The 4th International Conference

on

Public Management in the 21st Century:

Opportunities and Challenges

第四屆 21世紀的公共管理：機遇與挑戰

國際學術研討會

Ide o l ogy , P r agmat i sm and the

Chang i ng Ro l e o f the Sta te i n Br azi l

João P aul o M ac hado P e i xo to (Uni ve r s i ty o f Br as i l i a )

22/10 – 23/10/2010

Macau, China 中國 澳門

2

BRAZIL

IDEOLOGY, PRAGMATISM AND THE CHANGING ROLE

OF THE STATE IN BRAZIL

Prof. João Paulo M. Peixoto

University of Brasília - UnB

Mailing Address: SHIS QL 26 Conjunto 3 Casa 14

CEP: 71665-135

Telephone: +55-61-9119 9957

Fax: +55-61-3367 1885

E-mail: jpmp@unb.br

OVERHEAD PROJECTOR (power point presentation)

3

João Paulo M. Peixoto1

University of Brasília

Paper presented at

The 4th International Conference on

“Public Management in the 21st Century: Opportunities and Challenges”

October 22-23, 2010, Macau, China

1 Professor of Government at the University of Brasília. He is an international VILLA Associate at Victoria

University of Wellington, New Zealand. Professor Peixoto‟s most recent book (Ed) is “Governando o

Governo: modern ização da administração pública no Brasil”. São Paulo, Atlas, 2008. A former political

adviser for the Min istries of Finance and Education in Brazil, he also has served as an international public

servant and as a consultant in public sector management for the United Nations and the World Bank.

Professor Peixoto was a v isiting scholar at Columbia and Georgetown universities and a fellow at the

Woodrow Wilson Center (Brazil Programe).

4

“It does not matter what color a cat is as long as it hunts mice”.

Deng Xiaoping

Paramount leader of the People's Republic of China from 1978 to the early 1990s.

“If you want to make enemies, try to change something”.

Woodrow Wilson

28th

American President

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the resurgence of pragmatism as a

method of public-policy implementation for the achievement of structural reforms in

Brazil. The contradictions between social democracy and liberalism as the inspiring model

for those reforms suggest the necessity to find a new explanation for the nature of those

reforms. The economic crisis of the Brazilian State in the 1990’s was obvious in what

pertains the need for a fiscal adjustment. This will not be possible without structural

reforms that mainly alter the fiscal, administrative and social security realities.

Furthermore, the force of globalization has been responsible for the political and cultural

export of values, including pragmatic approaches to solve current political and economic

problems in the four corners of the globe.

Key Words: public administration; state reform; ideology; pragmatism.

1. Introduction

State Reform in Brazil has been a common goal pursued by dictators,

authoritarians and liberals alike.

Since the birth of modern Brazil in 1930, the country has experienced a continuous

process of state modernization. That process marked the 30 s, 60 s and 90 s,

5

regardless of the type of political regime. Under democrats and authoritarians the

need for reforms framed different administrations.

Inaugurated in the Vargas era, five important phases of reform have fuelled

Brazilian development and institutional modernization.

Success cases and failures are perceived throughout those phases. Reforms were

always launched but not always completed.

Brazil and the world have changed dramatically, as has the ideology embracing

the reforms. Left and right administrations had their chances to implement

changes with clear advantage to the last one.

In Brazil, public sector modernization can be conceived as a permanent state

venture and not simply as government policy.

This paper will deal with those and other questions linked to the pragmatic and

ideological aspects of the process of state reform in Brazil in the more important

cycles of the Brazilian development in the past century.

2. In Search of the Proper Role of the State

The role of the state continues to be affected by the mutations occurring within the

international political system. As a result of this process, the interventionist state

has emerged as a distinct and modernized institution that is able to impose its

interests upon society. The degree and extent of state intervention in political or

economic spheres have created controversies among liberals and non-liberal

6

theorists. In fact, the issue has even divided liberals themselves and has caused

disagreements over the limits for state intervention in the economy. The ability to

find a consensus on defining these boundaries is not a simple task, considering the

strong role that ideology plays in politics and economics.

