The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 12 | Issue 49 | Number 3 | Article ID 4233 | Dec 05, 2014

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The End of the Postwar? The Abe Government, Okinawa, andYonaguni Island 戦後の終焉？　安倍政権、沖縄、そして与那国

Gavan McCormack

1 Framing the Problem(s)

*16 November 2014: Okinawa prefecture electsas new Governor Onaga Takeshi, whocampaigned on the core policy of stoppingconstruction of a base for the US Marine Corpsin Northern Okinawa

*17 November 2014: Yonaguni Island townassembly votes to hold a referendum on thenational government’s project to construct abase for the Japanese Ground Self DefenseForces

*18 November 2014: Prime Minister AbeShinzo announces his intention to dissolve theLower House and conduct general elections on14 December

Few if any commentators link these threeconsecutive events, different as they are incharacter and scale. Yet this paper suggeststhat all – from one small Okinawan island to theJapanese nation state and the US-Japanrelationship – may profitably be consideredwithin a single frame. It rests on the premisethat it is profoundly mistaken to think in termsof the “Okinawa Problem” (and “Yonaguniproblem”) as distinct, self-contained andtherefore relatively minor in significance. Thethree superficially distinct events of November2014 all involve the democratic process, andmay be seen as manifestations of a complexstruggle whose nature is best perceived at theperiphery, in Okinawa and Yonaguni, but whichis deeply rooted in the nature of the Japanesestate in Tokyo. Through their prism, much is tobe learned of Japan itself – state, democracy,law, constitution, and diplomacy. This paper

addresses first the “Japan problem,” then the“Okinawa problem,” and finally the “Yonaguniproblem.”

2. The Japan Problem

When Prime Minster Abe announced hisdecision to dissolve the Lower House and call ageneral election, he offered as his reason thewish to secure the electorate’s approval of hisdecision to postpone for 18 months the raisingof the consumption tax from 8 to 10 per cent.Almost nobody believed that, however, andvirtually all commentators agreed that his realmotive was to entrench himself in power beforesupport for his government, a lreadycommencing significant decline, reachedcritical levels. Re-elected, he would stand areasonable chance of remaining in office until2018. That would allow him to fulfil his grandplan, which is nothing less than the remakingof the Japanese state.

The three basic charters on which the staterests are the Constitution (1946), theFundamental Law of Education (1947), and theSan Francisco Treaty (1951). Commonlydescribed as a “conservative,” Abe has followeda radical political career bent on revision of allof these. He would liquidate the post-warregime and replace it with a “new” and“beautiful” Japan.

During his first term (in 2006) Abe revised theFundamental Law of Education to makecompulsory the inculcation of patriotism, andby 2014 detailed rules to see this carried intopractice were being implemented, moral andpatriotic education had assumed a core part in

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school curriculum and history, geography, andcivics text for high schools had been requiredto “reflect the government’s official position oncontentious historical issues.”1 His second termagenda has focused on the constitution and thesecurity relationship with the United Statesunder the San Francisco Treaty. Unable toaccomplish constitutional revision in the short-term, he simply adopted a fresh interpretationof the terms of the existing one, one that wouldallow the exercise of a collective right to self-defense on Japan’s part, in so doing openingthe path to Japan’s future participation in US-led “coalitions of the willing.” He moves Japan’sdefence and security systems closer to fullintegration with those of the US, commits toconstruct major new facilities for the latter inOkinawa, Guam and the Marianas, and for theJapanese sel f -Defense Forces on theSouthwestern islands of Amami, Miyako,Ishigaki and Yonaguni, and he proceedstowards setting up Japanese versions of the CIAand the Marine Corps (an “amphibious rapiddeployment brigade”). Much of this securityagenda plainly pleases Washington even as hishistory and identity agenda alarms it. He maybe seen as the personif icat ion of thecontradictions of the post-war and post-SanFrancisco treaty system.

When Abe brushed off sustained and strong USadvice to the contrary and on December 26,2013 made his long-anticipated visit toYasukuni, the U.S. embassy in Tokyo released astatement that “the United States isdisappointed that Japan’s leadership has takenan action that will exacerbate tensions withJapan’s neighbors.”2 The word “disappointed,”with its hint of stern father remonstrating withwayward son, attested to the inequality of therelationship. The State Department’s DanielRussel also spoke of the “significant challenge”the United States faced in “helping Japan todeal with historical issues that create tensions,and even estrangement sometimes, with itsneighbors,”3 and counseled “prudence andrestraint in dealing with difficult historical

issues.”4 Washington enjoined Abe to “takesteps to address decades-old disagreementsover forced prostitution at Japanese militarybrothels in World War II.”5 Then in Tokyo inApril 2014, Obama admonished Abe inremarkably direct terms, telling him that itwould be “a grave mistake” to allow the disputewith China (over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands)to deteriorate, as Abe showed every sign ofdoing.6

Ironically, therefore, while no postwar leaderhas done more than Abe to please the UnitedStates, beneath the surface of friendlycooperation, misunderstandings andresentments accumulate and Abe causes asmuch angst as satisfaction. His Japan is bothsolipsistic, intent on vindicating its troubledpast at the cost of alienating its neighbors, andservile but also resentful towards the UnitedStates. The United States, for its part, persistsin the overweening assumption that it is itsprerogative to dictate and Japan’s obligation toobey.

The base “system” ratified under the SanFrancisco Treaty in 1951 restored sovereigntyto Japan at the cost of splitting Okinawa from itunder total military control, reserving the rightto maintain bases elsewhere throughout thecountry wherever and for however long it feltnecessary, and retaining fundamental levers ofcontrol over national government policy.7 Thatsystem has of course been modified from timeto time – by the Security Treaty revision of1960, the Japan-South Korea NormalizationTreaty of 1965, Okinawan reversion and thenthe normalization and friendship treaties withChina (1972 and 1978), and the complex ofchanges underway since 2005. But it has notfundamentally altered. As I have arguedelsewhere, Japan’s qualified sovereignty of1952, instead of being gradually “normalized,”steadily deepened into the “client state”relationship of the early 21st century.8 Therewere attempts to reduce or even reverse thepath of dependency, notably under the

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Hosokawa and Hatoyama governments(1993-1994 and 2009-2010), but they werefeeble, met fierce resistance, and failed. Thetwo governments of Abe Shinzo, from 2006 to2007 and again from 2012, have pursued thereverse process – accelerated and deepenedclientelism – and they have slowly transformedthe body politic.9

Sixty-three years after the San FranciscoTreaty, no government could stand in Tokyothat did not secure a general warrant ofapproval from Washington (as Hatoyama Yukioin particular found to his dismay). And whileAbe learns from Hatoyama’s failure and strivesmightily to fulfil the demands for stepped upmil i tary cooperat ion, which pleasesWashington, on the other hand his agenda onhistory and memory defies and even outragesit, threatens the US agenda for East Asia as awhole, and causes Japan’s relations with all itsneighbour states to be seriously fraught.

Clientelism, basically a repudiation ofnationalism, is masked by nationalist cover,what Nakano Koichi refers to as “AirNationalism.”10 To Washington, however, Abe’s“shrugging off the husk of the postwar state”and “recovering Japan’s independence”11 is anambiguous agenda, implying the replacementof U.S.-imposed structures with “Japanese”( i .e . , pre-1945 fascist and emperor-worshipping) ones.

