted from power in January i99i, and since then many of the inhabitants have been embroiled in clan-based battles. As well, the central regions were hit by severe droughts, the effects of which were aggravated by the civil war preventing agricultural activity in the normally productive areas of southern Somalia. The tragedy was internationalised with the outflow of some 8oo,ooo refugees into neighbouring countries.

The warring factions agreed to a cease-fire on 3 March I992. The UN Operation in Somalia (known as Unosom) was established by Security Council Resolution 75 I on 24 April I 992 to monitor the cease- fire in Mogadishu, to provide security for UN personnel and supplies, and to escort humanitarian supplies to distribution centres. On 22 July, the Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, reported that while the cease-fire had held reasonably well, Mogadishu was wracked by banditry and looting. In Resolution 767 of 24 July, the Security Council approved the establishment of four operational zones in Somalia with the hope that UN involvement would adapt to the complexity of the situation in the country and enhance the effectiveness of humanitarian operations.

Boutros-Ghali reported on 28 August that the main challenge was not the delivery of humanitarian relief supplies to the ports and airfields of Somalia, but the protection of convoys transporting these to warehouses and distribution centres. The deployment of an additional 3,000 security troops for Unosom was immediately authorised by

2 Julia Preston and Daniel Williams, 'Panel Blames U.S., UN and Aidid for Mayhem', in International Herald Tribune (Paris), I April I994.



THE UN OPERATION IN SOMALIA 389

Resolution 775 of the Security Council, which agreed that three specialised units should give logistical, communications, and medical support. The task of the consolidated, 4,2ig-strong Unosom was to provide humanitarian relief, to monitor the cease-fire, to provide security, to carry out demobilization and disarmament, and to assist in national reconciliation.

COERCIVE COLLECTIVE SECURITY

Although the League of Nations was killed by World War II, its legacy of international organisation lives on in the United Nations, notably the concept, by now firmly entrenched, yet revolutionary in i919, that the community of nations has both the moral right and the legal competence to discuss and judge the international conduct of its members. In particular, both the League and the UN embodied the idea that aggressive war is a crime against humanity, which every state has the interest, right, and duty to collaborate in preventing and defeating.

The closeness with which the UN was modelled upon the League was testimony to the fact that people still had faith in the idea of an umbrella international organisation to oversee world peace and co- operation. The UN incorporated the League proscription on the use of force for national objectives, but inserted the additional prescription to use force in support of international, that is UN, authority. As proof of the added potency of the new organisation, the Security Council was given the power to decide whether international peace was threatened, whether sanctions were to be imposed, and, if so, then their nature. Force, it was argued, would henceforth be put to the service of law, for the Security Council was being established as the equivalent of a supreme war-making organisation of the world community.

The primary purpose of the UN is to maintain international peace and security. The Charter specifies two chief means to this end: namely, pacific settlement of disputes in Chapter VI, and collective enforcement against threats to or breaches of the peace in Chapter VII. The trend towards narrowing the permissible range of any unilateral resort to force by nation-states has been matched by the historical movement to broaden the range of instruments available to states to settle their disputes by means short of war. Even though the normative principle of the primacy of peaceful over forceful means has become firmly entrenched, the Security Council cannot compel member-states to implement resolutions adopted under Chapter VI.



390 RAMESH THAKUR

Efforts to devise an operational system of collective security have been thwarted by a fundamental tension in the concept. Only the prospect of war between powerful states directly, or their involvement on rival sides in a quarrel between minor powers, can pose a challenge to the international order. Collective security understood as the maintenance of international peace and security is therefore superfluous in respect of small states. Equally, however, collective security is impossible to enforce against major powers, for any attempt to launch military measures against such a nation would bring about the very calamity of a world war that the system is designed to avoid.

The United Nations has sought to avoid the latter eventuality by conferring permanent membership of the Security Council upon the great powers, and by giving them the opportunity to veto any action launched by the Council. The practical effect of the clause is that the extensive decision-making competence of the Security Council, necessary for the successful operation of a collective security system, is severely curtailed by the extensive decision-blocking competence of the permanent members.

COLLECTIVE SECURITY AFTER THE COLD WAR

If we examine the actual provisions of the Charter instead of the rhetoric of its founders, then it becomes clear that the UN was deliberately denied the ability to launch military action against a major power. The veto was a confirmation, not a negation, of the founders' conception of the UN role in a divided world. With the end of the cold war and with co-operation among the five permanent members, the UN has been relieved of the disability of great-power disagreement. During the I990- I Gulf war, the Security Council adopted resolutions by consensus and with urgency. The most important long-term significance of UN actions in the Gulf lay in the crossing of the conceptual Rubicon by authorising enforcement of sanctions and then military eviction of the aggressor by troops not even nominally under UN command (as they had been in Korea in the I 95os). As in Korea, the advantage of the procedure was that it allowed the United Nations to authorise the establishment of a clear chain of command necessary for large-scale military operations. The cost to the UN was that the war in the Gulf, like that in Korea, became identified with American policy over which the organisation exercised little real control.

The end of the cold war does not mean that the idea and possibility of war have been eliminated from international relations. The



THE UN OPERATION IN SOMALIA 39I

frequency of war may decline as its cost goes up, and the dangers posed to humanity as a whole may diminish as the overlay of superpower rivalry is removed from regional conflicts. Human societies will still be divided by disputes over beliefs and interests, and as long as there are organised polities prepared to support rival groups, armed aggression cannot be ruled out. Indeed, as the shroud of the cold war lifts from the world, the multitude of national and ethnic fault lines will stand out with sharper clarity. The need for a collective security system therefore remains.