At the core of today's political debates in many countries is this necessity to

determine the limits for and the responsibilities of the state. The degree to which

the state should provide certain services is a political and economic question that

has permeated the whole reform debate. Nevertheless, the complexities and

omnipresence of economics problems require that every government must

participate, regulate, direct and, perhaps even, control its economy. Over the past

century, the governments all over the world have exerted increasing influence

upon their respective countries' economic life. Assuming that a strictly non-

interventionist state has never existed and probably never will, the recurring

dilemma is not whether the state should intervene in economy but rather the limits

to and scope for such actions.

Due to globalization and the changes it has caused to the international system,

state reform and public sector modernization has recaptured the attention of

governments. The new political and economic paradigms that have followed are

part of the constantly evolving agenda for government reform. The most recent

push for reforms has demonstrated that developed and developing countries alike

7

will have to confront increased pressures (external and internal) to adapt to the

cultural, economic, political and social forces of globalization.

3. Cycles of the Brazilian Government

The reformist agenda that has currently become popularized in Brazil is one of

various models that have been adopted to define the role of government. Since the

founding of the First Republic, it is possible to distinguish four distinct phases of

Brazil's political evolution. (See tables 1-4)

4. Reforming Brazil: State Commitment, Government Policy - Pragmatism

Partly due to prejudice, the concepts of pragmatism and ‚Maquiavellism‛ in Brazil,

tend to be used in a pejorative manner. Not always. They can be useful tools that

follow a non-ideological and secular approach to understand the evolution of

Brazil’s reform policies and national politics.

Giovani Sartori precisely has conceived of an alternative position between

ideology and pragmatism that is based on a two - dimensional concept of political

creeds: the cognitive dimension and the emotional dimension. Ideological systems

based on creeds are characterized, on a cognitive level, by a dogmatic mentality

and, on an emotional level, by passionate activism. In contrast, pragmatic systems

that are founded upon such creeds are characterized by the exact opposite qualities.

It is guided by pragmatism that structural reforms in Brazil have been

implemented and oriented. It is important to remember the words of Brazilian

8

economist Bresser Pereira who was one of the principal architects of

administrative reform during Cardoso’s first administration. As he observed

‚although ideologues are also part of governments and part of the multilateral

institutions, when they act as government or international institutions, they are

quite more pragmatic‛ (Bresser Pereira, 1999: 17).

5. A Changing Political Culture: Pragmatism as a Method for State Reform

Brazil still does not have many of the key attributes that characterize a liberal state.

There are four basic points that can help explain why reforms have not achieved these

ends. First, Brazil is not nor ever has been a liberal society, either economically or

politically. Second, the structural reforms instituted during the 1990s were mainly

designed as short-term measures to cope with the grave fiscal crisis and to attend to

the new, non-ideological scenario enforced by globalization. Third, Brazil has yet

attempted to implement a new development paradigm to succeed the exhausted state-

centered model of import substitution industrialization from the 1930s. Fourth, and

lastly, there has emerged a radical center in the politica l spectrum to offset the

complete adoption of neo-liberal policies.

Furthermore, the governments of Presidents Collor and Cardoso were not liberal

administrations in the classic sense. In fact, despite their intellectual differences and

diverse political styles, both of them identified themselves with center-left parties and

ideologies. President Cardoso even emerged as one of the world’s leaders of the Third

9

Way or Progressive Governance movement following the proclamation of the Berlin

Consensus.2

Nevertheless, the pragmatic character of Brazil’s structural reforms has projected a

certain ideological image of economic and political liberalism. Neo-liberal ideas

undeniably have been accepted in influential political circles if not among the majority

of Cardoso’s administration. This characteristic has been most visible in the PFL (now

Democrats), a member of the governing coalition, who has been an open defender of

an accelerated privatization program. The decision to adopt a neo-liberal approach for

policies is due to two different factors: a pragmatic adjustment to the globalization of

the economy and the need for electoral rationality (Power, 1997; 27).

There is a complex list of arguments for promoting these pragmatic reforms in Brazil

rather than pursuing pure neo-liberal doctrines. First, there has been an abandonment

of political ideology on the part of parties and society with the clearest example being

the high degree of personalized politics in the country. Second, the absence of a liberal

tradition consistent with modern Brazilian political history has made necessary the

implementation of pragmatic policies. Third, there has formed a dichotomy between

the social-democratic partisanship of the President and the neo-liberal reforms that

2 According to Anthony Giddens, “one of its most prominent expositors outside Europe and the U.S. is the

Brazilian President and former sociologist Fernando Henr ique Cardoso. The notion has also attracted the

attention of political leaders in diverse Lat in American countries, including Mexico, Argentina and Colombia.