While these contradictions persist and sharpen,Abe follows an unprecedented program ofconcentration of power over the levers of state:reaching into crucially important parallelorganizations of state: Cabinet LegislativeBureau, National Security Council, the Bank ofJapan, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,and the national broadcaster, NHK. While hefills important positions with like-minded alliesand associates, his cabinet is one of ideologues,with clear extremist tendencies, nearly all ofthem belonging to the organization known asNihon Kaigi and therefore committed to the

notion of Japan as (in the words of formerPrime Minister Mori) “country of the godscentring on the emperor.” Apart from the stresson the emperor, Tenno, whom they insistshould become sovereign genshu rather thansymbol, they reject the Tokyo Tribunal (theInternational Military Tribunal for the Far Eastor IMTFE), deny the “Nanjing massacre” andthe existence of the Comfort Women, call formoral and correct education, and insist on the“beautiful” Japan that was the subject of Abe’s2006 book.12 It is the sort of organization thatin a European context would be proscribed andmembership itself treated as a crime. It ischaracteristic of Abe’s Japan that his “Yes-men”occupy crucial positions, none more so thanMomii Katsuto appointed to head NHK late in2013. In January 2014, Momii was clear as tohis role:

“If government says right, who are we to sayleft?”

The consolidation of consensus at the centre ismatched by the virulence of the rejection ofdissent and dissenters, and even of those whodare to seem different. More than under anyprevious government, the mood of intolerance,chauvinism and hostility to dissent spreads. Inan atmosphere of ken-kan zo-chu (hatred ofKorea and of China), dissenters are houndedand abused as hikokumin, kokuzoku orbaikokudo (all being roughly translatable astraitor). The Asahi Shimbun, sometime bastionof liberalism, reels under massive, orchestratedassault, joined and licensed by Abe himself.Toxic waves of xenophobic abuse of China andKorea, speculation about the possibility of war,and “hate speech” vilification of Zainichiresident Koreans, help consolidate Abe’ssupport base and justify further militarization.

Most recently, Abe has centralized power withestablishment of a National Security Counciland adoption of a National Secrets ProtectionLaw that prescribes draconian penalties forwhistle-blowers and investigative journalists.

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He also took steps (on which below), at whichhis predecessors had balked, to enforce theconstruction of a new base for the MarineCorps on Okinawa. The revised version of theUS-Japan Military Guidelines (1978, 1997) duebefore the end of 2014, was in the eventpostponed till after the election and is expectedto articulate a clearer agenda for integration ofboth countries’ forces and their stepped upcontainment of China.

His agenda could be summarized as one of fullmilitary integration with the United States onan anti-China axis on the one hand andrestoration of the fundamentals of the“beautiful Japan” he associates with hisgrandfather on the other. The final grand touchwas to be a fundamentally revised or rewrittenconstitution, consolidating and extending thede facto “revision by interpretation” that hehad adopted in July 2014. At a foundingmeeting in October 2014 of the “NationalAssociation to make a Beautiful JapanConstitution” (Utsukushii Nihon no kempo otsukuru kokumin no kai), Abe’s adviser andassociate, Eto Seiichi, remarked of theconstitutional revision agenda “I feel that atlast the final switch has been pressed.” 13

Elsewhere in Japan, few dare to challenge oroppose this radical program. With theopposition disarray, resistance is fragmentedand minimal in the Diet. In one place only isthere serious opposition - Okinawa. There,legal, political, military, constitutional anddiplomatic issues of the Abe agenda areconcentrated.

3. The Okinawa Problem

The Okinawa crisis is rooted in the decisions of1951 and 1972, the first (the San FranciscoTreaty) severing it from Japan as the war stateto complement mainland Japan’s peace state,and the second to require that its “reversion”to Japan be done in such a way as to maintainthe priority of war and military matters over allelse. The consequent grim reality is that, sixty-

two years after the San Francisco Treaty, USforces still occupy 20 per cent of the land ofOkinawa Island and concentrate three-quartersof all US military presence in the country, andbase authorities retain a sovereign authoritylittle diminished from the time when the islandwas under direct US military rule.

A week in Okinawa during November 2014,spanning the gubernatorial election on the16th, left this author with an overwhelmingimpression of the ruthless authoritarianism ofthe Japanese state on the one hand, and of thedetermined, non-violent, democratic resistanceof the Okinawan people on the other. Thecontradiction was never so manifest as in theoutcome of the 16 November election, in whichthe Okinawan people delivered a massivemajority to the anti-base constructioncandidate for Governor, Onaga Takeshi,thereby declaring in effect that Okinawa wouldnot allow construction to go ahead on the newbase for the US Marine Corps on Oura Bay.

In an election focussed on national and baseissues to a degree unmatched by any previous,incumbent Nakaima Hirokazu promised “goahead” because Henoko construction was theonly way (and “extremely realistic”) to achievethe reversion of Futenma base land to the Cityof Ginowan.14 His main challenger, OnagaTakeshi, promised instead to do all in his powerto stop it. A third candidate, Shimoji Mikio,would conduct a plebiscite to clarify prefecturalopinion, and a fourth, Kina Shokichi, wouldsummarily order it stopped. Base opponentOnaga won by an unprecedented majority ofover 100,000 votes (380,820 to Nakaima’s261,076) with Shimoji and Kina getting just69,447 and 7,821 respectively.15 It was aresounding “No” to the national government’sOkinawan agenda.

At the Onaga headquarters that night thedeclaration of the poll at 8 p.m. was followedless than one minute later by announcement ofthe result, so clear had been the evidence of

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the exit polls. Joy and relief were unconfined inmany gatherings across the prefecture,especially at the Henoko tent headquarters ofthe opposition movement and at the sit-inoutside the gate of Camp Schwab marine camp.After 18 years of struggle, the people couldfeel, beyond their fatigue, that they hadachieved a major breakthrough. If justice anddemocracy meant anything, they reasoned,then surely now the Japanese state wouldconcede that the will of the Okinawan peoplewas clear beyond a shadow of doubt andtherefore abandon the project to impose uponthem one more massive military installation.

They did not have long to wait for an answer.Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga, who evenbeforehand had insisted that Okinawan opinionwas irrelevant,16 confronted by the outcomesimply repeated that the die was cast, theprocedures prescribed by law had been metand the government would proceed“shukushuku to” (solemnly) with construction.17

Preparatory boring survey works that had beensuspended for two months during the lead-upto the election were quickly resumed. Joy andhope gave way to anger as riot police seizedand manhandled protesters outside the CampSchwab gate and on the adjacent sea anddragged them away.

But then, suddenly and without explanation andjust as the reclamation proper was expected tocommence, the offensive stopped. 18 The Abegovernment, having decided to dissolve thelower house and call a national generalelection, evidently felt that images of thecrushing of a popular mass movement wouldnot sit well with the image to be projected forelection purposes. High noon had simply beenpushed back, however. The apparentlyirresistible force of the Abe governmentcontinued to confront the immovable object ofthe Okinawan people.

Okinawa has seen many crises in the 135 yearssince first being, forcibly, incorporated into the

Japanese state, but none match the present,which dates in particular to the violent assaultby three US servicemen on a 12 year-oldOkinawan schoolgirl in 1995. In the immediateaftermath of the outpouring of Okinawan angero v e r t h i s , t h e U S s i d e w a s o p e n t oconsideration of withdrawal of the MarineCorps but the Japanese government insistedthat, at all costs, the Marines must remain.19

They could withdraw from Futenma, but Japanwould build a much grander and morecomprehensive military facility for them atHenoko in Northern Okinawa. In oral testimonythat he recorded in 2004, then AmbassadorWalter Mondale gave important witness onthis. He said that, following the crisis over thechild rape, the US had been prepared toconsider drastic steps including withdrawal ofthe Marines from Okinawa but that thegovernment of Japan resisted. The Marinesmust stay, it said, and they must stay inOkinawa.20 As Defense Minister MorimotoSatoshi put it at the very end of the DPJgovernment (in December 2012), there is nomilitary reason for them to be in Okinawa. Thereasons are political, i.e., no other part of Japanwould have them.21

Henoko: Abe’s “Shock and Awe”

The undisputed objective of all Japanesegovernments since then, save Hatoyama’s, hasbeen the same: to retain the Marines onOkinawa, and to persuade them to stay byoffering to provide and pay for the bestpossible facilities at the major new base to beconstructed at Henoko. Originally referred toas a heliport, it grew and grew, into today’sproject to reclaim 160 hectares of sea frontingHenoko Bay to the east and Oura Bay to thewest, imposing on it a mass of concretetowering 10 metres above the sea andfeaturing two 1,800 metre runways and a deep-sea 272 meter-long dock. This so-calledFutenma Replacement Facility (FRF), a land-sea-air base with its own deep-water port. wasdesigned to serve through the 21st century as

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the largest concentration of land, sea, and airmilitary power in East Asia.

