uk era uk employment retention and advancement demonstration
DESCRIPTION
UK ERA UK Employment Retention and Advancement Demonstration. Policies Studies Institute Seminar London, England 6 December 2011. Final Impact and Cost-Benefit Results. Goals of the UK ERA demonstration 2003-2011. - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
UK ERAUK Employment Retention and Advancement Demonstration
Final Impact and Cost-Benefit Results
Policies Studies Institute SeminarLondon, England6 December 2011
2
Test a new model to help low-income groups keep jobs and advance in labor market
• Little attention was paid to these issues in British or US welfare-to-work policy
• New demo inspired by US example (ERA)
• “Hunches,” but no evidence on what did/didn’t work
Help build capacity in UK to conduct large-scale random assignment experiments
Not your typical British “pilot”
Goals of the UK ERA demonstration2003-2011
3
Evaluation sponsor• UK Department for Work and Pensions (DWP)
US Research Partner• MDRC (NYC-based, non-profit social policy research
organization; leader in RCTs)
UK research partners• Policy Studies Institute (PSI)• Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS)• National Institute for Economic & Social Research (NIESR)• Office for National Statistics (ONS)
Lessons traveled in both directions!
Transatlantic collaboration
4
Unemployed and entering New Deal welfare-to-work program:
(1) New Deal Lone Parents (NDLP)
(2) New Deal 25-Plus (ND25+)
Working part-time (lone parents):(3) Working Tax Credit (WTC) group
UK ERA Target groups
5
Operates within Jobcentre Plus centers• Separate staff• In some offices, separate post-employment teams
33-month program: • If unemployed at intake, get job placement
through New Deal w-t-w program (~ 9 months)
• Post-employment for all who work: 24+ months of “in-work” job coaching and support from “Advancement Support Advisors”
24 months of financial incentives
UK ERA model
6
Retention bonus £ 400 3 times/yr for for sustained full-time work 2 yrs (£ 2,400 total)
Tuition assistanceif combine training + work £ 1,000
Tuition bonus if complete training up to £ 1,000
In-work emergency funds £ 300/worker
Financial incentives
7
6 districts (Total N = 16,000 people):• 4 districts in England
– (E. Midlands, London, NE England, NW England)• 1 in Scotland• 1 in Wales
Spread across 58 local offices (where random assignment took place)
The pilot sites
8
Implementation, impact, benefit-cost analysesAdministrative records: up to 5 years of follow-up
• Employment and earnings (Labor Market Information Survey)• Benefit receipt• Bonus payments
3 waves of client surveys • 1-year for all • 2-year and 5-year for lone parents
Qualitative observations and interviews• ERA staff and participants
Cost data
Comprehensive evaluation
NDLP lone parents • Many who entered work wished to defer full-time work or
work+ training because of caring responsibilities, especially if had younger children
WTC lone parents• Many attracted to ERA because of offer of training support• Not all wanted full-time work
ND25+ • When they worked, tended to work full time• Many didn’t want deep ongoing engagement with ERA or JP+
What did participants want?
Target group #1
New Deal for Lone Parents (NDLP)
10
11
– Not working at baseline
– Receiving Income Support
– Volunteered for New Deal welfare-to-work program (and ERA)
New Deal for Lone Parents (NDLP)
12
NDLP: Lone parents not working at baseline
Random assignment
New Deal intake
ERA
Control
ERA New Deal
Welfare-to-work +advancement focus
Regular New Deal
Welfare-to-work
In-work support + incentives
JOB
JOB
Random assignment
PRE-employment
POST-employment
Implementation: Big challenge for JC+
New Deal phase: ERA vs. Control “treatment difference” minimal beyond offer of incentive/support
Post-employment: Struggles providing meaningful “in-work” services, but improvement over time
• Primacy of placement goals of JC+• Steep “learning curve” for advisers• Challenges maintaining contact with working participants
Still, a “fair test” post-employment model • More “in-work” help/advice for ERA group than controls• Most ERA participants aware of incentives offer
14
NDLP: Lone parents not working at baseline
Got “help/advice” from JC+ while employed (years 1 – 2)
ERA Control
61%
19%
Base = WORKERS in each group
Types of advancement issues
• Getting better job
• Increasing hours
• Getting a promotion
• Setting career goals
• Help finding ed/training
Among workers: Got help/advice on ANY advancement issue while working?