Discussion of the Third Way is gaining pace in Asia too, especially in China and Korea.”

10

have been proposed. Fourth, no room has been left for ideological concessions given

the fear of a return of a grave fiscal crisis. As a result, there is a continued demand for

orthodox economic measures to restructure the state apparatus, restrict credit, and

limit public expenditure. Fifth, the exhaustion of the previous economic model based

on ideology and state interventionism has created the need to find a pragmatic and

functional replacement. Lastly, all these concerns have had to be reconciled with

international pressures to adopt an economic model based on a free market-economy.3

6. FHC s Legacy versus Lula s Challenges

On January 1 st, 2003 Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva became the first metalworker in

Brazil and Latin America’s history to be sworn in to the presidency. Lula, the

worker, succeeds the sociologist and PhD Fernando Henrique Cardoso, the first

president to be reelected in the Republican era in Brazil. Both are from leftist

parties: the Workers’ Party (PT) and the Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB),

respectively. Actually, that also is a new fact in Brazilian politics in the last 40 years.

Both FHC and Lula come from a neomarxist background: the first in his

intellectual formation, and the second from his union activities, aligned with PT’s

socialist proposals. Both of them, committed with economic rationality, undertook

3 Not to mention the fact that President Cardoso‟s intellectual background was very much influenced by the

years he spent at the Institute for Advanced International Study in Princeton, New Jersey, working closely

with that veteran economist and brilliant pragmatist, proponent of reform by “muddling through,” Albert

Hirschman (Maxwell; 1999: 10).

11

and agenda of structural reform that changed the face of the Brazilian State. This

agenda was taken forth despite resistance from within their own parties

concerning the bigger governance issues. Playing the moderator’s role, both

presidents move pragmatically in their quest to neutralize dogmas and ideological

position that tend to mark the reform agenda. They rapidly aligned themselves

with the international economic architecture and the multilateral finance agencies,

notably the IMF and the World Bank, leaving perplexed the orthodox left. The two

Presidents left behind their leftist ideology and practice and committed to the

governmental praxis in an opposite way t their past.

President Cardoso s legacy in the field of state reform include structural changes

such as: public sector modernization, economics and social security reforms. His

administration was also responsible for deepening democracy and market

economy; strengthening the international presence of Brazil throughout

presidential diplomacy and macroeconomic stability, probably the more successful

aspect.

Eight years of social democracy were useful to continue the reformist agenda

inaugurated in the early 90’s during President Collor’s administration. His

presidency was dedicated to strongly re-introducing the principles of economic

liberalism accordingly to the principles of the Washington Consensus and a set of

international political economy. However, despite their social democrat

12

background the tucanos implemented economic public policies much closer to

liberalism than to keynesianism.

The expectations created on the new left-wing presidency of Lula da Silva were

oriented to immediately reverse such economic policies. To the despair of the

radical left inside the PT, it did not happen at all. On the contrary, the new

administration deepened the implementation of orthodox economic policies.

That road of the PT in order to occupy the empty political space left by the PSDB

(identified with the center) started during the electoral campaign of 2002, when it

launched the ‚Carta aos Brasileiros‛ [2002]. After four years in government it has

consolidated it.

That new political position assumed by the PT not only has partially neutralized

the PSDB, as it has been causing a crisis of identity in the party. According to

Timothy Power, in his article published in the Latin American Advisor 4, the PSDB

is [was] facing a crisis of identity due to the implementation by the Workers Party

of a reformist agenda inherited from the previous administration.

Lula’s election ends a cycle and evens the Brazilian political game. All political

groups had their swing at government after the 64 period. In 2006, it begins all

over again. The political arena is know re-open.

7. President Lula reformist agenda

21

Latin American Advisor, published by the Inter-American Dialogue, Washington, DC, 30 de junho de 2003.

13

The administration of Fernando Henrique Cardoso has left an unfinished agenda

of state reform.

As a newcomer to the Presidency of the Republic, Lula had to face a complex set of

important challenges apart of the reformist agenda, such as:

Governing efficiently at the federal level (for the first time ever);

Maintain economic stability;

Implement the long term promise of carrying out a „truly‟ social agenda;

Control PT’s radicals and at the same time retain its ideology;

Carry on the agenda of state reform;

Promote sustainable economic development;

Make a difference against the PSDB by appearing as the ‘real’ leftist

political party in Brazil.