Henoko, the hamlet chosen for this project,happens to be one of the most bio-diverse andspectacularly beautiful coastal zones in allJapan, one that its Ministry of the Environmentwants to promote as a UNESCO WorldHeritage Site. It hosts a cornucopia of lifeforms from blue—and many other speciesof—coral (with the countless microorganisms towhich they are host) through crustaceans, seacucumbers and seaweeds and hundreds ofspecies of shrimp, snail, fish, tortoise, snakeand mammal. Many are rare or endangered,and strictly protected, none more so than thecritically endangered dugong.

US amphibious vehicles take to the sea atHenoko, 9:45 am on 8 December 2014(Photo: Ryukyu shimpo,8 December 2014)

On the eve of the gubernatorial election inNovember 2014, a coalition of 19 Japanesescientific organizations, including the 4000-member Japan Ecological Society, issued anextraordinary statement calling for theenvironmental impact study of Oura Bay to bereopened so that the evidently global “hotspot”of biodiversity be better understood andappropriately protected.22 The Department ofDefense’s Environmental Impact study found5334 species, of which 262 were under threat

of extinction, but it had not adequatelyrecognized the complex tapestry of life thatlinked the mangrove river-mouth, tidalwetlands, sand, mud, coral, and sea-grassecologies of the Bay. It had reckoned thatdugongs only rarely transited the waters underthe shadow of construction, whereas asubsequent, two month survey in 2014 foundover 100 dugong feeding right in the middle ofthe planned reclamation zone.

On the very day, 19 November, that theNational Diet adopted a special law to addressthe problem of Chinese f ishing boatsdepredations of the coral in the seas around theOgasawara Islands, the same government itselfbegan to destroy the coral of Oura Bay.

From 1996 (when the initial decision to shiftFutenma to Henoko was made) to 2013,popular resistance forces in Okinawasuccessfully blocked the FRF agenda. For thelast three years of that period, the Hatoyamapromise of “at least not within Okinawa” (saiteidemo kengai) helped precipitate the shift bylocal governing authorities, bringing about adeep Okinawan consensus that Henoko must besaved. The opposition included majority opinionin the society (according to repeated surveys),the Governor, Prefectural and City Assemblies,prefectural chapters of the major nationalpolitical parties (Liberal Democratic Party andNew Komeito), and the two main newspapers.In the lead up to the November 2014 election,opposition to any such FRF was running at 74per cent late April) rising to over 80 per cent inlate August, the highest ever recorded.23

Okinawan unity was undoubtedly weakened bythe Hatoyama surrender of May 2010, and putunder tremendous further pressure with theadvent of the second Abe government at theend of 2012. It took Abe almost a year ofconcentrated pressure to break the alreadyweakened Okinawan unity. First the fiveOkinawan LDP Members o f the D ie tsurrendered, then the prefectural chapter of

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the LDP itself, and eventually, late inDecember, Governor Nakaima too, reversinghis own and his party’s kengai isetsu standadopted to win election in 2010 and acceptingthe Henoko design. This series of eventsmarked a victory, however shameful, for theAbe government, but it caused an anger inOkinawa that has persisted ever since.

Six months later (2 July) just over half of OuraBay was declared off limits and preliminarysurvey works begun.24 By mobilizing an armadaof ships under the Coastguard to enforce theworks, the Abe government hoped to displaysuch shock and awe as to sow Okinawa withimpotence and despair. It reminded them ofnothing so much as the previous armada, theAmerican one that launched that attack onOkinawa in the summer of 1945. This timeTokyo, the national government, was attacking.

The Okinawa taimusu editorialized that

“Throughout world history thepattern of sovereign countries hasbeen to make residents of theircolonies feel their powerlessnessby eliminating resistance inadvance.”25

The Abe government’s democratic façadeslipped further as it stepped up the intimidationand violence. On 20 November, 85 year oldShimabukuro Fumiko was carried off tohospital from the Camp Schwab protestgathering, suffering suspected head injury.26

On the following day journalists from theOkinawan dai ly Ryukyu shimpo weremanhandled, abused and forcibly removed fromthe site and protesting canoeists and kayakerswere intimidated and driven off, after beingheld for varying periods.27 The Government inTokyo, together with its agents, the Coastguardand the Riot Police, treat the people of Okinawaas the enemy.28

Demonstrators forcibly removed from gateof Camp Schwab, 19 November 2014(Okinawa taimusu)

The violence of the state is aided and abettedby mass opinion in mainland Japan andespecially by the national media, whichscarcely reports such events. The nationalbroadcaster, NHK, appears to hold fast to theprinciple enunciated by its head: defending theposition of the government. By contrast theOkinawan media – its two daily newspapers andits television channels – are freer and morevigorous than any elsewhere in Japan. TheRyukyu shimpo editorial of 18 August 2014wrote:

“ A s f a r a s w e k n o w , t h egovernment has never unleashedsuch reckless disregard of the willof the people, as we have seen atHenoko. … We wonder if there hasever been a case like this, wherethe government has trampled onthe will of the overwhelmingm a j o r i t y o f p e o p l e i n t h eprefecture elsewhere in Japan.This action by the government

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evokes memories of the crackdownagainst peasants during the Edoper iod . … Th is i s barbar icbehaviour by the government, andit is shameful if the internationalcommunity just stands by.”29

For that reason governments in Tokyo havelong feared and attempted to silence them.30 Nomedia is as forthright as Okinawa’s in itscritique of today’s Abe government. Thequestion they ask in the editorial quoted above)

“Who are outlaws of the sea, theresidents or the coast guard?”

has large and uncomfortable implications.

The Gubernatorial Election and the OldRegime – Nakaima Hirokazu

Fundamentally, Nakaima was unable toovercome the distrust caused by his deal withPrime Minister Abe in December 2013, when,without explanation, he abandoned his politicalpledge of 2010 (repeated many t imesthereafter) of “Futenma replacement outsideOkinawa” (kengai isetsu). His persona suffereda blow from which it would not easily recover.Soon afterwards, he was denounced by thePrefectural Assembly, which called for hisresignation (as did many city and townAssemblies). Ignoring such censure andpresenting himself for re-election in October2014, he issued a kind of apology to “allOkinawans” insisting that his consent to thereclamation had been a “painful” but in effectinescapable decision and that he deeplyregretted the loss of much of Oura Bay to thebase project. 3 1 It was a desperate butunsuccessful ploy to attempt to justify what toomany people saw as the sell-out of theprefecture to the power and money-brokers ofTokyo. Even the unqualified support of the twomost powerful organizations in the country –

the government and the Liberal DemocraticParty (whose leading figures all joined him atvarious times on the hustings) – could notregain for Nakaima the trust he had lost a yearearlier.