Nevertheless, the new promptness and near-unanimity of the Security Council do not herald a sudden feasibility of collective security.3 For example, third-world states are not likely to relinquish their control of the General Assembly and the UN agenda, and return the organisation to the world of I 945. Far from buttressing the international status quo, they are intent on challenging it. To them, equity is as important as order, and the UN is their principal instrument by which to re-order global relations with new political and economic legitimizing principles. How relevant will be the concept of collective security - which elevates order above justice - if the fault lines of international conflict are going to develop along the ridges of the world's major civilisations?4

It is only a matter of time before China - committed to the principle of state sovereignty, and suspicious of foreign encroachments into its internal affairs - becomes the new champion of the Third World in the Security Council. There are already signs of China, India, and others coalescing into a developing 'Asian bloc' to counter Western pressures on human rights. If the Council's permanent membership is not changed, then the chief executive organ will progressively lose legitimacy. If it is changed so that only Germany and Japan are made permanent members, then three of the seven will be European, with a fourth being the United States. Then too the lack of representational legitimacy will become a serious handicap, especially if the Council commits errors of judgement.

The will to design and construct a collective security system is strong in the immediate aftermath of a major war. Initially, leaders as well as people act in the consciousness that appeasement of aggressors is counter-productive. With the passage of time, they begin to believe

3 See Inis Claude, 'Collective Security After the Cold War', in Gary L. Guertner (ed.), Collective Security in Europe and Asia (Carlisle, PA, U.S. Army War College, I992), pp. 7-28.

4 See Samuel P. Huntington, 'The Clash of Civilizations?', in Foreign Affairs (New York), 72,

Summer I993, pp. 22-49.



392 RAMESH THAKUR

that the existing peace should not be lightly risked, that the rigid requirements of collective security are risk-inviting rather than problem-solving. According to Inis Claude, 'It may well be that the termination of the Cold War will produce a similar peak-and-valley pattern in the graph of support for the notion of collective security'.5

To be successful, collective security must rest on the certainty of response from the world community to an act of aggression anywhere by any power. In practice, the individual and collective responses will rarely be clear-cut. People and governments will differ on the timing in regard to initiating (were sanctions given enough time to work against Iraq?) as well as terminating military action (should the Gulf war have been continued for another one or two weeks?), the choice of means (was Iraq hammered into submission by a technological bully?), and interpretations of the outcome (who was the long-term victor in the Gulf war? should the Kurdish problem have been solved as part of the campaign? what about human rights in Kuwait?).

Collective security is a system designed to deter and defeat inter-state aggression, as of Kuwait by Iraq. It fails to match the requirements of civil strife, which is the more common type of conflict to confront the UN. Collective security requires multilateralism, and successful military operations require centralised command and control. Given that collective security is predicated on decisive leadership, it seems that this can only come in today's world from the United States. But Washington has given no indication that its global leadership role will be free of calculations of national interest. The Gulf war did not increase the probability, for example, that America would seek to check any Israeli resort to force by organising a UN-sanctioned military coalition. Selective opposition to aggression is unpredictable, and so may promote instability. There is also likely to be a world-wide trend towards the primacy of the domestic over the international in agenda- setting by the public.

CONSENSUAL PEACEKEEPING

Once collective security was seen to be unattainable, states moved to guarantee national security by means of collective defence,6 and the international community groped towards damage-limitation tech- niques to avoid and contain conflicts. Peacekeeping as an institution

5 Claude, loc. cit. p. I4.

6 One of the best discussions of the difference between collective security (one for all and all for one) and collective defence (us against them) remains Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration (Baltimore, i962), ch. I2.




evolved in the grey zone between pacific settlement and military enforcement. Collective security necessitates three elements that are in opposition to peacekeeping: a definition and determination of aggression; identification of the guilty party; and a contribution of forces by the major powers. Peacekeeping operations are focused on non-coercive and facilitative activities rather than on repelling aggression, and hence are more akin to armed police work than to standard combat.

Success for the military means battlefield victory or surrender by the enemy. Peacekeeping forces have no military objectives: they are barred from active combat, located between rather than in opposition to hostile elements, and negotiate rather than fight. Brian Urquhart tells the story of the French colonel serving with the UN force in Lebanon in early I 978 who spoke of 'the enemy' in relation both to the Christian militias and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) when briefing Kurt Waldheim. Afterwards this army officer was taken aside by Urquhart, who pointed out that UN peacekeeping forces had no ' enemies . . .just a series of difficult and sometimes homicidal clients'.7

UN peacekeeping forces have been used essentially as a mechanism for dealing on an ad hoc basis with crises in which third-party involvement is viewed as desirable or necessary. Lacking the requisite mandate and operational capability, they could not enforce world peace. Yet even while failing to bring this about, they succeeded in stabilising several potentially dangerous situations.

FORCE AS A NEGATION OF UN PEACEKEEPING

The difficulties associated with the organisation, deployment, and use of military force do not disappear simply because of UN authorisation. States are reluctant to transfer control over their national armed forces to the UN because of doubts over its managerial capacity for military operations,8 scepticism about its institutional ability to police the world wisely and effectively, and the fear of creating a military monster that might one day turn against them. 'Operation Desert Storm' was as much an aberration as the Korean war, and the correlation of circumstances was so exceptional that the

7 Brian Urquhart, A Life in Peace and War (London, i987), p. 293. 8 Major-General Lewis Mackenzie, the former Canadian head of UN forces in Sarajevo, made

the memorable comment that a UN commander in the field should not get into trouble 'after 5 p.m. in New York, or Saturday and Sunday. There is no one to answer the phone'. In I993 the UN established a 24-hour, seven days a week Situation Room that provides a direct link to its peacekeeping operations.



394 RAMESH THAKUR

action should not be interpreted as a trend-setter. The inhibitions on the use of UN force are likely to remain in place, including an inoperative Military Staff Committee, non-fulfilment of Articles 42 and 43 requiring national troop contingents to be placed at the disposal of the United Nations, and recurring suspicions of majority coalitions in the Security Council by important member-states.