15
NDLP: Lone parents not working at baseline
Impacts on training/education (years 1-2)
Obtained any training
qualifications
55.7
23.0
ERA Control ERA Control
Participated in training or education
16
NDLP: Lone parents not working at baseline
Impacts on training/education (years 1-2)
Obtained any training
qualifications
60.6
24.6
55.7
23.0
+ 4.8 pp**(+9%)
+ 1.7 pp (ns)
ERA Control ERA Control
Participated in training or education
17
NDLP: Lone parents not working at baseline
Impacts on employment
Ever worked
in 5 years
Months workedin 5 years
Ever worked full timein years 1-2
79.0%
25.0 27.9
ERA Control ERA Control ERA Control
18
NDLP: Lone parents not working at baseline
Impacts on employment
Ever worked
in 5 years
Months workedin 5 years
Ever worked full timein years 1-2
79.0%
25.137.5
79.0%
25.0 27.9
+ 9.6 pp***(+ 34%)
ERA Control ERA Control ERA Control
NDLP: Lone parents not working at baseline
Impacts on earnings trends
2005-2006 2006-2007 2007-2008 2008-20093000
3500
4000
4500
5000
5500
6000
19
Earn
ings
(£)
Tax Year
Control group
NDLP: Lone parents not working at baseline
Impacts on earnings trends
2005-2006 2006-2007 2007-2008 2008-20093000
3500
4000
4500
5000
5500
6000 ERA programme ended for all by October 2007 (earlier for some)
20
Earn
ings
(£)
Tax Year
Control group
ERA group
21
NDLP: Lone parents not working at baseline
Impacts on earnings, by tax year4-year total
£3,862 £4,999
£17,280
£3,554 £5,033
£16,742
- £ 35 (ns)
+ £ 538 (ns)
ERA Control ERA Control ERA Control
+ £ 308 ** (+ 9%)
Early (2005-6) Last (2008-9)
22
NDLP: Lone parents not working at baseline
Impacts on 4-year total earnings, by education subgroup
Lowest (No qualifications)
Highest (A-level)
Middle (GCSE)
£12,923£16,183
£22,845
ERA Control ERA Control ERA Control
23
NDLP: Lone parents not working at baseline
Impacts on 4-year total earnings, by education subgroup
Lowest (No qualifications)
Highest (A-level)
Middle (GCSE)
£12,289£15,546
£26,383
£12,923£16,183
£22,845
ERA Control ERA Control ERA Control
- £ 634 (ns)- £ 637 (ns)
+ £ 3,537** (+ 16%)†††
24
Not because of increase in training!• Impact on training = 0.2 %• Impact on earnings = 15.5 %
Hypothesis: ERA tapped their “reserve capacity”• At entry: Not working, but interested in work – although
some reluctance to work full time
• With A-level qualifications, if they chose to work, they’d have better job opportunities
• ERA incentives and support may have gotten some to try full-time work
NDLP: Lone parents not working at baseline
Why did A-level subgroup do better?
25
Examined through cross-office analysis (multi-level model)• 58 offices in which random assignment occurred; 37 with
sufficient sample/data for comparison
• Did variation in implementation influence size of ERA’s office-level impacts on work and welfare – after holding constant x-office differences in parents’ characteristics?
Found larger impacts in offices where: • Greater participant awareness of incentives (better marketing)• More in-work help received (vs. controls)• Thus: Both services and incentives mattered – but incentives
may have mattered somewhat more
NDLP: Lone parents not working at baseline
Incentives vs. services
26
Ethnic minority findings: Bigger effects?• Exploratory subgroup analysis – small samples • NDLP (and WTC): Larger impacts on work and earnings
and reductions in benefits for ethnic minorities than for whites – not always statistically sign., but a pattern
• ERA countered lower-expectations for this group?
Few non-economic impacts on parents or children • Little evidence of positive – or negative – effects on
overall well-being
NDLP: Lone parents not working at baseline
Other findings
Target group #2
Working Tax Credit (WTC)Lone Parents
27
28
• Already working part-time (16-19 hours/week)
• Receiving Working Tax Credit
• More attached to labour market and more advantaged in general
• Volunteered for ERA, beginning with post-employment phase
Working Tax Credit (WTC) lone parents
29
WTC: Lone parents working part-time at baseline
Random assignment
ERA
Control
In-work support + incentives
JOB
Random assignment
POST-employment
Applyfor ERA
30
WTC: Lone parents working part-time at baseline
Got “help/advice” from JC+ while employed (years 1 – 2)
ERA Con-trol
75%
7%
Base = WORKERS in each group
Types of advancement issues
• Getting better job
• Increasing hours
• Getting a promotion
• Setting career goals
• Help finding ed/training
Among workers: Got help/advice on ANY advancement issue while working?