Nakaima Hirokazu, b. 1939, Naha City,graduate Tokyo Institute of Technology,official of Ministry of International Tradeand Industry (MITI) from 1961, DeputyGovernor Okinawa from 1990, Governor,2006-2014

In the November 2014 election campaign, fewbelieved his core promise, the one he said hehad extracted from Prime Minister Abe ofFutenma “reversion within 5 years.” The formalbilateral (US-Japan) agreement on the issue inApril 2013 stipulated reversion by “at earliest,2022.”32 When Abe and other ministers in April2014 communicated to the US side the

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Okinawan “request” that this be altered to2019,33 Marine Corps commander John Wisslerexplicitly ruled it out. Withdrawal fromFutenma was not on the cards until troopscould be transferred to the newly built facilityat Henoko.34 The citizens of Ginowan wouldhave to live with the danger and the nuisanceof hosting a major base in the middle of theircity for at least eight, not five years, and almostcertainly much longer. At a joint ministerialmeeting in Tokyo on 2 October 2014 senior USofficials (of Defense and State) dismissedNakaima’s pledge as “pipedream.”35 Yet thisseemed to have no effect whatever on thecampaign, which retained the “Futenmareturn” pledge at its centre.

Furthermore, however much he and the Abegovernment might dangle the picture ofeconomic benefits to flow in return forsubmission on the base issue, the polls showedthat it was not economics but the base questionthat was uppermost in most people’s minds. 36

Base-related revenues had shrunk steadily insignificance for Okinawa, from circa 15 percentat reversion to less than 5 per cent now, andthe parcels of land that had been returned wereyielding far greater economic benefits thanthese that remained occupied by the bases.

In previous elections the LDP had boasted thatit enjoyed the thickest pipe for economiclinkages with the national government andcould therefore be relied on to bring maximumeconomic benefits, but that had now worn thin.Successive conservative regimes in Okinawahad brought no change to the statistical factsthat the prefecture ranked bottom in thecountry in terms of per capita income, highestin terms of unemployment, and No 1 or No 2 interms of absolute poverty, proportion ofworking poor, and of irregular workers in theworkforce. The electorate was disinclined as aresult to make any new act of faith in Nakaima.

People also noted that, while Nakaimarepeatedly stressed the almost certainly empty

promise of the early return of Futenma, he hadlittle or nothing to say on the massive new basewhose initial construction he had licensed or tothe militarization gradually spreading aroundOura Bay because of it. Four days beforedeparting from office (on 10 December 2014)Nakaima delivered his final insult to the peoplewho had repeatedly shown their lack ofconfidence in him. He approved two out ofthree applications by the Okinawa DefenseBureau for amendments to the Henokoreclamation plan that were designed to changethe original design so as to block any possibleintervention by Nago City (which resolutelyopposes construction). He did so from deepwithin the corridors of the Prefectural Office,avoiding explanation or justification.37

The Election and the New Regime – OnagaTakeshi and the Birth of “All Okinawa”

Decades of seething Okinawan discontentbrought to the fore late in 2014 an unlikelyfigure to play a key role in its next phase.Onaga Takeshi had built his career as aconservative politician and core figure in theLDP, campaign manager, no less, for NakaimaHirokazu in the 2010 gubernatorial election.His appeal to the anti-Henoko Okinawan masssentiment is based on his “re-birth” as anavatar of “All-Okinawa” identity politics,transcending the categories of conservativeand progressive. It was he who led the January2013 prefectural delegation, Kempakusho,many of its members staunchly conservative, toTokyo to demand unconditional closure andreturn of Futenma and withdrawal of theMV-22 Osprey vertical takeoff and landing(VTOL) Marine Corps aircraft, thereby in effectsetting the keynote of today’s confrontation.Facing the 2014 election, he insisted that“identity transcends ideology” and pledged todo everything within his power to implementthe Kempakusho demands.

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Onaga Takeshi, b. 1950, Naha City,graduated Hosei University 1975, memberof Naha City Assembly from 1985, and ofOkinawan Prefectural Assembly from 1992,Mayor of Naha 2000-2014, Governor ofOkinawa 2014-.

These Kempakusho events and their ongoingsequel have had the effect of seriously splittingthe Okinawan conservative camp, for the firsttime in Okinawan history. Many either resignedor were expelled from the LDP for refusal toaccept its discipline. Ironically it was they who,refusing to follow Nakaima, stood by theparty’s 2010 pledge, transferring their loyaltyto Onaga in order to remain consistent. NewKomeito support had also been crucial toconservative candidates in previous electionsand after its last minute plea to Nakaima inDecember 2013 to maintain his “kengai isetsu”stance was brushed aside, it instructed its

members to abandon their bloc support forNakaima and vote according to theirconsciences. Loss of that support was a majorblow to Nakaima in the November election,.

As for the business sector, while many,especially those with significant constructionindustry interests, remained loyal to Nakaima,a significant group, headed by leading figuresin the hotel, tourism, retail and food industries,moved instead to support Onaga.38 The meetingin Naha in August, which led to the invitationfrom 1,450 business and economic leaders tourge Onaga to stand, the consensus was thatUS bases were “nothing but an obstacle todevelopment” and that Okinawa needed aleader who transcended left and right. Oneprominent figure, Kanehide Group’s GoyaMorimasa said “The government is likely towield money and power in this election but itcannot crush voices of the people. This is anelection that goes to the identity of Okinawa.”39

Later, as the Onaga victory was announced inOnaga headquarters, it was another of thisgroup,Taira Chokei, CEO of the Kariyushihotels Group, who rose to say that, “WeOkinawans have reclaimed our pride and ourdignity.”40

As Onaga’s campaign developed in 2014 his“All Okinawa” message became increasinglyforthright.41 His core campaign pledge “to stopconstruction using every means at mydisposal” 4 2 to prevent Henoko beingconstructed and to rid Okinawa of the Osprey43

was unambiguous. To a Henoko beach-frontmass protest meeting in October 2014, beforesome 5,500 people, he declared his unequivocalcommitment to “zettai ni soshi” (absolutely puta stop to) base construction.44 The bases, hedeclared (echoing business leaders Taira andGoya), were the “biggest obstacles to Okinawandevelopment.”45

Having begun his campaign with a visit to thefront lines of struggle at Henoko, Onagafollowed his victory just two days later by

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repeating that gesture, declaring his solidarityand determination to stop the works. By theseacts, more than anything, he personified a newOkinawan politics beyond the fixed division intoconservative-progressive categories thatmarked the long Cold War. In forging this path,he seemed to gain widespread trust andsupport from both the pre-existing camps. Hewas formal ly endorsed by the SocialDemocratic Party, Japan Communist Party,Okinawan Social Mass Party. People’s LifeParty and the Okinawan Prefectural Citizens’Network, but he also enjoyed wide supportfrom across the political spectrum. Communistsand conservatives had certainly never beforestood together anywhere in Japan on a majorplatform. Now in Okinawa they do.

Beyond Base Dependence?

It means that Okinawa now has a Governor whoenjoys an extraordinary level of popularsupport to stop the construction works atHenoko, cancel all outstanding tenders relatedto the project, remove structures built on thebay since July 2014 and restore Oura bay, andstop the construction of the “Osprey” basesthroughout the Yambaru forest (especially inthe hamlet of Takae). As the result wasannounced, Onaga supporters, not only in Nahabut elsewhere and especially in the North, inthe tents of the resistance at Henoko, Takae,and along the fence outside Camp Schwab,rejoiced. The keynote of the campaign that hadplainly resonated with the people of Okinawawas the promise of “all-Okinawa,” transcending“left” and “right,” the priority to “identity overideology.” Whether or not such an essentiallymoral politics can be viable in the long term, inthe short term the contradiction betweenOkinawa and the nation state of Japan is sooverwhelming that it is widely supported.

