The  hidden  rules  and  open  secrets  of  corporate  governance.  

Preliminary  results  and  research  plan  of  European  Interlocking  directorates.    

Elisa  Bello*1,  Sergios  Lenis1,  Johan  Koskinen1,  Moses  Boudourides2,  Ning  Gao1  and  Mar<n  Evere>1  

   

1University  of  Manchester    2University  of  Patras  

The  Mitchell  Centre  for    Social  Network  Analysis  

A  board  of  directors  is  a  body  of  members,  either  elected  or  appointed,  who  supervise  and  manage  the  ac<vi<es  of  an  organiza<on.      -­‐  In  small  private  companies,  the  directors  and  execu<ve  managers  are  normally  

the  same  people.  -­‐  Rela<onship  owners  (stakeholders)/directors  -­‐  In  large  public  companies  execu<ve  tasks  are  covered  by  managers,  while  board  

in  is  in  charge  of  the  corporate  governance  (recrui<ng  and  compensa<ng  the  CEO  and  the  managers,  defining  the  strategic  goals  and  direc<ons  of  the  organiza<on,  developing  a  governance  system  which  regulates  how  the  board  interacts  with  the  CEO,  looking  aWer  the  assets  of  the  company)  

Func<ons  

Internal  (Execu<ve)   They  serve  execu<ve  func<ons  within  the  organiza<on  

External  (non  execu<ve)   They  are  officers  of  other  large  firms,  eg:  bankers,  insurance  company  execu<ves,  investment  bankers,  a>orneys,  accountants,  and  officers  of  firms  in  a  variety  of  nonfinancial  sectors,  representa<ves  of  groups  such  as  civil  rights  organiza<ons,    of  large  external  stockholders,  including  those  involved  in  recent  acquisi<ons  of  the  firm.  

Defini<on  

Ø  Interest  in  the  representa<on  of  banks  and  financial  ins<tu<on  (financial  capital).  Due  to  the  conspicuous  investments,  financial  ins<tu<ons  started  to  request  increasing  controlling  posi<ons  in  large  organiza<ons,  thus  producing  numerous  interlocks.    

Ø  Geographical  differences:    §  one  <er  (all  directors  in  the  same  board,  like  in  the  US)  or  two-­‐<er  

(execu<ve  directors  in  one  board,  non  execu<ve  directors  in  another  board,  like  in  Germany)  board  structure.    

§  Uneven  geographical  distribu<on  of  firms  included  in  the  top  European  companies  together  with  varia<ons  in  the  organiza<ons’  sectors.  The  UK  sample  of  top  financial  firms  tend  to  include  more  capital  (finance  related)  corpora<ons,  while  Germany  counts  more  labour  (industry)  oriented  firms.  

§  When  looking  at  the  overall  European  network,  German,  English,  French  and  Dutch  firms  are  over-­‐represented,  and  also  account  for  most  of  the  European  interlocks  (Heemskerk  2010).  

Ø  Evolu<on  of  interlocks:  are  they  increasing  or  decreasing?  Ø  Lack  of  variety  in  gender  and  ethnicity    

Interlocking  directorates  occur  when  directors  sit  in  different  boards  

The  old  boys’  network  refers  to  an  informal  group  of  people  with  a  shared  educa<onal  background,  tradi<onally  former  students  of  elite  

schools.    

Reasons  for  forming  old  boys  networks:    Ø  In  UK,  eli<st  public  schools  (like  Eton  and  Winchester)  and  Universi<es  (like  

Oxford  and  Cambridge),  have  tradi<onally  being  acknowledged  with  their  role  in  shaping  a  close  knit  group  of  former  members  who  would  then  maintain  privileged  rela<ons  with  each  other.  

Ø  Similar  func<ons  of  the  Grandes  Ecoles  in  France.  Ø  In  the  Netherlands,  the  student  fraterni<es  (studentencorpora)enabled  elite  

dis<nc<on  at  the  universi<es.    Ø  In  Japan,  elites  are  formed  via  academic  background,  poli<cal  affilia<ons,  

rela<onships  with  the  government,  and  marriage  <es.  In  the  Japanese  culture  the  term  “old  boy”  specifically  refers  to  a  former  government  official  who  aWer  re<rement  is  re-­‐employed  in  poli<cs  or  in  the  private  sector  due  to  the  exper<se  and  personal  rela<onships  he  accumulated  in  his  former  profession  as  a  bureaucrat  

Ways  of  maintaining  old  boys’  networks:      Ø  Various  informal  strategies  through  which  the  Japanese  elites  maintain  their  

networks,  like  the  mee<ngs  of  the  “Tuesday  club”,  or  private  lunches,  or  even  official  mee<ngs  organised  by  the  ministry  to  keep  the  former  bureaucrats  informed  on  relevant  policy  issues  .  