Lester Pearson, one of the originators of UN peacekeeping, described this as 'an intermediate technique between merely passing resolutions and actually fighting'.9 The constraining effect of the core principles - non-use of force because of military neutrality between the belligerents, and non-intervention in domestic quarrels because of political neutrality with respect to the conflict - occasionally produced controversy and frustration in the UN. The organisation refused to abandon them, however, because they represented a middle way between abdication of responsibility for management of the international order, and turmoil if the UN attempted to shake off the Charter shackles on collective military action.

In his Agenda for Peace, Boutros-Ghali defined peacekeeping as 'the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned '. By implication, then, he believed that future operations could be organised without the consent of all the parties. In that case, they would need to be prepared for active opposition from some groups. Such resistance is especially predictable in situations of deep-seated ethnic conflicts from those who believe their security and welfare to be under threat by UN intervention.

Facing up to the dilemma in Somalia, Boutros-Ghali outlined five options on 29 November I 992. The first was to continue to deploy Unosom under the established principles of consensual, non-forceful UN peacekeeping. The fear was that this would not be an adequate response to the scale of the humanitarian crisis in Somalia. The second option was to abandon Unosom's mission of protecting humanitarian activities and to withdraw the force. Apart from the fact that an admission of failure of this magnitude is too costly for a new Secretary- General in his first year in office, it was also unlikely to be acceptable to a United Nations flushed with success in dealing with Iraqi aggression. Moreover, coming on top of a policy of inaction in the former Yugoslavia, it would have called into question the credibility of the organisation.

9 Lester B. Pearson, 'Force for U.N.', in Foreign A4fairs, 35, April 1957, p. 401.

10 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: preventive diplomacy, peace-making and peace-keeping (New York, UN Department of Public Information, i992), para. 2o, my emphasis.




The remaining three options involved the use of force. Unosom could become forceful in Mogadishu, hoping that such a show of strength in the capital would be sufficient to convince lawless elements to stop abusing international relief efforts. Alternatively, the UN could launch a country-wide enforcement operation under its own command and control, albeit almost certainly beyond the world body's existing logistical capability. Finally, the Security Council could authorise a group of member-states to carry out such an operation. The United States had informed Boutros-Ghali that it would be prepared to take the lead in organising a UN-sanctioned forceful mission to establish a secure environment for humanitarian operations in Somalia. Whether the Security Council entrusted the command and control to a UN force or to an authorised multinational force, the objective of the operation, Boutros-Ghali said, should be precisely defined and limited in time in order to prepare the way for a return to peacekeeping and post-conflict peace-building.

On 3 December I 992 the Security Council, acting under the collective enforcement Chapter VII, authorised the use of' all necessary means' to secure the delivery of humanitarian aid to the people of Somalia. Sanctioning the use of force, for the first time in such a context, resulted from a growing conviction that the existing course of Unosom would not be an adequate response to the tragedy. The uniqueness of the deteriorating and complex challenge of mass starvation amidst total anarchy required an immediate and exceptional response. Resolution 794 promised to open up the possibility of joint, determined, and innovative action by the UN in order to alleviate and end the hardship of an entire nation.

In a message to the people of Somalia -on 8 December, Boutros-Ghali said that the Unified Task Force (Unitaf) would 'feed the starving, protect the defenceless and prepare the way for political, economic and social reconstruction'. The following day, 'Operation Restore Hope' began with the seizure of the airfield and port in Mogadishu by US marines. The transfer of responsibility to a 2iooo-strong UN peacekeeping force drawn from 29 countries was to be achieved as soon as possible. However, the Secretary-General noted that it would be 'a tragedy if the premature departure, or remodelling, of the Unified Task Force were to plunge Somalia back into anarchy and starvation and destroy the fragile political progress of recent weeks '.2

On 26 March I993 the Security Council adopted Resolution 8I4

11 UN Chronicle (New York), March I993, p. i6. 12 Ibid. p. I3.



396 RAMESH THAKUR

authorizing 'all necessary measures' against armed attacks on UN personnel, including the arrest, detention, trial, and punishment of the perpetrators. Unosom II was accordingly established in April with a strength of 28,ooo military and 2,800 civilian staff- the largest peacekeeping force in UN history, and the first authorised to use force under Chapter VII of the Charter. After UN troops had replaced the US-led multinational force (which may have been withdrawn prematurely) in May I993, it soon became clear that Unosom II could not command universal obedience. Major-General Lewis Mackenzie, former UN commander in Sarajevo, argued that the United Nations had to resort to military action in retaliation for the killings of 24

Pakistanis on 5 June I993 - the biggest single loss ever incurred by a UN peacekeeping operation. Unlike Bosnia, he argued, Somalia was a relatively easy military problem. The point about the credibility of the UN in the emerging new world disorder had to be made somewhere, and Somalia was the right place to make it."3

The resulting military engagements significantly altered the terms and raised the stakes of American involvement in Somalia. Tra- ditionally, peacekeepers are neither configured nor equipped for combat duties. Consequently, if conditions deteriorate so that they are in danger, it becomes necessary either to add sufficiently to the number and arms of the troops or to withdraw them. For the former course, a UN force would have to be transformed from a modest peacekeeping unit into a major combat force prepared for a full-scale war. Attempts to enforce peace where the subjective will and the objective conditions are absent merely create domestic and international divisions.

Converting peacekeepers into fighters dissipated the domestic consensus on US policy in Somalia. It is a paradox of modern times that while the sources and nature of contemporary challenges to peace are uncertain, the response to them must be clear. But an adequate national will in support of resolute force can only be sustained if the use of force is subjected to certain conditions. American or allied vital national interests must be engaged; there must be no qualification to the use of force; the political and military objectives must be clearly defined; the size, composition, and disposition of troops must be directly- related to the objectives, as well as capable of flexible adaptation to altered circumstances; congressional and public support must be assured in advance; and there must be continuing consultation. The longer that an operation goes on, the more difficult it is to satisfy these

13 Quoted in Maclean's (Toronto), 28 June I993, p. i8.




conditions. These were met in the Gulf war, but proved more difficult to satisfy in Somalia.