What in broad theoretical terms the electionoutcome signifies will take time to becomeclear. Some – such as University of theRyukyu’s Shimabukuro Jun – thought it marked

a structural transition, a transcendence of thelong-established “Okinawa DevelopmentSystem” What Shimabukuro referred to as“base-tied development, (Okinawa shinkotaisei) was a specific form of interest politicsba lanc ing base concen t ra t i on andcompensatory fiscal policies.46 It might bedescribed as a “lesser” Client State within the“greater” Japanese Client State. Whether suchan analysis is correct only time will tell, but forsure the victory by a massive margin of acandidate who presented himself as theembodiment of the negation of base-dependence suggests it might be. If so,Kasumigaseki (location of the Japanesegovernment in Tokyo) has good reason to beworried. It had believed Okinawans weregreedy and venal and could always be boughtoff. If that was no longer (or perhaps actuallynever had been) the case, how then to controlthem?

To crush Okinawan protesters by force wouldcarry the risk of being seen around the worldas brutal and anti-democratic, and it wouldthreaten the image Abe had been creatingbefore the UN and other global bodies of acommitment to “positive pacifism” and the“rule of law.”47

And yet the strength of that dependentsyndrome was not to be altogether denied. Itwas exemplified on the eve of the election bythe full page advertisement carried in bothOkinawan dailies on 14 November in which aremarkable 27 of the 41 heads of Okinawanlocal government bodies declared their “doubt”(i.e., rejection) of Kempakusho and theirsupport for Nakaima.48 Since all 41 haddeclared their support for Kempakusho inJanuary 2013, it was astonishing to see a largemajority now recanting, apparently. Thepressure applied to exact submission on such ascale can only be imagined. It follows thesubmission enacted in late 2013 from LDPDietmembers, party branches and GovernorNakaima. However, it might not have meant

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quite what it seemed. The Okinawa Taimusu,one of the papers that carried the paidadvertisement, also reported in that very sameissue its own survey and analysis of localgovernment heads. It found 19, not 28,belonging to the Nakaima camp, and when itposed a specific question on attitudes to theHenoko construction project, it found only fourwho supported it.49

In noting the overwhelming nature of theOnaga November electoral victory, however, itis necessary to enter two caveats. First, thatthe voting rate was just 64.15 per cent. It wasmore than three points higher than in 2010, butit still meant that 36 per cent of Okinawans didnot cast a vote at all. Second, exit pollsindicated that support for Onaga was strongestamong the older generation, while amongOkinawans in their 20’s support for Nakaimaand Onaga was roughly even, suggesting thatcommitment to the anti-base cause might beweakening over time.50

Nevertheless, the Okinawan people as ofDecember 2014 appear uni ted to anunprecedented degree under their newGovernor, rejuvenated, and more determinedthan ever not to yield. It remains to be seenhow Onaga will interpret his own words “everymeans at my disposal” that he says he willdeploy to stop the works. He has said that hewill first investigate the process of decision-making to identity flaws in the legal processthat would warrant its cancelation, but addseven if such flaws are not found, he would stickto his commitment and stop the works. Late inNovember it was reported that Onaga wasplanning an “All Okinawa” delegation to pressthe ant i -base construct ion cause inWashington.

As for Prime Minister Abe, it remained to beseen whether he would deploy “every means”at his disposal. In the short-term, the calling ofthe Lower House election for 14 Decembermeant a temporary Okinawan “ceasefire,” but

that could not last. Would he, for example,freeze or cancel the special subsidy he hadpromised Governor Nakaima in December 2013to gain his cooperation – 350 billion yen(roughly $3.5 billion) in 2014 and continuing atthe level of at least 300 billion each year to2021? He might, but to do so would be toexpose their December 2013 bargain – subsidyfor base consent – and so further outrageOkinawans. Otherwise, he could deploy furtherthe forces of the state (Riot Police, Coastguard,and potentially the Maritime Self DefenseForces) to enforce the works against a nowrevitalized, prefecture-wide opposition.However, thus far the intense efforts of theGovernment of Japan, especially under Abe forthe past 2 years but in effect ever since theHatoyama government of 2009-2010, hadstrengthened, rather than weakened, theOkinawan movement and its challenge to theGovernment of Japan has never been greater.

If the Abe government can be confident thatthe national media will continue to turn a blindand complicit eye upon its attempts to conquerOkinawa, and that mainland peace and anti-military movements will not come to Okinawa’said in any significant measure, it might yet takethe risk of simply bringing Okinawa to heel byforce. When then LDP party chief IshibaShigeru wrote in his blog on 29 November2013 that after all there was little difference insubstance between vociferous demonstratorsand terrorists, he likely spoke the sentiment ofthe Abe government as a whole.

4. The Yonaguni Problem

One day after the Onaga victory, far from thespotlight that surrounded those events, anotherdrama was being enacted in the remote frontierisland of Yonaguni. Though scarcely reportedeither in the rest of Japan or elsewhere, it toohad the potential to shake the plans of majorworld governments to their foundation and tohave a profound effect on the surrounding EastChina Sea.

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Okinawa’s outlying islands, as much “offshore”from Taiwan and East China in the East ChinaSea as from Japan, have been subject to adramatic increase in pressure to “host” militaryfacilities, though in this case, Japanese, or Self-Defense Force, rather than US facilities.Throughout the Cold War, this 600 kilometrechain of Japanese islands stretching downthrough the East China Sea remained peacefuland stable, with no significant militarypresence despite being on a much contestedfrontier. Yonaguni, far from the country’smetropolitan centers, is a small island, possibleto walk around in a day or so, at its closestpoint around 110 kilometres from the shore ofTaiwan and just 370 kilometres from the EastChina coastal city of Foochow, but 520kilometres from the Okinawan capital of Nahaand 2,000 kilometres from the national capitalof Tokyo. Significantly, it is a mere 150kilometres from the uninhabited, but contested,Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. 51 It was populatedhalf a century ago by over 10,000 people butnow a mere 1,500.

The island has long relied on just twopolicemen, a hand gun apiece, to keep order,and there may be few places in the countrywhere policing is less required. It is true,h o w e v e r , t h a t a c c o m p a n y i n g t h eSenkaku/Diaoyu island crisis that rose sharplyfrom 2010, the Japan-China relationship hasgenerated across Japan a widespread fear andhostility towards China that helps justify themilitarization of the frontier islands. Somewhatsurprisingly, because there is minimal sense inOkinawa of any “China threat” and a strongsocial memory of half a millennium of close andfriendly pre-modern contact with China, anApril 2014 opinion poll found ninety percent ofOkinawans reporting “bad” feelings towardsChina (virtually the same figure as had beenfound in a mainland Japan survey in mid-2013)and around 50 percent who thought a militaryclash (i.e., war) lay ahead.52

In the midst of a booming region, Yonaguni

suffers population attrition and economicdecline because of the lack of direct transportor communications links with either Taiwan orChina. It formulated (2005) a “Vision” for afuture based on regional cooperation and opendoors, but Tokyo forbade it. Following a USnaval intelligence-gathering visit to the island(under false pretences) in 2007, a different,even opposite idea of a military centred futurebegan to gather attention.53 A petition to urge abase presence was organized by a local“Defense Associat ion” and drew 514signatures, and the Yonaguni mayor, HokamaShukichi, in June 2009 approached the Ministryof Defense and the Ground Self-Defense Forcesto suggest they set up a base on the island. Astensions over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands (foradministrative purposes part of the OkinawanYaeyama Island group) rose from 2010, theproposal drew attention. The DefenseGuidelines of 2010 referred to the substantialreinforcement of an SDF presence on thefrontier islands. Late in 2012, the DemocraticParty government declared defense of thoseislands, including Yonaguni, “the highestpriority.” A token 50-man Ground Self-DefenseForce (GSDF) contingent grew to 150,54 in a“coastal surveillance” unit that would operateradar observation of adjacent seas and skies.The opposition was slow to stir, but in 2011,556 people, roughly 46 per cent of theelectorate (and marginally more than hadsigned the initial petition to invite the SDF),signed a petition seeking cancelation of theinvitation. When that had no effect, it then, in2012, organized a petition calling for a localplebiscite on the issue. Despite attracting 544signatures, it too had no effect because the CityAssembly voted 3:2 to reject it.