Ø  Similarly  a  rela<onship  was  found  between  the  loca<on  of  firms’  headquarters  in  ci<es  where  there  are  exclusive  upper  class  social  clubs  and  the  maintenance  of  local  interlocks,  which  conversely  was  not  found  for  firms  without  headquarters  in  places  with  such  clubs.    

Thus,  old  boys’  network      

§  Forms  on  the  ground  of  elite  family  background  and  shared  educa<onal  background  

§  It  is  preserved  via  a  common  lifestyles  that  requires  belonging  to  the  same  clubs  and  a>ending  the  same  social  events.    

Reasons  for  interlocks  

•  Collusion  and  social  cohesion:  interlocks  are  used  by  elites  and  power  groups  to  maintain  privileges  and  exercise  control  over  the  economy.  Elite  studies.  No  systema<c  evidence  of  interlocks  as  mechanisms  to  coordinate  specific  interests  and  favouring  collusion.  

•  Co-­‐opta<on  and  monitoring:  interlocks  as  an  expression  of  inter-­‐firms’  resource  dependency.  The  interlocks  may  be  used  to  control  the  external  environment  and  access  resources  not  produced  internally,  or  to  pass  informa<on  on  new  policies  and  governances  at  work  in  similar  firms.  Inclusion  of  banks,  financial  and  insurance  companies  in  the  boards  of  directors  as  a  way  in  which  firms  may  guarantee  access  to  liquidi<es,  and  conversely  investors  keep  control  over  their  investments  

•  Legi<macy  and  career  advancement:  new  companies  try  to  find  directors  with  some  established  reputa<on,  already  serving  in  the  boards  of  successful  organiza<ons,  with  a  diversity  of  skills  and  a  large  number  of  personal  contacts  Unclear  direc<on  of  causality:  interlocked  directors  may  improve  a  firm’s  success,  or  successful  firms  a>ract  well  connected  directors.    

Network  models  of  interlocking  directorates  

Ø One-­‐mode,  “directors  by  directors”  or  “firms  by  firms”,  networks.    §  Analysis  of  composi<on,  as  in  the  type  of  directors  and  firms  that  belong  

to  them  (gender,  geographical  loca<on,  industry  sector)  §  Analysis  of  structure,  by  looking  at  size,  cohesiveness,  centraliza<on  and  

structural  hole    §  Analysis  of  dynamics,  by  observing  if  the  number  of  interlocks  increases  or  

diminishes  over  <me.  SIENA  models  of  1mode:  preferen<al  a>achment  (legi<macy),  homophily  (collusion),  brokerage  (monitoring).  

 ü  Unimodal  projec<ons  implies  a  loss  of  informa<on  (value  of  <es)  and  spurious  

structural  features  in  the  randomiza<on  of  the  original  bipar<te  network.    ü  In  these  models  “changes  are  largely  explained  through  corporate  specific  

covariates  (size,  solvency,  profitability,  etc.)  rather  than  in  terms  of  structural  aspects  of  the  bipar<te  (and  unimodal)  network(s),  i.e.  endogenous  self-­‐organising”  (Koskinen  et  al.  2012).    

ü  Previous  models  assume  dyad-­‐independence.  

Models  for  bipar<te  and  mul<par<te  networks  

1.  Koskinen  et  al.  (2012)  adapt  a  stochas<c  actor-­‐oriented  model  to  the  study  of  the  evolu<on  of  bipar<te  networks,  which  aims  to  model  the  evolu<on  through  <me  of  the  random  set  of  edges  via  a  con<nuous-­‐<me  Markov  chain.    