Once the US troops are effectively engaged in hostilities, they become a prisoner of great/small power asymmetries. US itinerant stakes in the outcome of the struggle in Somalia were substantially different from those of the local clans and warlords. The latter's commitment to victory (or to avoiding defeat) was accordingly greater than the American capacity for perseverance. This was especially so in light of the unsuitability of the US national security apparatus to conduct small wars because of institutional inadequacies, foreign pressures, and the vagaries of public opinion."4

The use of force also raises questions about the appropriate balance between an impossibly long chain of command and the operational flexibility of the field commanders in being able to respond quickly to swiftly changing circumstances. The permissive environment of I992

had undergone drastic transformation in a year's time, becoming increasingly hostile to the presence of US and other outside forces in Mogadishu. The rules of engagement may not correspond to the realities of the environment in which they are to be implemented. The chain of command can fail to develop rules of engagement in pace with the changing threat. Should the guidelines forbid reprisals and punitive measures? While a 'hostile act' or 'force' can be easily defined, a 'hostile threat' cannot. Confused understandings by different units of Unosom as to what force was permitted, under what circumstances, and at which locations, did not help matters either.

From the UN point of view, peacekeeping operations face the danger that their conception of the international interest can be so abstract as not to coincide with the interest of any group of UN members. Nations are unwilling to authorise and arm international soldiers unless assured that they will fight their battle. In restricting the use of force by peacekeeping units to a very limited concept of self-defence, the UN tries to ensure that it is maintaining a neutral stance between the disputants, not serving the political interest of any faction in the conflict or at the UN, and not imposing the will of a UN majority upon any party.

There was sufficient international agreement for a peacekeeping force to be emplaced in Somalia. But the circle of consensus was narrow rather than broad, its scope restricted rather than expansive, and its

14 See Eliot A. Cohen, 'Constraints on America's Conduct of Small Wars', in International Security (Cambridge, MA), 9' Fall i984, PP. I5i-8i.



398 RAMESH THAKUR

strength brittle rather than durable. States are divided by real differences of interests and perspectives. Other members of the multinational force were less than happy at American imperiousness, and took alarm at suggestions of armed reprisals against particular warlords. Their impulse was to try to strike an equitable balance between the various Somali communities. The rules of engagement showed a marked difference in the latitude of intervention. Some units retaliated precisely and promptly, while others awaited a suitable time and target. Some took orders from the force commander, others referred all sensitive orders to their home governments for clearance. This deepened divisions even further.

The use of retaliatory force by US troops from June I993 onwards raised widespread fears that the relief operation had been transformed into a military campaign against General Aidid. After US helicopter gunships had attacked his command centre on I 2 July, Italy, Ireland, the Vatican, World Vision, and the Organisation of African Unity called for a review of UN policy. The attacks intensified anti-foreigner sentiment among Somalis, led to the death of four foreign journalists at the hands of angry mobs, and imperilled the humanitarian pro- gramme."5 As for the farcical raid by US army rangers on 30 August on buildings belong to the UN Development Project, this provoked international ridicule (a UN spokesman, Major David Stockwell, described it as a textbook operation of how to conduct such a raid) and resentment in equal measure.

The predicament of peacekeeping soldiers on the ground is that they are unable to move forward into an unwinnable battle, unable to stay put taking casualties for no purpose, and unable to withdraw without repercussions for the US position in the region and in the world. The dilemma of peacekeeping missions in the midst of escalating violence confronted Unosom with each fresh incident after the first shots of June I993: to terminate the mission and withdraw, or to reinforce the mission by changing the mandate. Any attempt to restore order in the chaotic circumstances of Somalia would have the effect, even if it lacked the intention, of the UN force taking sides in the vicious war between Somali communities. Impartiality is crucial to peacekeeping and distinguishes it from any other kind of conflict-control activity. Unosom was inadequate to the task of containing civil war in a country so deeply divided into armed clans.

15 For background to the transformation of the humanitarian mission into US intervention, see Rakiya Omaar and Alex de Waal, Somalia: crimes and blunders (London, forthcoming).




The amount and type of force employed in Somalia fell between two stools. It was insufficient for purposes of coercive enforcement, yet extravagant for the task of peacekeeping. Law and order in Mogadishu could not be restored without compelling the multiple armies in the capital to cease fire and disarm. The essential difficulty for the UN from June I993 onwards was that although the peacekeeping soldiers found it virtually impossible to stay in Mogadishu and be out of clan controversy, they could not get involved in the politics of Somali's future without dividing both the United Nations and the troop-contributing countries. The conjunction of interests which helped to establish the force was created by the narrow goal of overseeing peace and relief operations in Somalia. That consensus could not survive an effort to transform the mission into keeping peace by force. Haunting images of skeletal, vacant-eyed Somali children dying by the thousands were replaced by troubling pictures of shell-shocked civilians venting their frustration and rage at UN-inspired violence.