Moreover, during his electoral campaign president Lula promised to continue to

push reforms in favor of state modernization. Almost at the end of his mandate,

however, the results shown by his administration in that field are very low.

Only three (Judiciary; Social Security and Tax/Fiscal) were partially implemented.

There others are still waiting for a more favorable political environment, and it

seems rather impossible to happen in the last semester of his administration.

They will stay - although strongly demanded by many sectors in Brazil – waiting

for a better political moment.

14

Concluding Remarks

Undeniably, evidence from several countries on different continents demonstrates

that globalization has brought with it two core values: the supremacy of

democracy as a political regime and capitalism (although not necessarily economic

liberalism) as the only economic system. Ideologically, it may not be the best

model for all but; pragmatically it is what has prevailed in countries as diverse as

Bolivia, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Poland, Argentina, and Hungary. It is difficult

to imagine an ideological ‚anchor‛ that could sustain the numerous economic

changes in such different societies. What appears to be the best variable to explain

these institutional alterations is the adoption of a group of decisions a nd public

policies ‚anchored‛ in pragmatism.

It is concerned with how principles, values, and rationalization give the state

enough power to fulfill its responsibilities of maintaining freedom without fear.

Brazil has been no exception to this trend. Currently, the country not only has

been under the aegis of a coalition government formed from clearly overlapping

ideological parties but also it has seen a pragmatic wrapping of its political and

economic realities. In this sense, the process of reform in Brazil seems to be a

result of a conscious pragmatism. From the Washington Consensus to the Berlin

Consensus and beyond, Brazil has experienced a decade of structural reforms,

affecting the formation of the Brazilian economy as well as its political culture.

15

One of the driving forces in this process has been a method of public policy

implementation that has been steeped in pragmatism.

Deep structural changes have taken place in Brazil since 1990. Under FHC’s the

country was able to minimize its ideological and pro-state past and effectively alter

its economic models in the process. Various administrations - through policy

(1990); laws; and constitutional changes (1995) slowly have reduced or even

extinguished the power of state monopolies and have promoted structural reforms

(economics; social security, administrative, and fiscal). In the implementation of

these policies, fiscal crises and the unavoidable economic reality imposed by the

process of globalization have forced ideological sophistication to b e abandoned in

the name of pragmatism. The aggregation of these internal and external pressures

has prompted Brazil to minimize its pro-state tendencies and enter a new era of

pragmatic, neo-liberal-inspired economic policies. Mainly in macroeconomic

management policies.

However, these changes have not completely eliminated some of undesirable

state’s activities. However, Brazil’s leaders feel uncomfortable with pure neo-

liberalism and prefer politically a more social democrat oriented (not necessarily

the one proposed by PSDB).

16

Brazil, like the rest of South America, 5 must achieve increased economic openness

and cultural changes 6 if neo-liberal economic structures are to flourish.

Throughout the country, statism still is the prevailing model. This characteristic is

not new given economic liberalism has always lost out to development policies in

Brazil. The story of the country’s economic development has not been a process

marked by liberalism but one of state capitalism, economic nationalism, and

interventionism.7 The exhaustion of Brazil’s state-led development model by the

1980’s has mandated that Brazil redefines the role of the state. Determining its

proper role will ultimately depend on prevailing contextual and ideological factors.

As Brazil’s experience of reform demonstrates, the idea of one solution for every

state’s economic problems has proved to not be feasible because of the unique

historical and cultural dynamics of each country.

5 Exceptions to the statement could include Chile and Bolivia, perhaps.

6 A report produced by McKinsey consulting firm, reinforces other studies made in Brazil which point to 5

causes retarding economic development as such:

Informality (28%); macroeconomics deficiencies (13%); regulatory problems (11%); bad infrastructure (5%);

and low quality o f public services (8%). According to the study other 35% can be assigned to a „historical

backwardness‟ (wrong policies in the past, cultural aspects and even geographic constraints). The McKinsey

report concludes that if those barriers come to be surpassed, the Brazilian per capita income will triplicate

from U$ 3,325 to U$ 9,975 with considerable improvement in citizens standard of living.