The anti-base position rested on a fundamentalaversion for militarisation, in however initiallyqualified a way. Any military presence, onceestablished, could only grow, feeding the cross-sea confrontation and gradually changing thecharacter of the island and widening thepainful splits it had already caused in its close-

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knit community. It was also feared thatvulnerable island fauna and flora would suffer.The is land is known to be home to 52threatened or endangered plant and animalspecies, including the Yonaguni MerubaneKuwagata (the island’s distinctive stagbeetle).55 And the high-powered electro-magnetic waves that were to be directed fromthe prospective base over the township, school,and kindergarten of Kubura, 24 hours a day,caused fears for the unknown healthconsequences. Asked about this latter in theUpper House of the Diet in November 2014,Prime Minister Abe offered his assurances butdeclined on grounds of military secrecy toreveal the strength of the radar waves.56

Mayor Hokama, for his part, appealed to theisland to support the SDF base proposal notbecause of any reference to “China threat” orpossible military actions but as an economicboost to the flagging island’s economy. In hisre-election campaign in 2013, ignoring theevidence of a deep spl it in the is landcommunity, Hokama had little to say on thebase issue, concentrating instead on promisesof free school lunches, a waste incinerator,town water and sewerage systems, a sportsground, and optical fibre internet connections.Meanwhile, he haggled with the government inTokyo over the price to be paid for the island’scooperation. To secure the consent of theholders of the existing private lease over thedesired site (Minami Bokujo or South Ranch)he succeeded in persuading Tokyo to double itsinitial offer, from 1.1 billion yen to 2.4 billionyen (roughly $25 million, a huge sum for theisland), with an annual “rental” fee of 150million yen (Hokama ruffled Tokyo feathers byhis initial reference to this as a “nuisance fee”).57 He claimed that the arrival of a detachmentof well-paid and mostly young soldiers wouldconstitute a significant economic boost,invigorating the island.58

On 14 April 2013, a delegation of islandersopposed to the base project journeyed to Naha

to protest to Department of Defense officialsbut the contract was signed in June 2013 andHokama re-elected, by the narrowest ofmargins (553:506) in August. Despite efforts tosoften local opposition – such as the despatchof the Ground Self Defense Force band toperform on the island in February 2014 – whenthe Minister for Defense, Onodera Itsunori,arrived from Tokyo to take part in the“Commencement of Works” ceremony on 19April 2014 he faced a rowdy and hostiledemonstration.

As works commenced to level and contour thesite for construction, however, the politicalbalance of the island again shifted following alocal election in September 2014. On 17November a resolution to canvas island opinionby a referendum on the base issue (in effect thesame as had been narrowly rejected two yearsearlier) was adopted, 3:2.59 It provided for thevote to be held within 60 days, with all islandresidents of middle school and above enjoyingright to vote.60 Ten days later the mayor calledfor a “reconsideration” on grounds of theimpropriety of middle school children (andpermanent resident foreigners) being allowedto vote. Procedurally, a “reconsideration” voterequires a two-thirds (rather than simple)majority and was thus thought likely to fail.However, with the two governing partyrepresentatives absenting themselves, the votewas in fact confirmed, 3:0.61 While the politicalwheels to call the project into question andultimately to cancel it and reclaim the site werethus slowly turning, bulldozers and trucks atthe site stepped up their tempo of works to tryto make them irreversible.

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Yonaguni SDF Base Construction Works,December 2014 (Photo: Sato Jun)

If this project were to proceed, soldiers wouldmarch in at the beginning of 2016. If thathappened, it would be the first new militarybase to be constructed in Okinawa sincereversion to Japan in 1972 and since “inter-operability” is the principle regularly invokedin recent exchanges between Japan and theUnited States, the fact of its being “Japanese”would likely be nominal only.

From 2016, if the 150-man unit arrives and itsradar facilities are switched on, islanders canbe sure that they will occupy a place on theChinese People’s Army missile target list. AsOkinawa in 1945 constituted the “sacrificialstones” for defence of mainland Japan, soYonaguni Islanders (and Okinawans in general)would know that in any future clash betweenJapan and China they would be the first victims.Defence, in 2014 as in 1945, was concernedwith Japan’s core, its mainland, not Okinawaand least of all Yonaguni.

Furthermore, the military logic of suchsurveillance from Yonaguni is dubious sinceChinese ships passing from the East China Seato the Pacific naturally prefer the route throughinternational waters in the Miyako straitbetween Okinawa Island and Miyako Island(some hundred or so kilometres to thenortheast). Newspaper reports cited the view

held in the other Japanese SDF services (Airand Maritime) that the real reasons on the partof the GSDF for deployment to Yonaguni were“turf” considerations, to compensate for theloss of role in Hokkaido where, through theCold War, they prepared for a putative landattack by Soviet forces.62 In the post-Cold War,post-War on Terror era, the South-West wasclearly the growth area for Japan’s military,and both Air and Maritime forces had alreadyassured themselves of a major role. Yonaguniwas the Ground force’s chance. A similar moveinto the much larger Ishigaki Island, where thenewly re-elected conservative mayor is knownto be supportive of such stationing and alsowelcoming of Maritime SDF visits, was alsoexpected to follow shortly.63

Yonaguni, Adjacent to the Base Site, 2011(Photo: Shiba Hiromoto)

As Yonaguni Island goes to the polls, mostlikely late in December 2014, to formulate itscollective view of the projected SDF militarybase, opponents of the project wereundoubtedly heartened by the election ofOnaga Takeshi as Okinawan Governor. Onagahad not expressed any view on the Yonagunibase project but it clearly ran against thegeneral thrust of his core policies: returnFutennma, stop Henoko and remove Osprey.

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On Yonaguni Island as elsewhere in theprefecture, the Onaga election therefore gavehope to those who opposed what they saw asthe rush to militarize. Attention on Yonaguniturned again to the 2005 agenda of an EastAsian or East China Sea community. Islandersdrew Onaga’s attention to the idea of opening aregular ferry service to link Yonaguni Island toTaiwan (a two to two and a half hour journey byhydrofoil). It was a simple step but one thatwould radically transform life on the island.64

Beyond that, what they sought was the basicdemocratic right to a say in determining theirown future, and Onaga could not but besupportive. Yonaguni has to be added to theagenda on which he must confront the nationalgovernment.

The speed with which the Abe government hasmoved on Yonaguni during the two years todate of its second term may be seen as an indexof its anxiety to prevent the island developinginto a prolonged standoff such as at Henoko, anOkinawan second, or third, after Takae, front.

5. Prospect

Japan goes to the polls on 14 December.Nominally the people are to judge the Abegovernment’s decision to postpone the raisingof the consumption tax (and generally to makea judgement on “Abenomics”). However,serious political choice is at a minimumbecause of the weak and fragmented state ofthe opposition and the mainland mediacomplicity in framing the issue in Abe’s terms,as narrowly economic. Even on those terms,however, levels of satisfaction with thegovernment’s economic performance aresliding, GDP has begun to shrink and thebenefits from the rises in stock prices and a lowyen exchange rate are concentrated on anarrow social strata, while the majoritystruggle under neo-liberal economic policiesthat continue to replace regular jobs with part-time, temporary, or non-regular ones (nowaccounting for 19 million people of 38 per cent

of the labour force), reduce salaries and erodethe once model health and welfare systems.Other crucial but electorally neglectedquestions include the Abe intention to resumenuclear power generation and nuclear exportpromotion, and to engage Japan in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) with the prospect ofradical changes to the agriculture, health,pharmaceutical and insurance industries.Above all, the Abe challenge to the postwarstate, and his determination to radically revisethe constitution (noted in part one of thisessay) are scarcely addressed in the currentcampaign, though it is certain they will assumevery great importance once the election is outof the way.