Unosom's role began to suffer from confusion in relation to its mission, to a dynamic environment which was changing for the worse, and to the appropriate conditions for the use of force in self-defence. By July I993, the somewhat haphazard and ad hoc employment of weaponry had already succeeded in converting the US troops into a hostile force for some Somali factions, to the detriment of Unosom's role as a neutral peacekeeping presence. The scale, intensity, and frequency of the use of force by Unosom after June I 993 bore little resemblance to the rhetoric and expectations of when it was established, nor any recognisable relationship by then to a peacekeeping operation as defined in the UN lexicon. Some of the querulous Somali militias stopped viewing the force as peacekeepers. Mohamed Sahnoun, the former UN special representative to Somalia, reportedly remarked that Unosom had gradually become 'a heavy military presence' and was 'perceived by the Somalis as an occupation' force.16

The use of robust force by UN peacekeeping units also raises the vexed issue of how the laws of war might be applied to military conduct by troops acting under UN authorisation. When specific UN actions in Somalia have been criticised, the defence offered has seldom been convincing: provocateurs mingled in the crowds and fired the first shots at UN soldiers; the civilian casualties have been exaggerated; the terrorists deliberately use women and children as human shields, etc. The Times of London referred to the persistent pattern of 'evasions by

16 Maclean's, 26 July I 993, p. 20.

15 MOA 32



400 RAMESH THAKUR

UN spokesmen in Mogadishu when describing military actions'. In one attack on Aidid's positions, the International Red Cross claimed that 54 Somalis had been killed, while the UN insisted on the lower figure of I 7. On another occasion, the UN continued to deny the involvement of one of its gunships I2 hours after television footage of it had been broadcast around the world, including the CNN in the United States. The Times reporter listed four occasions in the three months since the launching of the punitive campaign against Aidid on which UN officials 'have appeared to mislead the media or to have failed to comply with international legal conventions'. The director of one US agency was quoted as saying that the UN had retreated into the tactic of the 'big lie - Vietnam style '.17 Such a slide into rationalizations of the use of force will steadily undermine the authority of the UN as the body responsible for moderating the use of force in international relations.

The United Nations is also committed to setting, promoting, and enforcing international human rights standards by state-governments. Typically, human rights abuses take place in the context of security operations by national police or military units. The UN operation in Somalia raises with particular cogency the question of the applicability of human rights instruments to actions in the name of the organisation itself. I have argued elsewhere that the UN and Amnesty International play complementary roles in human rights."8 The former is more authoritative in setting standards and generating norms, but weak in monitoring and enforcement of state behaviour, while the latter, because of its freedom from governments, is a more effective watchdog against human rights violations. The proliferation of UN peacekeeping operations has turned attention to the accountability and transparency of their human rights record, and Amnesty argues that the time is overdue for the world body to build measures for the promotion and protection of human rights into its own peacekeeping activities, and that the troops involved should be trained in those standards and understand their obligations.19 Their use of force must satisfy the long- established conditions of necessity with less harmful alternatives not being available, proportionality in respect to the threat faced and the goal sought, and discrimination between combatants and non-combatants.

In Somalia specifically, 'Some of the civilians killed by UN or US

17 Sam Kiley, 'UN Gathers Men and Arms for "Final Assault" on Aidid', in The Times (London), I 7 August I 993. The hunt for the General was finally called off by the Security Council on i6 November, and he participated in a UN-sponsored humanitarian conference in Addis Ababa in December I993.

18 Ramesh Thakur, 'Human Rights: Amnesty International and the United Nations', in Journal of Peace Research (London), 3 I, 2, I 994, pp. I 43-60.

19 Amnesty International, Peace-keeping and Human Rights (London, I 994).



THE UN OPERATION IN SOMALIA 40I

troops seem to have been victims of the use of lethal force in breach of human rights and international humanitarian law obligations', according to Amnesty. In addition, hundreds of Somalis have been held in 'administrative detention'.20 This has been the result in part of military units being given essentially civilian law enforcement and policing tasks. If the UN is to maintain its human rights credibility, then soldiers committing abuses in its name must face investigation and prosecution by effective international machinery. A good beginning would be an unambiguous affirmation by the Secretary-General, the Security Council, and the General Assembly that forces acting under UN authority are bound by international human rights standards and humanitarian law.

Another long-term cost of converting peacekeepers into peace enforcers, and thence into targets for attack by rival armed groups, is that countries will become more reluctant to contribute troops for such missions. National public opinion is unlikely to support high-risk ventures in far-off lands for the sake of quarrelling foreigners. The French, Italians, Germans, Belgians, Norwegians, Greeks, and Turks had decided to pull out from Somalia ahead of, or by, the 3I March I994 deadline set by Washington for the withdrawal of US troops.21

PEACEMAKING

The resort to overt force also entails certain 'opportunity costs' including a reduced ability to make the peace. Peacemaking and peace enforcement are not synonymous. The former refers to the range of activities designed to create peace: ameliorating the deeper causes of conflict such as injustice, poverty, and oppression, and extending the rule of law. Jan Eliasson, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, reportedly criticised the UN for spending ten times more on the military part of the operation in Somalia than on humanitarian aid.22 A UN official estimated in November I993 that of the $I,500 million being spent on the Unosom compound in Mogadishu, less than $Ioo

million would be for genuine developmental assistance.23 Amnesty has noted that the conflict which entangled Unosom in the capital detracted attention from its humanitarian work elsewhere in Somalia

20 Ibid. p. 20.

21 Keith Richburg, '6o Die in Somalia as West Pulls Back and Chaos Returns', in International Herald Tribune, I4 February I994. 22 The Economist (London), 24 July I 993, p. 22.

23 Rick Atkinson, 'UN Oasis Walls Off Mogadishu's Squalor', in International Herald Tribune, 27-28 November I993.

15-2



402 RAMESH THAKUR

towards ending famine, improving security, and establishing local administrative, police, and judicial structures.24

The goal of peacekeeping units is not the creation of peace, but rather the containment of war, so that others can search for peace in stable conditions. In the i98os, in both Beirut and Sri Lanka there was a contradiction between the reality of sectarian war and the peacekeeping principle of non-intervention. In the end the United States and India failed to reconcile the logical and practical incompatibility between the roles of peacekeeper, peacemaker, and peace enforcer. The role of American marines in Beirut was reduced to that of a superpower militia by i984, and their task had contracted to defending their own presence. As Washington grew more firmly committed to Amin Gemayel's regime, so opposing factions identified the marines increasingly as part of enemy forces, and thereafter their presence became an obstacle to Lebanese reconciliation and peace.25 A similar process of change took place in Sri Lanka in I 990, when the Indian Peacekeeping Force had to be withdrawn after the death of around i, ioo soldiers,26

mainly because its continued presence (since I987) would have obstructed the on-going search for peace.