31
WTC: Lone parents working part-time at baseline
Impacts on training/education (years 1-2)
Participated in training
or education
72.2
32.6
59.6
28.0
+ 12.6 pp***(+21%)
+ 4.5 pp**(+16%)
ERA Control ERA Control
Obtained any training qualifications
32
WTC: Lone parents working part-time at baseline
Impacts on employment
Ever worked
in 5 years
Months workedin 5 years
Ever worked full-time in years 1-2
88.1%
38.5 41.5%
86.8%
38.330.0%
+ 1.3 pp (ns)
+ 0.2 months (ns)
+ 11.5 pp***(+ 38%)
ERA Control ERA Control ERA Control
WTC: Lone parents working part-time at baseline
Impacts on earnings trends
2005-2006 2006-2007 2007-2008 2008-20096,000
6,500
7,000
7,500
8,000
8,500
9,000
33
Earn
ings
(£)
Tax Year
Control group
WTC: Lone parents working part-time at baseline
Impacts on earnings trends
2005-2006 2006-2007 2007-2008 2008-20096,000
6,500
7,000
7,500
8,000
8,500
9,000
34
Earn
ings
(£)
Tax Year
ERA group
Control group
ERA programme ended for all by October 2007 (earlier for some)
35
WTC: Lone parents working part-time at baseline
Impacts on earnings, by tax year
Early (2005-6) Last (2008-9) 4-Year Total
£7,069 £8,636
£30,615
£6,667 £8,401
£29,695+ £ 402 ** (+ 6%) + £ 234 (ns)
+ £ 921 (ns)
ERA Control ERA Control ERA Control
QualificationsSubgroup
ERA group
Control group
Difference (Impact) % Change
Lowest (No qualifications) 55.3 42.3 13.0 ** 30.7%
Middle(GCSE) 72.9 55.6 17.4 *** 31.3%
Highest (A-Levels) 79.8 71.6 8.2 ** 11.5%
Full sample 72.2 59.6 12.6 *** 21.1%
36
WTC: Lone parents working part-time at baseline
Impacts on training, by subgroup(Took training or education course, years 1-2)
37
-20
0
20
40
60
80
100
**
***
Impact on “took any courses” (21.1% ***)
*** **
% C
hang
e Im
pact
Impact on “obtained qualifications” (16.2% **)
*****
WTC: Lone parents working part-time at baseline
Payoff to impact on training?
38
-20
0
20
40
60
80
100
**
***
Impact on “took any courses” (21.1% ***)
*** **
% C
hang
e Im
pact
Impact on “obtained qualifications” (16.2% **)
NO Impact on total 4-year earnings (3.1% ns)
*****
WTC: Lone parents working part-time at baselineNo association between
training impacts and earnings impacts
Were courses occupationally relevant?
Some for personal enrichment or hobbies • E.g. aromatherapy, flower arranging
Some “safety” or non-advancement on the job• (e.g., CPR)
Course content analysis:• Verbatim responses to the 12-month and 24-
month surveys were analyzed and coded
• Developed training typology39
40
Type of courseERA
groupControl
group ImpactTrade-Specific (%) 68.0 54.5 13.5 ***
Business and information technology 14.6 10.7 4.0 **
Computer user skills 23.9 19.2 4.7 **
Personal services/retail 13.3 10.9 2.5
Skilled trades/protective services 3.0 1.0 2.0 **
Social services, child care. Education 28.6 26.7 1.9
.WTC: Lone parents working part-time at baseline
Impacts by type of trade-specific course
41
Type of courseERA
groupControl
group Impact
Not trade-specific (%) 34.0 28.1 5.9 **
Basic skills 7.9 4.7 3.2
Soft skills 6.5 5.5 1.1
Workplace skills 21.2 18.0 3.2
.WTC: Lone parents working part time at baseline
Impacts by type of “general” course
42
Possible reasons:
• Unrealistic expectations about “dream job”? Not driven by demand for workers
• Advisers were employment ‘generalists’
• No assistance in making transition between specific training and specific job openings
WTC: Lone parents working part-time at baseline
So why no payoff to training impacts?
Converting training into advancement
43
Increase training
Relevant courses
Connection to
better jobs?