7 This is coherent, to a certain point, with our Iberian colonial heritages.

17

The search for the proper role of the state in Brazil has been complicated by the

exhaustion of the ‘Washington Consensus ideology’. Two perspectives most likely

will be the guiding forces that shaped the state’s policy options: the Blairism8

course of action and the developmental state paradigm.

Historically, the developmental state paradigm has been the favorite approach for

Brazil, regardless of the strong and continuous concerns about fiscal constraints.

The pendulum seems to have swung back towards development-targeted polices,

as the fatigue of fiscal adjustment measures and their intended consequences has

become obvious in Latin America.

The adoption of Blairism is a clear alternative in the face of the enormous political

and legislative obstacles that exist for reversing economic reforms, especially the

privatizations. This Blairism shall consist of a feasible approach initially followed

by the PT.

The introduction of core reforms in Brazil and their approval as constitutional

amendments [in 1995] made very unlikely that the new government [Lula da Silva

2002], have a majority in Congress to reverse past policies. What has been seen is

8 Note from the author: Blairism means the course of action adopted by Prime Minister Tony Blair after he

defeated John Major but continued the liberalism of Margaret Thatcher. Against expectations, Tony Blair‟s

government did not reverse economic liberalism and privatizations. Instead it introduced new, Third Way

policies that respected the market-economy and moved ahead with institutional reforms and social policies

oriented to lightening the burden of structural reforms and fiscal adjustment.

18

not the change in economic model, but to change the government’s priorities to

address the social costs that have accumulated from the years of economic

stabilization. In this sense, it has not been necessary to destroy the economic and

fiscal gains obtained during the previous years to move ahead introducing

developmental economic policies. On the contrary, it is positive for the country

continuing to advance in some institutional reforms that have not been

implemented.

No matter who comes to be elected as President this year (2010), Brazil will have to

continue its saga for public sector modernization; and a new round of structural

reforms is going to be crucial to achieve it. Notably the following sectors should

deserve priority for the reformist agenda as it follows:

Administrative Reform; Judiciary Reform; Fiscal and Tax reforms; Labor and

Union reforms; Social Security reform and Political reform.

The search for the proper role of the state in Brazil will continue to be a challenge

faced by politicians, policy makers, and civil society. It has not been an easy

mission but a necessary one in the evolving process of the state. Similar to the

persistent problem that political scientists experience in finding a precise definition

for democracy, the same can be said about determining the proper role of the state.

Any such definition has to take into account not only the beliefs and values of the

observer, but also the perceived needs of a given society at a particular moment in

19

time. The waves of protest against neo-liberalism and Brazilian fears of the

privatization of state monopolies and withdraw the state from the economy are

major political and cultural obstacles for state reform. The lack of a liberal tradition

in Brazil, endemic ideological disputes, and a powerful cadre of political economic

interests have also posed major obstacles for the entrenchment of liberal structures

as well. These features indicate the continual battle that exists over the elimination

of the state as an ‚entrepreneur‛ and the re-emergence of a strong state role in

national development. Development measures versus structural adjustment

policies alone shall continue to be a major challenge for any government in Brasília.

The difference between them, however, shall be the policies and methods to

achieve them.

Finally, it should be noticed however that all previous reforms were more dedicated to

enhancing government’s capacity to design public policies than enhancing its capacity

to implement them. The country needs to reverse such a standard, dedicating efforts

for the two sides of the coin at the same time: not only desingning good policies, but

more important than that – efficiently implementing and managing them.

At the end, the institutional reforms agenda continues to be central to enhance the

development of Brazil.

REFERENCES

20

Blair, Tony. The Third Way: New Politics for the New Century. London, England:

Fabian Society, 1999. Print.

Bresser Pereira, Luiz Carlos. The New Left and the Moving Center. Brasília: Instituto

Teotônio Vilela, Idéias e Debate, 2000. Print.

Font, Mauricio A. and Spanakos Tony (Eds). Reforming Brazil. New York:

Lexington Books, 2004. Print.

Goertzel, Ted G. Fernando Henrique Cardoso e a reconstrução da democracia no Brasil.

São Paulo : Saraiva, 2002. Print.

Inter- American Development Bank. The Politics of Policies. 2006 report. Print.

Peixoto, João Paulo M. (Ed). Governando o Governo: modernização da administração

pública brasileira. São Paulo: Atlas, 2008. Print.