It can be argued that the UN's credibility has not been enhanced by military action in Somalia. By October I992, the country was in ruins. About 300,000 people had died during the preceding year, I-5 million were at risk because of famine, almost 4-5 of the total population of 6 million were threatened by severe malnutrition and related diseases, and 700,000 had sought refuge in neighbouring states. More than 6o per cent of Somalia's basic infrastructure had been destroyed, 8o per cent of all social services had ceased functioning, and the major cities in northern areas were reduced to rubble.27 Moreover, in the absence of an effective government capable of ensuring law and order, the UN relief effort had itself become a casualty of the anarchy. The different warlords and their followers competed with arms for anything of value. International aid provided by the UN and voluntary agencies had become a major source of income for gangs of bandits. Relief organizations were therefore subject to theft, extortion, hijacking of vehicles, and kidnapping of expatriate personnel. In short, relief

24 Amnesty International, op. cit. p. 2I. 25 See Ramesh Thakur, International Peacekeeping in Lebanon: United Nations Authority and

Multinational Force (Boulder, CO, I 987). 26 Ramesh Thakur, The Politics and Economics of India's Foreign Policy (London, I994), pp.

i87-9I- 27 The figures were provided by Boutros-Ghali in UN Chronicle, March 1993, p. I4.




supplies had become the basis of the only functioning economy that existed in Somalia.

Security issues had to be addressed effectively, Boutros-Ghali argued, because only so could the UN and voluntary agencies provide the relief assistance that was still so desperately needed.28 But this is a double- edged argument. For it acknowledges implicitly that the environment of banditry was a symptom, with the underlying cause being the lack of effective government. A solution therefore has to be the establishment and maintenance of a stable regime. But whose power and authority is going to be restored in Somalia? The restoration and maintenance of law and order has to be that of a foreign entity. Will it be that of the United Nations or America? The state is a Western juridical concept that bears little resemblance to the reality on the ground since the country is deeply divided, fragmented on clan and family lines, with no recognised channels for political action. By targeting only Aidid, but one of the I4 or so warlords fighting for control of Somalia, the UN 'virtually declared war on the Haber Gedr subclan' which he leads.29 More importantly, there is no assurance that a political order grafted on Somalia by international forces will not crumble as the country reverts to pre-intervention clan warfare.

If the tensions and divisions in Somalia are clan and family based, then no government will endure without genuine national reconciliation. This cannot take place through coercion, but must rest instead on compromise and give-and-take. Nor will eliminating any individual warlord bridge clan divisions. Any military 'solution' will reflect the temporary inability of dissatisfied groups to challenge the status quo. It will be neither a satisfactory nor an enduring outcome. For all their known odiousness, the Khmer Rouge had been tolerated as a possible participant in the reconciliation process in Cambodia precisely on such an understanding of the politics of peace negotiations.

The United Nations has argued from the start that the Somalis should assume progressively greater responsibility for establishing conditions and arrangements for the distribution of humanitarian assistance. In August I992, for example, Boutros-Ghali said that a stronger UN role in securing access, transport, and distribution of relief supplies had to be paralleled by an effort to involve Somali entities fully in all aspects of that process.30 The United Nations is indeed the

28 Ibid. p. I5. 29 Andrew S. Natsios (Vice-President of World Vision), 'Food through Force: humanitarian

intervention and U.S. policy', in Washington Quarterly, I7, Winter I994, p. I38. 30 UN Chronicle, December I 992, p. 8.



404 RAMESH THAKUR

appropriate channel for national reconciliation and the reconstitution of government and legitimate authority. The problem is that the organisation's credentials are tarnished and its peacemaking mission is imperilled when a peacekeeping operation is transformed into peace enforcement.

The UN's 'extravagant mission' included promises 'to reconstruct the country, disarm every Somali, end ancient clan hatreds [and] create a functioning democracy'.31 Such an assignment may prove to be a portent of difficulties to come. The disputes clamouring for the world body's attention are as much domestic as international. The United Nations was designed to cope with inter-state war. Founded on the principle of national sovereignty, it is ill-equipped to cope with civil conflict. Virtually all third-world countries would fear UN intervention in civil wars. Charles Krauthammer at least has had the honesty to acknowledge that outside intervention to solve problems like those of Somalia is tantamount to colonialism.32 While a new colonialism might be acceptable to some, it will be rejected by the third-world majority in the United Nations. The elemental force of ethno-nationalism is more likely to defeat UN efforts than to be tamed by the world body: 'despite the lure of riches and glory, the [old] imperial powers lacked the will to sustain [their] role; it is not clear why an international force should fare better, absent any specific national interest'.33

Ethnicity remains a neglected dimension in international relations.34 Humanitarian, peacekeeping, electioneering, and enforcement measures by the UN face distinctive difficulties when they have to be undertaken with regard to civil rather than international wars.35 Most civil conflicts have deep historical roots and are characterised by broad and mutual suspicions based on past traumatic experiences. Objective analyses and rational solutions are meaningless in such contexts.36

31 Natsios, loc. cit. p. I33. 32 Charles Krauthammer, 'The Immaculate Intervention', in Time (New York), 26July I993,

p. 66. 3 Paul D. Wolfowitz, 'Clinton's First Year', in Foreign Affairs, 73, January-February I994,

p. 38. 3 For an important exception, see Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Pandaemonium: ethnicity in

international politics (New York, I 993). 3 See Alan James, 'Internal Peace-keeping: a dead end for the UN?', in Security Dialogue

(London), 24, December I993, pp. 359-68, and Adam Roberts, 'The United Nations and International Security', in Survival (London), 35, Summer 1993, pp. 9-I I.