Target group #3
New Deal 25 Plus (ND25+)
44
45
• Claiming Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) for at least 18 months
• Participation in ND25+ is compulsory
• Participation in ERA experiment voluntary
New Deal 25 Plus (ND25+)
46
ND25+: Long-term unemployed at baseline
Random assignment
New Deal intake
ERA
Control
ERA New Deal
Welfare-to-work +advancement focus
Regular New Deal
Welfare-to-work
In-work support + incentives
JOB
JOB
Random assignment
PRE-employment
POST-employment
47
ND25+: Long-term unemployed at baseline
Got “help/advice” with advancement from JC+ while employed (years 1 – 2)
ERA Con-trol
47%
12%
Base = WORKERS in each group
Types of advancement issues
• Getting better job
• Increasing hours
• Getting a promotion
• Setting career goals
• Help finding ed/training(NDLP ERA = 61% )(WTC ERA = 75%)
Among workers: Got help/advice on ANY advancement issue while working?
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40 44 48 52 56 600
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
ND25+
NDLP22%
43%
Months after Random Assignment
% E
mpl
oyed
ND25+: Long-term unemployed at baseline
Control group employment rates
WTC61%
49
ND25+: Long-term unemployed at baseline
Impacts on employment
Ever workedIn 5 years
Months workedin 5 years
Series1
55.1%
13.2
ERA Control ERA Control
50
ND25+: Long-term unemployed at baseline
Impacts on employment
Ever workedIn 5 years
+ 1.1 months** (+ 8%)
+ 2.2 pp* (+ 4%)
Months workedin 5 years
Series1
57.3%
14.3
55.1%
13.2
ERA Control ERA Control
2005-2006 2006-2007 2007-2008 2008-20092,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
4,000
4,500
5,000
Tax Year
ND25+: Long-term unemployed at baseline
Impacts on earnings trendsEa
rnin
gs (£
)
Control group
2005-2006 2006-2007 2007-2008 2008-20092,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
4,000
4,500
5,000
Tax Year
Control group
ND25+: Long-term unemployed at baseline
Impacts on earnings trendsEa
rnin
gs (£
) ERA group
ERA programme ended for all by October 2007 (earlier for some)
53
ND25+: Long-term unemployed at baseline
Impacts on earnings, by tax year
Early (2005-6) Last (2008-9) 4-year total
£3,070 £3,954
£14,162
£2,758 £3,591
£12,681£ 312 **(+ 11%)
£363**(+10%)
ERA Control ERA Control ERA Control
£1,481pp ** (+ 12%)
54
Amount received
in 5 years
ND25+: Long-term unemployed at baseline
Impacts on Jobseeker’s Allowance
ERA Control ERA Control ERA Control
24.9 26.4
- 1.5*** months (-6%)-2.4** pp (-8%)
Received any in month 60
£7,493
£ 7,067
Months receivedin 5 years
28.3% 30.7%
- £ 426** (- 6%)
55
23% of eligible ND25+ were not included in study• 9% “not offered” opportunity to participate• 14% were offered, but refused
Do impact estimates represent likely effects on full eligible population?
• Explored with non-experimental techniques
Finding: Impact estimates may be conservative• Had experiment included full eligible population, impacts on
employment and earnings for ND25+ group may have been larger
ND25+: Long-term unemployed at baseline
Assessing generalisability
Cost-benefit findings
56
• Cost per participant for ERA and related services
• Net government investment in ERA per participant, above and beyond cost of normal control group services
• Accounting perspectives – Did the ERA participants come out ahead?– Did the Exchequer/taxpayers come out ahead?– Did “society” (the combination of participants and
Exchequer) come out ahead?
• Net present value– Sum of all economic “gains” and “losses” per perspective– Estimated in 2005-2006 pounds; 3.5% discount rate
57
Goals of the cost-benefit analysis
Base estimate: 10-year time horizon • 5 years observed• 5 years projected
- Applied annual impact decay rates – varied by target group and outcome measure
Alternative A: 5-year time horizon • 5 years observed• No projection
Alternative B: 20-year time horizon • 5 years observed• 15 years projected 58
Time horizons for assessing costs and benefits
• ERA budget cost and cost of external training
59
Gross costs
ND25+ NDLP WTCERA costs £1,860 £1,979 £2,640
• Pre-employment 26% 28% 0%• Post-employment 74% 72% 100%
Total 100 % 100 % 100 %
Incentives 35% 37%
44%
• Subtract costs of control services from gross costs• Compare these costs with “benefits”
60
Net costs
ND25+ NDLP WTCNet costs for ERA £1,261 £1,236 £2,625
• Pre-employment 0% 0% 0%• Post-employment 100% 100% 100%
61
Illustration: Distribution of gains and losses across perspectives
Participants Exchequer SocietyGross earnings + 0 +Income taxes - + 0Reduction in benefit payments
- + 0
Program costs 0 - -Etc.