While mainland Japanese people thus appearinclined to issue a blank check over their futureto the Abe government, Okinawa (includingYonaguni Island) differ. An entire prefecturenow says “No” (on large matters of security,environment, and indeed democracy) to theauthorities of the national government and tothe leader of the “free world” across the ocean.Okinawa (and Yonaguni) challenge the Abegovernment’s entrenched priority to themilitary and struggle to articulate a path ofenhanced autonomy and closer cooperationwith neighbour states in an open border frameof regional cooperation.

This direction was described some years ago inthe Ryukyu shimpo in these terms,

“the strength of the people opens anew history … changing the kind offoreign relations and security inwhich the military enjoys priorityo v e r h u m a n r i g h t s a n denvironment.” 6 5

Once the election is over, Okinawans gird theirloins for a renewed, perhaps stepped-up, Abeassault. It will be (if or when it happens) upon aprefecture more united than ever, with a

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Governor who seems determined to stand withthe people and who is mulling possible appealto the United Nations. It seems barely crediblethat the Japanese state, which incorporatedRyukyu/Okinawa uniquely in the 19th century asan act of punishment, might resort to the sameviolence, again against Okinawa, in the 21st

century. But such a trajectory looks almostinescapable. The “Okinawa problem” is thebiggest crisis for Japan and the US-Japansecurity relationship since the inauguration ofthe San Francisco Treaty system 62 years ago.It deserves the close attention of both Japanand the world.

Gavan McCormack is emeritus professor ofAustralian National University, editor of TheAsia-Pacific Journal – Japan Focus, author ofmany books and articles, including at this site(see index). His most recent books are:Resistant Islands: Okinawa Confronts Japanand the United States (with Satoko OkaNorimatsu), Rowman and Littlefield, 2012,Japanese and Korean editions from HoritsuBunkasha and Changbi in 2013 and 2014respectively) and Tenkanki no Nihon e –‘pakkusu amerikana’ ka ‘pakkusu ajia’ ka (withJohn W. Dower), NHK Bukkusu, 2014 (inJapanese).

This is a revised and expanded version of alecture given at International ChristianUniversity, Tokyo, Dong-A University, Fusan,and Seoul National University, Seoul, inNovember 2014.

Recommended citation: Gavan McCormack,"The End of the Postwar? The Abe Government,Okinawa, and Yonaguni Island", The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 12, Issue 49, No. 3,December 8, 2014.

1 Justin McCurry, “Japan: teachers to callSenkaku and Takeshima Islands Japaneseterritory,” The Guardian, January 29 2014;Kyodo, “History texts to get an official spin,”Japan Times, November 14 2013.

2 “Statement on Prime Minister Abe’sDecember 26 Visit to Yasukuni,” Press release,US Embassy, Tokyo, Japan.

3 Russel was serving as Assistant Secretary ofState for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (YukaHayashi, “US seeks Abe assurance he won’tvisit war shrine,” Wall Street Journal, January23, 2014.)

4 Daniel R. Russel, testimony, SenateCommittee on Foreign Relations Subcommitteeon Asia and the Pacific, March 4, 2014.

5 Yuka Hayashi, Wall Street Journal, cit.

6 “Obama shi hatsugen de goyaku,” Ryukyushimpo, 27 April 2014.

7 See, inter alia, Gavan McCormack, “The SanFrancisco Treaty at Sixty—The OkinawaAngle,” in Kimie Hara, ed, The San FranciscoSystem and Its Legacies: Transformation andHistorical Reconciliation in the Asia-Pacific,2014

8 Client State: Japan in the American Embrace,London and New York, Verso, 2007. “Zokkokumondai – Beikoku no hoyo to higashi Ajia de nokoritsu,” in Magosaki Ukeru and Kimura Akira,eds, Owaranai “senryo”, Kyoto, Horitsubunkasha, 2013, pp. 18-38．

9 “Japan’s “Positive Pacifism”: Issues ofHistorical Memory in Contemporary ForeignPolicy,” Brown Journal of World Affairs (BrownUniversity, Watson Institute for InternationalStudies), Vol. XX, issue 2, spring-summer 2014,pp. 73-92.

1 0 Nakano Koichi, “Neoribe jidai no eanashonarizumu,” Saraba dokusaisha, kensho,boso suru Abe seiken," Shukan kinyobi, rinjizokan, 17 April 2014, pp. 8-10．

11 A recurrent Abe theme. See: “Hatsugengoroku – shugiin giin Abe Shinzo koshiki saito.”

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12 One 2014 study notes that, apart from itsoverwhelming representation in the Abecabinet, Nihon Kaigi had some 35,000 membersin 228 branches, including 229 Dietmembersand over 1,700 members of local districtassemblies. “Abe seiken o kanzen shihai suru‘Nihon kaigi’ no shotai,” Friday, 22-29 August2014. Other studies vary slightly some of thosefigures but not the overall weight. The numberof Dietmembers is given at 231 and 47prefectural branches are noted in “Abe naikakutakaha giren kara 15 nin,” Asahi shimbun, 6September 2014, and Tokyo shimbun gives thefigure of 289 Dietmembers according to “Nihonsaidai no uyoku soshiki ‘Nihonkaigi’ o kenshosuru,” 31 July 2014).

13 “Kokumin tohyo jitsugen e kaikenha no ugokikappatsuteki,” Asahi shimbun, 12 November2014. The powerfully backed new organizationplans to collect 10 million signatures to back itscampaign for revision by 2016, i.e., within oneyear and 8 months).

14 “Futenma soki henkan o chijisen de Nakaimashi ga koyaku happyo,” Ryukyu shimpo, 19October 2014.

15 Nakaima won with 335,000 votes in 2010.

1 6“Henoko chushi 80% “eikyo nai’ Sugakanbochokan kaiken, honshi seron chosa,Ryukyu shimpo, 26 August 2014.

17 “Henoko isetsu ‘shukushuku to susumeru’Onaga shi tosen ni kambo chokan,” Ryukyushimpo, 17 November 2014.

18 “Umetate 22 nichi chakushu,” Okinawataimusu, 20 November 2014.

19 See evidence of opinions of Walter Mondale(then US ambassador to Japan), William Perry(then Defense Secretary), and Joseph Nye (thenDeputy Assistant Defense Secretary), inHeianna Sumiyo, “Kaiheitai no Okinawa churyu‘Nihon ga yobo’ moto chu-Nichi Bei taishi nokojutsu kiroku,” Okinawa taimusu, 13

September 2014.

20 Heianna Sumiyo, ibid.

21 Nakazato Isao, “Minami no ejji kara Nihon oyusaburu henkaku no nami,” Sekai, November2014, pp. 105-121, at p. 109.

2 2 “Kokunai shizen 19 dantai, Henoko‘Minaoshi’ motomeru chushi fukume asesu saijisshi mo,” Ryukyu shimpo, 11 November 2014.See also “Henoko minaoshi yosei,” ed, Okinawataimusu, 14 November 2014.

23 Ryukyu shimpo, 5 May and 26 August 2014(“Seron chosa: ‘Henoko chushi’ isetsu kyokohantai hirogaru”). Just 19.8 per cent favouredcontinuation of the works. Even in theconservative bloc, 70.1 per cent of LDPsupporters and 91.7 of New Komeitosupporters said it should be stopped.

24 For my 1 July report (on You-tube), sailingaround the Bay on the eve of this closure, seehere.

25 “Kasetsu sanbashi chakushu, minshushugi nihansuru banko da,” Okinawa taimusu, 21November 2014.