36 At a panel discussion held at the UN in April I 993, Charles William Maynes, the editor of Foreign Policy, used the analogy of the Los Angeles riots. There was no black or hispanic leader to go to for stopping the riots, and the people could not be threatened, bribed, or persuaded to end the rioting. The two 'terrible alternatives' were to allow the riots to burn out, as they did with the loss of 54 lives, or to impose martial law and risk the death of 53 or 153 lives. United Nations, New Realities: disarmament, peace-building and global security (New York, I 993), p. 338.




Time is a better solution to historical conflicts. UN intervention in sectarian strife must accordingly acknowledge the prospects of an indefinite commitment. To be effective in a peacekeeping role, the United Nations must negotiate with all significant sectarian leaders, albeit in the process endowing them with a degree of legitimacy. In return, however, leaders of ill-disciplined and uncoordinated guerrilla groups may not be able or willing to honour the agreements made with the UN representatives. Compared to the relative stability of border clashes, civil conflicts are characterised by political fluidity. The stakes are higher too: the entire territory, not just a border readjustment; and, possibly, life and death, not just victory or defeat in battle.

In most civil wars today, the distinctions between combatants and civilians have been almost totally eroded. UN intervention therefore necessitates measures to protect widely dispersed and highly vulnerable populations that are bitterly hostile towards one another. Not only are civil wars not fought by large armies; their weapons too are generally small arms not easily controlled or neutralised by bombings and arms embargoes. Unlike inter-state wars, there is no territorial status quo ante which can be restored after international intervention. Cease-fires 'in- place' will legitimise ethnic cleansing by the militarily most powerful; efforts to delay a cease-fire until territorial gains have been forcibly reversed will drag the UN into the quagmire of an internal war. Most importantly, UN intervention in internal conflicts raises the impossible political question of how the world body, which is committed to maintaining the territorial integrity of its member-states, will decide when to support and when to oppose a 'legitimate' government against attempts at secession. If the use of force is an illegitimate method of changing international frontiers, then should it be proscribed with equal conviction as a method of changing the territorial status quo from within? It is easy to see that the use of force by the United Nations cannot be politically neutral in so far as the outcomes of civil conflicts are concerned.

THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE UNITED STATES

Given that there is now only one superpower as well as one general international organisation, the United Nations cannot embark upon any substantial venture against the wishes of the United States. The peace of the world may well depend upon the latter's political wisdom and military power. Experience suggests that the US would be best advised to channel its efforts through the authoritative framework of



406 RAMESH THAKUR

the UN, not least because there is wisdom and virtue in imposing the organisation's international discipline and moderating influence upon the exercise of American power. The greatest strength of the United Nations is that it is the only universal forum for international co- operation and management. UN involvement mutes domestic opposition, eases international concern about goals, facilitates political management of allies, and lessens the risk of counter-intervention by adversaries.

Nevertheless, there are two problems arising from too close an identification of US interests with those of the United Nations. There is danger in permitting American power calculations to be cloaked uncritically in the UN flag. Collective security under the League was a conscious substitute for systems of alliances and balance of power policies that were 'forever discredited' by World War I. Progress towards a world order based on justice and law requires that American power be harnessed to UN authority. The mobilization of the world community under the United Nations in the Gulf crisis was an example of international propriety; the unilateral missile strikes on Baghdad in punishment for the alleged Iraqi attempt to assassinate former President George Bush serves as a counter-example. The latter does not represent progress towards a world where force is ruled by law. Instead, it is a reversion to a world where law is put to the service of the mighty.

Will the General Assembly continue to support using the United Nations for a Western crusade? Indeed, given the validity of Samuel Huntington's claim that 'the West in effect is using international institutions, military power and economic resources to run the world in ways that will maintain Western predominance, protect Western interests and promote Western political and economic values', 3 is it not likely that some member-states, perhaps even a majority, might decide sooner or later to reimpose checks and limits on UN actions?

From an American point of view, conversely, the case of Somalia shows yet again that the commitment of a multinational force to UN peacekeeping is not definable in concrete military or political terms, for its legitimising principle calls for loyalty to a general conception of international order. Unosom generated perceptions of a pledge to keep the peace in Somalia regardless of existing limitations of the capacity, other commitments, or specific national interests of the contributing countries. But when the force failed to discharge its perceived responsibility, then inferences were inevitably drawn about their

37 Huntington, loc. cit. p. 40.




broader capacities and determinations. Since Unosom was so closely identified with Washington, this was especially true of American credibility. That is, the Somali engagement entailed the prestige of the United States as a superpower. But the commitment had not in act been conceived in accordance with the resources of power available to the US for influencing events in Somalia. The operation there was a fair test only of UN peacekeeping, not of US credibility generally.

Resort to UN multilateralism contains costs as well as benefits. 'Pursuit of global collective security is likely to enmesh the United States in a myriad of complex and costly operations that have little to do with its national interest, and that will ultimately fail'." The UN is not an independent actor in its own right, but an instrument in the hands of its sovereign member-states.39 It may complement unilateral actions or allied coalitions, but cannot replace them on every occasion. At times UN involvement will risk internationalizing a local conflict. If/when Washington has to face another Grenada-type crisis in the post-cold war climate, unilateral US military action would still be simpler and more effective than the additional complications of going through the UN. In each instance, the US Administration will have to make a political judgement on investing money, troops, and prestige unilaterally or in a UN effort in which it surrenders a measure of policy autonomy and military control. To make the choice in favour of the latter course axiomatic is to abdicate US moral responsibility in world affairs to an international body whose past history is less than fully honourable from the standpoint of US values. Only by national deliberations in each case will Americans be convinced that their country's vast power and wealth are being used judiciously.