Ø  Peer  referral  measured  by  coun<ng  the  number  of  3paths  that,  in  <me,  become  4cycles  

Ø  Homophily  and  heterogeneous  cycles  

2.  Bohman  (2012)  observes  the  probability  that  a  director  interlock  is  formed  if  two  firms  are  owned  by  the  same  owner,  thus  forming  a  4cycle  of  one  owner,  two  firms,  and  one  director.  3mode,  as  directors  and  owners  can  only  relate  to  firms  

 3.  Robins  and  Alexander  (2004)  compare  the  interlocking  directorates’  system  in  

US  and  Australia  in  1996.  They  test  whether  these  networks  present  the  proper<es  of  small  worlds,  consis<ng  simultaneously  in  short  path  lengths  and  high  clustering.  Local  proper<es  are    Ø  the  geodesic  distances  between  companies,  between  people  and  between  

companies  and  people;    Ø  the  degree  distribu<on  of  both  people  and  companies;    Ø  the  number  of  edges,  stars,  3paths  and  4cycles;    Ø  and  the  bipar<te  clustering  coefficient  calculated  as  the  ra<o  of  4cycles  over  

3paths.    

Compare  observed  against  randomised  networks  as  the  best  way  to  sta:s:cally  test  network  proper:es  where  observa:ons  (dyads)  are  not  independent  

The  project:  modelling  the  evolu<on  of  the  bipar<te  network  of  European  interlocking  directorates  

It  aims  to  develop  innova<ve  methods  for  the  study  of  large,  mul<ple  and  longitudinal  two  mode  networks  of  directors.    It  does  so  by  inves<ga<ng  the  rela<onship  between  the  “old  boys’  network”  and  the  system  of  peer  referral  in  the  boards  of  directors  of  European  firms  listed  on  the  stock  exchange.  

AIM  1:  To  look  at  overall  structure  and  composi<on  of  the  social  network  of  both  firms  and  directors.  In  par<cular,  we  want  to  see  if  it  is  possible  to  iden<fy  some  meaningful  clusters,  and  if  these  clusters  represent  significant  subgroups.  We  aim  to  observe:  Ø  The  posi<on  of  specific  sectors,  like  financial  organiza<ons,  in  the  network  of  European  

interlocks.    Ø  If  the  network  is  na<onally  bounded,  or  if  it  is  possible  to  observe  the  emergence  of  an  

European  system  of  interlocks,  and  if  that  is  the  case,  if  some  countries,  like  Germany,  France,  the  Netherlands,  and  the  UK,  occupy  central  posi<ons.    

Ø  From  an  individual  perspec<ve,  we  want  to  see  if  gender  and  ethnicity  boundaries  are  s<ll  in  place,  if  there  are  any  significant  differences  between  execu<ve  and  non-­‐execu<ve  directors,  and  if  it  is  possible  to  iden<fy  the  common  characteris<cs  of  big  linkers.  

AIM  2:  To  verify  if  a  peer  referral  system  is  in  place,  and  if  it  is  has  been  increasing  or  declining  through  the  years.    Ø  We  do  so  by  looking  at  how  previous  affilia<ons  to  the  same  board  of  directors  influence  

subsequent  appointments,  controlling  for  relevant  a>ributes  like  gender,  na<onality,  and  age.    

Ø  We  model  the  probability  of  closing  a  3path  in  a  4cycle  over  <me  by  comparing  the  observed  data  against  randomly  generated  networks.  The  baseline  network  is  the  bimodal  “director  by  firms”  network.  

AIM  3:  To  inves<gate  if  there  is  a  rela<onship  between  the  various  informal  networks  that  emerge  over  <me  by  virtue  of  being  affiliated  in  various  types  of  networks  (educa<on,  leisure,  voluntary  ac<vi<es,  and  the  like)  and  the  subsequent  peer  referral  mechanisms.    Ø  We  do  so  by  observing  the  probability  that  a  3path  closes  into  a  4cycle  depending  on  

affilia<ons  to  other  ac<vi<es.    A>ributes  (of  people  and  firms)  are  used  as  covariates.  

Circles = directors  Squares = firms  Hexagon=universities  Stars=private association  Plus=previous employment  

The  dataset  

Boardex  data  covers  the  years  1999  to  2010  for  2.208  European  boards  Ø  Company  a>ributes:  geographical  loca<on;  the  sector;  the  financial  index  in  

which  it  is  listed;  the  market  cap;  the  revenue  at  the  end  of  the  year.  Ø  Director  a>ributes:  age;  date  of  birth;  gender;  na<onality;  the  number  of  boards  

to  date  s/he  has  been  si*ng  on;  the  number  of  current  boards  s/he  sits  on;  the  average  number  of  years  spent  in  quoted  boards.  