26 “Henoko 85 sai josei kega, ichiji ishikiushinau,” Okinawa taimusu, 21 November2014.

27 “Kenkei ga Henoko shusai bogai, kasha, eigakantoku o haijo,” Ryukyu shimpo, 21 November2014.

28 “Kenkei ga Henoko shusai bogai,” op. cit.

29“Kussaku sagyo ni chakushu, mohaya ‘kyofuseiji’ da, banko chushi min-i o toe,” Ryukyushimpo, 18 August 2014, also posted on theweb in English as “Abe administration signalsfuture reign of terror in Henoko.”

30 Prime Minister Mori Yoshiro in 2000 said,“The teachers union in Okinawa is controlled

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by the Communist Party and opposes anythingthe government does. The two Okinawannewspapers are the same,” quoted in “Shimbunto kenryoku,” (4) “Kaiju fuhatsu tsuyomeruatsuryoku,” Okinawa taimusu, 9 April 2014.

31 “Kenmin no mina sama e,” letter fromGovernor Nakaima,, n.d. (an “auspiciousOctober day”) 2014.

32 “Consolidated Plan for Facilities and Areas,”April 2013.

33 “‘Gonen inai’ hitei chabangeki no zokko wamu imi da,” Ryukyu shimpo, ed., April 2 2014.

34 “Marines won’t leave Futenma till new basebuilt: Wissler,” Japan Times, April 12, 2014. USPacific Commander Admiral (Samuel J))Locklear told a Senate Committee hearing thesame. (“‘Gonen inai teishi hitei’ kyoko no tanpoto shonin no tsumi,” Okinawa taimusu, April 132014.)

35 “Gonen-nai teishi ‘kuso’ Henoko o minaosujiki da,” editorial, Okinawa taimusu, 17 October2014.

36 Those who placed highest importance on thebase issue were 39.7 per cent according to onesurvey, 46.8 according to another, with“economy” second on 29 per cent and 21.9 percent respectively (Okianwa taimusu, 7November, and Ryukyu shimpo, 11 Novemberrespectively).

37 “‘Chiji, kakekomi shonin’ shugiin de kenminno shinpan o,” Ryukyu shimpo, editorial, 6December 2014.

38“Three candidates to run in the gubernatorialelection,” Ryukyu Shimpo, 24 July 2014.

39There was some evidence of vacillation onOnaga’s part early in the campaign. “Onaga-shie asu shutsuba yosei ‘hokaku’ koeta ri-da-’keizai yushi,” Okinawa taimusu, 7 August 2014.

40 Businessman Taira Chokei, at the declarationof the poll, 16 November 2014.

41 Some pointed with suspicion to the “wateringdown” of Onaga’s initial electoral pledge, from“withdraw the license to reclaim” (umetateshonin o tekkai suru) to determination “not toallow construction of any new base at Henokoout of respect for the voices of the Okinawanpeople who want the license cancelled” (shonintekkai o nzomu kenmin no koe o soncho shi,Henoko kichi wa tsukurasenai) (“Yato, OnagaTakeshi shi ni ipponka, kenchijisen kohosha,”Ryukyu shimpo, 23 July 2014.) Yaeyama nippoon 3 November published a copy of thedocument dated January 2013 in which Onagaput his name (even if as witness rather thanparty) to a statement in which Ishigaki mayorNakayama declared that he did not see theKempakusho (then being organized) as rulingout a Futenma replacement within Okinawa.This revelation weakened the core Onaga claimthat the Kempakusho had been unequivocal inruling out Futenma replacement within theprefecture and that it had the endorsement of“all 41 local government heads.” (“Kennaiisetsu hitei sezu,” Yaeyama nippo, 3 November2014. See also “Onaga Takeshi,” Wikipedia, 9November 2014.)

42 “aruyuru shuho o kushi shite, Henoko ni shinkichi wa tsukurasenai.”

43 “Futenma kichi no heisa, tekkyo, kennaiisetsu dannen, Osupurei haibi tekkai o tsuyokumotomeru.”

44 “Zen Naha shicho, Onaga Takeshi shi gakataru ‘Okinawa chiji sen’ shutsuba e nokakugo,” Nikkan gendai, 13 October 2014.

45 “Okinawa keizai hatten no saidai no sogaiyoin.”

46 Shimabukuro Jun, “Min-i no kaizu - 2014 nenkenchijisen no igi,” Ryukyu shimpo, 13November 2014. And see discussion in SatoManabu, “Min-i ‘shinko taisei’ o taosu,” Ryukyu

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shimpo, 19 November 2014.

47 On “positive pacifism,” Gavan McCormack,“Japan’s ‘positive pacifism’,” op. cit. On “rule oflaw,” Uchiyama Hiroshi, “‘Ho no shihai’ kataruAbe shusho no shiri metsuretsu,” Sekai,December 2014, pp. 29-32.

48 “Ketsudan to jikko – Futenma kichi nohenkan, jitsugen e,” Okinawa taimusu (andRyukyu shimpo), 14 October 2014.

49 “Nakaima shi shiji 19 nin,” Okinawa taimusu,14 November 2014.

50 Exit poll detail according to a Japanesecolleague quoting an informed source.

51 John W. Dower and Gavan McCormack,Tenkanki no Nihon e – pakkusu Americana kapakkusu Ajia ka, Tokyo, NHK Bukkusu, chapter3; Gavan McCormack, “Yonaguni: Dilemmas ofa Frontier Island in the East China Sea,” TheAsia-Pacific Journal – Japan Focus, 1 October,2 0 1 2 .http://www.japanfocus.org/-Gavan-McCormack/3837

5 2 “Kenmin no chugoku insho 9 wari gahiteiteki, Senkaku de akka,” Okinawa taimusu,16 April, 2014.

53 Gavan McCormack, “Yonaguni: Dilemmas”op. cit.

54 “Chomin 3 dantai, Yonaguni e no rikuji haibitekkai o,” Yaeyama Mainichi shimbun, 15 April,2014.

55 “Zetsumetsu kigu made ’52 shu seisoku’,”Okinawa taimusu, 15 April, 2014.

56 Response by Prime Minister Abe to questionfrom Itokazu Keiko on possible adverse healtheffects of SDF radar on Yonaguni. 25November 2014.

57 “Yonaguni rikuji yochi, hoshogaku 3 kagetsude bai,” Okinawa taimusu, 15 April, 2014.

58 The evidence of Tsushima Island, roughlyh a l f - w a y b e t w e e n F u k u o k a C i t y i nsouthwestern Japan and Pusan in Korea,suggests otherwise. When that city invited theSDF in 1959, its population was 70,000. Now itis around 35,000.

59 “Jumin tohyo 17 nichi jorei kaketsu e,”Ryukyu shimpo, 15 November 2014 and“‘Tozen’ ‘naze ima sara’,” Ryukyu shimpo, 18November 2014.

60 The precedent for middle school studentshaving right to vote was set in 2004, in aplebiscite on whether the island should acceptincorporation in the larger island of Ishigaki orremain on its own. It chose the latter.

61 “Yonaguni cho gikai, jieitai jumin tohyo joreian o saikaketsu,” RBC Ryukyu hoso, 28November 2014.

62 “Yonaguni rikuji kikoshiki, haibi kakudai e nofuseki,” Ryukyu shimpo, April 20 2014.

63 “Yonaguni rikuji kikoshiki,” ibid.

64 Memo by Tasato Chiyoki, member of theYonaguni town assembly, to then Okinawagubernatorial candidate Onaga Takeshi, 17October 2014 (copy courtesy Mr Tasato).

65 “Shimin no chikara ga atarashii rekishi ohiraku,” Ryukyu shimpo, 30 November 2000.