The Somalia operation has reinforced the need for separating the US national security decision-making calculus from the UN peacekeeping one. There seems to be a divergence of opinion on the nature of the understanding on the basis of which both sides (the US and the UN) got into the operation. The Americans believe that they went to Somalia to achieve precise and limited objectives - clearing the relief channels in order to avert mass starvation - that would enable them to leave fairly quickly. But two sets of mistakes were made. On the one hand, Boutros-Ghali, the UN Secretary-General, allegedly 'moved the goalposts',40 demanding that the US troops should disarm the Somali

" Jeffrey R. Gerlach, 'A U.N. Army for the New World Order?', in Orbis (Philadelphia), 37, Spring I993, p. 226.

" Ernest W. Lefever, 'Reining in the U.N.: mistaking the instrument for the actor', in Foreign AJ/airs, 72, Summer 1993, pp. I7-20.

40 Unnamed US official quoted in Time, i8 October 1993, p. 35.



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gangs, fan out from Mogadishu into the countryside, and stay for an unlimited period. With much less military capability than the Americans, the UN undertook the far more ambitious task of nation- building, a formidably complex challenge even under non-combat conditions. On the other hand Bill Clinton, the new US President, endorsed this particular goal as part of his shift to 'assertive multilateralism'.41 The error was compounded with the corollary goal of pacifying General Aidid, a combat mission that could be attempted only at great risk.

Those who were involved in setting up the operation from the UN end insist that their initial lack of enthusiasm was overcome because of the prospect of having US forces under UN command. US combat units had never before formed part of a blue helmet force.42 Their experience in Somalia may ensure that they do not again serve under a non-American UN commander. Relations were strained even with the Secretary-General personally. By I994, US officials were expressing rising irritation with Boutros-Ghali, describing him as egocentric, lacking in political and management skills, effective neither as a leader nor as a bureaucrat.43 For their part, UN officials were irritated that when i8 US army rangers were killed in Somalia in October I993, Clinton, without consulting Boutros-Ghali, announced that American troops would be withdrawn by 31 March I994.

Again, the broader, more important argument here is that in the post-cold war order, the UN and the US need each other too much to risk their relationship becoming a predictable casualty of a resort to muscular force by American units wearing blue helmets. There is a further consideration which reinforces this caution. If the UN moves to institute mechanisms and procedures to monitor, investigate, and prosecute human rights violations by troops under its authority, and they happen to be American soldiers, then the relationship between the UN and the US will be strained to beyond breaking point. The Pentagon is unlikely to permit its troops serving in the cause of global peace to be investigated by international machinery.

41 For a good account of the deliberate shift from the Bush to the Clinton Administration, see John R. Bolton (Assistant Secretary of State for International Organisation in the Bush Administration), 'Wrong Turn in Somalia', in Foreign Affairs, 73, January-February 1994, pp.

56-66. 42 Based on confidential discussions with officials who were involved in the decision to set up

the UN Operation in Somalia. 4 Peter Pringle, 'Ghali: wrong man at the top', in Independent (Bombay), 3 February 1994.




CONCLUSION

International peacekeeping has proved to be remarkably resilient. If a military solution proves illusory but peaceful settlement remains elusive, then peacekeeping forces are needed, wanted, and a useful instrument of conflict management. But they risk being mistaken as an adequate substitute for conflict resolution. In the past, the United Nations has emphasised abortion to the neglect of prophylaxis. It needs to sharpen its skills at identifying potential conflicts before they break into war so that parties to disputes can be brought together during the period of infancy. The UN also needs to become involved in post- conflict peace-building by identifying, supporting, and deepening the structures which will consolidate peace and enhance people's sense of confidence and well-being.44

On the cautionary side, the United Nations will have to address the problem of overload given the calls that continue to be made for an international peacekeeping force to act as a buffer between internally fighting groups in a number of countries. Imperial overreach may come to afflict the world body just as it has destroyed great powers throughout history. The zeal to intervene everywhere will have to be tempered with caution about entering into entangling commitments. The UN's dilemma is that it must avoid deploying peacekeeping forces into situations where the risk of failure is high, and yet not be so timid as to transform every difficulty into an alibi for inaction.

One possible reason why Boutros-Ghali and others prefer to use the euphemism 'peacemaking' may be that they realise that the concept of 'peace enforcement' is an oxymoron. One is reminded of a statement by a former head of government that 'a world where disputes are settled by law and reason ... is a very old dream. But we have the power, and now we have the opportunity to make it come true'.45 The speaker was President Lyndon B. Johnson, the time was April I 965, the context was Vietnam. Just as the self-contradictory irony of his remarks had escaped Johnson in I965, so some world leaders in I993 seemed to find it difficult to grasp the oxymoronic nature of peace enforcement. The point is that this does not work essentially within a consensus of all the parties to a conflict, and moves beyond a minimalist to a muscular conception of self-defence.

Withdrawal of UN peacekeeping machinery in the face of armed

44 This was recognised by Boutros-Ghali on op. cit. paras 55-9. See also various contributions in Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle A. Thayer (eds.), UN Peacekeeping in the 1990S (Boulder, I995).

45 Quoted in Ramesh Thakur, Peacekeeping in Vietnam: Canada, India, Poland and the International Commission (Edmonton, i984), p. 200.



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challenges can of course be cruel in human terms. But it is better in the long run for the organisation to leave with its reputation intact and capable of intervention elsewhere with the consent of all parties, than to turn into a factional participant, part of the problem instead of a solution, the object of armed reprisals and street demonstrations. The second approach is better left to major powers like the United States. Traditional peacekeeping may lack coercive or protective power, but it is also low-risk. The new burst of vigour multiplies the probability of casualties and failure. That is why it will stretch the conceptual fabric of UN peacekeeping beyond the point of sustainability.



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