Ø  Director  employment  history:  it  links  director  and  companies  indica<ng  current  and  past  board  roles  (in  quoted  firms);  current  and  past  non-­‐board  roles  (in  non  quoted  firms).    

Ø  Director  educa<on  history:  the  country  of  the  ins<tu<on,  the  type  of  qualifica<on  achieved,  and  the  date  of  the  achievement.  

Ø  Director  history  in  other  ac<vi<es:  geographical  loca<on  of  these  ins<tu<ons,  and  current  and  past  roles.  

    Directors   Firms  All   38994   2744  One  mode  dd_current   17441   2156  One  mode  dd_past   28881   2276  One  mode  dd_maincomp_current   12421      One  mode  dd_maincomp_past   26825      One  mode  ff_current   17441   1613  One  mode  ff_past   28881   2276  One  mode  ff_maincomp_current   1436  One  mode  ff_maincomp_past       2229  

Ø  One  mode  networks,  director  by  director  and  company  by  company,  where  weight  =  the  director  has  sat  in  the  company  board  more  than  once,  or  in  different  roles  (quoted/private).    

Ø  Two  mode,  director  by  company  network,  which  cons<tute  the  dependent  variable  in  the  longitudinal  analysis.  

Preliminary  analysis:  directors’  a>ributes  

0.2%  3.9%  

16.8%  

26.2%  22.3%  

7.8%  

23.0%  

Less  than  30  

30-­‐39   40-­‐49   50-­‐59   60-­‐69   Over  70   n.a  

Directors:  age  distribu<on  %  of  age  categories  

11.5%  

88.5%  

F   M  

Directors:  gender  distribu<on  %  of  gender  categories  

0.00%  5.00%  10.00%  15.00%  20.00%  25.00%  30.00%  35.00%  40.00%  45.00%  50.00%  

Albania  

Indo

nesia

 Latvia  

Lituania  

Slovakia  

Estonia  

Mon

aco  

Carib

bean  

Croa<a

 Be

rmud

a  Bu

lgaria  

Sloven

ia  

Romania  

Hungary  

Ukraina  

Cyprus  

Czech  Re

p  New

 Zeland  

Iceland  

Israel  

South  Asia  

China  

Africa  

East  

Leichten

stein  

Middle  East  

Poland

 India  

Japan  

North  Africa  

Australia  

South  Am

erica  

Luxembu

rg  

South  Africa  

Canada  

Russia  

Finland  

Portugal  

Austria

 Greece  

Denm

ark  

Ireland

 Be

lgium  

Switzerland

 Spain  

Norwegia  

Nethe

rland

s  US  

Italy  

Swed

en  

UK  

France  

Germ

any  

Unkno

wn  

Directors:  na<onality  

11.4%  

42.2%  

24.4%  

8.7%  

2.8%   1.1%   0.5%   0.5%  

8.4%  

Less  than  1   1  to  5   5  to  10   10  to  15   15  to  20   20  to  25   25  to  30   Over  30   na  

Directors:  %  of  average  years  in  boards    

75.6%  

12.1%  4.0%   1.6%   0.7%   0.2%   0.1%   0.1%   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%  

5.6%  

1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10   11   12   13   15   n.a  

Directors:  number  of  current  boards    

Descrip<ve   Value  MEAN   1.319  MAXIMUM  VALUE   15  MINIMUM  VALUE   1  STANDARD  DEVIATION   0.798  