Etc.
Net gain or loss (NPV) ? ? ?
62
Target Group Participants Exchequer
ND25+ + 726 + 1,816(ROI = 4.01 to 1)
NDLP - 37 -124
• NDLP A-level subgroup + 2,074 + 1,479
(ROI = 3.92 to 1)
WTC + 230 - 1,836
Cost-benefit results(Net Present Value per ERA participant, in £ )
Alternative assumptions applied:• Discount rates: 2%, 5%• Annual earnings impact decay rates: e.g.,
0%, 20%, 34% decay, depending on group• Time horizon: 5 years, 20 years
Findings:• Results not highly sensitive to alternative
assumptions• Basic story remains the same
63
Sensitivity tests
Considerable effort to assess omitted benefits and cost such as:
• Substitution effects• Leisure bias• Effect on health status• Effects on quality of life
Analysis suggests that, in general, these effects appear likely to be small in magnitude
64
Consideration given to“hard-to-monetarize” effects
ND25+ results are impressive • Unusual to see a “win-win” – i.e., net gain from
participant and government perspective
NDLP results:• Break-even for full group• “Win-win” for A-level subgroup, highlighting
potential for ERA to be a “good investment” for some lone parents
WTC results:• Sizable loss for the government for marginal
benefit for participants; not a good investment65
Lessons from cost-benefit
Final Reflections
66
67
On policy:• UK results (like US experience) show difficulty of
achieving advancement goals
• “Types of participants” matter a lot: UK ERA strategies can be good investment for some
• Overall: Much evidence to build on – new policies in this area won’t start from scratch
• Much value in learning what didn’t work
• Good that ERA wasn’t rolled out as national policy for all 3 target groups before the evidence was in!
Final reflections
68
On evaluation:• Can see the value of reliable control groups – and that
‘outcomes’ alone can give wrong answer
• Can see value of long-term follow-up: stopping too soon would have given wrong answer
• ERA and the transatlantic exchange helped build capacity on random assignment among civil service staff as well as research partners
• Dialogue around “evidence-building” now is very different than it was when ERA was conceived
Final reflections (continued)
Lessons from the US Employment Retention and Advancement Project
70
What is US ERA?• National study of programs aiming to
promote stable employment and wage progression– mostly current and former welfare
recipients/single parents
• Tested 12 distinct models in cities in 6 states– Little known about how to improve employment
retention and advancement outcomes
• Evaluation at final stage: most programs have 3-4 years of follow-up
71
Summary of US ERA impacts
• 3 models have shown positive economic impacts
• 9 models have shown no or only sporadic impacts
Features of the 3 promising modelsModel Pre-
employment services
Post-employment services
Post-employment financial incentives
Corpus Christi (Texas)
Chicago(Illinois)
RiversidePASS(California)
72
73
Corpus Christi (Texas) ERA programme—Most Like UK ERA for NDLP group—
• The model: Job search, financial incentives for retaining full-time jobs
• Targeted lone parents: TANF applicants/recipients (like Income Support)
• Providers: Non-profit organizations
• Control group: in relatively strong welfare-to-work program (mandatory)
Impacts on earnings Corpus Christi, Texas
74
RA 1
**2 *3 4 5 6 7
*
8 9
**10
***
11
***
12
* 1
3
**14
**15
**16
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
Quarter after random assignment
($)
ERA group
Impact on 4-Year total earnings = +2,560 (15%)***
Control group
Chicago and Riverside (California) ERA Programmes
• Neither used financial incentives
• Both put strong emphasis on re-employment assistance
• Both relied on contracted service providers– Chicago: for-profit provider with links to
employers in health and security sectors– Riverside: 3 non-profits, 1 community college, and
1 local welfare office 75
Impacts on earnings Chicago
RA 1 2 3 4 5 6
**
7
**
8
* 9 10 11
* 1
2
** 1
3 14
* 1
5 16
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
Quarter after random assignment
($)
Control group
Impact on 4-Year total earnings = + $1,909 (7%)*
ERA group
Impacts on earnings Riverside PASS
77
** R
A 1
***
2
***
3
***
4
**
5
**
6
* 7
**
8
* 9 10
* 11
* 12 13
* 1
4
** 1
5
***
16
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
Quarter after random assignment
($)
Impact on 4-Year total earnings = +3,470 (10%)***
ERA group
Control group
Evidence on other strategies: Not promising
• Lowering caseloads to increase individualized career guidance
• Holding out for job in preferred field versus first job
• Service continuity, job coaching from pre-to post placement w/o other services