Power, J. Timothy. A Social Democracia no Brasil e no Mundo. Porto Alegre, Brasil:

Instituto Teotônio Vilela/Fundação Pedroso Horta, 1997. Print.

Rego, Antonio Carlos Pojo e Peixoto, João Paulo M. A Política das Reformas

Econômicas no Brasil. Rio de Janeiro, Brasil: Expressão e Cultura, 1998. Print.

Wlliamson, John (Ed), The Progress of Policy Reform in Latin America in Latin

American Adjustment: how much has happened? Washington, DC: Institute of

International Economics, 1990. Print.

21

POLITICAL EVOLUTION OF BRAZIL

• 1500 DISCOVERED BY

THE PORTUGUESE

• 1500 to 1822PORTUGUESE COLONY

• 1822 INDEPENDENCE

• 1822 to 1889 EMPIRE

(UNIQUE IN L.A.)

• 1889 REPUBLIC

• 1930 MODERN BRAZIL

MAIN PHASES OF THE BRAZILIAN STATE(since 1930)

The golden years: from

the keynesianism of

30’s to the “quasi-

liberalism” of the 90’s.

Vargas Era

Military Regime

Collor and the Washington

Consensus

FHC Era

Lula’s Administration

PresidentialPresidentialLimited

Parliamentary

Government

System

Dictatorship

Provisory Government

1889 to 1891 and

Constitutional 1891 to 1930

Provisory Government 1930 to

1934 and

Constitutional 1934 to 1937

Dictatorship 1937 to 1945

Pre-constitutional

1822 to 1824

and

Constitutional

1824 to 1889

Type of

Constitution

DictatorshipLimited DemocracyLimited

Democracy

Political

Regime

Unitary in

practice, Federal

in theory

FederalUnitaryState

Structure

RepublicRepublicMonarchyGovernment

Strucure

From 1937 to

1945From 1889 to 1937

From 1822 to

1889

Brazilian

State

EVOLUTION OF THE BRAZILIAN STATE (from 1822 to 1945)

Syn

thesis

ela

bora

ted b

y th

e a

uth

or

THE VARGAS ERA

1930 – 1954

Institution Building

Reforms

Public Sector Modernization, DASP, Careers,Merit System, Scientific Administration – Weber

Objectives

Administrative

Labor First Legislation – Labor Code and Courts

Trade Unions Pluralism and Autonomy

Fiscal/Tax Flexibility

Political Electoral Code and Court

Industrialization Economic Nationalism (CSN – BNDES –PETROBRAS)

JOÃO GOULART ADMINISTRATION

‘REFORMAS DE BASE’ (1961 – 1964)

REFORMS OBJECTIVES

Agrarian ReformRedistribution of land, creating numerous classes of small owners.

Urban Reform Planning and regulations for city development.

BankingReform Creation of a financial system dedicated to attend national needs.

Electoral ReformAllow the iliterate to vote (about half the adult population) as well as the military.

Foreign CapitalReform

Regulation and control of foreign investment and

profit/capital flow.

Educational andUniversity Reform

Teaching and research alligned with national

interests and social needs.

Tax Reform Emphasis on collecting direct taxes, such as the progressive income tax.

Agrarian Reform Land Statute, rural settling and colonization.

Education Reform Structural and educational reforms in

the three levels of the system.

Tax/Fiscal Reform Modernizing the tax/fiscal systems, creation of new taxes, and redistribution of the income tax.

Administrative Reform Public Sector modernization, deburocratization, administrative reorganization.

Economic Reform Economic stabilization, business

liberalization, financial system reform.

Judiciary Reform Modernization of the Judiciary system.

Political Reform Two party system and indirect elections.

MILITARY REGIME (1964 – 1985)

REFORMS OBJECTIVES

Conservative Modernization

22

Economic modernization, privatization and business liberalization

Simplification and consolidation of indirect taxes, modernize and simplification of the collection and the auditing by the Revenue Service (RF), tax/fiscal system reform.

Review of the stability of public servants, careers structure, rationalize the public expenditures and salaries, de-regulation and administrative reorganization.

Review of Higher Education and regulation of the university’s autonomy.

End State tutelage, flex the labor laws.

Review of the ITR, encourage rural settling.

Pension reform, revenue system.