Preliminary  analysis:  companies’  a>ributes  

0%  2%  4%  6%  8%  10%  12%  14%  16%  

Germ

any  

France  

UK  

Swed

en  

Nethe

rland

s  Sw

itzerland

 Ita

ly  

Norway  

Repu

blic  Of  

Spain  

Belgium  

Greece  

Finland  

Denm

ark  

Austria

 Luxembo

urg  

Russian  

Portugal  

Poland

 Cyprus  

Iceland  

North  Africa   US  

China  

Mon

aco  

South  Asia  

Hong  Kon

g  Croa<a

 Czech  Re

public  

Hungary  

Malta  

Ukraine

 Canada  

Liechten

stein  

Romania  

Australia  

Berm

uda  

Bulgaria  

Carib

bean  

Sloven

ia  

South  Africa  

South  Am

erica  

Unkno

wn  

Companies:  na<onality  

0%  1%  2%  3%  4%  5%  6%  7%  8%  9%  

Real  Estate  

SoWw

are  &  Com

puter  

Banks  

Transport  

Speciality  &  Other  

Oil  &  Gas  

Pharmaceu

<cals  a

nd  

Engine

ering  &  

Diversified

 Indu

stria

ls  Co

nstruc<o

n  &  

Med

ia  &  

Investmen

t  Com

panies  

Health  

Telecommun

ica<

on  

Food

 Produ

cers  &  

Busin

ess  S

ervices  

Clothing,  Leisure  and

 Electron

ic  &  Electrical  

Leisu

re  &  Hotels  

Inform

a<on

 Mining  

Rene

wable  Ene

rgy  

Chem

icals  

Gene

ral  Retailers  

Insurance  

Automob

iles  &

 Parts  

Private  Eq

uity  

Steel  &

 Other  M

etals  

Electricity

 Ho

useh

old  Prod

ucts  

U<li<es  -­‐  Other  

Beverages  

Food

 &  Drug  Re

tailers  

Forestry  &  Paper  

Aerospace  &  Defen

ce  

Containe

rs  &  

Life  Assurance  

Publish

ing  

Tobacco  

Blank  Ch

eck  /  S

hell  

Consum

er  Services  

Who

lesale  Trade

 Re

gulators  

Trade  Associa<

on  

Companies  by  sector  

Over  100000  0.5%   50000-­‐100000  

1%  

10000-­‐50000  7%  

1000-­‐10000  22%  

Less  1000  70%  

Companies:  revenue  (Millions  of  Euros).      

One  mode  “directory  by  director”  network  

The  “director  by  director”  network  is  obtained  by  transforming  the  two  mode  original  “director  by  company”  network  into  the  corresponding  one  mode,  where  the  value  indicates  the  number  of  boards  two  directors  sit  together.    The  analysis  is  done  on  the  filtered  data  to  be  matched  with  people’s  a>ributes,  both  for  current  and  past  appointments,  reducing  the  total  number  of  directors  in  the  network  to  17441  nodes  in  the  current  network,  and  28881  nodes  in  the  past  network.    

The  current  network  

There  are  614  components  in  the  current  network,  where  the  main  one  includes  71%  (12421)  of  directors.  The  others  are  all  very  small  components,  with  less  than  50  directors  in  them.    The  distribu<on  of  directors’  a>ributes  in  components,  in  terms  of  age,  gender  and  na<onality,  does  not  significantly  diverge  from  the  overall  directors’  characteris<cs.    A>ribute  of  directors  in  main  component   Yule’s  Q  (+1=heterophily)  

Gender   -­‐0.0092  Na<onality   0.9005  Age   0.0859  

The  past  network  

There  are  313  components  in  the  past  network,  half  than  the  number  of  components  in  the  current  network,  indica<ng  a  progressive  fragmenta<on.  Also,  main  one  includes  93%  (26825)  of  directors,  compared  to  the  71%  of  the  current  network,  confirming  this  fragmenta<on  tendency.    The  distribu<on  of  a>ributes  is  rela<vely  similar  to  the  one  of  the  overall  directors,  with  the  only  difference  that    Ø  the  directors  aged  between  60  and  70  are  more  numerous  than  the  average  of  

all  directors,  and  of  the  current  networks  Ø men  are  slightly  overrepresented  

A>ribute  of  directors  in  main  component   Yule’s  Q  (+1=heterophily)  Gender   0.1073  Na<onality   0.9240  Age   0.0858  

One  mode  “company  by  company”  network  

The  “company  by  company”  network  is  obtained  by  transforming  the  two  mode  original  “director  by  company”  network  into  the  corresponding  one  mode,  where  the  value  indicates  the  number  of  directors  two  boards  share  together.    The  analysis  is  done  on  the  filtered  data  to  be  matched  with  companies’  a>ributes,  both  for  current  and  past  appointments,  reducing  the  total  number  of  firms  to  1613  nodes  in  the  current  network,  and  2276  nodes  in  the  past  network  