• Reducing work hours requirements to encourage employed welfare recipients to participate in education and training
78
Not promising (continued)
• Partnerships between welfare and workforce agencies to leverage resources and experience
• Providing retention services at the worksite (mostly nursing homes)
• Locate and provide retention & advancement services to former benefits recipients
79
Common theme among ineffective programs
• Counseling and referrals alone do not appear to be effective
• Need post employment services PLUS concrete, “tangible” services:– Financial incentives OR– Reemployment services w/strong job
development/employer ties
80
WorkAdvance
A Next Generation Advancement Strategy
WorkAdvance Partners
A a collaboration between:• MDRC• NYC Center for Economic Opportunity (CEO)
(An anti-poverty innovation unit in office of Mayor Bloomberg)• Mayor’s Fund to Advance NYC
Being piloted in 4 cities in 3 states• NYC , Cleveland and Youngstown (Ohio), and Tulsa (Oklahoma)
Funded with federal and private philanthropic dollars as part of Obama’s ‘Social Innovation Fund’
82
WorkAdvance model: A hybrid vision
83
Sector-basedstrategies
Post-employmentStrategies
(ERA-inspired)
+
Common features of sector strategies
• Training programmes targeted to specific careers in specific industries
• Heavy screening re: participants’ ‘fit’ for sector
• Employer input on programme’s approaches
• ‘Pipeline’: Staff have close ties with employers, helping to link training and the job
• But limited post-employment services84
Evidence on sector approaches
Study by Public/Private Ventures (P/PV) shows
• Tested sector training programs in 3 cities
• Eg, manufacturing, medical billing, computer recycling
• Small random assignment study showed substantial positive impacts on employment and earnings 18% gain over 2 years; 29% in 2nd year (after training)
85
’Tuning in to Local Labor Markets: Lessons From the Sectoral Employment Study.’ PPV. Maguire et al. 2010http://www.ppv.org/ppv/publications/assets/325_publication.pdf
P/PV study: Impacts of sectoral employment programme
’Tuning in to Local Labor Markets: Lessons From the Sectoral Employment Study.’ PPV. Maguire et al. 2010http://www.ppv.org/ppv/publications/assets/325_publication.pdf
P/PV study (continued)
Open questions about sector approach
• Can P/PV results be replicated? (Small study)
• Can other sectors achieve same results?
• Will the results hold up in the long term?
• Do participants remain in the sectors they trained for? Remain on a career tracks?
• Cost-benefit?
• Would adding a substantial post-employment component strengthen the effects? 88
WorkAdvance Demonstration
Sector-based training & job placement
• Narrow range of sectors and occupations
• Staff have deep expertise and employer connections
Strategic post-employment follow-up
New random assignment test• Implementation, impact, and cost-benefit
evaluation89
5 industry sectors
• Information Technology
• Manufacturing
• Transportation
• Environmental Remediation
• Health
90
Study eligibility criteria
• 18 years or older• Working < $15/hr in current or previous job• Family income <200 % of federal poverty level• Committed to a career in targeted sector• Meet sector-specific requirements (literacy tests, drug/criminal screening, manual dexterity etc.)Limitation: Many in US ERA would not qualify
91
Pre-employment services and training
Pre-employment services: • Sector-focused job readiness training; work with
advancement coach to start individual career plan; assess other needs
Occupation-specific skills training• Focused on particular industry career tracks, skill
needs, and training curricula identified by employers
92
Job development
Job development specialists:
• Identify job openings—who’s hiring within the sector
• Understand employers’ skill needs in targeted industry
• Have relationships with specific employers
93
Post-placement assistance: Building on ERA
Like ERA – but with a sector “twist”:• Help participants identify career advancement
opportunities
• Advise on further relevant training, as appropriate
• Assist with job changes for better opportunities or fit
• Rapid re-employment for those losing jobs
• Employer feedback on participants’ performance
Some participants (in some sites) may only get:• Sector placement + post-employment services 94
Next steps
• Random assignment getting underway
• Refinements to the model still underway, especially post-employment component
• Lessons from UK ERA are informing those approaches and evaluation strategy
• Federal government (HHS) is launching other RCT tests of health sector training programmes – opportunity for future comparisons
95