REFORMS IN THE COLLOR ADMINISTRATION (1990-1992)

REFORMS OBJECTIVES

Tax/Fiscal Reform

Public SectorReform

Higher EducationReform

Union and LabourReform

Agrarian Reform

Social SecurityReform

Economic Reforms

Globalization and Neoliberalism

FHC ADMINISTRATION(1995 – 2002)

Economic Reform End of State monopolies, economic stability, fiscal adjustment, privatization, public service concessions.

State Reform Regulatory agencies, administrative reform

and reorganization, fiscal responsability law (New Zealand).

Agrarian Reform Rural settling.

Tax/Fiscal Reform Review of the tax system.

Social security Reform Review of the public sector’s pension system.

Political Reform Electoral system, reelection, party system.

Judiciary Reform Modernization of the Judiciary.

REFORMS OBJECTIVES

Quase-Liberalism

FHC ADMINISTRATION LEGACY1995 - 2002

• Structural Reforms

• International Presence

• Presidential Diplomacy

• Economic Stability

• Civilizatory Progress

LULA ADMINISTRATION CHALLENGES2003 - 2008

- Govern Efficiently at the Federal Level

- Control the PT and its Ideology

- Maintain Economic Stability

- Implement the Social Agenda

- Promote Sustainable Development

- Carry on the Reform Agenda

Table 1 Phases of the Brazilian State (1822 to 1945)

The Brazilian State From

1822 to 1889

From

1889 to 1937

From

1937 to 1945

Type of State Unitary Federal Unitary in Practice

Federal in theory

Political Regime

Limited Democracy

Limited Democracy

Dictatorship

Type of Constitution Pre-Constitutional Provisory Government

23

1822 to 1824

&

Constitutional

1824 to 1889

1889 to 1891

Constitutional

1891 t0 1930

Provisory

Government

1930 to 1934

Constitutional

1934 to 1937

Dictatorship

Form of Government Monarchy Republic Republic

Table 2 Phases of the Brazilian State (1946 to 2009)

The Brazilian State From

1946 to 1964

From

1964 to 1985

From

1985 on

Type of State

Federal Federal Federal

Political Regime

Democracy Authoritarian Democracy

Type of Constitution

Constitutional Constitutional Constitutional

Form of Government

Republic Republic Republic

System of Government

Presidential Parliamentary

1961 to 1963

&

Presidential

Presidential

Table 3- Cycles of the Brazilian Government (1930-1985)

24

Period Government Main Aspects

November 1930 to October 1945

President Getúlio Vargas

Industrialization, Modernization of the

Public

Sector, State Intervention in the the

Economy

January 1946 to January 1951

President General Eurico

Gaspar Dutra

Economic Liberalization

Redemocratization,

Exchange Rate Crises

January 1951 to August1954

President Getúlio Vargas

Nationalism, Populism, State Inter-

vention in the Economy

January 1956 to January 1961 President Juscelino Kubitschek de

Oliveira

Developmentism, New Capital –

Brasilia, Inflation, Industrialization

January 1961 to August-1961

and September 1961 to March

1964) respectively

President Jânio Quadros

and

President João Goulart

Right and Left Wing

Populism, Parliamentarism

March 1964-to March 1985

President Humberto de

Alencar Castelo Branco,

President Artur da Costa e Silva,

President Emílio Garrastazu

Médici, President Ernesto Geisel,

President João Batista

de Oliveira Figueiredo

Nationalism, State Modernization,

Economic Reforms, National

Security and

Development Doctrine,

Debt Crisis

Table 4- Cycles of the Brazilian Government (1985-2010)

Period Government Main Aspects

March 1985to March 1990

President José Sarney

New Republic, Constitu-

tion of 1988, Economic

Nationalism, High Infla-

tion and Cruzado Plan.

March 1990toDecember 1992

President Fernando Collor

Economic Reforms, Neoli-

beralism, Administrative

Reform, Impeachment,

Privatizations

25

December 1992-to January1995

President Itamar Franco

Real Plan, Statism, Econo-

mic Nationalism

January 1995to January2002

President Fernando Henrique

Cardoso

Real Plan, Economic Stabiliza-

tion, State Reform, Privatizati-

on, Reelection, Pragmatism

January 2003-January 2011

President Luis Inácio

Lula da Silva

Pragmatism, Economic Stability,

Populism, Statism, Democratic

Left, Extensive Social Policies