The  current  network  

There  are  75  components  in  the  current  company  by  company  network,  and  the  main  one  includes  89%  (1436)  of  nodes.    The  distribu<on  of  a>ributes  slightly  diverges  from  the  overall  companies.    Ø  UK  is  not  well  embedded  in  the  main  component,  although  it  represents  the  

third  country  for  number  of  companies.    Ø  SoWware  companies  are  not  predominant  in  the  main  component,  despite  the  

large  number  of  companies  listed.    Ø  The  main  component  seem  to  be  composed  by  companies  with  a  slightly  be>er  

revenue  than  average,  possibly  indica<ng  the  tendency  of  interlocking  with  firms  of  similar  size.  

A>ribute  of  companies  in  main  component   Yule’s  Q  (+1=heterophily)  Geographical  loca<on   0.9346  Sector   0.6644  Revenue   0.3809  

The  past  network  

22  components,  many  less  than  in  the  current  one.  All  the  companies  used  to  belong  to  the  main  component  (97%).  Switzerland  is  be>er  interlocked  than  in  the  past.  SoWware  companies  and  other  financial  sectors  were  be>er  embedded.  No  differences  in  the  Yule’s  Q  compared  to  the  current  network.  

Discussion  

Directors:  Ø  Male  dominance  Ø  Most  of  them  in  the  age  range  of  40  –  70  Ø  Most  of  them  European  Ø  Years  in  boards:  between  1  and  15  Ø  75%  do  not  interlock,  and  most  interlocks  only  share  2/3  boards    Companies:  Ø  Overrepresenta<on  of  Germany,  France,  UK,  Sweden.  Followed  by  Netherlands,  

Switzerland  and  Italy  Ø  Sectors:  Banks  and  financial  ins<tu<ons  s<ll  occupy  the  third  and  fiWh  place  in  

terms  of  presence  Ø  70%  with  a  revenue  less  than  1000  millions,  but  22%  between  1000-­‐10.000,  and  

few  very  rich  companies    

Discussion  

One  mode  director  by  director  network:  Ø  1  large  component  Ø  Interlockers  interlock  with  people  of  different  na<onali<es  (but  mainly  

European)  Ø  The  network  is  fragmen<ng  in  a  higher  number  of  small  components,  and  the  

main  component  is  decreasing  in  size  Ø  More  men  and  older  people  in  the  past  network,  possibly  indica<ng  the  

tendency  to  appoint  female  and  younger  directors    One  mode  company  by  company  network:  Ø  89%  of  companies  in  the  main  component,  although  this  is  decreasing  in  size  

(fragmenta<on)  Ø  UK  and  soWware  companies  are  less  embedded  in  the  main  component  

compare  to  their  overrepresenta<on  in  the  data  Ø  Homophily  in  revenue:  interlocks  between  companies  of  similar  success  Ø  No  na<onal  networks,  but  a  European  one  Ø  Directors  interlock  across  sectors:  no  sector  specializa<on    

Challenges  

Ø Large  networks:  implementa<on  of  network  measures  in  Phyton  Ø Missing  data:  lack  of  informa<on  across  all  the  variables  

S<ll  to  do…  

Ø Analysis  of  the  old  boys  network:  §  Educa<onal  ins<tu<ons  §  Other  ac<vi<es  

Ø Modelling  bipar<te  network  (peer  referral  system)  §  Implementa<on  of  directors  trajectories  

Ø Modelling  mul<mode  networks  (condi<oning  peer  referral  system  against  old  boys  network  

Ø How  to  handle  missing  data.  Possibility  of  crossing  informa<on  with  other  datasets,  and/or  of  es<ma<ng  the  missing  informa<on  

The  project  is  intended  to  be  the  first  step  toward  a  bigger  proposal  to  look  at  extending  the  analysis  to  the  US  and  UK  networks,  and  to  connect  the  various  na<onal  networks  together.      This  last  step  will  grant  the  possibility  of  observing  cross-­‐na<onal  forms  of  corporate  governance  over  <me,  and  to  answer  some  substan<al  ques<ons  over  the  extension  and  the  connec<veness  of  the  globaliza<on  process.  

Future  projects  

If  you  are  interested  in  par:cipa:ng  to  future  bids,  please  come  to  talk  to  us!    elisa.belloA@manchester.ac.uk